SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner, vs.

Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, (3) WON the American lawyers could participate in the prosecution of this case? [Yes,
Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel they can.]
IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO ARANAS,
MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.\ MORAN, C.J.: Ratio: (1) The order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its
(1949)\Nature: En Banc Decision section 3, that- The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the nation.
Doctrine: Rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and
are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. They form part In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the
of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant
embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nation, all those
scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a
contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory. war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential
and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity
Facts: and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently, in the promulgation and
- A Military commission was empaneled under the authority of Executive Order 68 of the enforcement of Execution Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines has acted in
President of the Philippines, which was issued on July 29, 1947. This is an act conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of
establishing a national war crimes office and prescribing rules and regulation governing our Constitution.
the trial of accused war criminals.
- Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines from 1943-
Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of
1944, is charged before a military commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the
Yamashita vs. Styer. Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully
Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to
empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and
discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and
punishment of war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order
other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese
No. 68.
Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war".
- Melville Hussey and Robert Port, American lawyers, were appointed prosecutors in
(2) Rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are
behalf of USA.
wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In fact, these rules
- Kuroda challenges the legality of the EO No. 68 and the personality as prosecutors of
and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United States and
Hussey and Port.
Japan, who were signatories to the two Conventions. Such rule and principles
- Kurodas arguments were: (1)EO No. is illegal on the gound that ut wiolates not only the
therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a
provisions of our constitutional law but also our local laws; (2) Military Commission has
signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been
no Jurisdiction to try him for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the
Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the
recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to
second only in 1947 and, therefore, he is charged with crime not based on law, national
which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
or international; and (3) Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecutors in this case
because they are not qualified to practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the
of court and the appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national
Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound
sovereignty.
together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in
the treaties between the belligerent countries.
Issues/Held: (1) WON EO No. 68 is valid and constitutional? [Yes it is a valid because it
is based on the generally accepted principles of international law which form part of our
(3) There is nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel appearing before
laws.]
said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in
(2) WON rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions form part of the
accordance with the Rules of Court. Respondent Military Commission is a special military
law of the nation even if Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying
tribunal governed by a special law and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary
them? [Yes, they form part of our laws.]
civil court. Secondly, the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our
nation sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United States, which has submitted the
vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation,
should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been any
relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United States
Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies.
---
DISSENTING OPINION of Justice Perfecto

(1) Executive Order No. 68., is null and void because, through it, the President of the
Philippines usurped power expressly vested by the Constitution in Congress and in the
Supreme Court.

EO No. 68 confers upon military commissions jurisdiction to try all persons charged with
war crimes. It is clearly legislative in nature. The power to define and allocate jurisdiction
for the prosecution of person accused of any crime is exclusively vested by the
Constitution in Congress. It also appropriates the sum of P700,000 for the expenses of
the National War Crimes office established by the said EO No. 68. This constitutes
another usurpation of legislative power as the power to vote appropriations belongs to
Congress.

It provides rules of procedure for the conduct of trial. This provision on procedural subject
constitutes a usurpation of the rule-making power vested by Constitution in the Supreme
Court.
(2) Respondents suggest that the President issued EO No. 68 under the emergency
powers granted to him by Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth
Act No. 620, and Commonwelath Act No. 671.

The above Acts cannot validly be invoked, because they ceased to have effect much
before Executive Order No. 68 was issued on July 29, 1947. Said Acts had elapsed upon
the liberation of the Philippines from the Japanese forces or, at the latest, when the
surrender of Japan was signed in Tokyo on September 2, 1945. It has never been the
purpose of the National Assembly to extend the delegation of legislative powers to the
President beyond the emergency created by the war, as to extend it farther would be
violative of the express provisions of the Constitution. EO No. 68 is equally offensive to
the Constitution because it violates the fundamental guarantees of the due process and
equal protection of the law because it permits the admission of many kinds evidence by
which no innocent person can afford to get acquittal and by which it is impossible to
determine whether an accused is guilty or not beyond all reasonable doubt.
 On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's
jurisdiction and supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating
that Commissioners' authority should be understood as being confined only to
the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly
violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in
business".
On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and
supplemental motion to dismiss. And petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied
also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991.
The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and
preliminary injunction. Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and
investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al".

ISSUE:
Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the
CRH?

HELD:
No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of
the CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to
"investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation,
involving civil and political rights".
The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power
that the it does not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights
have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the
Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself
has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued
by the Judge in any court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of
the SC.
The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further
proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580.

SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994

FACTS:
On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing
the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA
pending the resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and
ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.
PBM Employees Asso. v PBM 51 SCRA 189 (1973)

Facts: Petitioners informed the respondent employers of their schedule for a mass
demonstration in protest for the alleged abuses of the Pasig police. Respondent invoke
that the demonstration is a violation of their CBA agreement however petitioners contend
it is an exercise of their freedom to peaceable assembly to seek redress of their
grievances against the abusive Pasig police and not a strike against their employer.
Respondent dismissed the petitioners and the court sustained their demonstration is one
of bargaining in bad faith.

Issue: Whether or not there was a restraint in the exercise of the right to peaceable
assembly of the petitioners.

Held: The court held that the primacy of human rights such as freedom of expression, of
peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been
sustained. The obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the
respondent firm was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses,
denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage
in such common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police
indignities. Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the
dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration
and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees.

489 SCRA 160 Political Law The Executive Branch Presidential Proclamation 1017
Take Care Clause Take Over Power Calling Out Power

Bill of Rights Freedom of Speech Overbreadth

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a
plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented
by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and
the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time
revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head
Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the
CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still,
another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same
day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a
warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters
cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency
ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is
unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the
president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated
in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth.
Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected
and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and
academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The
Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care power
and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly
unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the
questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the
alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The
SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of
which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017
and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum
shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo
Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military,
particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist
leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military.
Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017
calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not
expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she
believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such
power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on
their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not
primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not
primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the
AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth
doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered
harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth
are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC
considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power
was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly
declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the
calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out
power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has
been met.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP
1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to
the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power
that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The
SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the
authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The
president can only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions
such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the
word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but
rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the
state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come
automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from
Congress must be based on the following:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It
is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.
 aggrieved by her husband's infedility) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if
there is a "lawful order from the court or which public safety or order require otherwise,
as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in breaking
the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infedility. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or
her/his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available
to him or to her.

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making
it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one
from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to
the other.

The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable, except upon

lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescrbied
by law. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceeding section, shall
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On
March 26, 1962, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in
the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened
the drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private respondents between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards,
cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and
papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her
husband.

ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion
and from unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital
separation and disqualification from medical practice.

HELD:
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injuction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to
be inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
 1. Marti contends that the evidence had been obtained in violation of his constitutional
rights against unreasonable seach and siezure and privacy of communication.
Ruling :
1. Evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private
person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State
authorities. In the absence of governmental interference, the libertied guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
2. Mere presence of NBI agents does not convert it to warrantless search and siezure.
Merely to look at that which is plain sight is not search. Having observed that which is
open, where no trespass has been committed is not search.
Commissioner Bernas :
The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy...is a
protection against the State. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the
individual and the State. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a
private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some
forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder.

People vs. Marti 193 SCRA 57

Facts :

Andre Marti and his wife went to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders, carrying with
them four gift wrapped packages to be delivered to his friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita
Reyes (wife of the proprietor) asked if she could inspect the packages, however, Marti
refused assuring that it only contained books, cigars and gloves as gift to his friend.
Before delivery to Bureau of Customs/Posts, the proprietor Job Reyes, following
standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened
Marti's boxes, a particular odor emitted therefrom and he soon found out that the boxes
contained dried marijuana leaves. He reported the incident to the NBI who acknowledged
custody of the incident. Marti was convicted for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Constitutional Issues :
 Facts:

On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to
Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It
was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the packages. Shirley refused
and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready for shipment. Before
being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier
company, conducted an inspection of the package as part of standard operating
procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him
took sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited
agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes
opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was
filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a
quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right of
privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible
as evidence against him.

Issue:

Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of
Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies
as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. It
will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the presence of
the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and
siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain
sight is not a search.

The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged was AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRE MARTI (193 SCRA 57) Case Digest