Journal of Politics and International Affairs - Fall 2016

The Journal of Politics & International Affairs
The Journal of Politics

and International Affairs
Volume X, Issue II
Autumn 2016
The Ohio State University
Gabriel Giddens Wesley Swanson

Editors in Chief
Kasey Powers Andrea Stanic

Secretary& Treasurer Communications Director
Ryan Moore Rachel Williams

Outreach Director Layout Editor
JPIA Editorial Staff

Cormac Bloomfield Jordan Gunning
David Nield Gabs Minotti
Anna Smoot Alex Lebowitz
Mike Kinkoph Caroline Kinnen
Katlyn Perani Alan Grinberg
Thomas Graham Christopher Davis
Curtis Dickess Sam Lappert
Alex Lappert Rohin Dasari
Dr. Paul Beck
Advisor
1
A special thanks to our faculty advisors, Dr. Paul A. Beck and Ms. Christina Murphy, and The
Ohio State Department of Political Science Chair, Dr. Richard Herrmann, for guiding us and
making this journal possible.
2
The Journal of Politics
JPIA
and International Affiars
Volume X | Issue II | Autumn 2016 | Print Edition
Contents
The American Precariat: Black Precariousness in the United 8
States
Corey R. Payne, Johns Hopkins University
Popular Perceptions of Chinese Engagment in Nigeria 28

Timothy Yin, Georgetown University
Taiwanese Democratization: A Lasting Regime or a Pending 52

Reversal?
Taylor C. Veracka, Johns Hopkins University
Religiosity and Citizen Attitudes on Crime in Latin America 66

Alexa Garrett, University of South Alabama
3
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COPYRIGHT 2016 THE OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. ALL RIGHTS
RESERVED
4
Editorial Foreword
Gabriel Giddens Wesley Swanson
Editors in Chief
Hello,
We are pleased to present the Autumn 2016 edition of the Journal of Politics & International Affairs. This issue
features four papers chosen out of dozens of competitive submissions from undergraduates across the nation, as
well as from universities abroad. These papers, which serve as an entre for their authors into the social science
research community, not only contribute to the literature of international relations, public policy, and American
politics; they address topics that are of considerable importance in the world today.
Our Journal, which was revived in 2011, has continued to improve in quality each successive year thanks to the
efforts of our editing staff and officers. We are exceptionally proud of everyone serving with the Journal, and
grateful for the contributions and cooperation from the students that seek to gain recognition for their hard work
by submitting their papers to us.
The Journal of Politics & International Affairs would not be possible without the support of the Ohio State
Universitys Department of Political Science. We would especially like to thank Dr. Richard Herrmann for his
vision and belief in the Journal, Dr. Paul Beck for his guidance and advice, and Ms. Christina Murphy, whose
support has been invaluable.
We would also like to thank you for taking the time to read the Journal. We hope that the articles inside will
introduce you to a new perspective on some critical issue, or influence the way you look at global affairs, or
at the very least pique your interest. Our goal is to provide an appreciation for the quality of social science
research that can, and is, being done at the undergraduate level nationwide. It is through you that the research
contained within these pages finds meaning and stays relevant.
Wesley Swanson and Gabriel Giddens
Editors in Chief
5
6
The American Precariat: Black Labor Precariousness
The American Precariat: Black Labor Precariousness in

the United States
Corey R. Payne
This piece seeks to critically engage developments in labor theory regarding the presence of a pre-
carious underclassa precariatthat does not conform to the Standard Employment Relation-
ship of Western industrial capitalism. This paper argues that, despite a groundswell of research
on the precariat since the wave of marketization associated with neoliberalism in the 1980s, the
precariat as a class position has existed much longer in the United States, largely consisting of
black workers since the end of slavery. Using descriptive statistical and historical data, the paper
sketches out the reproduction of this class position and introduces prescriptive changes to begin
to combat the duplicity of exploitative and repressive structures that black precarious labor faces
in the United States.
T he rise of neoliberalism since the 1980s has brought a groundswell of academic discourse
on the precariat or precarious proletariat as a growing stratum in the Western class
hierarchy. These are workers that do not have a standard, long-term, stable employment rela-
tionship with capitalists. Many Western scholars argue that the precariat is growing because of
the surge of neoliberal polices, primarily the informalization of the worker-capitalist relationship,
after its inception in the 1960s.1 However, these arguments have received ample criticism for
their Western-centric focus and their ignorance of the state of employment relationships in the
Global South.2 But both this surge of literature and its discontents fail to recognize the perma-
nence of the precariat, not just in the Global South, but in the form of black labor in the United
States. Since the incorporation of the black population into the wage labor pool (i.e. since the end
of slavery), black laborers have always existed in a state of precariousness.
Current discourse among labor scholars is focused on the idea that the emergence of an
American precariat is an invention of the modern era. This research shows that black labor has
existed in this state for much longer. In an epoch of intensely neoliberal capitalism, understand-
ing the informalization and flexibilization (wherein workers are hired seasonally or through
subcontracting, for example), of any labor is crucial to understanding the plight of the worker.
Understanding black labor as existing in this structural position for over a century is similarly
crucial to understanding the economic plight of the black worker throughout history. Therefore,
1 Standing, 2014.
2 See: Munck, 2013; Breman and Linden, 2014.
7
the purpose of this paper is to analyze the history of black labors precarious state; to complicate
the white-washed notion that precariousness has only existed in America in the last few decades;
and to explain precariousness in a more complete manner.
Using an historical analysis and a descriptive statistical analysis of data on the develop-
ment of black labor in the United States, this paper argues that informal, flexible, and precarious
labor are not creations of neoliberal capitalism, but rather have existed in racially ostracized and
oppressed groups of laborersblack Americanssince the end of slavery. Black labor is dis-
proportionately represented amongst the precariat class in the modern eraa reproduction of the
historical permanence of their precariousness and the unequal disadvantages for blacks in Amer-
ican societal structure. Current discourse of the precariat ignores the historically constant state
of precariousness of black labor and presents the emergence of American informalization and
flexibilization of labor as new because it now extends into white labor in greater troves.
The full realization of the capitalist ideal occurred following World War II, when the
West reached almost full employment. Until the end of the 1960s, this ideal form culminated in
the Standard Employment Relationshipan idealized version of the bourgeois-proletariat re-
lationship that included the following components: continuity of employment, full-time work,
sustainable wage, legal rights, and social insurance provisions.3 Historians of capital such as Paul
Bairoch argue that this standard (or baseline) relationship exists until labor productivity grows
too high, replacing labor with automation, then informalization and robotization (resulting in
what he has called overunemployment).4 He then argues that this process is what causes the
precarization of workers.
This argument, while well-supported, does not address the labor force for which a Stan-
dard Employment Relationship has never existed. As others have shown, this formalized class
relationship is an advent of the Westit has never taken hold in the Global South.5 But just as
importantly, this Standard Employment Relationship only existed for a certain subset of labor
in the West (particularly the United States) in the form of white laborers. Black workers, on the
other hand, remained trapped in what we now call a precarious state.
For our purposes, the most complete definition of the precariat is set forth by Jan Breman
3 Breman and van der Linden, 2014.

4 Bairoch, 1988.
5 Munck, 2013.
8
and Marcel van der Linden. They assert that the process of precarization is characterized by the
shift from the Standard Employment Relationship to informality, which is manifested in different
ways.6 But these concepts must be amended, as we argue here that black labor has always existed
as a precariat. There was never a precarization process because there was never a Standard Em-
ployment Relationship. Therefore, we conceptualize the black precariat as a permanent feature of
the American class structure with the following characteristics:
High levels of underemployment. Underemployment is here defined as the unemployed pop-
ulation plus the population of workers that are not at full employment. These are workers
who are trapped in part-time work while desiring full-time work or those who are of work-
ing age but have given up on finding adequate employment.
Low wages that do not rise with costs of living and are unable to support a nuclear family.
Informal employment relationships. Workers are hired as subcontractors, flexible, or tempo-

rary laborers. This classification holds the most precarious of the precariat, as this represents
the most unstable form of employment.
Low benefits.
Lack of effective workplace regulation and protections. The surge of laissez-faire neoliber-
alism brought an uptick of deregulation and relaxed labor protections. However, this lack of
effective regulation and protection has existed even before this new wave.
The idea of the precariat stems from Marxist theory, particularly his discussion of the relative
surplus population. In his chapter in Capital: Volume I on The General Law of Capitalist Accu-
mulation, he writes: Every worker belongs to [the relative surplus population] during the time
when he is only partially employed or wholly unemployedWe can identify three forms which it
always possesses: the floating, the latent, and the stagnant.7 Floating surplus population refers to
those previously employed in growing sectors that then became unemployed; this group is con-
stantly looking for work and following the path of capital. Stagnant refers to those that work in
worst conditions (i.e. low wages and long hours) and/or work very irregularly (Marx also refers
to them as a part of active army of labor with extremely irregular employment). Latent describes
6 Breman and van der Linden, 2014. Pg. 925

7 Marx, 1868. Pg. 794.
9
those in agricultural production who are on the point of joining the ranks of urban proletariat. It
has been conceptualized that this group refers to the population outside the capitalist production
but that is a reserve for industrial production. Finally, Marx discusses pauperdom, which is the
lowest segment of the relative surplus population, and lumpenproletariat, the underclass beyond
the relative surplus population. The existence of relative surplus population is instrumental for
capitalists to keep wages low since it gives the ability to replace laborers easily. But most impor-
tantly, we must understand that this reserve army of labor is a constant character of capitalism,
not just a feature of times of crisis. We can conceptualize the precariat as those in this relative
surplus population and those beyond it.
In the following sections, this paper outlines the evidence for the above claims that black
labor is historically situated with these characteristics. We use contemporary empirical evidence
to present black labor in this state, uses historical evidence to present this state as existing in the
longue-dure, and uses race and labor theory to reconcile the evidence with the claim and pro-
vide prescriptive steps forward.
Understanding Black Labor Data

Wages for black workers in the United States are significantly lower than those of their white
counterparts. Figure 1 below shows the median family income of blacks and whites from 1947
through 2010 in constant 2011 US dollars. While the trends in wage levels tend to follow one an-
other, the gap between the median incomesalready over $10,000 in 1947expands over time,
reaching approximately $25,000 in 2010.
10
But making less money, on its own, does not constitute precariousness. While blacks are certain-
ly earning lower incomes than whites, if this income was sufficient, precariousness would not be
present. This is not the case. Lower median wages constitute more blacks living in poverty than
whites. In Figure 2 below, the US Census Bureaus data shows the percentage of all working age
people living below the poverty line broken down by race from 1973 to 2014.
8 The State of Working America 12th edition, Table 2.5

9 US Census Bureau, Historical Poverty Tables
11
At its peak in 1980, almost thirty percent of black laborers lived below the poverty line (com-
pared to less than ten percent of whites). Even in the most recent year, almost a quarter of all
black workers live in poverty (compared to just a tenth of whites). People who are working or
are able to work yet still are living in poverty are the clearest examples of the precariat. Broadly
speaking, all workers captured in this measure are members of the precariat (13.5% of the work-
ing-age population in 2014). Because the plurality of this national precariat is black, this chart
alone presents a compelling picture to show thatat the very least, in the past forty yearsblack
labor is far more likely to be in a precarious state than white workers are. It is important to note
that this data shows this state of increased precariousness existing before the neoliberal period
(approximately 1980 to present). The white working-age precariat steadily increased after the
implementation of neoliberal policies (5.9% in 1973 to 10% in 2014), while black precariousness
existed at relatively stable levels (22.6% in 1973 to 22.6% in 2014). This serves as evidence that
(1) precariousness existed in the black labor force before neoliberalism and (2) the increase of
the white precariat, caused by neoliberalism, was cause for concern among white labor scholars
in the decades since, despite their academic omission of the historically precarious black labor
force.
Further evidence of precariousness exists in the presence (or lack) of benefits for workers,
particularly black workers, in the past four decades. Simply put, white workers are more likely to
receive health and other benefits than their black counterparts. This is shown below in Figure 3
and Figure 4.
12
10
11
The inadequate benefits of workersboth black and whiteno doubt contributes to the surge of
literature on the rise of the precariat. All racial groups received, in the latest available data year,
the lowest amount of health insurance coverage in their respective recorded histories. This is
no doubt a result of neoliberal deregulation. But while the data do not extend far enough before
the rise of neoliberalism to make an accurate assessment, one can extrapolate from context that
13
the trends present in the graphed data were extended into the pastand that black laborers have
received fewer benefits than whites historically.
Studied alone, each of these indicators provides a compelling case for understanding the
economic oppression of black Americans. But together they provide a complete picture of the
state of black labor in recent decadesa picture that shows an intense precariousness, a day-to-
day livelihood, and an economic mode not designed for their inclusion. As we will show in the
following sections, these contemporary realities stem from the historical race- and class-based
oppression in American society. Precariousness, as a state of class existence, for these black
workers is deepened by their simultaneous racial oppression.
Historical Analysis
Others have touched upon the idea of black precariousness, particularly Loc Wacquant in Ur-
ban Outcasts: A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality. Wacquant, in fact, uses the
concept of the precariat in his discussion of labor marginality. But even Wacquants stunning
analysis posits this as a problem created in the 1960s. While he does not take the stance of
many scholars and argue that it is caused by the emergence of an underclass, he argues that the
increased marginality is caused by a withdrawal of the market and the state from the realms of
public regulation of race and urban development.12 While this certainly plays a role in the inten-
sification of marginality in this period, we must take the idea a step further: this marginality or
precarity was not formed by the withdrawal of the state from urban centersrather it was created
in the rise of Jim Crow neo-slavery and socially reproduced through today.
The current status of this reproduction is represented in the previous section, which
discusses the empirical realities of the modern precariat. But as we argue that the inception of
this system was the mid-nineteenth century, we must make a more complete historical analysis.
This section seeks to explore the foundations of black economic oppression and precariousness
through an analysis of its origins and development.
Racism is a major economic foundation of the United States and this is clearly manifested
in our study of the American precariat. From its inception, the United States was designed for the
exploitation of black labor. The heart of the US Constitution rests in the protection of property of
12 Wacquant, 2008.
14
the bourgeoisieproperty which included enslaved black men, women, and children. The Con-
stitutional convention was not just a political gathering to create a major new bourgeois-demo-
cratic government; it was also a meeting to protect the racial and economic interests of men with
wealth. Sociologist Joe Feagin outlines the material inception of systemic racism in his book
Racist America.13
In the initial decades of the United States, a period of unjust enrichment and deprivation
occurred. White Americans received their wealth and luxury through the exploitation of black
slaves. This went beyond the general Marxist concept of surplus labor by the institution of slav-
ery that robbed the black men, women, and children completely of wages. Even after slavery, the
reproduction of this wealth (alongside the reproduction of the poverty of blacks) allowed white
Americans to continue to unjustly build up wealth off of the labor of blacks through the present.
It is through this process that black labor was subjugated vis--vis white labor to the levels seen
in the previous section.
Slavery and the subsequent subjugation of blacks provided a substantial part of the stim-
ulus needed for the economic development of and generation of capital in the United States for
centuries. Following slavery, access to significant wealth-building resources was not available
to legally free black Americans. Whites at the end of slavery were able to accumulate wealth
unfairly and disproportionately because there was little competition from black Americans.
This undeserved unequal footing is recreated over the generations, reproducing the
economic and racial exploitation present at the inception of the United States. As Feagin writes:
Reproduced over time are racially structured institutions, such as economic institutions that
embed the exploitation and extend oppression into other arenas of societal life.14 Each new gen-
eration of Americans inherits the organizational structures of the previous generationones that
protect and perpetuate the racial oppression of people of color by whites. Because of this repro-
duction, members of groups continue to suffer serious bars to securing the resources necessary
for achievement and mobilitywhich shapes these opportunities for generations to come.
Feagins analysis of the racist foundations of the United States fit clearly into the frame-
work of the black precariat. The institution of slavery put black labor at a disadvantage from the
inception of American capitalism. When black labor was freed from the bonds of slavery, the
13 Feagin, 2014
14 Feagin, 2014. Pg. 19
15
disadvantages were continually reproduced in society through the exploitation of black workers
by whites. Black labor would, it seems, always exist in a position beneath white labor because of
the mechanisms in place in our capitalist system. What was less certain from these reproductive
mechanisms was the existence of a precariat.
Following the end of slavery, the Freedmans Bureau was set up to assist blacks as they
assimilated into their supposed liberation. They were given the promise of reparations, but these
promises went unfulfilled. Instead, blacks were met with a system of Jim Crow neo-slaverya
further racist subjugation of their social, political, and economic rights. This new Jim Crow
changed shape over the decades since its inception, but the effect has still been the same: a sys-
tem of laws and social norms have existed that restrict the ability of black workers to get ahead.
Black labor has been forced to endure the exploitation of a capitalist mode of production and the
subjugation of a white supremacist sociopolitical system. Through these methods, black laborers
have been condemned to a state of precariousness that has been reproduced over the generations.
We strive here to show this social reproduction historically. To accomplish this, we will
briefly explore four periods in history: post-slavery Jim Crow, the interwar period, the Civil
Rights and Black Power era, and the War on Drugs period through the present. It is not the goal
of this paper to provide a comprehensive overview of the economic oppression of black Ameri-
cansrather, we seek to explore these historically significant periods simply, in order to provide
enough evidence to show the presence of black labor precariousness throughout history. We do
not purport to be complete, nor do we assert that these are the only periods where black precari-
ousness was evident.
We will begin with post-slavery and move forward chronologically. Economic oppression
of black labor during the Jim Crow era was far more formalized than in any other period here
discussed. But it is also unique in that the goals of the Southern whites were to keep black labor
in a state of neo-slaverya feat that was largely accomplished. This simultaneously created a
neo-precariat, where employment, though less than adequate and highly exploitative, was, in a
way, guaranteed. Legal scholar Jennifer Roback explains:
The Southern legal system aided the enforcement of a labor-market cartel through four
basic types of legislation. These were (1) enticement laws and contract-enforcement
laws, which were designed to limit competition in the labor market to the beginning of
each contract year; (2) vagrancy laws, which were designed to prevent blacks from being
unemployed or otherwise out of the labor force; (3) emigrant-agent laws, which were de-
16
signed to restrict the activities of labor recruiters; and (4) the convict-lease system, which
provided punishment for blacks who violated the above or other laws.15
She goes on to explain that these policies, implemented shortly after the reconstruction era,
continued until as late as the 1920s. Each of these four types contributes to the establishment of
a black precariat, and we shall go through them all. First, the enticement and contract-enforce-
ment laws made it illegal for white employers to entice black labor away from one job and into
another. The contract enforcement laws allowed contracts (and competition) to exist only at one
time during the year. Lack of competition violates a basic tenet of liberalismthe exploitation
of black labor was not even presented under the guise of freedom. Further, the vagrancy laws
restricted mobility between jobs by criminalizing unemploymentwhile not placing restrictions
on white employers to maintain an employment relationship with the black labor. Similarly, the
emigrant-agent laws attempted to restrict the movement of black labor across state lines. It is
explained that these laws were enacted in order to restrict competition and force low wages upon
black labor in order to perpetuate neo-slavery exploitation.
But perhaps most precarious of these policies was the convict-lease system, which was
a statutory practice of leasing out state or county convicts to private firms.16 The victims of this
system were mostly black laborers who had violated the vagrancy or contract-enforcement pol-
icies. This system of lease labor is of the most exploitative variety. Convicts are forced to work
without pay, benefits, or freedom. If they survived the lease system, which was unlikely as the
firms had no incentive to keep them alive longer than their prison terms, they faced an uncom-
petitive job market which led to a cycle of vagrancy. It is this cycle, along with the inadequate
wages, benefits, and conditions that constitutes the bulk of this eras historical precarity.
While the repressive Jim Crow continues for many decades, we will refer to the decades
of the 1920s, 30s, and 40s as the interwar period to distinguish its unique characteristics of eco-
nomic and racial oppression. In fact, this era saw the formation of primarily black labor unions
and organizations of resistance which followed an increase of solidarity and organizational
power of black workersoften inspired and led by women of color.17 In fact, black women often
faced the harshest wage-labor positions in this era due to their reliance on informal domestic
work in the homes of white families.
15 Roback, 1984. Pg. 1163-1164
16 Ibid. Pg. 1170
17 Griffin and Korstad, 1995.
17
We also see in this period a greater separation into two spheres of black labor: middle
class blacks and lower class blacks. In fact, from 1920 to 1990, the decade of the 1940s and the
years following the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were the only two periods of relative black eco-
nomic improvement, according to Heckman and Donahue.18 This separation is important because
the lack of trans-class solidarity made it nearly impossible for lower class black labor to exit the
precariat state. Middle class black labor would often refuse to identify with lower class blacks,
which contributed to their exploitation and perpetuation as a precariat. As Kelley writes:
[W]e need to acknowledge intraracial class tensions. Mutual disdain, disappointment,
and even fear occasionally found their way into the public transcript. Some middle-class
blacks, for example, regarded the black poor as lazy, self-destructive, and prone to crim-
inal behavior. Geraldine Moore, a black middle-class resident of Birmingham, Alabama,
wrote that many poor blacks in her city knew nothing but waiting for a handout of some
kind, drinking, cursing, fighting and prostitution. On the other hand the sociologist
Allison Davis found that lower class blacks often accused upper-class persons of
snobbishness, color preference, extreme selfishness, disloyalty in caste leadership, (sel-
lin out to the white folks), and economic exploitation of their patients and customers.19
What is important about this tension has been discussed implicitly throughout: the black precar-
iat is doubly oppressed both by a white supremacist system and a capitalist exploitative system.
There is no clearer evidence of this than the direct exploitation of black lower classes by black
middle and upper classes.
W.E.B. DuBois recognized this exploitationeven in his weariness of socialism
through his discussion of a top tier of black excellence that would spearhead black uplifting. He
wrote in 1948:
training a talented [top tier of blacks] might put in control and power, a group of
self-indulgent, well-to-do men, whose basic interest in solving the Negro problem was
personal; personal freedom and unhampered enjoyment and use of the world, without
any real care, or certainly no arousing care, as to what became of the mass of American
Negroes, or the mass of any people.20
DuBois, writing prophetically about the eras to come, understood the complexities of the struc-
tures of oppressioneven when the white supremacist political structure oppressed black bodies,
the capitalist economic base exploited all workers.
In the Civil Rights and Black Power period, which we are loosely defining as the 1960s
and 1970s, black economic existence went through a shiftwhile still holding onto some of
18 Donahue and Heckman, 1991. Pg. 3
19 Kelley, 1993. Pg. 80
20 DuBois, 1948.
18
the characteristics of the past. As mentioned above, from 1920 to 1990, the years following the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 were one of only two periods of relative black economic improvement,
according to Heckman and Donahue.21 This signaled a difference in improvement from that of
the post-war period in the 1940s, as those gains were made through bottom-up organizing while
these were made from top-down legislation and judicial rulingsincluding the Civil Rights Act,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, the Fair Employment Practices law, Executive Order
11246, and the integration rulings by the Supreme Court.22
What should be clear about these improvements is that they existed for formal black
workers that were experiencing the Standard Employment Relationship. But in this period, the
precariat still thrived in ways similar to those of the past. Scholar bell hooks uses the popular
novel by Kathryn Stockett, The Help, as a method of analyzing one form of persistent precarity
in this timeblack female domestic labor. Despite the novels portrayal of these black women
as happy and loving in their relationships, hooks points out that the relationships between these
women and the families they served were often highly exploitative and abusive.23 These informal
employment relationships constituted precariousness not only because they were exempt from
legislation and social progress, but also because the families of the domestic workers existed in
severe poverty. Oftentimes the domestic workers were forced to work for exploitative white fam-
ilies because of the high levels of un- and under-employment of black men (their husbands).
After the gains made in the Civil Rights and Black Power eras for black citizens and
workers, the 1990s saw an almost complete reversal of the trend toward gradual liberation. The
War on Drugs was initiated to end what appeared to be an endemic of violent crime connected
to the drug trade that spanned throughout the country. But instead of serving as a crackdown on
violent crime, the initiatives spearheaded by the Clinton Administration and others served only to
massively incarcerate nonviolent (and often first-time) drug offenders, the majority of whom are
black.
The War on Drugs did little to actually curb the drug trade and the violence that went
along with it. But it did usher in a new era in crime and punishmentan era characterized by
racism, school-to-prison pipelines, and a militarized police force. Racist sentencing laws were
21 Donahue and Heckman, 1991. Pg. 3

22 Chay, 1998.
23 Hooks, 2013. Pg. 58-69
19
instituted that required harsher prison terms for crack cocaine users (primarily black) than those
for powder cocaine users (primarily white). The over-policing of low-income and black neigh-
borhoods led to a disproportionate rate of incarcerationblacks were being locked up more than
their white counterparts, despite committing crime at similar levels.
McGrath and Carlson wrote in 2013 that the United States incarcerates 2.4 million peo-
ple, more than any nation on earth. Almost 12 million people pass through local jails every year.
These statistics alone are more than disturbing, but when one considers the impact of over-polic-
ing, prosecuting, and incarceration of people of color, the criminal justice system can be under-
stood as anything but just.24 Even without harsh sentencing, a single arrest or conviction can be
detrimental to the lives of these citizens.
This creates the opposite problem than what we saw in the Jim Crow Neo-Slavery peri-
odprivate firms are allowed to use public infrastructure to search the criminal histories of po-
tential employees. They are then legally allowed to refuse to hire them on the basis that they are
ex-convicts. Some large corporations automatically remove ex-convicts from the job pool, and
in some states, ex-convicts are not allowed to hold certain jobs. This creates a cycle of precarity:
poor people often turn to crime to survive and provide a basic level of material well-being, they
get caught and harshly sentenced under statutes that unfairly target poor people of color. When
they get out they are unable to find work because of their criminal records, and then they again
often turn to crime to survive. Malcolm Young estimates that almost none of the 650,000 inmates
released in a given year will find stable employment due to the state of the job market and legal
discrimination.25 This existence defines precariousness.
From this historical analysis, we gain insight into several key features of the black precar-
iat. First, and foremost, we see that black precarity has existed for as long as black labor has in
the United States. Second, we see that this state of precariousness has existed in different forms
throughout history, yet shares the similar characteristics of inadequate material conditions, lack
of agency in the selection of work, and the over-exploitation of black labor in comparison to
whites. And finally, we see that the work of labor scholars is not wrong: the severity of precari-
ousness has certainly increased in the neoliberal erabut it did not find its inception here.
24 McGrath and Carlson, 2014. Pg. 2

25 Young, 2014. Pg. 2
20
Conclusions
The purpose here was not to create a new understanding of black labor exploitation, but rather
to rearrange our understanding. If one has at all studied the institutions of the capitalist system,
one cannot be surprised at the presence of a multiplicity of oppressive structures that black labor
faces. Black labor has existed in a precarious state since its inception; the American precariat has
existed in the longue dure.
In American society, it is held as normal that black workers are more likely to be in
poverty than their white counterparts. It is expected that black workers experience higher unem-
ployment and underemployment. But like Feagin and others, we strive to present these condi-
tions not as a function of individual rational choice, of laziness or nihilism, or of the breakdown
of familial bonds. Rather, we attempt to understand these conditions as systemically constructed
and reproduced. The American precariat was formed in slaverys shadow and it has continued to
today.
We shall begin our prescriptive closing the way we began our opening: building off of
and complicating global labor scholarship. We tend to agree with the assertions of Breman and
Van Der Linden, who wrote, in regards to the precariat as a whole:
In framing an outline for further analysis and action our point of departure is that efforts
to contain capitalism within national or even regional boundaries are going to remain
futile. Neither would it be realistic to expect that the current mode of runaway capitalism
will be tamed by a sudden resurgence of effective public governance at the supra-national
level given the absence of an equivalent of the state globally. We see no other option than
a strategy aiming at the formalization of labor rights which also has to be formulated and
acted upon at the global level.26
While not explicitly a part of the body of this paper, we cannot ignore the global nature of mod-
ern capitalismthe system in which the precariat exists. Specific reforms and remedies may be
worthwhile within the boundaries of the United States, but the limitless bounds of capital today
force us to reexamine the validity ofand perhaps caution againstone-state solutions. If the
labor conditions become too unfavorable in the United States, for example, there is little to stop
capitalists from outsourcing their production to where the regulations are more favorable to ex-
treme exploitation and precarity. This complex global reality cannot be ignored in our discussion
26 Breman and Van Der Linden, 2014. Pg. 934, Emphasis added.
21
of the black American precariat.
In this same vein, Breman and Van der Linden discuss the actions already in progress,
particularly those taken by global unions and advocacy groups, such as the International Labour
Organization. Their demands lean on the conservative sidethey simply work towards a base-
line global minimum wage. They wrote: [This] approach, born out of the World Employment
Programme launched by the ILO in 1976, was a policy recipe for addressing absolute poverty
redistribution remained limited to sharing in growth, not touching on existing wealth.27 While
this plan would undoubtedly need to be part of the solution, and while we certainly cannot ignore
the global aspects of this structural positioning, we also cannot solely focus on the global. The
realities of the black American precariat are often unique. Our approach must take both the spe-
cific and the general remedies seriously.
In the United States, the black precariat, as we have shown, is not simply an over-exploit-
ed class. Precarious black workers must also deal with a white supremacist social and political
systemwhile the economic remedies may be global, the political ones must be national. But
despite this, our prescriptions again mirror Breman and Van der Lindenwith added layers of
specificity.
Herbert Aptheker wrote that the [American] Constitution was a bourgeois-democratic

document for the governing of a slaveholder-capitalist republic.28 The political reality in the
United States is that black Americansand even more so the black proletariatare second-class
citizens in society. While black men, women, and children are no longer held as slaves to a white
elite, they are still oppressed by a system that cannot survive without their subjugation. The
foundations of American societyslave-based capitalismhold a fundamental requisite that
blacks cannot be on an equitable playing-field as whites. Despite this, there are often calls to add
amendments to the Constitution, change laws and policies, and institute new educational curric-
ulum to combat the reproduction of racism within the system. But these calls miss that changing
the racist institutions within the system will never create racial liberation because the system
itself is racist. As history has shown, every step in the right direction has been accompanied by
a new form of racial oppression. The effects of the unjust benefits and losses incurred during the
27 Breman and Van Der Linden, 2014. Pg. 935
28 Quoted in Feagin, 2014. Pg. 3
22
first century of the American nation are still felt today. It is clear that, short of economic revolu-
tion, a rewrite of the state-superstructure which reinforces, perpetuates, and amplifies the inher-
ent racial oppression found within this foundation is needed. A new democratic government, with
a constitution written by representatives of all the people, must be established.
Much like a recreation of the economic mode of production would solve the problem of
precarity, so would a recreation of the state superstructure. But again we must concede that this
prescription is as far from feasible in the American political world today as an advancement in
the mode of production is. But there are certainly more gradual steps that can be taken to work
towards this goal.
The first of these steps is laid out by William A. Darity, Jr. He calls for full employment,
to the tune of an enhanced New Deal for all Americansincluding the groups, such as the
black underclass, that were left out of Franklin D. Roosevelts revitalization. Darity writes:
The United States needs to form a National Investment Employment Corps to provide
work for all who want to work. States and municipalities would develop inventories of
needed work to produce a job bank. Jobs could address both the physical and human
infrastructure needs of the nation, including the building, repair and maintenance of
roads, bridges, dams, mass transit systems, and school facilitiesAll employees could
be assured of a minimum annual salary of $20,000 plus benefits including federal health
insurance. A job ladder could be introduced that would provide opportunities for ad-
vancementit would cost $750 billion to put 15 million persons to work. It is less than
the total amount of the first stimulus package Congress enacted during the early years of
the [post-2008] downturn. It is vastly less than the $10-$30 trillion doled out to the banks
by the Federal Reserve.29
Darity concisely points out that a program to guarantee full employment is not only economi-
cally feasible, but is in fact less expensive than the welfare system that the U.S. government has
established for financial institutions. Similarly, the implementation of full employment would
lead to a significant decrease (if not an elimination of) the individual welfare stateand the costs
associated with it.
But even if full employment is reached, we must avoid what Steven Pitts calls bad jobs.
Pitts, in his large span of work on black labor, comes close to arguing that a black precariat is a
consistent part of American social structurehe cautions against understanding black economic
29 Darity, 2013. Pg. 118
23
existence as binary, where there are those who have made it and an underclass. Instead, he argues
that we must pay particular attention to those who are not in the underclass but still are expe-
riencing bad jobs, or what we have defined here as precariousness. Pitts argues that the only
way to reduce unemployment and transform bad jobs is to reenergize unionization.30 It is clear
through any labor study that unions allow workers to obtain higher wages and better benefits
from capitalists while simultaneously creating ties to the community and political infrastructures.
Pitts argues this is especially significant for black workers:
When Blacks migrated from Georgia and the Carolinas to New York City, they entered
a labor market heavily influenced by powerful unions. When Blacks left Alabama and
Mississippi for jobs in Detroits auto industry or Chicagos steel industry, they help to
organize the United Auto Workers and the United Steelworkers of America. When Blacks
moved from Louisiana and Texas to California, they found jobs in heavily unionized mar-
itime and aircraft industries.31
These two reforms, much like the efforts by the ILO described above, are fairly conservative.
They only work to ensure a more equitable distribution of future generated wealththey do not
address the current levels of wealth disparity. According to the Pew Research Center, in 2013,
black families had an average wealth of $11,000 while white families had an average wealth of
$141,900. This massive disparity holds in magnitude over all the years data is available.32 We
know that this is due to the economic and social reproduction of unjust enrichment/impoverish-
ment over time, as discussed by Feagin above.
But even when all new wealth generated is distributed more equitably between workers
and capitalists, what is to be done of the racial disparities? Short of the relinquishment of private
property or intergenerational inheritance, the only equitable manner of distribution would be
reparations for the unjust enrichment/impoverishment that has been reproduced over time.
About the Author

Corey R. Payne is a sociology student at Johns Hopkins University and a research assistant in the
Arrighi Center for Global Studies. He would like to thank Dr. Floyd W. Hayes III, whose class
facilitated the initial draft of this paper, and Dr. Sefika Kumral, who provided guidance on labor
theory.
30 Pitts, 2007. Pg. 39

31 Pitts, 2007. Pg. 45
32 Kochhar and Fry, 2014.
24
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the Jim Crow South.Social Science History(1995): 425-454.
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Great Recession. Pew Research Center. 12 December 2014.
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Racial Jobs Gap. Open Society Foundations, Future of Work Project. 2014.
Munck, Ronaldo. The Precariat: a view from the South.Third World Quarterly34, no. 5 (2013): 747-
762.
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of Work Project. 2014.
25
26
Popular Perceptions of Chinese Engagment in Nigeria
Popular Perceptions of Chinese Engagement in Nigeria

Timothy Yin
Chinas engagement in Africa has varyingly been criticizedparticularly in the Westas exploit-
ative, opaque, and selfish. In the case of Nigeria, Chinas increasing economic and socio-cul-
tural presence has engendered mixed, but mostly positive, perceptions of its people and society.
I argue that this perception can be traced to three factors: Chinas flexibility and eagerness to
engage, linkages between Chinese economic engagement and endemic problems within Nigerian
society, and Chinas effective soft power projection. I begin by placing current Nigerian public
opinion data on China into the historical context of bilateral relations and growing engagement
between the two countries. Relying on Nigerian accounts of Chinas impact on the economy and
society, I present a complex view of how Chinese and Nigerian actions converge to shape opin-
ions of China. Based on the Nigerian case, I conclude by offering suggestions as to how African
governments should understand Chinas diversified interests and how they might serve to help
optimize their economies and facilitate institutional reforms.
You must also imbibe the spirit of having a mutually beneficial relationship in your business
transactions. You must not see Nigeria as a consumer market alone, but as an investment destina-
tion where goods can be manufactured and consumed locally.
Muhammadu Buhari speaking to Chinese investors in Beijing, April 20161
O n his recent trip to China in April 2016, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari secured a
$6 billion loan and currency swap deal for his countrys flailing economy and signed a vari-
ety of other trade deals across multiple economic sectors.2 Some economists expressed frustration
with the deal as it would ease pressures on Nigeria to liberalize its foreign exchange market and
devalue its currency, which they argue would promote long-run economic growth. Controversies
like these have generated many conversations among policy and scholarly communities on the im-
plications of improving Sino-African relations for African development as well as the continents
relations with the West.
Many Western commentators have termed Chinas recent engagement a second scramble
for Africa, characterizing its activities as opportunistic lending or resource grabs in a way that
1 Levinus Nwabughiogu, Nigeria must Not be Consumer Market for Chinese Products Buhari,
Vanguard, April 13, 2016.
2 AFP, Nigerias Buhari, Doing Everything to Avoid the IMF, Brings Home Chinese Billions;
Analysts Say Tiny for a Giant, The Mail & Guardian, April 20, 2016.
27
essentialize[s] China and over-simplif[ies] its motivations.3 These criticisms are often a part of
a narrative arguing that China is attempting to overturn or challenge the existing neoliberal world
order. A more critical examination of the China in Africa literature as well as a survey of the situ-
ation on the ground, however, reveals a more nuanced picture.
In Nigeria, Chinas global rise and local presence has had noticeable effects on trade, the
economy, and Nigerian society. Building on existing scholarship that has looked at the economic
and structural effects of Chinas economic engagement in Nigeria, I ask how Chinese migrants,
imports, and capital have affected perceptions of China within Nigeria. I argue that increased
engagement has for the most part engendered positive perceptions of Chinas people and culture.
This can be attributed to Chinas willingness and availability to engage, links between Chinese
economic engagement and endemic problems within Nigerian society, as well as Chinas limited,
but effective, soft power projection in Nigeria.
History
Before the establishment of official ties with the Peoples Republic of China, some entrepreneurs
from the Republic of China and Hong Kong established a minor presence in some urban parts of
Nigeria like Kaduna and Lagos. They financed auto parts manufacturing and textiles businesses
throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Most of these projects collapsed due to inadequate infrastruc-
ture or foreign competition, but their failure created opportunities for another generation of
Chinese investors to fill as they left.4 In 1971, Nigeria was among the first West African states to
officially establish relations with the PRC. Prior to 1971, China had vocally backed Biafra in the
Nigerian Civil War primarily because it was opposed to the Soviet Union and its rising influence
in Africa.5 Nigerias ultimate decision to recognize the PRC was made independently of the Unit-
ed States as part of its non-alignment foreign policy strategy and was undertaken in spite of some
apprehension and fears among the Nigerian public about communist influence.6
3 Marcus Power and Giles Mohan, Towards a Critical Geopolitics of Chinas Engagement with
African Development, Geopolitics 15, no. 3 (2010), 488.
4 Margaret Egbula and Qi Zheng, China and Nigeria: A Powerful South-South Alliance, West
African Challenges, no. 5 (2011), 17.
5 Bruce D. Porter, The USSR in Third World Conflicts : Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars,
1945-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 109.
6 S. Salahuddin Ahmad, Nigeria-China Relations: An Approach to Positive Neutrality, Pakistan
Horizon 26, no. 1 (1973), 54.
28
Until the late 1990s, a pattern developed in Sino-Nigerian ties where leaders (Sani Aba-
cha and Deng Xiaoping for example) from each country would visit the other when faced with
international isolation as a way to boost their international credibility and improve their domestic
image.7 For the most part, early bilateral relations between Nigeria and China were rather weak
while trade was also fairly negligible. This would change significantly with the return to civilian
rule under Obasanjo and with Chinas adoption of its Going Out policy. Officially inaugurat-
ed in 1999, Chinas Going Out strategy called for significant increases in Outward Foreign
Direct Investment using its foreign reserves in order to seek resources, increase technical and
managerial know-how, and gain new markets.8 Engagement with Nigeria during the Obasanjo
yeas was characterized as dealing oil for infrastructure with Obasanjo securing oil blocs for
Chinese companies. Chinas infrastructure investments totaled $6 billion by 2008 and Chinese
multinationals increased their market share in Nigeria.9 Hu Jintao reciprocally designated Nigeria
a strategic partnerimportant for its oil fields, potential market size, and prominent political
role in regional institutions like the AU and ECOMOG.10 These oil deals were accompanied
by sales of military equipment, increases in Chinese imports of Nigerian agricultural products,
educational partnerships, technical cooperation, and a Malaria prevention program.11 Although
several of Obasanjos oil deals with China were put on hold and eventually cancelled by his suc-
cessor after they were investigated for corruption, mismanagement, and non-execution, relations
between the two countries have still generally continued to improve.12
Perceptions Today
Today, public opinion of China in Nigeria is generally quite positive. A 2014 Pew Study found
that 70% of Nigerians had a favorable opinion of China and 68% believed that Chinas growing
7 Edgar Agubamah, Bilateral Relations: Periscoping Nigeria and China Relations, European
Scientific Journal 10, no. 14 (2014).
8 Raphael Shen SJ and Victoria Mantzopoulos, Chinas Going Out Policy: Inception, Evolution,
Implication, Journal of Business and Behavior Sciences 25, no. 2 (Fall 2013, 2013), 124.
9 Gregory Mthembu-Salter, Elephants, Ants and Superpowers: Nigerias Relations with China,
South African Institute of International Affairs, September 2009, 8.
10 Chris Alden, China in Africa (London; New York: Zed Books, 2009), 68.
11 Ndubisi Obiorah, Darren Kew and Yusuf Tanko, Peaceful Rise and Human Rights: Chinas
Expanding Relations with Nigeria, in China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence, ed. Robert I. Rotberg
(Washington, DC: Brookings Instituion Press, 2008), 274-278.
12 Nick Tattersal, Mismanagement Marred Nigeria-Asia Oil Deals: Report, ReutersAugust 9,
2009.
29
economy was a good thing for Nigeria (although this is notably down from 90% in 2010).13 An-
other global survey found that 78 percent of Nigerian respondents had a positive view of Chi-
nas influence in the world, significantly higher than respondents in Ghana, Kenya, and Egypt.14
An Afrobarometer survey found that most believed that Chinas economic influence in Nigeria
was positive (67%).15 The survey further found that respondents cited Chinese investment in
business, low costs, and infrastructure investments as determinants of this positive image while
poor product quality was the most ubiquitous negative perception of China.16 A more specific
university-based cross-national survey of impressions of China in Africa further confirmed that
China is perceived mostly positively by Nigerians.17 The survey found that large majorities of
Nigerians believed Chinas developmental path was a positive model (75%) and that small Chi-
nese businesses were helpful overall (73%), while a minority believed that China was practicing
neo-colonialism (16%) or that it was only in Africa for resources (30%).18 For the vast majority
of Nigerians, the Chinese people are perceived as hardworking, disciplined, and friendly. Those
characterizing Chinese as unfriendly, racists, or opportunity seekers totaled just 6%.19
Even as overall opinion seems overwhelming positive, there still exists a popular dis-
course that is critical of Chinas impact in Nigeria. Further analyses of African public opinion in
general have found that most of this negative China-Africa rhetoricis not echoed among Af-
ricans generally although most hold some concerns about competition from Chinese imports.20
Even Nigerian elites like former Central Bank Governor Sanusi have warned against romanti-
cized views of Chinese economic investment in Nigeria and called for reviews of the exploit-
ative and predatory aspects of the Sino-Nigerian relationship.21 A repeated criticism of China
13 Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes and Jacob Poushter, Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and
Drones, but Limited Harm to Americas Image, Pew Research Center,[July 14, 2014], .
14 Jo Ebhomenye, Views of China and India Slide while UKs Ratings Climb: Global Poll, Program
on International Policy Attitudes,[May 22, 2013].
15 Nengak Daniel Gondyi et al., Citizens Hold Mixed Views on Nigerias International Relations
Afrobarometer, 2015, 7.
16 Ibid., 8.
17 Barry Sautman and Hairong Yan, African Perspectives on China-Africa Links, The China
Quarterly 199 (2009), 736-747.
18 Ibid., 736-737, 739, 746.
19 Ibid., 744.
20 Marek Hanusch, African Perspectives on China-Africa: Modelling Popular Perceptions and
their Economic and Political Determinants, Oxford Development Studies 40, no. 4 (12, 2012), 502.
21 Lamido Sanusi, Africa must Get Real about Chinese Ties, Financial Times, sec. Opinion,
March 11, 2013.
30
is the disconnect between huge, non-transparent Chinese investment numbers and rising Nigerian
unemployment rates, with many expressing discontent with the speculative statistic that Chi-
nese industries use up to 70% Chinese labor.22 As was partially reflected in some public opinion
measures, there is also a view that the significant trade deficit with China is not only detrimental
or exploitive for the Nigerian economy but also unfair because many of the manufactured goods
sold to Nigeria are sub-standard.23 While China recognizes an imbalance in its trade relations, it
often argues that investment is just as important, if not more, because it helps Nigeria industri-
alize and would theoretically further its economy with Chinese manufacturing.24 Among some,
there is also a perception that Chinas cavalier attitude toward labor rights and environmental
protections in their quest for resource extraction undercuts existing Nigerian institutions and
social protections.25
Political and Economic Relations

The Chinese governments abundant capital and enthusiasm in its political and economic rela-
tions with Nigeria have contributed to generally positive views of China. Nigeria is Chinas third
largest trading partner in Africa and attracts significant amounts of Chinese foreign investment.
With $5 billion of infrastructure investments in dam and railroad projects, Nigeria is currently
the top recipient of Chinese infrastructure investment.26 One such investment was a joint railway
restoration project between a Chinese state-owned enterprise and the Nigerian government to
connect Lagos and Kano at a cost of $8.3 billion.27 These projects, for the most part, come with
no-strings attached and have been quite popular in Nigeria and across Africa.
China has long supplied Nigeria with investments and soft loans as a means of boosting
relations and gaining access to Nigerian markets and resources. Although China does not publish
22 James Okoro, Richard Ingwe and Mathew O. Ojong, Diplomacy in China-Nigeria Political-Eco-
nomic Relations, Romanian Journal of Society and Politics 6, no. 12 (2011), 109.
23 Faouziatou Aboudou Kabassi, A Tale of Two Superpowers: Nigeria and China Relations (Mas-
ter of Arts in International Studies, University of San Francisco), 30.
24 Adie Vanessa Offiong, Africans Order for Low Quality Products from China, Daily Trust, sec.
Business, December 7, 2015.
25 Marcus Power, Giles Mohan and May Tan-Mullins, Chinas Resource Diplomacy in Africa: Pow-
ering Development? (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 169.
26 Vivien Foster et al., Building Bridges: Chinas Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for
Sub-Saharan Africa., Vol. 5 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009).
27 Deborah Brautigam, The Dragons Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 162.
31
official aid numbers, it has provided significant amounts of unconditional aid to Nigeria as part
of its global South-South co-development strategy. More recently though, it appears that for Ni-
geria, China is moving away from this aid-focused model and is increasingly relying on financial
instruments including commercial loans and Panda Bonds which resembles a model of business
engagement.28 Chinese corporations, both private and state-owned have also played a pivotal role
in investing in Nigeria by bankrolling infrastructure projects like power stations and cell phone
towers for Nigerias growing mobile phone market.29
Another focal point of Chinas investment and broader economic engagement in Nigeria
is its two special economic zones in Lagos and Lekki. These zones are typically built to facilitate
international investment and cooperation with Chinese corporations and in Nigeria are specifical-
ly being used to manufacture and assemble Chinese products.30 Built by a joint venture between
the Nigerian government and Chinese companies, the free trade zones will include an airport
in Lekki and a deep sea port in Lagos as well as several industrial parks for industries like car
assembly, light manufacturing, and textiles.31 Nigerian experiences with these zones have been
fairly positive and officials have noted that Chinese partners have been fairly responsive when
met with complaints about infrastructure quality and construction delays.32 The early success of
special economic zones highlight how Chinese investments and no-strings attached capital can
create goodwill and positive feelings for China in Nigeria.
Overall, Nigerias business community seems to believe that Chinese business provides
substantial benefits with their lower-cost merchandise, opportunities for learning about busi-
ness models, and the Chinese willingness to arrange financing and engage in joint ventures.33
Chinese economic engagement with Nigeria is also perceived as particularly appealing because
unlike Western countries, China exhibits a willingness to transfer technology and offer profes-
28 Stephen Chan, Nigeria and China: Will Pandas Ride to Buharis Budgetary Rescue? News-
week, sec. Opinion, April 13, 2016.
29 Chris Alden and Martyn Davies, A Profile of the Operations of Chinese Multinationals in Afri-
ca, South African Journal of International Affairs 13, no. 1 (2006), 92.
30 Peter Kragelund and Meine Pieter Van Dijk, Chinas Investments in Africa, in The New Pres-
ence of China in Africa, ed. Meine Pieter van Dijk (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Amsterdam University
Press, 2009, 2009), 91-92.
31 Peter Gakunu et al., Comparative Study on Special Economic Zones in Africa and China UNDP
China; International Poverty Reduction Center in China, 2015, 23-27.
32 Deborah Brutigam and Tang Xiaoyang, African Shenzhen: Chinas Special Economic Zones in
Africa, The Journal of Modern African Studies 49, no. 1 (2011), 46.
33 Utomi, China & Nigeria, 43.
32
sional workforce training.34 This can often offset the harms and negative perceptions from lower
wages and substandard working conditions. For example, Golden Telecoms, a Chinese telecom-
munications firm in Nigeria, pays less than other providers but promote[s] locals more rapidly
and offers more training which enables employees to switch to more lucrative jobs or start their
own businesses.35 That said, technology sharing and training is not always in everyones inter-
est. For example, Chinese agribusinesses like Green Agricultural West Africa in Nigeria engage
in outgrower programs that introduce advanced farming technologies to Nigerian growers and
increase output but also endangers small-scale farming livelihoods.36
Without the baggage of historic colonialism, China has an elevated level of credibility as
an economic partner and is often admired by Nigerians as a model for economic development.37
Unlike in Sudan and Angola where it dominates the oil production and exports, China has strug-
gled to gain a foothold in the Nigerian oil sector because of the relative decentralization of
power in the Nigerian federal system.38 This has likely helped to counter the wider perception in
other parts of Africa that Chinese economic engagement is motivated entirely by its selfish quest
for oil. Instead China has been able to frame its engagement in Nigeria as a configuration of
South-South cooperation in shared development areas such as industrialization, energy, agricul-
ture, and technology.39 This framing also helps China avoid the perception that it is a neo-colo-
nialist power.
Criticism of Chinese economic engagement in Nigeria is usually not centered on the lack
of economic benefit but rather the view that it benefits China more than it does Nigeria. Dis-
courses on the trade deficit, the import of Chinese laborers, and investment in extractive indus-
tries all seem to be reflective of this view. As beneficial as Chinese capital, low-cost products,
and expertise have been, its penetration of the [Nigerian] economy has meant increased com-
34 David Haroz, China in Africa: Symbiosis Or Exploitation? The Fletcher Forum of World Af-
fairs 35, no. 2 (2011), 75.
35 Giles Mohan and Ben Lampert, Negotiating China: Reinserting African Agency into
ChinaAfrica Relations, African Affairs 112, no. 446 (January 01, 2013), 105-106.
36 Yang Jiao, Neither Friendship Farm nor Land Grab: Chinas Agricultural Investment in
Nigeria, in Center for African Studies: Research Report, ed. Jessica Horwood (University of Florida,
2015), 40.
37 Brautigam, Dragons Gift, 10.
38 Princeton Lyman, Cooperation for Investment, in The Report: Nigeria 2010 (Oxford Business
Group, 2011), 33.
39 Samuel Onuoha Udeala, Nigeria-China Economic Relations Nigeria-China Economic Relations
Under South-South Cooperation, African Journal of International Affairs 13, no. 2 (2013), 62.
33
petition in virtually all sectors of the economy, which inevitably can displace jobs and busi-
nesses.40 Alongside investment and resource extraction, China has also significantly increased its
exports to Nigeria. Some estimates indicate that competition from these cheap Chinese exports
have cost the country 350,000 jobs directly and a further 1.5 million jobs indirectly.41 A related
negative perception of China is that the Chinese overly emphasiz[e] commerce and profit and
not socioeconomic development.42 But at the same time investment from Western countries is
also perceived as over-involved or meddlesome in a way that could also hurt Nigerias develop-
mental interests.43 These two concerns therefore seem somewhat inconsistent. Even when signif-
icant concerns about potential harm to the Nigerian economy gain traction among some Nigerian
communities, these grievances are rarely fed into policy making at the state level because
most well-connected elites perceive significant benefits from greater economic engagement with
China.44
The Nigerian textiles industry is a centerpiece of controversy concerning Chinese engage-
ments effect on the local economy. As Nigeria opened its markets to Chinese textile products, its
once robust textile industry soon collapsed, destroying with it local manufacturing capacity and
creating national socioeconomic, distributional and poverty impacts.45 While textiles products
certainly became cheaper and benefited Nigerian consumers, they have also incited strong reac-
tions from a vocal community of textile traders that claim that Chinese textiles are killing the Ni-
gerian market and their livelihoods.46 Other observers have noted that competition from Chinese
textile manufacturing will force Nigeria to fix low productivity by updating equipment, improv-
ing infrastructure, and ultimately rebuild a globally competitive textile industry.47 Commentary
40 Dulue Mbachu, Nigerian Resources: Changing the Playing Field, South African Journal of
International Affairs 13, no. 1 (2006), 81.
41 Patrick Bond, Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation (New York: Zed Books, 2006), 60.
42 Enduo Ji , Qishi Niriliya Ren Dui Zhongguoren De Yinxiang Bing Buhao
[Nigerian Impressions of Chinese People Not that Great], Tiexue Online,
July 2, 2014.
43 Pat Utomi, China and Nigeria (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Stud-
ies,[2008], .
44 Ian Taylor, Chinas Relations with Nigeria, The Round Table 96, no. 392 (2007), 632.
45 Sola Akinrinade and Olukoya Ogen, South-South Neo-Liberalism and the Collapse of the Nige-
rian Textile Industry, The Global South 2, no. 2 (2008), 166.
46 Murtala Muhammed, Kano Residents Protest Presence of Chinese Textiles in their Market, The
Guardian Nigeria, May 14, 2015.
47 Elisha P. Renne, The Changing Contexts of Chinese-Nigerian Textile Production and Trade,
19002015, TEXTILE 13, no. 3 (05/27, 2015), 229.
34
surrounding Nigerias textile industry and its collapse after exposure to Chinese competition is
reflective of the ambivalent attitudes Nigerians generally have about Sino-Nigeria economic rela-
tions and illustrates how personal interests can affect attitudes towards China.
Another common criticism of Chinese economic investment in Africa is the claim that
it often does not rely on African workers. In the case of Nigeria, these concerns are probably
overstated. After a government ban on furniture imports, a Nigerian furniture manufacturer ac-
tually hired relatively cheap workers from China because he worried that local laborers were not
sufficiently skilled or reliable.48 In Nigeria, Chinese firms typically followed a three-jump
pattern beginning with trade which leads to investment in a domestic production facility, and in
turn results in the development of a supply chain and even industrial parks.49 In this way Chinese
enterprises help to augment the business environment in Nigeria and contribute to further em-
ployment. In Kano, Chinese factories have actually been the most resilient source of jobs with
one Chinese companydespite complaints about low wages and poor working conditionsac-
counting for the most jobs after the government.50 Another way Nigerians make this criticism is
by distinguishing between quality Chinese investors and lowly-rated Chinese traders en-
gaged in economic scavenging and performing low-skill work that could be performed by Nige-
rians.51 The underlying assertion appears to be that while Chinese capital is more than welcome,
opportunities for Chinese workers in Nigeria should be limited.
Cooperation on security matters between the two countries has also increased. Although
the United States has provided Nigeria military assistance, it does not sell arms to Nigeria due
to a policy of not selling to foreign militaries with records of human rights violations. China has
stepped in to fill a large part of this demand. Between 2006 and 2010, Nigeria was the largest
recipient of Chinese conventional arms sales in Africa, accounting for 35% of all sales to the
continent and also procured machinery from China to produce its own small arms.52 In 2015, Ni-
48 Giles Mohan and Ben Lampert, Chinese Migrants in Africa: Bilateral and Informal Governance
of a Poorly Understood South-South Flow (Geneva, Switzerland, United Nations Research Institute for
Social Development, 2013), 13.
49 Jing Gu, Chinas Private Enterprises in Africa and the Implications for African Development,
European Journal of Development Research 21, no. 4 (2009), 575.
50 Giles Mohan, Beyond the Enclave: Towards a Critical Political Economy of China and Africa,
Development and Change 44, no. 6 (November 2013), 1264.
51 Larry Hanauer and Lyle J. Morris, Chinese Engagement in Africa Drivers, Reactions, and Impli-
cations for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014), 71.
52 Pieter D. Wezeman, Siemon T. Wezeman and Lucie Braud-Sudreau, Arms Flows to Sub-Saha-
35
geria also became the first country to utilize CH-3 model drones purchased from China in active
combat against Boko Haram.53 In addition to arms sales, Nigeria has also had military-to-mili-
tary ties with China since 1999. China has provided technical assistance to the Nigerian military,
trained some 390 Nigerian soldiers, and is also exploring bilateral space cooperation after China
helped launch Nigerias first satellite into space.54 Here the Chinese willingness to engage politi-
cally also contributes to positive perceptions of China.
Looking Inwards?
Negative perceptions of China should be understood in the context of the sociopolitical and
economic challenges facing Nigeria. Perceptions of China are colored by Chinese complicity
in Nigerian problems like economic favoritism, worker exploitation, corruption, and theft. This
analysis is driven by a presumption that fundamentally all Chinese involvement in Nigeria is
constrained by specifically Nigerian political and economic realities.55 It builds on the work of
scholars who have argued that the decisive factor in determining the impact of Chinese economic
engagement in Africa is the individual African country and its government rather than Chinese
behavior itself.56 Many Nigerian critiques of China should thus be understood as critiques of
Nigerian society and its policies of economic engagement rather than as anti-Chinese.
Firstly it should be noted that most negative narratives surrounding Chinese business be-
havior in Nigeria are largely anecdotal and disjointed. Some have even theorized that Nigerians
have more negative perceptions of China compared to some African countries because Nigerians
are more influenced by [the] Western media which has generally been quite critical of China
in its discourse on Sino-African relations.57 Still there are certainly critiques of China and Chi-
nese behavior that can be grounded in the everyday experiences of Nigerians. One such area for
the formation of negative perceptions is the practice of corruption, more commonly referred to
as 419. Many Nigerian businesspersons have complained about abusive and underhanded
ran Africa (Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,[2011]), 12.
53 David Axe, Chinas First Drone War is Here, The Daily Beast, August 11, 2015.
54 Omatseye OWeyinmi Nesiama, China-Nigeria Security Cooperation Policies: Challenges and
Prospects, [Defense Forum], no. 1 (2013), 77.
55 John Campbell, Opinion: Whos in Charge, China Or Nigeria? GlobalPost, sec. Commentary,
June 7, 2010.
56 Brautigam, Dragons Gift, 21.
57 Sofie Geerts, Namhla Xinwa and Deon Rossouw, Africans Perceptions of Chinese Business in
Africa-A Survey (Pretoria, South Africa: Ethics Institute of South Africa,[2014]), 56.
36
business practices including accusations of smuggling and product imitation.58 While many view
the Chinese as participating in incredibly corrupt behavior it can be argued that the Chinese
are simply amplify[ing] the characteristics and corrupt practices of business in Nigeria.59 Al-
though they are ambivalent about the culture of corruption as a whole, Chinese migrant workers
are also frustrated by the fact that they have to deal with corruption from immigration, police,
and customs authorities.60 When discussing Chinese business corruption, Nigerians do not view
themselves as victims of the Chinese but as sufferers and participants in a pattern of endemic
corruption. Some Nigerians have even claimed that the Chinese are being unfairly singled out
for corruption and unscrupulous behaviors like treating workers poorly, arguing that the system
encourages foreigners to get away with what they can, just as it enables corruption by Nigeri-
ans.61
Chinese participation and complicity in corruption should be understood in a context
where local political and moral economies leave them with few other choices.62 That said,
there appears to be a perception of Chinese businesspeople as having a unique way of doing
business that allows them to take advantage of Nigerian social and cultural practicesincluding
corrupt behaviorin a way that other nationals do not. According to this view, Chinese success
in evading laws and regulations by paying off enforcement officials simply reflects their unique
ability to slot in to business life and everyday petty corruption in Nigeria.63 For example,
Nigerias relatively porous border security means that an abnormal number of Chinese imports
can come through without being recorded, exacerbating levels of corruption.64 But ironically, this
58 Yunnan Chen et al., Learning from China? Manufacturing, Investment, and Technology Transfer
in Nigeria (Washington, DC: SAIS China Africa Research Initiative, [January 2016]), 18.
59 Irene Yuan Sun, Chinese Business and Corruption in Nigeria, The Guardian Nigeria, sec. Busi-
ness, September 21, 2013.
60 Allen Hai Xiao, In the Shadow of the States: The Informalities of Chinese Petty Entrepreneur-
ship in Nigeria, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 44, no. 1 (2015), 97.
61 Adewale Maja-Pearce, Nigerias China Connection, The New York Times, sec. Opinion, May 7,
2014.
62 Daniel Jordan Smith, A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in
Nigeria (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 56.
63 Ben Lampert and Giles Mohan, Making Space for African Agency in China-Africa Engage-
ments: Ghanaian and Nigerian Patrons Shaping Chinese Enterprise, in Africa and China : How Africans
and their Governments are Shaping Relations with China, ed. Aleksandra W. Gadzala (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 115-118.
64 Daniel Wagner and Giorgio Cafiero, China and Nigeria: Neo-Colonialism, South-South Solidar-
ity, Or both? The World Post, July 19, 2013.
37
corruption is not necessarily condemned and can actually be viewed positively as a symbol of
South-South solidarity and shared challenges.
Taking a broader view of corruption to include unethical and illegal business practices
further reveals a complicated view of China rooted in deeper failings of Nigerian society. In
2006, the Chinatown in Lagos was raided by police looking for fake goods and pirated films/
discs.65 This singling out of counterfeit good sellers in Chinatown simply moved sales outside its
gates but also seemed suspect as copyright law enforcement has been mostly inadequate in Nige-
ria due to poverty, poor enforcement mechanisms and various corrupt practices.66 There is also a
popular perceptionpartially rooted in physical realitythat Chinese products and services are
of low quality. Just 11% of Nigerians believed that Chinese products were of high quality and
satisfaction with Chinese infrastructural projects stands at just 29%.67 But among sellers of these
Chinese goods, there is an understanding that while some of these goods are of lower quality, if
they were of higher quality then Nigerians would refuse to pay for them.68 There is also evidence
to suggest that many of the failures of Chinese infrastructure projects such as the Kano-Lagos
railway contracted to the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation can be attributed to
corruption, management inefficiency, and unethical conduct on the part of Nigerian officials and
businesspeople.69
Here again, a criticism of China and its products is turned into a critique about wide-
spread poverty and inequality in Nigeria. After all, in a country where shoddy and counterfeit
products are pervasive in general, low-cost Chinese goodswidely viewed as subparcontinue
to dominate the market because consumers have few other choices.70 Even as alarming com-
plaints about Chinas hazardous products, fake brands, and smuggling continue, there seems to
be a widespread realization that Chinese products in Nigeria have come to stay and that the
65 Frank Langfitt, In Nigeria, Chinatown Vendors Struggle for Profits, NPR ,June 15, 2011.
66 Mary Imelda Obianuju Nwogu, The Challenges of the Nigerian Copyright Commission in the
Fight Against Copyright Piracy in Nigeria, Global Journal of Politics and Law Research 2, no. 5 (2014),
33.
67 Geerts, Xinwa & Rossouw, Africans Perceptions of Chinese Business, 43-44.
68 BattaBox, Tour of China-Town in Nigeria... but Where are all the Chinese People??. Youtube
Video, 1:27. Posted [July 23, 2013], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=COAaMIeMR4Y.
69 Rasheed Bisiriyu, Nigerian Railway: A Tale of Failed Contracts, Dashed Hope, The Punch,
February 4, 2016.
70 Keith Bradsher and Adam Nossiter, In Nigeria, Chinese Investment Comes with a Downside,
The New York Times, sec. International Business, December 5, 2015.
38
impetus for change is with Nigeria.71 In addition to combating corruption which can make it dif-
ficult for Nigerian authorities to enforce regulations on product standards, Nigeria also needs to
develop its economy equitably so that it can demand and afford quality goods. For example, one
Nigerian businessmen claimed that Chinese products were actually number one in quality and
that standards were lowered for Nigeria because they believed that Nigerians did not have the
funds to match up [to] good quality products.72
Even criticisms and fears of Chinese competition in sectors like low-end manufacturing
and the textiles putting out domestic businesses are rooted in deeper problems with Nigerian
development. The two primary areas where Nigerian manufacturers face higher costs are energy
and transport, where difficulties linked to the chronic inefficiency, misadministration, and cor-
ruption within Nigerias service industries drive up production costs.73 After all, problems like
an inconsistent power and inadequate transportation networks can make manufacturing and sup-
ply chain development very challenging. Nigeria is ranked near the bottom on indexes measuring
economic competiveness, corruption, and ease of doing business, leading to a very high cost of
doing business that makes it difficult for goods made in Nigeria to compete even domestically.74
These observations on corruption, unethical business behavior, and product quality all
raise the question of whether denouncing China serves as a proxy for broader Nigerian societal
critiques. Pointing to the fact that Nigeria historically blamed problems like government mis-
management and Islamic fundamentalism on Africans from neighboring countries, some writers
argue that critiques of the Chinese are based on unwarranted animosity towards foreigners in
general.75 Perhaps negative views of China are also a means for Nigerians to express their frus-
tration with a government that cannot leverage demands for fairer economic engagement that
transfers wealth to Nigerias impoverished population.
71 Edwin Ikhuoria, The Impact of Chinese Imports on Nigerian Traders, in Chinese and African
Perspectives on China in Africa, eds. Axel Harneit-Sievers, Stephen Marks and Sanusha Naidu (Cape
Town, South Africa: Pambazuka Press, 2010), 137.
72 Vera Samuel Anyagafu, China and Nigeria: Neo-Colonialism, South-South Solidarity, Or both?
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, February 19, 2015, http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t1322716.htm.
73 David E. Brown, Hidden Dragon, Crouching Lion: How Chinas Advance in Africa is Underes-
timated and Africas Potential Underappreciated (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute-US Army War
College, 2012), 59.
74 Francis Arinze Iloani, Why made-in-Nigeria Goods Suffer Low Patronage, Daily Trust, sec.
Business, March 6, 2015.
75 Patrick Mazimhaka, China and Africa: An African View, in The Morality of China in Africa :
The Middle Kingdom and the Dark Continent, ed. Stephen Chan (London: Zed Books, 2013), 122-113.
39
Part of Chinas appeal more generally among African elites is explained by its policy of
non-interference which has allowed corrupt and incompetent ruling cliques to enrich them-
selves with foreign commercial deals.76 Such perceived complicity in corrupt behaviors is anoth-
er way in which China may be viewed negatively by other Nigerians. Officials from Nigerias
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) have also expressed frustration with Chi-
nas very minimal cooperation in its investigations of graft and attempts to trace internationally
laundered money.77
There is a general sense, though, that the Chinese are simply reinforcing existing pa-
tron-client networks and neopatrimonial governance as protests are often not directed against
the Chinese but against Nigerian elites such as Dangote Group which was accused of being un-
patriotic by hiring Chinese workers.78 There are now growing calls among Nigerians for their
country to avoid the pursuit of short-term gains and extract maximum benefits from their rela-
tions with China through bargaining and encouraging Nigerian manufacturing exports to China.79
Negative perceptions of China in Nigeria can be viewed as an indictment of bad governance,
structural inequality, and sweeping corruption in Nigeria as critique of Chinese activities.
Cultural Ties and Chinese Soft Power

China projects its image and soft power in Nigeria in a variety of ways. One medium is sim-
ply through the activities and movement of its citizens. Although the embassy last claimed that
there were only 20,000 Chinese nationals in 2004, because of visa overstays and recent surges in
migration the actual number is likely far higher with some estimating the population at upwards
of 100,000.80 This population has reportedly grown by 20,000 between 2012 and 2014 and is
concentrated primarily in the Nigerian cities of Lagos and Kano.81 Like most Chinese migrs,
76 Lukasz Fijalkowski, Chinas Soft Power in Africa? in Chinas Rise in Africa : Perspectives
on a Developing Connection, eds. Dominik Kopinski, Andrzej Polus and Ian Taylor (New York: Rout-
ledge, 2012), 102.
77 Ade Adesomoju and Eniola Akinkuotu, Jonathan Not Needed to Prove Case Against Metuh
EFCC, The Punch, sec. News, February 24, 2016.
78 Lampert & Mohan, China-Africa Engagements: Nigerian Patrons Shaping Chinese Enterprise,
123.
79 Tolu Ogunlesi, Opinion: Africa Needs to Drive a Harder Bargain with China, CNN Opinions,
September 10, 2010.
80 China-Nigeria Relations. Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in the Federal Republic
of Nigeria, July 8, 2004, http://ng.china-embassy.org/eng/zngx/t142490.htm; Alden, China in Africa, 52.
81 Chinese Diaspora Across the World: A General Overview. Institute for Cultural Diplomacy,
40
migrants to Nigeria seek economic opportunities by either working contracts for Chinese com-
panies or starting their own small enterprises. As such, they usually settle in residential enclaves
or in corporate compounds, and thus do not really assimilate into Nigerian culture and only
regularly support the concerns of fellow Chinese nationals.82 The migrants tend to believe that it
is easier to make money [in Nigeria] than in China and are primarily concerned with Nigerian
import policies, kidnappings and robbery of ethnic Chinese, and Naira devaluation.83
Even though there are no active attempts to increase intercultural understanding and
contact with local populations is generally quite limited, Chinese culture has found its way into
Nigerian society. Chinatown settlements in Nigeria such as the most well-known marketplace in
Lagos have become centers of economic life where Nigerians often come to contact with Chi-
nese culture. According to its founder and boss, Chinatown in Lagos was founded in 2000 not as
a settlement enclave but as an open marketplace that would help to eliminate middlemen in the
trade of Chinese consumer products to Nigeria.84 In doing so he also helped to bring Nigerians
into contact with not only Chinese products and capital but also with the Chinese population.
These opportunities for cultural contact have helped to promote Chinese cultural products in Chi-
na. For example, Chinese Ginseng-based items and green teas have become very popular, partic-
ularly amongst health conscious young Nigerians.85 In major cities like Lagos, Chinese food has
grown wildly popular, with Chinese restaurants proliferating and cater[ing] to all budgets and
tastes.86
Cultural relations and intercultural communication has always been an important com-
ponent of Sino-Nigerian relations. Early on, XinhuaChinas official news agencywas a key
player in improving Chinas diplomatic outreach in Nigeria. It signed cooperation agreements
2014 http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/index.php?chinese-diaspora.
82 John D. Lamkin, The Effects of Chinese Economic and Immigration Patterns in Nigeria from
2000 to 2013 (Master of Military Art and Science in Strategic Studies, US Army Command and General
Staff College), 61.
83 Chibuike Oguh, Chinese Migrants Move to Nigeria to make Money, Migrants Story Blog,
April l20, 2015, https://migrantsstory.wordpress.com/2015/04/20/chinese-community-in-lagos/.
84 Liang Wei , Fangwen: Zhongguoren Mei Qiang Feizhouren Fanwan
[Interview: Chinese are Not Taking Africans Rice Bowls], BBC Chinese , January 23,
2013.
85 Adie Vanessa Offiong, Nigeria: Chinese Food here Taste Different from those in China - Xiang-
dong, Daily Trust, sec. Entertainment, June 29, 2014.
86 A List of our 10 Best Chinese Restauraunts in Lagos. HowNG, 2014, http://howng.com/list-
10-best-chinese-restaurants-lagos/.
41
with and donated equipment to the News Agency of Nigeria in 1987 and also helped to sponsor
cultural, sports, and youth ties with China.87 China has also set up China Radio International in
Nigeria as a tool to broadcast news from China and highlight friendly exchanges in Sino-Nige-
rian relations. Uniquely, China Radio International also broadcasts in Hausa, a language widely
spoken in northern Nigeria. This broadcast has been notably popular with many veritable China
fans who have actively expressed their love for and understanding of China in their engagement
with Chinese Hausa-speaking broadcasters.88
Film is another important medium through which Chinese culture has proliferated in
Nigeria. In a profile of a martial arts-related cultural exchange, John Chukwu, a Nigerian partici-
pant and martial arts enthusiast, reveals that he first developed his interest in Kungfu after watch-
ing the Hong Kong action film Drunken Master.89 Indeed, exposure to Hong Kong films as they
rose in popularity in the 1970s may have been Nigerias earliest significant contact with Chinese
culture.90 Today, popular Nollywood films like Kalybos in China and King of Guangzhou
offer positive portrayals of Chinese culture and Nigerians living in China and have helped to en-
hance people-to-people ties and cultural understanding of China.91 The Chinese government has
attempted to take advantage of the popularity of film as a medium for cultural communication in
Nigeria. In 2015, it sponsored an inaugural Chinese Film Festival to facilitate cultural commu-
nication and to showcase Chinas history, culture, [and] etiquette to Nigerians.92 The event
featuring a variety of genres of Chinese filmdrew thousands of visitors and was well-received
by film viewers who said that movies could help them communicate [more] easily with their
Chinese counterparts.93 The success of such films also opened an opportunity for StarTimes, a
87 David Hamilton Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, China and Africa : A Century of Engagement (Phil-
adelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 302.
88 Weiwei Zhang , Niriliyaren Jiaowo Laizi Zhongguo De Haosaren
[Nigerians Call Me Hausa Person from China], Guangming Daily, November 11,
2015.
89 Jian Chen , Yige Niriliyaren De Zhongguo Gongfu Meng
[A Nigerians Chinese Kungfu Dream], Xinhua Online, May 17, 2015.
90 Brian Larkin, Signal and Noise : Media, Infrastructure, and Urban Culture in Nigeria (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2008), 266.
91 Nua Tuki, Nollywood: An Untapped Opportunity for Deepening China-Africa Relations?
Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University,September 7, 2015.
92 Speech from Consul General Liu Kan in Chinese Film Festival.Consulate-General of the Peo-
ples Republic of China in Lagos,
93 Japhet Alakam, China Boost Future Cultural Ties with Nigeria through Film, Vanguard, sec.
The Arts, January 11, 2016.
42
Chinese media company, to partner with the Nigerian Television Authority to offer TV program-
ming showcasing Chinese culture in eighteen cities across Nigeria.94
In terms of official soft power, China has established two Confucius Institutes in Nigeria,
one at Nnamdi Azikiwe University and the other at the University of Lagos. In the Nigerian con-
text each of these institutes is paired with a Chinese university and engages in cultural exchanges
and Mandarin language instruction and also offers several Chinese-paid scholarships to pursue
graduate study in Nigeria.95 These institutes have appeared to be relatively successful compared
to institutes in developed countries with the institute at the University of Lagos enrolling some
22,000 students and hosting some 250 cultural events between 2009 and 2015.96 At Nnamdi
Azikiwe University, the success of the Confucius Institute pushed the Chinese embassy to fund
a Chinese Cultural Research Centre that will further advance language training and scholarly
exchange.97 It appears that the primary reason for the popularity of these institutes is the percep-
tion of huge job opportunities available to those with an understanding of Chinese and Chinese
culture.98 A student at the Confucius Institute in Lagos exclaimed that she liked China a lot
and promised to work hard and go to China to receive advanced education and technical train-
ing in order to serve her country in the future.99 Judging by their general popularity and program
growth, Confucius Institutes appear to have reinforced the image of China as a successful devel-
opment model and country of economic opportunity.
Conclusion and Evaluation

Overall, China is viewed positively by most Nigerians although there are certainly negative
94 Samuel Ramani, China-Nigeria Relations: A Success Story for Beijings Soft Power, The Dip-
lomat, July 12, 2016.
95 Emmanuel Edukugho, Confucius Institute Opens at UNILAG for Teaching of Chinese Lan-
guage, Vanguard, November 5, 2009.
96 Weiwei Zhang , Niriliya Lagesi Daxue Kongzixueyuan Juxing 2016 Hounian Chunjie
Lianhuanhui 2016 [University of Lagos, Nigeria
Confucius Institute Holds 2016 Year of the Monkey Spring Festival Party], CRI Online, February 5, 2015.
97 Chukwuemerie Uduchukwu, China Opens Cultural Research Centre in Nigeria, Premium
Times Nigeria, sec. Arts/Life, June 29, 2016.
98 Xia Hua, Chinese Language Attracts Job Opportunities: Nigerian Students, Xinhua OnlineJune
29, 2015.
99 2015 Nian Niriliya Lagesi Daxue Kongzixueyuan Disi Jie Zhongguo Wenhua Yue Lakai
Weimu 2015 [Fourth Chinese
Culture Month of the Confucius Institute at the University of Lagos Commences]. Confucius Institute at
University of Lagos, June 28, 2015, http://ciunilag.ng.chinesecio.com/zh-hans/node/146.
43
perceptions stemming from personal economic interests and dissatisfaction with their own gov-
ernment and society. The spread of Chinese capital, migrants, experience, products, and culture
in Nigerian society is viewed by most as a positive development and part of a global trend of
increased South-South cooperation. Perhaps this raises the questions of just how different Chi-
na in Nigeria is from China in the rest of Africa. This papers findings appear to be relatively
consistent with accounts of other African encounters with Chinese products, investment, and
migrants. Other studies of perceptions of the Chinese presence in Africa reveal similarly com-
plicated views. One study found that Chinese investment and aid clearly correlates with positive
feelings about China as well as admiration for its culture and business success, although there are
also concerns about China potentially retarding local reforms, depleting African resources, and
displacing businesses or workers.100 Other cross-sectional studies of perceptions of China have
found acute differences in perceptions of China based on socioeconomic background but with
a majority of the population carrying a balanced assessment of Chinas influence in their coun-
try.101 Nigerian views seem to be similarly complex and varied.
While resource access is a component of Chinas engagement with Nigeria, Chinas vari-
ous other investments in infrastructure, manufacturing, and cultural diplomacy seem to challenge
the notion that China invests solely to gain access to resources. That said there are very real lim-
its to what China is ready to commit to in Nigeria and in the region. The Ebola crisisrelatively
minor in Nigeriaand the unmet expectations for Beijing to do something about the emergency
exposed the possibility that expectations about Chinas role in Africa had been raised to unman-
ageable proportions.102 Chinese engagement is still primarily motivated by its search for mar-
kets, employment opportunities, and economic security, not by humanitarian goals or visions for
global human development.
Chinas relations with the Giant of Africa will likely have effects on how it engages with
other countries in the region. While the Nigerian experience with China is unique in its focus on
investments in manufacturing, Chinas diversified interests in the country, and Nigerias market
100 Fei-Ling Wang and Esi A. Elliot, China in Africa: Presence, Perceptions and Prospects, Jour-
nal of Contemporary China 23, no. 90 (11/02, 2014), 1029-1030.
101 Mario Esteban, A Silent Invasion? African Views on the Growing Chinese Presence in Africa:
The Case of Equatorial Guinea, African and Asian Studies 9 (2010), 249.
102 Ian Taylor, Chinas Response to the Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa, The Round Table 104,
no. 1 (2015), 51.
44
size, the perceptions of China that the relationship engendered can offer lessons for other African
states. Economic engagement with China is not a panacea for structural challenges like corrup-
tion, weak rule of law, low human capital, or an unequal, elite-dominated economic system. It is
but one opportunity through which African governments may optimize their economies, create
opportunities for their citizens, and reform their institutions while increasing their engagement
with the world. Rather than deride China with accusations of neocolonialism, the West should
encourage China to become a responsible stakeholder in African development and work with
China for the advancement of the human condition worldwide.
About the Author
Timothy Yin is a senior studying International Politics at Georgetown University.
45
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50
Taiwanese Democratization: A Regime or Reversal
Taiwanese Democratization: A Lasting Regime or a

Pending Reversal?
Taylor C. Veracka
This article discusses the democratization of Taiwan and why it will be a lasting institution rath-
er than a short-lived attempt at democracy. It will accomplish this by providing a brief history of
the creation of the Taiwanese state and examining the causal state- and agent-based mechanisms
that were implemented throughout. The paper strives to prove that the mechanisms that birthed
the Taiwanese democracy are what make it stable and will prevent its collapse. An analysis and
refutation of arguments against this theory are included to provide more substantiation of the
claim. The article goes even further to claim that the Taiwanese democracy may act as a positive
force on the not-yet-democratized countries in the East Asian region and provides evidence to
support this claim as well.
T he world-renowned political scientist Samuel P. Huntington helped classify democratiza-

tion of states into three historical waves. The first occurred between the 1820s and 1926,
the second between World War II and 1962, and the third between 1974 and 1990 (Dahl 2003).
Though democratization has slowed down, considering the fact that the majority of the worlds
countries are already democratic, that doesnt mean democratization cannot and does not exist
outside these waves. Through structural and agent-based mechanisms, like economic and politi-
cal pressures from neighboring countries, states do not necessarily have to fall into a wave cat-
egory in order to make the necessary changes that are required of them to complete the transition
to democracy. A prime example of this phenomenon would be Taiwan, a country whose reach for
democracy began at the end of the third wave but only recently came to true fruition.
The case of Taiwan is interesting, as it became a democracy outside of any waves and
without a very tumultuous transition. No large rebellion or civil war created the regime change;
the authoritarian government started the transition itself. Additionally, it was at the time, and
continues to be, a disputed area of land, as the Chinese government is not yet willing to release
the claim it has on the island. As the young democracy continues on this track, its important to
examine the factors that started it on its journey, and whether or not it has sufficient foundations
to withstand outside pressures from nondemocratic countries and remain democratic.
As previously stated, the third wave of democratization occurred between 1974 and 1990
51
(Dahl 2003). While Taiwan may not strictly belong to that wave for the simple reason that it did
not officially become a democracy until after the wave had ended, it began to trend toward
democratization during the twilight of the third movement at the end of the 1980s. Taiwan held
its first officially open elections in 1996, a mere twenty years ago. However, that twenty years
seems quite long when one considers that it essentially took Taiwan that length of time to com-
plete the process and consolidate the democracy. Some are still skeptical that the country can
hold on to this new regime, especially when one considers how long it took to reach that point.
Not to mention the fact that it is located so close to China, a country not only currently econom-
ically prosperous and nondemocratic, but also one that desires to control the territory of Taiwan.
Though China has been less than successful in officially bringing Taiwan back under their um-
brella of direct control, it still has not quite given up its claim to sovereignty over the country.
It is thought that the close proximity of and interference by this nondemocratic country will
eventually cause Taiwan to fall back into its authoritarian roots that run quite deep in its history.
Ultimately, one can assume that this will not be the case: Taiwan has more than sufficient struc-
tural foundations created by specific actors that will allow the country to continue to foster and
sustain its democracy. In the end, its slow build-up to consolidation will help, not hurt, what it
has created, and there is potential for Taiwan to have a positive effect upon China and influence it
to become a democracy itself.
Until relatively recently (within the past fifty years), Taiwan had been governed through-
out much of its existence by foreign colonizers. For a period in the 1600s, the Dutch East India
Company established a trading post on the island, though they were somewhat laissez-faire polit-
ically. They did not follow this practice, however, economically: they required a cut of all profits
made by the islanders and head taxes on Taiwanese citizens over six years of age (Roy 2003).
Like most Europeans, they tried to civilize the aboriginals who inhabited the island, and often
tried (and occasionally succeeded) to abolish traditional cultural practice (Roy 2003). The Dutch
also worked to establish strong economic ties with the Chinese on the island, but in doing so
created a rift between the Taiwanese and Chinese as economic competitors when the Dutch left
the island at the end of the 1600s (Roy 2003). Ultimately, this conflict led to the just over two-
hundred-year period during which the Chinese claimed authority over Taiwan, starting in 1683
when the Qing Dynasty of China first claimed sovereignty over the land until 1895 (Roy 2003).
52
Because the Taiwanese population was so culturally diverse, the already-existing conflicts among
ethnic groups made Taiwan difficult to control; the Taiwanese people would in turn often revolt
or rebel against the few Chinese oppressors who inhabited the island if they felt the Chinese were
becoming too harsh (Roy 2003). The Chinese eventually were unable, and unwilling, to deal with
the tumultuous island population, and so when the Japanese took over in 1895, it was something
of a relief (FAPA 2016).
The Japanese gained control over Taiwan and other parts of Asia through their conquests
in the Sino-Japanese War (Roy 2003). They ruled Taiwan with a military dictatorship, but
eventually amended some of their programs to allow the Taiwanese to have a small say in their
governance (Roy 2003). In addition to having small assemblies in the five provinces of Tai-
wan (created by the Japanese), the ruling country also allowed meaningful elections beginning
in 1920 that gave some of the Taiwanese population (tax-paying males over twenty-five years
of age) even greater political power (Roy 2003). Additionally, Taiwans economy grew rapidly
under their intense economic programs (FAPA 2016). In fact, the Japanese actually changed the
entire economic structure of Taiwan; before their alterations, the Taiwanese had mainly grown
crops like rice, which they could eat in addition to sell (Roy 2003). In order to increase their
profits, the Japanese switched the main crop from rice to sugar, which worked because the sugar
farmers essentially only had the option to sell their product, and not keep a portion of it for them-
selves (Roy 2003). The Japanese also instituted a pseudo-assimilation program that was more
about abandoning Chinese heritage than anything else: they legalized marriage between Japanese
and Taiwanese citizens, allowed the Taiwanese to attend Japanese schools, changed the school
system on the island so that the Japanese language would be taught instead of Chinese, and even
encouraged Japanese citizens to move to Taiwan (Roy 2003). Japan far exceeded the Dutch and
the Chinese with the extent of their assimilation, as many Taiwanese readily volunteered to fight
for the Japanese army in World War II (Roy 2003). And though the Japanese were quite severe in
the way that they handled their rule over Taiwan, it was nothing compared to what the Taiwanese
would experience when the Kuomintang reasserted Chinese power over the island.
China reassumed control of Taiwan at the end of World War II, after Japan had been
defeated by the allies (FAPA 2016). Of the two political parties that were fighting for power, Mao
Tse-tung and the Chinese communists were the ones operating under platform that they would
53
aid both Korea and Taiwan with their independence movements (FAPA 2016). Chiang Kai-shek
of the Nationalist party (the Kuomintang, or KMT) believed that since Taiwan had been part of
China before Japan had taken over, China should still claim sovereignty; the Allied Powers all
sided with the KMT over the communists in this regard (Roy 2003). Once the Kuomintang were
defeated by the communists in 1949, they retreated from mainland China and established them-
selves on the island of Taiwan, instituting martial law (Tien 1992). In order to keep control, the
KMT executed over 20,000 Taiwanese citizens in order to send a message to protestors who had
begun revolting in retaliation to the KMTs presence (FAPA 2016). Through the destruction of
the class of Taiwanese political and academic elite, the KMT was able to create an oppressive
hard authoritarianism that allowed for them to consolidate state power and control the politics,
economy, and people of Taiwan (Tien 1992).
This rigid rule lasted through to nearly the end of the twentieth century. Only one politi-
cal party was legally allowed in the state: the Kuomintang (Rigger 2011). The KMT did continue
to employ the system of voting that the Japanese had established before them, but it was more
perfunctory than before. That being said, it did provide a good stepping stone to the transition to
democracy that would eventually occur (Roy 2003). Generally, however, the KMT dismantled
what the Japanese had done, especially economically, by putting their own programs in place that
involved taking Taiwanese land and possessions that were deemed of use to the military govern-
ment (Roy 2003). These did little to spur the economy forward and hurt the Taiwanese popula-
tion by sending more people into poverty (Roy 2003).
The United States also had a hand in keeping Taiwan under KMT rule. At first, it had
seemed as if the US would not support the KMT when they split from Beijing, but the invasion
of communist North Korea into South Korea changed that (Dumbaugh 2009). As a result, the US
gave money to the KMT in order to foster its economic advancement in the 1950s as part of their
attempt to prevent the spread of communisma dictatorial government, they believed, was better
than a communist one (Tien 1992). Then in 1971, the US impeded Taiwans sovereignty a second
time. Throughout most of the thirty or so years prior, since the creation of the Peoples Republic
of China (PRC), the US had sided with the KMT as being the official leaders of the Republic of
China (ROC), and members of the KMT represented China in the United Nations (Dumbaugh
2009). However, this time, they sided with Beijing and the Chinese communists over Chiang
54
Kai-shek, which swayed the UN to pass Resolution 2758 that only recognized the legitimacy of
the communist regime in China and forced the KMT out of the UN (Winkler 2012). Though the
US did vote against the resolution, after having swung their support toward Beijing previously,
they were in the clear minority and Taiwan was dispelled from the UN (Winkler 2012). The US
used this as a strategic move in their Cold War fight with the Soviet Union: they believed that
aligning themselves with the Peoples Republic of China, with whom they shared a common ene-
my in the USSR, would bolster their stance against them (Dumbaugh 2009). This strategic move
by the United States cost Taiwan for years to come, as the Taiwanese government has attempted
to regain entry since the 1990s, but to no avail (Winkler 2012).
Despite these troublesome beginnings, there are a multitude of reasons as to why Tai-
wans democracy was created as an institution that can and will last. In order to prove this point,
four causal mechanisms will be explored. Three of them are structural: the modernization theory
of economic development, the Liberal/Democratic (Political) consensus theory, and Linzs theory
of linkage among countries. Additionally, the impact of specific actors in Taiwans democratiza-
tion is something that also must be considered. These mechanisms will be explored, compared,
and combined so as to show how Taiwans transition to democracy has a substantial basis for
future success.
Modernization theory originated in 1959 when S. M. Lipset found a correlation between
economic development and democracy, and the theory has since become a simplistic potential
explanation as to why some countries are democracies and others arentthe greater the eco-
nomic development a country has, the more likely it is or will become a democracy (Dahl 2003).
Though it is not without its exceptions, modernization theory allows one to correctly predict
77.5 percent of the 4,126 annual observations of regimes just by looking at per capital income,
and is by far the best predictor of political regimes. (Dahl 2003) In the case of Taiwan, serious
economic growth began in the 1960s, and despite an economic downturn in the 1970s, continued
through the modern day to create the strong, sound economy that Taiwan currently boasts (Tien
1992). Specific pieces of its economic growth attribute to its longevity. Taiwans gross national
product (also known as GNP, the sum of all goods and services produced in a country) grew over
fifty times in size from the beginning of its economic rise to 2000 (Lau 2002). The current GNP,
according to 2016 data, is roughly US$445 billion, nearly 75 times its starting point over half a
55
century ago (Trading Economics 2016). A key factor in Taiwans strong economy is the fact that
it exports more than it imports (Lau 2002). In the late 1950s, the KMT transitioned the economy
to an export-oriented industrialization (EOI) policy because Taiwan was in danger of defaulting
on international payments (Tien 1992). This was halted somewhat in the 1970s when Taiwan was
forced out of the UN and became more isolated, especially coupled with the oil crisis of 1973
(Tien 1992). However, with the political reforms of the late 1980s, Taiwan opened itself back
up again to international investment and trade, and its growing dependence upon international
trade is a major factor in its economic growth (Meltzer 2014). When looked at simplistically, the
modernization theory mechanism is easy to prove: Taiwans economy grew, and thus it became
a democracy and joined the other 75% of economically strong democracies in the world. Its
strength has likely pushed it past the necessary threshold of sustainability, and it will not foresee-
ably regress back to a version of authoritarianism.
However, modernization theory may be too simplistic to fully explain everything about
Taiwanese democratic sustainability. When one examines more pieces of data about Taiwanese
international trade statistics, it reveals certain patterns that could potentially affect its democra-
tization. As Taiwan has become more reliant upon foreign trade, it has become more dependent
upon other countries to sustain its economy. In 1992, Taiwans largest trading partner was the
United States: the US held over 25% of Taiwans foreign trade (Meltzer 2014). By 2012, the
US had dropped to Taiwans third largest trading partner and held less than 10% of Taiwanese
trade (Meltzer 2014). This fact alone doesnt seem overly concerning; however, there is anoth-
er interesting point to consider. In 1992, China was the 26th most important Taiwanese trading
partner (Meltzer 2014). By 2012, China became Taiwans number one most important trading
partner and represents over 21% of total trade (Meltzer 2014). This may not be consequential,
but it shows a clear shift from reliance on a well-established, capitalist democracy to the worlds
biggest communist country. Though Taiwan has established itself as a strong country in its own
rightit now qualifies as one of the four Asian Tigers, along with Hong Kong, Singapore, and
South Korea its growing reliance upon trade with China could broaden Chinas influence over
the politics of Taiwan, which is exactly what China wants to occur. While modernization theory
seems apt to describe Taiwans shift to democracy, it doesnt seem sufficient to provide reason
for its sustainability, and therefore, further exploration is necessary.
56
Building upon modernization theory is the Liberal/Democratic economic mechanism. It

goes further into investigating the impact of Taiwanese economic development and helps give a
broader idea of what, other than economic growth, affected the shift, and what that potentially
means for its sustainability. In particular, the focus is on the education mechanism: the idea that
education is an important factor in the creation of a democracy (Aghion 2009). The education
mechanism is a sociological explanation of the impact of the economic development that was ex-
plored previously. Essentially, economic development creates more opportunity for a government
to spend money on education, which in turn leads to a growing understanding of the world and
greater tolerance for ones peers, and ultimately, a democracy is created out of this knowledge
(Aghion 2009). The fundamental assumption beneath this is that education broadens ones out-
look and opens people to understanding the thoughts, feelings, and rights of others, which pre-
vents them from adhering to extremist ideas and increases their ability to make rational choices
that move away from dictatorial societies and towards democracies (Aghion 2009). According to
this theory, states with strong economies and strong education systems will become democracies.
Taiwan fits this description well. In addition to its economic strength, Taiwan also has an
incredibly strong history of education. A robust education system had been set up under Japa-
nese rule in the 19th century that was continued by the KMT, with obvious changes like a shift
from the Japanese language back to Chinese (Roy 2003). As a result, Taiwan has one of the most
educated populations in East Asia, with a nearly 100% literacy rate (Tien 1992). Additionally,
the Taiwanese people have often been ones to reject authoritarianism, though they generally
only staged small, unsuccessful rebellions (if any) (Roy 2003). Linzs theory of linkage can also
be tied here, as it has a lot to do with general education of the population: linkage is influence
through the flow of communication from other countries. This in itself is a form of education,
and even under the KMT, access to information was not incredibly restricted. This access grew
especially towards the end of their rule, and Taiwan now has the same level of access to mass
media and modern transportation as most western countries (Tien 1992). This contributes to not
only the economic exchange already discussed, but also cultural exchange that increases the pop-
ulations awareness of other cultures and people, and therefore lends itself to a democracy.
As with all theories, there are points of opposition that must be considered. Within the
education mechanism, one must inspect what kind of education is being delivered. For instance,
57
if the government is spending money on education, they could be influencing the information
being disseminated to have a certain kind of bias that would make the public think that an au-
thoritarian government is what is best for them. In respect to linkage, depending upon which
countries a state is receiving information from, they could be influenced in many directions, and
potentially back to authoritarianism. In Taiwans case, its already been established that they are
relying more heavily upon China for trade than they were even twenty years ago, and less upon
the United States, which means more linkage with a non-democratic country. If this is the case,
then the education mechanism would hurt, not help, Taiwan sustain its democracy.
However, the education mechanism still appears to help substantiate the modernization
mechanism much more when being used to prove Taiwans transition to and maintenance of
its democracy. Without a proper education, Taiwan may not have reached full democratiza-
tionoftentimes, countries with insufficient education and level of tolerance will reach a state of
half-democracy or fall quickly back to autocracy; this was not the case for Taiwan. This implies
that their type of education is substantial enough to help foster the democracy and allow it to
thrive. With the support of an educated and tolerant population, it should continue to prosper as
it has, despite the influence of outsiders like China. At the same time, it still seems as if theres
a mechanism lacking here. Can it be simply these structural mechanisms that caused Taiwans
democratization? The answer, unsurprisingly, is no.
Democratization and its theories are complex and convoluted, and as has been explored
herein, there are many arguments for and against certain causal mechanisms. Therefore, it is
clear that one can simply not do enough to explain democratization, and it makes sense to in-
clude the impact of specific agents on Taiwans transition to democracy. The KMT began moving
towards democratization in 1986 under President Chian Ching-Kuo by legalizing opposition
parties, which allowed the newly formed Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to exist legally in
Taiwan (Tien 1992). He then proceeded with lifting martial law for the first time since it was in-
stituted in 1949 (Tien 1992). Ching-Kuo even created a twelve-person committee to study reform
measures and overruled KMT members who wanted to push back to oppression (Tien 1992).
The next important actor in Taiwans democratization was Lee Teng-hui, Ching-Kuos appointed
successor; since he had been chosen by Ching-Kuo himself, Teng-hui was able to continue the
already-begun reforms, finish drafting a new Taiwanese constitution, and eventually establish
58
the first election of the Legislative Yuan (Taiwans U.S. Congress equivalent) in 1992. After this
came the first official democratic election in 1996 (Roy 2003). Without these two incredibly im-
portant political actors, Taiwan likely would not have made the change to democracy. Even with
all the structural factors working it its favor, it took actors to actually begin the transition, and if
they had not, the KMT would have continued rule indefinitely. That does not necessarily seem to
have much to do with Taiwans ability to continue its democracy, but since the way in which it
democratized was not volatile, implications are that it is much more stable. The fact that agents
of the government did the work to change the government from the inside out, as opposed to
staging a violent uprising, would suggest that the Taiwanese government has an incredibly solid
base. Different groups were not and are not fighting for control, power does not seem to be con-
tested, and everything proceeded in remarkably smooth fashion. When combined with the strong,
ever-growing economy and excellent system of education and communication, it appears that
Taiwan has benefited from structural and agential mechanisms that will sustain it into the future.
There are some causal mechanisms that havent yet been touched upon, simply for the
fact that they are invalid explanations as to why the Taiwanese government shifted to a de-
mocracy or would work against its sustainability. It is possible that one could attempt to make
the argument that the Marxist economic (class) mechanism is a valid theory as to why Taiwan
became a democracy, though they would be wrong. The country did experience large economic
advancement, which led to the creation of a strong middle class, and then ultimately an uprising
performed primarily by the middle class that resulted in democracy. However, the order in which
this all occurred doesnt make sense with the theory, and the uprising in question didnt lead to
anything in the way of democracy. The Chungli Incident, which occurred on February 27, 1947,
is likely what someone making this case would point to as an uprising: a widow was killed by
an officer from the Monopoly Bureau who struck her with the end of his pistol for selling cig-
arettes in the marketplace and resisting the surrender of her goods (Roy 2003). As a result, the
crowd retaliated against the officers, one of whom fired his gun in the air to stop the chaos and
ended up wounding a bystander (Roy 2003). The next day, over two thousand people demon-
strated against the KMT in public and held a petition calling for the execution of the agents,
the resignation of the [Monopoly Bureau] director, and the revision of monopoly regulations.
(Roy 2003) The crowd was fired upon by the guards at the building, resulting in the death of two
59
people, and only serving to cause further outrage at the Chinese government (Roy 2003). Chen
Li, the Governor General at the time of this event, was pulled into a series of negotiations with a
quickly formed Settlement Committee of Taiwanese elites, who at one point threatened a violent
uprising (Roy 2003). However, the negotiations eventually died out, and few reforms were made
as the KMT redirected their focus to fighting occurring on mainland China against the commu-
nists (Roy 2003). That fact alone makes this an invalid piece of evidence to support the Marx-
ists economic mechanism. As already discussed, real reforms werent instituted until the late
1980s. This small rebellion by the Taiwanese people didnt actually bring anything to fruition.
No event like this occurred before 1987 to directly influence the course of the regime change.
Furthermore, Taiwans economic advancement and strong middle class did not even form un-
til sometime after in the 1960s. While it is likely that its economic strength and the prominent
middle class are factors that have helped sustain Taiwans democratization into the present and
will continue to sustain its democracy into the future, it is still implausible to say that the shift
was caused as a result of this mechanism or that it has anything to do with this particular case,
considering these factors.
Additionally, the cultural theories surrounding the modernization mechanism have to be
addressed and dispelled. According to Ronald Inglehart and Wayne Bakers view of the mod-
ernization theory, cultural change has widely been determined to be path-dependent, and while
economic development such that Taiwan experienced in the 1960s usually brings about cultural
changes, strong cultural ties, like religion, are what shape the foundation of a people and are
rooted so that they still have influence over the people fundamentally, no matter what advance-
ments are made (Dahl 2003). This is all well and good, and in Taiwan, a majority of the popu-
lation does practice Confucianism, a uniting factor that was adopted from centuries of Chinese
influence (Roy 2003). However, already there is a problem with the idea that Confucianism could
be what created and will sustain a Taiwanese democracy: there is much debate as to whether
Confucianism is inherently nondemocratic or not, it provides first and foremost a dedication to
the family and then the state, and only two Confucian countries (Japan and the Philippines) ex-
perienced periods of democracy before 1990 (Dahl 2003). That aside, Taiwan is still not a cultur-
ally united country. In the early period of Taiwan, aboriginals from surrounding states migrated
looking for new economic opportunities, like fishing possibilities and natural resources (Roy
60
2003). Additionally, the Chinese, Japanese, and Fujianese all made their way over to the island in
its early years of inhabitance (Roy 2003). Between this original colonization of the island by the
aboriginals from the Asian mainland, to the colonization by the Dutch, and Chinese and Japanese
influences, the state of Taiwan holds an incredibly diverse population with many different lan-
guages, traditions, and cultures (Roy 2003). Therefore, it doesnt seem plausible that the cultural-
ist version of the modernization theory would exist in the case of Taiwan, as it seems to have not
been a factor in its democratization based on the already-discussed theories and that the diversity
would have been, if anything, working against the Taiwanese people. In fact, it is likely that this
is something that prevented Taiwanese people from banding together in the fashion of the class
mechanism discussed above, as different cultural factions existed throughout the state.
In order to do a thorough examination of Taiwans case, it would be helpful to look at
a similar case. For the purpose of this paper, a comparison of Taiwans East Asian neighbor,
Thailand, is appropriate. Thailand has a very similar profile to Taiwan upon first inspection.
They are both Asian cultures with a large portion of the population practicing the same religion
(in the case of Thailand, Buddhism), they both have strong and developing economies, a strong
and educated middle class, and they both made their transitions to democracy in the same period
(the 1990s) (Kurlantzick 2011). Before it could boast a democracy, Thailand also had a military
government, but in contrast to Taiwan, it was brought down by a rebellion of hundreds of thou-
sands of Thai citizens in 1992 (Kurlantzick 2011). After holding several elections and creating a
new constitution, Thailand was officially declared a free country in 1999 (Kurlantzick 2011). If
one stopped there, it would seem as if Thailand and Taiwan were almost one in the same devel-
opmentally. However, the ending of the story for the Thai people is much different than for the
Taiwanese.
The 2001 election in Thailand brought to power wealthy businessman Thanksin Shinawa-
tra, who promised incredible reforms directed at the poor that helped him win the election and
then reelection in 2005 in almost dictatorial fashion (Kurlantzick 2011). This angered the middle
class, who started protesting him and his government and called for a different form of de-
mocracyspecifically, a military oligarchy to be established (Kurlantzick 2011). Then, in late
2006, a military coup turned the Thai democracy into a version of soft authoritarianism where
the military has the largest role in determining political outcomes, the middle class is growing
61
less and less pro-democracy, and the new military in charge has used threats and even resorted
to violence in order to silence opposition (Kurlantzick 2011). This is essentially where Thailand
exists today, a cautionary tale for young democracies everywhere.
The reason for referring to Thailands failed democracy is not to show the ways in which
Taiwan itself might fail, but to prove that Taiwan has created something far more stable than its
neighbor. Taiwan didnt create its democracy through violence like Thailand did, and while many
countries have been successful with that route, the way Taiwans democracy came into being im-
plies greater stability and a sound structure to grow and expand upon. The government changed
from the inside out in a very smooth manner that made it easy to continue a transition. The fact
that it took nearly twenty years to consolidate shows dedication to reform that will surely con-
tinue into the future. In fact, Taiwan passed Samuel Huntingtons two turnover test in the 2008
election, which marked the second time that the country had elected a person from a different
party (McLean-Dreyfus 2011). In the most recently held election in 2016, not only did Taiwan
again change parties for a third time when the incumbent KMT candidate was knocked out by
DPP candidate Dr. Tsai Ing-wen (who became Taiwans first female president), the election also
contained candidates from three parties (aside from the KMT and DPP, the third was the People
First Party, or PFP) (McLean-Dreyfus 2011). In its 20 years since democratization, Taiwan has
shown incredible progress and seems as if it finally has solidified its place among the worlds
democracies.
Finally, in regard to Chinas influence over Taiwan, one has to think that it is possible for
Taiwan to have influence over China. Though it may still be disputed territory, Chinas relation-
ship with Taiwan has increased in amiability even within the past decade (Bernstein 2015). Tai-
wan is seeing a higher influx of Chinese tourists and college students, and Taiwan is also sending
its own population frequently to the mainland (Bernstein 2015). The Chinese people who come
over to Taiwan are seeing a much freer, more liberal state than their own, and the knowledge that
they bring back with them could start stirring up the populations desire for democracy. This is
especially true in regard to the Chinese students who are getting their education in Taiwan. As
discussed earlier, education played an incredibly important role in the establishment and consol-
idation of the Taiwanese democracy, and there is no reason why it cant do the same for China.
The more people who visit Taiwan from China, the more educated and influenced theyll be, and
62
instead of China dragging Taiwan down from democracy, Taiwan could actually help pull China
up towards it.
To conclude, it appears as if Taiwan has made a stable democracy out of itself: through
the actions of specific government actors in the years before its transition, its strong econom-
ic base, excellent education system, and influence from other democratic countries around the
world, Taiwan will continue to be stable and prosper. The proof is already there, cemented by
the third election in which the control of the countrys politics switched hands from one party to
another. While the KMT still exists in Taiwan as a more conservative political party, it is clear
that it is not the same Kuomintang as the one that put the country under martial law in 1949,
but rather is much closer to the KMT that began Taiwan on its journey to democratization in the
1980s. Taiwan has set an example for the rest of the worlds nondemocratic countries to follow,
and hopefully it can have a positive influence upon the next wave of democratization.
About the Author

Taylor Veracka is a third year undergraduate at Johns Hopkins University completing both
the International Studies and Film and Media studies majors. Her research focuses primarily
on comparative politics in International Relations. She would like to thank her professor, Dr.
Mazzuca, for his help and support.
63
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Brookings Institute, 20 June 2012. Web. 09 May 2016.
64
Religiosity and Citizen Attitudes on Crime in Latin America

Alexa Garrett
Latin America has been deemed one of the most crime stricken regions in the world. Scholars
examining the increased approval of vigilante behavior as a result of this violence typically ig-
nore the role of religiosity. Using survey data from the 2012 round of the Latin American Pub-
lic Opinion Project (LAPOP), I investigate the influence of religiosity as well as Catholic and
Evangelical identity in determining citizens opinions on extra-legal action. As expected, there is
a negative correlation between Religiosity and approval of extra-legal behavior. Controlling for
other factors, Catholics express greater approval of vigilantism and excessively aggressive police
tactics, while the effect of Evangelical identity is either null or negative.
L atin America has been through many changes in recent decades. Governments have failed
to respond adequately to problematic challenges of democratic transitions across the region,
leading to widespread concern and spikes in corruption, insecurity, and crime. Latin America
is now considered one of the most dangerous places in the world. This study contributes to our
understanding of the factors which influence citizen attitudes on non-democratic responses to the
scourge of crime. I focus on the region of Latin America not only because it is facing a particu-
larly difficult struggle with violent street crime, but also because focusing on one region helps
control for confounding cultural factors that can bias results in cross-national comparative re-
search. While much previous work investigates citizen support for extra-legal responses to crime,
such as vigilantism, a commonly omitted variable is religiosity. I theorize that increasing levels
of religiosity should help mitigate citizens temptation to approve of violent and illegal resolu-
tions to rampant crime.
Using survey data from the region of Latin America collected by the Latin American Pub-
lic Opinion Project (LAPOP) in 2012, I find evidence that stronger levels of religiosity do in fact
correlate with lower support for vigilantism and other non-democratic solutions to crime. I also
show that ceteris paribus, Catholics are more likely than evangelicals to support such extra-legal
measures.
65
Background: Crime in Latin America

Latin Americas crime rates continue to be among the highest in the world. The region is respon-
sible for half of the worlds homicides (Ungar, 2011). With a rate of 27.5 homicides per 100,000
people in comparison to the Worlds average of 8.8 per 100,000, Latin America tops the charts
in murder rates (Ungar 2011). The region is home to some of the most dangerous countries on
the globe, the worst of which are El Salvador and Honduras. The two countries have extremely
high crime, victimization, and homicide rates. According to Insight Crime in 2014, El Salvador
and Honduras led with homicide rates of 68.6 and 66 per 100,000 respectively. Guatemala had
a rate of 31 per 100,000 in 2014, which is moderate only in comparison to the extremely violent
statistics of the region. Nicaragua on the opposite end of the scale ranked fairly low with 8.7 per
100,000 the country ranked just under the global average of 8.8 per 100,000 (Ungar 2011).
Figure 1 shows there is a positive correlation between countries with higher victimization rates
and approval of vigilantism. Latin America contains three of the five countries listed as having
nearly half of their urban population [having] had at least one member victimized (Gaviria,
2001).
Two of the three listed countries are Guatemala and El Salvador. El Salvador rates show
almost 60 percent of urban households suffered some form of victimization (Gaviria 2001).
During the period of 1979 to 2001 Guatemala experienced a major decrease in crime. While
crime and victimization for the region, as a collective whole is detrimental, it varies sufficiently
among countries to allow for further analysis. The countries in the region differ in their crime
rates, but by isolating crime as a unique characteristic it is possible to determine specific correlat-
ing factors.
66
Cr me V ct m zat on & Approva of V g ant sm

Guatemala
45
El Salvador Ecuador
Dom Rep Bolivia
Peru
4
Nicaragua
Approve V g an sm
Honduras
35
Paraguay Mexico
Colombia
Chile A gen na
Argentina
Venezuela
3
Costa Rica
Uruguay
Brazil
25
Panama
1 2 3
V c m za on Ra e
Figure 1: Scatter Plot of Crime Victimization Rate and Approval of Vigilantism
Religiosity
Although there is some research on the effect of victimization and fear of crime on citizen sup-
port for vigilantism and other anti-social or extra-legal behavior, scholars investigating crime and
citizen attitudes in Latin America largely ignore the role of a persons religiosity. Religion can
have an important influence in terms of how citizens deal with stress and traumatic surroundings.
Yonker describes spirituality and religiosity as an active personal devotion and passionate quest
largely within the self-acknowledged framework of a sacred theological community (2012, p.
300). In other areas of research, religiosity is evaluated by both qualitative and quantitative mea-
sures. I follow Lederman (2002) in conceiving it as a persons self-proclaimed importance of re-
ligion in combination with church involvement and attendance (Lederman, 2002). This variable
incorporates more than one aspect of religion, incorporating not only ones personal importance
of religion but also indicators of attendance and organizational commitment. Combining these
elements allows for a more accurate measure.
A study conducted in Sweden shows that religiosity does play a role in criminal attitudes
and behavior (Pettersson, 1991). Previous studies show higher religiosity is associated with less
risk of deviance (Yonker, 2012, p. 306). Religious beliefs can be associated with lower levels of
illicit conduct and considered a psychological force that can be used to reduce risk behaviors
67
(Yonker, 2012, p. 300). As Abar (2009) reports, The level of an individuals self-reported religi-
osity, as well as the extent to which these religious beliefs are internalized, seem to potentially be
functioning as a promoting factor of desirable outcomes and a protective factor against negative
outcomes (p. 269).
Religion allows for people to better understand themselves and allows for people to
handle their own situations better (Laird, 2011, Rubin, 2014). Religion is not just a belief without
action. As Rubin (2014) explains, people do not just live their religion by thinking, believing,
and orienting themselves; rather, they feel and act by way of religious meanings and representa-
tion in real time and in real social spaces (p. 12).
Evidence of how religiosity is seen to affect propensity to commit crime and criminal
attitudes can be seen in the common practice for gangs in Latin America to not seek out and kill
ex-members who choose to convert to Evangelical Christianity (Brenneman 2014). Part of the
reason gangs allow former members to denounce their gang affiliation is that the ex-members,
in an attempt to follow the strict rules of the church, will not serve as a threat to gangs criminal
business. There are limits, however, as gangs in places heavily stricken by crime, as in parts of El
Salvador, no longer allow for converts to escape retaliation due to their conversion (Brenneman,
2014). Therefore, in the most violent areas, the link between religion and crime may be
mitigated.
Religious Identity in Latin America

In addition to the challenge of insecurity amidst democratic transitions, the religious culture of
Latin America is also undergoing a major shift. There is a large decline in Catholicism and major
growth in Protestant and Evangelical identification (LAPOP). Catholicism previously dominated
the region since colonization, but in more recent decades citizens are identifying as Protestant
and Evangelical in almost equal number in some countries. In El Salvador, the Protestant pop-
ulation increased from 17 to 35 percent and four out of five are Evangelical and or Pentecostal
(Christian, 2015). Whereas citizens used to identify as Catholic, Latin Americans no longer
identify with this denomination by default (Boas & Smith, 2015). El Salvador lagged behind,
being one of the few countries the Catholic Church has not lost a large amount of identifiers
(Boas & Smith, 2015).
68
Unlike El Salvador, in recent years there has been a rise in Protestant participation and
less Catholic participation. It is possible that the change in religious affiliation can also be a
variable associated with levels of criminal behavior. Evangelicals report having higher levels
of church attendance. Brenneman (2014) argues that institutions such as churches and mosques
play a role in changing a persons characteristics and that the actual engagement of worship is an
important factor for reform. Evangelicals are also now associated with gang conversion allowing
protection to gang members to leave their gangs and criminal behaviors behind while upholding
the new rules of the Church. As Brenneman (2014) explains, Evangelical-Pentecostal Christian-
ity has become a key site for the reconstruction of identity and for the experience of community
and camaraderie, especially for young males (p. 113). Because of the strict rules and restriction
of the Evangelical-Pentecostal churches, gang leaders often allow for evangelical exemption
assuming the disbanded member poses no threat to the gang (Brenneman, 2012, p. 116). Arias
(2014) describes a disappointed interviewee unsatisfied with the Catholic church for seeing
priests frightened to take action in their own community, who only sees an evangelical presence
in the crime infested community.
Hypothesis
Given the evidence that religiosity and Evangelical identity in particular can reduce the likeli-
hood of criminal activity, I also expect that these will play important roles in shaping citizen atti-
tudes toward crime in their communities and the appropriate responses to it. Since religion gives
comfort to people in stressful situations and asks its adherents to maintain strong principles even
in the face of adversity, I expect that the more religious a citizen is the less likely she is to sup-
port non-democratic solutions to crime like vigilantism and human rights abuses by the police.
Furthermore, given that many Latin American citizens desiring a richer religious experience are
turning to Evangelical Christianity, I expect that self-identifying Evangelicals will benefit more
from the emotional and psychological resistance that religion can provide. Such citizens will
therefore be less likely to give in to the temptation to support radical, illegal, and authoritarian
solutions to crime that many in the region are starting to promote.
Hypothesis 1: As religiosity increases, support for extra-legal solutions to crime will decrease,
ceteris paribus
69
Hypothesis 2: Evangelical citizens will be less supportive of extra-legal solutions to crime, ceter-
is paribus
Research Design
To test the hypotheses, I use data from the 2012 LAPOP public opinion surveys conducted in 18
Latin American countries. I analyze the effect of religiosity and religious identity on four differ-
ent measures of support for extra-legal solutions to crime. This allows for greater confidence in
the results than would occur if only investigating one dependent variable. The first variable asks
respondents to what extent they would approve of police torturing a criminal that was threatening
their neighborhood. Response options include would approve, would not approve, but would
understand, and would neither approve nor understand. The variable is coded so that higher
values indicate more approval. The second dependent variable asks a similar question about ap-
proval of a community killing a criminal that is afflicting it. The response options are the same.
The third dependent variable ask respondents to what extent they approve of vigilantism, and is
measured on a scale of 1 to 7 with higher values indicating more approval. Finally the fourth
dependent variable asks respondents whether they think police should always abide by the law
when pursuing criminals or whether they can sometimes cross the line, This is a binary vari-
able, with crossing the line given a value of 1.
The main independent variables of interest are Religiosity and Evangelical. Religiosity is
an index comprising of three different questions. The first asks to what extent religion is import-
ant in the survey respondents life, the second measures the frequency with which the respondent
attends religious services, and the third indicates the extent to which the respondent participates
in religious organizations. This creates a scale of Religiosity from one to ten with higher values
indicating greater religious commitment. Evangelical is binary variable in which respondents
receive a one if they identify as Evangelical Christian or zero if they do not.
A number of control variables are included based on the possibility that they correlate
with both the individual variables of interest and the dependent variable. The controls found here
are commonly used in other work on citizen attitudes in the face of high crime in Latin America
(Carreras, 2013; Perez, 2015; Nivette, 2016; Zizumbo-Colunga, 2013).
70
Table 1: Fixed Effects OLS Regressions of Religiosity and Support Extralegal Activities
Police Can Tor- Community Can Approve of Police Can

ture Kill Criminals Vigilantism Break the Law
Religiosity -0.006*** -0.015*** -0.056*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001)
Fear of Crime 0.035*** 0.026*** 0.135*** 0.024***

(0.006) (0.006) (0.022) (0.004)
Crime Victimization 0.111*** 0.096*** 0.169*** 0.044***

(0.013) (0.012) (0.046) (0.008)
Police Corruption 0.075*** 0.081*** 0.431*** 0.026**

(0.016) (0.015) (0.059) (0.010)
Catholic 0.059*** 0.031** 0.046 0.042***

(0.014) (0.013) (0.049) (0.008)
Evangelical -0.001 -0.033* -0.287*** 0.009

(0.018) (0.017) (0.066) (0.011)
View of Economy -0.027*** -0.015** -0.033 0.014***

(0.006) (0.006) (0.022) (0.004)
Education -0.013*** -0.007*** -0.058*** 0.002***

(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Age -0.003*** -0.000 -0.021*** -0.002***

(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Gender 0.098*** 0.066*** 0.037 0.036***

(0.010) (0.009) (0.036) (0.006)
Life Satisfaction -0.004 -0.007 -0.038 -0.012**

(0.007) (0.007) (0.025) (0.004)
Trust -0.036*** -0.041*** -0.094*** -0.014***

(0.006) (0.006) (0.021) (0.004)
71
Approve of President 0.009 -0.009* -0.104*** -0.006*

(0.006) (0.005) (0.021) (0.004)
N 25913 25929 26114 25926

R2 0.022 0.020 0.030 0.019
Standard errors in parentheses; Constant not shown
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 1 shows the results of four models using Ordinary Least Squares regression. All
four dependent variables help to distinguish a respondents approval for extralegal activities.
Because of potential country level variation that could affect citizen attitudes the regression uses
fixed effects, estimated with the xtreg command in STATA. The 2012 data includes four ques-
tions that help determine a persons approval for extralegal behavior.
As expected, Religiosity has a strong negative correlation across the four separate depen-
dent variables. Each one unit increase Religiosity correlates with a .056 reduction on the scale of
a respondents Approval of Vigilantism. That is, those with a lower religiosity approve of ex-
tralegal actions significantly more than those with a higher religiosity. This effect is consistent
across all four models and is statistically significant at p<0.001. Religiosity therefore reduces
support for police that act outside of the law and for communities that engage in various form of
vigilantism. Although the effect sizes are relatively small, in comparison with other variables,
the influence is far from negligible. For a point of comparison, the difference in terms of support
for Vigilantism between the least religious citizen and the most religious citizen would be a fac-
tor of 0.56, which is three times larger than the difference between victims of crime and non-vic-
tims.
I also find support for Hypothesis 2 which predicts that Evangelicals are less supportive
of extra-legal solutions to crime. Although the effect of Evangelical identification is null in the
first and fourth model, there is evidence that Evangelicals are less likely to support Vigilantism
in models two and three. As a point of contrast, those identifying as Catholic differ largely from
those identifying as Evangelical. When compared against all religious identities other than Evan-
gelicalism (which is also included in the model), Catholics actually show statistically significant
support for extralegal behaviors in three of the four categories.
72
Unsurprisingly, Fear of Crime and Crime Victimization are also both strongly correlated
with the dependent variables. This is consistent with prior literature (Nivette, 2016).
The regressions also include variables such as Education, Age, and Gender as basic
demographic control variables, and a number of these have statistically significant effects on
the attitudes toward extra-legal solutions to crime. Education shows a very significant negative
correlation across all models, showing that the more educated, the less approving. In all but one
model, Age has a negative correlation indicating that older citizens are more opposed to illicit
behavior. Gender has a strong statistical significance in almost every model and aside from the
Approval of Vigilantism men have a greater approval for extralegal action. Life Satisfaction is
a variable is only mildly in one category. Political and economic variables are utilized as well
in the regression. In all but one category Police Corruption, View of Economy, and Approval of
President are statistically significant.
Conclusion
As hypothesized, Religiosity has a negative correlation with approval of illicit, criminal, and ex-
tralegal behaviors. Across four different models of approval of different forms of non-democratic
solutions to crime, citizens expressing stronger religious commitments are less approving, ceteris
paribus. This is an important contribution to our knowledge of what factors influence the way in
which Latin American citizens are processing the scourge of crime and the possible solutions to
it. It points to an important role that churches can play in helping reduce the urge to seek rad-
ical and counterproductive solutions to crime. The analysis also indicates that the turn toward
Evangelicalism in the region may be mitigating the effect crime has on support for extra-legal
solutions, as in two of the models related to vigilantism, Evangelical identity is strongly and
negatively correlated with the dependent variable. This is in contrast to Catholic identity which
positively correlates with approval of non-democratic crime solutions in three of the four mod-
els. Further research should seek to better analyze these black boxes of Catholic and Evangelical
identity.
Though rarely analyzed in the context of crime in Latin America, religiosity can have a
strong influence on how citizens process situations of great stress and pressure. I provide evi-
dence that future research on democratic attitudes in Latin American should go further than just
73
including controls for religious identity and investigate the extent to which religious commitment
can help crime victims and those experiencing crime-induced anxiety shore up democratic ideals
in the face of pressure and incentives to find comfort in more authoritarian solutions.
About the Author

Alexa Garrett is a Senior majoring in Political Science at the University of South Alabama. She
is also the President of the National Pan-Hellenic Council at the University. Her interests include
Political Behavior, Religion, and the intersection of the two. She is grateful for the encourage-
ment and guidance she received from Dr. Scott Liebertz.
74
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The Journal of Politics & International Affairs

The Journal of Politics

Gabriel Giddens Wesley Swanson

Kasey Powers Andrea Stanic

Ryan Moore Rachel Williams

JPIA Editorial Staff

The Journal of Politics

Popular Perceptions of Chinese Engagment in Nigeria 28

Taiwanese Democratization: A Lasting Regime or a Pending 52

Religiosity and Citizen Attitudes on Crime in Latin America 66

Wesley Swanson and Gabriel Giddens

The American Precariat: Black Labor Precariousness in

3 Breman and van der Linden, 2014.

Informal employment relationships. Workers are hired as subcontractors, flexible, or tempo-

6 Breman and van der Linden, 2014. Pg. 925

Understanding Black Labor Data

8 The State of Working America 12th edition, Table 2.5

21 Donahue and Heckman, 1991. Pg. 3

24 McGrath and Carlson, 2014. Pg. 2

of the black American precariat.

Herbert Aptheker wrote that the [American] Constitution was a bourgeois-democratic

29 Darity, 2013. Pg. 118

About the Author

30 Pitts, 2007. Pg. 39

Popular Perceptions of Chinese Engagement in Nigeria

Political and Economic Relations

Cultural Ties and Chinese Soft Power

Conclusion and Evaluation

About the Author

Timothy Yin is a senior studying International Politics at Georgetown University.

Town, South Africa: Pambazuka Press.

September 21, 2013, sec Business.

Taiwanese Democratization: A Lasting Regime or a

T he world-renowned political scientist Samuel P. Huntington helped classify democratiza-

Building upon modernization theory is the Liberal/Democratic economic mechanism. It

About the Author

Religiosity and Citizen Attitudes on Crime in Latin America

Background: Crime in Latin America

Cr me V ct m zat on & Approva of V g ant sm

Figure 1: Scatter Plot of Crime Victimization Rate and Approval of Vigilantism

Religious Identity in Latin America

Police Can Tor- Community Can Approve of Police Can

Fear of Crime 0.035*** 0.026*** 0.135*** 0.024***

Crime Victimization 0.111*** 0.096*** 0.169*** 0.044***

Police Corruption 0.075*** 0.081*** 0.431*** 0.026**

Catholic 0.059*** 0.031** 0.046 0.042***

Evangelical -0.001 -0.033* -0.287*** 0.009

View of Economy -0.027*** -0.015** -0.033 0.014***

Education -0.013*** -0.007*** -0.058*** 0.002***

Age -0.003*** -0.000 -0.021*** -0.002***

Gender 0.098*** 0.066*** 0.037 0.036***

Life Satisfaction -0.004 -0.007 -0.038 -0.012**

Trust -0.036*** -0.041*** -0.094*** -0.014***

Approve of President 0.009 -0.009* -0.104*** -0.006*

N 25913 25929 26114 25926

About the Author

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Fear of Crime 0.035* 0.026* 0.135* 0.024*

Crime Victimization 0.111* 0.096* 0.169* 0.044*

Police Corruption 0.075* 0.081* 0.431* 0.026

Catholic 0.059* 0.031 0.046 0.042***

View of Economy -0.027* -0.015 -0.033 0.014***

Education -0.013* -0.007* -0.058* 0.002*

Age -0.003* -0.000 -0.021* -0.002***

Gender 0.098* 0.066* 0.037 0.036***

Trust -0.036* -0.041* -0.094* -0.014*