that serves as an example in later court cases.
Chief Justice Marshall's ruling interpreted the
ARTICLE VIII. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes:
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Grave abuse of discretion
I. Definition and scope
*Marbury v. Madison 1 Cranch 137 [1803] (essence of judicial duty)
FACTS
During these months, Adams persuaded Congress to pass a new law, the Judiciary
Act of 1801. This act gave Adams the power to appoint several new federal judges.
The Federalists hoped to fill the nation's courts with people who would be opposed to
the policies of the incoming Republican administration.
Adams was generally successful in this effort, appointing some 39 new judges.
Adams's Secretary of State was to deliver the commissions, or official documents
authorizing the appointments. The Secretary of State, though, failed to deliver the com
Republic Act No. 9262 (An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children) missions to three new justices of the peace before Adams's term of office
ended. One of the commissions was to go to William Marbury.
When Thomas Jefferson became President in March 1801, he learned of Adams's
attempt to pack the court with Federalist judges. He also discovered the failure to
deliver the remaining commissions. To prevent these Federalists from becoming
justices of the peace, Jefferson instructed his Secretary of State, James Madison, to
refuse the appointments.
Marbury went to the Supreme Court in an attempt to gain his post. He wanted the
Court to issue an order forcing Madison to give Marbury his commission. The Judiciary
Act of 1789 had given the Supreme Court the power to issue such an order.
The Court's Decision
In a unanimous decision, written by Justice Marshall, the Court stated that Marbury, indeed, had
a right to his commission. But, more importantly, the Judiciary Act of 1789 was unconstitutional.
In Marshall's opinion, Congress could not give the Supreme Court the power to issue an
order granting Marbury his commission. Only the Constitution could, and the document
said nothing about the Supreme Court having the power to issue such an order. Thus, the
Supreme Court could not force Jefferson and Madison to appoint Marbury, because it did not
have the power to do so.
While Marbury never became a justice of the peace, the Court's ruling
in Marbury v. Madison established a very important precedent. A precedent is a legal decision
Constitution to mean that the Supreme Court had the power of judicial review.
That is, the Court had the right to review acts of Congress and, by extension, actions
of the President. If the Court found that a law was unconstitutional, it could overrule
the law. Marshall argued that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and that
the Supreme Court has the final say over the meaning of the Constitution. He wrote, lt
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
*Santiago v. Bautista 32 SCRA 188 [1970] (concept of judicial function)*
FACTS
Teodoro Santiago, Jr., a pupil in Grade Six at the public school. Two days before
graduation, he (represented by his mother) filed a certiorari action under Rule 65
sought the invalidation of the ranking of honor students where he ranked third
placer.
Santiago alleged that the teachers of the school who composed the "Committee on
the Rating of Student for Honor" gravely abused their discretion and showed bias
through several instances such as the changing of the final ratings on the
grading sheets of Socorro Medina and Patricia Lingat, from 80% to 85%, and
some teachers giving petitioner a starting grade of 75% in Grade VI.
This resulted to Socorro Medina and Patricia Lingat becoming first and second placers
respectively, which prove that there was already an intention to pull him to a much
lower rank at the end of the school year.
Respondents moved for the dismissal of the case claiming that the certiorari was
improper since it is a remedy against abuse of judicial power and the ranking
committee is not a tribunal or body exercising judicial function. Moreover, the issue
has become academic since the graduation has already proceeded.
ISSUE
WON judicial function is exercised in this case?
HELD
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedy
The allegation does not show that petitioner formally availed of and exhausted the
administrative remedies of the Department of Education. The petition implies that this is the first
formal complaint of petitioner against his teachers.
2. The administrative agencies of the Department of Education could have investigated the
grievances of the petitioner and give effective remedies, but petitioner negligently abandoned
them. Petitioner cannot now claim that he lacked any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Exercise of Judicial Power
3. A special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy against the grave abuse of
discretion committed by any 'tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions".
TEST TO DETERMINE IF A BODY IS EXERCISING JUDICIAL FUNCTION:
 there must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or property and
said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing and
determination of their respective rights and obligations
the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have the
power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the
controversy construing and applying the laws to that end
the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which
belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative or
executive department.
The exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the
legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever
an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions,
he acts judicially.
Judicial Power authority to determine the rights of persons or property by
arbitrating between adversaries in specific controversies at the instance of a party
thereto. It implies the construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights. It
includes the power to hear and determine but not everyone who may hear and
determine has judicial power.
No Demandable Legal Rights nor Exercise of Judicial Function involved
The Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor whose actions are questioned in
this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi-judicial functions in the performance of its
assigned task.
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is
necessary that there be a law that give rise to some specific rights of persons or
property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with
power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the
respective rights of the contending parties.
Felipe vs. Leuterio
, No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because theirs was
merely the privilege to compete for the prize, and that privilege did not ripen into a
demandable right unless and until they were proclaimed winners of the competition by
the appointed arbiters or referees or judges.
The Court declared in that case that the judiciary has no power to reverse the award
of the board of judges of that contest and, for that matter, it would not interfere in
literary contests, beauty contests and similar competitions.
*Radiowealth v. Agregado 86 PHIL. 429 [1950] (implied power; acquisition of equipment)
The preservation of Judiciarys integrity and effectiveness is necessary. Corollary to
this is the power of judiciary to maintain its existence. The quality of the government
depends upon the independence of judiciary and the officials of the government
cannot deprive the courts of anything which is vital to their functions.
Furthermore, the prerogatives of this court which the Constitution secures against
interference include not only the powers to adjudicate cases but all things that are
REASONABLY necessary for the administration of justice. The purchase of the
necessary equipment would contribute to a more effective judiciary. Lastly, these are
implied and incidental powers that are as essential to the existence of the court as the
powers specifically granted to it.
FACTS
A Webster Teletalk and Webster Telephone Speaker were bought for Php 585 and
installed in the second and third floor of the Malacanang Annex which houses the
Supreme Court.
The Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee (appointed by the President)
disapproved of the purchase and its installation invoking EO 302 which discontinues
open market purchases.
Petitioners also contend that Judicial functions do not include purchase of property.
Radiowealth, Inc. (vendor) is now requesting that the payment be approved however,
the Auditor of the SC refused to countersign the warrant for payment.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Judicial Dept can make purchases without the prior approval of
the Executive?
HELD: YES, they can.
Found in a ruling in Tarlac VS Gale
All three departments are co-equal and co-important, each is independent from the
other and cannot control or interfere with each other in the exercise of special
functions.
Judiciary has the power to maintain its existence and do whatever is necessary to
preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity and ensure effectiveness in the
administration of justice.
Officials of the government who owe duty to the court under the law cannot deprive
the courts of anything vital to their functions.
Officials and boards are duty-bound to construct or purchase offices or court rooms
and furnish them. They also have to insure that the character of these rooms would
permit the court to exercise its functions in a reasonably effective manner.
In case of conflict to, the court shall overpower the officials as they will be the
ultimate judge in determining what is necessary for its efficiency.
Officials have the power to assign a particular room or court room to the Court of First
Instance and change the assignments provided that the new rooms are reasonable
adequate.
Courts have the power to refuse dispossession of the room if they deem that the new
room would be inadequate in the exercise of their duties.
If board refuses to furnish the articles mentioned by law, then the court would have
the power either to purchase things directly or by proper proceedings to
compel the officials to perform their duties to the law.
Executive does not have power over the purchase of books and other office
equipment needed for the convenient transaction of its business.
Court could not maintain its independence and dignity if it executive could determine
what the courts should have. They are of equal footing when it comes to the
requisition of for fixtures, equipment and supplies.
HELD
Contrary to the respondents' theory, the prerogatives of this court which the
Constitution secures against interference includes not only the powers to adjudicate
causes but all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice.
So, we believe, it is within its power free from encroachment by the Executive to
acquire books and other office equipment reasonably needed to the convenient
transaction of its business.
o These implied, inherent, or incidental powers are as essential to the
existence of the court as the powers specifically granted. Without the
 power to provide itself with appropriate instruments for the
performance of its duties, the express powers with which the
Constitution endows it would become useless.
o The court could not maintain its independence and dignity as the
Constitution intends if the executive personally or through subordinate
officials could determine for the court what it should have or use in the
discharge of its functions, and when and how it should obtain them.
The court's independence of the legislative branch with regard to the acquisition of
fixtures, supplies and equipment is bound up with and subject to its dependence upon
the Congress for appropriation.
o The interrelation between the court and the Congress in this regard is not
so easy to define. (Fortunately there is no conflict between the legislature
and the court to complicate the issues in this case.) But it is our considered
opinion that this court is supreme and independent of the executive in this
sphere.
o In the requisition for fixtures, equipment and supplies both the executive
and judicial departments are on the same footing. They derive their authority
from the same source and represent the sovereignty in equal degree.
o It stands to reason that the Chief Executive has no more authority to
encroach on the Supreme Court in the choice of the instruments needed to
carry on its functions than the court has to dictate to the executive what,
when and how to get his.
*In re Laureta 148 SCRA 382 [1987] (power to preserve its honor)*
The Court's authority and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its
honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to
safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.
FACTS
Eva Maravilla-Ilustre wrote a letter to the Justices of the First Division of the Supreme
Court alleging that the dismissal of her case via a minute resolution was
promulgated unjustly and in violation of the legal and judicial ethics
. In her letter, she threatened that she will hold a press conference regarding the
issue and requested that the judges disclose the extent of their participation in
the promulgation of the minute resolution. She also claims that Justice Yap of the
first division was previously the law partner of Atty. Ordonez, then counsel of the other
party, and now the Solicitor General.
The Supreme Court, acting on the letter of Ilustre,
o explained that when the resolution was issued, Justice Abad was the
presiding justice and Justice Yap had no knowledge of the fact that Atty.
Ordonez was the counsel for the opponent and that Justice Yap later on
inhibited himself from the case.
Ilustre then filed a criminal complaint against the Justices before the Tanodbayan for
knowingly rendering an unjust resolution and a complaint charging Justice Yap and
Atty. Ordonez of using their influence in rendering the said resolution.
Atty. Wenceslao Laureta, counsel of Ilustre, allegedly circulated these complaints to
the press. In particular, the headline in the Daily Express read Ordonez, 8 Justices
Face Graft Charges making it appear that the Justices were charged with Graft
and Corruption.
The Tanodbayan dismissed the compliant and subsequently, the Supreme Court
charged Atty Laureta and Eva Ilustre and found them guilty of Contempt.
Atty. Laureta claims that the order of suspension issued without hearing was violative
of his constitutional right to due process of law making said order null and void while
Ilustre claims that her constitutional right to due process was likewise violated for she
should have been given every opportunity to present her side since contempt
proceedings are in the nature of a criminal proceeding.
ISSUE
Whether Illustre and Laureta may be charged for contempt?
HELD
YES
Contempt of Court
Respondents' reliance on the "privacy of communication" is misplaced. Letters
addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial
functions become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire
Court. The contumacious character of those letters constrained the First Division to
refer the same to the Court en banc, en consulta and so that the Court en banc could
pass upon the judicial acts of the Division.
The Court is not estopped from initiating contempt proceedings. It must act to
preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer,
mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal
profession.
Respondent Ilustre has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and
criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice in her letters
addressed to the individual Justices.
o The fact that said letters are not technically considered pleadings, nor the
fact that they were submitted after the main petition had been finally
resolved does not detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The
constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used
as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court.
Offense of Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment
Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment"
refer to an individual judge who does so "in any case submitted to him for decision"
and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would pass judgment on the "unjustness"
of the decision rendered by him but the proper appellate court with jurisdiction to
review the same, either the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court.
5. Said penal article has no application to the members of a collegiate court such as this Court or
its Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective
judgment after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is "unjust"
cannot prosper.
Judicial Independence
The fundamental principle of separation of powers and checks and balances under a
republican form of government [means] that the three co-equal branches of
government, the executive, legislative and judicial, are each supreme and
independent within the limits of its own sphere.
Neither one can interfere with the performance of the duties of the other. Our
Constitution "as 'a definition of the powers of government' placed upon the judiciary
 the great burden of 'determining the nature, scope and extent of such powers'
and 'when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments .. but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation entrusted to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which the instrument secures and guarantees to them.'"
To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so
a member of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in the
regular exercise of official duty and judicial functions is to subvert and undermine that
very independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive.
Decisions of the Supreme Court are beyond investigation or inquiry
8. Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for
themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry
under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature.
9. Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the separation of powers
relitigate in another forum the final judgment of this Court on legal issues submitted by them for
final determination to and by the Supreme Court and which fall within the judicial power to
determine and adjudicate exclusively vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and in
such inferior courts as may be established by law.
*In re Borromeo - 241 SCRA 405 [1995] (contempt power)
Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or
factors. They should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or
administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the
performance of their duties and functions.
Hence it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute that judges
are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good
faith. The Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held
administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. The
exercise of the power of contempt of the court is valid.
FACTS
The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer, but from 1978 to
the present, has ventured to represent himself in numerous original and review
proceedings in various courts.
Given the disastrous results of his efforts, he has seen fit to compose and circulate
many scurrilous statements against courts, judges and their employees, as well as his
adversaries, for which he is now being called to account as he is confronted by a
charge for contempt of court.
The cases began when Borromeo entered into transactions with three (3) banks:
Traders Royal Bank (TRB), United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Security Bank &
Trust Co. (SBTC). Borromeo obtained loans or credit accommodation from them, to
secure which he constituted mortgages over immovables belonging to him or
members of his family, or third persons. He failed to pay these obligations, and
when demands were made for him to do so, laid down his own terms for their
satisfaction which were quite inconsistent with those agreed upon with the
banks or prescribed by law.
When the banks refused to let him have his way, he brought suits against said banks,
its officers, and even the lawyers who represented the banks in the actions brought by
or against him. He sued, as well, the public prosecutors, the Judges of the Trial
Courts, and the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court who at
one time or another, rendered a judgment, resolution or order adverse to him, as
well as the Clerks of Court and other Court employees signing the notices
thereof
In the aggregate, he has initiated or spawned in different fora the astounding number
of no less than fifty (50) original or review proceedings, civil, criminal, administrative,
which have been ongoing for some sixteen (16) years now.
ISSUE
HELD
Borromeo liable for Contempt of Court
There can scarcely be any doubt of Borromeo's guilt of contempt, for abuse of and
interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to courts and
judges and improper conduct directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the
administration of justice.
He has stubbornly litigated issues already declared to be without merit, obstinately
closing his eyes to the many rulings rendered adversely to him in many suits and
proceedings, rulings which had become final and executory, obdurately and
unreasonably insisting on the application of his own individual version of the rules,
founded on nothing more than his personal (and quite erroneous) reading of the
Constitution and the law.
More particularly, despite his attention having been called many times to the egregious
error of his theory that the so-called "minute resolutions" of this Court should contain
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and should be signed or certified by the
Justices promulgating the same, he has mulishly persisted in ventilating that selfsame
theory in various proceedings, causing much loss of time, annoyance and vexation to
the courts.
Joaquin Borromeo was found GUILTY OF CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEMPT repeatedly
committed over time, despite warnings and instructions given to him, and sentenced to
ten (10) days in the City Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of P1,000
Charge for Contempt may be instituted directly by the court, without
intervention of a fiscal or prosecutor
Borromeo's defense that the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should
inhibit themselves from the contempt proceedings "since they cannot be the Accused
and Judge at the same time is untenable.
It is axiomatic that the "power or duty of the court to institute a charge for
contempt against itself, without the intervention of the fiscal or prosecuting
officer, is essential to the preservation of its dignity and of the respect due it
from litigants, lawyers and the public.
Were the intervention of the prosecuting officer required and judges obliged to file
complaints for contempt against them before the prosecuting officer, in order to bring
the guilty to justice, courts would be inferior to prosecuting officers and impotent to
perform their functions with dispatch and absolute independence.
The institution of charges by the prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold persons
guilty of civil or criminal contempt amenable to trial and punishment by the court. All
that the law requires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an
opportunity to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel. The charge may
be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by a private person.
Paramount Need to End Litigation at Some Point
Public policy demands that at some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest and
the court's dispositions thereon accorded absolute finality. As observed by this Court
in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer,
o a party "may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his
privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it.
This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be
allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in
words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the
temples of right."
Controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the courts
demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgments of courts determining
controversies submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed by
law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the
control even of the court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of
fact or of law, into which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen. The very
purpose for which the courts are organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide
the questions submitted to the litigants, and to determine the respective rights of the
parties.'[ see In Re: Wenceslao Laureta]
Judgments of Supreme Court Not Reviewable
8. The principle prevailing in this, as in most, jurisdictions is that judgments of the
highest tribunal of the land may not be reviewed by any other agency, branch,
department, or official of Government. The Supreme Court's decision should not and
cannot be appealed to or reviewed by any other entity, much less reversed or
modified on the ground that it is tainted by error in its findings of fact or conclusions of
law, flawed in its logic or language, or otherwise erroneous in some other respect.
This is founded on public policy, and constitutional and traditional principle.
9. Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak
for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry
under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature.
10. The 'doctrine of separation of powers calls for the executive, legislative and judicial
departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit.' It has thus maintained in
the same way that the judiciary has a right to expect that neither the President nor Congress
would cast doubt on the mainspring of its orders or decisions, it should refrain from speculating
as to alleged hidden forces at work that could have impelled either coordinate branch into acting
the way it did. The concept of separation of powers presupposes mutual respect by and between
the three departments of the government.
Final and Executory Judgments of Lower Courts Not Reviewable Even by Supreme Court
11. In respect of Courts below the Supreme Court, the ordinary remedies available under law to
a party who is adversely affected by their decisions or orders are a motion for new trial (or
reconsideration) under Rule 37, and an appeal to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court, depending on whether questions of both fact and law, or of law only, are raised, in
accordance with fixed and familiar rules and conformably with the hierarchy of courts.
Exceptionally, a review of a ruling or act of a court on the ground that it was rendered without or
in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, may be had through the special
civil action of certiorari or prohibition pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
12. However, should judgments of lower courts -- which may normally be subject to review by
higher tribunals -- become final and executory before, or without, exhaustion of all recourse of
appeal, they become inviolable, impervious to modification. They may no longer be reviewed, or
in any way modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court,
much less by any other official, branch or department of Government.
Administrative and/or Criminal Prosecution of a Judge for rendering manifestly unjust
judgment not allowed until and unless the judgment referred to has become final and
executory
13. It is neither permissible nor proper for a party who feels aggrieved by a judicial order or
decision not yet final and executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminal prosecution for
unjust judgment against the issuing judge. This is because it is not within the power of public
prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his deputies, to review judgments or final orders or
resolutions of the Courts of the land. The power of review -- by appeal or special civil action -- is
not only lodged exclusively in the Courts themselves but must be exercised in accordance with a
well-defined and long established hierarchy, and long-standing processes and procedures.
14. The indispensable requisites are that there be (i) a final declaration by a competent court in
some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or
order, and (ii) there be also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable
negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order.
15. The essential requisite is that there be an authoritative judicial pronouncement of the
manifestly unjust character of the judgment or order in question. Such a pronouncement may
result from either (a) an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity
of the judgment, as having been rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion; e.g., there has been a denial of due process to the prosecution; or (b) if this
be not proper, an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for
promulgating an unjust judgment or order. Until and unless there is such a final, authoritative
judicial declaration that the decision or order in question is "unjust," no civil or criminal action
against the judge concerned is legally possible or should be entertained, for want of an
indispensable requisite.
Article 204, RPC (rendering knowingly unjust judgment) refers to individual judges and
cannot apply to collegiate courts
16. The provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as to 'rendering knowingly
unjust judgment,' refer to an individual judge who does so 'in any case submitted to him for
decision'. Said penal article has no application to the members of a collegiate court such as
this Court or its Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultationand accordingly render their
collective judgment after due deliberation. [ see In Re: Wenceslao Laureta]
The determination of whether or not a judgment or order is unjust is an essentially
judicial function
17. Even then, the determination of whether or not a judgment or order is unjust or was (or
was not) rendered within the scope of the issuing judge's authority, or that the judge had
exceeded his jurisdiction and powers or maliciously delayed the disposition of a case is an
essentially judicial function. To repeat, no other entity or official of the Government, not the
prosecution or investigation service or any other branch, nor any functionary thereof, has
competence to review a judicial order or decision whether final and executory or not and
pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for
rendering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone.
*Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice GR 132601, January 19, 1999 (power to delay execution of
sentence)
The FINALITY OF A JUDGMENT does not mean the Court has lost all its powers
over the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction
to amend, modify, or alter the same. The court still has jurisdiction to execute and
enforce it.
The POWER TO CONTROL THE EXECUTION OF ITS DECISION is an essential
aspect of jurisdiction. Supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties
and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent
unfairness.
Postponement of the date: The particulars of the execution itself are absolutely
under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over
the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to
pardon. The date can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common
law this postponement can be ordered in 3 ways:
(1) by command of the King
(2) by discretion of the court
(3) by mandate of the law.
FACTS
Leo echegaray found guilty by RTC of QC for raping his common law spouses 10 yr
old daughter and was given a Death Sentence of Penalty. The execution of the
judgment against leo echegraay was scheduled on jan 4 but SC issued a TRO to
stay the execution of the same. Justice secretary asailed the issuance of TRO
stating that once judgment has become final and executory, it can no longer be
stated and the SC encroached on the power of executive department to grant
reprieve when it issued the said order
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo
Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary
assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated
the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to
grant reprieve
Leo Echegaray is a convict subject to lethal injection (RA 8177 as amended ). The SC issued a
temporary restraining order for the execution until it ensures that there will no longer be any
repeal or modification as to the implementation of RA 8177. Such action by the court was
questioned since it already rendered a final judgment on the case.
ISSUE
Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been
rendered?
HELD
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the
President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment.
The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to
control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of
execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that
postponement of the date can be requested.
There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the
date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in
sentences of death.
o Under the common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1)
By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by
mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law
to render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that after the convict
has once been placed in jail the trial court cannot reopen the case to
investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the
ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date
of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that
after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution .
. . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay
the execution, and there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency
and to order a postponement. Then the question arises as to whom the
application for postponing the execution ought to be addressed while the
circumstances is under investigation and as to who has jurisdiction to make
the investigation."
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of
jurisdiction.
o It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution7 vests
the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be estabished by law. To be sure, the most important part of a
litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions
where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and
compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent
unfairness.
o It is because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts
have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its
processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice
o For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that
"when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer,
all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry
it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the
procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not
specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable
process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears
conformable to the spirit of said law or rules."
It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is
the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to
check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as
alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular
misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by
Congress.
Finality of Judgment
The rule on finality of judgment cannot divest the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment.
The finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers over
the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to
 amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court
retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.
Jurisdiction of the court to execute its Jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter
judgment judgment
continues even after the judgment has terminates when the judgment becomes final.
become final for the purpose of enforcement For after the judgment has become final facts
of judgment and circumstances may transpire which can
render the execution unjust or impossible
3. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.
Notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date
set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of
death.
It is the special duty of the Supreme Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights to the minority fully hold
Court's power of control over execution of its decisions
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of
jurisdiction.
The process of execution of decisions are subject to supervening events which
may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust
the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen,
supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and
necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to
law and justice.
The Court may not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress but it may
restrain temporarily the execution of its own decision
. The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by
the Constitution to the Supreme Court to enhance its independence.
The 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. The power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court
with Congress, more so with the Executive.
The constitutional provision which is the source of the pardoning power of the
President cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality;
*RE: Letter of UP Law Faculty - A.M. No. 10-10-4-C, June 7, 2011 (contempt power)
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
*Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary 677 SCRA 408 [2012] (ODES no power to
try and decide cases; E.O. No. 13 empowering it is unconstitutional)
FACTS
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order
No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of
the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs(ODESLA), more particularly to its
newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the
IAD-ODESLA a complaint-affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A.
Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent tmembers of the LWUA Board of
Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena,
Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four
Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of
stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive Secretary
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective
written explanations under oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same
transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v.
Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending
before the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE
whether e.o. 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of congress to delegate quasi-judicial
powers to administrative agencies
By congress.
HELD
NO
The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with quasi-
judicial powers.
Petitioner next avers that the IAD-ODESLA was illegally vested with judicial power
which is reserved to the Judicial Department and, by way of exception through an
express grant by the legislature, to administrative agencies. He points out that the
name Investigative and Adjudicatory Division is proof itself that the IAD-ODESLA
wields quasi-judicial power.
while the term "adjudicatory" appears part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot
try and resolve cases, its authority being limited to the conduct of investigations,
preparation of reports and submission of recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states
that the IAD-ODESLA shall "perform powers, functions and duties xxx, of PAGC." 22
Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in the
government"23 and to "submit its report and recommendations to the President."24The
IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President, not having
the power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases. As the Court ruled in Cario v.
Commission on Human Rights,25 and later reiterated in Biraogo v. The Philippine
Truth Commission:26
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals
or modes of review as may be provided by law.
The President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IAD-ODESLA as his fact-finding
investigator cannot be doubted.
After all, as Chief Executive, he is granted full control over the Executive Department to ensure
the enforcement of the laws. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully executed necessitates the corresponding power
in the President to conduct investigations into the conduct of officials and employees in the
executive department
*Tan v. Matsuura, GR 179003, Jan 9, 2013(power to review findings of prosecutor preliminary
investigation)
FACTS
Petitioner Tan filed a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor for the crime of
falsification against Petitioners Matsuura, Tanjutco and Cua which was dismissed
by the said office for lack of probable cause.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was as well denied by the same office.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ).
In April 2003, then Secretary of Justice Datumanong denied the petition for lack of
evidence.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted by then DOJ
Acting Secretary Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez in a Resolution dated July 1, 2004.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said resolution which was
denied by DOJ Undersecretary Pineda on behalf of the Secretary but with
modification. The latter resolution excluded Respondent Cua from the filing of an
information. Petitioner filed for a Partial Motion for Reconsideration which was
later granted by the DOJ.
Respondents filed their Petitions for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals which were
granted by the appellate court.
Petitioner assails the decision of the Court of Appeals granting Respondents
petitions.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals can take cognizance of petitions filed before it
where the Department of Justice, through the Secretary of Justice, has already rendered a
resolution where cause has already been determined and information for such has already been
instituted in court?
HELD
Despite the established principle that the determination of probable cause is vested in
the public prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice, it is also a well-settled rule that
the courts are vested with the power to review findings of prosecutors during
preliminary investigations in exceptional cases.
While the findings of the prosecutors are reviewable by the DOJ, this does not mean
that the courts cannot intervene and review the findings of the prosecutors or the DOJ.
In this case, the appellate court can take cognizance of the petitions considering that
several varying resolutions were issued by the DOJ.
The appellate court is merely exercising its power of review to determine if there was
grave abuse of discretion
Courts possess the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary investigations.
On the first main issue, the petitioner contends that the CA should not have taken cognizance of
the petitions for certiorari filed before it because criminal proceedings shall not be restrained
once probable cause has been determined and the corresponding information has been filed in
courts. Citing jurisprudence, Tan argues that the institution of a criminal action in court
depends upon the sound discretion of the prosecutor.
The Court remains mindful of the established principle that the determination of
probable cause is essentially an executive function that is lodged with the
public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice. However, equally settled is the
rule that courts retain the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary
investigations, although in a mere few exceptional cases showing grave abuse
of discretion.
Judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
o covers the courts' power to determine whether there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by any
branch or instrumentality of the government in the discharge of its functions.
o Although policy considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to
the prosecutors' findings, courts should not shirk from exercising their
power, when the circumstances warrant, to determine whether the
prosecutors'findings are supported by the facts or by the law. In so doing,
courts do not act as prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary that are
exercising their mandate under the Constitution, relevant statutes, and
remedial rules to settle cases and controversies. Indeed, the exercise of the
courts' review power ensures that, on the one hand, probable criminals are
prosecuted and, on the other hand, the innocent are spared from baseless
prosecution.33
Tan v. Ballena
o while the findings of prosecutors are reviewable by the DOJ, this does not
preclude courts from intervening and exercising our own powers of review
with respect to the DOJ's findings.
o In the exceptional case in which grave abuse of discretion is committed, as
when a clear sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of
probable cause is ignored, the CA may take cognizance of the case via a
petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Based on the grounds raised by the respondents in their petitions with the CA, the
appellate court's exercise of its power to review was also the proper and most
prudent course to take after the Secretary had successively issued several
resolutions with varying findings of fact and conclusions of law on the
existence of probable cause, even contrary to the own findings of the OCP that
conducted the preliminary investigation.
Although by itself, such circumstance was not indicative of grave abuse of discretion,
there was a clear issue on the Secretary of Justice's appreciation of facts, which
commanded a review by the court to determine if grave abuse of discretion attended
the discharge of his functions.
*Garcia v. Drilon (supra., A2, S14; power granted to Punong Barangay/Kagawad to issue TPO not
judicial but executive function)
FACTS
 Republic Act No. 9262 (An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children) defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children
(VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or
any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman
has a common child. The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the
courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC.
Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed, for herself and in behalf of her 3 minor children, a verified
petition before theRTC of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO) against her husband,Jesus Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to RA
9262.Rosalie alleged that during the marriage, her husband admitted to an ongoing
affair with a bank manager.
The infidelity spawned a series of fights that left her physically and emotionally
wounded and the children traumatized. She is determined to leave her husband but he
threatened to deny her financial support.
The RTC initially issued a Temporary Protection Order effective for 30 days which was
repeatedly renewed. Notwithstanding the TPO, the husband allegedly failed to give
them financial support and continued to commit new acts of harassment.
The petitioner husband assails the constitutionality R.A. 9262 of as being violative of
the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial
power to barangay officials
Barangay protection order
ISSUE
Whether the protection orders from barangay officials is unconstitutional because
protection orders involved the exercise of judicial power is placed upon courts?
HELD
NO
Undue delegation of Judicial Power
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power
which, under the Constitution, is placed upon the courts and, thus, protests the
delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection orders.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rightswhich are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or nstrumentality of the
Government. On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as thepower
to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance.
The Protection Order issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability,
by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist
from
(a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to
cause the woman or her child physical harm.
Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature in
pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to enforce all laws and
ordinances, and to maintain public order in the barangay.
We have held that (t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the
existence ofcertain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his
official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not
constitute an exercise of judicial powers
*City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo 715 SCRA 182 [2014] (power of CTA to issue auxiliary writs,
e.s. (certiorari)
FACTS
Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed
taxes for the taxable period from January to December 2002 against the private
respondents.In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents
pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM),
said assessment covered the local business taxes. private respondents were
constrained to pay the P 19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed before the RTC of Pasay City the
complaint denominated as one for Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or
ErroneouslyCollected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction
The RTC granted private respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 but the RTC denied. Petitioners then
filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA but the CA dismissed petitioners
petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA
ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents complaint for tax
refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA),
pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows
that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the
said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 but the CA denied it in its Resolution
hence, this petition
ISSUE
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court.
HELD
NO
The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case. In order for any appellate
court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to
issue, among others, a writ of certiorari.
Indeed, This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals
stated that a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the
final orders or decisions of the lower court order for any appellate court to
effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue,
among others, a writ of certiorari.
In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can
reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is
deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is
no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, J.M. Tuason & Co.,
o "if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body,
then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."30
o This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,31 where the
Court stated that "a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error,
the final orders or decisions of the lower court."32 The rulings in J.M.
 Tuason and De Jesus were reiterated in the more recent cases of Galang,
Jr. v. Geronimo33 and Bulilis v. Nuez.34
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when by law,
jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and
other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.
II. Limits
*Noblejas v. Teehankee 23 SCRA 405 [1968] (no power to discipline officers in other branch with
equivalent rank of judge)
Judicial power does not include the power to discipline officers in others branches of government
with equal rank as that of a judge. This is beyond the judicial sphere.
FACTS
Antonio Noblejas was the duly appointed Commissioner of Land Registration a
position created by Republic Act No. 1151 which declared such position to be
entitled to the same rank and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First
Instance
Noblejas approved a subdivision plan covering certain areas that are greatly in excess
of those covered by the title, and because of which, then Secretary of Justice, Claudio
Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas requiring him to explain in writing why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Noblejas answered, arguing that since he enjoyed the rank and compensation of
a CFI Judge, his case could only be submitted to the Supreme Court, as he
could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as an ordinary
Judge in accordance to Section 67 of the Judiciary Act (Republic Act No. 296)
and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
Nevertheless, Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive Secretary,
by authority of the President, stating that he is suspended based on the findng of
a prima facie case against him for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to
the public interest.
Noblejas filed a case of prohibition with preliminary injunction claiming the lack of
jurisdiction and abuseof discretion on the part of the Executive Secretary. The Court
ruled against Noblejas and hence, this petition
ISSUE
Whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme
Court, in view of the conferment upon him by the Statutes heretofore mentioned (Rep. Act 1151
and Appropriation Laws) of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.
HELD
Section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for investigation, suspension or removal of
Judges cannot apply to Noblejas since a Commissioner of Land Registration is not a
District Judge or a member of the Judiciary at all.
Noblejas' theory that the grant of privileges of a Judge of First Instance includes by
implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be
suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the
same right being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the
Legislature had conferred the same privileges
It would mean placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of investigating and
disciplining all these officials whose functions are plainly executive, and the
consequent curtailment, by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the
President's power to discipline and remove administrative officials who are presidential
appointees, and which the Constitution expressly place under the President's
supervision and control
The doctrine of separation of powers provide that the Supreme Court of the
Philippines and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power
or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial
function, unless it be reasonably incidental to its judicial functions
May sc be vested with non-judicial functions?
NO
III. Grave abuse of discretion
IV. Advisory opinions
*Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio 33 SCRA 494 [1970] (no power to give advisory opinions or
recommend executive action)
The power to revoke a conditional pardon is within the realm of the executive, and does not fall
within the jurisdiction of the judiciary. Neither does the judiciary have the power to give advisory
opinions. Its main duty is to settle disputes and uphold rights, in the absence of which it cannot
render opinions, as this is not one of its functions.
FACTS
Ang was convicted for various offenses committed in the Philippines and was
sentenced to suffer penalties. After serving six and a half years of his sentence, he
was granted conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines. He was ordered
never to return to the Philippines. In violation of his pardon, he returned. He was
recommitted by order of the Executive Secretary.
Ang filed a petition for habeas corpus and the RTC denied it. Likewise it was also
denied by the CA.
Although, the CA made a recommendation that Ang may be allowed to leave the
country on the first available transporation abroad.
The Solicitor General assailed this decision by the CA, claiming that: The
recommendation by the CA should not be part of the decision, because it gives the
decision a political complexion, because court are not empowered to make such
recommendation, nor is it inherent or incidental in the exercise of judicial powers.
The Solicitor General further contends that allowing convicted aliens to leave the
country is an act of the state exercised solely in the discretion of the Chief Executive.
It is urged that the act of sending an undesirable alien out of the country is political in
character, and the courts should not interfere with, nor attempt to influence, the
political acts of the President. The Court held that the CA decision was not proper and
that it could not make recommendation
ISSUE
Whether the judiciary has the power to give advisory opinions or recommend executive
action?
HELD
NO
In so far as Opinions of judges
The case in the Court of Appeals was for Habeas Corpus. The only issue there was
whether the RTC correctely denied the petition. The Court of Appeals was not called
upon to review any sentence imposed upon Ang. The sentence against him had long
 attained the character of finality and in fact, he was even pardoned. The opinion of
judges should be relevant to the question presented for decision
The opinion of the Court of Appeals should have been limited to the affirmance of the
decision of the RTC, and no more.
The recommendatory power of the courts are limited to those expressly provided
in the law, such as Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code (when an act is not
punishable by law, judges should report it to the executive)
.
The Court of Appeals was simply called to determine whether Ang was illegally
confined or not under the Director of Prisons (for violating the pardon).
o It was improper for the CA justices to make a recommendation that would
suggest a modification or correction of the act of the President.
The matter of whether an alien who violated the law may remain or be deported is a
political question that should be left entirely to the President, under the principle of
separation of powers.
o It is not within the province of the judiciary to express an opinion, or a
suggestion that would reflect on the wisdom or propriety of an action
by the President, which are purely political in nature.
After all, courts are not concerned with the wisdom or morality of laws, but only in the
interpretation and application of the law. Judges should refrain from expressing
irrelevant opinions in their decisions which may only reflect unfavorably upon the
competence and the propriety of their judicial actuations.
V. Justiciable Controversy
*SBMA v. COMELEC 262 SCRA 492 [1996] (supra. Art. 6, Sec. 32; no controversy when
resolution is at proposal stage)
Courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.
Judicial power has been defined in jurisprudence as "the right to determine
actual controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts
of proper jurisdiction".
It is "the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for
violation of such rights". Thus, there can be no occasion for the exercise of judicial
power unless real parties come to court for the settlement of an actual controversy
and unless the controversy is such that it can be settled in a manner that binds the
partie
s by the application of existing laws.
FACTS
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development
Act of 1992), which created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to
implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into
alternative productive uses.
, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippines government.
Immediately,petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of
the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy.
the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10,
Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of
RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the
President.
respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993.
The petition prayed for the following:
a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone
b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.
The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain
provisions of RA 7227.
Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.
On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the
subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.
On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds
of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Municipality of Morong.
On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a
"Calendar of Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern
the conduct of the referendum.
On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution
No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that
proposes an amendment of a national law.
ISSUE
Withdrawal of Adherence and Imposition of Conditionalities -- Ultra Vires
HELD
Petitioner maintains that the proposition sought to be submitted in the plebiscite,
namely, Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, is ultra vires or beyond the powers of the
Sangguniang Bayan to enact,[18] stressing that under Sec. 124 (b) of RA 7160 (the Local
Government Code), "local initiative shall cover only such subjects or matters as are within the
legal powers of the sanggunians to enact." Elsewise stated, a local initiative may enact only such
ordinances or resolutions as the municipal council itself could, if it decided to so enact.
Deliberating on this issue, the Court agrees with private respondent Garcia that
indeed, the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage.
It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing
to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has
become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be
enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ
of prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally
speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or
cases.
*In re Save the Supreme Court 746 SCRA352 [2015] (Supreme Court cant declare a
proposed bill unconstitutional; no right arises therefrom; read with SBMA v. COMELEC, supra.)
FACTS
ISSUE - to define,
- prescribe, and
- apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts
but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5 hereof.
HELD
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of
tenure of its Members.
VI. Distinguished from declaratory relief

*Tano v. Socrates 278 SCRA 154 [1997] (hierarchy of courts)
FACTS
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princessa enacted ordinance no. 15-92 banning the
shipment of live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princessa City for a period of 5 years. In the
same light, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan also enacted a resolution that prohibits
the catching, gathering, buying, selling and possessing and shipment of live marine coral
dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of 5 years within the Palawan waters. The petitioners
Airline Shippers Association of Palawan together with marine merchants were charged for
violating the above ordinance and resolution by the city and provincial governments. The
petitioners now allege that they have the preferential rights as marginal fishermen granted with
privileges provided in Section 149 of the Local Government Code, invoking the invalidity of the
above-stated enactments as violative of their preferential rights.
ISSUE
HELD
*Malaga v. Penachos 213 SCRA 516 [1992] (injunctions against infrastructure projects)*
FACTS
The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and
Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28,
1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a
Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF.
The notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification
requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and
opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE
Construction and Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-
qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988.
Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of
them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were
considered late.

Disregard of the hierarchy of the courts must be put to a halt. Lower courts are often Petitioners
better equipped to resolve factual issues since the Supreme Court is not a trier of o filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for
facts. their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-
The judicial policy that the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders.
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and o They sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the acceptance of their documents.
exercise of primary jurisdiction o asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be
Supreme Court is not possessed of original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.
relief even if only questions of law are involved On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC
Declaratory Relief Advisory opinion from conducting the bidding and award the project.
-parties with real conflicting legal interest - legal issue posed in the abstract DEFENDANTS
binding on parties -not binding on anyone o filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the court
- judicial act -NOT a judicial act is prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project
under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818.
o They also contended that the preliminary injunction had become moot
and academic as it was served after the bidding had been awarded and
closed.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the
petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be
Rule 65 rule 1 and 2 constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling within
VII. Conclusive character of Supreme Court Judgment the coverage of the subject law.
VIII. Plenary Judicial Power; derivative; PET Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
Supplement preliminary injunction, or preliminary infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other
Did Article 8, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution Expand the Jurisdiction of the natural resource development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the
Supreme Court? 8 LR 6, #12 (Dec. 31, 1999). El Andres Narvasa, El Poder (1998). government, including among others public utilities for the transport of the goods and
commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power government official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any
such project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for
such execution, implementation or operation.
ISSUE
Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD 1818?
HELD:
The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled
corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:
Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special
charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or
objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary
authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is
therefore covered by P.D. 1818.
There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government
instrumentality.
o First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development
policy of the State, a priority program of the government to effect the socio-
economic life of the nation.
o Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the
ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to
be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative.
o Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are
authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state
college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of
such employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public
service.
o Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the
funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the
funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in
the General Appropriations Law.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in
the said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that
justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the award of the project
(citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).
liabilities of the private respondents.
It has been held in a long line of cases that a contract granted without the competitive bidding
required by law is void, and the party to whom it is awarded cannot benefit from it. It has not
been shown that the irregularities committed by PBAC were induced by or participated in by any
of the contractors. Hence, liability shall attach only to the private respondents for the prejudice
sustained by the petitioners as a result of the anomalies described above.
As there is no evidence of the actual loss suffered by the petitioners, compensatory damage
may not be awarded to them. Moral damages do not appear to be due either. Even so, the Court
cannot close its eyes to the evident bad faith that characterized the conduct of the private
respondents, including the irregularities in the announcement of the bidding and their efforts to
persuade the ISCOF president to award the project after two days from receipt of the restraining
order and before they moved to lift such order..com.ph
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may
not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year
and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
Section 4.
1. The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
2. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive
agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other
cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those
involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
3. Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at
least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be
decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court
sitting en banc.
I. Filling-in vacancy in Supreme Court; 90 days
*De Castro v. JBC 615 SCRA 666 [2010] (supra.)
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
II. Referral to en banc; par. 3; cases only; modification of doctrine
*Fortich v. Corona GR 131457, August 19, 1999 (involves "matters")
This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon,
owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation
(NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners.
 In October 1991, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144-
hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38
million. At that time, the property was under a 10-year lease to Del Monte Philippines,
Inc. (DMPI) which was set to expire in 1994.
NQSRMDC resisted the DAR's action. It sought and was granted by the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB) a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction in an
Order dated March 31, 1992.
Despite the DARAB Order, the DAR Regional Director issued a Memorandum, dated
May 21, 1992, directing the Land Bank to open a trust account for P2.38 million in the
name of NQSRMDC and to conduct summary proceedings to determine the just
compensation of the subject property. However, Land Bank subsequently cancelled
the trust account upon orders of DARAB.
In the meantime, Bukidnon Governor Carlos Fortich passed Resolution No. 6,
designating certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon
Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is situated.
Subsequently, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, enacted Ordinance No.
24 converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land from agricultural to
industrial/institutional with a view of providing an opportunity to attract investors.
Pursuant thereto, an application for conversion (from agri to industrial) was filed by
NQSRMDC. The proposed industrial area, as conceived by NQSRMDC (project
proponent), would contain museums, sports development complex, schools, an Agro-
Industrial Park, and commercial facilities.
The DAR Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands under
Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying the NQSRMDC application for
the conversion of the land from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the
same under the compulsory coverage of CARP and directed the distribution thereof to
all qualified beneficiaries.
Bukidnon Governor Fortich appealed the order of denial to the Office of the President
(OP).
On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP), issued through then Executive
Secretary Ruben D. Torres, issued a Decision ( OP Decision), reversing the DAR
Secretary's decision, and approved the conversion of the 144-hectare land from
agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area.
In protest of the said OP Decision, a well-publicized hunger strike was staged by some
alleged farmer-beneficiaries in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
compound in Quezon City on October 9, 1997.
This led the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C.
Corona, to issue the so-called "Win-Win" Resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially
modifying its earlier OP Decision after the same had already become final and executory.
The said "Win-Win" Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-
industrial area only to the extent of 44 hectares, and ordered the remaining 100 hectares to
be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
Petitioners filed the present certiorari petition (Rule 65) seeking to annul and set aside the
"Win-Win" Resolution and to enjoin DAR Secretary Garilao from implementing the said
Resolution. A motion for intervention was filed by the alleged farmer-beneficiaries
The main issue is: What is the legal effect of the "Win-Win" Resolution issued by the Office
of the President on its earlier Decision involving the same subject matter, which had already
become final and executory?
The OSG also raised the following procedural issues:
(a) petitioners should have filed a petition for review under Rule 43, instead of a certiorari
under Rule 65,
(b) petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the Win-Win" Resolution before
filing the present petition, and
(c) the filing by the petitioners of:
o (i) a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction with the
Court of Appeals,
o (ii) a complaint for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and
injunction against DAR with the RTC and
o (iii) the present petition, constitute forum shopping.
HELD:
Proper remedy is a special civil action under Rule 65 (Certiorari), not an ordinary appeal
under Rule 43 (Petition for Review)
1. It is contended the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review
directly with the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court.
2. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-
judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctable only by the extraordinary
writ of certiorari.
3. Under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-
judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, including the Office of the President, may be
taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition for review within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution, whether the appeal involves questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
4. In this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that the
present petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is "patently illegal" and was
issued with "grave abuse of discretion" and "beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C.
Corona's) jurisdiction" when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of
March 29, 1996 which had long become final and executory. In other words, the crucial issue
raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an
appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed
resolution is an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners
Motion for reconsideration is not a pre-requisite to challenge an order or resolution that
is patently void
10. As to the issue of whether the petitioners committed a fatal procedural lapse when they
failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Win-Win Resolution before seeking
judicial recourse, suffice it to state that the said motion is not necessary when the questioned
resolution is a patent nullity.
Motion for intervention must be filed by a real party in interest
14. The motions for intervention filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries are denied for lack of
merit. In their motion, movants contend that they are the farmer-beneficiaries of the land in
question, hence, are real parties in interest. To prove this, they attached in their motion a Master
List of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged master list was made pursuant to the
directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution which directs the DAR
"to carefully and meticulously determine who among the claimants are qualified farmer-
beneficiaries." However, a perusal of the said document reveals that movants are those
purportedly "Found Qualified and Recommended for Approval." In other words, movants are
merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries.
15. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be benefited
or injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest means
a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest. Undoubtedly, movants' interest over the land in question is
a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.
16. Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants based their motion is null and
void. Hence, their motion for intervention has no leg to stand on.
"Win-Win" Resolution is void- The Office of the President acted without authority when it
modified an earlier Decision which had already become final and executory
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are
embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
"SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise
provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such
period.
"Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in
exceptionally meritorious cases."
18. When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the
Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so
modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority
to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which
second motion became the basis of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution. Therefore, the assailed
"Win-Win" Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of March 29, 1996 after it has
attained finality, is utterly void.
19. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the
Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to
be filed in "exceptionally meritorious cases," as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of
AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for
reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to
lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and
substantially modifying its March 29, 1996 Decision which had already become final and
executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.
Res judicata applies to decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered
pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority
20. It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative
agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force
and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata . The rule
of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent
authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or
administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts
having general judicial powers [see Brillantes v. Castro]
*Republic v. Garcia 527 SCRA 495 [2007] (modification of doctrine)
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may
require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of
the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil
Service Law.
I. Judicial Review; par. 2
A. Administrative agencies; no power
B. Requisites
1. ripe for adjudication
*PACU v. Secretary of Education 97 PHIL. 806 [1955] (also under locus standi)
Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assails the constitutionality
of Act No. 2706, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 180, entitled An Act making
 the inspection and recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the
Secretary of Public Instruction."
PACU contends that any law requiring an approval or permit for such amounts to
censorship of previous restraint. They refer to section 3 of the statute which provides
that before a private school may be opened to the public, a permit must first be
obtained from the Secretary of Education.
Petitioner likewise assail the assessment of 1 per cent levied on gross receipts of all
private schools for additional Government expenses in connection with their
supervision and regulation. They maintain that this is a tax on the exercise of a
constitutional right - the right to open a school, the liberty to teach, etc.
PACU also questions section 1 and section 6 of the statute which confers to the
Secretary of Education unlimited power and uncontrolled discretion to prescribe rules
and standards contending that it constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative
power.
In addition, PACU also assails the validity of Republic Act No. 139 which provides that
the textbooks to be used in private schools shall be submitted to the Board of
Textbooks which shall have the power to prohibit the use of any of said textbooks
which it may find to be against the law or to offend the dignity and honor of the
government and people of the Philippines, or which it may find to be against the
general policies of the government, or which it may deem pedagogically unsuitable,
saying that this constitutes censorship.
The Government argues that: 1) the matter constitutes no justiciable controversy; 2)
PACU is in estoppel to challenge the validity of the said acts; and 3) the Acts are
constitutionally valid.
HELD
Judicial Power (Actual Controversy)
The courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one
who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.
Petitioners all have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their
permits. They do not assert that the respondent Secretary of Education has
threatened to revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of
the law - and, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain.
Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the
permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy
The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests
of litigants require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual
interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient.
Notwithstanding the failure of the petitioners to show actual controversy, the court
decided to look into the allegation of violation of a fudamental right.
Delegation of Legislative Powers to the Secretary of Education to Fix the Standards of
Education
11. Petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the said Department.
However they failed to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally
objectionable. In order to assail the constitutionality of a circular or memorandum issued by the
Department of Education, such circular or memorandum must be indicated, the wrong inflicted or
threatened must be alleged and proved, and the constitutional pointraised and argued
specifically.
12. The statute does not in express terms give the Secretary complete control. It gives him
powers to inspect private schools, to regulate their activities, to give them official permits to
operate under certain conditions, and to revoke such permits for cause. This does not amount to
complete control.
13. To confer, by statute, upon the Secretary of Education the power and discretion to prescribe
rules fixing the minimum standards of adequate and efficient instruction to be observed by all
private schools and colleges, is not to unduly delegate legislative powers.
*Tan v. Macapagal 43 SCRA 678 [1972] (also taxpayers suit)
FACTS
Tan, Acejas and Fernandez filed a petition for declaratory relief as taxpayers, but
purportedly suing on behalf of themselves and the Filipino people, in assailing the
validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution,which deals with the range of authority of the
1971 Constitutional Convention.
Petitioners seek to have the Court declare that the Laurel-Leido Resolution is without
power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to
consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution
through the adoption of a form of government other than the form now outlined in the
present Constitution, the Convention being merely empowered to propose
improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general plan laid down
therein. The first petition consisted only of 5 pages, which the court dismissed. The
petitioners then submitted a 32 page motion for reconsideration, which the court had
to deny.
Held:
Locus Standi
1. The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injuryas a result of its enforcement.
2. As a relaxation of the direct injury rule, taxpayers have been given standing to
petition for the nullification laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon
the theory that the 'expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds,
3. As far as a taxpayer's suit is concerned, the Court still has discretion as to whether
or not it should be entertained.
Ripeness
Adhering to the rule on non-interference, the Court declined to entertain petitioners
suit to seek a declaration of the nullity of a resolution of the Laurel-Leido Resolution.
As long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by the Constitutional
Convention, there is no room for judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete
what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until
then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction.
It is a prerequisite that something had been accomplished or performed by either
(executive or legislative) branch before a court may come into the picture. At such a
time, it may pass on the validity of what was done but only "when properly challenged
in an appropriate legal proceeding."
Such a principle applies also when the inquiry concerns the scope of the powers
lodged in the Constitutional Convention. The judiciary must leave it free to fulfill its
 responsibility according to its lights. There is to be no interference. Its autonomy is to
be respected.
*Suplico v. NEDA - GR 178830, July 14, 2008 (ZTE contract moot)
On April 18, 2008, the OSG filed respondents reply, reiterating
their position that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication,
there must be an actual case or controversy one which involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations
not cognizable by a court of justice.
Contrary to petitioners contentions that these declarations made
by officials belonging to the executive branch on the Philippine
Governments decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project
are self-serving, hence, inadmissible, the Court has no alternative
but to take judicial notice of this official act of the President
of the Philippines.
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Judicial Notice, when mandatory. A court shall take
judicial notice, without introduction of evidence, of the existence
and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms
of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations,
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
the political constitution and history of the Philippines,
the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure
of time, and the geographical divisions.
It is further provided in the above-quoted rule that the court
shall take judicial notice of the foregoing facts without
introduction of evidence. Since we consider the act of
cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the proposed
ZTE-NBN Project during the meeting of October 2, 2007 with
the Chinese President in China as an official act of the
executive department, the Court must take judicial notice
of such official act without need of evidence.
Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the
very antithesis of mootness. In the absence of actual
justiciable controversies or disputes, the Court generally
opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where there is
no more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to
have a reason to render any ruling or make any pronouncement.
The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise
its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case
or controversy one which involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible
of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.
Where the issue has become moot and academic, there
is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication
thereon would be of no practical use or value as
courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic
questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging.
2. Standing
a. Legislators and Government Officials
*Concepcion v. COMELEC 591 SCRA 420 [2009]
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
b. Taxpayers
*Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works 110 PHIL 331 [1960-1961] (supra. Art. 2, Secs. 24 & 29;
requisites in questioning use of public funds)
Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action for
declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that RA 920, entitled "An Act
Appropriating Funds for Public Works", contained, in section 1-C (a) thereof, an item
of appropriation of P85,000.00 for the construction of Pasig feeder road terminals. At
the time of the passage and approval of said Act, the planned feeder roads were
located within the Antonio Subdivision which was a private property of Jose C.
Zulueta, then a member of the Senate of the Philippines.
The respondents maintained that petitioner could not assail the appropriation in
question because "there is no actual bona fide case . . .in which the validity of RA 920
is necessarily involved" and petitioner has not shown that he has a personal and
substantial interest in said Act and that its enforcement has caused or will cause him a
direct injury.
HELD
Appropriating public funds for a public purpose
1. In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public
purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expended only for public
purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals.
2. The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds
is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to
the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to
individuals might incidentally serve the public.
3. It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must
determine its validity as justifying a tax. Incidental to the public or to the state, which
results from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises
or business, does not justify their aid by the use public money.
Right of Taxpayers to Assail the Constitutionality of a Legislation)
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the
constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but
also taxpayers, have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by
taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of
public moneys.
8. Indeed, in the Province of Tayabas vs. Perez involving the expropriation of a land by the
Province of Tayabas, two taxpayers thereof were allowed to intervene for the purpose of
contesting the price being paid to the owner thereof, as unduly exorbitant. It is true that
in Custodio vs. President of the Senate a taxpayer and employee of the Government was not
permitted to question the constitutionality of an appropriation for backpay of members of
Congress. However, in Rodriguez vs. Treasurer of the Philippines and Barredo vs.
Commission on Elections we entertained the action of taxpayers impugning the validity of
certain appropriations of public funds, and invalidated the same. Moreover, the reason that
impelled this Court to take such position in said two cases the importance of the issues
therein raised is present in the case at bar. Again, like the petitioners in the Rodriguez and
Barredo cases, petitioner herein is not merely a taxpayer. The Province of Rizal, which he
represents officially as its Provincial Governor, is our most populated political subdivision, and,
the taxpayers therein bear a substantial portion of the burden of taxation, in the Philippines.
*Galicto v. Aquino 667 SCRA 150 (2012) (no material interest in future increases in benefits)
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
c. Citizens and associations; transcendental importance
*Legaspi v. CSC 150 SCRA 530 [1987] (access to records)
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
*Joya v. PCGG 225 SCRA 568 [1993] (private funds)
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
*Board of Optometry v. Colet 260 SCRA 88 [1996] (unregistered organizations)
R.A. No. 8050 or the Revised Optometry Law of 1995. The final version of the law that
was approved by the President was a consolidated version of the house and senate
bills. The Reconciled Bill was then separately ratified by both the Senate and the
House of Representatives
Private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a petition for
declaratory relief and for prohibition and injunction, assailing RA 8050 on various
constitutional grounds.
It appears that the petition was filed by several optometrist associations, each
allegedly represented by its president. The body of the petition, however, gave no
details as to the juridical personality and addresses of these associations. It merely
listed the names of the presidents as well as their profession and home addresses.
The trial court issued an order enjoining the implementation of RA 8050 or its Code of
Ethics, finding that the law violated several constitutional principles.
The Board of Optometry, DOH Secretary, etc. filed this petition to assail the injunction
order of the trial court. They allege further that the optometrist associations do not
have the requisite standing to challenge the validity of RA 8050 since they are not
registered associations with the SEC and two of the alleged association presidents are
not duly registered optometrists as certified to by the PRC.
Held:
Locus Standi
1. An association is considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personality
separate and distinct from that of its members.
2. Since OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP were not shown to be juridical entities, they
cannot, for obvious reasons, be deemed real parties in interest. Moreover, since the
names of private respondents Miguel Acebedo, Miriam F. Llave, and Republica A.
Panol do not appear in the registration books of the Board of Optometry as authorized
optometry practitioners in the Philippines, they do not have requisite personal and
substantial interest in the case.
Class Suit
3. As a class suit, the petition must fail. Not only did the private respondents fail to
allege this in their petition, they likewise failed to allege the existence and prove the
requisites of a class suit, viz., (1) the subject matter of the controversy is one of
common or general interest to many persons, and (2) the parties are so numerous that
it is impracticable to bring them all before the court
4. Courts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is the
exception to the requirements of joinder of all indispensable parties.
Taxpayer suit
5. Although this Court has shown liberality in granting locus standi to taxpayers in
taxpayers' suits, private respondents have not adequately shown that this liberality
must be extended to them. Their plea of injury or damage is nothing but a sweeping
generalization.
Declaratory relief
6. The requisites of a special civil action for declaratory relief are: (1) the existence of
a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) that the issue invoked is ripe for judicial determination. At least the first and
 fourth requisites are wanting in the present case.
Judicial Review
7. Then rule in constitutional law is that courts will not assume jurisdiction over
a constitutional question unless the following requisites are first satisfied: (1) there
must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict or rights susceptible of
judicial determination; (2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper
party (locus standi); (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary
to the resolution of the case (lis mota).
8. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory.
9. There is yet no actual case or controversy involving all or any of the private
respondents on one hand, and all or any of the petitioners on the other, with respect to
rights or obligations under RA 8050. This is plain because the action is for declaratory
relief.
*Tondo Medical v. CA 527 SCRA 746 [2007] (standing is determined by merits of case even in
cases of transcendental importance)
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
*Anak Mindanao v. Executive Secretary 531 SCRA 583 [2007] (abstract claims)
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
*Resident Marine Mammals v. Sec Reyes (supra. A2, Sec. 16)
In G.R. No. 180771, the Resident Marine Mammals ,as petitioners, are the toothed
whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in
and around the Taon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between the islands
of Negros and Cebu. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-
Osorio , to be collectively known as the Stewards who allegedly seek the protection
of the aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and
undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Taon Strait, among others
In G.R. No. 181527, petitioners are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development
Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization, established
for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk, and other individuals representing the
subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the Department
of Energy (DOE), entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102
(GSEC-102) with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX), a Japanese
company. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Taon
Strait.
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into Service
Contract No. 46 (SC -46), which allowed the exploration, development, and
exploitation of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 square
kilometers offshore the Taon Strait.
From May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Taon
Strait. JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of
the project. Since the well was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungajan, where the Taon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988,
JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment(EIA)
requirements pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586.
Having obtained the required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of
3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province. The drilling
began onNovember 16, 2007 and lasted until February 8, 2008.
Petitioners filed the present Petitions for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Injunction to
enjoin respondents from implementing SC-46 and to have it nullified for willful and
gross violation of the 1987 Constitution and certain international and municipal laws.
Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS) filed a Motion to Strike its name as a respondent
on the ground that it is not the Philippine agent of JAPEX. SOS claimed that it had
acted as a mere logistics contractor for JAPEX in its oil and gas exploration activities
in the Philippines.
JAPEX PH, branch office of JAPEX (Japan) alleged that it had already stopped
exploration activities in the Taon Strait way back in 2008, rendering this case moot.
The various issues raised by the petitioners may be condensed into two primary
issues: (1) Procedural Issue: Locus Standi of the Resident Marine Mammals and
Stewards, petitioners in G.R. No. 180771; and (2) Main Issue: Legality of Service
Contract No. 46.
Held:
I. Procedural Issues
Courts may decide cases otherwise moot and academic
1. This Court makes clear that the moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that
can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts have decided cases otherwise
moot and academic under the following exceptions:
(a) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
(b) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
(c) The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and
(d) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review
2. In this case, despite the termination of SC-46, this Court deems it necessary to resolve these
consolidated petitions as almost all of the foregoing exceptions are present in this case. Both
petitioners allege that SC-46 is violative of the Constitution, the environmental and livelihood
issues raised undoubtedly affect the publics interest, and the respondents contested actions are
capable of repetition.
Locus Standi of petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
3. The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals and
inanimate objects standing is due to the need to comply with the strict requirements in bringing a
suit to court. The 1997 Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be either natural or juridical
persons, or entities authorized by law. It further necessitates the action to be brought in the
name of the real party-in-interest, even if filed by a representative.
4. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized
approach. While developments in Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence have not progressed
as far as [granting] legal standing for inanimate objects, the current trend moves towards
simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases. [For instance],
the Court [recently] passed the landmarkRules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which
allow for a citizen suit, and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for
violations of our environmental laws.
5. Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure may be
retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and will
not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is
no vested rights in rules of procedure.
6. In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has
been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a
suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting that the Stewards are joined as real
parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species.
The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be
possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are
therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.
3. Raise at earliest opportunity & Constitutionality is the very lis mota
*People v. Vera 65 PHIL. 56 [1937-1938] (exception to the rule on earliest opportunity)
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
*Narra Nickel Mining v. Redmont 722 SCRA 382 [2014] (capable of repetition; need to
formulate principles)
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
C. Political questions; requisites
*Torrecampo v. Metropolitan 649 SCRA 482 [2011] (executive policy
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
1. Textually demonstrable commitment
2. Judicially discoverable and manageable standards
D. Effect of unconstitutionality; par. 2(a)
*De Agbayani v. PNB 38 SCRA 429 [1971] (operative fact)
De Agbayani obtained a loan of P450 secured by a real estate mortgage from PNB.
The loan was obtained in July 19, 1939 and would mature in 5 years (July 19, 1944).
In 1959, PNB extra-judicially foreclosed the property to recover the balance of the
loan. De Agbayani countered with a suit against PNB and the Provincial Sheriff stating
that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having
elapsed from the date of maturity, July 19, 1944.
PNB sought to dismiss the suit stating that prescription as a defense would not be
available if the period from 1945, (when EO No. 32 was issued) to 1948 (when the RA
342, the subsequent legislative act extending the moratorium period, was declared
invalid) were to be deducted from the computation of the time during which the bank
took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan.
The lower court, in ruling in favor of De Agbayani, took the view that an
unconstitutional act is not a law, creating no rights and imposing no duties, and thus
as inoperative as if it had never been. (The court reasoned that since the moratorium
law was declared unconstitutional, it should be treated as if it had never been passed,
hence, it was as if no moratorium took place to prevent the bank from foreclosing on
the petitioners mortgage)
Held:
Doctrine of Operative Fact (Effect of unconstitutional statutes)
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when not
contrary to the Constitution, the latter being supreme and paramount.
However, prior to the declaration of nullity, such challenged legislative or executive act
was in force and thus, entitled to obedience and respect.
The operative fact principle states that the existence of a statute or executive order
prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are
attached.
Rational basis test
While the act can be assailed on due process, equal protection and non-impairment grounds, all
that is required to avoid the corrosion of invalidity is that the rational basis or reasonable test is
satisfied
Meanwhile, the measure has been acted upon by the public and accepted as valid.
Moreover, because the constitutionality of the statute is conditioned on its being fair
and reasonable, an act valid when enacted may subsequently be stricken down due to
altered circumstances
. EO 32, and RA 342 which continued the moratorium legislation, suspended the
enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable by war
sufferers.
At the time of its issuance, there was factual justification for the moratorium because
the Philippines was in a state of emergency at the time of its liberation from the
Japanese forces in 1945. Businesses were at a standstill and radical measures were
devised to tide over the country until the economy reached some semblance of
normalcy.
However, time passed and conditions changed. Thus, when the moratorium legislation
was brought to court in 1953, it was then found unreasonable. The court, applying the
rational basis test at that point in time, held that the right to non-impairment of
contractual obligations must prevail.
the relief accorded by the moratorium law works injustice to creditors who are
practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes
extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more
patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the
operation of the relief.
*Philippine Coconut v. Republic, supra. (retroactive application to avoid injustice)
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
*CIR v. San Roque Power Corp.- 707 SCRA 66 [2013] and [MR] October 8, 2013
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
*Araullo v. President Aquino, (supra, A6, S 29)
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
*Katipunan v. Robredo 730 SCRA 322 [2015] (implementation of infrastructure project not
subject to judicial review)
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
*Sameer v. Cabiles 732 SCRA 531 (re-enactment of a void law declared unconstitutional cant
be done)
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement
agency
Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract for
a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co.
Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her employment contract, she
agreed to work as quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a
cutter
Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed
Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that she should immediately
report to their office to get her salary and passport. She was asked to prepare for
immediate repatriation. Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14,
1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted
NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against
petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LAs decision. CA
affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission finding
respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three months worth of salary,
the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorneys fees
ISSUE: Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal
dismissal
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondents salary should
be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co.,
Inc., this court ruled that the clause or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less is unconstitutional for violating the
equal protection clause and substantive due process.
A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.
The Court said that they are aware that the clause or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less was reinstated in
Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in
2010.
Ruling on the constitutional issue
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of
the government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the
Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports such
exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws
must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is
a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same
or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared
unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse
conclusion.
The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act.
No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as
well as the Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances
that would warrant us to revisit the precedent.
The Court declared, once again, the clause, or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section
10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
*Film Dev. Council v. Colon Heritage 758 SCRA 536 [2015] (acted in good faith, so, operative
fact applied)
FACTS
In 1993, the City of Cebu, passed Ordinance LXIX or the revised omnibus tax ordinance of Cebu
city
o Sec. 42 and 43 of Chapter XI requires proprietors, lessees or operators of
theaters, cinemas, and the like to pay an amusement tax of 30%.
- on June 7, 2002, Congress passed RA 9167, creating the Film Development Council
of the Philippines (FDCP) and abolishing the Film Development Foundation of the
Philippines, Inc. and the Film Rating Board. Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 provided for
the tax treatment of certain graded films
- According to petitioner, from the time RA 9167 took effect up to the present, all the
cities and municipalities in Metro Manila, as well as urbanized and independent
component cities, with the sole exception of Cebu City, have complied with the
mandate of said law.
- Petitioner sent demand letters for the unpaid amusement tax with a 5% delinquency
tax. They were given 10 days to pay the amounts of the said letter but feel on deaf
ears.
- Because of the persistent refusal of the operators, Cebu city file a petition for
declaratory relief and sought secs 13 and 14 of the said RA as unconstitutional.
- Colon heritage also sought to declare sec 14 of the RA as unconstitutional
RTC: declared the said sections as unconstitutional
ISSUE
WON the RTC gravely erred in declaring sec 13 and 14 of RA 9167 as unvalid and
unconstitutional
HELD
- No
WHEREFORE, in view of all the disquisitions, judgment is rendered in favor of the City of Cebu
against the Film Development Council of the Philippines
Ratio:
- The power of taxation, being an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty,
belongs, as a
matter of right, to every independent government, and needs no express conferment
by the people before it can be exercised. It is purely legislative and, thus, cannot be
delegated to the executive and judicial branches of government without running afoul
to the theory of separation of powers. It however, can be delegated to municipal
corporations, consistent with the principle that legislative powers may be delegated to
local governments in respect of matters of local concern.
It is a well-settled rule that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it . confers no rights; it imposes
no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been
passed at all. Applying this principle, the logical conclusion would be to order the return of all the
amounts remitted to FDCP and given to the producers of graded films, by all of the covered
cities, which actually amounts to hundreds of millions, if not billions. In fact, just for Cebu City,
the aggregate deficiency claimed by FDCP is ONE HUNDRED FIFTY NINE MILLION THREE
HUNDRED SEVENTY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT PESOS AND
FIFTY FOUR CENTAVOS (P159,377,988.54). Again, this amount represents the unpaid
amounts to FDCP by eight cinema operators or proprietors in only one covered city.
An exception to the above rule, however, is the doctrine of operative fact, which applies as a
matter of equity and fair play. This doctrine nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law or an
executive act by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences that cannot always be
ignored. It applies when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on
those who have relied on the invalid law.45
In Hacienda Luisita v. PARC,
- the Court elucidated the meaning and scope of the operative fact doctrine, viz:
- The "operative fact" doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals,
wherein it is stated that a legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared
as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be complied with, thus:
- Here, to order FDCP and the producers of graded films which may have already
received the amusement tax incentive reward pursuant to the questioned provisions of
RA 9167, to return the amounts received to the respective taxing authorities would
certainly impose a heavy, and possibly crippling, financial burden upon them who
merely, and presumably in good faith, complied with the legislative fiat subject of this
case.
- For these reasons, We are of the considered view that the application of the doctrine
of operative facts in the case at bar is proper so as not to penalize FDCP for having
complied with the legislative command in RA 9167, and the producers of graded films
who have already received their tax cut prior to this Decision for having produced top-
quality films.
- Having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative,
conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. . . . It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the
effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The
actual existence of a statute, prior to [the determination of its invalidity], is an operative
 fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
- The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to
have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both
of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions
are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state
and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement
of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.'
E. Automatic review; par. 2 (d)
*People v. Mateo 433 SCRA 640
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
F. Question of law; par. 2(e)
II. Change of Venue; par. 4
*People v. Gutierrez 36 SCRA 172 [1970] (transfer of venue)
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
III. Power to Promulgate Rules; par. 5
A. Enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts
*Santero v. CFI-Cavite 153 SCRA 728 [1965] (rules of court v. civil code)*
Petitioners are the children of the late Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while private
respondents are four (minors) of the seven children begotten by Santero with Anselma Diaz.
Both sets of children are the natural children of the late Santero since neither of their mothers
was married to their father Pablo.
Petitioners question the order of the respondent court granting the Motion for Allowance filed by
private respondents.
Before the court could act on the instant petition, private respondents filed another Motion for
Allowance to include three of the other children/siblings. Anselma Diaz claims that her first three
children who were then of majority age should have been included since all her children have
the right to receive allowance as advance payment of their shares in the inheritance of Pablo
Santero under Article 188 of the Civil Code. Petitioners argue that they are not entitled to any
allowance since they have already attained majority age, two are gainfully employed and one is
married, as provided for under Sec. 3 Rule 83, of the Rules of Court.
Held:
Children's right to receive allowances
1. Support is defined in Article 290 of the Civil Code as everything indispensable to the basic
needs of the family. The social position of the family must be taken into consideration in
determining the amount of support due.
2. Under Article 188 of the Civil Code, the surviving spouse and all children are entitled to
support from the conjugal property while the property of the deceased spouse is being
liquidated. However, if the amount they receive for support exceeds the fruits or rents that are
actually due them, the excess may be deducted from this allowance.
3. Meanwhile, Rule 83, Section 3 of the Rules of Court limits the kind of children entitled to an
allowance from the estate of a deceased parent. Under this provision, only the widow and her
minor or incapacitated children may receive an allowance during the settlement of the estate.
4. In this case, Articles 188 and 290 of the Civil Code apply over Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the New
Rules of Court. While the Rules of Court limit allowances only to the widow and minor or
incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code guarantees support for the surviving
spouse and his/her children without distinction.
5. Applying Article 188 to this case, the fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully
employed, or married should bar their right to allowances from the communal property under Art.
188.
Procedural law Cannot Prejudice Rights Under Substantive law
6. The right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased is vested upon
the surviving spouse and the children under the Civil Code, which is a substantive law. Given the
nature of the Civil Code, its provisions and the rights it grants cannot be overturned by Rule 83
Section 3 of the Rules of Court, which is only a procedural rule.
*Damasco v. Laqui 166 SCRA 214 [1988] (prescription of crimes v. rules of court)*
Petitioner Atty. Eugenio S. Damasco was charged with the crime of grave threats. After
trial, respondent Judge Hilario L. Laqui found that the evidence presented did not
establish the crime of grave threats but only of light threats. As a result, petitioner was
convicted of the latter crime.
Petitioner contends that he cannot be convicted of light threats necessarily included
in grave threats charged in the information since the lighter offense had already
prescribed when the information was filed.
Petitioner states that the crime was committed on July 8, 1987 and the information for
grave threats was filed only on September 17, 1987, after a lapse of 71 days. On the
other hand, the crime of light threats, which is a light offense, prescribes in two (2)
months or sixty (60) days.
Held:
Prescription of lesser offense

1. Under Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescription of a crime extinguishes
the offenders criminal liability. The prescription of a crime is considered the states
loss or waiver of its right to prosecute.
2. The court held in Francisco vs. Court of Appeals that an accused who is charged for
a graver offense but is found guilty of a lesser offense cannot be convicted for the
latter if it has already prescribed. Otherwise, the law on prescription may be
circumvented by simply accusing the defendant of a graver offense.
Revision of Rules on Criminal Procedure
3. A departure from the Francisco ruling requires an overhaul of rules on criminal
procedure, particularly to redefine prescription as a mere bar to the commencement of
a criminal action and to change its nature from permanent to waivable.
4. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution gives the Supreme Court the power to
promulgate rules concerning the law profession and legal procedure, among others.
However, the court acknowledges that its suggested modification of the rules of
criminal procedure in this case may clash with the Constitutional provision by
diminishing, increasing, or modifying substantive rights.
*Baguio Market Vendors v. Hon. Cortes GR 165922, February 26, 2010 (Congress cant repeal
SC rules)
FACTS:
Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative filed a petition with RTC Baguio
to foreclose a mortgage under act 3135. This type of petition is subject to legal fees
based on value of claim.
Seeking an exemption for payment of these fees, petitioner then invoked Art 62
(6) of RA 6938 (Cooperative Code of the PH) which exempts cooperatives: from the
payment of all court and sheriff's fees payable to the Philippine Government for and in
connection with all actions brought under this Code, or where such action is brought
by the Cooperative Development Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of
obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative.
Respondent Judge Cortes denied request for exemption citing Section 22 of Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, as amended, exempting from the Rules coverage only the
"Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities" and certain suits of
local government units. She said they were liable to pay for foreclosure fees.
Reconsideration filed by petitioner denied
Hence this petition
KIND OF CASE/PETITION:
Petition for review
ISSUES/ QUESTIONS:
1. WN petitioners application for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt from legal fees
under Article 62(6) of RA 6938.
HELD/RATIO:
1. No,
Petitioner: The case calls for nothing more than a simple application of Article 62(6) of RA 6938
exemption should be granted
Court: Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner to claim exemption from the
payment of legal fees in this proceeding because first, the fees imposable on petitioner do not
pertain to an action brought under RA 6938 but to a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage under Act 3135. Second, petitioner is not the Cooperative Development Authority
which can claim exemption only in actions to enforce payments of obligations on behalf of
cooperatives. (SUFFICIENT TO DISPOSE OF PETITION)
Congress cannot repeal SC rules
Additionally, the rule making power of the Court was expanded in the 1987 consti. The 1987
constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with
the Executive.
Also, In the En Banc ruling in Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government
Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees, the Court described its exclusive power
to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure as "one of the safeguards of this
Courts institutional independence"
RULING:
Petition Denied.
*In Re: In the Matter of Clarification of Exemption from Payment of All Court and Sheriffs Fees
of Cooperatives - A.M. 12-2-03-0, 13 March 2012 (legal fees) 668 SCRA 1 (2012) (SC rule
cannot be modified by law)
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
B. Admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar,disciplinary powers, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged
*In re Cunanan 94 PHIL. 534 [953-1954] (admission to the bar).
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
C. Limits of power
1. Simplified and inexpensive procedure for speedy disposition
2. Uniform for all courts of the same grade
3. Not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights
*PNB v. Asuncion 80 SCRA 321 [1977] (procedural v. substantial rights) Commission's jurisdiction. The CA further ruled that whether as a public school teacher or a
FACTS court interpreter, petitioner was part of the civil service, subject to its rules and regulations.

ISSUE Hence, the present petition. The issue is whether the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over an
employee of the Judiciary for acts committed while said employee was still with the Executive or
Education Department.
HELD
Held:
*People v. Lacson 400 SCRA 267 [2003] (time bar rule)
Supreme Court exercises exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and judicial
FACTS
personnel

1. It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. As defined under
ISSUE the Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and government-owned or controlled
corporations. Pursuant to its administrative authority, the CSC is granted the power to "control,
HELD
supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service examinations." This authority grants to the CSC the
right to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations.
4. Procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies effective unless disapproved by SC
2. However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative
IV. Supervision over the Judiciary
supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme
Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, rules and
*Ampong v. CSC 563 SCRA 293 [2008]
regulations. It may take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
During the 1991 Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET), a certain Evelyn Junio-
violation. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of
Decir took the examination and passed with a rating of 74.27%
the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, this Court ruled that the Ombudsman cannot justify
its investigation of a judge on the powers granted to it by the Constitution. It violates the specific
At the time of the examination, petitioner Sarah Ampong (nee Navarra) and Evelyn Decir were
mandate of the Constitution granting to the Supreme Court supervisory powers over all courts
public school teachers under the supervision of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
and their personnel; it undermines the independence of the judiciary.
(DECS). Later, on August 3, 1993, Ampong transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Sarangani Province where she was appointed as Court Interpreter III.
Administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme Court,
regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the
When Evelyn Decir went to the Civil Service Regional Office to claim a copy of her PBET
judiciary
Certificate of Eligibility, the CSRO personnel noticed that the woman did not resemble the picture
of the examinee in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP). It was found that it was Ampong who took and
3. The present case involves a similar violation of the Civil Service Law by a judicial employee.
passed the examinations under the name Evelyn Decir.
But this case is slightly different in that petitioner Ampong committed the offense before her
appointment to the judicial branch. At the time of commission, petitioner was a public school
Decir and Ampong were charged by the CSRO for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct
teacher under the administrative supervision of the DECS and, in taking the civil service
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Decir denied the charges against her. But Ampong
examinations, under the CSC. She was a party to cheating or dishonesty in a civil service-
voluntarily appeared at the CSRO and admitted to the wrongdoing and claimed she was
supervised examination.
persuaded into the act by the husband of Evelyn Junio-Decir, her (Ampong) husband's cousin
4. That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC does not take her case out
The Civil Service Commission (CSC) found petitioner Ampong and Decir guilty of dishonesty,
of the administrative reach of the Supreme Court. The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction
dismissing them from the service.
over a court employee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was
committed before or after employment in the judiciary.
Petitioner Ampong moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the issue of jurisdiction.
She contended that at the time the case was instituted on August 23, 1994, the CSC already lost
When the offender is a judicial employee, the CSC should file the necessary charges
jurisdiction over her since she was then already serving as Court Interpreter III of the RTC.She
before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
argued that the exclusive authority to discipline employees of the judiciary lies with the Supreme
Court and that the CSC acted with abuse of discretion when it continued to exercise jurisdiction
5. In Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, the court held that impersonating an examinee of a
despite her assumption of duty as a judicial employee.
civil service examination is an act of dishonesty. But because theoffender involved a judicial
employee under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court, the CSC filed the
In upholding its jurisdiction over petitioner, the CSC differentiated between
necessary charges before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), a procedure which this
administrative supervision exercised by the Supreme Court and
Court validated. (see also Bartolata v. Julaton)
administrative jurisdiction granted to the Commission over all civil service employees. The fact
that court personnel are under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court does not
6. The standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee
totally isolate them from the operations of the Civil Service Law.
before the OCA. Records show that the CSC did not adhere to this procedure in the present
case.
The Court of Appeals (CA) denied petitioner's appeal noting that petitioner never raised the issue
of jurisdiction until after the CSC ruled against her. Thus, she was estopped from questioning the
The previous actions of petitioner have estopped her from attacking the jurisdiction of the
CSC
7. We are constrained to uphold the ruling of the CSC based on the principle of estoppel. The
previous actions of petitioner have estopped her from attacking the jurisdiction of the CSC. A
party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal exercising quasi-judicial
functions to secure an affirmative relief may not afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape
a penalty.
8. Under the principle of estoppel, a party may not be permitted to adopt a different theory on
appeal to impugn the court's jurisdiction.
9. In Emin v. De Leon, this Court sustained the exercise of jurisdiction by the CSC, while
recognizing at the same time that original disciplinary jurisdiction over public school teachers
belongs to the appropriate committee created for the purpose as provided for under the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers. It was there held that a party who fully participated in the
proceedings before the CSC and was accorded due process is estopped from subsequently
attacking its jurisdiction.
10. Petitioner was given ample opportunity to present her side and adduce evidence in her
defense before the CSC. She filed with it her answer to the charges leveled against her. When
the CSC found her guilty, she moved for a reconsideration of the ruling. These circumstances all
too clearly show that due process was accorded to petitioner.
Assistance of counsel is not a requirement in administrative proceedings
11. Apart from her full participation in the proceedings before the CSC, petitioner admitted to the
offense charged - that she impersonated Decir and took the PBET exam in the latter's place.
Now, she assails said confession, arguing that it was given without aid of counsel.
12. In police custodial investigations, the assistance of counsel is necessary in order for an
extra-judicial confession to be made admissible in evidence against the accused in a criminal
complaint. If assistance was waived, the waiver should have been made with the assistance of
counsel.
13. But while a party's right to the assistance of counsel is sacred in proceedings criminal in
nature, there is no such requirement in administrative proceedings. A party in an administrative
inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel. Moreover, the administrative body is under no
duty to provide the person with counsel because assistance of counsel is not an absolute
requirement. (see Lumiqued v. Exevea)
14. Petitioner's admission was given freely. There was no compulsion, threat or intimidation. As
found by the CSC, petitioner's admission was substantial enough to support a finding of guilt.
Dishonesty as a ground for dismissal from service
15. The CSC found petitioner guilty of dishonesty. It is categorized as "an act which includes the
procurement and/or use of fake/spurious civil service eligibility, the giving of assistance to ensure
the commission or procurement of the same, cheating, collusion, impersonation, or any other
anomalous act which amounts to any violation of the Civil Service examination." Petitioner
impersonated Decir in the PBET exam, to ensure that the latter would obtain a passing mark. By
intentionally practicing a deception to secure a passing mark, their acts undeniably involve
dishonesty.
16. This Court has defined dishonesty as the "(d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." Petitioner's
dishonest act as a civil servant renders her unfit to be a judicial employee. Indeed, We take note
that petitioner should not have been appointed as a judicial employee had this Court been made
aware of the cheating that she committed in the civil service examinations. Be that as it may,
petitioner's present status as a judicial employee is not a hindrance to her getting the penalty
she deserves.
17. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden or responsibility. The image of a
court, as a true temple of justice, is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and
women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel.
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and
the personnel thereof.
*Maceda v. Vasquez 221 SCRA 464 [1993] (falsification) read with
Respondent Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office filed an affidavit-complaint before
the Office of the Ombudsman. He alleged that petitioner Maceda, a Presiding Judge in
RTC Antique, had falsified his Certificate of Service by certifying "that all civil and
criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of
90 days have been determined and decided" on or before a certain date, when in truth
and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10
criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent further alleged that
Maceda similarly falsified his certificates of service for several months in 1989 and
1990, for a total of 17 months.
On the other hand, Maceda contends that he had been granted by this Court an
extension of 90 days to decide the aforementioned cases. Maceda also contends that
the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's ruling in Orap
vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of
his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into
the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.
Held:
Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate offense committed by
judge whether or not offense relates to official duties
There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses
committed by a judge which are unrelated to his official duties.
A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme
Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his
felonious act.
Jurisdiction to investigate offense related to official duties subject to prior
administrative action taken against judge by Supreme Court
The Court agrees with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken
against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation
being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of
 administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine
of separation of powers.
Procedure to be observed by Ombudsman regarding complaint against judge or
other court employee
The Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this
Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending
case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination . In
fine, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the
same to this Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within
the scope of their administrative duties.
Ombudsman cannot subpoena Supreme Court and its personnel
5. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of
government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as
suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. The rationale for the
foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively, the question before Us is
this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide
cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not
yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve
the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question?
Section 7.
1. No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate
court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme
Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a
judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
2. The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no
person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a
member of the Philippine Bar.
3. A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity,
and independence.
Section 8.
1. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and
Issue:
a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of
are members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
the private sector.
2. The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of
Held:
four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first
No.
appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the
professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative
of the private sector for one year.
3. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and
shall keep a record of its proceedings.
4. The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be
determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget
the appropriations for the Council.
The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the
judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may
assign to it.
*Chavez v. JBC 676 SCRA 579 [2012] (interpretation of a representative of Congress)
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of
Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Coronas departure. Originally, the
members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate,
competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it
conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment
process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that (1) A
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector. In compliance therewith, Congress, from the
moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress
to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of
having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two
(2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as
representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally
envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating a representative of the
National Assembly to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive
with the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional Commission
on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were made
aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral
one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of
Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC
would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of balance.
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of
Congress to be members of the JBC does not render JBCs purpose of providing
balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from Congress will most
likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably
presidential appointees
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of
concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the
right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the
functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is
unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of
a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation.
It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms
are employed.
As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1,
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, a representative
 of Congress, the use of the singular letter a preceding representative of
Congress is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction.
o It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had
in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the
JBC.
o Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the
legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain
terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in
which it is founded or with which it is associated.
Every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the
context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in
association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted
by the latter.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word
Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its
generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or
the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a
singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the
Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look
into the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from
the records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote
may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among
any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
With the respondents contention that each representative should be admitted from the
Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the
records of Constitutional Commission, held that Congress, in the context of JBC
representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that there are still
differences between the two houses and that an inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the
Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation because
no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is
required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and
nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the
entire legislative department.
The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the
three branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the
selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have
more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether
with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would negate the principle of equality
among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed
of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether
with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with
other members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is
explicit.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC,
all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the
doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are
legally recognized. They are not nullified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the
Judicial and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council
is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of Congress will sit
as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution. This disposition is immediately executory.
*Jardeleza v. CJ Sereno, et al., GR 213181, August 19, 2014
Following Justice Abads compulsory retirement, the JBC announced the application or
recommendations for the position left by the Associate Justice. Jardeleza, the
incumbent Sol-Gen at the time, was included in the list of candidates.
However, he was informed through telephone call from some Justices that the Chief
Justice herself CJ Sereno, will be invoking Sec 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 or the so-
called unanimity rule against him. Generally, the rule is that an applicant is included
in the shortlist when s/he obtains affirmative vote of at least a majority of all the
members of the JBC.
When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, however, is invoked because an applicants
integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is required. Jardeleza was then
directed to make himself available on June 30, 2014 before the JBC during which he
would be informed of the objections to his integrity.
Jardeleza wrote a letter-petition asking the SC to exercise its supervisory power and
direct the JBC to, among others, give Jardeleza a written notice and sworn written
statements of his oppositors or any documents in the JBC hearings, and to disallow
CJ Sereno from participating in the voting process for nominees on June 30, 2014.
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, Justice Carpio appeared and disclosed
a confidential information which, to CJ Sereno, characterized Jardelezas integrity as
dubious. Jardeleza demanded that CJ Sereno execute a sworn statement specifying
her objections and that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public
hearing. He also requested deferment of the JBC proceedings, as the SC en banc has
yet to decide in his letter-petition.
However, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the nominees
to be included in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC released the shortlist of 4 nominees.
It was revealed later that there were actually 5 nominees who made it to the JBC
shortlist, but 1 nominee could not be included because of the invocation of the
unanimity rule..
Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus via Rule 65 with prayer for TRO to compel
the JBC to include him in the list of nominees on the grounds that the JBC and CJ
Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered
a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position
Issue: W/N the right to due process is demandable as a matter of right in JBC proceedings
HELD:
Yes.
While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not mean that an
applicants access to the rights afforded under the due process clause is discretionary
on the part of JBC.
 The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings.
Notwithstanding being a class of its own, the right to be heard and to explain ones
self is availing. In cases where an objection to an applicants qualifications is raised,
the observance of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBCs duty to
recommend.
This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process.
Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the
exercise of its discretion.
When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the
chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it
faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious
assessment of information brought before it.
The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an
objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person
challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that an
exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been
included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of
Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 per se, but from the violation by the JBC of its own
rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process.
By no means does the Court intend to strike down the unanimity rule as it
reflects the JBCs policy and, therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees.
Even so, the Court refuses to turn a blind eye on the palpable defects in its
implementation and the ensuing treatment that Jardeleza received before the Council.
True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from
the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process. ##
*Villanueva v. JBC 755 SCRA 182 [2015]
After about a year from being appointed as a MCTC judge, Judge Villanueva applied
for the vacant position of presiding judge in some RTC branches. The JBC however
informed him that he was not included in the list of candidates for such position
because the JBCs long-standing policy requires 5 years of service as judge of first-
level courts before one can apply as judge for second-level courts.
Before the SC, he assailed via Rule 65 and Rule 63 with prayer for TRO and
preliminary injunction the policy of JBC on the ground that it is unconstitutional and
was issued with grave abuse of discretion. Allegedly, the policy also violates
procedural due process for lack of publication and non-submission to the UP Law
Center Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR), adding that the policy
should have been published because it will affect all applying judges.
On the other hand, one of the JBCs arguments was that the writ of certiorari and
prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function
under the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC
is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function.
Issue 1: W/N the policy of JBC requiring 5-year service is constitutional
Yes.
As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend
appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially
transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the
judiciary.
Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with public
interest as it determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While
the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this
does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and
providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
Issue 2: W/N JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in laying down such policy
No.
The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to
the JBCs principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in
the judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay
down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants
qualifications.
In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria
in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the
minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every position. The
search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order
to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not
unbridled license to act in performing its duties.
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees preferred by the Judicial
and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issued the appointment within ninety days from
the submission of the list.
Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During the continuance in
office, their salary shall not be decreased.
*Nitafan v. CIR 152 SCRA 284 [1987] (no tax exemption)
The petitioners, duly appointed and qualified Judges of the Regional Trial Courts in
Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any
deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial
officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision
of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that "during their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to
the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
HELD
Salaries of Justices and Judges subject to income taxation
The salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to a general income tax law
applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such income tax by Justices
and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of their
salaries during their continuance in office.
The clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express
grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to
"give substance to equality among the three branches of Government"
3. The Court hereby makes of record that it has discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs.
 Meer and Endencia vs. David, that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary
exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution
of their salaries during their continuance in office.
Statutory Construction
4. Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution states: "The salary of the Chief
Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower
courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not
be decreased.".
5. It is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate
of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which
they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to
those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the
provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional
Commission.
Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower court shall hold
office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall
have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted in thereon.
*Vargas v. Rilloraza 80 PHIL. 297 [1948] (temporary replacement; uninterrupted security of
tenure) Read with
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
*People v. Gacott 246 SCRA 52 [1995] (En banc decision to discipline)
FACTS
A complaint for violation of Anti-Dummy Law was filed by Asst. City Prosecutor
Perfecto Pe against Arne Strom and Grace Reyes. A Motion to Quash/Dismiss was
filed contending that the power to prosecute such case is vested exclusively in the
Anti-Dummy Board under Republic Act. No. 1130.
The prosecution filed an opposition pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has
already been abolished by Letter of Implementation (LOI) No. 2, Series of 1972.
Despite such opposition however, the Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. granted the motion
espousing the position that the said letter relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the law
contemplated under Article 7 of the New Civil Code which can repeal another law such
as R.A. 1130.
Judge Gacott thus issued an order stating that the City Prosecutor has no power or
authority to file and prosecute the case. The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration but Judge Gacott denied the same and said that a LOI is not a law by
any standard and it neither has the force and effect of law.
Held:
Anti-Dummy Board was already abolished
It must be recalled that immediately after the proclamation of martial law, the late
President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1 to reorganize the entire
Executive Branch of the National Government.
To carry out the intent of P.D. No. 1, various Letters of Implementation were issued
from time to time. It was in the course of this reorganization that Letter of
Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972 was issued for the purpose of reorganizing
certain agencies in the Department of Justice. One such agency was the Anti-Dummy
Board which was abolished by the aforesaid LOI.
Courts are bound to take judicial notice of all the laws of the land
Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall keep
abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs,
support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical
training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and
jurisprudence
. Canon 6 on the other hand states that this provision applies to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks.
The Judge showed utter inexcusable neglect to check the citations of the prosecution
in the mistaken belief that the duty to inform the court on the applicable law to a
particular case devolves solely upon the prosecution or whoever may be the advocate
before the court. The courts are duty bound to take judicial notice of all the laws of the
land. Being the trier of facts, judges are presumed to be well-informed of the existing
laws, recent enactments and jurisprudence. Indeed, Section 3, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution states that all existing laws, decrees, and letters of instructions not
inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or
revoked.
Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law
shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
function.
Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for the
decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case the case
assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this
effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the
record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or
dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The
same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate court.
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
I. Decision expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based
A. Sufficient
*Air France v. Carrascoso 18 SCRA 155 [1966] (appellate conclusions: ultimate facts)*
FACTS
 In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route to
Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France.
But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air France
to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a better right than him.
Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and upon advise of other Filipinos
on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to the planes tourist
class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air
France for damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court,
Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist
class, he went to the planes pantry where he was approached by a plane purser who
told him that he noted in the planes journal the following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually
awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the
issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be
seated in first class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent
between the parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascosos testimony regarding the
note made by the purser because the said note was never presented in court.
HELD
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by
any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based". 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment
determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based"; 6 and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall
contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it".
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct
attack. 8 The law, however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate
facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound
to write in its decision every bit and piece of evidence 10 presented by one party and
the other upon the issues
By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is
not appropriately the business of this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions
of fact. raised. Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to specify in the
sentence the facts" which a party "considered as proved"
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as
"the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential to
support the decision and judgment rendered thereon". 16They consist of the
court's "conclusions" with respect to the determinative facts in issue". 17 A question of
law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one which does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties." 18
*Francisco v. Permskul 173 SCRA 324 [1989] (memorandum decision)*
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD
*Deutsche Bank v. CIR, GR 188550, August 28, 2013 (applies only to decisions and not minute
resolutions) (supra Art II, Sec 2)
FACTS
In October 2003, Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch (petitioner) withheld and remitted PHP
67,688,553.51 to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) representing the 15% branch profit
remittance tax (BPRT) on its regular banking unit (RBU) net income remitted to Deutsche Bank
Germany (DB Germany) for 2002 and prior taxable years.
Believing that it made an overpayment of the BPRT, petitioner filed with the BIR on October 4,
2005 an administrative claim for refund or issuance of its tax credit certificate in the total amount
of PHP 22,562,851.17. On the same date, petitioner requested from the International Tax Affairs
Division (ITAD) a confirmation of its entitlement to the preferential tax rate of 10% under the RP-
Germany Tax Treaty.
Alleging the inaction of the BIR on its administrative claim, petitioner filed a Petition for Review
with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) on October 18, 2005. Petitioner reiterated its claim for the
refund or issuance of its tax credit certificate for the alleged excess BPRT paid on branch profits
remittance to DB Germany.
The CTA Second Division denied the claim for refund on the ground that the application for a tax
treaty relief was not filed with ITAD prior to the payment of its BPRT and actual remittance of its
branch profits to DB Germany, or prior to its availment of the preferential rate of ten percent
(10%) under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty provision. The CTA Second Division held that
petitioner violated the 15-day rule for tax treaty relief application mandated under Section III
paragraph (2) of Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 1-2000.
The CTA En Banc affirmed the CTA Second Division and held that a ruling from the ITAD of the
BIR must be secured prior to the availment of a preferential tax rate under a tax treaty. The CTA
En Banc also relied on Mirant (Philippines) Operations Corporation vs. CIR which involved the
same issue.
Hence, the present petition. The issue is whether the failure to strictly comply with RMO No. 1-
2000 will deprive persons or corporations of the benefit of a tax treaty.
Held:
A minute resolution is not a binding precedent
Although contained in a minute resolution, the dismissal of the petition in Mirant was a
disposition of the merits of the case. However, the Supreme Courts minute resolution on Mirant
is not a binding precedent.
2. With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues concerning the sameparties, it
constitutes res judicata. However, if other parties or another subject matter(even with the same
parties and issues) is involved, the minute resolution is not binding precedent. (see Philippine
Health Care Providers, Inc. vs. CIR and CIR vs. BaierNickel)
3. There are substantial, not simply formal, distinctions between a minute resolution and a
decision:
(a) The constitutional requirement under the first paragraph of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution that the facts and the law on which the judgment is based must be expressed
clearly and distinctly applies only to decisions, not to minute resolutions.
(b) A minute resolution is signed only by the clerk of court by authority of the justices, unlike a
decision. It does not require the certification of the Chief Justice.
(c) Unlike decisions, minute resolutions are not published in the Philippine Reports.
(d) The proviso of Section 4(3) of Article VIII speaks of a decision. Indeed, as a rule, this Court
lays down doctrines or principles of law which constitute binding precedent in a decision duly
signed by the members of the Court and certified by the Chief Justice.
B. Insufficient
*Salazar v. Marigomen 537 SCRA 25 [2007]
Doroteo M. Salazar (Salazar) charged Judge Antonio D. Marigomen (Judge Marigomen) with
gross ignorance of the law, bias, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service and rendering a
decision violative of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure and the
Constitution in connection with Election Case he presided. In said election case, Judge Salazar
is accused of admitting in evidence uncertified photocopies of the contested ballots contrary to
Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Salazar also accuses Judge Marigomen of partiality after he ordered his Clerk of Court to
coordinate with counsel for the protestee in the election case and to testify for her, despite the
objection of the protestant in relation with the presentation of the plain photocopies of the
contestedballots. Furthermore, Judge Marigomen allowed Atty. Reinerio Roeles, the co-counsel
for the protestee, to testify despite the protestants objection on the ground that his testifying
would be a violation of professional ethics and despite Judge Marigomens citation of authorities
on the matter. Finally, Salazar claims that Judge Marigomen violated the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure as well as the Constitution for not clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the law
on which his decision was based.
In his Comment, Judge Marigomen proffers, among other things that Salazar is not the real party
in interest and, in any event, the complaint is moot and academic as the election protest had
been decided on appeal by the COMELEC; and if errors were committed, they pertain to the
exercise of his adjudicative functions which cannot be corrected through
administrative proceedings.
Subsequently, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Marigomen
be found guilty of (a) gross ignorance of the law and fined in the amount of P20,000, and (b) bias
and dishonesty, amounting to grave misconduct and suspended for six months without pay.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the administrative case shall be dismissed because the complainant is not a
real party in interest
2. Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law, bias and dishonesty
HELD:
Administrative matter involves the exercise of the Courts power to discipline judges. It is
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, that is, to maintain the faith and
confidence of the people in the government. Thus, unlike in ordinary cases, there is no private
offended party in administrative proceedings who may be entitled to judicial relief. The
complainant need not be a real party in interest, as anyone may file an administrative complaint
against a judge, the only requirement being that the complaint be verified and it be in writing
and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of standards
of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Court finds the evaluation of the case by the OCA in order. Judge Marigomens questioned
acts do not conform to Canons 3 and 5 regarding impartiality and equality of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
And respondent indeed committed falsehood, as found by the OCA. Judge Marigomens claim
that he allowed the protestees counsel, Atty. Roeles, to testify over the objection of the
protestants counsel because the latter failed to submit a memorandum in support of the
objection, is belied by the records of the case. Thus, in a pleading captioned Manifestation,
the protestants counsel submitted a memorandum of authorities on the matter.
Judge Marigomen also indeed failed to state in his decision why he invalidated 90 ballots in
favor of the protestant and to specify the ballotsbeing set aside, thereby violating the
Constitution.
II. Legal basis must be stated if a petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision
shall be refused due course or denied
Section 15.
1. All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or
resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and,
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and
three months for all other lower courts.
2. A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of
the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court
itself.
3. Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by
the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof
attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification
shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said
period.
4. Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice
to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or
resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.
Supplement
Sibayan-Joaquin v Judge Javellana - A.M. No. RTJ-00-1601, Nov. 13,2001
Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular
session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on
the operations and activities of the Judiciary.