OPULENCIA V.
CA difficulties in her living conditions and
G.R. No. 125835 July 30, 1998
Facts: Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven
(herein private respondents) alleged that Natalia
Opulencia executed in their favor a CONTRACT
TO SELL a lot located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna at
P150.00/sq.m; that plaintiffs paid a
downpayment of P300,000.00 but defendant,
despite demands, failed to comply with her
obligations under the contract. Private
respondents therefore prayed that petitioner be
ordered to perform her contractual obligations
and to further pay damages, attorneys fee and
litigation expenses.
Petitioner admitted the execution of the contract
in favor of plaintiffs and receipt of P300,000.00
as down payment. However, she put forward the
following defenses: that the property subject of
the contract formed part of the Estate of
Demetrio Carpena (petitioners father), in respect
of which a petition for probate was filed with the
Regional Trial Court; that at the time the contract
was executed, the parties were aware of the
pendency of the probate proceeding; that the
contract to sell was not approved by the probate
court; that realizing the nullity of the contract
petitioner had offered to return the downpayment
received from private respondents, but the latter
refused to accept it; that petitioner had chosen
to rescind the contract.
Issue: W/N the Contract to sell executed by the
petitioner and private respondents without the
requisite probate court approval is valid.
Held: Contract to Sell is VALID. Petitioner
contends that where the estate of the deceased
person is already the subject of a testate or
intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot
enter into any transaction involving it without
prior approval of the Probate Court. She
maintains that the Contract to Sell is void
because it was not approved by the probate
court, as required by Section 7, Rule 89 of the
Rules of Court.
The Court is not persuaded. As correctly ruled
by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of
the Rules of Court is not applicable, because
petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her
capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix or
administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she
represented herself as the lawful owner and
seller of the subject parcel of land. She also
explained the reason for the sale to be
consequent need of cash. These
representations clearly evince that she was not
acting on behalf of the estate under probate
when she entered into the Contract to Sell.
Accordingly, the jurisprudence cited by petitioner
has no application to the instant case.
We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested
in the heir or heirs from the moment of the
decedents death. Petitioner, therefore, became
the owner of her hereditary share the moment
her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial
approval does not invalidate the Contract to sell,
because the petitioner has the substantive right
to sell the whole or a part of her share in the
estate of her late father.
Administration of the Estate Not Prejudiced
by the Contract to Sell
The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioners
offer to sell is contingent on the complete
clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament
of her father. Consequently, although the
Contract to Sell was perfected between the
petitioner and private respondents during the
pendency of the probate proceedings, the
consummation of the sale or the transfer of
ownership over the parcel of land to the private
respondents is subject to the full payment of the
purchase price and to the termination and
outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore,
there is no basis for petitioners apprehension
that the Contract to Sell may result in a
premature partition and distribution of the
properties of the estate. Indeed, it is settled that
the sale made by an heir of his share in an
inheritance, subject to the pending
administration, in no wise stands in the way of
such administration.
Estoppel
Petitioner is estopped from backing out of her
representations in her valid Contract to Sell with
private respondents, from whom she had
already received P300,000 as initial payment of
the purchase price. Petitioner may not renege
on her own acts and representations, to the
prejudice of the private respondents who have
relied on them.[21] Jurisprudence teaches us
that neither the law nor the courts will extricate a
party from an unwise or undesirable contract he
or she entered into with all the required
formalities and with full awareness of its
consequences.
 NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY V.
ALMEIDA
G.R. No. 162784 June 22, 2007
Facts: On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure
Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita
Herrera several portions of land which are part
of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna.
Records show that Margarita Herrera had 2
children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the mother of
private respondent) and Francisca Herrera.
Beatriz Herrera-Mercado predeceased her
mother and left heirs.
Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27,
1971.
On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the
remaining child of the late Margarita Herrera
executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming
that she is the only remaining relative, being the
sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She
also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the
late Margarita Herrera. The Deed of Self-
Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated October 7, 1960, allegedly
executed by Margarita Herrera.
The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado
filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-
Adjudication before the then Court of First
Instance of Laguna.
On December 29, 1980, (questioning the Deed
of Self-Adjudication) was rendered and the deed
was declared null and void.
Francisca Herrera filed an application with the
NHA to purchase the same lots submitting
therewith a copy of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
executed by her mother. Private respondent
Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado,
protested the application.
In a Resolution dated February 5, 1986, the
NHA granted the application made by Francisca
Herrera.
Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office
of the President and the resolution of the NHA,
private respondent Segunda Mercado-Almeida
sought the cancellation of the titles issued in
favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a
Complaint for "Nullification of Government Lot's
Award," with the RTC. RTC and CA ruled in
favor of respondent, hence this petition.
Issue: WN the sinumpaang salaysay is in a
nature of a will; and who between the parties
has preferential rights for award over the subject
lots.
Held: Yes, and SC ruled in favor of
respondents. When the petitioner received the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have noted
that the effectivity of the said document
commences at the time of death of the author of
the instrument; in her words "sakaling ako'y
bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay" Hence, in
such period, all the interests of the person
should cease to be hers and shall be in the
possession of her estate until they are
transferred to her heirs by virtue of Article 774 of
the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by
virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance, of a person are transmitted through
his death to another or others either by his will
or by operation of law.
By considering the document, petitioner NHA
should have noted that the original applicant has
already passed away. Margarita Herrera passed
away on October 27, 1971. The NHA issued its
resolution on February 5, 1986. The NHA gave
due course to the application made by Francisca
Herrera without considering that the initial
applicant's death would transfer all her property,
rights and obligations to the estate including
whatever interest she has or may have had over
the disputed properties. To the extent of the
interest that the original owner had over the
property, the same should go to her estate.
Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property
and that interest should go to her estate upon
her demise so as to be able to properly
distribute them later to her heirsin accordance
with a will or by operation of law.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not
extinguish her interest over the property.
Margarita Herrera had an existing Contract to
Sell with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita
Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was
neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to
Sell was an obligation on both parties
Margarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are
transmissible. Margarita Herrera's obligation to
pay became transmissible at the time of her
death either by will or by operation of law.
When the original buyer died, the NHA should
have considered the estate of the decedent as
the next "person" likely to stand in to fulfill the
obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price.
The opposition of other heirs to the repurchase
by Francisca Herrera should have put the NHA
on guard as to the award of the lots. Further, the
Decision in the said Civil Case (questioning the
Deed of Self-Adjudication) which rendered the
deed therein null and void should have alerted
the NHA that there are other heirs to the
interests and properties of the decedent who
may claim the property after a testate or
intestate proceeding is concluded. The NHA
therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the
lots.
We need not delve into the validity of the will.
The issue is for the probate court to determine.
We affirm the Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Court which noted that it has an element of
testamentary disposition where (1) it devolved
and transferred property; (2) the effect of which
shall transpire upon the death of the instrument
maker.