CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
G.R. No. 91391 January 24, 1991
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Solicitor General, petitioner vs.THE HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
The petitioner challenges the resolutions dated June 8, 1989 and November 2, 1989 of
the Sandiganbayan issued in Civil Case No. 0033 which granted the motion of private
respondent Juan Ponce Enrile, one of the defendants in the civil case, to implead the
petitioner as additional party defendant in Enrile's counterclaim in the same civil case
and denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On July 31, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) with the assistance of Solicitor General Francisco Chavez
filed with the respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 0033
against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile, among others, for
reconveyance, reversion and accounting, restitution and damages.
After the denial of his motion to dismiss, respondent Enrile filed his answer with
compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim with damages.
The Republic filed its reply to the answer and motion to dismiss the counterclaim. The
motion was opposed by respondent Enrile.
On January 30, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, to wit:
The resolution of the Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim against the Plaintiff
government is deferred until after trial, the grounds relied upon not appearing to
be indubitable.
On the matter of the additional parties (Solicitor General Chavez, Ex-PCGG
Chairman Diaz, former Commissioners Doromal, Rodrigo, Romero and Bautista),
the propriety of impleading them either under Sec. 14, Rule 6 or even under Sec.
12 as third-party defendant requires leave of Court to determine the propriety
thereof. No such leave has been sought. Consideration thereof cannot be
entertained at this time nor may therefore, the Motion to Dismiss the same be
considered. (Rollo, p. 329; Annex "H", Petition)
Respondent Enrile then requested leave from the Sandiganbayan to implead the
petitioner and the PCGG officials as party defendants for lodging this alleged
"harassment suit" against him.
The motion was granted in a resolution dated June 8, 1989, to wit:
In respect to defendant Juan Ponce Enrile's Manifestation and Motion dated
February 23, 1989, praying for leave to implead additional parties to his
counterclaim, the Court, finding reason in the aforesaid Manifestation and
Motion, grants leave to implead the defendants named in the counterclaim and
admits defendant Juan Ponce Enrile's answer with counterclaim.
This is without prejudice to the defenses which said defendants may put forth
individually or in common, in their personal capacities or otherwise. (Rollo, p. 27)
In a later resolution dated November 2, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan denied a
motion to reconsider the June 8, 1989 resolution. The dispositive portion of the resolution
states:
WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration of the Solicitor General and
former PCGG officials Ramon Diaz, Quintin Doromal, Orlando Romero, Ramon
Rodrigo and Mary Concepcion Bautista are denied, but, considering these
motions as in the nature of motions to dismiss counterclaim/answers, resolution
of these motions is held in abeyance pending trial on the merits. (Rollo, p. 31)
Thereafter, all the PCGG officials filed their answer to the counterclaims invoking their
immunity from suits as provided in Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1. Instead of filing
an answer, the petitioner comes to this Court assailing the resolutions as rendered with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The lone issue in this petition is the propriety of impleading the petitioner as additional
party defendant in the counterclaim filed by respondent Enrile in Civil Case No. 0033.
It may be noted that the private respondent did not limit himself to general averments of
malice, recklessness, and bad faith but filed specific charges that then PCGG Chairman
Jovito Salonga had already cleared the respondent and yet, knowing the allegations to
be false, the petitioner still filed the complaint. This can be gleaned from excerpts found
in respondent Enrile's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-Claim:
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant-in-counterclaim Francisco Chavez was the Solicitor General who
assisted the PCGG in filing and maintaining the instant Complaint against
Defendant. As the incumbent Solicitor General, he continues to assist the PCGG
in prosecuting this case.
He is sued in his personal and official capacities.
1

On or about October 1986, the PCGG, speaking through the then Chairman, now
Senate President, Hon. Jovito R. Salonga, found and declared that "not one of
the documents left by then President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos including the
2,300-page evidence turned over to the PCGG by the US State Department
implicates Enrile." Chairman Salonga stressed that in view of the PCGG's
findings, he refused to yield to the "pressure" exerted on him to prosecute
Defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the findings of the PCGG that there was absolutely no evidence
linking Defendant to the illegal activities of former President and Mrs. Ferdinand
E. Marcos, the PCGG, this time composed of Chairman Ramon Diaz, the
Commissioners Quintin Doromal, Ramon Rodrigo, Orlando Romero and Mary
Concepcion Bautista, filed the Complaint against Defendant, among others, on or
about 22 July 1987.
Defendant has reasons to believe, and so alleges that Chairman Diaz, and
Commissioners Doromal, Rodrigo, Romero and Bautista ordered, authorized,
allowed or tolerated the filing of the utterly baseless complaint against Defendant.
Solicitor General Francisco Chavez assisted or cooperated in, or induced or
instigated, the filing of this harassment suit against Defendant.
In so ordering, authorizing, allowing and tolerating the institution of the action
against Defendant, all the aforenamed officers, with malice and in evident bad
faith, and with grave abuse of power and in excess of their duty and authority,
unjustly and unlawfully obstructed, defeated, violated, impeded or impaired the
constitutional rights and liberties of Defendant . . . . (Rollo, pp. 260-262)
On the other hand, the petitioner submits that no counter-claim can be filed against him
in his capacity as Solicitor General since he is only acting as counsel for the Republic.
He cites the case of Borja v. Borja, 101 Phil. 911 [1957] wherein we ruled:
. . . The appearance of a lawyer as counsel for a party and his participation in a
case as such counsel does not make him a party to the action. The fact that he
represents the interests of his client or that he acts in their behalf will not hold
him liable for or make him entitled to any award that the Court may adjudicate to
the parties, other than his professional fees. The principle that a counterclaim
cannot be filed against persons who are acting in representation of another
such as trustees in their individual capacities (Chambers v. Cameron, 2 Fed.
Rules Service, p. 155; 29 F. Supp. 742) could be applied with more force and
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
effect in the case of a counsel whose participation in the action is merely
confined to the preparation of the defense of his client. Appellant, however,
asserted that he filed the counterclaim against said lawyer not in his individual
capacity but as counsel for the heirs of Quintin de Borja. But as we have already
stated that the existence of a lawyer-client relationship does not make the former
a party to the action, even this allegation of appellant will not alter the result We
have arrived at (at pp. 924-925)
Thus, the petitioner argues that since he is simply the lawyer in the case, exercising his
duty under the law to assist the Government in the filing and prosecution of all cases
pursuant to Section 1, Executive Order No. 14, he cannot be sued in a counterclaim in
the same case.
Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena correctly observed that there is no general
immunity arising solely from occupying a public office.
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts
claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have
acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith. We ruled in one case:
A number of cases decided by the Court where the municipal mayor alone was
held liable for back salaries of, or damages to dismissed municipal employees, to
the exclusion of the municipality, are not applicable in this instance. In Salcedo v.
Court of Appeals (81 SCRA 408 [1978]) for instance, the municipal mayor was
held liable for the back salaries of the Chief of Police he had dismissed, not only
because the dismissal was arbitrary but also because the mayor refused to
reinstate him in defiance of an order of the Commissioner of Civil Service to
reinstate.
In Nemenzo v. Sabillano (25 SCRA 1 [1968]), the municipal mayor was held
personally liable for dismissing a police corporal who possessed the necessary
civil service eligibility, the dismissal being done without justifiable cause and
without any administrative investigation.
In Rama v. Court of Appeals (G.R. Nos. L-44484, L-44842, L-44591, L-44894,
March 16 1987), the governor, vice-governor, members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, provincial auditor, provincial treasurer and provincial engineer
were ordered to pay jointly and severally in their individual and personal capacity
damages to some 200 employees of the province of Cebu who were eased out
from their positions because of their party affiliations. (Laganapan v. Asedillo, 154
SCRA 377 [1987])
2

Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunity proviso under Section 4(a) of
Executive Order No. 1 also extends to him is not well-taken. A mere invocation of the
immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being automatically dropped.
In the case of Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pea (159 SCRA 556
[1988]) then Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, added a clarification of the immunity
accorded PCGG officials under Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 as follows:
With respect to the qualifications expressed by Mr. Justice Feliciano in his
separate opinion, I just wish to point out two things: First, the main opinion does
not claim absolute immunity for the members of the Commission. The cited
section of Executive Order No. 1 provides the Commission's members immunity
from suit thus: "No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member
thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by
this order." No absolute immunity like that sought by Mr. Marcos in his
Constitution for himself and his subordinates is herein involved. It is understood
that the immunity granted the members of the Commission by virtue of the
unimaginable magnitude of its task to recover the plundered wealth and the
State's exercise of police power was immunity from liability for damages in the
official discharge of the task granted the members of the Commission much in
the same manner that judges are immune from suit in the official discharge of the
functions of their office . . . " (at pp. 581-582)
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano stated in the same case:
It may be further submitted, with equal respect, that Section 4 (a) of Executive
Order No. 1 was intended merely to restate the general principle of the law of
public officers that the PCGG or any member thereof may not be held civilly
liable for acts done in the performance of official duty, provided that such member
had acted in good faith and within the scene of his lawful authority. It may also be
assumed that the Sandiganbayan would have jurisdiction to determine whether
the PCGG or any particular official thereof may be held liable in damages to a
private person injured by acts of such manner. It would seem constitutionally
offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the PCGG could not be
required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were
exempted from complying with orders of this Court. (at pp. 586- 587)
Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant
a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. (id., at page 586)
Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General acts in bad faith, or, as
contended by the private respondent, "maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG
commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
baseless suit in derogation of the latter's constitutional rights and liberties" (Rollo, p.
417), there can be no question that a complaint for damages may be filed against him.
High position in government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure
another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on Human
Relations may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike. The issue is not
the right of respondent Enrile to file an action for damages. He has the right. The issue is
whether or not that action must be filed as a compulsory counterclaim in the case filed
against him.
Under the circumstances of this case, we rule that the charges pressed by respondent
Enrile for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code arising from the filing of an alleged
harassment suit with malice and evident bad faith do not constitute a compulsory
counterclaim. To vindicate his rights, Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct
civil action for damages against the Solicitor General.
In the case of Tiu Po v. Bautista, (103 SCRA 388 [1981]), we ruled that damages claimed
to have been suffered as a consequence of an action filed against the petitioner must be
pleaded in the same action as a compulsory counterclaim. We were referring, however,
to a case filed by the private respondent against the petitioners or parties in the litigation.
In the present case, the counterclaim was filed against the lawyer, not against the party
plaintiff itself.
To allow a counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for his clients, who is
merely their representative in court and not a plaintiff or complainant in the case would
lead to mischievous consequences.
A lawyer owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability.
(See Agpalo, Legal Ethics [1980] p. 147 citing Javier v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293 [1936]; In re
Tionko, 43 Phil. 191 [1922]; In re: Atty. C. T. Oliva, 103 Phil. 312 [1958]; Lualhati v. Albert,
57 Phil. 86 [1932]; Toguib v. Tomol, Jr., G.R. Adm. Case No. 554, Jan. 3, 1969; People v.
Macellones, 49 SCRA 529 [1973]; Tan Kui v. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 199 [1973]). A
lawyer cannot properly attend to his duties towards his client if, in the same case, he is
kept busy defending himself.
The problem is particularly perplexing for the Solicitor General. As counsel of the
1wphi1
Republic, the Solicitor General has to appear in controversial and politically charged
cases. It is not unusual for high officials of the Government to unwittingly use shortcuts in
the zealous desire to expedite executive programs or reforms. The Solicitor General
cannot look at these cases with indifferent neutrality. His perception of national interest
and obedience to instructions from above may compel him to take a stance which to a
respondent may appear too personal and biased. It is likewise unreasonable to require
3
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
Government Prosecutors to defend themselves against counterclaims in the very same
cases they are prosecuting.

As earlier stated, we do not suggest that a lawyer enjoys a special immunity from
damage suits. However, when he acts in the name of a client, he should not be sued on
a counterclaim in the very same case he has filed only as counsel and not as a party.
Any claim for alleged damages or other causes of action should be filed in an entirely
separate and distinct civil action.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the

Sandiganbayan are SET ASIDE insofar as they allow the counterclaim filed against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

4

G.R. No. L-44388 January 30, 1985
VICTORIANO BULACAN, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FAUSTINO TORCINO and FELIPA
TORCINO, defendants-appellants.
The issue before us is whether or not a complaint for forcible entry and detainer should
be dismissed by a municipal court on the ground that the plaintiff knowingly asked a non-
member of the bar to sign and file it for him.
A complaint for forcible entry and damages with preliminary mandatory injunction was
filed with the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte by Victoriano Bulacan against Faustino
Torcino and Felipa Torcino. The complaint was signed by Nicolas Nues, Jr., "Friend
counsel for the Plaintiff" but was verified by the plaintiff-appellee himself. The verification
reads:
I, VICTORIANO BULACAN, of legal age, Filipino, married and a resident
of Baybay, Leyte after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law
thereby depose and say:
That I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled case; that I have caused the
above complaint to be prepared by Nicolas P. Nues, Jr. and that I have
voluntarily asked, sought and requested his aid to file, claim, prosecute,
and defend in court my civil case against the defendants Faustino Torcino
et al or others in connection with this case at the Municipal Court of
Baybay, Leyte; that I have read and known the contents thereon and the
allegations therein are true and correct to my own knowledge.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 4th day of
August, 1972 at Baybay, Leyte.
s/VICTORIANO BULACAN
t/VICTORIANO BULACAN
Plaintiff
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4th day of August, 1972 at
Baybay, Leyte by Victoriano Bulacan with his Res. Cert. No. A-930280
dated Aug. 4, 1972 issued at Baybay, Leyte.
s/NICOLAS P. NUES, JR
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
t/NICOLAS P. NUES, JR.
Notary Public
Until December 31st, 1972
Doc. No. 344
Page No. 56
Book No. VII
Series of 1972
When the defendants-appellants filed their answer, they did not question the fact that the
complaint was signed by Nicolas Nues, Jr.
On February 10, 1973, the municipal court issued the following order:
The contending parties are given one week time to submit the proposed
compromise agreement in connection with his case.
Failure to do so will constrain this court to render judgment on the basis
of the ocular inspection conducted sometime on December, 1972.
Due to the failure of the parties to settle their case amicably, the court rendered a
decision ordering the Torcinos to demolish and remove the portion of their house which
was illegally constructed on the land of the plaintiff The municipal court stated that there
is no doubt that Victoriano Bulacan is the owner and has been in possession of Lot No.
5998 and that the lot of the defendants-appellants is on the eastern portion of said lot.
The court found that the Torcinos constructed a residential house which unfortunately
encroached on the lot of the plaintiff.
The Torcinos appealed the decision to the Court of First Instance of Leyte.
On September 18, 1973, the appellants Torcinos filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that the complaint was not signed by the plaintiff or by an admitted
attorney, and therefore must be considered as sham and false.
5

Four days later, another motion to dismiss the complaint was filed with the additional
discussion that the fact that the complaint is verified, does not in itself cure the defect
obtaining in the complaint.
On September 24, 1973, appellee Bulacan opposed the motion and alleged that the
motion to dismiss was not filed on time and the defenses therein were not pleaded in the
answer in the municipal court and therefore, are deemed waived and may not be raised
for the first time on appeal in the Court of First Instance. The opposition also stated that
the complaint substantially conforms to the Rule.
On September 24, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Leyte denied the motion to
dismiss. A motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
On December 7, 1973, when the case was called for continuance, the parties presented
to the court a stipulation of facts which states and which we quote verbatim:
COME NOW, the plaintiff and the defendants duly assisted by their
respective counsel and unto this Honorable Court most respectfully
submits the following stipulation of facts, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff and the defendants hereby agree to relocate the
defendants' land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Number T-8133
which is hereto attached.
2. That should the findings of the Geodetic Engineer be that the present
construction particularly the wallings is beyond the lot of the said
defendants as defined and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
8133 then the defendants win remove any portion of the wallings that
maybe inside the land of the plaintiff and vacate from the premises
encroached. However, should the findings of the Geodetic Engineer be
that the walling constructed by the defendants does not encroach even
an inch on the land of the plaintiff then the plaintiff hereby agrees to the
dismissal of the present case.
3. That should the Geodetic Engineer finds out that the defendants has
encroach the land of the plaintiff the defendants will be the one who will
pay for the services of the Goedetic Engineer and should the findings be
that no encroachment were made by the defendants, then the plaintiff
should shoulder the expenses of the relocation survey.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
4. That parties hereby agree that Geodetic Engineer Jaime Kudera be
appointed by the Honorable Court to conduct and execute the relocation
survey.
5. That plaintiff and defendants hereby agree to waive the claims and
counterclaims for damages.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court
renders judgment on the basis of the above stipulation of facts.
The stipulation of facts was signed by plaintiff Victoriano Bulacan, his new counsel Atty.
Diego A. Cala defendants Faustino and Felipa Torcino, and their counsel Gerardo A.
Pabello
The court issued an order directing surveyor Jaime Kudera to conduct the relocation
work on the basis of the stipulation.
On December 17, 1983, Kudera submitted his report and on the basis of his findings, the
Court of First Instance of Leyte affirmed the decision of the municipal court.
The defendants appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and assigned two errors:
I
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO
DISMISS FILED BY THE DEFENDANTS APPELLANTS AND IN NOT
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.
II
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE AGAINST
THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS AND IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT ON THE DECISION APPEALED FROM.
The Court of Appeals in a resolution dated August 7, 1976 certified the appeal to us on
the ground that no testimonial or oral evidence was presented by the parties and,
therefore, no factual matters are in issue in the appeal.
We affirm the decision of the lower court.
6

The Torcinos allege that the complaint is irregular as it was signed not by the plaintiff but
by one who was not a member of the bar and who designated himself merely as "Friend
counsel for the Plaintiff." The appellants argue that the municipal court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case. They invoke Section 5, Rule 7 which states:
SEC. 5. Signature and address.Every pleading of a party represented
by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
individual name, whose address shall be stated A party who is not
represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his
address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute,
pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature
of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there
is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a
pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this
rule, it may be stricken out as sham and false and the action may
proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a willful
violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate
disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent
matter is inserted. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the facts of this case, however, the applicable provision is Section 34, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the Court of a municipality a party may
conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
The Rules are clear. In municipal courts, the litigant may be assisted by a friend, agent,
or an attorney. However, in cases before the regional trial court, the litigant must be
aided by a duly authorized member of the bar. The rule invoked by the Torcinos applies
only to cases filed with the regional trial court and not to cases before a municipal court.
In the case of Cantimbuhan v. Cruz, Jr. (126 SCRA 190) we decided a similar issue and
allowed the appearance of two senior law students as friends of the complainant-
petitioner Cantimbuhan to prosecute the case before the sala of Judge Nicanor J. Cruz,
Jr., of the Municipal Court of Paraaque.
Similarly, in the case of Laput v. Bernabe (55 Phil. 621) a law student was allowed to
represent the accused in a case pending before the City Court of Manila.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
Court procedures are often technical and may prove like shares to the ignorant or the
unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear for party litigants in
places where duly authorized members of the bar are not available. (U.S. v. Bacansas, 6
Phil. 539). For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the Rules still allow a
more educated or capable person to appear in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a
lawyer. But for the protection of the parties and in the interest of justice, the requirement
for appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts is more stringent.
In the case before us, the complaint was verified by the party litigant himself. In the
verification, the plaintiff specifically stated that he had caused Mr. Nues to conduct the
litigation and to sign the complaint in Ms behalf, indicating his awareness that Nues in
not a registered lawyer. There is, therefore, added justification for the pleading to be
admitted rather than dismissed. As the lower court has cited:
So it has been held that, where a pleading is not signed by the attorney
as required, but is verified by the party, substantial rights have not been
affected and the defect may be disregarded as against a motion to strike.
(71 C.J.S. 954- 955)
Rules of pleading, practise, and procedure must be liberally construed so
as to protect the rights and interests of the ties. As we stated in Paulino v.
Court of Appeals (80 SCRA 257):
xxx xxx xxx
... pleadings, as well as remedial laws, should be construed liberally, in
order that litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective
claims, and that a possible denial of substantial justice, due to legal
technicalities, may be avoided. ...
The Torcinos try to impugn the results of the relocation survey. We agree with the
appellee that the appellants are now estopped on this issue because they themselves
prayed in the stipulation of facts that the findings of the geodetic engineer would be
bases for the decision of the court of first instance. We see no error, much less any grave
abuse of discretion, in the lower courts' findings that the house of the Torcinos
encroached on the lot of Victoriano Bulacan.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
7

G.R. No. 92349 November 9, 1990
MARIA LUISA ESTOESTA petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and GERRY R. GONZALES, Presiding Judge, MTC, Br. 76,
Marikina, respondents.
The legal effect of the appearance of a litigant in his own behalf is the focus of
controversy in this petition.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of slight physical injuries committed against Perla
Y. Corpuz in an information filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina, Metro
Manila. By the same token, on a countercharge of petitioner, Perla Y. Corpuz was
charged in an information for the same offense before the same court.
The cases were consolidated and after a joint trial on the merits where both parties were
duly represented by counsel, the trial court rendered a decision dated January 12, 1989
convicting the petitioner of the crime charged and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment
of arresto menor in its medium period of eleven (11) days to twenty (20) days but
acquitting Perla Y. Corpuz with costs de oficio in both cases.
Not satisfied therewith petitioner through counsel filed a notice of appeal within the
reglementary period to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig wherein in due course the
judgment appealed from was modified as to the penalty by imposing a straight penalty of
eleven (11) days imprisonment.
A motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for petitioner was denied by the Regional
Trial Court on August 30, 1989.
On September 20, 1989, petitioner, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the Court
of Appeals a motion for extension of time of thirty (30) days from September 30, 1989 or
up to October 19, 1989 within which to file a petition for review on the ground that she
has to look for another lawyer to represent her and prepare the necessary petition. The
motion was granted by the appellate court in a resolution dated October 16, 1989.
However, instead of filing the petition for review, petitioner in her own behalf filed on
October 9, 1989 a written manifestation and motion to withdraw petition for review for the
purpose of applying for probation in the court of origin, "she being a first offender and
possesses (sic) all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided for under
the said probation law." 1 The motion was granted by the appellate court in a resolution
dated October 24, 1989, copy of which was received by petitioner on October 30, 1989.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
The division clerk of court of the Court of Appeals made the entry of judgment on
October 25, 1989.
On November 17, 1989, the petitioner filed a joint or alternative motion for
reconsideration and reinstatement of petition for review and petition for relief from
judgment with prayer for a temporary restraining order based on the ground that the
motion to withdraw the petition for review was filed without the advice of her lawyer and
under the honest impression that her application for probation pending with the lower
court will be granted.
In a resolution dated February 20, 1990, the Court of Appeals denied the said motion for
lack of merit.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari with prayer for restraining order dated March
10, 1990 predicated on the following grounds:
I. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING
YOUR PETITIONER'S MOTION TO REINSTATE PETITION FOR
REVIEW IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE DOCTRINES ENUNCIATED
IN THE CASES OF DELGADO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 145 SCRA
357; REPUBLIC VS. ARRO, 150 SCRA 626 AND SILVESTRE VS.
MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 21, NO. L-46366, MARCH 8, 1978.
II. THE DENIAL OF YOUR PETITIONER'S MOTION TO REINSTATE
HER PETITION FOR REVIEW WOULD PERPETUATE THE SERIOUS
AND PATENT ERRORS COMMITTED BY THE LOWER COURT
ESPECIALLY AS TO THE ALLEGED OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE
WITNESSES' DEMEANOR WHEN THE JUDGE WHO PENNED THE
DECISION WAS NOT THE SAME JUDGE WHO HEARD THE
WITNESSES (WHO) TESTIFIED. 2
The petition is devoid of merit.
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice of the
peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally
8

or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar.
From the foregoing provision of the rule, it is clear that a party in a case may conduct a
litigation either personally or by an attorney in the courts. He may also be assisted by an
agent or friend for the purpose in the inferior courts. And even if a party may have
chosen to appear through counsel, he may at any time dispense with the services of
his/her lawyer and prosecute or defend his/her case personally.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
the testimony of the offended party corroborated by her witnesses and proof of the injury.
Such judgment has become final and petitioner must now face the reality of submitting
herself for its execution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

In this case the Court notes that before the Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional
Trial Court, the petitioner was duly represented by counsel. However, when she decided
to elevate her case to the Court of Appeals she chose to handle her case personally,
first, by asking for an extension of time within which to file a petition for review and
second, by filing thereafter a petition to withdraw the petition for review to enable her to
apply for probation. Unfortunately, under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1257 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1990 dated October 5, 1985, it is specifically
provided that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted when the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction."

Thus, as petitioner failed to secure favorable action on her application for probation, she
filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the appellate court granting her
motion to withdraw or in the alternative, a petition for relief from judgment alleging that
she was not duly assisted by counsel then and that she was under the honest impression
that she could apply for probation, and that if the motion is granted, petitioner could very
well demonstrate that the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses by the lower
court which was relied upon by the Regional Trial Court is misplaced as the one who
decided the case is different from the judge who heard the case.

The said alternative motion for reconsideration or petition for relief from judgment,
however, was filed only on November 17, 1989, beyond the reglementary period.
Petitioner received a copy of the questioned resolution dated October 24, 1989 on
October 30, 1989. Hence, said resolution had become final by the time petitioner filed
her motion. Besides, the alternative petition for relief from judgment is not accompanied
by an affidavit of merit as required by the rules. 3

The Court emphasizes the fact that it is always better for a party to be represented by
counsel in a litigation. Nevertheless, it is the right of such party to appear in his or her
own behalf to prosecute or defend a cause in court. If in the process petitioner suffered
reverses, she has only herself to blame. She is bound by the consequences of her own
voluntary act.

The judgment of conviction of the petitioner for slight physical injuries inflicted by the
petitioner upon the offended party was arrived at by the Regional Trial Court based on
9

G.R. No. L-32547 May 9, 1978
CONCHITA CORTEZ, ELENA CORTEZ, ROSENDO CORTEZ, JUDINA CORTEZ and
FERNANDO CORTEZ, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE
FELIX R. DOMINGO of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Manila, THE SHERIFF,
City of Manila, SPECIAL SHERIFF REYNALDO JAVIER, KUY GUAM KAY, LTD. and
MACARIO SUPAN Y MERCADO, respondents.
This case is about the propriety of the service of a decision of the Court of Appeals upon
appellants' lawyer, who that he had ceased to be their counsel but who was not
authorized to withdraw from the case.
The question is whether, after the had been remanded to the trial court and after a writ of
execution had been issued, the Court of Appeals could still set aside that decision on the
theory that it did not become final because it had not been properly served upon the
appellants.
1. On August 12, 1960, Judge E. Soriano of the Court of First Instance of Manila
rendered a decision ordering defendants Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. and Macario Supan to pay
solidarily the sum of four thousand pesos as damages to the plaintiffs, the heirs of
Severino Cortez (Civil Case No. 34092). The court found that, due to the driver's
negligence, a truck owned by Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. and driven by Macario Supan on
August 20, 1957, hit and killed Severino Cortez in Misericordia Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
2. Defendants Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. and Supan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-
G.R. No. 28400-R). During the pendency of that appeal Judge Luis B. Reyes of the Court
of First Instance of Manila in his decision dated June 12, 1961 in Case No. 41549
acquitted Supan of homicide through reckless imprudence.
3. Because of that acquittal Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. and Supan filed petition in the Court of
Appeals dated July 14, 1961 and March 26, 1966 to re-open Civil Case No. 34092 so
that the judgment of acquittal could be presented in evidence. The latter petition was
denied on June 15, 1966.
4. On November 17, 1969 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision the judgment of the
lower court in Civil Case No. 34092 with the modification that the amount of damages
was increased to P12,000. A copy of that decision was served on November 21, 1969 on
Atty. Joaquin C. Yuseco, the defendants-appellants' counsel of record. However, Atty.
Yuseco returned that copy and informed the Court by letter that he had ceased to be the
lawyer for defendants-appellants Supan and Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. The Court of Appeals
in its resolution of January 13, 1970 noted Yuseco's letter and made the observation that
Yuseco had "not filed any formal motion for the withdrawal of his appearance" in that
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
case. The Court of Appeals then sent copies of the decision to the defendant-appellants
themselves by registered mail but the copies were not delivered because they were
unclaimed.
5. Thereafter, there was an entry of judgment indicating that the decision of the Court of
Appeals became final and executory on December 8, 1969. The record was remanded
and was received in the lower court on March 25, 1970. Notices to that effect were sent
to Attys. Pacifica Garcia and Yuseco, the parties' counsels of record.
6. On May 30, 1970 a writ of execution was issued by the lower court. The Sheriff levied
upon five freight trucks and an adding machine owned by Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. He
scheduled the auction sale on June 26, 1970. Instead of guarding the trucks and adding
machine, the sheriff allowed the manager of the firm to have custody thereof so that they
could be used in the firms business. On June 26, two trucks and the adding machine
were turned over to the plaintiffs. The other three trucks were sequestered away by the
manager of defendant firm.
7. On June 23, 1970 defendant firm, through a new lawyer, filed in the Court of Appeals a
motion for reconsideration and suspension of execution. It alleged that there was no valid
service of the decision upon it; that the decision is contrary to the ruling in Corpus vs.
Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062 (that the acquittal of the accused of the
crime of homicide through reckless imprudence is a bar to the civil liability), and that the
increase of the damages from P4,000 to P12,000 was unwarranted since the plaintiffs
did not appeal
8. The Court of Appeals in its resolution of July 1, 1970 set aside the entry of judgment,
ordered the lower court to elevate the record of the case and required plaintiffs Cortez to
comment on the motion for reconsideration. The a opposed the motion. The record was
re-elevated to the Court of Appeals.
9. On August 18, 1970 the Court of Appeals issued a resolution setting aside its decision
of November 17, 1969 and damaging the complaint on the basis of the said ruling
in Corpus vs. Paje, supra. Plaintiffs' motion for the reconsideration of that decision was
denied.
10. On September 21, 1970, the plaintiffs filed the petition for certiorari the Court of Kuy
Guam Kay, Ltd. (which had been succeeded by Seven-O-Seven Trucking Co., Inc.) and
Macario Supan (who allegedly died in 1962, pp. 150 and 164 of Rollo). The petition is
really an appeal from the resolution of August 18, 1970. After the petitioners had posted
a bond in the sum of P500, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction dated
September 30, 1970 to restrain the enforcement of that resolution. Because of that
10
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
injunction, the petitioners retained the possession of the adding machine and the two substitution of attorney is effected. (Wack Wack Golf and Country Club, Inc. vs. Court of
trucks (p. 203, Rollo). Appeals, 106 Phil. 501, 504).

The petition is meritorious. We hold that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to set
aside on August 18, 1970 its decision of November 17, 1969 which had become final and
was in the process of being executed in the lower court to which the record was
remanded after entry of judgment had been made in the Court of Appeals.
The 1969 decision became final and executory as to defendant-appellant Kuy Guam
Kay, Ltd. because its lawyer of record, Atty. Yuseco, was duly served with a copy of that
decision. It is true that Atty. Yuseco returned that copy to the Court with the note that he
was no longer appellants' counsel but that return did not nullify the effectiveness of the
service upon him since he did not retire from the case with his client's consent or with the
Court's authorization (Sec. 2, Rule 13 and Sec. 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court; Don Lino
Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Alvendia, L-39124, November 15, 1974,
61 SCRA 87, 91; Magpayo vs. Court of Appeals and People, L-35966, November 19,
1974, 61 SCRA 115; Baquiran vs. Court of Appeals, 112 Phil. 764; Guanzon vs. Aragon,
107 Phil. 315, 320).
It is noteworthy that in the instant case even after Atty. Yuseco had returned to the Court
the copy of the decision served upon him, the Appellate Court and the lower court
continued to serve copies of orders and resolutions upon him as defendants' counsel of
record without any objection on his part. He was responsible for the conduct of the case
since he had not been properly relieved as counsel of record of the appellants (See U. S.
vs. Borromeo, 20 Phil. 189; Olivares and Colegio de San Jose vs. Leola, 97 Phil. 263,
257).
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated August 18, 1970 is reversed
and set aside with costs against respondent firm.
SO ORDERED.

When a party is represented by an attorney, service of orders and notices must be made
upon the latter, and notice to the client and not to his lawyer of record is not a notice in
law (Chairman vs. Tancinco, 90 Phil. 862).

Thus, it was held that, unless the procedure prescribed in section 26 of Rule 138 is
complied with, the attorney of record is regarded as the counsel who should be served
with copies of the judgments, orders and pleadings and who should be held responsible
for the conduct of the case (Fojas vs. Navarro, L-26365, April 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 476,
485).

"In order that there may be substitution of attorneys in a given case, there must be (1)
written application for substitution; (2) a written consent of the client, and (3) a written
consent of the attorney to be substituted. And in case the consent of the attorney to be
substituted cannot be obtained, there must at least be proof that notice of the motion for
substitution has been served upon him in the manner prescribed by our rules." Where
the procedure for substitution of attorney is not followed, the attorney who appears to be
on record before the filing of the application for substitution should be regarded as the
attorney entitled to be served with all notices and pleadings and the client is answerable
for the shortcomings of this counsel of record. (Ramos vs. Potenciano, 118 Phil. 1435).

The counsel of record is obligated to protect his clients interest until he is released from
his professional relationship with his client. For its part, the court could recognize no
other representation on behalf of the client except such counsel of record until a formal

11
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)

G.R. No. L-39958 May 11, 1978 5. That by virtue of the agreement, private respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini
JESUS D. JUREIDINI, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and NAZARIO does hereby renounce, repudiate, waive and quitclaim, now and moreover, in
CLARENCE JUREIDINI, represented by his mother LUZ RODRIGUEZ, respondents. favor of petitioner Jesus D. Jureidini whatever rights, interests, claims, title, and
participations he has in the estate, real personal and/or whatever nature, left by
Within the extended period for petitioner to file his brief in the above-entitled case, private the deceased Nazario S. Jureidini;
respondent, thru his counsel, Atty. Luisito Villanueva, simultaneously filed before this
Court, on August 5, 1976, an amicable compromise agreement and an appearance, both 6. The parties do hereby agree to waive, relinquish and abandon, whatever
dated August 2, 1976, furnishing a copy thereof to each of the counsel of record of claims and counterclaims they have against each other in the aforesaid cases.
petitioner, and to Attys. Estanislao A. Fernandez, Arroyo, Acsay, Barin and Ortile and
Sisenando Villaluz Law Office, Suit 804 JMT Bldg., Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila WHEREFORE, it is respectively prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance
counsel for private respondent (pp. 381, 383-385, rec.). The amicable compromise with this Amicable Compromise Agreement, without costs.
agreement which was signed by Nazario Clarence Jureidini, private respondent, assisted
by his counsel, Luisito S. Villanueva, and by Jesus D. Jureidini, petitioner, assisted by his At Oroquieta City (for Manila), August 2, 1976.
counsel, Conrado V. Sanchez and Felipe G. Tac-an, and verified under oath before Hon.
Melecio A. Genato, Presiding Judge, Branch 1, Court of First Instance of Misamis
(SGD) NAZARIO-CLARENCE JUREIDINI Private Respondent Plaridel. Misamis
Occidental at Oroquieta City, runs as follows:
Occidental
AMICABLE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
(SGD) JESUS D. JUREIDINI Petitioner Ozamis City
COME NOW the parties, assisted by their respective counsels, and to this
WITH OUR ASSISTANCE
Honorable Court, respectfully submit this AMICABLE COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT to be made as basis for the Decision in the above-entitled case, to
wit: (SGD) LUISITO S. VILLANUEVA
Counsel for Private Respondent
Calamba, Misamis Occidental
1. That private respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini is now of legal age and is
PTRNo. 3395909
not suffering from any incapacity to enter into a contract, and that he has entered
January 2, 1976
into this agreement in his own personal capacity,
Calamba, Mis. Occ.
TAN No. 2638380-2
2. That the parties have agreed to settle and terminate this case No. G.R. No. L-
39958 before this Honorable Court, including the case under CA-G.R. No.
CONRADO V. SANCHEZ
40441-R, Court of Appeals, and Civil Case No. OZ (118), Court of First Instance,
and
Branch II, Misamis Occidental;
FELIPE G. TAC-AN
Counsel for Petitioner
3. That for and in consideration of this amicable compromise agreement, the By:
parties have agreed that petitioner Jesus D. Jureidini shall pay, as in fact he has (SGD) FELIPE G, TAC-AN
already paid to private respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini the amount of ONE Oroquieta City
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), Philippine Currency; PTR No. 7791769 T-
Jan 13/76
4. That private respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini does hereby acknowledge Oroquieta City
receipt, to his entire satisfaction, of the aforesaid sum of ONE HUNDRED TAN No. 1556-436-2
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), Philippine Currency, from petitioner;

12

Acting on the aforequoted compromise agreement, Attys. Estanislao A. Fernandez,
Arroyo, Acsay, Barin and Ortile and Sisenando Villaluz Law Office, filed with this Court on
August 19, 1976, a manifestation and motion stating, among other things: (a) that the
appearance of Atty. Luisito S. Villanueva as counsel for respondent Nazario Clarence
Jureidini is without their knowledge and consent; and (b) that they have no knowledge
intervention or inkling of the amicable settlement executed by and between the petitioner
and aforesaid respondent, with prayer that they be given thirty (30) days from August 19,
1976 within which to file the necessary comment, pleading or motion with respect to said
amicable settlement, and pending the filing of such comment, any action on the
agreement be held in abeyance.
The Court, per Its resolution of September 1, 1976 required: (1) the movants to furnish
Atty. Villanueva with a copy of said manifestation and motion and to submit to this Court
proof of such service, both within five (5) days from notice thereof; and (2) Atty.
Villanueva to comment thereon within ten (10) days from receipt of said copy.
On October 5, 1976, Atty. Luisito S. Villanueva filed his comment to manifestation and
motion, stating among other things
2. That the private respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini sometime on August 2,
1976, engaged the legal services of the undersigned for the purpose of drafting,
preparing and participating in the execution of the amicable settlement which
said private respondent and the petitioner had already arrived at and concluded,
as a matter of fact, the monetary consideration mentioned in the Amicable
Compromise Agreement had already been paid prior to August 2, 1976, par. 3, of
the Amicable Compromise Agreement.
3. That the undersigned had inquired from the private respondent as to whether
his previous counsel or counsels has knowledge of the said settlement, and the
latter informed the former that he has not engaged and contracted the services of
any counsel at any time, however, he declared that his mother did, but their legal
services were already fully compensated, and that he further declared that he
wants and desires to engage a counsel of his own choice;
4. That having known the private respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini to be of
legal age and that he was not suffering from any incapacity to enter into a
contarct, and further knowing that the contract he will enter into is not contrary to
law, morals or public policy, the undersigned accepted the request of private
respondent to be his counsel in the execution of the said Amicable Compromise
Agreement and its consequent approval by this Honorable Court;
5. That consequently, on the same date of August 2, 1976, when the Amicable
Compromise Agreement was entered into by the parties in the City of Oroquieta,
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
the undersigned formally filed his appearance with this Honorable Court, with the
consent and authority of the private respondent as may be shown therein. ...
In reply to the foregoing comment of Atty. Luisito S. Villanueva, Attys. Estanislao
Fernandez, Arroyo, Acsay, Barin and Ortile filed on November 4, 1976 a motion to hold in
abeyance approval of the compromise agreement, stating among other things that the
compromise, agreement "is not only immoral and entered (into) in bad faith by petitioner
and private respondent but also patently unconscionable, inequitous and an unjust.
action to the prejudice of all the lawyers who had rendered legal services since 26 March
1976 and that even assuming Nazario Clarence Jureidini did not enter into any contract
with the attorneys of record, he (,cannot disregard the legal services rendered in his
behalf and for which he has wholly benefited," and praying further that a be appointed to
receive the evidence for attorney's fees and to approve. the same as charging lien on the
Testate Estate of Nazario Jureidini.
Considering the reply of Atty. Estanislao Fernandez, Arroyo, Acsay, Barin and Ortile to
the comment of Atty. Luisito S. Villanueva to the former's manifestation and motion dated
August 19, 1976, this Court in its Resolution dated November 10, 1976, required private
respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini at Plaridel, Misamis Occidental was returned to
this Court with the information that addressee is no longer residing at Plaridel, Misamis
Occidental. Accordingly this Court, in a resolution dated January 26, 1977, resolved;: (a)
to advise Atty. Estanislao Fernandez, et al. that The aforesaid respondent no longer
residing at his last known address; and (b) to require aforesaid counsel to inform this
Court within five (5,) days from notice, of the present address of aforesaid respondent
Nazario Clarence Jureidini. Complying with the immediately preceding resolution, Atty.
Estanislao Fernandez, et al. informed this Court that the present address of private
respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini is as follows:
Nazario Clarence Jureidini
c/o Luz Rodriguez
No. 339 Younger Street
Balut, Tondo, Manila
Acting on the compliance by counsel for respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini
aforesaid, this Court resolved on February 28, 1977, to send to respondent at the above
given address, the resolution of this Court dated November 10, 1976 requiring him to file
rejoinder to the reply of Atty. Estanislao Fernandez, et al.
13

For failure of private respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini to file a rejoinder to the reply
of Atty. Estanislao Fernandez, et al. to the comment of Atty. Luisito S. Villanueva to the
former's manifestation and motion dated August 19, 1976, within the period which
expired on March 19, 1976, the Court resolved on May 10, 1977 to require aforesaid
respondent; (a) to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for such failure;
and (b) to comply with the resolution of November 10, 1976 requiring said rejoinder, both
within ten (10) days from notice thereof.
For willful disregard of the resolution of this Court of May 20, 1977 which required private
respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court for having failed to file a rejoinder to the reply dated November 3, 1976
of Attys. Estanislao Fernandez, Arroyo, Acsay, Barin and Ortile and to comply with the
resolution of November 10, 1976 requiring said rejoinder both within the period which
expired on June 9, 1977, the Court adjudged said respondent Jureidini guilty of contempt
of court and ordered cell of the National Bureau of Investigation until he shall have
complied with this Court's resolutions. Forthwith, this Court issued on the same day an
"Order of Arrest and Commitment", commanding the Director, National Bureau of
Investigation, Taft Avenue Manila, "to arrest Nazario Clarence Jureidini who is said to be
found at No. 339 Younger Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila (c/o Luz Rodriguez) ... and to
commit him to the detention cell of the NBI where he shall be detained and safely kept
until he has fully complied with the resolutions of this Court... .
On January 12, 1978, Sr. NBI Agent Jesus S. Caragan of the National Bureau of
Investigation returned to this Court the order of arrest and commitment, UNSERVED,
with the information that subject cannot be located at the aforementioned address and
his present whereabouts are not known.
While this Court, in the meantime, was awaiting compliance by private respondent
Nazario Clarence Jureidini of the resolution of November 10, 1976, one Manuel T. Cortez
of Ozamis City filed before this Court a petition for intervention praying, inter-alia, that he
be allowed to intervene and file his claim against the private respondent for all his
financial aid extended to him during the pendency and prosecution of his claim in the trial
court and in the Court of Appeals againsts the Testate Estate of Nazario Jureidini; and
that the approval of petitioner's compromise agreement entered into with private
respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini, on March 7, 1974. Among other things, said
memorandum of agreement provides that to reimburse Cortez for the expenses incurred
to prosecute and defend the case including the professional fee of her lawyer together
with the interest charged thereon, the parties (petitioner and Luz Rodriguez) agreed that
in the event this case is finally terminated and won, Luz Rodriguez would pay Cortez:
ONE-HALF (1/2) PORTION OF THE TOTAL SHARE OF THE FIRST PARTY OF
THE MONIES, PROPERTIES AND ALL OTHER KINDS OR NATURE
WHATSOEVER ADJUDICATED TO THE FIRST PARTY, including damages
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
awarded and interests due thereon as based and computed in the final
promulgation of the decision in said Civil Case mentioned herein.
The question that now arise are:
1. May the rights of lawyers to the fees due them for vices rendered their client be
invoked as a ground for in abeyance the approval of a compromise agreement entered
into by the client and his adversary?
2. May a petition for intervention filed by an alleged financier of one of the parties litigants
in a case be en by this Court at this stage of the proceedings, and if so, may the
pendency thereof be invoked as a ground for holding in abeyance a compromise
agreement entered into by and between the parties litigants?
WE answer these questions in the negative.
1. The matter of attorney's fees, if any, due Attys. Estanislao Fernandez, Arroyo, Acsay,
Barin and Ortile from private respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini cannot have a
standing higher than the rights of the clients or the parties themselves. Hence, lawyers'
rights to fees from their clients may not be invoked by the lawyers themselves as a
ground for disapproving or otherwise. holding in abeyance the approval of the
compromise agreement, which is otherwise not contrary to law, morals-, public order or
public policy. The lawyers concerned can enforce their rights in the proper court in an
appropriate proceeding in accordance with the Rules of Court, but said rights may not be
used to prevent the approval of the compromise agreement (Jesalva, et al. vs. Hon.
Bautista and Premier Productions, Inc., 105 Phil. 348, 352).
2. With respect to the petition for intervention, We deny the same, not only because the
claim of the intervenor can be properly ventilated before the proper court in a separate
proceeding, but also because it will unduly delay and prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the parties litigants in the case at bar.
The compromise agreement hereinabove reproduced is not contrary to law, morals,
public order or public policy, and provides for the full satisfaction of respondent's claim
against the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, THE AMICABLE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT DATED AUGUST 12,
1976 IS HEREBY APPROVED, AND THE PARTIES ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO
ABIDE BY AND COMPLY WITH THE TERMS THEREOF.
THIS CASE IS HEREBY CLOSED AND TERMINATED. NO COSTS.
14
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)

15

G.R. No. 95026 October 4, 1991
SPOUSES PEDRO and ANGELINA TELAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
ROBERTO TELAN, and SPOUSES VICENTE and VIRGINIA TELAN, respondent.
This is a petition for review of the Resolution dated December 28, 1989 of the Court of
Appeals 1 which considered the appeal of the herein petitioner, spouses Pedro and
Angelina Telan (hereinafter PEDRO and ANGELINA), ABANDONED and DISMISSED,
for their failure to file an appeal brief within the reglementary period, pursuant to Section
I(f), Rule 50 of the Rules of the Court.
The only issue involved in this petition for review on certiorari is:
Whether or not the representation of the petitioner by a fake lawyer amounts to a
deprivation of his right to counsel and hence a lack of due process.
The circumstances under which the case arose are as follows:
The petitioner PEDRO is a retired government employee and high school graduate who
settled in 1973 on a property abutting the national highway in Guibang, Gamu, Isabela. 2
In 1977, when the government needed the land, PEDRO was compelled to transfer his
residence to the other side of the national highway on a lot owned by Luciano Sia where
he rented 750 square meters for P50.00 a month. 3
Because the lot was en route to the shrine of Our Lady of Guibang which was frequented
by pilgrims, PEDRO set up business enterprises such as a vulcanizing shop and an
eatery. Shortly thereafter, his cousins, the herein private respondents Roberto Telan and
Spouses Vicente and virginia Telan (hereinafter ROBERTO, VICENTE, and VIRGINIA),
followed suit by setting up their own eatery within the same lot. 4
On March 27, 1984, PEDRO and his spouses ANGELINA received a Notice to Vacate
from the Development Bank of the Philippine (DBP). This was followed by a letter from
VIRGINIA herself, reiterating the said demand. Apparently VICENTE and VIRGINIA had
executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with Sia over the said lot shared
by PEDRO and ANGELINA. 5
Soon, DBP as the mortgagee of Sia's lot, foreclosed the mortgage.
On June 7, 1984, the DBP and the Spouses VICENTE and VIRGINIA TELAN filed a suit
at the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela to evict PEDRO TELAN's family from the lot.
The case was dismissed.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
Meanwhile, on September 22, 1986, ROBERTO TELAN was able to secure a Certificate
of Title in his name over the contested lot. 6
With the new Transfer Certificate of Title, ROBERTO and the spouses VICENTE and
VIRGINIA filed a complaint denominated as Accion Publiciana against the petitioners,
Spouses PEDRO and ANGELINA. 7
At this point, PEDRO and ANGELINA hired the services of Atty. Antonio Paguiran to
defend them in the suit. 8
On October 27, 1988, the lower court awarded the possession of the property in question
to ROBERTO and Souses VICENTE and VIRGINIA TELAN.
PEDRO and ANGELINA informed Atty. Paguiran that they wanted to appeal the case, but
since Atty. Paguiran was disposed not to do so, PEDRO and ANGELINA asked another
person to sign for them. 9
In the course of their eatery business, petitioner ANGELINA TELAN became acquainted
with Ernesto Palma who represented himself to be a "lawyer." Having no counsel to
assist them in their appeal, Angelina asked "Atty. Palma" to handle their case. he
cosented and the petitioners paid his "lawyer's fees." 10
In the meantime, on August 5, 1988, PEDRO TELAN broke his hip while he was getting
off from a passenger jeepney. On September 5, 1988, unable to withstand the pain, he
went to the Philippine General Hospital for treatment where he was diagnosed to have a
"fractured, closed, complete, femoral neck garden type IV (R) femur." 11 On the spot, the doctors
recommended an operation.
Another operation followed on September 22, 1988. All the while, from September 5,
1988 up to October 2, 1988, PEDRO was confined a the PGH. He had to go back to
PGH several times for check-up even after was released from the hospital. 12
It was only by January 1990 that PEDRO managed to walk again although still with much
difficulty.
Meanwhile, on December 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution which
considered the appeal interposed by petitioners as abandoned and dismissed "for
failure ... to file an appeal brief within the reglementary period, pursuant to Section 1 (f),
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. 13
16

The petitioners were not aware of the dismissal of their appeal. They only came to know
about it on May 1990, when somebody in the Isabela Provincial Capitol at Ilagan
informed PEDRO TELAN immediately verified the facts. "Atty. Palma" could no longer be
found. PEDRO in verifying the existence of "Atty. Palma" in the Roll of Attorneys with the
Bar Confidant's Office. This was followed by the filing of Criminal Case No. 389-90 for
Estafa against "Atty. Palma." 15 By now PEDRO had realized that "Atty. Palma" was a
fake.
The Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated August 27, 1990 ruled as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be recalled that the instant appeal was dismissed only on December 28, 1989
(p. 13 rollo). Prior thereto, appellant's counsel received on July 25, 1989 this Court's
letter-notice dated July 14, 1989 requiring him to file the appellants' brief within forty-five
(45) days from receipt thereof. Per report dated October 185, 1989 of the brief, non has
yet been filed as of said date and hence, this Court issued a Resolution dated October
20, 1989 for appellants to show cause, within ten (10) days, why the appeal should not
be dismissed for failure to file the appellants' brief within the reglementary period. Hence
from July 25, 1989 when appellants' counsel received this Court's letter-notice to file brief
until the JRD's report on December 15, 1989 that no appellant's brief has been filed, a
period of about four (4) months and twenty-three (23) days have elapsed, thus giving
appellants enough to time to file their brief. Unfortunately, no appellants' brief was ever
filed during said period. Let it be stressed that the rules prescribing the time within which
certain acts must be done or certain proceedings taken are absolutely indispensable to
the prevention of needless delay and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business. (FJR Garment Industries v. CA, 130 SCRA 216, 218). 16
On January 24, 1990, the Resolution dated December 28, 1989 became final and was
entered on May 24, 1990 in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
On September 12, 1990, the presiding judge of the lower court issue the Writ of
Demolition for the enforcement of the decision. 17
The Petition for Review on certiorari before this Court was filed on October 18, 1990 by
the spouses PEDRO and ANGELINA TELAN with an Urgent Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction. 18
On October 24, 1990, after deliberating on the petition for review on certiorari, the Court
without giving due course required the respondents to COMMENT within ten (10) days
form notice thereof. At the same time, as prayed for, effective "immediately" and
"continuing until further orders from this Court", a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
was issued enjoining the respondents from enforcing the Order dated September 12,
1990 issued in Civil Case No. 279.
In due time, after the filing of the necessary pleadings, the petition was given due course
and the parties were ordered to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda. The
petitioners filed their memorandum while the private respondents manifested to adopt
their Comments dated November 5, 1990. However, after the filing of the petitioners'
memorandum, the private respondents filed on June 10, 1991, a pleading they
denominated as Addendum. Apparently, changing their minds, on July 23, 1991, the
private respondents filed their memorandum.
We rule for the petitioners. We hold that they had not been accorded due process of law
because they lost their to appeal when deprived of the right to counsel.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitutional provides:
xxx xxx xxx
No person shall be deprived of life, or property, without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.
The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, 19 specially
so when as a consequence, life, liberty, or property is subjected to restraint or in danger
of loss.
In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar
is immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process. Thus, even if the
judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused
afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel. 20
There is no reason why the rule in criminal cases has to be different from that in civil
cases. The preeminent right to due process of law applies not only to life and liberty but
also to property. There can be no fair hearing unless a party, who is in danger of losing
his house in which he and his family live and in which he has established a modest
means of livelihood, is given the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
Even the most experienced lawyers ge tangled in the web of procedure. To demand as
much form ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn
the legal system into a intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of
his property rights not because he has no right to the property but because he does not
know how to establish such right.
17
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case of
an on-going litigation, it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way, with
the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company.

No arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the right
to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit
of the appeal.

This is the reason why under ordinary circumstances, a lawyer can not simply refuse
anyone the counsel that only the exercise of his office can impart. 21

Curiously, the counsel of the private respondents, ROBERTO TELAN and spouses
VICENTE and VIRGINIA, would still insist that the petitioners, spouses PEDRO and
ANGELINA TELAN, had lost their right to appeal because of the negligence of their
counsel, referring to "Atty. Palma."

A client is generally bound by the action of his counsel in the management of a litigation
even by the attorney's mistake or negligence in procedural technique. 22 But how can
there be negligence by the counsel in the case at bar when the "lawyer", "Atty. Palma,"
turned out to be fake? The Affidavit of the petitioner PEDRO TELAN, the sworn Petition,
the Certifications of the Bar Confidant's Office and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the submitted records of Criminal Case No. 389-90 more than sufficiently establish
the existence of an Ernesto Palma who misrepresented himself as a lawyer. 23

WHEREFORE, the Petitioner is GRANTED; the proceedings in CA-G.R CV No. 20786

are hereby REINSTATED and the respondent Court of Appeals is ordered to give DUE
COURSE to the appeal and to decide the same on the merits.

SO ORDERED.

18

G.R. No. 129718 August 17, 1998
SANTO TOMAS UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, petitioner, vs. CESAR ANTONIO Y. SURLA
and EVANGELINE SURLA, respondents.
Can a compulsory counterclaim pleaded in an Answer be dismissed on the ground of a
failure to accompany it with a certificate of non-forum shopping? This question is the core
issue presented for resolution in the instant petition.
First, a factual background.
On 26 December 1995, respondent spouses filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner Santo Tomas University Hospital with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
predicated on an allegation by the spouses that their son, Emmanuel Cesar Surla, while
confined at the said hospital for having been born prematurely, had accidentally fallen
from his incubator on 16 April 1995 possibly causing serious harm on the child. The case
was raffled and assigned to Branch 226 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
presided over by the Hon. Leah S. Domingo-Regala, and there docketed Civil Case No.
Q-95-25977.
On 28 February 1996, petitioner hospital filed its Answer with "Compulsory Counterclaim"
asserting that respondents still owed to it the amount of P82,632.10 representing hospital
bills for Emmanuel's confinement at the hospital and making a claim for moral and
exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees, by reason of the supposed unfounded and
malicious suit filed against it.
On 21 March 1996, petitioner received a copy of respondents' Reply to Counterclaim,
dated 12 March 1996, that sought, inter alia, the dismissal of petitioner's counterclaim for
its non-compliance with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring that a
complaint and other initiatory pleadings, such as a counterclaim, cross-claim, third
(fourth, etc.) party complaint, be accompanied with a certificate of non-forum shopping.
In its Rejoinder to respondents' Reply to Counterclaim, petitioner contended that the
subject circular should be held to refer only to a permissive counterclaim, an initiatory
pleading not arising out of, nor necessarily connected with, the subject matter of the
plaintiffs claim but not to a compulsory counterclaim spawned by the filing of a complaint
and so intertwined therewith and logically related thereto that it verily could not stand for
independent adjudication. Petitioner concluded that, since its counterclaim was
compulsory in nature, the subject circular did not perforce apply to it. 1
In its Order of 22 March 1996, the trial court dismissed petitioner's counterclaim; it held:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 provides; among others:
The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of
this Circular are the original civil complaint, counterclaim, crossclaim,
third (fourth, etc.) party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention, petition or
application wherein a party asserts his claim on (sic) relief.
It will be noted that the counterclaim does not distinguish whether the same
should be permissive or compulsory, hence this Court finds that the counterclaim
referred to in said Circular covers both kinds.
WHEREFORE, the counterclaim of defendant is hereby DISMISSED. Let the
pre-trial of this case be set on May 14, 1996 at 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon . . . . 2
On 16 April 1996, petitioner filed before the same court an Omnibus Motion seeking a
clarification of the court's Order of 14 March 1996 denying respondents' Reply to
Counterclaim and a reconsideration of the 22nd March 1996 Order dismissing the
compulsory counterclaim. 3 On 22 April 1996, petitioner received a copy of the court's Order,
dated 16 April 1996, which pertinently read:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated March 14, 1996 is hereby clarified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The Reply to counterclaim filed by counsel for plaintiffs is hereby NOTED.
SO ORDERED.
The Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Order dated March 22, 1996 is
hereby DENIED. The pre-trial conference set on May 14, 1998 will go on as
scheduled. 4
Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court, asseverating grave abuse of discretion
by public respondent in dismissing the compulsory counterclaim and in espousing the view
that Administrative Circular No. 04-94 should apply even to compulsory counterclaims.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision promulgated on 12 March 1997, dismissed the
petition for certiorari; it opined:
19

. . . the Supreme Court circular aforequoted requires without equivocation that to
the original civil complaint, counterclaim, crossclaim, third (fourth, etc.) party
complaint, or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or application wherein a party
asserts his claim for relief to be filed in all courts and agencies other than the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals must be annexed and simultaneously
filed therewith the required certification under oath to avoid forum shopping or
multiple filing of petitions and complaints. Non-compliance therewith is a cause
for the dismissal of the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading.
Included in such initiatory pleading is the defendant's counterclaim, permissive or
compulsory.
A counterclaim partakes of the nature of a complaint and/or a cause of action
against the plaintiff in a case . . ., only this time it is the original defendant who
becomes the plaintiff. It stands on the same footing and is tested by the same
rules as if it were an independent action. 5
In its present recourse, petitioner contends that
The Court of Appeals (has) committed serious, evident and palpable error in
ruling that:
5.1 THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT IS UNAVAILING. THE DISMISSAL OF THE
COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM BEING A FINAL ORDER, THE PETITIONER
SHOULD HAVE TAKEN AN APPEAL THEREFROM; AND
5.2 ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 OF THIS HONORABLE COURT
LIKEWISE APPLIES TO BOTH KINDS OF COUNTERCLAIMS, PERMISSIVE
AND COMPULSORY. 6
The petition is partly meritorious.
The appellate court ruled that the dismissal of the counterclaim, being a final order,
petitioner's remedy was to appeal therefrom and, such appeal being then available, the
special civil action of certiorari had been improperly filed.
The concept of a final judgment or order, distinguished from an interlocutory issuance, is
that the former decisively puts to a close, or disposes of, a case or a disputed issue
leaving nothing else to be done by the court in respect thereto. Once that judgment or
order is rendered, the adjudicative task of the court is likewise ended on the particular
matter involved. 7 An order is interlocutory, upon the other hand, if its effects would only be
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
provisional in character and would still leave substantial proceedings to be further had by the
issuing court in order to put the controversy to rest. 8
The order of the trial court dismissing petitioner's counterclaim was a final order since the
dismissal, although based on a technicality, would require nothing else to be done by the
court with respect to that specific subject except only to await the possible filing during the
reglementary period of a motion for reconsideration or the taking of an appeal therefrom.
As a rule, errors of judgment, as well as of procedure, neither relating to the jurisdiction
of the court nor involving grave abuse of discretion, are not reviewable by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. 9 As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction and does
not gravely abuse its discretion in the exercise thereof, any supposed error committed by it
will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment reviewable by a timely appeal and not
assailable by a special civil action of certiorari. 10 This rule, however, is not a rigid and
inflexible technicality. This Court has not too infrequently given due course to a petition
for certiorari, even when the proper remedy would have been an appeal, where valid and
compelling considerations could warrant such a recourse. 11 Certiorari has been deemed to
be justified, for instance, in order to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party where
the trial judge has capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, or where there may
be danger of clear failure of justice, or where an ordinary appeal would simply be inadequate
to relieve a party from the injurious effects of the judgment complained of. 12
In the case at bar, an appeal from the dismissal of the counterclaim, although not totally
unavailable, could have well been ineffective, if not futile, as far as petitioner is concerned
since no single piece of evidence has yet been presented by it, that opportunity having been
foreclosed by the trial court, on the dismissed counterclaim which could form part of the
records to be reviewed by the appellate court. The object of procedural law is not to cause an
undue protraction of the litigation, but to facilitate the adjudication of conflicting claims and to
serve, rather than to defeat, the ends of justice. 13
The opinion of this Court on the next issue persuades it to accept, tested by the foregoing
disquisition, the instant petition for its consideration.
The pertinent provisions of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 provide:
1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the
complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath
in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertakings:
(a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action or proceeding involving
the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding
is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency; (c) if there is any such action or proceeding which is either pending or
20

may have been terminated, he must state the status thereof; and (d) if he should
thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending
before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency,
he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or
agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification contemplated here
have been filed.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby modified in that the claim for moral,
exemplary damages and attorney's fees in Civil Case No. Q-95-25977 of petitioner is
ordered reinstated. The temporary restraining order priorly issued by this Court is lifted.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of this
Circular are the original civil complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim third (fourth,
etc.) party complaint or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or application
wherein a party asserts his claim for relief. (Emphasis supplied)

It bears stressing, once again, that the real office of Administrative Circular No. 04-94,
made effective on 01 April 1994, is to curb the malpractice commonly referred to also as
forum-shopping. It is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been
rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another
forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two
or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one
or the other court would make a favorable disposition. 14 The language of the circular
distinctly suggests that it is primarily intended to cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient
application of a party asserting a claim for relief. 15

It should not be too difficult, the foregoing rationale of the circular aptly taken, to sustain the
view that the circular in question has not, in fact, been contemplated to include a kind of claim
which, by its very nature as being auxiliary to the proceedings in the suit and as deriving its
substantive and jurisdictional support therefrom, can only be appropriately pleaded in the
answer and not remain outstanding for independent resolution except by the court where the
main case pends. Prescinding from the foregoing, the proviso in the second paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 8, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, i.e., that the violation of the anti-
forum shopping rule "shall not be curable by mere amendment . . . but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice," being predicated on the applicability of the need for
a certification against forum shopping, obviously does not include a claim which cannot be
independently set up.

Petitioner, nevertheless, is entitled to a mere partial relief. The so-called "counterclaim"

of petitioner really consists of two segregative parts: (1) for unpaid hospital bills of
respondents' son, Emmanuel Surla, in the total amount of P82,032.10; and (2) for
damages, moral and exemplary, plus attorney's fees by reason of the alleged malicious
and unfounded suit filed against it. 16 It is the second, not the first, claim that the Court here
refers to as not being initiatory in character and thereby not covered by the provisions of
Administrative Circular No. 04-94.

21

G.R. No. 116910 October 18, 1995
INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., ET AL., petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANGEL V. COLET, MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, ET
AL., respondents.
Material hereto are the antecedents mostly taken from the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP 33177, (International Container Terminal Services,
Inc., et. al. v. Hon. Angel V. Colet, et. al.), 1 subject of the present petition for review, viz:
On February 3, 1988, the Philippine Ports Authority issued Administrative Order No. 02-
88 (A.O. No. 02-88) entitled "Implementing Guidelines on Open Pilotage Service". A.O.
No. 02-88 opened pilotage services in the Philippines to all licensed and accredited
harbor pilots regardless of their non-membership in existing harbor pilots association. 2
The United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
"United Harbor" for brevity) and private respondent Manila Pilots Association (hereinafter
referred to as "Manila Pilots") 3 made representations with then Acting Secretary of
Transportation and Communications, Hon. Rainerio O. Reyes and the Chairman of the
Philippine Ports Authority to set aside the implementation of A.O. No. 02-88 claiming that it
violated their exclusive right to provide pilotage services in the Philippines.
Failing in their efforts to obtain a reconsideration of the said administrative order, "United
Harbor" and private respondent "Manila Pilots" sought to invalidate A.O. No. 02-88 by
filing with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a temporary restraining order against Secretary Reyes, the Philippine Ports
Authority, its General Manager, Maximo S. Dumlao, Jr. and certain "John Does" (Civil
Case No. 88-44726).
On October 26, 1989, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 88-
44726 in favor of "United Harbor" and private respondent "Manila Pilots", the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for all of the foregoing, the petition is hereby granted:
1. Respondents are hereby declared to have acted in excess of jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in approving
Resolution No. 869 and in enacting Administrative Order No. 02-88, the subject
of which is "Implementing Guidelines or (sic) Open Pilotage Service;
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
2. Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 02-88 is declared null and
void;
3. The preliminary injunction issued on September 8, 1989 is made permanent;
and
4. Without costs.
SO ORDERED. 4
The above decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari and
prohibition which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as it raised a purely legal
question. 5 The dismissal was appealed to this court by way of a petition for review
on certiorari which was denied with finality on June 8, 1992. 6 Notwithstanding the finality of
the decision recognizing the exclusive right to pilotage of "United Harbor" and private
respondent "Manila Pilots", petitioner "International Container" took over the pilotage services
at the Manila International Port area 7 on October 28, 1992 by virtue of a contract it entered
into with the Philippine Ports Authority.
As a consequence, "United Harbor" and private respondent "Manila Pilots" filed a series
of petitions in Civil Case No. 88-44726 to hold then Philippine Ports Authority General
Manager Rogelio A. Dayan and "International Container" officials and other persons in
contempt of court. The contempt petitions, however, have not been resolved because the
Office of the Solicitor General elevated to the Supreme Court (docketed as G.R. 107720)
the question of whether or not the lower court still had jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the petitions for contempt in view of the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 88-
44726.
Pending resolution of the contempt petitions, private respondent "Manila Pilots" filed
another case against petitioner "International Container" before Branch 32 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 93-66024 for damages
suffered by private respondent "Manila Pilots" between April 19, 1993 and April 29, 1993
as a result of petitioner's usurpation of its sole and exclusive exercise of harbor pilotage
in the South and North Harbors of Manila and Limay, Bataan, except the Manila
International Port area. 8
Similarly, aggrieved by the unjust actuations of petitioner "International Container", and
its continuing refusal to relinquish pilotage services in the Manila International Port area,
private respondent "Manila Pilots" instituted a petition for mandamus, prohibition with
22

preliminary mandatory injunction and damages against petitioner "International
Container" before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila docketed as Civil Case
No. 66143.
In an Order dated January 20, 1994, the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 93-66143
issued the writ prayed for, thereby "restoring and reinstating private respondent "Manila
Pilots" to the exclusive exercise of harbor pilotage in the Manila International Port (MIP)
area and commanding petitioner "International Container" to cease and desist from
usurping or exercising the right to compulsory pilotage in the said Manila International
Port (MIP) area." 9Petitioner "International Container" assailed this order of the lower court by
filing a petition for certiorari with respondent court contending, among others, that the filing of
Civil Case No. 93-66143, pending:
1.) Contempt petitions incidents of Civil Case No.
88-44726 The contempt petitions filed by "United Harbor" and private
respondent "Manila Pilots" against petitioner "International Container" and
Philippine Ports Authority for defying the final judgment in Civil Case No. 88-
44726;
2.) G.R. No. 107720 The case filed by the Office of the Solicitor General with
the Supreme Court raising the question of jurisdiction of the lower court to take
cognizance of the contempt petitions in view of the finality of the decision in Civil
Case No. 88-44726; and
3.) Civil Case No. 93-66024 The action for damages filed by private
respondent "Manila Pilots" against "International Container" to recover unearned
income from the exercise of harbor pilotage in ports other than the Manila
International Port (MIP) area from April 19, 1993 to April 29, 1993 was violative of
the prohibition against forum shopping. 10 Respondent court found no merit in this
contention, and affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Hence, the main inquiry posed before us: On the basis of the foregoing, is there forum
shopping?
Petitioner "International Container" contends that there is forum shopping because "[t]he
issue on (sic) the contempt petition before Judge Flojo 11 and before this Court and (sic) in
G.R. No. 107720 is the very same issue involved in the case for mandamus and prohibition
(Civil Case No. 93-66143)". 12 It further contends that private respondent "Manila Pilots" is
guilty of forum shopping because "[a]t the time the contempt petitions were pending . . . and
while these petitions were being challenged . . . (G.R. No. 107720), another case . . . was
pending before RTC Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 93-66024 . . ." 13
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
We are not persuaded.
The assailed decision is in accordance with the established rule that for forum shopping
to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, same essential facts and
circumstances. 14 Furthermore, the actions must also raise identical causes of action, subject
matter, and issues. 15 We find no such similarity in the actions involved. Thus, as correctly
observed by the respondent court:
The facts which gave rise to the contempt petition is directed against what was
perceived to be violative of the permanent injunction issued by Judge Flojo not to
implement the open pilotage policy as provided for under PPA Administrative
Order No. 02-88, . . . .
Upon the other hand the complaint in Civil Case No. 93-68143 (sic) is anchored
on the alleged usurpation of the right of respondents on (sic) the sole and
exclusive exercise of Harbor Pilotage only in the MIP area, from October 29,
1992 up to the present and the corresponding claim for damages. 16 (Emphasis
provided)
Furthermore, G.R. No. 107720 was filed with the Supreme Court solely to question the
jurisdiction of the lower court to take cognizance of the contempt petitions filed in Civil
Case No. 88-44726, and the issue raised therein has no bearing on that raised in Civil
Case No. 93-66143.
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 93-66024 sought the recovery of damages in the form
of unearned income as a result of petitioner's usurpation of the right to pilotage of private
respondent "Manila Pilots" in the South and North Harbors of Manila and Limay,
Bataan except Manila International Port area from April 19, 1993 to April 29, 1993 while
Civil Case No. 93-66143 was brought to enjoin petitioner from further usurping the same
right of private respondent "Manila Pilots" in the Manila International Port area only from
October 28, 1992 up to the present. Clearly, these two cases do not have the same facts
nor do they raise identical causes of action.
Moreover, "[t]here is forum shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another". 17 Therefore, a party to a case resorts to forum shopping because "[b]y filing
another petition involving the same essential facts and circumstances, . . ., respondents
approached two different fora in order to increase their chances of obtaining a favorable
decision or action". 18 It cannot be said that private respondent "Manila Pilots" sought to
increase its chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action as a result of an adverse
opinion in one forum, inasmuch as no unfavorable decision had ever been rendered against
23
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
private respondent "Manila Pilots" in any of the cases brought before the courts below. On the
contrary, private respondent "Manila Pilots" was one of the prevailing parties in Civil Case No.
88-44726 which established with finality its exclusive right together with "United Harbor" to
provide pilotage services in the Philippines even prior to the institution of the other actions
(G.R.107720, Civil Case No. 93-66024 and Civil Case No. 93-66143.)

ACCORDINGLY, finding no reversible errors, the decision appealed from is hereby

AFFIRMED and this petition is DENIED.

24

G.R. No. 89431 April 25, 1990
ERIBERTO G. VALENCIA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. CARLOS
C. OFILADA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Branch XL, Third
Judicial Region, Deputy Sheriff PABLO R. GLORIOSO, MIGUEL BUNYE and
RICARDO BAGTAS, respondents.
For review is the resolution of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on June 20, 1989 in
1
CA-G.R. SP No. 17374, which dismissed the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus filed by petitioner assailing the order of respondent judge granting a writ
of execution pending appeal, and the resolution of said respondent court, dated August
9, 1989, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal.
The record shows that on July 6, 1984, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 7554-M of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch XL at Malolos, Bulacan, for the rescission of a lease
contract over a 24 hectare fishpond in Paombong, Bulacan, with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against private respondents. Private respondents filed
2
an answer with a counterclaim for damages.
During the pendency of the case, as found by the trial court, the lease contract expired
and the defendants therein peacefully surrendered the fishpond to therein plaintiff.
Consequently, in its decision dated November 29, 1988, the court a quo declared that the
plaintiff's prayer for rescission of contract had become moot and academic and the only
remaining issue for adjudication was the matter of damages claimed by the defendants.
On that score, the trial court awarded P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00
as exemplary damages to each defendant and further ordered plaintiff to pay P30,000.00
as attorney's fees, aside from the costs of suit.
3
Petitioner claims that defendant Bagtas acknowledged in writing his receipt of a copy of
said decision on January 3, 1989. On the other hand, petitioner received a copy of the
decision on January 10, 1989, and filed a notice of appeal on January 16, 1989. On the
4
same day, respondent judge issued an order that said notice of appeal be "given due
course" and directing that the records of the case be forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
5
On January 17, 1989, private respondents filed a motion for execution pending appeal,
alleging that:
2. Under Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court a writ of execution may be
issued to enforce a judgment before the expiration of the period to appeal upon
showing good reasons. In the cases of Hacienda Navarro, Inc. vs. Labrador, et
al., 65 Phil. 536; The People's Bank and Trust Company vs. San Juan, et al., L-
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
7692, April 27, 1955; and Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, May 23, 1953, it has
already been held that the filing of the bond by the successful party is a good
reason for ordering execution. (Cited in Moran, Rules of Court, Volume 2, 1979
edition, Page 256)
3. Pursuant to said Section 2 of Rule 39 and the jurisprudence on the matter,
defendant is now moving that a writ of execution be issued pending appeal to
enforce judgment of this Honorable Court and for this purpose hereby offers to
post a bond in such amount that this Honorable Court may deem adequate to
answer for all damages that the plaintiff may suffer by reason of the execution
prayed for. 6
On March 6, 1989, respondent judge, over the opposition filed by herein petitioner,
issued an order granting the motion for execution pending appeal, the defendants
7
having filed a bond in the amount of P330,000.00 posted by the Domestic Insurance
Company of the Philippines. It also granted a period up to April 27, 1989 within which
8
the plaintiff may "file a counterbond to stay the implementation of the Writ of Execution to
be issued."
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof was denied by the trial court in its order
dated April 6, 1989, on the ground that "an offer of a bond for immediate execution of
judgment is a good ground for execution pending appeal" and "execution pending appeal
may be granted as long as movant files a good and sufficient surety." 9
On April 10, 1989, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued by the trial
court. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the
10
Court of Appeals on the following grounds reproduced in the decision of said respondent
court, to wit:
THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, UPON THE PERFECTION OF THE
APPEAL FROM THE DECISION RENDERED ON NOVEMBER 29, 1988 IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 7554-M, A COPY THEREOF HAVING BEEN RECEIVED BY
BUNYE AND BAGTAS ON JANUARY 3, 1989, AS INDICATED ON THE
RECORDS OF SAID CASE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BULACAN BRANCH XV
(15), THIRD JUDICIAL REGION, LOST JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
(AQUINO V. SANTIAGO, G.R. NO. 56362, 28 MAY 1988) AND ACCORDINGLY,
NO LONGER HAD ANY JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN BUNYE'S AND
BAGTAS' MOTION FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL, LET ALONE TO
ISSUE A WRIT OF EXECUTION.
25

CONSIDERING THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF THE RULE GOVERNING
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL IN RELATION TO THE SETTLED
DECISIONAL LAW DEFINING THE ESSENTIAL REQUISITES, STATING THAT
MERE FILING OF A BOND DOES NOT SUFFICE ABSENT OF (sic) A
SHOWING OF SUPERIOR CIRCUMSTANCES DEMANDING URGENCY
WHICH WILL OUTWEIGH THE INJURY OR DAMAGES SHOULD THE LOSING
PARTY SECURE A REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT, AND RULING THAT A
TRIAL COURT EXCEEDS THE LIMITS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHERE IT
ORDERS ADVANCE OF (sic) EXECUTION OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES,
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.
INSTEAD, RESPONDENT JUDGMENT (sic) SHOULD HAVE IMPLEMENTED
HIS ORDER GIVING DUE COURSE TO VALENCIA'S APPEAL AND
DIRECTING THE RECORDS OF CIVIL CASE NO. 7554-M FORWARDED TO
THIS COURT. 11
As stated at the outset, respondent Court of Appeals dismissed said petition and refused
to reconsider such dismissal, eventuating in petitioner's appeal to us. In our resolution of
August 28, 1989, we issued a temporary restraining order against respondents.
We are not persuaded by the first and third grounds invoked by petitioner. Under the
present procedure, an appeal is perfected upon the expiration of the last day to appeal
by any party. It is not perfected on the date the notice of appeal was filed. In the
12 13
present case, the defendants had up to January 18, 1989 within which to appeal and the
plaintiff had up to January 25, 1989. The motion for execution was filed by defendants on
January 17, 1989, before the expiration of the last day to appeal by any of the parties.
The fact that plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on January 16, 1989 did not, as already
stated, result in the perfection of the appeal. Despite plaintiff's having filed his notice of
appeal, defendants, had they been so minded, could still have availed of the right, up to
their last day to appeal which was January 18, 1989, to also file their notice of appeal or
to file a motion for new trial or to move for execution as in fact they did, since plaintiff s
appeal had not yet been perfected. That respondent judge gave "due course" to plaintiffs
notice of appeal, on the same date when it was filed on January 16, 1989, is
inconsequential. Both under the former and present procedural governance on appeals,
a notice of appeal does not require the approval of the trial court, and its act of giving
14
"due course" thereto, or seeming approval thereof, does not affect the rule as to when an
appeal is deemed perfected.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
Petitioner's second ground, however, commends itself as a meritorious submission. It is
concordant with our present doctrinal pronouncements and must be sustained.
Conformably with Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in order that there may be a
discretionary issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal the following requisites must
be satisfied: (a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse
party; (b) There must be a good reason for issuing the writ of execution; and (c) The
good reason must be stated in a special order. 15
In the case at bar, the ground relied upon by the trial court in allowing the immediate
execution, as stated in its order of March 20, 1989, is the filing of a bond by private
respondents. The rule is now settled that the mere filing of a bond by the successful
party is not a good reason for ordering execution pending appeal, as clarified in Roxas
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., which we are constrained to quote for the benefit of the
16
parties:
It is not intended obviously that execution pending appeal shall issue as a matter
of course. Good reasons, special, important, pressing reasons must exist to
justify it; otherwise, instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice, it may well
become a tool of oppression and inequity. But to consider the mere posting of a
bond a "good reason" would precisely make immediate execution of a judgment
pending appeal routinary, the rule rather than the exception. Judgments would be
executed immediately, as a matter of course, once rendered, if all that the
prevailing party needed to do was to post a bond to answer for the damages that
might result therefrom. This is a situation, to repeat, neither contemplated nor
intended by law.
The exercise of the power to grant or deny immediate or advance execution is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court. However, the existence of good reasons is
17
principally what confers such discretionary power. Absent any such good reason, the
special order of execution must be struck down for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion. The Court has had the occasion to explain the importance of such
requirement for good reasons, thus:
. . . If the judgment is executed and, on appeal, the same is reversed, although
there are provisions for restitution, oftentimes damages may arise which cannot
be fully compensated. Accordingly, execution should be granted only when these
considerations are clearly outweighed by superior circumstances demanding
urgency and the provision contained in Rule 39, Section 2, requires a statement
of these circumstances as a security for their existence. 18
26

The courts look with disfavor upon any attempt to execute a judgment which has not
acquired a final character. Section 2 of Rule 39 which authorizes the discretionary
execution of judgments, being an exception to the general rule, must be restrictively
construed. It would not be a sound rule to allow indiscriminately the execution of a
money judgment, even if there is a sufficient bond.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
the judgment does not bar the certiorari action filed in respondent court as the appeal
could not be an adequate remedy from such premature execution.
That petitioner could have resorted to a supersedeas bond to prevent execution pending
appeal, as suggested by the two lower courts, is not to be held against him. The filing of
such bond does not entitle him to the suspension of execution as a matter of right. It 21

Moreover, we likewise further reproduce what we said in Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) vs. Lantin, et al. that awards for moral and exemplary damages
19
cannot be the subject of execution pending appeal, under the following rationale:
cannot, therefore, be categorically considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Hence, no rule requires a losing party so circumstances to adopt such remedy in lieu or
before availment of other remedial options at hand.

. . . The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is dependent
on the outcome of the main case. Unlike actual damages for which the
petitioners may clearly be held liable if they breach a specific contract and the
amounts of which are fixed and certain, liabilities with respect to moral and
exemplary damages as well as the exact amounts remain uncertain and
indefinite pending resolution by the Intermediate Appellate Court and eventually
the Supreme Court. The existence of the factual bases of these types of
damages and their causal relation to the petitioners' act will have to be
determined in the light of the assignments of errors on appeal. It is possible that
the petitioners, after all, while liable for actual damages may not be liable for
moral and exemplary damages. Or as in some cases elevated to the Supreme
Court, the awards may be reduced.
Anent the issue of the propriety of a special civil action for certiorari to assail an order for
execution pending appeal, we have ruled in Jaca et al. vs. Davao Lumber Company, et
al. that:
20
Furthermore, a rational interpretation of Section 3, Rule 39 should be that the
requirement for a supersedeas bond presupposes that the case presents a
presumptively valid occasion for discretionary execution. Otherwise, even if no good
reason exists to warrant advance execution, the prevailing party could unjustly compel
the losing party to post a supersedeas bond through the simple expedient of filing a
motion for, and the trial court improvidently granting, a writ of execution pending appeal
although the situation is violative of Section 2, Rule 39. This could not have been the
intendment of the rule, hence we give our imprimatur to the propriety of petitioner's
action for certiorari in respondent court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the assailed resolutions of respondent Court
of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of execution issued by the
trial court pursuant to its order of March 20, 1989 is hereby ANNULLED. The temporary
restraining order heretofore issued against the said order and writ is hereby made
permanent.

SO ORDERED.
. . . Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special
civil action of certiorari may only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the (ordinary) course of law," this rule is
not without exception. The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not
constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy or
equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy not the mere
absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without
the writ that usually determines the propriety of certiorari.

Thus, we held therein, and we so reiterate for purposes of the case at bar,
that certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending appeal where the same is
not founded upon good reasons. Also, the fact that the losing party had appealed from

27

G.R. No. 134468 August 29, 2002
NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FORMER
FIFTH DIVISION, RENE OFRENEO, in his capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, and
NSC-HDCTC MONTHLY-DAILY EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION-FFW, respondents.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated November 25,
19971 which dismissed National Steel Corporations petition for review on the ground that
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping were signed not by the petitioner
but by its counsel of record, as well as the subsequent Resolution dated July 2,
19982 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
In December of 1993, a dispute arose between petitioner National Steel Corporation
(NSC) and respondent NSC-HDCTC Monthly/Daily Employees Organization-FFW
(union) regarding the grant of Productivity and Quality Bonus and the Fiscal Year-End
Incentive Award in the company. Both parties agreed to submit the case for voluntary
arbitration.
On April 3, 1995, representatives of NSC and the union appeared before Voluntary
Arbitrator Rene Ofreneo and defined the issues of their dispute thus:
"Whether or not there was a diminution of the 1993 Fiscal Year-End Productivity
and Quality Profit-Sharing Incentive Benefit annually granted by the Company,
per CBA, and if there was, whether or not there was just cause for the diminution
of this benefit by management, and if without just cause, what should be the
remedy."3
The union was of the position that the company violated Article XII, Section 3 of their
CBA when it stopped, since 1993, giving Productivity and Quality Bonus and Fiscal Year-
End Incentive Award. Said CBA provision provides:
"ARTICLE XII
ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENTS
xxx
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
"SECTION 3. Productivity and Quality Bonus The COMPANY shall grant
productivity and quality bonus whenever, in the exclusive determination of the
COMPANY, the production and quality targets for the immediately preceding
period justify the granting of such bonus. The amount of the bonus shall be left to
the sole discretion of the COMPANY.
"The productivity and quality bonus provided herein shall be separate from and in
addition to the 13th month pay provided by law and the fiscal year-end incentive
award traditionally granted by the COMPANY."4
The union claimed that these benefits were demandable because the granting of such
benefits was not only provided for by the CBA but had also become the practice in the
firm from 1989 to 1993. Also, the incentive pay was not dependent on the profit situation
of the company since the company gave the incentive pay in 1989 and 1990 despite the
latters admission of difficult financial operations.5
The company on the other hand contended that the matter of granting productivity and
quality bonus was discretionary on its part consistent with its exercise of management
prerogatives and assessment of production targets, while the distribution of the Fiscal
Year-End Incentive Award was dependent on corporate performance.6
On July 19, 1996 public respondent Voluntary Arbitrator Ofreneo issued a decision ruling
as follows:
" 1. There is no merit in the demand of the Union for a productivity and quality
bonus in 1993.
" 2. The demand of the Union for the distribution of the year-end incentive award
is in order.
" 3. The said incentive award shall be computed based on the Companys past
practice in the determination of such award.
"SO ORDERED."7
On August 2, 1996, the NSC filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration 8 with respect to
the award of the year-end incentive which was denied by Arbitrator Ofreneo. 9 On October
31, 1996, the NSC filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. 10
28

On November 25, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing the
companys petition for review on the ground that it failed to comply with the requirements
of Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping.
The pertinent portions of the decision read:
"xxx We hold that Atty. Roberto C. Padilla, one of the counsels of record, then, of
the petitioner is not a real party in interest or the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit
but a retained counsel with mere incidental interest and therefore, not the
petitioner or plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief of the union for the distribution of the year-end incentive award?
required by law to certify under oath to the facts and/or undertakings stated in
Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94."
"Consequently, the Court hereby RESOLVES to GRANT the `Motion to Dismiss
Appellants Petition for Review.
"SO ORDERED."11
On December 17, 1997, NSC filed a Motion for Reconsideration 12 of the resolution. But
this was denied in a Resolution13 dated July 2, 1998 where the appellate court found that:
"x x x absent any authority from the petitioner corporations board of directors to
sue in its behalf, the counsel of record is without personality to sue x x x.
"xxx xxx xxx
"ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner
NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION is DENIED.
"SO ORDERED."14
Hence this petition raising the following grounds:
"A. NSCS COUNSEL OF RECORD WAS DULY AUTHORIZED TO
REPRESENT NSC IN THE PREPARATION OF THE PETITION FOR REVIEW
FILED BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS.
"B. THE VERIFICATION CUM CERTIFICATION OF PETITIONERS COUNSEL
OF RECORD WAS TRUTHFUL IN ALL RESPECTS.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
"C. THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION FOR REVIEW BEFORE THE COURT
OF APPEALS ON A PURELY TECHNICAL GROUND VIOLATES PETITIONERS
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND OPPRESSIVELY DEPRIVED THE LATTER OF
SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE."15
Simply stated, the pertinent issues of this case are as follows: (1) May the signature of
petitioners counsel be deemed sufficient for the purposes of Revised Circular No. 28-91
and Administrative Circular No. 04-94; and (2) granting that the petition a quo should
have been allowed, did the voluntary arbitrator commit any error in granting the demand
We will first resolve the issue on the certification against forum shopping.
Circular No. 28-91 was put in place to deter the practice of some party-litigants of
simultaneously pursuing remedies in different forums for such practice works havoc upon
orderly judicial procedure.16
In the case at bar, the certification was signed by petitioners counsel. Petitioner argues
that contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals, NSCs counsel of record was duly
authorized to represent them not only before the Voluntary Arbitrator but also to prepare
the petition for review filed before the Court of Appeals. To support this claim, petitioner
attached to its petition before this Court a Secretarys Certificate dated December 16,
1997 which states that:
"x x x [B]ased on the records of the Corporation, Atty. Roberto C. Padilla, with
office address at the 2 nd floor, Chere Bldg., Del Pilar St., Iligan City is the legal
counsel of the Corporation on a general retainer and is duly authorized to
represent the latter and to act on its behalf in several cases, including "National
Steel Corporation v. Rene E. Ofreneo and NSC-HDCTC Monthly-Daily
Employees Organization-FFW", docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42431 before the
Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals."17
Counsel of petitioner, Atty. Padilla also submitted a Verification cum Certification where
he stated that he prepared the petition upon the explicit instructions of the VP-Marketing
& Resident Manager of petitioner corporation.18
Petitioner explains that powers of corporations organized under the Corporation Code
shall be exercised by the board of directors; that the exercise of such powers may be
done indirectly through delegation; that pursuant to the exercise of its powers, the
corporation through its Board of Directors, may employ such persons as it may need to
29

carry on the operations of the corporate business; that hence, with the express
authorization by NSCs board of directors, Atty. Padilla was conferred with enough
authority to sign the Verification cum Certification in the petition for review filed before the
Court of Appeals;19 that assuming arguendo there is no express authorization from NSC,
still Atty. Padilla is impliedly authorized to file the petition for review before the Court of
Appeals in line with its obligation to take all steps or do all acts necessary or incidental to
the regular and orderly prosecution or management of the suit; that respondent union
never questioned the authority of Atty. Padilla to represent NSC in the proceedings
before the Voluntary Arbitrator; that the union is therefore absolutely estopped from
questioning Atty. Padillas authority to file the petition for review before the Court of
Appeals;20 that the dismissal of the petition for review on a purely technical ground
violated petitioners right to due process and oppressively deprived it of substantive
justice as enunciated in Section 6, Rule 1, as well as previous rulings of this Court which
upheld the primacy of substantial justice over technical rules of procedure. 21
For its part, respondent union claims that petitioner violated Rule 13, Section 11 of the
Rules of Court anent the priorities in modes of service and filing; 22 that the Court of
Appeals did not err in dismissing NSCs petition for review because it was not duly
verified by the petitioner as required by the rules; that the petition filed before the
appellate court did not have a Secretarys Certificate stating the authority of Atty. Padilla
to represent petitioner corporation; and that it was only after the Court of Appeals
dismissed their petition in a Resolution dated November 25, 1997 that petitioner attached
said Certificate dated December 16, 1997.23
We rule in favor of petitioner and hold that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
petition.
In the case of BA Savings Bank vs. Sia, 24 this Court has ruled that the certificate of non-
forum shopping required by Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 may be signed, for and
on behalf of a corporation, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has personal
knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document.
The reason is that:
"Unlike natural persons, corporations may perform physical actions only through
properly delegated individuals; namely, its officers and/or agents.
"xxx xxx xxx
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
"The corporation, such as the petitioner, has no powers except those expressly
conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied by or are
incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through its
board of directors and / or its duly authorized officers and agents. Physical acts,
like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly
authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by specific act of the board of
directors. `All acts within the powers of a corporation may be performed by
agents of its selection; and, except so far as limitations or restrictions which may
be imposed by special "charter, by-law, or statutory provisions, the same general
principles of law which govern the relation of agency for a natural person govern
the officer or agent of a corporation, of whatever status or rank, in respect to his
power to act for the corporation; and agents once appointed, or members acting
in their stead, are subject to the same rules, liabilities and incapacities as are
agents of individuals and private persons.
"xxx xxx xxx
"x x x For who else knows of the circumstances required in the Certificate but its
own retained counsel. Its regular officers, like its board chairman and president,
may not even know the details required therein."25
While it is admitted that the authorization of petitioners counsel was submitted to the
appellate court only after the issuance of its Resolution dismissing the petition based on
non-compliance with the aforesaid Circular, we hold that in view of the peculiar
circumstances of the present case and in the interest of substantial justice, the
procedural defect may be set aside, pro hac vice. As held by the Court: "Technical rules
of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice. While the swift unclogging
of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even
more urgent ideal."26 By recognizing the signature of the authorized counsel in the
certification, no circumvention of the rationale, that is to prevent the ills of forum
shopping, is committed.27 As we have held in many cases:
"x x x Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be so interpreted
with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective or the goal of all rules of procedure --which is to achieve substantial
justice as expeditiously as possible.
"The fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely
underscores its mandatory nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its
30

requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial
compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances."28
We will now delve into the merits of the case.
Petitioner NSC assails the following portions of the award of the Voluntary Arbitrator:
"In view of the foregoing, therefore, the Voluntary Arbitrator rules as follows:
"xxx xxx xxx
"2. The demand of the Union for the distribution of the year-end incentive award
is in order.
"3. The said incentive award shall be computed based on the Companys past
practice in the determination of such award.
"SO ORDERED."29
Petitioner claims that the Voluntary Arbitrator erred when he ordered petitioner to pay
private respondent the 1993 fiscal year-end incentive award despite his own findings that
the mid-year incentive pay already paid by the petitioner is an advance payment of the
fiscal year-end incentive award;30 that the "Mid-year Incentive Pay" granted to private
respondent is itself a bonus not demandable upon NSC as it is not provided for in the
CBA; that this notwithstanding, it has granted the Mid-year Incentive Pay to members of
respondent union every year in the years 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993; that in
every instance of the grant, petitioner expressly stated that the Mid-year Incentive Pay is
an advance against the Fiscal Year-end Incentive Pay; that petitioners express
reservation that the payment of the Mid-year Incentive Pay is an advance payment of the
fiscal year-end incentive award has been repeatedly brought to the attention of the
Voluntary Arbitrator;31 that the Voluntary Arbitrator committed serious misapprehension of
facts when he ruled that the grant of the fiscal year-end incentive award has become
traditional and has therefore ripened into a demandable right of private respondent; 32 and
that for a period of four (4) years i.e., from 1990 through 1993, the fiscal year-end
incentive award has been granted only twice -- in 1991 and in 1992. 33
In his Award, the Voluntary Arbitrator established as a fact that:
"x x x the Company gave the following benefits to the workers:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
"1. Mid-Year Incentive Pay, which was usually given as an "advance" for the
Year-End Incentive Bonus. The Company announced the Mid-Year Incentive Pay
through memos issued on the following dates:
August 25, 1989,
August 1, 1990,
August 2, 1991,
August 24,1992, and
August 31, 1993."34
Yet, petitioner complains that despite the above findings that the Mid-year Incentive
Awards were given as advances to the Year-End Incentive Awards, the Voluntary
Arbitrator still ruled that the NSC was liable to pay respondent Union the Year-End
Incentive Pay, explaining that:
"xxx xxx xxx
"In the case of the fiscal year-end incentive award, the CBA provision has a
general proviso which reads: `The productivity and quality bonus provided herein
shall be separate from and in addition to the 13 th month pay provided by law and
the fiscal year-end incentive award traditionally granted by the COMPANY. Thus,
unlike in the productivity and quality bonus, the CBA simply recognizes the fiscal
year-end incentive award as one of the benefits accorded to the workers, just like
the 13th month pay. It even added the phrase `traditionally granted by the
COMPANY. There were no qualifications or conditions specified for the granting
of this benefit similar to those governing the granting of the productivity and
quality bonus. The Company argued that like the productivity and quality bonus,
the granting of year-end incentive award is a management prerogative and is
guided by the same conditions, e.g., actual performance versus production
targets, that it uses when it decides on the granting of productivity and quality
bonus. As "pointed out, the CBA is silent on this. And if there are doubts on the
interpretation of the manner by which benefits like year-end incentive award shall
be given, the Labor Code has long ago decided that all such doubts shall be
interpreted in favor of Labor.
31
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
"Moreover, the capacity of the Company to grant this incentive pay is also not at
issue. A closer scrutiny of the Company loss for 1993 shows that the net loss of
P36 million registered for that year was due to the deduction of `expenses paid in
retained earnings amounting to P358 "million from the original P322 million net
income. The audited data gathered by the Union from the Commission on Audit
also show that while earnings and incomes declined from 1992 to 1993, the
Company still registered a healthy level of profitability."35

We rule in favor of petitioner.

This Court has stressed that voluntary arbitrators, by the nature of their functions, act in
quasi-judicial capacity. Hence, as a rule, findings of facts by quasi-judicial bodies which
have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
accorded not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence,
even if not overwhelming or preponderant. 36 However, in spite of statutory provisions
making "final" the decisions of certain administrative agencies, we have taken
cognizance of petitions questioning such decisions where want of jurisdiction, grave
abuse of discretion, violation of due process, denial of substantial justice, or erroneous
interpretation of the law were brought to our attention.37

In the present petition for review on certiorari, we find the award of the 1993 year-end
incentive to be patently erroneous which amounts not only to grave abuse of discretion
but also to denial of substantial justice. The Voluntary Arbitrator himself found that the
mid-year incentive pay for 1993 was given by petitioner as an advance payment of the
fiscal year-end incentive award for the same year. Indubitably, to require petitioner to pay
again the same incentive pay at the year-end of 1993 is obviously a great injustice that
would be committed against petitioner.

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Resolutions dated November 25, 1997 and July 2,
1998 of the Court of Appeals.

The Award of Voluntary Arbitrator Ofreneo dated July 19, 1996 is modified to the effect
that the grant of the claim for the distribution of the 1993 year-end incentive award
is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

32

G.R. No. 146125. September 17, 2003
NOVELTY PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; PANEL OF
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS, Represented by Its Chairman, RAMON T. JIMENEZ;
and REFORM THE UNION MOVEMENT IN NOVELTY (RUMN), respondents.
As much as practicable, litigations should be decided on their merits and not on
procedural technicalities. This statement holds true especially in labor cases like the
present one, in which the defect has been cured by the motion for reconsideration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
July 12, 2000[2] and the November 21, 2000[3] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-GR SP No. 59544. The first Resolution dismissed petitioners original action
for certiorari as follows:
This instant petition is hereby DISMISSED outright:
a.) For failure to comply with Sec. 1, Rule 65 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Mr. Steven Young,[4] allegedly the personnel officer of petitioner, who signed the petition
did not attach the alleged authority from petitioner to institute the same.
b.) For failure to comply with Sec. 13, Rule 13 of the same Rules, there being no
attachment of the required affidavit proof of service.[5]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the second assailed Resolution,
pertinent portions of which are reproduced hereunder:
In the case at bench, petitioner failed to attach the required authority to file the instant
petition. It was only submitted when the instant motion was filed and the Special Power
of Attorney was executed only on July 26, 2000 while the instant petition was filed on
July 6, 2000. Sadly, at the time the case was filed, no authority was given to Mr. Ventura
when the petition was filed. Hence, we had to dismiss the instant petition.
Anent the issue of failure to attach the required affidavit of proof of service, a close
scrutiny of the records reveal that the affidavit of service was attached after the annexes
x x x. Nevertheless, despite such compliance, the instant motion must still be denied for
reasons above-stated.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. Our resolution dated July 18, 2000 is REITERATED.[6]
The Facts
The dispute between Novelty Philippines, Inc. (Novelty) and Reform the Union
Movement in Novelty (RUMN) arose when the latter started assessing penalties against
its erring members. On June 26, 1997, RUMNs executive board adopted a
Resolution[7] sanctioning union officers and members who had failed to join big rallies,
with a penalty equivalent to their salary for one day.
On November 19, 1997, petitioner issued a Memorandum announcing that, for the
payroll period November 16 to 22, 1997, it would deduct from the salaries of union
members who had failed to attend the mobilization on July 28, 1997, amounts equivalent
to their one-day salary. According to it, the checkoff was being done pursuant to the
Resolution of the RUMN executive board and existing individual checkoff authorizations.
When some members of the union allegedly complained of the salary deduction,
petitioner temporarily held in abeyance the implementation of the checkoff on the special
assessment made by RUMN. Petitioner also requested from the Office of the Secretary
of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) its opinion on the matter.
This move notwithstanding, RUMN continued to insist on the implementation of the
checkoff on the special assessments. Nevertheless, citing an Opinion rendered by the
legal office of the DOLE, petitioner rejected RUMNs persistent demand for a
checkoff. Consequently, RUMN raised the matter for grievance. Since no settlement was
reached during the grievance procedure, the case was elevated to the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board, which referred the controversy to voluntary arbitration.
After the submission of the necessary pleadings by the parties, the Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators rendered a Decision[8] dated April 26, 2000, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Panel hereby declares that there has been sufficient compliance
[with] the provisions of the Labor Code, the CBA provisions between the parties and the
check-off authorization form executed by the Union members or, more specifically,
special assessments effected by authority of the Unions resolution duly adopted and
approved by the majority of the Union in a general membership meeting. The Panel
therefore confirms the right of the Union to demand from Management the check-off of
one days pay against erring members who had violated the Union directive for members
33

to attend and participate in the protest rally during the [State of the Nation Address]
SONA of July 1997.[9]
Petitioner filed with the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied in a Resolution[10] dated June 19, 2000. Thereafter, the former
elevated the matter to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA denied due course to the Petition for failure of the personnel officer of petitioner
to attach (1) his authority to institute the action and (2) the required proof of service. The
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the appellate court, because the
required authority to file it had been executed only after 20 days from its filing.
Hence, this recourse.[11]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
I. The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed the Petition for Certiorari despite petitioners substantial
compliance with the requirements of the rules.
II. The Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators committed grave abuse of discretion when it
rendered the assailed majority Decision and assailed Resolution without
factual or legal basis and patently contrary to law.[12]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Substantial Compliance
with the Procedural Requirements
Petitioner avers that it has substantially complied with the requirements of Section 1 of
Rule 65 in relation to Section 3 of Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It has
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
allegedly done so particularly with regard to the authority of Ventura,[13] its personnel
officer, to file the Petition for Certiorari before the CA. According to petitioner, when
Ventura represented the company at the voluntary arbitration level, his authority to act for
and on its behalf was never questioned.
It further claims that the pertinent provisions of the aforementioned rules do not specify
any requirement pertaining to the authority of the representative of the company to file
the Petition. Moreover, it contends that its subsequent submission of a Special Power of
Attorney constituted substantial compliance with the subject rules and, in effect, ratified
Venturas authority to file the Petition for and on behalf of the company.
On the other hand, private respondent counters that Ventura had no authority to file the
Petition before the CA or to sign the Verification and Certificate of Non-Forum
Shopping. It argues that such authority should have been conferred to him through an
appropriate board resolution of Novelty or a special power of attorney, since he was
neither the president nor a corporate officer of the company. Moreover, private
respondent insists that the authority to verify and certify is an essential requirement in the
filing of a petition for certiorari, especially when petitioner is a corporation that can act
only through its president or any other officer authorized by a board resolution.
Finally, respondent claims that petitioners subsequent submission of a Special Power of
Attorney was still defective, because the document had been executed by the general
manager and not by the president of Novelty.
Based on the second assailed Resolution, the alleged lack of authority of petitioners
personnel officer to sign the Verification and Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping became
the CAs sole basis for dismissing the certiorari action. The appellate court refused to give
due course to the Petition, even after petitioner had submitted a Special Power of
Attorney granting such authority to Ventura. The CA reasoned that this authorization
should have been submitted together with the initiatory pleading, not as an annex or
attachment to the Motion for Reconsideration.
The policy of our judicial system is to encourage full adjudication of the merits of an
appeal. In the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, this Court may reverse the dismissal of
appeals that are grounded merely on technicalities.[14] Moreover, procedural niceties
should be avoided in labor cases in which the provisions of the Rules of Court are
applied only in a suppletory manner.[15] Indeed, rules of procedure may be relaxed to
relieve a part of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of noncompliance with
the process required.[16]
34

The foregoing judicial policy acquires greater significance where there has been
subsequent compliance with the requirements of the rules, as in this case in which
petitioner has submitted the Special Power of Attorney together with its Motion for
Reconsideration.
In Jaro v. Court of Appeals,[17] this Court held that the subsequent submission of
requisite documents constituted substantial compliance with procedural rules. It
explained:
There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial compliance of
an appellant may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. In Cusi-Hernandez vs.
Diaz and Piglas-Kamao vs. National Labor Relations Commission, we ruled that the
subsequent submission of the missing documents with the motion for reconsideration
amounts to substantial compliance. The reasons behind the failure of the petitioners in
these two cases to comply with the required attachments were no longer
scrutinized. What we found noteworthy in each case was the fact that the petitioners
therein substantially complied with the formal requirements. We ordered the remand of
the petitions in these cases to the Court of Appeals, stressing the ruling that by
precipitately dismissing the petitions the appellate court clearly put a premium on
technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case.[18]
We find equally untenable private respondents argument that the Special Power of
Attorney authorizing Ventura to file the Petition was still defective, since it had been
signed by the general manager and not by the president of petitioner company. This
Court, in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals,[19] recognized the
authority not only of a general manager but even of an acting general manager to sign a
verification and certificate against non-forum shopping.
We are not persuaded by CHIONGBIANs claim that the Verification and Certification
against forum shopping accompanying MCIAAs petition was insufficient for allegedly
having been signed by one who was not qualified to do so. As pointed out by the MCIAA,
Colonel Cordova signed the Verification and Certification against forum shopping as
Acting General Manager of the MCIAA, pursuant to Office Order No. 5322-99 dated
September 10, 1999 issued by the General Manager of MCIAA, Alfonso Allere. x x x.[20]
The authority of the general manager to sue on behalf of the corporation and to sign the
requisite verification and certification of non-forum shopping may be delegated to any
other officer of the company through a board resolution or a special power of attorney. In
this case, it was Ventura, the personnel officer of petitioner company, who was
authorized to file the Petition through a Special Power of Attorney. This was a logical and
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
practical decision of management, considering that the person who was in the best
position to ascertain the truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations in the Petition
was its personnel officer, who knew the status of any personnel and any labor-related
suit of the company.
In Pfizer v. Galan,[21] this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.,
explained the nature and purpose of a verification. It then upheld the validity of a
verification signed by an employment specialist who had not even presented any proof of
her authority to represent the petitioner company.
Verification is intended to assure that the allegations in the pleading have been prepared
in good faith or are true and correct, not mere speculations. Generally, lack of verification
is merely a formal defect that is neither jurisdictional nor fatal. The court may order the
correction of the pleading or act on the unverified pleading if the attending circumstances
are such that strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order to serve the
ends of justice.
We firmly believe that the purpose of verification was served in the instant case wherein
the verification of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals was done by Ms. Cleofe R.
Legaspi. It remains undisputed that Ms. Legaspi was an Employment Specialist of
petitioner Pfizer, Inc., who coordinated and actually took part in the investigation of the
administrative charges against respondent Galan. As such, she was in a position to
verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition. Besides, as
pointed out by petitioners, Pfizer, being a corporate entity, can only act through an
officer. Ms. Legaspi, who was an officer having personal knowledge of the case, was,
therefore, merely acting for and in behalf of petitioner Pfizer when she signed the
verification. Thus, the disputed verification is in compliance with the Rules.[22]
Likewise, in Shipside v. Court of Appeals,[23] we elucidated on the necessity of a
certificate of non-forum shopping. We then ruled that the subsequent submission of a
proof of authority to act on behalf of petitioner corporation justified the relaxation of the
Rules for the purpose of allowing its Petition to be given due course.
On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not
curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the
required documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification
against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same
rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a
35
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a
petition on behalf of the corporation.

xxxxxxxxx

In the instant case, the merits of petitioners case should be considered special
circumstances or compelling reasons that justify tempering the requirement in regard to
the certificate of non-forum shopping.Moreover, in Loyola, Roadway, and Uy, the Court
excused non-compliance with the requirement as to the certificate of non-forum
shopping. With more reason should we allow the instant petition since petitioner herein
did submit a certification on non-forum shopping, failing only to show proof that the
signatory was authorized to do so. That petitioner subsequently submitted a secretarys
certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an action on behalf of petitioner
likewise mitigates this oversight.

It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum
shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally
and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum-
shopping. Lastly, technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate
justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of
substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.[24]

Indeed, while the right to appeal is a statutory and not a natural right, it is
nonetheless an essential part of our judicial system. Courts are therefore advised to
proceed with caution, so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal. Litigants should
have the amplest opportunity for a proper and just disposition of their cause -- free, as
much as possible, from the constraints of procedural technicalities.[25]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Resolutions SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings on the
merits. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

36

G.R. No. 141947 July 5, 2001
ISMAEL V. SANTOS, ALFREDO G. ARCE and HILARIO M.
PASTRANA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHILS.,
INC., LUIS P. LORENZO, JR. and FREDERICK DAEL, respondents.
This petition for review seeks to annul the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 54853 dated 28 September 1999 which summarily dismissed petitioners' special
civil action for certiorari for failing to execute properly the required verification and
certification against forum shopping and to specify the material dates from which the
timeliness of the petition may be determined.
Private respondent Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. (PEPSI) is a domestic corporation
engaged in the production, distribution and sale of beverages. At the time of their
termination, petitioners Ismael V. Santos and Alfredo G. Arce were employed by PEPSI
as Complimentary Distribution Specialists (CDS) with a monthly salary of P 7,500.00 and
P10,000.00, respectively, while Hilario M. Pastrana was employed as Route Manager
with a monthly salary of P 7 ,500.00.
In a letter dated 26 December 1994, 2 PEPSI informed its employees that due to poor
performance of its Metro Manila Sales Operations it would restructure and streamline
certain physical and sales distribution systems to improve its warehousing efficiency.
Certain positions, including that of petitioners, were declared redundant and abolished.
Consequently, employees with affected positions were terminated.
On 15 January 1995 petitioners left their respective positions, accepted their separation
pays and executed the corresponding releases and quitclaims. However, before the end
of the year, petitioners learned that PEPSI created new positions called Account
Development Managers (ADM) with substantially the same duties and responsibilities as
the CDS. Aggrieved, on 15 Apri1 1996, petitioners filled a complaint with the Labor
Arbiter for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement, back wages, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that the creation of the new positions belied
PEPSI's claim of redundancy. They further alleged that the qualifications for both the
CDS and ADM positions were similar and that the employees hired for the latter positions
were even less qualified than they were. 3 Likewise taking note of possible procedural
errors, they claimed that while they were notified of their termination, PEPSI had not
shown that the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) was also notified as
mandated by Art. 283 of the Labor Code which states-
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
Art. 283. Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel. The employer
may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of
labor-saying devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing
or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing
is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this title, by serving a written
notice on the worker and the Ministry of Labor and Employment: at least
one (1) month before the intended date thereof xxxx (italic supplied).
PEPSI, on the other hand, maintained that termination due to redundancy was a
management prerogative the wisdom and soundness of which were beyond the
discretionary review of the courts. Thus, it had the right to manage its affairs and decide
which position was no longer needed for its operations. It further maintained that the
redundancy program was made in good faith and was not implemented to purposely
force certain employees out of their employment. It also claimed that a close perusal of
the job descriptions of both the CDS and ADM positions would show that the two (2)
were very different in terms of the nature of their functions, areas of concerns,
responsibilities and qualifications.4
On 18 June 1997, Labor Arbiter Romulus S. Protacio dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. Furthermore, he ruled that the one (1)-month written notice prior to termination
required by Art. 283 was complied with.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the ruling of the
Labor Arbiter. However, in its Decision5 dated 5 March 1999 it found that the
Establishment Termination Report was submitted to the DOLE only on 5 April 1995 or
two "(2) months after the termination had already taken place 6 and thus effectively
reversing the finding of the Labor Arbiter that the required one (1)-month notice prior to
termination was complied with. Nonetheless, the NLRC dismissed the appeal,
citing International Hardware, Inc. v. NLRC,7 which held -
x x x x if an employee consented to his retrenchment or voluntarily applied for
retrenchment with the employer due to the installation of labor-saving devices,
redundancy, closure or cessation of operation or to prevent financial losses to the
business of the employer, the required previous notice to the DOLE is not
necessary as the employee thereby acknowledged the existence of a valid cause
for termination of his employment x x x x (italics supplied).
On 10 September 1999, petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals.8 The Court of Appeals in the assailed Resolution dismissed the petition
outright for failure to comply with a number of requirements mandated by Sec. 3, Rule
37

46, in relation to Sec. 1, Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent
appellate court found that the verification and certification against forum shopping were
executed merely by petitioners' counsel and not by petitioners. The petition also failed to
specify the dates of receipt of the NLRC Decision as well as the filing of the motion for
reconsideration.9 Under the aforecited Rules, failure of petitioners to comply with any of
the requirements was sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
Petitioners now present the sole issue of whether there was failure to comply with the
requirements of the Rules in filing their petition for certiorari.
We find no manifest error on the part of the Court of Appeals; hence we affirm.
It is true that insofar as verification is concerned, we have held that there is substantial
compliance if the same is executed by an attorney it being presumed that facts alleged
by him are true to his knowledge and belief. 10However the same does not apply as
regards the requirement of a certification against forum shopping. Section 3, Rule 46 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly requires -
x x x x The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn
certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving
the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or
proceeding he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter
learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and
other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom x x x x
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the certification must be made by
petitioner himself and not by counsel since it is petitioner who is in the best position to
know whether he has previously commenced any similar action involving the same
issues in any other tribunal or agency.11
Petitioners argue that while it may be true that they are in the best position to know
whether they have commenced an action or not this information may be divulged to their
attorney and there is nothing anomalous or bizarre about this disclosure. 12 They further
maintain that they executed a Special Power of Attorney specifically to authorize their
counsel to execute the certification on their behalf.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
We are aware of our ruling in BA Savings Bank v. Sia13 that a certification against forum
shopping may be signed by an authorized lawyers who has personal knowledge of the
facts required to be disclosed in such document. However, BA Savings Bank must be
distinguished from the case at bar because in the former, the complainant was a
corporation, and hence, a juridical person. Therefore, that case made an exception to the
general rule that the certification must be made by the petitioner himself since a
corporation can only act through natural persons. In fact, physical actions, e.g., signing
and delivery of documents, may be performed on behalf of the corporate entity only by
specifically authorized individuals. In the instant case, petitioners, are all natural persons
and there is no showing of any reasonable cause to justify their failure to personally sign
the certification.14 It is noteworthy that PEPSI in its Comment stated that it was petitioners
themselves who executed the verification and certification requirements in all their
previous pleadings. Counsel for petitioners argues that as a matter of policy, a Special
Power of Attorney is executed to promptly and effectively meet any contingency relative
to the handling of a case. This argument only weakens their position since it is clear that
at the outset no justifiable reason yet existed for counsel to substitute petitioners in
signing the certification. In fact, in the case of natural persons, this policy serves no legal
purpose. Convenience cannot be made the basis for a circumvention of the Rules.
Neither are we convinced that the out-right dismissal of the petition would defeat the
administration of justice. Petitioners argue that there are very important issues such as
their livelihood and the well being and future of their families. 15 Every petition filed with a
judicial tribunal is sure to affect, even tangentially, either the well being and future of
petitioner himself or that of his family. Unfortunately, this does not warrant disregarding
the Rules.
Moreover, the petition failed to indicate the material dates that would show the timeliness
of the filing thereof with the Court of Appeals. There are three (3) essential dates that
must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date when
notice of the judgment or final order or Resolution was received; second, when a motion
for new trial or reconsideration was filed; and third, when notice of the denial thereof was
received. Petitioners failed to show the first and second dates, namely, the date of
receipt of the impugned NLRC Decision as well as the date of filing of their motion for
reconsideration. Petitioners counter by stating that in the body of the petition for certiorari
filed in the Court of Appeals, it was explicitly stated that the, NLRC Resolution dated 11
May 1999 was received by petitioners through counsel on 30 July 1999. They even
reiterate this contention in their Reply.
The requirement of setting forth the, three(3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed
not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to
38

be assailed. Therefore, that the petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41) days from
16
receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of
Appeals was not in any position to determine when this period commenced to run and
whether the motion for reconsideration itself was filed on time since the material dates
were not stated. It should not be assumed that in no event would the motion be filed later
than fifteen (15) days. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends
of justice. These are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and
thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot
justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. 17
But even if these procedural lapses are dispensed with, the instant petition, on the
merits, must still fail. Petitioners impute grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC for holding that the CDS and ADM positions were dissimilar, and for concluding
that the redundancy program of PEPSI was undertaken in good faith and that the case
of International Hardware v. NLRC18 was applicable.
This Court is not a trier of facts. The question of whether the duties and responsibilities of
the CDS and ADM positions are similar is a question properly belonging to both the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In fact, the NLRC merely affirmed the finding of the Labor
Arbiter on this point and further elaborated on the differences between the two (2). Thus
it ruled -
x x x x We cannot subscribe to the complainants' assertions that the positions
have similar job descriptions. First CDS report to a CD Manager, whereas the
ADMs do not report to the CD Manager, leading us to believe that the
organizational setup of the sales department has been changed.
Second, CDS are filed personnel who drive assigned vehicles and deliver stocks
to "dealers" who, under the job description are those who sell and deliver the
same stocks to smaller retail outlets in their assigned areas. The ADMs are not
required to drive trucks and they do not physically deliver stocks to wholesale
dealers. Instead, they help "dealers" market the stocks through retail. This
conclusion is borne out by the fact (that) ADMs are tasked to ensure that the
stocks are displayed in the best possible locations in the dealer's store, that they
have more shelf space and that dealers participate in promotional activities in
order to sell more products.
It is clear to us that while CDS are required to physically deliver, sell and collect
payments for softdrinks, they do so not primarily to retail outlets but to wholesale
dealers who have retail customers of their own. They are not required to assist
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
the dealers they deliver to in selling the softdrinks more effectively whereas
ADMs sell softdrinks to big retail outlets (groceries and malls who have shelves
and display cases and who require coolers and other paraphernalia). They do not
only sell but they have to effectively market the products or put them in the best
and most advantageous light so that the dealers who sell the softdrinks retails
can sell more softdrinks. The main thrust of the ADMs job is to ensure that the
softdrinks products ordered from them are marketed in a certain manner ("Pepsi-
Way standards") in keeping with the promotional thrust of the company.
Factual findings of the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the Labor
Arbiter, are accorded respect, even finality, and will not be disturbed for as long as such
findings are supported by substantial evidence, 19defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 20 In this case, there
is no doubt that the findings of the NLRC are supported by substantial evidence. The job
descriptions submitted by PEPSI are replete with information and is an adequate basis to
compare and contrast the two (2) positions.
Therefore, the two (2) positions being different, it follows that the redundancy program
instituted by PEPSI was undertaken in good faith. Petitioners have not established that
the title Account Development Manager was created in order to maliciously terminate
their employment. Nor have they shown that PEPSI had any ill motive against them. It is
therefore apparent that the restructuring and streamlining of PEPSI's distribution and
sales systems were an honest effort to make the company more efficient.
Redundancy exists when the service capability of the work force is in excess of what is
reasonably needed to meet the demands of the enterprise. 21 A redundant position is one
rendered superfluous by a number of factors, such as overhiring of workers, decreased
volume of business, dropping of a particular product line previously manufactured by the
company or phasing out of a service previously undertaken by the business. 22
Based on the fact that PEPSI's Metro Manila Sales Operations were not meeting its
sales targets,23 and on the fact that new positions were subsequently created, it is
evident that PEPSI wanted to restructure its organization in order to include more
complex positions that would either absorb or render completely unnecessary the
positions it had previously declared redundant. The soundness of this business judgment
of PEPSI has been assailed by petitioners, arguing that it is more logical to implement
new procedures in physical distribution, sales quotas, and other policies aimed at
improving the performance of the division rather than to reduce the number of employees
and create new positions.24
39
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
This argument cannot be accepted. While it is true that management may not, under the Sec. 13, Rule 46, in relation to Sec. 1, Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
guise of invoking its prerogative, ease out employees and defeat their constitutional right is AFFIRMED.
to security of tenure, the same must be respected if clearly undertaken in good faith and
if no arbitrary or malicious action is shown. SO ORDERED.

Similarly, in Wiltshire File Co., Inc. v. NLRC25 petitioner company effected some changes
in its organization by abolishing the position of Sales Manager and simply adding the
duties previously discharged by it to the duties of the General Manager to whom the
Sales Manager used to report. In that case, we held that the characterization of private
respondent's services as no longer necessary or sustainable, and therefore properly
terminable, was an exercise of business judgment on the part of petitioner company. The
wisdom or soundness of such characterization or decision is not subject to discretionary
review on the part of the Labor Arbiter or of the NLRC so long as no violation of law or
arbitrary and malicious action is indicated.

In the case at bar, no such violation or arbitrary action was established by petitioners.
The subject matter being well beyond the discretionary review allowed by law, it
behooves this Court to steer clear of the realm properly belonging to the business
experts.

We agree with the NLRC in its application of International Hardware v. NLRC that
the mandate one (1) month notice prior to termination given to the worker and the DOLE
is rendered unnecessary by the consent of the worker himself. Petitioners assail the
voluntariness of their consent by stating that had they known of PEPSI's bad, faith they
would not have agreed to their termination, nor would they have signed the
corresponding releases and quitclaims.26 Having established private respondent's good
faith in undertaking the assailed redundancy program, there is no need to rule on this
contention.

Finally, in a last ditch effort to plead their case, petitioners would want us to believe that
their termination was illegal since PEPSI did not employ fair and reasonable criteria in
implementing its redundancy program. This issue was not raised before the Labor Arbiter
nor with the NLRC. As it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice to
allow a party to raise a question which has not been passed upon by both administrative
tribunals,27 it is now too late to entertain it.
1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, in the absence of any reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals,
the petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolution dated 28 September 1999 which
summarily dismissed petitioner's special civil action for certiorari for non-compliance with

40

G.R. No. 147394 August 11, 2004
SPOUSES MANUEL and ROSEMARIE WEE, petitioners, vs. ROSARIO D.
GALVEZ, respondent.
For review is the Decision1 dated December 4, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 55415, which denied special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
filed by petitioners Manuel and Rosemarie Wee. In said petition, the Wees sought to (1)
annul and set aside the Order dated July 29, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 80, denying their prayer to dismiss Civil Case No. Q-99-37372, as
well as the Order of September 20, 1999 denying their motion for reconsideration; (2)
order the trial court to desist from further proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-99-37372; and
(3) order the trial court to dismiss the said action. Also assailed by the Wees is
the Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals, promulgated March 7, 2001, denying their
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts in this case are not complicated.
Petitioner Rosemarie Wee and respondent Rosario D. Galvez are sisters. 3 Rosemarie
lives with her husband, petitioner Manuel Wee, in Balanga, Bataan, while Rosario
resides in New York, U.S.A. The present controversy stemmed from an investment
agreement between the two sisters, which had gone sour along the way.
On April 20, 1999, Rosario, represented by Grace Galvez as her attorney-in-fact, filed a
complaint before the RTC of Quezon City to collect a sum of money from Manuel and
Rosemarie Wee. The amount for collection was US$20,000 at the exchange rate
of P38.30 per dollar. The complaint, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-37372,
alleged that Rosario and Rosemarie entered into an agreement whereby Rosario would
send Rosemarie US$20,000, half of said amount to be deposited in a savings account
while the balance could be invested in the money market. The interest to be earned
therefrom would be given to Rosario's son, Manolito Galvez, as his allowance.
Rosario claimed that pursuant to their agreement, she sent to Rosemarie on various
dates in 1993 and 1994, five (5) Chemical Bank checks, namely:
CHECK No. DATE AMOUNT
CB No. 97 5/24/93 US$1,550.00
CB No. 101 6/11/93 10,000.00
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
CB No. 104 11/12/93 5,500.00
CB No. 105 2/1/94 2,000.00
CB No. 123 3/3/94 1,000.00
TOTAL US$20,050.004
Rosario further alleged that all of the aforementioned checks were deposited and
encashed by Rosemarie, except for the first check, Chemical Bank Check No. 97, which
was issued to one Zenedes Mariano, who gave the cash equivalent of US$2,000 to
Rosemarie.
In accordance with her agreement with Rosario, Rosemarie gave Manolito his monthly
allowance ranging from P2,000 to P4,000 a month from 1993 to January 1999. However,
sometime in 1995, Rosario asked for the return of the US$20,000 and for an accounting.
Rosemarie promised to comply with the demand but failed to do so.
In January 1999, Rosario, through her attorney-in-fact, Grace Galvez, sent Rosemarie a
written demand for her US$20,000 and an accounting. Again, Rosemarie ignored the
demand, thus causing Rosario to file suit.
On May 18, 1999, the Wees moved to dismiss Civil Case No. Q-99-37372 on the
following grounds: (1) the lack of allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts toward a
compromise had been made in accordance with Article 1515 of the Family Code; (2)
failure to state a valid cause of action, the action being premature in the absence of
previous earnest efforts toward a compromise; and (3) the certification against forum
shopping was defective, having been executed by an attorney-in-fact and not the plaintiff,
as required by Rule 7, Section 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Conformably with Rule 10, Sections 1 7 and 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rosario amended her complaint with the addition of the following paragraph:
9-A. Earnest efforts towards (sic) have been made but the same have failed. As a
matter of fact, plaintiff thru her daughter as Attorney-In-Fact caused the sending
of a Demand Letter dated January 4, 1999 and the last paragraph of which reads
as follows:
41

...
Trusting this will merit your utmost preferential attention and
consideration in as much as you and our client are sisters and in order
that [earnest] efforts toward a compromise could be obtained.9
The Wees opposed Rosario's motion to have the Amended Complaint admitted. They
contended that said motion was a mere scrap of paper for being in violation of the three-
day notice requirement of Rule 15, Section 4 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
for having the notice of hearing addressed to the Clerk of Court and not to the adverse
party as required by Section 511 of the same Rule.
On July 29, 1999, the trial court came out with an Order denying the Wees' motion to
dismiss for being "moot and academic," thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the amended complaint is hereby admitted.
Defendant-spouses are hereby directed to file their Answer within the
reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.12
The Wees duly moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied on September 20,
1999, for lack of merit.
On October 18, 1999, the Wee couple brought the matter to the Court of Appeals via a
special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 55415. The petition assailed the trial court for having acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for issuing the interlocutory orders
of July 29, 1999 and September 20, 1999, instead of dismissing Civil Case No. Q-99-
37372 outright.
On December 4, 2000, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 55415 in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.13
The Court of Appeals held that the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-99-37372, as amended,
sufficiently stated a cause of action. It likewise held that the questioned certification
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
against forum shopping appended thereto was not so defective as to warrant the
dismissal of the complaint.
On January 9, 2001, the petitioners herein moved for reconsideration of the appellate
court's decision, but this was denied on March 7, 2001.
Hence, the instant petition, raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE INSTANT PETITION FOR REVIEW ON
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT IS THE
PROPER REMEDY FOR PETITIONERS UPON THE DENIAL OF THEIR
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS BY THE
COURT OF APPEALS;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
EXECUTED BY THE PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY-IN-FACT IS DEFECTIVE; AND
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE AMENDED COMPLAINT BEFORE THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT SUFFICIENTLY STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE
DEFENDANTS.14
We shall now resolve these issues seriatim.
On the first issue, the petitioners argue that the present appeal by certiorari filed with this
Court assailing the dismissal of their special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus by the appellate court is meritorious. After all, according to petitioners, a
petition for review under Rule 45, Section 1, 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure could
be brought before us, regardless of whether the assailed decision of the appellate court
involves an appeal on the merits from the trial court's judgment or the dismissal of a
special civil action questioning an interlocutory order of the trial court. What is important
under Rule 45, Section 1, is that the assailed decision of the appellate court is final and
that the petition before this Court should raise only questions of law.
Respondent, in turn, point out that the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of herein
petitioners' special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in CA-G.R. SP
No. 55415 is not the final judgment or order, which could be the subject of an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45. This is because, according to respondent, certiorari as a
mode of appeal involves the review of a judgment, final order, or award on the merits.
Respondent contends that the appellate court's ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 55415 did not
dispose of the case on the merits, as the orders of the trial court subject of CA-G.R. SP
42

No. 55415 were all interlocutory. In other words, the ruling of the appellate court did not
put an end to Civil Case No. Q-99-37372, which is still pending before the trial court.
Hence, a petition for review on certiorari will not lie to assail the judgment of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55415, according to respondent.
We find no basis for respondent's contention that the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 55415, dismissing the petitioners' special civil action for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus is interlocutory in nature. The CA's decision on said petition
is final for it disposes of the original action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
directed against the interlocutory orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-99-37372. In
other words, having dismissed the said action, there is nothing more left to be done in
CA-G.R. SP No. 55415 as far as the appellate court is concerned.
Nor can we sustain respondent's argument that the appellate court's decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 55415 is not on the merits. In special civil actions for certiorari, such as CA-G.R.
SP No. 55415, the only issue before the appellate court is whether the lower court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Stated differently, in a certiorari petition the appellate court is not
tasked to adjudicate the merits of the respondent's claims before the trial court.
Resolving such claims on the merits remains the proper province of the trial court in Civil
Case No. Q-99-37372. The appellate court properly ruled in CA-G.R. SP No. 55415 that
the trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction so as to warrant the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
that petitioners sought. In so limiting itself to and addressing squarely only the issue of
grave abuse of discretion or lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 55415, precisely decided the matter on the merits. In other words, it found
that the special civil action of petitioners before it had no merit.
Now, as to whether the Court of Appeals decided the matter in CA-G.R. SP No. 55415 in
a manner contrary to law or established jurisprudence remains precisely for us to
determine in this review on certiorari. Considering the factual and procedural
circumstances of this case, the present petition is petitioners' proper remedy to challenge
the appellate court's judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 55415 now.
Anent the second issue, the petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
finding that the certification against forum shopping in Civil Case No. Q-99-37372 was
valid, notwithstanding that it was not the plaintiff below, Rosario D. Galvez, who executed
and signed the same, but her attorney-in-fact, Grace Galvez. Petitioners insist that there
was nothing in the special power of attorney executed by Rosario D. Galvez in favor of
Grace Galvez, which expressly conferred upon the latter the authority to execute and
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
sign, on behalf of the former, the certificate of non-forum shopping. Petitioners point out
that under Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the "plaintiff" or
"principal party" who must sign the certification. They rely on our ruling in BA Savings
Bank v. Sia,16that where the parties in an action are natural persons, the party himself is
required to sign the certification, and where a representative is allowed in case of
artificial persons, he must be specifically authorized to execute and sign the certification.
The petitioners stress that Rosario D. Galvez failed to show any justifiable reason why
her attorney-in-fact should be the one to sign the certification against forum shopping,
instead of herself as the party, as required by Santos v. Court of Appeals.17
Respondent counters that petitioners' contention has no basis. The Special Power of
Attorney executed by her in favor of Grace Galvez, if subjected to careful scrutiny would
clearly show that the authority given to the latter is not only broad but also all
encompassing, according to respondent. By virtue of said document, Grace Galvez is
given the power and authority to institute both civil and criminal actions against any
person, natural or juridical, who may be obliged or answerable to the respondent.
Corollary with this power is the authority to sign all papers, documents, and pleadings
necessary for the accomplishment of the said purpose. Respondent likewise stresses
that since Grace Galvez is the one authorized to file any action in the Philippines on
behalf of her principal, she is in the best position to know whether there are other cases
involving the same parties and the same subject matter instituted with or pending before
any other court or tribunal in this jurisdiction. Moreover, as an attorney-in-fact, Grace
Galvez is deemed to be a party, pursuant to Rule 3, Section 3 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Hence, petitioners' argument that Grace Galvez is not specifically authorized
to execute and sign the certification of non-forum shopping deserves scant
consideration.
We find for the respondent. Noteworthy, respondent in the instant case is already a
resident of the United States, and not of the Philippines. Hence, it was proper for her to
appoint her daughter, Grace Galvez, to act as her attorney-in-fact in the Philippines. The
Special Power of Attorney granted by the respondent to her attorney-in-fact, Grace
Galvez, categorically and clearly authorizes the latter to do the following:
1. To ask, demand and claim any sum of money that is duly [due] from any
person natural, juridical and/or corporation in the Philippines;
2. To file criminal and/or civil complaints before the courts of justice in the
Philippines to enforce my rights and interest[s];
43

3. To attend hearings and/or Preliminary Conference[s], to make stipulations,
adjust claims, to settle and/or enter into Compromise Agreement[s], to litigate
and to terminate such proceedings; [and]
4. To sign all papers, documents and pleadings necessary for the
accomplishment of the above purposes.19
From the foregoing, it is indisputable that Grace Galvez, as attorney-in-fact of the
respondent, was duly authorized and empowered not just to initiate complaints, whether
criminal or civil, to enforce and protect the respondent's rights, claims, and interests in
this jurisdiction, but is specifically authorized to sign all "papers, documents, and
pleadings" necessarily connected with the filing of a complaint. Pursuant to
Administrative Circular No. 04-94,20which extended the requirement of a certification on
non-forum shopping to all initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and quasi-judicial
agencies,21 as well as Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure, the
aforementioned papers and documents, which Grace Galvez was authorized and
empowered to sign, must necessarily include the certification on non-forum shopping. To
conclude otherwise would render nugatory the Special Power of Attorney and also render
respondent's constitution of an attorney-in-fact inutile.
Forum shopping "occurs when a party attempts to have his action tried in a particular
court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment or
verdict."22 In our jurisdiction, it has taken the form of filing multiple petitions or complaints
involving the same issues before two or more tribunals or agencies in the hope that one
or the other court would make a favorable disposition. 23 There is also forum shopping
when, because of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion
(other than by appeal or certiorari) in another.24The rationale against forum shopping is
that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different fora.
Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court processes, 25 which tends
to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure,
and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. 26 Thus, the rule
proscribing forum shopping seeks to promote candor and transparency among lawyers
and their clients in the pursuit of their cases before the courts to promote the orderly
administration of justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon the other party, and save
the precious time of the courts. It also aims to prevent the embarrassing situation of two
or more courts or agencies rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the same
issue.27 It is in this light that we must look at the propriety and correctness of the
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping signed by Grace Galvez on the respondent's behalf.
We have examined said Certificate28 and find that under the circumstances, it does not
negate but instead serves the purpose of the rule against forum shopping, namely to
promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, requires that the certification should be signed by
the "petitioner or principal party" himself. The rationale behind this is "because only the
petitioner himself has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions
or proceedings in different courts or agencies." 29 However, the rationale does not apply
where, as in this case, it is the attorney-in-fact who instituted the action. The Special
Power of Attorney in this instance was constituted precisely to authorize Grace Galvez to
file and prosecute suits on behalf of respondent, who was no longer resident of the
Philippines but of New York, U.S.A. As respondent points out, it is Grace Galvez, as
attorney-in-fact for her, who has actual and personal knowledge whether she initiated
similar actions or proceedings before various courts on the same issue on respondent's
behalf. Said circumstance constitutes reasonable cause to allow the attorney-in-fact, and
not the respondent, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-99-37372 to personally sign the
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that
there has been proper compliance with the rule proscribing forum shopping. As we
previously held concerning Administrative Circular No. 04-94:
The fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely
underscores its mandatory nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its
requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial
compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.30
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is now incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as Rule 7, Section 5. It is basic that the Rules "shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding."31 Otherwise put, the rule requiring a certification of forum
shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading, "should not be interpreted with such
absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of
all rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible."32
On the third issue, petitioners submit that the amended complaint in Civil Case No. Q-99-
37372 violates Rule 8, Section 1 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as there is no
plain and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for her claim.
Specifically, petitioners contend that the allegation in paragraph 9-A 34 of the amended
complaint that "Earnest efforts towards have been made but the same have failed" is
clearly insufficient. The sentence is incomplete, thus requires the reader of the pleading
to engage in deductions or inferences in order to get a complete sense of the cause of
action, according to petitioners.
44

Respondent rebuts petitioners' contention by stating that the amended complaint as well
as the annexes attached to the pleadings should be taken in their entirety in determining
whether a cause of action was validly stated in the complaint. Thus taken together, in
their entirety, the amended complaint and the attachments to the original complaint,
clearly show that a sufficient cause of action as it is shown and stated that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have been made, according to respondent.
Under Article 151 of the Family Code, a suit between members of the same family shall
not be entertained, unless it is alleged in the complaint or petition that the disputants
have made earnest efforts to resolve their differences through compromise, but these
efforts have not succeeded. The attempt to compromise as well as its failure or inability
to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same
family.35 Rule 8, Section 336 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that conditions
precedent may be generally averred in the pleadings. Applying the foregoing to the
instant case, we have to ask: Is there a sufficient general averment of the condition
precedent required by the Family Code in the Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-
99-37372?
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
We find in the affirmative. Our examination of paragraph 9-A of the Amended Complaint
shows that respondent has complied with this requirement of a general averment. It is
true that the lead sentence of paragraph 9-A, which reads "Earnest efforts towards have
been made but the same have failed" may be incomplete or even grammatically incorrect
as there might be a missing word or phrase, but to our mind, a lacking word like
"compromise" could be supplied by the rest of the paragraph. A paragraph is "a distinct
section or subdivision of a written or printed composition that consists of from one to
many sentences, forms a rhetorical unit (as by dealing with a particular point of the
subject or by comprising the words of a distinct speaker)." 37 As a "short composition
consisting of a group of sentences dealing with a single topic," 38 a paragraph must
necessarily be construed in its entirety in order to properly derive the message sought to
be conveyed. In the instant case, paragraph 9-A of the Amended Complaint deals with
the topic of efforts made by the respondent to reach a compromise between the parties.
Hence, it is in this light that the defective lead sentence must be understood or
construed. Contrary to what petitioners claim, there is no need for guesswork or
complicated deductions in order to derive the point sought to be made by respondent in
paragraph 9-A of the Amended Complaint, that earnest efforts to compromise the
differences between the disputants were made but to no avail. The petitioners' stance
that the defective sentence in paragraph 9-A of the Amended Complaint fails to state a
cause of action, thus, has no leg to stand on. Having examined the Amended Complaint
in its entirety as well as the documents attached thereto, following the rule that
documents attached to a pleading are considered both as evidence and as part of the
pleading,39 we find that the respondent has properly set out her cause of action in Civil
Case No. Q-99-37372.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
December 4, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55415, as well as its
Resolution dated March 7, 2001, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
45

G.R. No. 163039 April 6, 2011
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO RETUYA, FELICITAS R. PINTOR, HEIRS OF EPIFANIA R.
SEMBLANTE, namely, PREMILINO SEMBLANTE, LUCIFINA S. TAGALOG,
URSULINA S. ALMACEN; HEIRS OF JUAN RETUYA, namely, BALBINA R.
RODRIGUEZ, DOLORES R. RELACION, SINFOROSA R. BASUBAS, TEOPISTA R.
BASUBAS, FERNANDO RETUYA, BALDOMERO RETUYA, TEOFILO RETUYA,
LEONA COLINA, FIDELA R. RAMIREZ, MARTINA R. ALBAO, SEVERINA R.
CABAHUG; HEIRS OF RAFAELA VILLAMOR; ELIzABETH V. ALESNA; HEIRS OF
QUINTIN RETUYA, namely, FELIMON RETUYA, SOFIA RETUYA, RUDOLFA RETUYA
and ELISA RETUYA, Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
ULRIC CAETE as Presiding Judge of REGIONAL TRIAL COURT Branch 55,
Mandaue City, NICOLAS RETUYA; HEIRS OF EULOGIO RETUYA, namely, MIGUEL
RETUYA, RAMON RETUYA, GIL RETUYA, PIO RETUYA, MELANIO RETUYA,
NICANOR RETUYA, LEONILA RETUYA, AQUILINA RETUYA, LUTGARDA RETUYA
and PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA, Respondents.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Resolutions dated November 28,
20031 and March 3, 20042of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76235, which
dismissed petitioners' Petition for Annulment of Judgment and their Motion for
Reconsideration, respectively.
Severo Retuya (Severo) and Maxima Mayol Retuya (Maxima) were husband and wife
without any children. Severo left several parcels of land registered under his name which
are located in Mandaue City, to wit:
A parcel of land situated in Barangay Tipolo, City of Mandaue, known as Lot No. 113-U of
the Subdivision Plan, Psd -07-016382 being a portion of Lot No. 113, II-5121 Amd.
(Hacienda Mandaue) LRC Rec. 4030, containing an area of Two Hundred and Eighty-
One (281) sq. meters described in the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26728 in the Office
of the Registry of Land Title and Deeds of Mandaue City.
A parcel of land located in Barangay Tipolo, Mandaue City, known as Lot No. 5 of the
consolidation of Lot No. 122-Q, 122R, 122-S, 122-T, 122-U, 122-V, 122-W, 122-X, 122-
U, 122-AA, Psd 07-05-12450, LRC Rec. No. 4030, containing an area of Five Hundred
Seventy-Four (574) sq. meters, described in the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25213 of
the Office of the Registry of Land Title and Deeds of Mandaue City.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
A parcel of land located in Barangay Tipolo, Mandaue City, known as Lot No. 10 of the
consolidation of Lot No. 122-Q, 122-R, 122-S, 122-T, 122-U, 122-V, 122-W, 122-X, 122-Y
and 122-AA, Psd 07-05-12450, LRC Rec. No. 4030, containing an area of Four Hundred
Forty-Two (442) sq. meters, described in the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25218 of the
Office of the Registry of Land Title and Deeds of Mandaue City.
A parcel of land, Lot No. 121-1-10 of the subdivision plan, Psd 07-023191, being a
portion of Lot 121-1, LRC Psd. 262374, LRC Rec. No. 4030 located in Banilad, Mandaue
City, containing an area of One Thousand Five Hundred (1,500) sq. meters described
under TCT 32718 of the Registry of Land Title and Deeds of Mandaue City.
A parcel of land, Lot No. 47-L of the subdivision plan Psd. 07-05-012479, being a portion
of Lot 47-11-5121 Amd Hacienda Mandaue LRC Rec. No. 4030, situated in Barangay
Banilad, Mandaue City, covered by TCT 21687 in the Registry of Land Titles and Deeds
for the City of Mandaue.3
Some of these parcels of land were covered by a lease contract, the rentals of which
were received by respondents Nicolas Retuya and Procopio Villanueva, while Lot No.
47-L, covered by TCT No. 21687, was previously sold by the Heirs of Severo and
Maxima Retuya to third persons.
On June 14, 1961, Severo died intestate, survived by his wife Maxima and by Severo's
full blood brothers and sisters, namely, Nicolas, Francisco, Quintin, Eulogio, Ruperto,
Epifania, Georgia and the Heirs of Juan Retuya (Severos brother who had died earlier),
as well as Severo's half-blood siblings, namely, Romeo, Leona, Rafaela, Fidela, Severina
and Martina.
Sometime in 1971, Maxima also died intestate, survived by her siblings, namely,
Fructuoso, Daniel, Benjamin, Lorenzo, Concepcion and Teofila.
In 1996, Severo and Maxima's siblings and their nephews and nieces, herein petitioners,
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, an action 4 for judicial partition
of the above-mentioned real properties registered under the names of Severo and
Maxima, and the accounting of the rentals derived therefrom against Severo's two other
brothers, respondents Nicolas and his son Procopio Villanueva, and Eulogio, who was
represented by the latter's heirs.
Respondents Heirs of Eulogio filed their Answer 5 claiming that Severo had already sold
the subject lands to their father Eulogio by virtue of a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale of
Interests and Pro Indiviso Shares to Lands dated March 29, 1961; thus, petitioners have
46

no right to ask for the partition of the subject properties, as respondents heirs are the
owners of the same. On the other hand, respondents Nicolas and his son Procopio filed
their Answer6 admitting to have collected rentals on some of the subject properties and
that such rentals were still intact and ready for partition; and that they were willing to
partition the properties but were opposed by their co-respondents.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision 7 dated August 9, 2001, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered declaring the heirs of Eulogio
Retuya as owners of the 1/16 share of Severo Retuya to of the subject properties
representing the shares of the late Severo Retuya which he inherited from his deceased
father, Esteban Retuya and which he sold to Eulogio Retuya as follows:
Lot 113-U - 48.78 sq. meters
Lot 5 - 99.65 sq. meters
Lot 121-1-10-260 - 42 sq. meters.
and that the remaining areas of these properties, which have not been sold to
defendants Heirs of Eulogio Retuya, as well as the rental, be partitioned among the
herein parties in accordance with law.
Lot No. 10 is a road right of way and should not be partitioned. 8
Respondents Heirs of Eulogio filed a Motion for Correction 9 of Mathematical Computation
of their share in Lot 121-1-10 alleging that their correct share should be 255 sq. meters,
instead of 42 sq. meters.
Petitioners, through their then counsel, Atty. Ernesto B. Mayol, filed a
Comment10 manifesting that they will submit and abide by whatever resolution the RTC
may adopt or render in relation to the Motion for Correction of Mathematical
Computation. The other respondents, represented by Atty. Basilio Duaban, did not file
any comment despite receipt of the Order11 to do so.
On October 23, 2001, the RTC issued an Order,12 the dispositive portion of which reads:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
WHEREFORE, the decision dated August 9, 2001 is amended by changing the area of
42 sq. meters to 255 sq. meters, and the dispositive portion of said decision will now
read as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered declaring the Heirs of
Eulogio Retuya as owners of the 1/16 share of Severo Retuya to the of the subject
properties representing the shares of the late Severo Retuya, which he inherited from his
deceased father, Esteban Retuya and which he sold to Eulogio Retuya as follows:
Lot 113-U 48.78 sq. meters
Lot 5 99.65 sq. meters
Lot 121-1-10-260 255 sq. meters
and that the remaining areas of these properties, which have not been sold to
defendants Heirs of Eulogio Retuya as well as the rental be partitioned among the herein
parties in accordance with law.
Lot No. 10 is a road right of way and should not be partitioned.
Furnish parties, through counsels, copy of this Order for their information. 13
The RTC decision became final and executory.14
Respondents Heirs of Eulogio filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution,
which the RTC granted in its Order15 dated March 15, 2002.
Petitioners, through Atty. Norberto Luna, Jr., as collaborating counsel, filed a Motion to
Hold in Abeyance the Implementation of the Writ of Execution with Motion for
Clarification and Precautionary Reservation to File Pertinent Pleadings and Legal
Remedies.16 Respondents Heirs of Eulogio filed their Opposition17 thereto.
In an Order18 dated June 14, 2002, the RTC denied the motion, and the Writ of
Execution19 was issued.
Respondents Heirs of Eulogio filed a Motion to Authorize the Branch Clerk of Court to
Enforce the Amended Decision.20 Petitioners were ordered by the RTC to file their
Comment thereto. 21
47

Petitioners filed their Comment with Prayer for the Issuance of a Clarificatory Order as
22
to how the RTC arrived at the new computation of 255 sq. meters from the original award
of 42 sq. meters for Lot No. 121-1-10-260.
In an Order23 dated February 17, 2003, the RTC, after finding that what was at issue was
just the matter of mathematical computation of the area adjudicated to the parties, and in
the interest of substantial justice, set a conference to settle once and for all the exact
computation of the parties' respective shares.
On February 24, 2003, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
of the RTC Order dated October 23, 2001, amending the decision dated August 9, 2001,
claiming that the questioned Order was a patent nullity for want of jurisdiction and utter
lack of due process.
On April 30, 2003, petitioners filed with the RTC a Manifestation 24 submitting the
mathematical computation and/or mode of partitioning the shares of the opposing
parties.
As the RTC was in receipt of a copy of the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed with
the CA, it issued an Order25 holding in abeyance the resolution of respondents Motion to
Authorize the Branch Clerk of Court to enforce the RTC decision pending such petition.
In a Resolution26 dated April 24, 2003, the CA outrightly dismissed the Petition for
Annulment of Judgment. It found that three of the petitioners, namely, Promilino
Semblante, Salome Retuya and Fernando Retuya, did not sign the certification of non-
forum shopping; and that the payment of the docket fee was short of P480.00.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA granted in a
Resolution27 dated July 3, 2003 and reinstated the petition.
On July 22, 2003, respondents Heirs of Eulogio filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
July 3, 2003 Resolution,28on the ground that it was made to appear in the Petition for
Annulment of Judgment that Quintin Retuya, one of the petitioners, had signed the
certification against forum shopping on March 18, 2003, when he had already died on
July 29, 1996; that the signature of co-petitioner Romeo Retuya in the certification
against forum shopping was not his, as compared to his signature in the letter which
respondents attached to the motion for reconsideration; and that Romeo suffered a
stroke in January 2003 and was bedridden until he died on April 28, 2003.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
In a Resolution dated November 28, 2003, the CA granted respondents Motion for
Reconsideration and dismissed the petition, as no Comment was filed by petitioners. The
CA said that Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that the principal party shall
sign the certification against forum shopping, as the attestation requires personal
knowledge by the party who executed the same, otherwise, it would cause the dismissal
of the petition. Considering that Quintin, one of the parties to the petition, died on July 29,
1996, it could have been impossible for him to sign the Petition dated March 18, 2003. 1avvphi1
A Motion for Reconsideration29 was filed by Atty. Renante dela Cerna as counsel for
petitioners, contending that there was substantial compliance with the rule on certification
against forum shopping when majority of the principal parties were able to sign the
verification and certification against forum shopping. Attached in the motion for
reconsideration was the affidavit of the Heirs of Quintin acknowledging said mistake and
submitted a verification and certification duly signed by the heirs.
On March 3, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. In so ruling, the CA said:
While it may be true that when majority of the parties have signed the certification
against non-forum shopping would constitute "substantial compliance," this Court cannot
apply the same rule to petitioners. First, petitioners' counsel failed to explain why a dead
person/party was able to sign the certification against non-forum shopping. The issue is
not the parties' substantial compliance, but the dishonesty committed by the parties
and/or their counsel when they made it appear that one of the listed parties signed the
certification when in fact he died long before the petition was filed. Under Circular No. 28-
91 of the Supreme Court and Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the attestation
contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the
party who executed the same. The liberal interpretation of the rules cannot be accorded
to parties who commit dishonesty and falsehood in court.
Second, records reveal that this Motion for reconsideration was signed by a certain Atty.
Renante A. Dela Cerna as counsel for the petitioners without the counsel of record, Atty.
Norberto A. Luna's formal withdrawal. No notice of substitution of counsel was filed by
the petitioners and Atty. Dela Cerna never entered his appearance as counsel for
petitioner.
xxxx
There being no formal withdrawal or substitution of counsel made, Atty. Norberto A. Luna
remains the counsel of record for petitioners. Atty. Luna may not be presumed
48

substituted by Atty. Renante Dela Cerna merely by the latter's filing or signing of the
motion for reconsideration. In the absence of compliance with the essential requirements
for valid substitution of counsel of record, the court can presume that Atty. Luna
continuously represents the petitioners. Hence, Atty. Renante Dela Cerna has no right to
represent the petitioners in this case. 30
Hence, this petition wherein petitioners raise the sole ground that:
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITIONERS PETITION BY RULING AGAINST THE PETITIONERS' SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE TO THE CERTIFICATION AGAINST NON-FORUM SHOPPING FOR
THE ALLEGED DISHONESTY COMMITTED BY THE PARTIES AND/OR THEIR
COUNSEL WHEN THEY MADE IT APPEAR THAT ONE OF THE LISTED PARTIES
SIGNED THE CERTIFICATION, WHEN IN FACT HE DIED BEFORE THE PETITION
WAS FILED.31
The CA dismissed the Petition for Annulment of Judgment after it found that Quintin, one
of the parties to the petition, had already died on July 29, 1996, thus, it was impossible
for him to have signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to
the petition filed on March 18, 2003. The CA found petitioners to have committed
dishonesty and falsehood to the court, thus, it could not apply the liberal interpretation of
the rule on certification against forum shopping.
We found no reversible error committed by the CA.
As correctly observed by the CA, while we have in a number of cases 32 applied the
substantial compliance rule on the filing of the certification of non-forum shopping,
specially when majority of the principal parties had signed the same and who shared a
common interest, We agree with the CA that such leniency finds no applicability in this
case because of petitioners dishonesty committed against the appellate court. A perusal
of the verification and certification against forum shopping attached to the petition for
annulment of judgment filed in the CA would show that there was a signature above the
typewritten name of Quintin. In fact, written below the signature of Quintin was
Community Tax Certificate (CTC) No. 06570132, issued on January 8, 2003 in Mandaue
City. Thus, it would appear that Quintin, who was already dead at the time the petition
was filed, had signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping and he was
even in possession of a CTC. Petitioners actuation showed their lack of forthrightness to
the CA which the latter correctly found to be a dishonest act committed against it.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
Petitioners allege that the explanation of their former counsel on record, Atty. Luna, to the
show cause order issued by the CA to him that: (1) he had no intention to make it appear
that a dead man in the person of Quintin was able to sign the verification and certification
against forum shopping; (2) when he entered his appearance as counsel for petitioners
before the RTC, he, the RTC, the co-petitioners and the other respondents, as well as
their counsel, knew of the fact of Quintins death and the status of Felimon Retuya who
immediately substituted his father, and in behalf of his siblings; (3) that in his entry of
appearance filed before the RTC, it was Felimon, one of Quintin's heirs, who signed in
the above typewritten name of Quintin, were found by the CA to be meritorious and noted
the same. Thus, petitioners claim that they also have no intention of deceiving
respondents, since as explained by Atty. Luna, all the parties and counsels knew of the
death of Quintin.
We are not persuaded.
Notwithstanding that the CA had found the explanation of Atty. Luna to be meritorious,
the CA did not err when it dismissed the petition. Notably, there was a signature above
the typewritten name of Quintin without any showing that it was signed by another
person for or in behalf of Quintin. In the absence of such qualification, it appeared before
the CA that Quintin was the one who signed the same, especially since the CA did not
know of the fact of Quintins death. There was nothing in the petition for annulment of
judgment which alleged such information. In fact, we do not find any sufficient
explanation given by petitioners as to why there was a signature of Quintin appearing in
the verification and certification against forum shopping.
We also find that the CA correctly denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground
that Atty. Renante dela Cerna, the lawyer who filed the motion for reconsideration, had
no right to represent petitioners.
Under Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence, a valid
substitution of counsel has the following requirements: (1) the filing of a written
application for substitution; (2) the clients written consent; (3) the consent of the
substituted lawyer if such consent can be obtained; and, in case such written consent
cannot be procured, (4) a proof of service of notice of such motion on the attorney to be
substituted in the manner required by the Rules. 33 In this case, petitioners failed to
comply with the above requirements.
Atty. Dela Cerna, as counsel for petitioners, filed the motion for reconsideration on
December 22, 2003. However, he is not the counsel on record of petitioners, but Atty.
Luna. Petitioners did not file a motion for substitution of counsel on record before the
49
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)
filing of the motion for reconsideration. It is worthy to mention that Atty. Dela Cerna did there was no mention at all of Atty. Dela Cerna. Indeed, there was no showing of the
not even file a notice of appearance. If it has been held that courts may not presume that authority of Atty. Dela Cerna to file the motion for reconsideration for petitioners. Thus,
the counsel of record has been substituted by a second counsel merely from the filing of the CA correctly found that Atty. Dela Cerna has no personality to represent petitioners
a formal appearance by the latter,34 then with more reason that Atty. Dela Cerna could not and file the motion for reconsideration.
be considered to have substituted Atty. Luna as there was no notice of his entry of
appearance at all. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated November 28, 2003 and
March 3, 2004 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
The fact that Atty. Luna was still the counsel on record at the time Atty. Dela Cerna filed
his motion for reconsideration was established in Atty. Luna's Explanation dated March SO ORDERED.
19, 2004 to the CA's Show Cause Order to him wherein he prayed therein that an Order
be issued relieving him of his legal obligations to petitioners. Moreover, on April 30, 2004,
petitioners through their counsel on record, Atty. Luna, filed a motion for substitution of
counsels wherein they alleged that they engaged the services of Atty. Jorge Esparagosa
as their new counsel and relieved Atty. Luna of all his legal obligations to them. Notably,

50