Ebarle v.

Sucaldito,
G.R. No. L-33628. December 29, 1987

FACTS:
The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a
candidate for reelection in the local elections of 1971, seeks injunctive relief
in two separate petitions, to enjoin further proceedings of his criminal cases,
as well as I.S. Nos. 1-70, 2-71, 4-71, 5-71, 6-71, and 7-71 of the respondent
Fiscal's office of the said city, all in the nature of prosecutions for violation of
certain provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and various
provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Principally, the petitioner relies on the
failure of the respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League to comply
with the provisions of Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDUE
BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE
GUIDED," preliminary to their criminal recourses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 264 is applicable in the case at bar.

HELD:
No. It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive
application to administrative, not criminal complaints. The very title speaks
of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not even by
implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to say, "crimes." While "crimes"
amount to "irregularities," the Executive Order could have very well referred
to the more specific term had it intended to make itself applicable thereto.
Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these existing rules and
streamlines the administrative apparatus in the matter of complaints against
public officials. It is moreover significant that the Executive Order in question
makes specific reference to "erring officials or employees ... removed or
otherwise vindicated. If it were intended to apply to criminal prosecutions, it
would have employed such technical terms as "accused", "convicted," or
"acquitted." While this is not necessarily a controlling parameter for all
cases, it is here material in construing the intent of the measure.

People v. Echaves
G.R. Nos. L-47757-61. January 28, 1980

FACTS:
On October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate
information against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as
penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The information provides
that sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present, the above-
named accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a
portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty.
Vicente de la Serna, accused's entrance into the area has been and is still
against the win of the offended party; did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously squat and cultivate a portion of the said grazing land; said
cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the pasture
applicant from the full use thereof for which the land applied for has been
intended, that is preventing applicant's cattle from grazing the whole area,
thereby causing damage and prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-
occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr.
Five of the information were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. who
dismissed the five information on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the
accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the
decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force, intimidation or
threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner",
and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to
the cultivation of a grazing land.

ISSUE:
Whether or not by Presidential Decree No. 772 applies to agricultural lands.

HELD:
No. The court agrees to the lower court that the decree does not apply to
pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to
squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions
in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of
involves pasture lands in rural areas. It should be noted that squatting on
public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in this case, is
punished by Republic Act No. 947. The rule of ejusdem generis invoked by
the trial court, however, does not apply to this case. The decree is intended
to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The
rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is
resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.

People v. Subido
G.R. No. L-21734. September 5, 1975.
FACTS:
On September 27, 1958, the accused-appellant filed a motion praying that
(1) the court enter of record that the judgment of the Court of Appeals has
been promulgated and (2) that his appeal bond be cancelled. Accused-
appellant argued that although he could not pay the fine and the indemnity
prescribed in the judgment of the Court of Appeals, he could not be required
to serve the amount of fine and indemnity in the form of subsidiary
imprisonment because said judgment did not expressly and specifically
provide that he should serve the fine and indemnity in form of subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On December 10, 1959, the offended party registered its opposition to
accused-appellant's motion for cancellation of appeal bond and asked the
lower court to require accused-appellant to pay the fine of P500.00 and the
indemnity of P5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The lower court issued an order denying the accused-appellant's motion and
declared in accordance with the terms of the judgment of the Court of
Appeals that the accused-appellant has to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in
case he could not pay the fine and indemnity prescribed in the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant can be required to serve the fine and
indemnity in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

HELD:
No. Under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code "a libel committed by means
of writing, printing, litography, engraving, radio, phonograph, paintings,
theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition or any similar means, shall
be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium period or a
fine ranging from 200 to 6000 pesos or both, in addition to the civil action
which may be brought by the offended party". It is evident from the
foregoing provision that the court is given the discretion to impose the
penalty of imprisonment or fine or both for the crime of libel. It will be noted
that the lower court chose to impose upon the accused: three months
ofarresto mayor; a fine of P500.00; indemnification of the offended party in
the sum of P10,000.00; subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
the payment of the costs. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in the
exercise of its discretion decided to eliminate the penalty of three (3)
months arresto mayor and to reduce the indemnity of P10,000.00 to
P5,000.00.

A careful scrutiny of the decision of the trial court reveals that the clause
"with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" is separated by a
comma from the preceding clause" is hereby sentenced to three months
ofarresto mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of five
hundred (P500.00) pesos, to indemnify the offended party, Mayor Arsenio
Lacson, in the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) pesos." The use of a
comma in the part of the sentence is to make "the subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency" refer not only to non-payment of the indemnity, but
also to non-payment of the fine.
Fortunately, however, accused-appellant is favored by the retroactive force
of Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
5465 which exempts an accused person from subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency to pay his civil liability.

It is a well known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal statutes are to be

strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of the
accused. In the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to give it
careful scrutiny, and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the
rights of the defendant. Considering that Article 39 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, is favorable to the accused-appellant, the same should
be made applicable to him. Thus applying Article 39 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, to the accused-appellant, he cannot also be required to
serve his civil liability to the offended party in form of subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency because this is no longer required by the
aforesaid article.

People v. Yabut
G.R. No. 39085. September 27, 1933.

FACTS:
On or about the 1st day of August, 1932, the accused Antonio Yabut, then a
prisoner serving sentence in the Bilibid Prison, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and treacherously, assault, beat and use personal violence upon one Sabas
Aseo, another prisoner also serving sentence in Bilibid, by then and there
hitting the said Sabas Aseo suddenly and unexpectedly from behind with a
wooden club, without any just cause, thereby causing the death of the latter.
Yabut was a recidivist, he having previously been convicted twice of the
crime of homicide and once of serious physical injuries, by virtue of final
sentences rendered by competent tribunals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code applies to the case at bar.
HELD:
Yes. Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code, translated in English, provides that:

Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another

previous offense Penalty. Besides the provisions of rule 5 of article 62,
any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final
judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the
same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by
law for the new felony.

The appellant places much stress upon the word "another" appearing in the
English translation of the headnote of article 160 and would have us accept
his deduction from the headnote that article 160 is applicable only when the
new crime which is committed by a person already serving sentence is
different from the crime for which he is serving sentence. The language is
plain and unambiguous. There is not the slightest intimation in the text of
article 160 that said article applies only in cases where the new offense is
different in character from the former offense for which the defendant is
serving the penalty.

It is familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and
unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to the
preamble or headings or epigraphs of a section of interpretation of the text,
especially where such epigraphs or headings of sections are mere
catchwords or reference aids indicating the general nature of the text that
follows. A mere glance at the titles to the articles of the Revised Penal code
will reveal that they were not intended by the Legislature to be used as
anything more than catchwords conveniently suggesting in a general way
the subject matter of each article. Being nothing more than a convenient
index to the contents of the articles of the Code, they cannot, in any event
have the effect of modifying or limiting the unambiguous words of the text.

Manila Jockey Club v. Games and Amusements Board

G.R. No. L-12727. February 29, 1960

FACTS:
 As stated, Republic Act No. 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races of the PCSO to
twelve, but without specifying the days on which they are to be run. To accommodate these
additional races, the GAB resolved to reduce the number of Sundays assigned to private
individuals and entities by six. Appellants protested, contending that the said increased should be
taken from the 12 Saturdays reserved to the President, for charitable, relief, or civic purposes, or
should be assigned to any other day of the week besides Sunday, Saturday, and legal holiday.
They also hold that respondent PCSO does not have the right or power to appropriate or use the
race tracks and equipment of petitioner without its consent, nor can respondents compel
petitioner to so allow such use of its race tracks and equipment under pain of having its license
revoked.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not there was a proper placement of the six additional racing days given to the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office in virtue of Republic Act No. 1502.
(2) Whether or not legislative debates and explanatory statements by members of the legislature
may be resorted to in the interpretation of statutes.

HELD:
(1) Yes. It is clear from Section 4 Republic Act No. 309, as amended by Republic Act No. 983, that
appellants have no vested right to the unreserved Sundays, or even to the 24 Saturdays (except,
perhaps, on the holidays), because their holding of races on these days is merely permissive,
subject to the licensing and determination by the GAB. When, therefore, Republic Act No. 1502
was enacted increasing by six (6) the sweepstakes draw and races, but without specifying the
days for holding them, the GAB had no alternative except to make room for the additional races,
as it did, from among the only available racing days unreserved by any law the Sundays on
which the private individuals and entities have been permitted to hold their races, subject to
licensing and determination by the GAB.

The law does not authorize the holding of horse races with betting on week days. Secondly,
sweepstakes races have always been held on Sundays. It is not possible to hold them on Saturday
afternoons as, it is claimed, a whole day is necessary for the mixing of the sweepstakes balls, the
drawing of winning sweepstakes numbers, and the running of the sweepstakes races. The
language of Republic Act No. 1502 in authorizing the increase, clearly speaks of regular
sweepstakes draws and races. The conclusion seems inevitable that the additional sweepstakes
draws and races were intended to be held on a whole day, separate and apart from the club races.

(2) No. Legislative debates are expressive of the views and motives of individual members and are
not safe guides and, hence, may not be resorted to in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the
lawmaking body. It is impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put upon an
act by the members of the legislative body that passed the bill, by resorting to the speeches of the
members thereof. Those who did not speak, may not have agreed with those who did; and those
who spoke, might differ from each other.The legal act, so to speak, is made up of two elements
an internal and an external one; it originates in intention and is perfected by expression.
Failure of the latter may defeat the former

People v. Purisima
G.R. No. L-42050, Nov. 20, 1978

FACTS:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review were filed by the People of the
Philippines charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed
by the accused, the three Judges issued an Order quashing or dismissing the
Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege
facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9
because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Informations filed by the petitioners are sufficient in form and substance to
constitute the offense of illegal possession of deadly weapon penalized under PD No. 9.

HELD:
No. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective. The two
elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the
Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid
charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts
alleged therein. Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the
elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.

In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary

rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative
intent is the controlling factor, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is
within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would
result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. Because of the problem of
determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary
to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found
among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid

presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a
legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences.