Super Law Provisions in Peoples Initiatives:

A Determination of the Constitutionality of

Sec. 10 of the Peoples Initiative Against Pork,

Providing For A Restricted Means of Amendment And Repeal

Juan Gregorio M. Ragragio

Submitted to the University of the Philippines College of Law

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Juris Doctor.

Dean Raul Pangalangan, Supervised Legal Research Advisor

April 30, 2015

 Table of Contents

Chapter 1 - Introduction: The Peoples Initiative Against Pork,

p.1
and Its Vision of Being a Super Law

Chapter 2 - The Legal Philosophy of a Democratic Republic p.4

I. Social Contract Theory: We, The People p.4
II. American Traditions: The Republic p.10
III. The 1987 Constitution: A Democratic And Republican State p.12

Chapter 3 - The Legal Framework of Legislative Power p.16

I. Legislative Power, Defined p.16
II. Legislative Power, As Reserved for the Sovereign p.19
III. Legislative Power: Different Means, Same Power p.21

Chapter 4 - Critiques on the Attempts at Defenses of a Super Law Provision p.24

I. First Attempt: The Statements of Rep. Neri Colmenares and Atty. Edre
p.24
Olalia
II. Second Attempt: Statement of Atty. Rex Fernandez p.27
III. Third Attempt: The Statement of U.P. Law Professor Evalyn Ursua p.30
IV. Summary, and An Observation on Underlying Antagonism p.32

Chap. 5 - A Super Laws Kryptonite: The Datu Michael Abas Kida Doctrine p. 34

Chapter 6 - Conclusion p.37

I. Sec. 10 of the Peoples Initiative Against Pork is Unconstitutional p.37
II. A Final Word: Delusions of Omniscience p.39
 Chapter 1 - Introduction: The Peoples Initiative Against Pork,

and Its Vision of Being a Super Law

The Peoples Initiative to Abolish Pork1 is a movement that seeks to respond to the

fear that unscrupulous government officials will attempt to recreate the contentious

Priority Assistance Development Fund (PDAF) in some other form within the succeeding

General Appropriations Acts (GAAs). To achieve this, this movement seeks to enact a law

by a peoples initiative under the Initiative and Referendum Act of 1989 (Republic Act

No. 6735).

Among the features of the proposed law is Sec. 10, which provides that This Act

may only be repealed, modified or amended by a law that has been approved by the

people under the system of initiative and referendum enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.

Various supporters, some of them respected members of the law academe, have expressed

their support for this provision, explaining that as a direct act of the sovereign, and there

being no explicit restriction in R.A. 6735, the law if passed would be a sort of super

law, akin to but not at the level of the 1987 Constitution.

Without going into the specifics of the various policies and amendments being

proposed within the Peoples Initiative Against Pork, in the hypothetical event that the

Peoples Initiative Against Pork goes to a plebiscite and is ratified, Sec. 10 will make it

1
People's Initiative Petition vs Pork Barrel (Updated August 13, 2014). Scribd.com. (BlogWatch.ph: Aug 12, 2014)
Retrieved Sept. 11, 2014:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/236600451/People-s-Initiative-Petition-vs-Pork-Barrel-Updated-August-13-2014

1
very difficult to amend or repeal the law, should the need ever arise. The question then,

which is the subject of this thesis, is: Can a peoples initiative pass a law restricting the

power of amendment and repeal of Congress with respect to that particular law?

To answer this question, we must first determine or define what legislative power is,

and how it is understood to be exercised within the framework of the Constitution. For

this thesis, I will go into the very roots of our democratic republic system to determine

the philosophy behind legislative power, and the possible rationale behind the

introduction of the system of initiative and referendum in our 1987 Constitution. To do

this, I will trace the origins of the term republic as it is used in our Constitution, as well

as the origins of and intent behind the word democratic. Tracing the roots of the word

republic will necessarily bring us into a discussion of the philosophies surrounding the

United States Constitution, on which our 1935 Constitution was based. On the other hand,

for the word democratic, I will examine the records of the Constitutional Commission,

as well as the relevant Constitutional provisions. I will also delve into case law to

examine the pronouncements of the Supreme Court with respect to the exercise of

legislative power.

After establishing a philosophical and legal framework of analysis, I will then

examine the various statements of support released in favor of the inclusion of Sec. 10 in

the Peoples Initiative Against Pork, and test the veracity of the statements.

Once we have examined the supporting statements, we will then look at the provision

2
directly and make a conclusion on its constitutionality.

This thesis will not delve into the validity or propriety of the substantial provisions of

the Peoples Initiative Against Pork, nor will it explore alternatives to the system of

initiative used in this regard. The discussion will be limited strictly to the validity of Sec.

10 of the Peoples Initiative Against Pork.

3
 Chapter 2 - The Legal Philosophy of a Democratic Republic

I. Social Contract Theory: We, The People

The Constitution of the United States2 begins with the following Preamble:

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice,

insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and

secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this

Constitution for the United States of America.

This is immediately followed by the Article pertaining to Congress, or the

law-making body of the United States Federal Government. This is reflective of the

prevailing theories on social contracts, particularly of the likes of John Locke, Thomas

Hobbes, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Charles-Louis de Secondat Baron de Montesquieu.

We focus on these particular authors not only for their contributions to the development

of modern social contract theory, but also for their evident influence on the crafting of the

United States Constitution and the organization of government, particularly of the

legislative body.

Thomas Hobbes is the earliest to expound on social contract theory, in his book The

Leviathan3. In sum, Hobbes states that man is in a natural state of war against each other,

2
Constitution of the United States, www.archive.gov, n.p. Web. Retrieved April 24, 2015:
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html
3
Thomas Hobbes, Hobbess Leviathan reprinted from the edition of 1651 with an Essay by the Late W.G. Pogson
Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909). Retrieved Oct. 31, 2014 :http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/869

4
due to self-interest. In this natural state, man has a natural inclination to avoid pain and

suffering and to strive for peace. This inclinations of self-preservation in light of

self-interest drive men to enter into agreements with others, where the greater number

agree to give up rights and liberties in exchange for granting a few, or a one, with

authority and power to protect life and liberty of those involved in the agreement. Once

surrendered, men can no longer take back the authority they have vested in the other or

others. This vested authority includes the power to make and enforce laws. For Hobbes, it

would seem, although the people begin as the sovereign power, the entry into a social

contract divests them of sovereign power and lodges it into whichever entity is tasked to

maintain order and ensure cooperation among the populace - be it a State or in the person

of a monarch.

The social contract theorists who followed Hobbes were slightly less pessimistic of

human nature. John Locke, in his Two Treatise of Government4, argues that mans state of

nature is actually rather pleasant: Man is in a natural state of liberty, where men are equal

in rights and stature. Rather than a state of war, as Hobbes proposes, men helped each

other in the concept of community, and upheld others rights as equals. However, Locke

argues that there was a need to form a body politic - that is, a political entity that would

decide on behalf of the community - in order to secure those rights, particularly rights to

property, defined as the fruit of labor and effort combined with materials found within

nature, including ones own body. In particular, Locke argues that as equals, no individual

man had the authority to determine the bounds of another mans property, nor to adjudge

4
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Thomas Hollis (London: A. Millar et al., 1764). Retrieved Oct. 31,
2014:http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/222

5
rights and obligations among men, or to enforce such judgments - essentially functions of

government as we know today. Locke says that only in a society where men have so

agreed on these aspects could men truly be free, since in knowing the defined boundaries

of liberty men could now proceed undisturbed.

A key distinction between Hobbes and Locke is in the degree of sovereignty

surrendered by men to the constituted authority. Hobbes argues that the lodging of power

to protect life and liberty in one entity necessarily means the surrender of all rights by the

people; the State and Sovereign are, in fact, one and the same. Locke, on the other hand,

argues that only the right to protect life and liberty are those surrendered by the people,

and that the people retain all other rights and liberties; in other words, sovereignty resides

in the people, and is retained by it even as a government is formed. Locke even goes on to

argue that the failure of the constituted authority in living up to this function gives the

people the right to remove the authority as such, and replace it with a new authority by

way of a new social contract - the modern basis for a revolution against a constitutional

State.

Jean Jacques Rousseau may be seen as a bridge between Locke and Hobbes, with

respect to the discussion on the natural state of man. In his book The Social Contract5,

Rousseau argues that while man started out in a natural state of peace and harmony,

mans relations with each other grew dim as society became more and more complex.

5
The Social Contract and Discourses by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, translated with an Introduction by G.D. H. Cole
(London and Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1923). Retrieved Oct. 31, 2014:http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/638

6
 From here, however, Rousseau contrasts Hobbes and Locke on several fronts.

Rousseau states that the creation of private property results in mans break from his

natural state of peace, in contrast to Lockes proposition that property is a natural

consequence of mans natural harmonic state. On the issue of sovereignty and

government, however, Rousseaus analysis - that there is a distinction between the State

and the sovereign, and that the sovereign resides in the people - is closer to Lockes than

to Hobbes State/sovereign equivalency.

Rousseaus analysis of the social contract proceeds from his concept of the general

will - the collective decision-making consciousness of the people in making laws and

deciding how they would govern themselves. Unlike Hobbes and Locke, both of whom

saw the necessity of lodging a certain degree of legislative power into a government of

whatever form, Rousseau saw it best that the people decide via a direct democracy, where

people craft laws directly, and where administration is done by officials who take

orders from the people.

Finally, we arrive at Charles Montesquieu. In his book The Spirit of Laws 6 ,

Montesquieu was not as direct as his predecessors Hobbes and Locke in discussing the

concept of the social contract. Instead, he analyzed it as part of mans progression from a

pre-political natural state towards an organized body politic.

Montesquieu directly contradicts Hobbes with respect to mans natural state. Mans

6
The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu (London: T. Evans, 1777), 4 vols. Vol. 1. Retrieved 10/31/2014 from the
World Wide Web: http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/837

7
natural state, Montesquieu argues, is one of fear and inferiority, but also one that seeks

nourishment and survival. These factors interplay and cause men to gravitate towards one

another, and to eventually form a society. But in doing so, Montesquieu qualifies, man

discards fear, and it is only then that man commences a state of war against other

societies. It is at this point where man, having discarded fear, then seeks to direct his own

society towards his own gain, resulting in a state of war with other individuals within

the society. Montesquieu concludes that two sets of laws - the law of nations and political

law - stems from the resolution of these external and internal conflicts, respectively.

Montesquieu does not ascribe to any single form of government, although he heavily

criticizes despotic forms of government. Instead, he identifies and examines three basic

forms of government - democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy - and demonstrates how

each one reflects the united strength of the people (referred to as the body politic, in a

sense different from Lockes use of the term) as well as the conjunction of wills of the

people (referred to as the civil state). This is in sharp contrast to Hobbes, Locke, and

Rousseau, who each propose a particular form of government as an ideal.

A key feature of Montesquieus discourse is his concept of separation of powers.

According to Montesquieu, power must check power, and so he apportions the

functions of government into three major divisions: executive, legislative, and judicial.

Each branch is assigned its own scope of authority, and is possessed of powers that are

meant to check one another.

8
 In his discourse of ascribing functions and pointing out the kind of persons or groups

best fit to assume the functions of each specific office, Montesquieu actually proposes a

completely different kind of government that had not yet truly existed at the time.

(Although he had used the English parliament as his template, he mistakenly ascribed

executive power to the English monarch, who was already only a figurehead and had very

limited executive powers by the time The Spirit of Laws was written.) We will return to

this point when we discuss the United States Constitution and the proposed form of

government in American Traditions: The Republic.

In synthesis, social contract theorists posit that individuals come together to form a

body, called a body politic by Rousseau and Locke. The purpose of this body politic

differs from philosopher to philosopher: Hobbes argues the prevention of mutual

destruction, Locke proposes the preservation of property rights and liberties, Montesquieu

highlights commercial interest and survival, and finally Rousseau focuses on the

guarantee of civil rights and liberties in exchange of natural rights. Differences in

objectives aside, one common thread running through the discourse of Hobbes, Locke,

Rousseau and Montesquieu is the act of men coming together and entering into an

agreement as to how they will be governed, and more importantly, how laws are to be

crafted. While the four differ on where sovereign power resides at any given time, they all

agree that the first sovereign power is that of legislation, or making laws, and that this is

the most potent among all sovereign powers. Finally, although a social contract is not

necessarily a constitution, the Constitution may be considered a social contract for the

purpose of the sovereign defining its government, canalizing sovereign power among

9
differing departments, and defining the relationships between the government and the

sovereign people with respect to decision-making, adjudication of rights and obligations,

and the enforcement of such determinations.

Among the four social contract theorists, Montesquieu may be arguably the most

influential. His discourse on the separation of powers into an executive, legislative, and

judiciary was relied on by the drafters of the United States Constitution in creating the

three main branches of government as it was organized and codified in the U.S.

Constitution. Rousseau, on the other hand, is credited with the phrase at the beginning of

the Preamble of the U.S. Constitution, We, The People, as reflective of his discourse on

the general will.

II. American Traditions: The Republic

Prior to the 1987 Constitution, the Philippines had described itself as a republic.

This is largely influenced by the American occupiers who had assisted in crafting the

1935 Constitution, and who thought to bring the system of democracy that had been in

place in the United States of America. To understand what the term republic here means,

therefore, we must examine how the concept developed in the United States, and how it

was envisioned to be implemented here.

James Madison, noted Virginia statesman and the eventual 4th President of the United

10
States, was one of the drafters of the U.S. Constitution, and strongly advocated for a

central government. To help promote the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, Madison

wrote a series of letters along with other advocates, collectively known as The Federalist

Papers. In The Federalist No. 107 , Madison wrote that a republic - referring to a

representative form of government, particularly a federal government with a federal

legislative body - is a superior means of protecting common interests against an

oppressive majority rule, as contrasted to a pure democracy where the rule of the majority

wins out over that of a minority. Madison qualifies this, however, by laying out certain

requisites for a central legislature to succeed. First, Madison says that the number of

representatives must be balanced - enough to represent the interests of the people, not so

many that decision-making becomes muddled, not so few that certain vested interests

wind up dominating legislation. Second, the extent of citizenry and territory encompassed

by a republic makes it less likely for a single group to dominate policy determination, as a

more expanded scope of citizenry and territory brings with it a more diverse set of

interests represented. Here we can see the clear influences of Montesquieu on the

concepts of Madison, such as in the idea of competing interests as a means to check

power within the legislature.

In context, Madison makes these arguments in favor of a Federal form of government,

in particular arguing for a Federal legislature as opposed to leaving legislation entirely to

individual states. Nevertheless, the principles of a representative form of government

under a Republic apply equally to the concept of a Philippine republic, as embodied in the

7
The Federalist Papers No. 10, ed. Henry B. Dawson. (Morrisania, New York: Charles Scribner, 1863.) Retrieved
10/31/2014 from the World Wide Web:http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Federalist_(Dawson)/10

11
1935 Constitution. Our bicameral Congress was envisioned to be a representative

legislative body, with the House of Representatives representing district concerns and the

Senate representing broader, national concerns. Each branch of Congress is vested with

exclusive powers: the Senate Legislative power was to be vested in the Philippine

Congress, and exercised in accordance with the procedures provided in the Constitution.

For the Philippines, all of this changed with the passage and ratification of the 1987

Constitution.

III. The 1987 Constitution: A Democratic And Republican State

In 1987, the Constitutional Commission saw fit to add the word democratic to our

form of government. Commissioner Nolledo discusses this change in no uncertain terms8:

THE PRESIDENT: The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. OPLE: I see that Section 1 is largely a repetition of the original text of the 1935 and the 1973

Constitutions, except for a few changes The Committee added the word "democratic" to

"republican," and, therefore, the first sentence states: "The Philippines is a republican and

democratic state." In the second sentence, the same phrase from the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions

appears: Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them and

continues only with their consent.

8
Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 4, 09-17-1986 R.C.C. No. 85

12
 May I know from the committee the reason for adding the word "democratic" to "republican"? The

constitutional framers of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions were content with "republican." Was

this done merely for the sake of emphasis?

MR. NOLLEDO: I would like the Commissioner to know that as author of this term "democratic

state," I am not ruling out certain concepts in socialism. I am putting the word "democratic"

because of the provisions that we are now adopting which are covering consultations with the

people. For example, we have provisions on recall, initiative, the right of the people even to

participate in lawmaking and other instances that recognize the validity of interference by the

people through people's organizations, et cetera. (emphasis added)

Commissioner Rosario Braid, in clarifying the term democratic in contrast to its

use as labeling Communist states, said the following9:

MS. ROSARIO BRAID: Commissioner Nolledo wanted to know whether or not this is a

committee opinion. Yes, it is. We regard this kind of democracy as a participatory democracy. To

reinforce Commissioner Garcia's point, communism and capitalism have seeds of totalitarianism;

therefore, a certain sector in the population is excluded. It is really the concept of exclusion of

certain sectors of the population that would make it less democratic. What we are trying to say is

that this is a concept where people and sectors may participate. The concept of participatory or

communitarian democracy perhaps best expresses this concept. (emphasis added)

From the foregoing discussion, the 1987 Constitution now has two modes of

governance running side-by-side with respect to legislation: one in which the sovereign

acts directly as a legislative body, and another where the sovereign acts via a

9
Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 4, 09-17-1986, R.C.C. No. 85

13
representative legislative body. The full import of this concept will be clarified in Chapter

3: The Legal Framework of Legislative Power, but for this section the discussion will be

limited to the implications of the reservation of power by the Sovereign with respect to

social contract theory.

Among the social contract theorists, the Philippine concept of a democratic state

hews closely to Rousseaus vision of a direct democracy at first glance. But it is not a

direct translation. For one, our ability to pass, amend, or repeal laws directly is still

subject to the law that Congress passed that would provide for the processes the sovereign

people will undergo in order to exercise the right; in contrast, Rousseaus vision of a

direct democracy does not contemplate the so-called officials being able to tell the

sovereign people how their power of legislation is to be exercised. Nevertheless, we can

consider this reservation of legislative power as a means by which the general will may

be directly expressed into legislation.

Additionally, we may view this innovation as an extension of the ideas of

Montesquieu on checks and balances within departments. In 1986, the Philippines had

just come from an extended dictatorial rule masquerading as a democracy - a despotic

government, so despised by Montesquieu, pretending to be a republic. And although the

Constitutional Commission saw it fit to place safeguards into the Constitution to prevent

another dictatorial regime, they also saw the need to reserve legislative power from

Congress.

14
 Why promote direct participation in legislation? As consistently held by social

contract theorists, legislation is the first among sovereign powers that must be exercised,

as it guides both the people and the State on how public matters are to be conducted, both

in terms of the executive and even the judiciary. Our past experience with a Congress that

was largely a subservient rubber-stamp for a dictator10 may well be the basis for the

reservation of power; with the power of legislation directly in the hands of the sovereign

people, the people are free to undo legislative acts done by Congress if the people

perceive the legislation as being contrary to the general will. So now the check on

legislature is two-fold: if Congress does not pass laws that express the general will, or

otherwise pass laws that offend or contradict the general will, then the people may, first,

reject the continued stay of the members of Congress via the election of different

representatives in succeeding elections, and second, may go so far as to amend or repeal

the offensive law via a peoples initiative.

This raises two key questions. To what extent, exactly, has the Philippine sovereign

reserved legislative power for itself and vested legislative power in Congress? And as the

sovereign has reserved the power to pass, amend, or repeal laws, does Congress also have

that power with respect to a law passed via a peoples initiative?

10
Andreo Calonzo, Martial Law legislation: Ex-assemblymen recall rubber stamp legislature. GMA News Online.
(GMA News Inc.: September 21, 2012) Retrieved Apr. 28, 2015:
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/274993/news/nation/martial-law-legislation-ex-assemblymen-recall-rubber-sta
mp-legislature

15
 Chapter 3 - The Legal Framework of Legislative Power

I. Legislative Power, Defined

Legislative power is not specifically defined in the Constitution, nor is its nature

expounded on. To define legislative power and to determine its nature, we turn to case

law. In the February 2011 decision of the Supreme Court in the case of League of Cities v.

Commission on Elections11, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to define the nature

of legislative power:

Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and

repeal them. The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their original,

sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The

grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. The legislative body

possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative

by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it

elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative

power embraces all subjects, and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.

Breaking this down, the Supreme Court tells us that the sum total of legislative power

is to make, alter, and repeal laws. The authority to exercise this power must be sourced

from the Constitution, and we already know that there are two entities that may exercise

such legislative power: Congress, via the procedures provided under the Constitution,,

and the sovereign people via initiative and referendum. In this regard, we may treat both

11
G.R. No. 176951, Feb. 15, 2011

16
as distinct legislative bodies.

According to the ruling above, Congress has broad, general, and comprehensive

legislative powers. That is not to say that it is unrestricted. Sec. 16(2) of Art. VI requires a

quorum - a simple majority of all members of either the Senate or the House of

Representatives - do conduct business, which necessarily includes passing laws. The

Constitution also provides the following restrictions with respect to the bills themselves:

the one title, one subject rule (Sec. 26(1)) and conformity to the prescribed procedure

for passing laws (Sec. 26(2)). In light of these Constitutional limits, we may interpret the

words of the Court to mean that, for as long as legislative power is exercised within said

limits, then it may be exercised for whatever purpose Congress deems necessary to do so.

The Supreme Court also tells us that any power usually and traditionally deemed

legislative is lodged in Congress, unless it is lodged elsewhere by the Constitution. A

clear example of this is the veto power of the President: although it is an executive

function, because it is the President who exercises the function, it is primarily a

legislative power, because it pertains to the process of passing a law. This is what the

Supreme Court means by legislative power being lodged elsewhere.

With respect to Congress, we are given the scope of legislative powers lodged within

it by Constitutional provision under Art. VI. This includes, but is not limited to:

Conducting inquiries in aid of legislation (Sec. 21)

Declaring the existence of a state of war (Sec. 23(1))

17
 Granting the President emergency powers (Sec. 23(2))

Passing appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the

public debt, bills of local application, and private bills (Sec. 24)

Passing a general appropriations act for the operation of government, subject to

limitations (Sec. 25)

Increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, providing that the

Supreme Court gives its advice and concurrence (Sec. 30)

Since these legislative powers are lodged in Congress, then no other entity may

exercise these powers - not even the sovereign people acting as a legislative body.

Earlier we concluded that for as long as Congress exercises legislative power within

Constitutional limits, then it may exercise such power as it deems necessary. This was

tested in the case of Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines12, where

Congress had passed a law that required a 2/3 vote, or a super-majority, in the event that

the law would be amended or repealed. In this case, the Supreme Court struck down the

supermajority provision as unconstitutional, for being in excess of what the Constitution

requires for the passage of bills in Sec. 16(2), Art, VI. Although this case speaks of an act

of Congress, it pertains directly to the legislative power, and not some incidental or

administrative power of Congress.

We are beginning to see the contours of legislative power, and how Congress may

exercise it. It is now time to see how the sovereign people may exercise legislative power.
12
G.R. No. 196271, Oct. 18, 2011.

18
 II. Legislative Power, As Reserved for the Sovereign

The 1987 Constitution defines the manner by which the sovereign has reserved

legislative power in Sec. 1 and 32 of Art. VI. They are reproduced below as follows:

ARTICLE VI

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall

consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by

the provision on initiative and referendum.

XXX

Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and

referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws

or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative

body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total

number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three

per centum of the registered voters thereof.

The phrasing of Sec. 1 and 32, Art. VI is crucial in understanding the scope of

legislative power reserved by the sovereign as compared to that vested in Congress.

According to Sec. 32, with respect to national laws, the sovereign has reserved the right

to directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof

passed by the Congress.

19
 In addition, Congress was supposed to provide exceptions that may not be subject to

an initiative or referendum. None are provided for in R.A. 6735, or the The Initiative

and Referendum Act, but then we may go back to the Supreme Courts discourse: Any

power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by

Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. Stated differently, if the

Constitution did not explicitly lodge such power or authority anywhere else - such as in

the sovereign with respect to their reservation of legislative power - then it is, by

necessary implication, lodged in Congress. Thus we may reasonably say that a peoples

initiative or referendum may not deal with: appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills

authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills; the

General Appropriations Act, or the expansion of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court, as these are all powers clearly lodged in Congress. This is also in line with the

phrasing of Sec. 1 Art. VI, where legislative power is vested in Congress, except to the

extent that the sovereign may also directly make, amend, or repeal laws.

On another front: is the exercise of legislative power via a peoples initiative or

referendum without restriction or requirement within the law itself? Of interesting note

here is Sec. 10 of R.A. 6735, which provides:

Sec. 10. Prohibited Measures. The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or

referendum petition:

(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate;

and

(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in

Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its

effectivity.

20
 Sec. 10(b) seems to be merely an additional check on the power lodged in Congress

to grant the President emergency powers. Sec. 10(a), on the other hand, is a substantial

reproduction of the one title, one subject rule that is applicable to bills passed by

Congress. This is one of the indications that, all other limitations aside, the legislative

power to make, amend or repeal laws exercised by Congress is the same legislative power

wielded by the sovereign people under the Constitution, as realized in R.A. 6735.

III. Legislative Power: Different Means, Same Power

It makes sense to view legislative power in this manner. In social contract theory, at

no time is there ever a distinction between legislative power and authority as exercised

via representation, and legislative power and authority as exercised directly by the people.

In particular, Montesquieu distinguishes between a direct democracy and an aristocracy,

but only with respect to where sovereign power is lodged, and not in terms of any

differences between the scope and nature of the sovereign power. In other words, the

legislative power exercised in a direct democracy would be the same as the legislative

power exercised in an aristocracy.

In the Constitution, there is no distinction between the nature of legislative power

vested in Congress and the legislative power reserved by the sovereign. At most, there is

a difference only in scope, with respect to two aspects: first, that certain powers are

lodged in Congress, and by implication are not within the extent of legislative power

21
reserved; and second, that Congress has their procedure for making, amending, and

repealing laws are set in the Constitution and contemplates a dedicated body for the

purpose, while the procedure for initiative and referendum are provided by law, and

contemplate a loosely organized mass trying to pass a law by popular vote.

The importance of recognizing legislative power as being the same for Congress and

for the sovereign people is in resolving the question of whether or not Congress may

likewise amend or repeal laws passed via a peoples initiative. In discussing the power of

Congress to amend or repeal laws, the Constitution does not make any distinction

between laws passed by Congress and laws passed via a peoples initiative. A law is a law,

regardless of how it is passed.

In sum, legislative power as defined by the Supreme Court is possessed by both

Congress and the sovereign people, each as distinct legislative bodies. Although their

respective processes and procedures for exercising this power are different, these

differences do not affect the nature of legislative power, which is the same as to both

Congress and the sovereign people. Being of the same nature, legislative power as

exercised by Congress may be superseded by the sovereign via initiative or referendum;

likewise, it follows that laws passed via initiative or referendum must necessarily be open

to amendment or repeal by Congress. This is not only a sound proposition with respect to

a reasonable construction of Constitutional provision, but it is also a sound proposition in

terms of the principles of social contract theory with respect to the nature of sovereign

power.

22
 With that, we arrive at the crux of this discussion: can the sovereign, acting via an

initiative, restrict the legislative power of Congress with respect to amending or repealing

laws passed via initiative? Stated more generally, may a legislative body, vested with

legislative powers under the Constitution, restrict the legislative power of another

legislative body, similarly vested with legislative powers under the Constitution? In the

next chapter, we will discuss the various statements of support for Sec. 10 of the Peoples

Initiative Against Pork, and will analyze it using the framework above. The above

questions will be answered following the analyses.

23
 Chapter 4 - Critiques on the Attempts at Defenses of a Super Law Provision

Sec. 10 of the Peoples Initiative Against Pork provides: This Act may only be

repealed, modified or amended by a law that has been approved by the people under the

system of initiative and referendum enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.

Can the sovereign prevent Congress from making amendments or repealing laws

passed via initiative? Specifically, can a peoples initiative require, in the law proposed,

more than what is ordinarily necessary for the amendment or repeal of a law?

I. First Attempt: The Statements of Rep. Neri Colmenares and Atty. Edre Olalia

As a preliminary qualification, the points raised by Atty. Edre Olalia13 may be

considered as a summary of the extensive discussion made by Rep. Neri Colmenares, and

thus they will be treated as a single attempt.

It is submitted by Rep. Colmenares14 that this kind of super law provision is

constitutional. He first justifies it by first, attempting a textual analysis of Sec. 1 of Art.

VI, claiming that the phrase except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision

on initiative and referendum meant to exclude the power so reserved from the legislative

13
"Additional Explanatory Note on Section 10 - Edre Olalia" signupvspork.org. (Aug. 27, 2014) Retrieved Sept. 11,
2104: http://www.signupvspork.org/2014/08/27/additional-explanatory-note-on-section-10-edre-olalia/
14
"Explanatory Notes on Section 10 by Evalyn Ursua, Neri Colmenares and Rex Fernandez." signupvspork.org (Aug.
27, 2014) Retrieved Sept. 11, 2014:
http://www.signupvspork.org/2014/08/27/explanatory-notes-on-section-10-by-evalyn-ursua-neri-colmenares-and-rex-fe
rnandez/>

24
power vested in Congress. Colmenares then proceeds to characterize the legislative power

lodged in Congress as a mere delegated power, as opposed to the direct exercise of

legislative power by the sovereign. From here, Colmenares tries to argue that the

delegate cannot be empowered to simply override the powers exercised by its principal;

in other words, by his argumentation, Congress cannot, by its own exercise of legislative

power, supersede a law that results from a peoples initiative or referendum.

With all due respect to Rep. Colmenares, his analysis is flawed from the start. He

claims that whatever power the sovereign has reserved for itself must necessarily be

excluded from the legislative power vested in Congress, due to the word except. But

this is mere wordplay. Looking at Sec. 32, of Art. VI, it is clear as day that the sovereign

has reserved for itself, with respect to national laws, the power to make, amend or repeal

laws, via a system of initiative and referendum. Bringing Colmenares argument to its

logical conclusion, it would mean that Congress does *not* have the power to make,

amend, or repeal laws. This is patently erroneous, as the Constitution itself provides for

the processes and procedures on how Congress may exercise legislative power,

specifically making, amending, and repealing laws.

Next, Colmenares claims that legislative power is merely delegated to Congress by

the sovereign. In other words, Congress is merely an agent, while the sovereign is its

principal. That is inaccurate, and is not supported by the text of the Constitution. The

word used is vested. In ordinary language, vested means fully and unconditionally

guaranteed as a legal right, benefit, or privilege. Thus, Congresss possession of

25
legislative power is considered by the Constitution as full and unconditional. Indeed, the

Supreme Court in the League of Cities case, as earlier mentioned, describes legislative

power as follows: The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and

comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil

government. (emphasis supplied) Colmenares argument that Congress exercise of

legislative power as being subordinate or inferior to that reserve by the sovereign for

itself simply has no basis in black letter law or in jurisprudence.

From the perspective of social contract theory, Colmenares seems to view Sec. 1 of

Art. VI from the lens of Rousseaus discourse on direct democracy. But as previously

discussed, the reservation of legislative power made by the sovereign as embodied in Sec.

1 and 32 of Art. VI is not on all fours with Rousseaus concept of a direct democracy; in

fact, neither does it fit any of the models of governance proffered by Hobbes, Locke, or

Montesquieu. On the other hand, Rousseau does not make any distinction between

legislative power as a sovereign power prior to the social contract, and legislative power

as a sovereign power after the social contract is in force. Montesquieu, in discussing both

a direct democracy and a representative aristocracy, makes no distinction between the

legislative power exercised by both types of governments. From the foregoing, we may

conclude that within the general framework of social contract theory, legislative power

does not change in terms of potency or effectivity depending on who exercises it as

provided in the Constitution. Legislative power is legislative power.

Legislative power being of the same character no matter how exercised within

26
Constitutional provisions, Colmenares argument that Congress cannot supersede a

peoples initiative is without basis.

II. Second Attempt: Statement of Atty. Rex Fernandez

Atty. Rex Fernandez, in his statement of support for the Peoples Initiative 15 ,

basically repeats the arguments of Rep. Colmenares. However, Atty. Fernandez brings up

a unique argument, equating the direct participation of the sovereign in the exercise of

legislative power with the direct act of the sovereign in the form of revolution:

The Supreme Court in pari argumenti (parity of argument) has declared that EDSA was an

exercise of the sovereign will of the people and cannot be prevailed upon by any act of

government.

This was reiterated in the Erap case.

Here he refers to the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. President

Corazon C. Aquino, et al.16, where the Supreme Court ruled that the legitimacy of the

new government under then President Corazon Aquino was not a justiciable matter, being

a matter of the judgment of the people. This doctrine was reiterated and expounded upon

in the case of Joseph Estrada v. Aniano Desierto, et al.17, where the Court makes the

following observation:

In the cited cases, we held that the government of former President Aquino was the result of a

successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the Freedom

15
"Explanatory Notes on Section 10 by Evalyn Ursua, Neri Colmenares and Rex Fernandez." signupvspork.org (Aug.
27, 2014) Retrieved Sept. 11, 2014:
http://www.signupvspork.org/2014/08/27/explanatory-notes-on-section-10-by-evalyn-ursua-neri-colmenares-and-rex-fe
rnandez/>
16
G.R. No. 73972. Oct 24, 1986
17
G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001

27
 Constitution declared that the Aquino government was installed through a direct exercise of the

power of the Filipino people in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended.

It is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by

people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the

constitutional loop. (citations omitted)

From here, we can see that the cases he cites talks about revolution as a direct act of

the sovereign, in repudiation of the existing social contract at the time, the 1977

Constitution. There is basis for this in social contract theory. Rousseau saw revolution as

a means to overthrow a government that no longer served the general will, as a means by

which society could then transition into a direct democracy. In contrast, Locke defines the

right of revolution as a right, even a duty, to overthrow a government that does not serve

the common interests of the sovereign people, with the intention of replacing it with a

new government suited for the task.

Be that as it may, in the Estrada case, the Supreme Court clearly differentiates a

revolution as a direct act of the sovereign, and an exercise of a right as contained within

the Constitution:

In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II is

clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole

government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of

assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the

President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted

from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the

resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as

President are subject to judicial review.

28
 We can see now that Atty. Fernandez comparisons between the EDSA Revolution

and a peoples initiative is faulty. First, the Supreme Court did not say that all direct acts

of the sovereign cannot be prevailed upon by any act of government. What the Supreme

Court did say, in the Lawyers League case, is that the validity of the revolutionary

Aquino government is outside the ambit of judicial review. The Court went even further

in the Estrada case, explaining that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful

revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically

orbits out of the constitutional loop. In other words, the validity of an extraconstitutional

act by the sovereign is a political question, and would not be the proper subject of judicial

review.

Second, the Supreme Court explicitly says in Estrada that intra-constitutional acts,

such as the exercise of the right to free speech and assembly, may pose legal questions

and would thus be within the realm of judicial review. I submit that the exercise of

legislative power by the sovereign via initiative and referendum, being a right that is

Constitutional and for which a process is given by statute, is necessarily also subject to

judicial review, as well as other Constitutional processes as may be applicable.

Atty. Fernandez also introduces a unique concept of a heirarchy of laws. Atty.

Fernandez argues that, with the introduction of the direct exercise of legislative power by

the sovereign, we have in effect three levels of laws. The highest is the Constitution,

and next is any enactment by the sovereign via initiative or referendum, and the lowest is

29
Congressional law.

The simple problem with this theory is that the Constitution itself does not make any

distinction between the laws passed by Congress and the laws passed via initiative or

referendum. Lex non distinguitur nos non distinguere debemus. Where the law does not

make a distinction, so we must likewise not make a distinction. Moreover, we have earlier

established through social contract theory that the legislative power to make, amend, or

repeal laws is the same as between that vested in Congress and that reserved by the

sovereign. It stands to reason that as the legislative power is the same, and its exercise is

essentially the same, then its results must also be considered the same, with neither one

being superior or having primacy over the other.

III. Third Attempt: The Statement of U.P. Law Professor Evalyn Ursua

Of the three attempts at defending the super law provision of the Peoples Initative

Against Pork, that of Prof. Evalyn Ursua18 is the one most grounded on legal principles.

Prof. Ursua argues, first, that a super law provision does not clip the plenary powers of

Congress to amend or repeal laws, that it only pertains to this single piece of legislation.

Second, Prof. Ursua states that the limits of the exercise of sovereign power must be

found either in the Constitution itself, or in the enabling law as provided in Sec. 32, Art.

VI of the Constitution. There being no explicit restriction against super law provisions

18
"Explanatory Notes on Section 10 by Evalyn Ursua, Neri Colmenares and Rex Fernandez." signupvspork.org (Aug.
27, 2014) Retrieved Sept. 11, 2014:
http://www.signupvspork.org/2014/08/27/explanatory-notes-on-section-10-by-evalyn-ursua-neri-colmenares-and-rex-fe
rnandez/>

30
in either the Constitution or in R.A. 6735, legislative power as exercised by the sovereign

people must be understood as to allow for such super law provisions for laws passed

via initiative or referendum.

Prof. Ursua also makes an additional argument of the legislative power of Congress

as being merely delegated. As that argument has been disposed of earlier, there is no

need to repeat that discussion here. Instead I will focus on the legal discussion set forth

by Prof. Ursua.

On the super law provision only pertaining to a single piece of legislation, and

thereby not clipping the plenary powers of Congress, this argument appears to be sound

at first glance. However, all it really does is to lay the groundwork for creating the

hierarchy of laws that Atty. Fernandez proposes. This goes against the principle earlier

established that the exercise of legislative power, whether by Congress or directly by the

sovereign, is necessarily the same, especially with respect to the passage of laws within

the framework of the Constitution.

The counterarguments for the remaining points of Prof. Ursua proceed from this.

Although Prof. Ursua is correct in stating that there is no explicit prohibition or restriction

in either the Constitution or in R.A. 6735 with respect to the inclusion of super law

provisions, there is nevertheless a philosophical argument against such provision in terms

of the nature of legislative power, and the principle that Congress and the sovereign, as

legislative bodies, are possessed of the same legislative power to make, amend, and

31
repeal laws. To allow a super law provision is to essentially argue that the legislative

power exercised by the sovereign, as provided in the Constitution and in the enabling law,

is different from the legislative power exercised by Congress, as likewise provided in the

Constitution. We have established that such is not the case.

IV. Summary, and An Observation on Underlying Antagonism

To summarize, the statements made in support of the super law provision in the

Peoples Initiative Against Pork proceeds from faulty assumptions on the nature of

legislative power and a misinterpretation of Constitutional provisions. These statements

assume that legislative power changes with respect to the body that exercises the power.

These statements also assume that one exercise of legislative power, particularly that of

the sovereign by way of initiative or referendum, is superior to that of the exercise of

legislative power by Congress. Finally, the statements of support invariably refer to a

fictional hierarchy of laws where a law passed via initiative is necessarily of a higher

order than that of laws passed by Congress. None of these conclusions have any true basis

on law or even in legal philosophy.

A final word on these statements of support: it is noteworthy that, with the exception

of Prof. Ursua, all other statements made seem to infer that there is an antagonistic

relationship between Congress and the sovereign people. More specifically, it would

appear that there is an apprehension that without the super law provision in the Peoples

32
Initiative Against Pork, Congress will, by some natural consequence, amend or repeal the

law in the future. I will not pretend to understand where this apprehension comes from,

because I dont. However, it bears mentioning that in the same way Congress could

theoretically amend the resulting law in order to neuter it, or that Congress could repeal

the law entirely, Congress could also, in theory, see the law as a positive contribution to

our legal system, and may have their own input that could strengthen and enhance the

resulting law. What would Congress do then? Additionally, there is an inherent difficulty

in enacting a law via initiative - for example, as of this writing, the Peoples Initiative

Against Pork is still in the process of gathering signatures in support of the measure, and

it has been more than a year and a half since the various organizations supporting this

measure have undertaken to gather the necessarily signatures to submit the proposed law

to the COMELEC. What then would be the recourse of the sovereign if, at some point in

the future, the national circumstances change, such that the provisions of the resulting law

become too restrictive or unwieldy?

These are questions that have no answers in our philosophical framework. There is,

however, an answer within the legal framework we have established.

33
 Chap. 5 - A Super Laws Kryptonite: The Datu Michael Abas Kida Doctrine

To reiterate, Sec. 10 of the Peoples Initiative Against Pork provides: This Act may

only be repealed, modified or amended by a law that has been approved by the people

under the system of initiative and referendum enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.

This provision admits to no other means of amending or repealing the resulting law.

Congress may not amend or repeal it via subsequent legislation.

Is this valid?

We have already examined the justifications for this clause, and found them wanting.

Nevertheless, Prof. Ursuas observation is correct: neither the Constitution nor R.A. 6735

explicitly prohibit the inclusion of such a provision in any law proposed and passed via a

peoples initiative.

I submit that the answer lies in the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the

Datu Michael Abaas Kida case, briefly mentioned in Chapter 3. In this case, Congress

passed Republic Act 9054, amending the Organic Act of the Autonomous Region of

Muslim Mindanao. One of the issues raised in this case was the constitutionality of the

provision on amendments and revision, reproduced below:

ARTICLE XVII

Amendments or Provisions

SECTION 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be

34
 reamended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of

the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.

In addressing this issue, the Supreme Court struck down this provision as

unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reasoned that the requirement of a supermajority of

the Senate and the House of Representatives, voting separately, is in excess of what is

required in the Constitution for either chamber of Congress to conduct its business, under

Sec. 16(1) of Art. VI. Citing the earlier case of City of Davao v. GSIS19, the Court

explained:

Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to

have the ability to bind the actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are

regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility

is not one of the attributes desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to

forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.

xxx

A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to

persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old,

unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by

its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so

restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its

predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act

was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature

cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the

intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.

19
G.R. No. 127383, Aug. 18, 2005

35
 The Supreme Court here goes into the exercise of legislative power of Congress,

particularly the power of repeal. The power of repeal of future Congresses cannot be

restricted by an act of a past Congress, unless the Constitution expressly grants that power,

simply because a future legislative body is, in the word of the Supreme Court, of equal

footing with a past legislative body. In our case, no provision in the Constitution grants

such an awesome power to Congress. But more on point, neither does the Constitution

grant such power to the sovereign in its exercise of legislative power via initiative.

Recall that in Chapter 3, we considered both Congress and the sovereign, when it

exercises legislative power, as distinct legislative bodies, both possessed of legislative

power. In the Datu Michael Abas Kida case, the Supreme Court clearly says that insofar

as the exercise of legislative power is concerned, legislative bodies cannot bind one

another. Although the ruling was with respect to a law passed by Congress, because we

are dealing with legislative power, by necessary implication this restriction also applies to

the sovereign as a legislative body when exercising legislative power via a peoples

initiative. This is the death knell of Sec. 10 of the Peoples Initiative Against Pork.

36
Chapter 6 - Conclusion

I. Sec. 10 of the Peoples Initiative Against Pork is Unconstitutional

In analyzing the constitutionality of Sec. 10 of the Peoples Initiative Against Pork,

we first started by examining the full implication of the phrase democratic republic

State. We examined the philosophical bases and traditions behind our being a republic

state, going as far back as the philosophical influences over the United States Constitution

after which our own 1935 Constitution was patterned. We then looked into the intent of

the drafters of the 1987 Constitution in adding the word democratic in describing our

form of government today. In so doing, we established that in social contract theory - the

basis from which the drafters of the United States Constitution crafted their form of

government - legislative power is the first among the sovereign powers, and that it is by

social contract ordinarily vested in a single authority, regardless of the form of

government.

We found our democratic republic form of government to be unique in this respect,

because in our system, we have two distinct legislative bodies, concurrently exercising

the legislative powers of making, amending, and repealing laws: the Congress comprised

of a Senate and a House of Representatives, and the sovereign people via a system of

initiative and referendum. Relying on both social contract theory and on the Courts

pronouncement in the League of Cities cases, we determined that legislative power as

exercised by both legislative bodies is essentially the same and of equal potency.

37
 We examined the supporting statements made in favor of Sec. 10 of the Peoples

Initiative Against Pork in light of these findings, and found the assertions made to be

wanting. We found that these statements wrongly portray Congress as a mere delegate

of legislative power, rather than being fully vested with such power as explicitly provided

in the Constitution. We also found that these statements created and relied on a hierarchy

of laws that have no basis on the Constitution. Finally, we noted that there is an

undercurrent of antagonism between Congress and the sovereign people alluded to by

most of the statements . This results in a bias in their discussion of legislative power in

favor of its exercise by the sovereign via initiative and against the exercise of the same by

Congress - a framework that is unnecessary and uncalled for.

Finally, we looked into the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the Datu

Michael Abas Kida case, and saw that the Supreme Court has already had an opportunity

to deal with super law provisions. The Supreme Court struck the super law provision

in R.A. 9054, stating that it was in excess of what was provided in the law for Congress

to be able to conduct business, and that such a restriction imposed on future legislative

assemblies is anathema to democratic principles. By the principle of the uniformity of

legislative power as exercised by Congress and by the sovereign, we can therefore

conclude that the sovereign, as a legislative body, is similarly barred from enacting laws

with super law provisions.

38
 II. A Final Word: Delusions of Omniscience

It is perhaps fitting that in striking down a super law provision in Datu Michael

Abas Kida, the Supreme Court made the following pronouncement:

Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a legislative body, and a legislature

which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under

delusions of omniscience.

It would do well for the organizations currently promoting the Peoples Initiative

Against Pork to heed these words.

39