Professional Documents
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Accused Quiao, an alleged former military agent who had been picked up by the police authorities, confessed during the
investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman. He implicated Abenoja,
Jr., who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain "Jimmy." During the
investigation, Wilfredo Quiao was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic notes of the proceedings during the
investigation as transcribed with the sworn statement of Quiao was signed, with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to
before City Fiscal Balajadia. The following day, Agustin was apprehended, and was investigated and was afforded the privileges
like that of Quijano. Agustins defense interpose that he was forced to admit involvement at gunpoint in the Kennon Road. He
further declared that although he was given a lawyer, Cajucom (a law partner of the private prosecutor), he nevertheless, asked
for his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in English and Tagalogbut not in
Ilocano, the dialect he understands. The promise that he would be discharged as a witness did not push through since Quijano
escaped. However the RTC convicted him, since conspiracy was established. Hence the appeal.
Held: No. Extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession. In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt of the
accused, while anadmission is a statement direct or implied of facts pertinent to the issue. The rule on inadmissibility, however
expressly includes admissions, not just confessions.The extrajudicial admission of the appellant, contained in twenty-two pages
appear to be signed by him and Atty. Cajucom but for reasons not explained in the records, the transcript of the notes which
consists of twelve pages was not signed by the appellant. Since the court cannot even read or decipher the stenographic notes it
cannot be expected that appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth grade, to read or decipher its contents.
The appellant, therefore was deprived of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Firstly, he was not fully and
properly informed of his rights. The appellantwas not explicitly told of his right to have a competent and independent counsel of
his choice, specifically asked if he had in mind any such counsel and, if so, whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if he
could not, whether he would agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him. He was not categorically informed that he could
waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel and that this waiver must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel. He had,
in fact, waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to be investigated. Yet, no written waiver of such right appears in the
transcript and no other independent evidence was offered to prove its existence. In short, after the appellant said that he wanted
to be assisted by counsel, the City fiscal, through suggestive language, immediately informed him that Atty. Cajucom was ready
to assist him. Moreso said counsel is not independent since he is an associate of the private prosecutor.
Torres reported the robbery to the police authorities at Fairview, Quezon City and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On
July 25, 1988, Madaraog (Torres maid) and Quintal (neighboring maid) described the physical features of the four (4) robbers
before the NBI cartographer. On August 30, 1988, petitioner was arrested by the NBI agents. The next day, at the NBI
headquarters, he was pointed to by Madaraog and the other prosecution witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the crimes at
bench. Throughout cross-examination petitioner testified that during line-up at the NBI, the reason why he was testified and
pointed as one of the robbers is that an NBI agent pointed at him before the witnesses did. The trial court in a Joint Decision
convicted petitioner of the crimes charged. The respondent Court of Appeals gave no credence to the exculpatory allegations of
petitioner and affirmed in toto the assailed Decisions. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
1. Appellant was convicted of the murder of one Dante Huelva. Huelva was urinating on the roadside when accused appellant
stabbed him in the back. This was witnessed by two people Sayson and Pangatihon.
2. Accused-appellant interposed the defense of alibi and relied on the testimony of his principal witnesses to support his version
that he was somewhere else and not at the scene of the crime at the time of the killing.
3. During the trial, Godofreda Huelva, mother of the victim testified that accused-appellant offered to settle the case for the sum
of P10,000.00. In his surrebuttal testimony, accused-appellant vaguely denied this offer of compromise. He, however, insinuated
that he could offer a higher amount
RTC: The Trial court held him liable for the killing of Dante Huelva qualifying it to murder,
Issue: Whether or not the offer to settle the case should be admitted as evidence of guilt
YES. An offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. The second
paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that,'In criminal cases, except those
involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the
accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. Murder is not among those criminal cases that can be
compromised.
The crime was committed with treachery due to the sudden and unexpected attack on the victim, who was then urinating at the
side of the road, with a deadly 7-inch Batangas knife. Accused-appellant consciously adopted this mode of attack to facilitate or
insure the commission of the crime without risk to himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the victim.
Evident premeditation was not duly established by the prosecution.
ISSUE: W/N the complainants affidavits of desistance would be enough to exonerate the accused of the crime charged
HELD: NO.
Generally, the court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially when it is executed as an afterthought.
Some of the complainants may have had a change of heart as the offense on their person is concerned, but this will not affect the
public prosecution of the offense itself.
The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the attributes that by a natural law belongs to the sovereign power
instantly charged by the common will of the members of society to look after, guard and defend the interest of the community
The cardinal principle which states that to the State belongs the power to prosecute and punish crimes should not be overlooked
since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State.
2. Another witness testified, PO Mangubat, a police officer , who interviewed the victim (Wilson Vergara) right after the
shooting. Mangubat testified that he saw the victim already on board a Ford Fiera pick-up ready for transport to the hospital. He
inquired from the victim about the incident, and the former answered he was shot by CVO Amaca and Ogang. Upon query why
he was shot, the victim said he did not know the reason why he was shot. Upon being asked as to his condition, the victim said
that he was about to die. He was able to reduce into writing the declaration of the victim and made latter affixed his thumb mark
with the use of his own blood in the presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City Mayor.
3. Segundina Vergara, mother of the victim, and her son-in-law Jose Lapera both desisted from further prosecution of the
case. the former because of the "financial help" extended by the accused to her family, and the latter because Segundina had
already "consented to the amicable settlement of the case." Despite this, the Department of Justice found the existence of
a prima facie case based on the victim's ante mortem statement.
4. The lower court convicted Amaca on the basis of the victim's ante mortemstatement to Police Officer Mangubat positively
identifying accused. The dying declaration was deemed sufficient to overcome the accuseds defense of alibi. However, due to
the voluntary desistance of the victim's mother from further prosecuting the case, the court a quo declined to make a finding on
the civil liability of the appellant.
YES. The "financial help" when viewed as an offer of compromise may be deemed as additional proof to demonstrate appellant's
criminal liability. The victim's mother desisted from prosecuting the case in consideration of the "financial help" extended to her
family by the accused-appellant.
It is a well-settled rule that that the desistance of the victim's complaining mother does not bar the People from prosecuting the
criminal action, but it does operate as a waiver of the right to pursue civil indemnity. Hence, in effectively waiving her right to
institute an action to enforce the civil liability of accused-appellant, she also waived her right to be awarded any civil indemnity
arising from the criminal prosecution. This waiver is bolstered by the fact that neither she nor any private prosecutor in her behalf
appealed the trial court's refusal to include a finding of civil liability. But the heirs, if there are any may file an independent civil
action to recover damages for the death of Wilson Vergara.
Issue (2): Whether or not the dying declaration of victim should be admitted
A dying declaration is worthy of belief because it is highly unthinkable for one who is aware of his impending death to accuse,
falsely or even carelessly, anyone of being responsible for his foreseeable demise. Indeed, "when a person is at the point of
death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the
truth." This is the rationale for this exception to the hearsay rule under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The elements
of such exception are: (1) the deceased made the declaration conscious of his impending death; (2) the declarant would have
been a competent witness had he survived; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's death; (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case where the declarant's death is the subject of inquiry; and (5) the
declaration is complete in itself. All these concur in the present case.
Finally, Police Officer Mangubat is presumed under the law to have regularly performed his duty. There is nothing in the
circumstances surrounding his investigation of the crime which shows any semblance of irregularity or bias, much less an attempt
to frame Amaca. Even the accused testified that he had no previous misunderstanding with Police Officer Mangubat and knew no
reason why the latter would falsely testify against him.
The serious nature of the victim's injuries did not affect his credibility as a witness since said injuries, as previously mentioned,
did not cause the immediate loss of his ability to perceive and to identify his shooter.
Appellant may be held liable only for homicide since treachery was not alleged in the Information, while evident premeditation
and night time, although duly alleged, were not satisfactorily proven. The Information readily reveals that the killing was qualified
only by evident premeditation. Treachery was not alleged in the information. It is necessary to qualify the crime to murder.
Treachery is an element of the crime. The Constitution requires that the accused must be informed of the "nature and cause of
the accusation against him."The failure to allege treachery in the Information is a major lapse of the prosecution.
Moreover, treachery and night time may not be considered even as generic aggravating circumstances, because there is nothing
in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses to convincingly show that the accused-appellant consciously and purposely
adopted (1) such means of attack to render the victim defenseless and (2) the darkness of night to facilitate the commission of
the crime, to prevent its discovery or even evade capture.
RULE 130 SECTION 32 ADMISSION BY SILENCE [US vs. Bay 27 P 495 (missing)]