EN BANC Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated, the Government has
not found way and means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and none are in sight,
G.R. No. L-4254 September 26, 1951
BORIS MEJOFF, petitioner, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
TUASON, J.:
This is a second petition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff, the first having been denied in a
decision of this Court of July 30, 1949. The history of the petitioner's detention was thus briefly set
forth in that decision, written by Mr. Justice Bengzon:
The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country
from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in
these Islands. Upon liberation he was arrested as a Japanese spy, by U.S. Army Counter
Intelligence Corps. Later he was handed to theCommonwealth Government for disposition
in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 682. Thereafter, the People's Court ordered
his release. But the deportation Board taking his case up, found that having no travel
documents Mejoff was illegally in this country, and consequently referred the matter to the
immigration authorities. After the corresponding investigation, the Board of commissioners
of Immigration on April 5, 1948, declared that Mejoff had entered the Philippines illegally in
1944, without inspection and admission by the immigration officials at a designation port
of entry and, therefore, it ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation
to Russia. The petitioner was then under custody, he having been arrested on March 18,
1948. In May 1948 he was transferred to the Cebu Provincial Jail together with three other
Russians to await the arrival of some Russian vessels. In July and August of that year two
boats of Russian nationality called at the Cebu Port. But their masters refused to take
petitioner and his companions alleging lack of authority to do so. In October 1948 after
repeated failures to ship this deportee abroad, the authorities removed him to Bilibid
Prison at Muntinglupa where he has been confined up to the present time, inasmuch as
the Commissioner of Immigration believes it is for the best interests of the country to keep
him under detention while arrangements for his departure are being made.
The Court held the petitioner's detention temporary and said that "temporary detention is a
necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens and that pending
arrangements for his deportation, the Government has the right to hold the undesirable alien under
confinement for a reasonable lenght of time." It took note of the fact, manifested by the Solicitor
General's representative in the course of the of the oral argumment, that "this Government desires
to expel the alien, and does not relish keeping him at the people's expense . . . making efforts to
carry out the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land." No period was fixed within which
the immigration authorities should carry out the contemplated deportation beyond the statement that
"The meaning of 'reasonable time' depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties of
obtaining a passport, the availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements with the
governments concerned and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away;" but the Court warned
that "under established precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus."
Mr. Justice Paras, now Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Perfecto, and the writer of this
decision dissented. Mr. Justice Feria and Mr. Justice Perfecto voted for outright discharge of the
prisoner from custody. Mr. Justice Paras qualified his dissent by stating that he might agree "to
further detention of the herein petitioner, provided that he be released if after six months, the
Government is still unable to deport him." This writer joined in the latter dissent but thought that two
months constituted reasonable time.
although it should be said in justice to the deportation authorities, it was through no fault of theirs
that no ship or country would take the petitioner.
Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein (Sowapadji vs. Wixon, Sept.
18, 1946, 157 F. ed., 289, 290), even if they are "stateless," which the petitioner claims to be. It is no
less true however, as impliedly stated in this Court's decision, supra, that foreign nationals, not
enemy against whom no charge has been made other than that their permission to stay has expired,
may not indefinitely be kept in detention. The protection against deprivation of liberty without due
process of law and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land is not limited to
Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.
Whether an alien who entered the country in violation of its immigration laws may be detained for as
long as the Government is unable to deport him, is a point we need not decide. The petitioner's entry
into the Philippines was not unlawful; he was brought by the armed and belligerent forces of a de
facto government whose decrees were law furing the occupation.
Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Universal
Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations of
which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and
liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was there
resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that
"Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social
origin, property, birth, or other status" (Art. 2): that "Every one has the right to an effective remedy by
the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile"
(Art. 9); etc.
In U. S. vs. Nichols, 47 Fed. Supp., 201, it was said that the court "has the power to release from
custody an alien who has been detained an unreasonably long period of time by the Department of
Justice after it has become apparent that although a warrant for his deportation has been issued, the
warrant can not be effectuated;" that "the theory on which the court is given the power to act is that
the warrant of deportation, not having been able to be executed, is functus officio and the alien is
being held without any authority of law." The decision cited several cases which, it said, settled the
matter definitely in that jurisdiction, adding that the same result had reached in innumerable cases
elsewhere. The cases referred to were United States ex rel. Ross vs. Wallis, 2 Cir. 279 F. 401, 404;
Caranica vs. Nagle, 9 Cir., 28 F. 2d 955; Saksagansky vs. Weedin, 9 Cir., 53 F. 2d 13, 16 last
paragraph; Ex parte Matthews, D.C.W.D. Wash., 277 F. 857; Moraitis vs. Delany, D.C. Md. Aug. 28,
1942, 46 F. Supp. 425.
The most recent case, as far as we have been able to find, was that of Staniszewski vs. Watkins
(1948), 90 Fed. Supp., 132, which is nearly foursquare with the case at hand. In that case a
stateless person, formerly a Polish national, resident in the United States since 1911 and many
times serving as a seaman on American vessels both in peace and in war, was ordered excluded
from the United States and detained at Ellis Island at the expense of the steamship company, when
he returned from a voyage on which he had shipped from New York for one or more European ports
and return to the United States. The grounds for his exclusion were that he had no passport or
immigration visa, and that in 1937 had been convicted of perjury because in certain documents he
presented himself to be an American citizen. Upon his application for release on habeas corpus, the
Court released him upon his own recognizance. Judge Leibell, of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, said in part:
 When the return to the writ of habeas corpus came before this court, I suggested that all
interested parties . . . make an effort to arrange to have the petitioner ship out of some
country that he would receive him as a resident. He is, a native-born Pole but the Polish
Consul has advised him in writing that he is no longer a Polish subject. This Government
does not claim that he is a Polish citizen. His attorney says he is a stateless. The
Government is willing that he go back to the ship, but if he were sent back aboard a ship
and sailed to the Port (Cherbourg, France) from which he last sailed to the United States,
he would probably be denied permission to land. There is no other country that would take
him, without proper documents.
It seems to me that this is a genuine hardship case and that the petitioner should be
released from custody on proper terms. . . .
conviction. If I assume that defendants are disposed to commit every opportune disloyal to
act helpful to Communist countries, it is still difficult to reconcile with traditional American
law the jailing of persons by the courts because of anticipated but as yet uncommitted
crimes. lmprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so
unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I
am loath to resort it, even as a discretionary judicial technique to supplement conviction of
such offenses as those of which defendants stand convicted.
But the right of every American to equal treatment before the law is wrapped up in the
same constitutional bundle with those of these Communists. If an anger or disgust with
these defendants we throw out the bundle, we alsocast aside protection for the liberties of
more worthy critics who may be in opposition to the government of some future day.

What is to be done with the petitioner? The government has had him in custody almost
seven months and practically admits it has no place to send him out of this country. The
steamship company, which employed him as one of a group sent to the ship by the Union,
with proper seaman's papers issued by the United States Coast Guard, is paying $3 a day
for petitioner's board at Ellis Island. It is no fault of the steamship company that petitioner
is an inadmissible alien as the immigration officials describe him. . . .
I intend to sustain the writ of habeas corpus and order the release of the petitioner on his
own recognizance. He will be required to inform the immigration officials at Ellis Island by
mail on the 15th of each month, stating where he is employed and where he can be
reached by mail. If the government does succeed in arranging for petitioner's deportation
to a country that will be ready to receive him as a resident, it may then advise the
petitioner to that effect and arrange for his deportation in the manner provided by law.
Although not binding upon this Court as a precedent, the case aforecited affords a happy solution to
the quandry in which the parties here finds themselves, solution which we think is sensible, sound
and compatible with law and the Constitution. For this reason, and since the Philippine law on
immigration was patterned after or copied from the American law and practice, we choose to follow
and adopt the reasoning and conclusions in the Staniszewski decision with some modifications
which, it is believed, are in consonance with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the
Philippines.
xxx xxx x x x1wphl.nt
If, however, I were to be wrong on all of these abstract or theoretical matters of principle,
there is a very practical aspect of this application which must not be overlooked or
underestimated that is the disastrous effect on the reputation of American justice if I
should now send these men to jail and the full Court later decide that their conviction is
invalid. All experience with litigation teaches that existence of a substantial question about
a conviction implies a more than negligible risk of reversal. Indeed this experience lies
back of our rule permitting and practice of allowing bail where such questions exist, to
avoid the hazard of unjustifiably imprisoning persons with consequent reproach to our
system of justice. If that is prudent judicial practice in the ordinary case, how much more
important to avoid every chance of handing to the Communist world such an ideological
weapon as it would have if this country should imprison this handful of Communist leaders
on a conviction that our highest Court would confess to be illegal. Risks, of course, are
involved in either granting or refusing bail. I am naive enough to underestimate the
troublemaking propensities of the defendants. But, with the Department of Justice alert to
the the dangers, the worst they can accomplish in the short time it will take to end the
litigation is preferable to the possibility of national embarrassment from a celebrated case
of unjustified imprisonment of Communist leaders. Under no circumstances must we
permit their symbolization of an evil force in the world to be hallowed and glorified by any
semblance of martyrdom. The way to avoid that risk is not to jail these men until it is finally
decided that they should stay jailed.

It was said or insinuated at the hearing ofthe petition at bar, but not alleged in the return, that the
If that case is not comparable with ours on the issues presented, its underlying principle is of
petitioner was engaged in subversive activities, and fear was expressed that he might join or aid the
universal application. In fact, its ratio decidendi applies with greater force to the present petition,
disloyal elements if allowed to be at large. Bearing in mind the Government's allegation in its answer
since the right of accused to bail pending apppeal of his case, as in the case of the ten Communists,
that "the herein petitioner was brought to the Philippines by the Japanese forces," and the fact that
depends upon the discretion of the court, whereas the right to be enlarged before formal charges
Japan is no longer at war with the United States or the Philippines nor identified with the countries
are instituted is absolute. As already noted, not only are there no charges pending against the
allied against these nations, the possibility of the petitioner's entertaining or committing hostile acts
petitioner, but the prospects of bringing any against him are slim and remote.
prejudicial to the interest and security of this country seems remote.

Premises considered, the writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from
If we grant, for the sake of argument, that such a possibility exists, still the petitioner's unduly
custody upon these terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration
prolonged detention would be unwarranted by law and the Constitution, if the only purpose of the
authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he
detention be to eliminate a danger that is by no means actual, present, or uncontrolable. After all,
keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance shall be
the Government is not impotent to deal with or prevent any threat by such measure as that just
reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court of
outlined. The thought eloquently expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme
First Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse. He shall also put up a bond for the above
Court in connection with the appliccation for bail of ten Communists convicted by a lower court of
purpose in the amount of P5,000 with sufficient surety or sureties, which bond the Commissioner of
advocacy of violent overthrow of the United States Government is, in principle, pertinent and may be
Immigration is authorized to exact by section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
availed of at this juncture. Said the learned Jurist:

The Governmet's alternative contention is that defendants, by misbehavior after

conviction, have forfeited their claim to bail. Grave public danger is said to result from
what they may be expected to do, in addition to what they have done since their

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2662 March 26, 1949
SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner,
vs.
Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel
MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major
FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.
MORAN, C.J.:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding
General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period covering 19433 and
19444 who is now charged before a military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the
Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his
duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against
noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and
customs of war" comes before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No.
68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and
Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission
and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioners.
In support of his case petitioner tenders the following principal arguments.
First. "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provision of
our constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a
signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare and therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international."
Hence petitioner argues "That in view off the fact that this commission has been empanelled by
virtue of an unconstitutional law an illegal order this commission is without jurisdiction to try herein
petitioner."
Second. That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the
Commission in behalf of the United State of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port
who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is a
diminution of our personality as an independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are a
violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice law in the
Philippines.
Third. That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the United State not
being a party in interest in the case.
Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and regulation
governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of the Philippines on the
29th days of July, 1947 This Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our
Constitution provides in its section 3, that
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including
the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international
jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been
guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and
offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of
humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and
enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with
the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as
Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of
Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) 1 when we said
War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed
hostilities incident of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of
war. An importance incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure by the military
command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary
measure those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have
violated the law of war. (Ex parte Quirin 317 U.S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.) Indeed the power to
create a military commission for the trial and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of
waging war. And in the language of a writer a military commission has jurisdiction so long
as a technical state of war continues. This includes the period of an armistice or military
occupation up to the effective of a treaty of peace and may extend beyond by treaty
agreement. (Cowles Trial of War Criminals by Military Tribunals, America Bar Association
Journal June, 1944.)
Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this
unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance and
enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the
Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that
the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based
on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were
accepted by the two belligerent nation the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two
Convention, Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and
principle of international law as continued inn treaties to which our government may have been or
shall be a signatory.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines
was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound together with the
United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the
belligerent countries. These rights and obligation were not erased by our assumption of full
sovereignty. If at all our emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce the right on our own of
trying and punishing those who committed crimes against crimes against our people. In this
connection it is well to remember what we have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):
. . . The change of our form government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect
the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during then
Commonwealth because it is an offense against the same sovereign people. . . .
By the same token war crimes committed against our people and our government while we were a CARPIO, J.:
Commonwealth are triable and punishable by our present Republic.
The Case
Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys namely Melville S. Hussey and
Robert Port in the prosecution of his case on the ground that said attorney's are not qualified to
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the
practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said
Sandiganbayan (First Division)1 dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No.
attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty.
0037. The first Resolution dismissed petitioners Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the
confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied petitioners
In the first place respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended
law and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. It has already been shown that Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for
Executive Order No. 68 which provides for the organization of such military commission is a valid further proceedings allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence.
and constitutional law. There is nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel
appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in
Antecedent Facts
accordance with the Rules of Court. In facts it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the
parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") creating the Presidential
Secondly the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty. It
Commission on Good Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-
is only fair and proper that United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her
gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates
government and her people to a tribunal of our nation should be allowed representation in the trial of
and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct investigation as
those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our
may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order" and the power
government but by the United State Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of
"(h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this
her enemies. The least that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow them representation in said
order." Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-
trials.
Graft Board ("AFP Board") tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices
by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.2
Alleging that the United State is not a party in interest in the case petitioner challenges the
personality of attorneys Hussey and Port as prosecutors. It is of common knowledge that the United
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of
State and its people have been equally if not more greatly aggrieved by the crimes with which
respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas ("Ramas"). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued
petitioner stands charged before the Military Commission. It can be considered a privilege for our
a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. The
Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the honor of its citizens and its
relevant part of the Resolution reads:
government to a military tribunal of our country.

III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:

The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law with jurisdiction over the
crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having said petitioner
in its custody, this Court will not interfere with the due process of such Military commission. Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan
St., La Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has
an area of 3,327 square meters.
For all the foregoing the petition is denied with costs de oficio.

The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at P700,000.00.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of Elizabeth
Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all covered by
invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items
EN BANC could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent
Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
G.R. No. 104768 July 21, 2003
Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was also
able to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and ELIZABETH
DIMAANO, Respondents. Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine Army,
stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of
respondent. That respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth
DECISION
Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano
embraces and kisses respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to
the residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and owned by
MGen Ramas.
Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of
income and is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military equipment/items
seized in her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns
the P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.
This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There was
an intention to cover the existence of these money because these are all ill-gotten and unexplained
wealth. Were it not for the affidavits of the members of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp
Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money would have never been
known.
The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny and analysis
by the Boards consultant. Although the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not
included, still it was disclosed that respondent has an unexplained wealth of P104,134. 60.
IV. CONCLUSION:
In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against respondent for ill-
gotten and unexplained wealth in the amount of P2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.
V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for
violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and
RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired
Property."3
Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 ("RA
No. 1379") 4against Ramas.
Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed an
Amended Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines ("petitioner"), represented by the
PCGG, as plaintiff and Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth
Dimaano ("Dimaano") as co-defendant.
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army
until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit,
Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to February
1979. The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas "acquired funds, assets and properties
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately
acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority
and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close
associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos."5
The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found reasonable
ground to believe that respondents have violated RA No. 1379.6 The Amended Complaint prayed for,
among others, the forfeiture of respondents properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim to
the Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a
residential house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out of
proportion to his salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu
City and the cash, communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house of
Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerk-
typist in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the
monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine
Constabulary raiding team.
After termination of the pre-trial,7 the court set the case for trial on the merits on 9-11 November
1988.
On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due to its lack of preparation
for trial and the absence of witnesses and vital documents to support its case. The court reset the
hearing to 17 and 18 April 1989.
On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order "to charge the
delinquent properties with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by
defendant Dimaano alone x x x."8
Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with petitioners
presentation of evidence on the ground that the motion for leave to amend complaint did not state
when petitioner would file the amended complaint. The Sandiganbayan further stated that the
subject matter of the amended complaint was on its face vague and not related to the existing
complaint. The Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the case had been pending in
court, petitioner should proceed to present its evidence.
After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of the trial.
On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner manifested its inability to
proceed to trial because of the absence of other witnesses or lack of further evidence to present.
Instead, petitioner reiterated its motion to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence already
presented or to change the averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired the monies
or properties subject of the forfeiture.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a year mainly
because of its many postponements. Moreover, petitioner would want the case to revert to its
preliminary stage when in fact the case had long been ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered
petitioner to prepare for presentation of its additional evidence, if any.
During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to present further evidence.
Giving petitioner one more chance to present further evidence or to amend the complaint to conform
to its evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The Sandiganbayan, however,
hinted that the re-setting was without prejudice to any action that private respondents might take
under the circumstances.
However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial because it had
no further evidence to present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner
60 days within which to file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned
petitioner that failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic action.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino. 9 The Court
held in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military
officers by reason of mere position held without a showing that they are "subordinates" of former
President Marcos.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without
pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the
confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered returned
to Elizabeth Dimaano.
The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has
primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as the
evidence warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection
herewith.
SO ORDERED.
On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.
In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a Joint Comment/Opposition
to which petitioner filed its Reply on 10 January 1992.
On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:
(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme
Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan10 and Republic v. Migrino11 which involve the same
issues.
(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was
conducted against Ramas and Dimaano.
(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against
him.
(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONERS
EVIDENCE CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS NO
SHOWING OF CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP BY CONSANGUINITY
OR AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN RESPONDENT RAMAS AND RESPONDENT
DIMAANO NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS WERE
CLEARLY UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE, HAVING BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO
THE COMPLETION OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PETITIONER.
B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTIONS
TAKEN BY THE PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL
COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE
WITH THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN,
194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO, 189 SCRA 289, NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT:
1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic v. Migrino,
supra, are clearly not applicable to this case;
2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in Civil Case No.
0037 was cured and/or waived by respondents with the filing of their respective
answers with counterclaim; and
3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper considering that
they were filed after commencement of the presentation of the evidence of the
petitioner and even before the latter was allowed to formally offer its evidence
and rest its case;
C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ARTICLES
AND THINGS SUCH AS SUMS OF MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT,
JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT
DIMAANO WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE. 12
The Courts Ruling
First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents
This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan13 and Republic v. Migrino.14
The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause
the filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No.
1379.
We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is-
AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.15 The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make
the necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies on the action to be taken
[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and
based on its findings.16 The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGGs power
specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be
under Section 3 of EO No. 1 "to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish
held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned
and to carry out the purposes of this order." EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to
[Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation
wit:
of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].

SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the
[T]he term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association with
following matters:
former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close
associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his No. 2.
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or
abroad, including the takeover and sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
xxx
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue
advantage of their public office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationship. It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee
during the administration of former President Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the
respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the
Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. (Emphasis supplied)
Commission from time to time.

x x x.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO
No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the
administration of former President Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative,
subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers,
influence x x x;17 or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the
President assigns their cases to the PCGG.18
Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major
General19 does not suffice to make him a "subordinate" of former President Marcos for purposes of
EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that Ramas was a
close associate of former President Marcos, in the same manner that business associates,
dummies, agents or nominees of former President Marcos were close to him. Such close
association is manifested either by Ramas complicity with former President Marcos in the
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by former President Marcos
acquiescence in Ramas own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.
This, the PCGG failed to do.

Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas case to the PCGG.
Petitioners attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner
Therefore, Ramas case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG
argues that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the instant case states that the AFP
could exercise its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate
Board conducted the investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379.
of former President Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of the Philippine
Petitioner asserts that there is a presumption that the PCGG was acting within its jurisdiction of
Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas position enabled him to receive orders directly from his
investigating crony-related cases of graft and corruption and that Ramas was truly a subordinate of
commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a subordinate of former President Marcos.
the former President. However, the same AFP Board Resolution belies this contention. Although the
Resolution begins with such statement, it ends with the following recommendation:
We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated
under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
V. RECOMMENDATION:

Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a "subordinate" as this term
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for
is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with
violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and
former President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:
RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired
Property."20
A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated
within the term subordinate. The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover
Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents under EO Nos.
the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379
relatives, and close associates both here and abroad.
without any relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its
amendments proves fatal to petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited
EO No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos purpose, and necessarily its powers must be construed to address such specific and limited
and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, purpose.
dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation.
Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show that the
properties Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by him in his capacity as a "subordinate" of
his commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned and
suggested that these properties were disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate income
without showing that Ramas amassed them because of his close association with former President
Marcos. Petitioner, in fact, admits that the AFP Board resolution does not contain a finding that
Ramas accumulated his wealth because of his close association with former President Marcos,
thus:
10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines did not categorically find a prima facie evidence showing that respondent Ramas
unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former
President Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that such omission was not fatal. The
resolution of the Anti-Graft Board should be read in the context of the law creating the same and the
objective of the investigation which was, as stated in the above, pursuant to Republic Act Nos. 3019
and 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a;21(Emphasis supplied)
Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten
wealth was accumulated by a "subordinate" of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on
PCGG. EO No. 122 clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-
gotten wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates
and close associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal is clearly contrary to the
intent behind the creation of the PCGG.
In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,23 the Court outlined the cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the
PCGG pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2,24 14,25 14-A:26
A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation with Sections 1, 2 and 3
of Executive Order No. 14, shows what the authority of the respondent PCGG to investigate and
prosecute covers:
(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth
under Republic Act No. 1379, accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or
abroad, including the take-over or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities
owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through his nominees,
by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority and
influence, connections or relationships; and
(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the acquisition of said
ill-gotten wealth as contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.
However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise falling
under the foregoing categories, require a previous authority of the President for the
respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of Executive
Order No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman and other
duly authorized investigating agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors, their
assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his assistants and the state
prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)
The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture
petitions not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of
unexplained wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman, while the authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor
General.27 The Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No. 6770 ("RA No. 6770") vests in the Ombudsman
the power to conduct preliminary investigation and to file forfeiture proceedings involving
unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986.28
After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this case despite the
absence of a prima facie finding that Ramas was a "subordinate" of former President Marcos. The
petition for forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of authority by the
PCGG to investigate respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its
amendments apply to respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended Complaint
state that there are violations of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should have
recommended Ramas case to the Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:
[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of
private respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined
from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper
prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to exercise
only the powers granted to it.
Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture
petition by submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as well.
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in the
first place. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it.
PCGGs powers are specific and limited. Unless given additional assignment by the President,
PCGGs sole task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and
cronies.29 Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.
Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG to investigate and
prosecute their cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as soon as they learned of the
pronouncement of the Court in Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August 1990, which explains
why private respondents only filed their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990. Nevertheless, we
have held that the parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding. 30 Thus, we
hold that there was no waiver of jurisdiction in this case. Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the
parties to an action.31
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the
preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary investigation for
violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file the forfeiture petition with
the Sandiganbayan.32 The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not
subject to prescription, laches or estoppel.33
Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case
Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of
the presentation of petitioners evidence.
We disagree.
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner has
only itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been
pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed its Amended
Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner
had almost two years to prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time, petitioner still
delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for postponements
and extensions. Even before the date set for the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13
April 1989, a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint.34 The motion sought "to charge the
delinquent properties (which comprise most of petitioners evidence) with being subject to forfeiture
as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x."
The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioners evidence since
petitioner did not state when it would file the amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the
Sandiganbayan set the continuation of the presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and 9-11
October 1989, giving petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989,
petitioner manifested its inability to proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The
Sandiganbayan issued an Order expressing its view on the matter, to wit:
The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events because this case
has been ready for trial for over a year and much of the delay hereon has been due to the inability of
the government to produce on scheduled dates for pre-trial and for trial documents and witnesses,
allegedly upon the failure of the military to supply them for the preparation of the presentation of
evidence thereon. Of equal interest is the fact that this Court has been held to task in public about its
alleged failure to move cases such as this one beyond the preliminary stage, when, in view of the
developments such as those of today, this Court is now faced with a situation where a case already
in progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a five-month pause where appropriate
action could have been undertaken by the plaintiff Republic.35
On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting a preliminary investigation
on the unexplained wealth of private respondents as mandated by RA No. 1379.36 The PCGG
prayed for an additional four months to conduct the preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan
granted this request and scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29 March 1990. However, on
the scheduled date, petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of the preliminary investigation
the PCGG supposedly conducted. Again, the Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until 18 May 1990 to
continue with the presentation of its evidence and to inform the court of "what lies ahead insofar as
the status of the case is concerned x x x."37 Still on the date set, petitioner failed to present its
evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner filed its Re-Amended Complaint. 38 The Sandiganbayan
correctly observed that a case already pending for years would revert to its preliminary stage if the
court were to accept the Re-Amended Complaint.
Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to complete
the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than sufficient time to
finish the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioners delays and yet
petitioner ended the long-string of delays with the filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would
only prolong even more the disposition of the case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to
dismiss the case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against
private respondents. This alone would have been sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to
dismiss the forfeiture case against private respondents.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioners evidence.
Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from
Dimaanos house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a
significant effect on petitioners case since these properties comprise most of petitioners evidence
against private respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case against
private respondents if these properties are inadmissible in evidence.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a search warrant
captioned "Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition." Dimaano was not present during the
raid but Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the
seizure receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized
these items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol,
caliber .45; communications equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and
land titles.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and
seizure "on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution." 39 Petitioner argues
that a revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1
announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were "taking power in the name and by
the will of the Filipino people."40 Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively
withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary
right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that
all rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the
search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and
use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not
enjoy any constitutional right.
Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquinos
Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was "done in defiance of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution."41 The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the
revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of
the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of
power by the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to
24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether
the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("Covenant") and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration") remained in effect
during the interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration
remained in effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme
law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the
abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher
than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a
person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a
constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate
Justice Reynato S. Puno:42
A revolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any
country or state by those who were previously subject to it" or as "a sudden, radical and
fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least
some acts of violence." In Kelsen's book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that
which "occurs whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . .
a way not prescribed by the first order itself."
If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the validity and
propriety of sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these
particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have received constitutional
approbation and sanction. As already mentioned, the Provisional or "Freedom" Constitution
recognizes the power and duty of the President to enact "measures to achieve the mandate of the
people to . . . (r)ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous
regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or
accounts." And as also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution treats
of, and ratifies the "authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated
March 25, 1986."

The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were fully aware that the
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly known as
sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both constitutions had
the "people power revolution" that the Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime.
to include specific language recognizing the validity of the sequestration orders. The following
This revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government.
discourse by Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission is instructive:
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as "an inherent right of a
people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of
FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the arguments in defense
government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods
of the present amendment.
of making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable." It has
been said that "the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state" and from
there is derived "the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salongas lecture in the Gregorio Araneta University
government without regard to the existing constitution." Foundation, of which all of us have been given a copy. On the one hand, he argues that everything
the Commission is doing is traditionally legal. This is repeated by Commissioner Romulo also.
Minister Salonga spends a major portion of his lecture developing that argument. On the other hand,
xxx
almost as an afterthought, he says that in the end what matters are the results and not the legal
niceties, thus suggesting that the PCGG should be allowed to make some legal shortcuts, another
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional word for niceties or exceptions.
processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a
Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986
Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM for special protection?
presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government which
The answer is clear. What they are doing will not stand the test of ordinary due process, hence they
was met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet
are asking for protection, for exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios, fine, as the saying
and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of
stands, but let us not say grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not an allowable
the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then in effect, had
extrapolation. Hence, we should not give the exceptions asked for, and let me elaborate and give
ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)
three reasons:

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum
First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the CONCOM is to hasten
would render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good
constitutional normalization. Very much at the heart of the constitutional normalization is the full
Government ("PCGG") before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders,
effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We cannot, in one breath, ask for constitutional normalization and at
which direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance
the same time ask for a temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at the heart of
without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of
constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that would be a repetition of Marcosian protestation of
Rights.
due process and rule of law. The New Society word for that is "backsliding." It is tragic when we
begin to backslide even before we get there.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the
Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained. The committee report
Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the
asks for extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six months after the convening of
adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders
Congress, and Congress may even extend this longer.
as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.

In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on Good
Government,43 petitioner Baseco, while conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the
interregnum, questioned the continued validity of the sequestration orders upon adoption of the
Freedom Constitution in view of the due process clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the
Freedom Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the validity of
sequestration orders, thus:
Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice. What the committee
report is asking for is that we should allow the new government to acquire the vice of disregarding
the Bill of Rights.
Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The practitioners of the vice begin to
think that they have a vested right to its practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the
franchise. That would be an unhealthy way of consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.
Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties is an argument that
is very disturbing. When it comes from a staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a Minister,
and repeated verbatim by another staunch Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly
disturbing and even discombobulating. The argument makes the PCGG an auctioneer, placing the
Bill of Rights on the auction block. If the price is right, the search and seizure clause will be sold.
"Open your Swiss bank account to us and we will award you the search and seizure clause. You can
keep it in your private safe."
Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the hoarders of hidden
wealth. The hoarders will release the hidden health if the ransom price is paid and the ransom price
is the Bill of Rights, specifically the due process in the search and seizure clauses. So, there is
something positively revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale to the highest
bidder nor can it be used to ransom captive dollars. This nation will survive and grow strong, only if it
would become convinced of the values enshrined in the Constitution of a price that is beyond
monetary estimation.
For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is to delete all of Section
8 of the committee report and allow the new Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If Section 8 is
deleted, the PCGG has two options. First, it can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo argument
that what the PCGG has been doing has been completely within the pale of the law. If sustained, the
PCGG can go on and should be able to go on, even without the support of Section 8. If not
sustained, however, the PCGG has only one honorable option, it must bow to the majesty of the Bill
of Rights.
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me conclude with what
another Christian replied when asked to toy around with the law. From his prison cell, Thomas More
said, "I'll give the devil benefit of law for my nations safety sake." I ask the Commission to give the
devil benefit of law for our nations sake. And we should delete Section 8.
Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)
Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment excepting
sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Commission still adopted the
amendment as Section 26,44 Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the Constitution
were fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration orders would not stand the test of due
process under the Bill of Rights.
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the
interregnum, absent a constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of
Rights, would clearly render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless,
even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the
Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed
responsibility for the States good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a
signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 45 recognized in the present
Covenant." Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure
that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence."
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Although the signatories to the Declaration did not
intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the
Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the
State.46 Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe
the rights47 of individuals under the Declaration.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the
interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under
the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the
Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human
beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the
revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it
repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could
not escape responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under
international law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives
and orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if
contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted
verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.48 The Provisional Constitution served as a self-
limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers entrusted to it by
the people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them
by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the
Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned
the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge
upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid
with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by
petitioners witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:
Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian
AJ AMORES
Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for weapons. What else, aside
from the weapons, were seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US dollars, some jewelries,
land titles, sir.
Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the house of Elizabeth
Dimaano. Do you know the reason why your team also seized other properties not mentioned in
said search warrant?
A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed that the reason why
they also brought the other items not included in the search warrant was because the money and
other jewelries were contained in attach cases and cartons with markings "Sony Trinitron", and I
think three (3) vaults or steel safes. Believing that the attach cases and the steel safes were
containing firearms, they forced open these containers only to find out that they contained money.
xxx Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that only weapons were
in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason why your team seized
this money instead of weapons? A. Yes, your Honor.50

A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him decided to bring along also xxx
the money because at that time it was already dark and they felt most secured if they will bring that
because they might be suspected also of taking money out of those items, your Honor.49
Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle M-16 and how many
ammunition?
Cross-examination
A. Forty, sir.
Atty. Banaag
Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with the fiscals office who
Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was applied before the charged Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition?
Municipal Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1?
A. Yes, sir.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what happened to that case?
Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of five (5) baby armalite
rifles M-16 and five (5) boxes of ammunition?
A. I think it was dismissed, sir.

A. Yes, sir.
Q. In the fiscals office?

xxx
A. Yes, sir.

AJ AMORES
Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a Memorandum
Receipt in the name of Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?
Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the house of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. I think that was the reason, sir.

A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU elements, your Honor.
Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?
Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant, like for instance,
jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?
A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring along also the
jewelries and other items, sir. I do not really know where it was taken but they brought along also
these articles. I do not really know their reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that these
were taken because they might get lost if they will just leave this behind.

xxx
A. Yes, your Honor.

Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also included in the search
Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any other properties or
warrant?
contraband which could be found in the residence of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was discovered to be
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for instance, the
contained in attach cases.1wphi1 These attach cases were suspected to be containing pistols or
communications equipment and money. However, I did not include that in the application for search
other high powered firearms, but in the course of the search the contents turned out to be money.
warrant considering that we have not established concrete evidence about that. So when
So the team leader also decided to take this considering that they believed that if they will just leave
the money behind, it might get lost also.
Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by your raiding team, like EN BANC
Transfer Certificates of Title of lands?

A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened.51

G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search
warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO
authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items OCAMPO, petitioners,
could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure.52 Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its vs.
authority when it seized these items. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN
DOES, respondents.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se,53 and
they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we
do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and The City Attorney for petitioners.
seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor.
We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano. The Solicitor General for public respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding
the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may
warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a VITUG, J.:
determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.

The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed
SO ORDERED.
into focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction.
The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR
Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."

The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one
of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers
Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private
respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association,
Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12
July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. 1 Prior to their receipt of
the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls
should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". 2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their
President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the
CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to
be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed
as CHR Case No. 90-1580. 3 On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to
desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the
vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before
the CHR. 4

On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well
as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the
demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, 5 the CHR, in its resolution of
1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in
favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the
Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with
the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." 6
A motion to dismiss, 7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also
averred, among other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the
Inter-Agency Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors
agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in
Metro-Manila;
xxx xxx xxx
3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred
to therein refers to moratorium in the demolition of the structures of poor
dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent
business entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of
1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the
sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion
and authority whether or not a certain business establishment (should) be
allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a
permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the
motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise
manifested that they would bring the case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that
the Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of
violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil
and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business." 9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with
the contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously
objected to by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved). 10
In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out
the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it
imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.
On 1 March 1991, 12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and
supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had
jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who complained of
the gross violations of their human and constitutional rights. The motion to
dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a
paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a
quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human
rights of all persons within the Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life
and to dignity. All these brazenly and violently ignored and trampled upon by
respondents with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of women
and children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have
psychologically scarred and traumatized the children, who were witness and
exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.
In an Order, 14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently
reinstated, however, in our resolution 16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary
restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-
1580." 17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose
stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of
Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his
comment for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own comment, 18 through Hon. Samuel
Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of private
respondent Roque Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991,
requiring such comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution. 19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order
No. 163, 20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded,
but so superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights. 21
The powers and functions 22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide
for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to
enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights
and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their
families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty
obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the
intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial
body. 23 This view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cario v. Commission
on Human Rights, 24 the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa,
has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any
resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to
the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental
law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate
much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact
as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But
fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively,
finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this
controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to
define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a
symposium on human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the University of the Philippines in
1977, one of the questions that has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human
rights?" The participants, representing different sectors of the society, have given the following
varied answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity.
They are the same in all parts of the world, whether the Philippines or England,
Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property;
freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom, and the rights
of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the right to elect
public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political associations
and engage in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an education,
employment, and social services. 25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the
sheer fact of his humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights are not
granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it. 26
 (Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights
defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They
are part of his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable. 28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an
individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the
term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally
considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional
Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in creating an independent
commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look back at the country's experience
under the martial law regime which may have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in
our fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented
perhaps of the sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected
jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in
the Philippines," 29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of
Rights most of the human rights expressed in the International Covenant, these
rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21
September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the
thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and
held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until ordered
released by the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to petition
for the redress of grievances became useless, since group actions were
forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media were subjected to
censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence and security of
tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit
letters of resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture
to extort confessions were practiced as declared by international bodies like
Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following
discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of
the importance of human rights and also because civil and political rights have
been determined by many international covenants and human rights legislations
in the Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and
subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we
might diffuse its impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity
would also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the
commission can be most effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights
are very broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights.
Every single right of an individual involves his civil right or his political right. So,
where do we draw the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in
the language of human rights advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on the right to life, the
right against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These are
very specific rights that are considered enshrined in many international
documents and legal instruments as constituting civil and political rights, and
these are precisely what we want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as
defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil
and Political Rights distinguished this right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and
economic rights, and there are other violations of rights of citizens which can be
addressed to the proper courts and authorities.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions,
and, therefore, in doing that the commission will be authorized to take under its
wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under the
jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the
government. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to
define the specific parameters which cover civil and political rights as covered
by the international standards governing the behavior of governments regarding
the particular political and civil rights of citizens, especially of political detainees
or prisoners. This particular aspect we have experienced during martial law
which we would now like to safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we
are really trying to say is, perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all those
rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined as
human rights. Those are the rights that we envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our
Constitution. They are integral parts of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under
the Bill of Rights covered by human rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I
would like to state that in the past regime, everytime we invoke the violation of
human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as a matter of
fact, they had defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent
housing and a life consistent with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political
rights. Is that the sense of the committee, so as not to confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points
raised by the previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act
effectively: 1) protection of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners
and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of
disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed
against the religious.
xxx xxx xxx
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we
should, in order to make the proposed Commission more effective, delimit as
much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the
concept and jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". I was actually
disturbed this morning when the reference was made without qualification to the
rights embodied in the universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later
on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after
mentioning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or
linked the concept of human right with other human rights specified in other
convention which I do not remember. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture
of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention
on Civil and Political Rights of which we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other
covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights specified in that
other convention which may not be specified here. I was wondering whether it
would be wise to link our concept of human rights to general terms like
"convention," rather than specify the rights contained in the convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the
Committee, before the period of amendments, could specify to us which of
these articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and political
rights, not for the purpose of including these in the proposed constitutional
article, but to give the sense of the Commission as to what human rights would
be included, without prejudice to expansion later on, if the need arises. For
example, there was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado
as to whether the right to marry would be considered a civil or a social right. It is
not a civil right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and
political rights that we felt must be envisioned initially by this provision
freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to fair and
public trials, as well as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings
and collective violations. So, it is limited to politically related crimes precisely to
protect the civil and political rights of a specific group of individuals, and
therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no
longer linking his concept or the concept of the Committee on Human Rights
with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, I was referring to an international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
 MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific
article therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil and politically related, as
we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction
between civil and social rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International
Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the
different rights-the rights of labor to organize, the right to education, housing,
shelter, et cetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the
committee to those that the Gentlemen has specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights,
I cannot stress more on how much we need a Commission on Human Rights. . .
. have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few
lawyers will accept clients who do not pay. And so, they are the ones more
abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very delicate
torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre and
the persons who are allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians, men in
the military and big shots. Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must be
independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission,
especially for the little Filipino, the little individual who needs this kind of help
and cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate only on civil and political
violations because if we open this to land, housing and health, we will have no
place to go again and we will not receive any response. . . . 30 (emphasis
supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision
empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any
party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights," 31 has been defined as referring
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider
sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or
administration of the government. They include the rights of property, marriage,
equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined
civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a
state or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights
capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution,
unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt. 32
Political rights, 33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in
the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public
office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the
management of government. 34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that
the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more
severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the
"(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of
tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and
(6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant
to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless,
significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in
peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They
human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its
recommendation." 35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the
stalls, sari-saristores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents
on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins
the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national
highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is
indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first
place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards
hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared
to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the
private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and
political rights" intended by the Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines
and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of
Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to
cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in
accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite
for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational
guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the
power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said
body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like,
in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order)
in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an
adjudicative power that it does not possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on
Human Rights, 36 the Court, speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino, explained:

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive

measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights
have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction
for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.
"Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived
by implication.

EN BANC
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the
Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of
preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of
the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR
itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within
his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO,
A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE,
pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted). vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and RELATIONS, respondents.
recommendations to any appropriate agency of government. 37
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to
the vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.
there lack of locus standion the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more
importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially
consider.

The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become
moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard,
and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive
remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an
act already accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its
resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to
also prevent CHR from precisely doing that. 39
MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as
PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas,
Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are
officers and members of the petitioner Union.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights
is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the
P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made
permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang
on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the
workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts
(from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the
respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the
respondent Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties parties
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass
demonstration at Malacaang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig
Police Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM)
workers as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and
8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00
A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1)
Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section
heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano
de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected
mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin
Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled
because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained
further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the
union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager,
informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation
of the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon
warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the
demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4,
1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA
and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked
Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was
composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and
Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company
reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers
may join the Malacaang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular
shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and
should report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in
order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO
LOCKOUT NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the
Company shall be dismiss; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the
officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass demonstration.
The union panel countered that it was rather too late to change their plans
inasmuch as the Malacaang demonstration will be held the following morning;
and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to
the Company which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of
which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT
EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8,
Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration
despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to
participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized
for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of
the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners
and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6
in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA
providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was
accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24,
rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief
Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA
because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4,
1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of
speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration
was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D",
pp. 31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M.
Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining
in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion
Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly
responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered
to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.);
and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59,
rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is
contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days within which to file their
arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp.
57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company
averred that herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17
(should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until
September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that because their
motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien
vs. Castillo, 1 which held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period for the filing
of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M",
pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated October 11,
1969, in support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion for
reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary
period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on
October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October 24,
1969 and addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of
Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion
for reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an
appeal from the decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from the
order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration
on time was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the president of the
petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said
president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969,
herein petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex
"L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by
the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human
personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable
character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts
and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person." 2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the
assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments,
and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general principles." 3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw
"certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's
rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly,
and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections." 4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State,
was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits
to the authority it was entitled to exercise." 5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among
the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to
protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated,
not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to
listen. 6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and
the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected. 7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political
rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete
fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment
of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in
the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to
the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the
imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property
rights is recognized. 8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as
the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government
regulation only "with narrow specificity." 9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If
human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to
limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials,
of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred
position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere
reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose
that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law
which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement
of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate
danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the
main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the
opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs.
Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs.
Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly
and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when
exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be
governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice
Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz.
whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage
of work," herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective
bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and
tested by foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such conclusion cannot be sustained.
The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacaang was against alleged
abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said
demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general and of
their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate
governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig.
They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe
were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect
herein petitioner Union and its members fro the harassment of local police officers. It was to the
interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its
employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as
consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as
profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local
police. Was it securing peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the
local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its
own employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers the alleged oppressive police who
might have been all the more emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of
petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein
private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them
by the Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of
their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6
o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their
property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life
and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark
reality abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of
the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-
vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as
well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The
debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully
evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying
day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly
and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic
reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon at once the shield and armor of the dignity and
worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization becomes
Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can
produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against
police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence
a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of
the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement,
is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the
constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to
the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe
regular working hours." The strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated
working shifts deny the workers the right to stage mass demonstration against police abuses during
working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and deserves severe
condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally
enjoined by any court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the
workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The respondent Court of
Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration
of a strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is concerted act and the
occurrence of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the
demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M.
to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand
failed appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely
the complete unity of the Union members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in
order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediately action
on the part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised
against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. 21 If
demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the
demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the
purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a
substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued
alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two days in advance of their
projected demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent
whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in
this case when the Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the
demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the
company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43,
rec.). There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting
the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the
Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is
as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of
the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against
alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service
constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and
freedom petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice
defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the
Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to
engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair
labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights
guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the
respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police
abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in
such common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. The
insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shift
should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated,
"a potent means of inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal protection as
the concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank president
with immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in the appointment and promotion of ban
employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to
come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875,
"it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated," as
long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court
dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is
an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company" and
"warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who
without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who
are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning
(March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and,
therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of
dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass demonstration. However, the
issues that the employees raised against the local police, were more important to them because
they had the courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most
that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the
day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a
family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their
demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But management was
adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free assembly
and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers
proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that
the evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities having
jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the
Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to disciplining the local police officers
involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration
"paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This
significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not
present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to comply with purchase orders on
that day; or that penalties were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that
day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of its
failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were
damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a
sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric
consumption that day. Such savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or
damages it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to
petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the
workers for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work,
constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly
employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is
emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall
afford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is
under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in
favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of
"meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations
is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging
and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of
collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most
unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very governmental
agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed
mission its raison d'etre as ordained and directed by the Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of
jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a
criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through
habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the
remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced
confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25or who is denied the
right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of
law, 26even after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these
constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and
aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the
municipal police. Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial
Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a
nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public offices including the
courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must not
be nullified by mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a
purely delegate legislative power, when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the
untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of the
freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one
article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised
when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced,
inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by
rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for
time. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because
he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required
diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent legal
services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its order or writ
should filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion
shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16).
As above intimated, these rules of procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations
pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on
September 22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim
that they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of
the petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply
with a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration or appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail
over constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To
accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights
sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional
government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but
also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional
right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed.
Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or
strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying
the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule,
promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is
beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to
file a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do
not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re
hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of
Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if
September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of
Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based
on the ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and
facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which
to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations
(Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by the herein petitioners on
October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period required for the filing of
such supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Herein
petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the
motion for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary period
(Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or
where the arguments in suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period
provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision subject of 29-
a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But in all these cases, the constitutional rights of
free expression, free assembly and petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must be
specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in
such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for
the first time on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to
a decision of the case, the very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which no final and
complete determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that a procedural rule of
Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the
procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the
constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor
practice charged against them and in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is
a most compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges
on such human rights. 30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own rules
or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr.
Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-c reiterated this principle
and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without
concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to
do justice, in any case, without further loss of time, provided that the right of the
parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may
treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words, when all the
material facts are spread in the records before Us, and all the parties have
been duly heard, it matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment
or of jurisdiction. We can then and there render the appropriate judgment. Is
within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and within
the power of this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the
admit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in
 any error of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a
flaw of jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on
whether or not the errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of
Appeals are short of being jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this Court would still
be on firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said decision here and
now even if such errors can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or
only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary
return of this case to the lower court for the sole purpose of pursuing the
ordinary course of an appeal. (Emphasis supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this particular case
at bar would an unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the herein
laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the right to survive, must be according supremacy
over the property rights of their employer firm which has been given a full hearing on this case,
especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual material damage has be demonstrated as having
been inflicted on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders
more imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human
rights sanctioned and shielded with resolution concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the
organic law. It should be stressed that the application in the instant case Section 15 of the Court of
Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore such
application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of petitioning labor union and
workers in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with
reference to the case at is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R.
charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo,
speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion
for new trial is not "newly discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of
procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion is not binding
upon the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act
No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure
and shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice:
Provided, however, That in the hearing, investigation and determination of any
question or controversy and in exercising any duties and power under this Act,
the Court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the
case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by
any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as
it may deem just and equitable.' By this provision the industrial court is
disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts.
Said court is not even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the
parties but may issue such orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient
for the purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise
to future disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila
Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We
believe that this provision is ample enough to have enabled the respondent
court to consider whether or not its previous ruling that petitioners constitute a
minority was founded on fact, without regard to the technical meaning of newly
discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v.
Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578). (emphasis supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case
is to rule in effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer
seek the sanctuary of human freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because
their counsel erroneously believing that he received a copy of the decision on September 23,
1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion for reconsideration September 29, 1969,
which practically is only one day late considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be instruments
of justice, for the attainment of which such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence
on this score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil.
315 [1910]. The Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds
v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil.
156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far
back as 1910, "technicality. when it deserts its proper-office as an aid to justice
and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has remained
committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936])
was of a similar mind. For him the interpretation of procedural rule should never
"sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural laws are no other than
technicalities" view them in their entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends
themselves for the compliance with which courts have organized and function,
but as means conducive to the realization the administration of the law and of
justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have remained steadfastly opposed, in the highly
rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant
in altar of sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred principles of
justice." (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As
succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities of the
situation." (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In
the latest decision in point promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23
SCRA citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.)
Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that
rules of procedure "are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense"; but
are intended "to help secure substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect, the
dismissal or termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh
for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court itself recognized the severity of such a
sanction when it did not include the dismissal of the other 393 employees who are members of the
same Union and who participated in the demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact,
upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not officers, were not
dismissed and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as
respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the firm (pp. 16-20,
respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm
insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee participated in the demonstration, for which reason
only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in the unfair labor practice
charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the morning and regular
shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the firm continued in
operation that day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty if it deserves any penalty at all should have been simply to charge
said one-day absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the
petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their
wages for their daily sustenance as well as that of their respective families aside from the fact that it
is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty
tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously
seek to destroy our system of Government, but from men of goodwill good
men who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that what they
propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember,
however, is thatpreservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A
suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppress or be a
reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is a constant
alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our
Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes
easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never
ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are
protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel
secure because we belong to a group that is important and respected, we must
recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that
we in all honor and good conscience must be observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of
sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to
indignities by the local police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits
than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty
tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency
resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It
was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner
Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to
the Bank president demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the
appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein,
thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents.
Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the
letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in
concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that includes
concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial
Peace Act ...) This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been
aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of
employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity
protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be
involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416
[1949]).
xxx xxx xxx
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air
their grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the
respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the
right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp.
vs. NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for
cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773,
April 29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal
exercise of the right of the employer to select his employees or to discharge
them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with the
countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S.
177 [1941])...
xxx xxx xxx
In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's
conduct, identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-
organization or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively,
constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of
section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic
Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president
no less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are
rendered all the more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass
demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated
September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date of
their separation from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they
might have realized from other sources during their separation from the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, C.J, took no part.
Manila
G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE,
JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO
BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171409 May 3, 2006
NIEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE PUBLISHING CO., INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL
ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171485 May 3, 2006
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AGAPITO
A. AQUINO, MARIO J. AGUJA, SATUR C. OCAMPO, MUJIV S. HATAMAN, JUAN EDGARDO
ANGARA, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III, EMMANUEL JOSEL J. VILLANUEVA, LIZA L. MAZA,
IMEE R. MARCOS, RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JUSTIN MARC SB. CHIPECO, ROILO GOLEZ,
DARLENE ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, JOSEL G. VIRADOR, RAFAEL
V. MARIANO, GILBERT C. REMULLA, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-
BARAQUEL, IMELDA C. NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI JAVIER COLMENARES,
MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES REPRESENTED BY AMADO
GAT INCIONG, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., SECRETARY, DND
RONALDO V. PUNO, SECRETARY, DILG, GENEROSO SENGA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF PNP,Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171483 May 3, 2006
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON ELMER C. LABOG AND
SECRETARY GENERAL JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS
KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT,
JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, EMILIA P.
DAPULANG, MARTIN CUSTODIO, JR., AND ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HER EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, THE HONORABLE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, EDUARDO ERMITA, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, GENEROSO SENGA, AND THE PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO
LOMIBAO, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence,
such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 171400 May 3, 2006
Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but persistently modern problem. How does the
Constitution of a free people combine the degree of liberty, without which, law becomes tyranny,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner,
with the degree of law, without which, liberty becomes license?3
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, LT. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, AND
DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, Respondents. On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
G.R. No. 171489 May 3, 2006
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR M.
me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President. . .
AMORADO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FELIMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J.B.
whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. .
JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA AND INTEGRATED BAR
.rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed
OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioners,
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
vs.
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by
CAPACITY AS AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS
me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the
CAPACITY AS PNP CHIEF,Respondents.
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

x-------------------------------------x
She cited the following facts as bases:

G.R. No. 171424 May 3, 2006

LOREN B. LEGARDA, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-
CHIEF; ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE (PNP); GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP); AND EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Respondents.
DECISION
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with
authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right,
represented by military adventurists the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine
State who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy,
over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted Government elected in May 2004;
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain
segments of the national media;

WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the peoples confidence in
government and their faith in the future of this country;
All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid formula are
necessary.1 Superior strength the use of force cannot make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;
courts should be vigilant in safeguarding the constitutional rights of the citizens, specifically their
liberty.
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left and extreme
Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans philosophy of liberty is thus most relevant. He said: "In cases
State;
involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against government and in favor
of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak." Laws and
actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts "with a heavy presumption against their WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the
constitutional validity."2 democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;

These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects
Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria constitute aclear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of
Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent the Filipino people;
officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions,
On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with
authoritarians of the extreme Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right,
represented by military adventurists - the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State and
who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a
broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted Government elected in May 2004;
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our republican government;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of
the national media;
WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance,
including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the peoples confidence in the
government and their faith in the future of this country;
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the
opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the
democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;
WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects
constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the
Filipino people;
WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has been issued declaring a State of
National Emergency;
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me
under the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of
the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do
hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police
(PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country;
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and
men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.
On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after
all these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021
which reads:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution,
Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, was issued declaring a state of national
emergency;
WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No.5 and No.6 dated February 24, 2006, which were issued
on the basis of Proclamation No. 1017, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP), were directed to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent
and suppress all form of lawless violence as well as any act of rebellion and to undertake such
action as may be necessary;
WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented, suppressed and quelled the acts lawless
violence and rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of national
emergency has ceased to exist.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the
proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers,
leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a
plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.4 They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the
President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.
During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to
the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from petitioners
counsels.
The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary
powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. He
emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases. While
he explained that it is not respondents task to state the facts behind the questioned Proclamation,
however, they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.
On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento,
Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the
Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public statement,
they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called upon the people to "show
and proclaim our displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only by going
to the streets in protest, but also by wearing red bands on our left arms." 5
On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled "Oplan Hackle I " which
detailed plans for bombings and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming
in Baguio City. The plot was to assassinate selected targets including some cabinet members and
President Arroyo herself.6 Upon the advice of her security, President Arroyo decided not to attend
the Alumni Homecoming. The next day, at the height of the celebration, a bomb was found and
detonated at the PMA parade ground.
On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas
province. Found in his possession were two (2) flash disks containing minutes of the meetings
between members of the Magdalo Group and the National Peoples Army (NPA), a tape recorder,
audio cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive documents.7 Prior to his arrest, Lt.
San Juan announced through DZRH that the "Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the
20th Anniversary of Edsa I."
On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP-
Special Action Force were planning to defect. Thus, he immediately ordered SAF Commanding
General Marcelino Franco, Jr. to "disavow" any defection. The latter promptly obeyed and issued a
public statement: "All SAF units are under the effective control of responsible and trustworthy
officers with proven integrity and unquestionable loyalty."
On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory Aquinos
brother, businessmen and mid-level government officials plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo
administration. Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported that Pastor Saycon, longtime Arroyo
critic, called a U.S. government official about his groups plans if President Arroyo is ousted. Saycon
also phoned a man code-named Delta. Saycon identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander of
the Armys elite Scout Ranger. Lim said "it was all systems go for the planned movement against
Arroyo."8
B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso Senga,
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that a huge number of soldiers would
join the rallies to provide a critical mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held
on February 24, 2005. According to these two (2) officers, there was no way they could possibly stop
the soldiers because they too, were breaking the chain of command to join the forces foist to unseat
the President. However, Gen. Senga has remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the
chain of command. He immediately took custody of B/Gen. Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return
to the Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.
Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work within the military
and the police establishments in order to forge alliances with its members and key officials. NPA
spokesman Gregorio "Ka Roger" Rosal declared: "The Communist Party and revolutionary
movement and the entire people look forward to the possibility in the coming year of accomplishing
its immediate task of bringing down the Arroyo regime; of rendering it to weaken and unable to rule
that it will not take much longer to end it."9
On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National Democratic Front (NDF) at North
Central Mindanao, publicly announced: "Anti-Arroyo groups within the military and police are
growing rapidly, hastened by the economic difficulties suffered by the families of AFP officers and
enlisted personnel who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the field." He claimed that with
the forces of the national democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo conservative political parties,
coalitions, plus the groups that have been reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable that the
Presidents ouster is nearing its concluding stage in the first half of 2006.
Respondents further claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in
Bulacan and Bataan was also considered as additional factual basis for the issuance of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5. So is the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three (3)
soldiers. And also the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front
organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass
protests.10
By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security advisers and several cabinet
members to assess the gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation. She directed both the
AFP and the PNP to account for all their men and ensure that the chain of command remains solid
and undivided. To protect the young students from any possible trouble that might break loose on
the streets, the President suspended classes in all levels in the entire National Capital Region.
For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5.
Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities
related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold
rallies issued earlier by the local governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political
rallies, which to the Presidents mind were organized for purposes of destabilization, are
cancelled.Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that "warrantless arrests and
take-over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented."11
Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups
of protesters (members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-
Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention
of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site were violently
dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained policemen used truncheons, big fiber
glass shields, water cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter
the massed participants. The same police action was used against the protesters marching forward
to Cubao, Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan Street and EDSA. That same evening,
hundreds of riot policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue and Paseo
de Roxas Street in Makati City.12
According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal
of their assemblies.
During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf
S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested
was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily
Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents,
pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon City were
stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the newspaper; while policemen from the
Manila Police District were stationed outside the building.13
A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the
premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.
The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor, is "meant to show a strong
presence, to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing
down this government." The PNP warned that it would take over any media organization that would
not follow "standards set by the government during the state of national emergency." Director
General Lomibao stated that "if they do not follow the standards and the standards are - if they
would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General
Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 we will recommend a takeover." National Telecommunications
Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to "cooperate" with the government
for the duration of the state of national emergency. He asked for "balanced reporting" from
broadcasters when covering the events surrounding the coup attempt foiled by the government. He
warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that
violates rules set out for media coverage when the national security is threatened.14
Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing
the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in
Bulacan. The police showed a warrant for his arrest dated 1985. Beltrans lawyer explained that the
warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed during the Marcos regime, had long
been quashed. Beltran, however, is not a party in any of these petitions.
When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran, they were told they could
not be admitted because of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Two members were arrested and detained,
while the rest were dispersed by the police.
Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the police went after him during a
public forum at the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. But his two drivers, identified as Roel and Art, were
taken into custody.
Retired Major General Ramon Montao, former head of the Philippine Constabulary, was arrested
while with his wife and golfmates at the Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmarias, Cavite.
Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo, Representative Rafael
Mariano, Bayan Muna Representative Teodoro Casio and Gabriela Representative Liza
Maza. Bayan Muna Representative Josel Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao
City. Later, he was turned over to the custody of the House of Representatives where the "Batasan
5" decided to stay indefinitely.
Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the rights of Representatives Beltran,
Satur Ocampo,et al., are not being raised in these petitions.
On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency
has ceased to exist.
In the interim, these seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
were filed with this Court against the above-named respondents. Three (3) of these petitions
impleaded President Arroyo as respondent.
not really a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued that "it amounts to an exercise by the
President of emergency powers without congressional approval." In addition, petitioners asserted
that PP 1017 "goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised
Administrative Code."
And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424,petitionerLoren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
are "unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights
such as freedom of the press and the right to access to information on matters of public concern, all
guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution." In this regard, she stated that these
issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending before the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal.
In respondents Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General countered that: first, the petitions
should be dismissed for being moot; second,petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424
(Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.) and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no legal
standing; third, it is not necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as
respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis; andfifth, PP 1017 does not violate
the peoples right to free expression and redress of grievances.
On March 7, 2006, the Court conducted oral arguments and heard the parties on the above
interlocking issues which may be summarized as follows:
A. PROCEDURAL:

In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it
1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.
encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) itis a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional
requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. 2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos.
171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171489(Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have
legal standing.
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged
the CIDGs act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of "censorship" or "prior restraint."
They also claimed that the term "emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar B. SUBSTANTIVE:
occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no emergency" that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.
1) Whetherthe Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.
In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty
one (21) other members of the House of Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocampo,
2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.
Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casio, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5 constitute "usurpation of legislative powers"; "violation of freedom of expression" and "a
declaration of martial law." They alleged that President Arroyo "gravely abused her discretion in a. Facial Challenge
calling out the armed forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless
violence and a showing that there is necessity to do so."
b. Constitutional Basis

In G.R. No. 171483,petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and
c. As Applied Challenge
G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact
laws and decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of
expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their grievances. A. PROCEDURAL

In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. First, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks.
No. 5 are unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 415 of Article II, (b) Sections 1,16 2,17 and
418 of Article III, (c)Section 2319 of Article VI, and (d) Section 1720 of Article XII of the Constitution.
I- Moot and Academic Principle

In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an "arbitrary
and unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers." And assuming that PP 1017 is
One of the greatest contributions of the American system to this country is the concept of judicial guarantees.35 And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the
review enunciated in Marbury v. Madison.21 This concept rests on the extraordinary simple petitions are subject to judicial review.
foundation --
In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio
The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all V. Panganibans Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.36 However, they failed to take
political authority. It confers limited powers on the national government. x x x If the government into account the Chief Justices very statement that an otherwise "moot" case may still be decided
consciously or unconsciously oversteps these limitations there must be some authority "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or
competent to hold it in control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate damaged as a direct result of its issuance." The present case falls right within this exception to the
and preserve inviolate the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution. This power the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.
courts exercise. This is the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial review.22
II- Legal Standing
But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "self-starting capacity." 23 Courts
may exercise such power only when the following requisites are present: first, there must be an
In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities, the Court deems it imperative to
actual case or controversy;second, petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality; third, the
have a more than passing discussion on legal standing or locus standi.
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the
constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.24
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."37 In
private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2,
Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence, we shall limit our
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be
discussion thereon.
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in
interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible party entitled to the avails of the suit."38 Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own
of judicial resolution. It is "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having right to the relief sought.
adverse legal interest;" a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief.25 The Solicitor
General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the present
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
petitions were rendered "moot and academic" by President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021.
"public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could
Such contention lacks merit. be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or taxpayer." In either case, he has to
adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
"taxpayer.
supervening events,26 so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value.27 Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case28 or dismiss it on ground of mootness.29
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions.
The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk,39 where it was held that the plaintiff in a
The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions
taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the
moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers,
plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere
according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case
constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that
v. Collins:40 "In matter of mere public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at
must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that "an unconstitutional act is not a
least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be
law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal
properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied." With respect to
contemplation, inoperative."30
taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan41 held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an
action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied."
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or
grave violation of the Constitution;31 second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged
paramount public interest is involved;32third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;33 and fourth, the case is capable of
injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt,42 later reaffirmed inTileston v. Ullman.43 The same Court ruled that for
repetition yet evading review.34
a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative
action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts assumption of jurisdiction over not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.
the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the
Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the publics interest, involving
This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera,44 it held that the
as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press.
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in
Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts,
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine
doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the
was upheld in a litany of cases, such as,Custodio v. President of the Senate,45 Manila Race Horse
present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional
Trainers Association v. De la Fuente,46 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works47 and Anti-Chinese Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Courts attitude toward legal
League of the Philippines v. Felix.48 standing.

However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,56 the Court ruled that the status of Kilosbayan as a peoples
the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers organization does not give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the on-line lottery
Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan,49 where the "transcendental importance" of the cases prompted the contract, more so where it does not raise any issue of constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot sue as a
Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec,50 this taxpayer absent any allegation that public funds are being misused. Nor can it sue as a concerned
Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the "far-reaching implications" of the petition citizen as it does not allege any specific injury it has suffered.
notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit.
Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary
In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,57 the Court
citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the
reiterated the "direct injury" test with respect to concerned citizens cases involving constitutional
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.51
issues. It held that "there must be a showing that the citizen personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official act."
Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct injury,
they have been allowed to sue under the principle of "transcendental importance." Pertinent are
In Lacson v. Perez,58 the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong
the following cases:
Pilipino (LDP), is not a real party-in-interest as it had not demonstrated any injury to itself or to its
leaders, members or supporters.
(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,52 where the Court ruled that the enforcement of
the constitutional right to information and the equitable diffusion of natural
In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,59 the Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members of
resources are matters of transcendental importance which clothe the petitioner
Congress have standing to sue, as they claim that the Presidents declaration of a state of
with locus standi;
rebellion is a usurpation of the emergency powers of Congress, thus impairing their
legislative powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and Social Justice Society,
(2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,53 wherein the Court held that "given the the Court declared them to be devoid of standing, equating them with the LDP in Lacson.
transcendental importance of the issues involved, the Court may relax the standing
requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of direct injury to the
Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions.
parties seeking judicial review" of the Visiting Forces Agreement;

The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt.
(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,54 while the Court noted that the petitioners may not file suit
The same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing
in their capacity as taxpayers absent a showing that "Balikatan 02-01" involves the
Co. Inc. They alleged "direct injury" resulting from "illegal arrest" and "unlawful search" committed by
exercise of Congress taxing or spending powers, it reiterated its ruling in Bagong
police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not question their legal
Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,55that in cases of transcendental importance, the
standing.
cases must be settled promptly and definitely and standing requirements may be
relaxed.
In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative
powers. They also raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court.
whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of
Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided
justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the
that the following requirements are met:
attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights.

(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the
tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election
law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes
upon their prerogatives as legislators.
In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v.
Enriquez,60 Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,61 Association of
Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,62 Basco v. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation,63 and Taada v. Tuvera,64 that when the issue concerns a
public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the
laws.
In G.R. No. 171483, KMUs assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful
assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted
standing to assert the rights of their members.65 We take judicial notice of the announcement by
the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies
following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which
the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No.
1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,66 the Court held that the mere
invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly
true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is
shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance
of the issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi.
In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as
there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator
is of no consequence. She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives
as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a media
personality will not likewise aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement of these
issuances prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has pending
electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She has not
sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her case. But considering
once more the transcendental importance of the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing
rules.
It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger
question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the "liberality
doctrine" on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a
judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice
Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this
very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the "transcendental importance"
doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the "PP 1017
cases."1avvphil.net
This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.
Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that
the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,67 may not be sued in any civil or
criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the
dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official
duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive
branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important
duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.
However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official,
he remains accountable to the people68 but he may be removed from office only in the mode
provided by law and that is by impeachment.69
B. SUBSTANTIVE
I. Review of Factual Bases
Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual basis. Hence, it was not "necessary" for President
Arroyo to issue such Proclamation.
The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the Presidents exercise of his
Commander-in-Chief power has reached its distilled point - from the indulgent days of Barcelon v.
Baker70 and Montenegro v. Castaneda71 to the volatile era of Lansang v. Garcia,72 Aquino, Jr. v.
Enrile,73 and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.74 The tug-of-war always cuts across the line defining "political
questions," particularly those questions "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government."75Barcelon and Montenegro were
in unison in declaring that the authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen belongs to
the President and his decision is final and conclusive on the courts. Lansang took the opposite
view. There, the members of the Court were unanimous in the conviction that the Court has the
authority to inquire into the existence of factual bases in order to determine their constitutional
sufficiency. From the principle of separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the system of
checks and balances, "under which the President is supreme, x x x only if and when he acts
within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or
not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which in this respect, is, in turn,
constitutionally supreme."76 In 1973, the unanimous Court ofLansang was divided in Aquino v.
Enrile.77 There, the Court was almost evenly divided on the issue of whether the validity of the
imposition of Martial Law is a political or justiciable question. 78 Then came Garcia-Padilla v.
Enrile which greatly diluted Lansang. It declared that there is a need to re-examine the latter case,
ratiocinating that "in times of war or national emergency, the President must be given absolute
control for the very life of the nation and the government is in great peril. The President, it
intoned, is answerable only to his conscience, the People, and God."79
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora80 -- a recent case most pertinent to these cases at
bar -- echoed a principle similar to Lansang. While the Court considered the Presidents "calling-out"
power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that "this does not prevent
an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits
or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion."This ruling is
mainly a result of the Courts reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies
the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only "to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." The
latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to
review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the
government.81 It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty.82
As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test
that "judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the Presidents decision
is correct," but that "the President did not act arbitrarily." Thus, the standard laid down is not
correctness, but arbitrariness.83 In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court further ruled that "it is
incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual
basis" and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then "this Court cannot
undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."
Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyos exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP
1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment
and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group,
their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the
Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing
alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events.
Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in
issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold
her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
 II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
Doctrines of Several Political Theorists
on the Power of the President in Times of Emergency
This case brings to fore a contentious subject -- the power of the President in times of emergency. A
glimpse at the various political theories relating to this subject provides an adequate backdrop for
our ensuing discussion.
John Locke, describing the architecture of civil government, called upon the English doctrine of
prerogative to cope with the problem of emergency. In times of danger to the nation, positive law
enacted by the legislature might be inadequate or even a fatal obstacle to the promptness of action
necessary to avert catastrophe. In these situations, the Crown retained a prerogative "power to act
according to discretion for the public good, without the proscription of the law and
sometimes even against it."84 But Locke recognized that this moral restraint might not suffice to
avoid abuse of prerogative powers. Who shall judge the need for resorting to the prerogative
and how may its abuse be avoided? Here, Locke readily admitted defeat, suggesting that "the
people have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth,
but to appeal to Heaven."85
Jean-Jacques Rousseau also assumed the need for temporary suspension of democratic processes
of government in time of emergency. According to him:
The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from adopting themselves to circumstances, may,
in certain cases, render them disastrous and make them bring about, at a time of crisis, the ruin of
the State
It is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions as strong as to render it impossible to
suspend their operation. Even Sparta allowed its law to lapse...
If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle to their preservation,
the method is to nominate a supreme lawyer, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a
moment the sovereign authority. In such a case, there is no doubt about the general will, and it clear
that the peoples first intention is that the State shall not perish.86
Rosseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency dictatorship or "supreme magistracy" as he
termed it. For him, it would more likely be cheapened by "indiscreet use." He was unwilling to rely
upon an "appeal to heaven." Instead, he relied upon a tenure of office of prescribed duration to
avoid perpetuation of the dictatorship.87
John Stuart Mill concluded his ardent defense of representative government: "I am far from
condemning, in cases of extreme necessity, the assumption of absolute power in the form of
a temporary dictatorship."88
Nicollo Machiavellis view of emergency powers, as one element in the whole scheme of limited
government, furnished an ironic contrast to the Lockean theory of prerogative. He recognized and
attempted to bridge this chasm in democratic political theory, thus:
Now, in a well-ordered society, it should never be necessary to resort to extra constitutional
measures; for although they may for a time be beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the
practice is once established for good objects, they will in a little while be disregarded under that
pretext but for evil purposes. Thus, no republic will ever be perfect if she has not by law provided for
everything, having a remedy for every emergency and fixed rules for applying it.89
Machiavelli in contrast to Locke, Rosseau and Mill sought to incorporate into the constitution a
regularized system of standby emergency powers to be invoked with suitable checks and controls in
time of national danger. He attempted forthrightly to meet the problem of combining a capacious
reserve of power and speed and vigor in its application in time of emergency, with effective
constitutional restraints.90
Contemporary political theorists, addressing themselves to the problem of response to emergency
by constitutional democracies, have employed the doctrine of constitutional dictatorship.91 Frederick
M. Watkins saw "no reason why absolutism should not be used as a means for the defense of
liberal institutions," provided it "serves to protect established institutions from the danger of
permanent injury in a period of temporary emergency and is followed by a prompt return to
the previous forms of political life."92 He recognized the two (2) key elements of the problem of
emergency governance, as well as all constitutional governance: increasing administrative
powers of the executive, while at the same time "imposing limitation upon that
power."93 Watkins placed his real faith in a scheme of constitutional dictatorship. These are the
conditions of success of such a dictatorship: "The period of dictatorship must be relatively
shortDictatorship should always be strictly legitimate in characterFinal authority to
determine the need for dictatorship in any given case must never rest with the dictator
himself"94 and the objective of such an emergency dictatorship should be "strict political
conservatism."
Carl J. Friedrich cast his analysis in terms similar to those of Watkins.95 "It is a problem of
concentrating power in a government where power has consciously been divided to cope with
situations of unprecedented magnitude and gravity. There must be a broad grant of powers, subject
to equally strong limitations as to who shall exercise such powers, when, for how long, and to what
end."96 Friedrich, too, offered criteria for judging the adequacy of any of scheme of emergency
powers, to wit: "The emergency executive must be appointed by constitutional means i.e.,
he must be legitimate; he should not enjoy power to determine the existence of an
emergency; emergency powers should be exercised under a strict time limitation; and last,
the objective of emergency action must be the defense of the constitutional order."97
Clinton L. Rossiter, after surveying the history of the employment of emergency powers in Great
Britain, France, Weimar, Germany and the United States, reverted to a description of a scheme of
"constitutional dictatorship" as solution to the vexing problems presented by emergency.98 Like
Watkins and Friedrich, he stated a priori the conditions of success of the "constitutional dictatorship,"
thus:
1) No general regime or particular institution of constitutional dictatorship should be
initiated unless it is necessary or even indispensable to the preservation of the State and
its constitutional order
2) the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be in the hands of
the man or men who will constitute the dictator
3) No government should initiate a constitutional dictatorship without making specific
provisions for its termination
4) all uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization of the
government should be effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal requirements
5) no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded, no regular procedure
altered any more than is absolutely necessary for the conquest of the particular crisis . . .
 6) The measures adopted in the prosecution of the a constitutional dictatorship should
never be permanent in character or effect
7) The dictatorship should be carried on by persons representative of every part of the
citizenry interested in the defense of the existing constitutional order. . .
8) Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for every action taken under a
constitutional dictatorship. . .
9) The decision to terminate a constitutional dictatorship, like the decision to institute one
should never be in the hands of the man or men who constitute the dictator. . .
10) No constitutional dictatorship should extend beyond the termination of the crisis for
which it was instituted
11) the termination of the crisis must be followed by a complete return as possible to the
political and governmental conditions existing prior to the initiation of the constitutional
dictatorship99
Rossiter accorded to legislature a far greater role in the oversight exercise of emergency powers
than did Watkins. He would secure to Congress final responsibility for declaring the existence or
termination of an emergency, and he places great faith in the effectiveness of congressional
investigating committees.100
Scott and Cotter, in analyzing the above contemporary theories in light of recent experience, were
one in saying that, "the suggestion that democracies surrender the control of government to
an authoritarian ruler in time of grave danger to the nation is not based upon sound
constitutional theory." To appraise emergency power in terms of constitutional dictatorship serves
merely to distort the problem and hinder realistic analysis. It matters not whether the term "dictator"
is used in its normal sense (as applied to authoritarian rulers) or is employed to embrace all chief
executives administering emergency powers. However used, "constitutional dictatorship" cannot be
divorced from the implication of suspension of the processes of constitutionalism. Thus, they favored
instead the "concept of constitutionalism" articulated by Charles H. McIlwain:
A concept of constitutionalism which is less misleading in the analysis of problems of emergency
powers, and which is consistent with the findings of this study, is that formulated by Charles H.
McIlwain. While it does not by any means necessarily exclude some indeterminate limitations upon
the substantive powers of government, full emphasis is placed upon procedural limitations,
and political responsibility. McIlwain clearly recognized the need to repose adequate power in
government. And in discussing the meaning of constitutionalism, he insisted that the historical and
proper test of constitutionalism was the existence of adequate processes for keeping
government responsible. He refused to equate constitutionalism with the enfeebling of
government by an exaggerated emphasis upon separation of powers and substantive limitations on
governmental power. He found that the really effective checks on despotism have consisted not in
the weakening of government but, but rather in the limiting of it; between which there is a great and
very significant difference. In associating constitutionalism with "limited" as distinguished
from "weak" government, McIlwain meant government limited to the orderly procedure of law
as opposed to the processes of force. The two fundamental correlative elements of
constitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the legal limits to arbitrary
power and a complete political responsibility of government to the governed.101
In the final analysis, the various approaches to emergency of the above political theorists - from
Locks "theory of prerogative," to Watkins doctrine of "constitutional dictatorship" and, eventually, to
McIlwains "principle of constitutionalism" --- ultimately aim to solve one real problem in emergency
governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of discretionary power to the Chief
Executive, while insuring that such powers will be exercised with a sense of political
responsibility and under effective limitations and checks.
Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh from the fetters of a repressive regime,
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, in drafting the 1987 Constitution, endeavored to create a
government in the concept of Justice Jacksons "balanced power structure."102 Executive, legislative,
and judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and the Supreme Court,
respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in
times of emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the
other. This system does not weaken the President, it just limits his power, using the language of
McIlwain. In other words, in times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we
repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the
same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.
a. "Facial Challenge"
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its "overbreadth." They claim that its
enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the
Constitution and sent a "chilling effect" to the citizens.
A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their
faces" statutes infree speech cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment
cases.103
A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related
conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms
of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,104the US Supreme Court held that "we have not
recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment"
(freedom of speech).
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects
legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered
"harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected conduct." InBroadrick v. Oklahoma,105 it was held:
It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly be held void on its
face and when such summary action is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the
very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of
practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise
unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from pure speech toward
conduct and that conduct even if expressive falls within the scope of otherwise valid
criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls
over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only "spoken words" and again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all,
have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct."106Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used
"sparingly and only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored;"107 The reason for this is
obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that
a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it
may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the
Court.108 A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to
some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that
a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve
away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a
case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of
third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules
give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates
the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes
unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates
courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect
of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes
that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that
deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine
PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but
on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the Court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. In Younger v. Harris,109 it was held that:
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of
these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the
judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the
legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature
of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind of case that
is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be
decided.
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed
law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is
unwarranted.
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is
facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application."110 It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine.
For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. And
like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all
its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is
vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot
understand the meaning and application of PP 1017.
b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017
Now on the constitutional foundation of PP 1017.
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision:
"by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress
all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion"
Second provision:
"and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by
me personally or upon my direction;"
Third provision:
"as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency."
First Provision: Calling-out Power
The first provision pertains to the Presidents calling-out power. In Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary,111 this Court, through Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution reproduced as follows:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-
eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by
the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of
the factual bases of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or
the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction
on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion
or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of graduated powers. From the most to
the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora,112 the Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
"whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces "to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." Are these conditions present in the instant
cases? As stated earlier, considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it
necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Offices vast intelligence network, she is in the best
position to determine the actual condition of the country.
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in
suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But
every act that goes beyond the Presidents calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For
this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater
power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the
greater the power, the greater are the limitations.
It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the Presidents authority to
declare a "state of rebellion" (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national
emergency. While President Arroyos authority to declare a "state of rebellion" emanates from her
powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book
II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:
liberties. It is a strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly. It cannot be used to stifle or
persecute critics of the government. It is placed in the keeping of the President for the purpose of
enabling him to secure the people from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their
individual freedoms. In fact, Section 18, Art. VII, provides:
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction
on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a
call by the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot
be used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any
other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its command
is ultra vires.
Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b)
ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d)
issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as
Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus.
Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is
merely an exercise of President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in
preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of
Second Provision: "Take Care" Power
public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is
made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive
order. The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
President Arroyos declaration of a "state of rebellion" was merely an act declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
declaration, in the words ofSanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency,
President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on
As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested,115 the primary function of the President is
the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section
to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it
17, Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public
that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office,
utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of
he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will,
an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal
among others, "execute its laws."116 In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may
significance, or not written, as in the case of Sanlakas.
employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the
country,117 including the Philippine National Police118 under the Department of Interior and Local
Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It Government.119
is no so. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the
President invoked was her calling-out power.
Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G. Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael
Mariano, Teodoro Casio, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it
The declaration of Martial Law is a "warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called arrogated upon President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1,
upon by the executive to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency Article VI of the Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in Congress. They assail the
lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way clause "to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
render more difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law."113 promulgated by me personally or upon my direction."

In his "Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice" on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice Vicente \
V. Mendoza,114 an authority in constitutional law, said that of the three powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare Martial Law poses the most severe threat to civil
Petitioners contention is understandable. A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was
lifted120 from Former President Marcos Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the
powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby
place the entire Philippines as defined in Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law
and, in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction.
We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling
clause states: "to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction." Upon the other hand, the enabling clause
of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to
all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction."
Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate "decrees"?
PP 1017 states in part: "to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction."
The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987). She may issue any of the following:
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent
character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated
in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of
governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders.
Sec. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of
public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is
made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive
order.
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of
subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government
shall be embodied in memorandum orders.
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. Acts of the President on matters relating to internal
administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the
departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall
be embodied in memorandum circulars.
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special
orders.
President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot
issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential
Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were
issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law
under the 1973 Constitution.121
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
Arroyo the authority to promulgate "decrees." Legislative power is peculiarly within the province
of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives." To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency
can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these
decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to "laws," she cannot call the
military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and
property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military,
under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
Third Provision: Power to Take Over
The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:
x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article XII of
the Constitution do hereby declare a state of national emergency.
The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under
PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce obedience "to all the laws and to all decrees x x x"
but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during
the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP
1017?
The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to
grant the President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the
operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, as a product of the "martial law" thinking
of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.122 In effect at the time of its approval was President Marcos
Letter of Instruction No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of National Defense
to take over "the management, control and operation of the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the
Philippine National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient Airways . . .
for the successful prosecution by the Government of its effort to contain, solve and end the present
national emergency."
Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President Arroyos
inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislatures emergency
powers.
This is an area that needs delineation.
A distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare "a state of national
emergency" and toexercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18,
Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be
raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled,
voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but
also to "other national emergency." If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to
withhold from the President the authority to declare a "state of national emergency" pursuant to
Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the
existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend
that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a "state of national
emergency." The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence
of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from
Congress.
Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together.
Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the
same subject matter will be construed together and considered in the light of each
other.123 Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted,
relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise
of emergency powers.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of
Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body
cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies,
it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of
our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President,
subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.124
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The
taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency
powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may,
during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise
such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing
the reasonable terms thereof. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer,125 held:
It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some
provision of the Constitution. And it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants this
power to the President. The contention is that presidential power should be implied from the
aggregate of his powers under the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on provisions in Article
II which say that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President . . . .;" that "he shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed;" and that he "shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States.
The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the Presidents military power as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a number of
cases upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of
war. Such cases need not concern us here.Even though "theater of war" be an expanding
concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private
property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the
nations lawmakers, not for its military authorities.
Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that
grant executive power to the President. In the framework of our Constitution, the Presidents
power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the
recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the
Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is
to execute. The first section of the first article says that "All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States. . ."126
Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term "emergency" under Section 17, Article XII
refers to "tsunami," "typhoon," "hurricane"and"similar occurrences." This is a limited view of
"emergency."
Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the
degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit in
this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety, and perception.127 Emergencies, as perceived
by legislature or executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been occasioned by a wide range of
situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a)economic,128 b) natural
disaster,129 and c) national security.130
"Emergency," as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may include rebellion,
economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide
proportions or effect.131This is evident in the Records of the Constitutional Commission, thus:
MR. GASCON. Yes. What is the Committees definition of "national emergency" which appears in
Section 13, page 5? It reads:
When the common good so requires, the State may temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
MR. VILLEGAS. What I mean is threat from external aggression, for
example, calamities or natural disasters.
MR. GASCON. There is a question by Commissioner de los Reyes. What about strikes and riots?
MR. VILLEGAS. Strikes, no; those would not be covered by the term "national emergency."
MR. BENGZON. Unless they are of such proportions such that they would paralyze government
service.132
xxxxxx
MR. TINGSON. May I ask the committee if "national emergency" refers to military national
emergency or could this be economic emergency?"
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, it could refer to both military or economic dislocations.
MR. TINGSON. Thank you very much.133
It may be argued that when there is national emergency, Congress may not be able to convene and,
therefore, unable to delegate to the President the power to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.
In Araneta v. Dinglasan,134 this Court emphasized that legislative power, through which extraordinary
measures are exercised, remains in Congress even in times of crisis.
"x x x
After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation of
powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects
and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The
Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they share the faith of
other democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this
framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not excepting periods of
crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of whose
Constitution have been copied in ours, have specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting
laws been surrendered to another department unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a
legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was fighting a
total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that
under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal
circumstances the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial, given the ability to act, are
called upon to perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them
respectively."
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP
1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist
warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without
legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public
interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all
the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act
passed by Congress.
c. "AS APPLIED CHALLENGE"
One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to security, is that military
necessity and the guaranteed rights of the individual are often not compatible. Our history reveals
that in the crucible of conflict, many rights are curtailed and trampled upon. Here, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless arrest; and the freedom of
speech, of expression, of the press, and of assemblyunder the Bill of Rights suffered the
greatest blow.
Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate "direct injury."
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas alleged that, on February 24, 2006, they were
arrested without warrants on their way to EDSA to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power
I. The arresting officers cited PP 1017 as basis of the arrest.
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. claimed that on
February 25, 2006, the CIDG operatives "raided and ransacked without warrant" their office. Three
policemen were assigned to guard their office as a possible "source of destabilization." Again, the
basis was PP 1017.
And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that their members were
"turned away and dispersed" when they went to EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue, to celebrate the
20th Anniversary of People Power I.
A perusal of the "direct injuries" allegedly suffered by the said petitioners shows that they resulted
from theimplementation, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, of PP 1017.
Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal
acts? In general,does the illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional?
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be
abused and misabused135 and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of
application.136 The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose
and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired,not from its effects in a particular case.137 PP
1017 is merely an invocation of the Presidents calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command mention only a few, were originally labeled as terrorists by those who controlled the territory at the
the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end time, but later became internationally respected statesmen.
desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing
the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens
What, then, is the defining criterion for terrorist acts the differentia specifica distinguishing those
constitutional rights.
acts from eventually legitimate acts of national resistance or self-defense?

Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor
Since the times of the Cold War the United Nations Organization has been trying in vain to reach a
committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or
consensus on the basic issue of definition. The organization has intensified its efforts recently, but
ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere
has been unable to bridge the gap between those who associate "terrorism" with any violent act by
incidental result arising from its exertion.138This is logical. Just imagine the absurdity of situations
non-state groups against civilians, state functionaries or infrastructure or military installations, and
when laws maybe declared unconstitutional just because the officers implementing them have acted
those who believe in the concept of the legitimate use of force when resistance against foreign
arbitrarily. If this were so, judging from the blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed
occupation or against systematic oppression of ethnic and/or religious groups within a state is
upon by the Court, majority of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code would have been declared
concerned.
unconstitutional a long time ago.

President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. General orders
are "acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines." They are internal rules issued by the executive officer to his subordinates
precisely for the proper and efficientadministration of law. Such rules and regulations create no
relation except between the official who issues them and the official who receives them.139 They are
based on and are the product of, a relationship in which power is their source, and obedience, their
object.140 For these reasons, one requirement for these rules to be valid is that they must
be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious.
G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the "necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence."
Unlike the term "lawless violence" which is unarguably extant in our statutes and the Constitution,
and which is invariably associated with "invasion, insurrection or rebellion," the phrase "acts of
terrorism" is still an amorphous and vague concept. Congress has yet to enact a law defining and
punishing acts of terrorism.
In fact, this "definitional predicament" or the "absence of an agreed definition of terrorism" confronts
not only our country, but the international community as well. The following observations are quite
apropos:
In the actual unipolar context of international relations, the "fight against terrorism" has become one
of the basic slogans when it comes to the justification of the use of force against certain states and
against groups operating internationally. Lists of states "sponsoring terrorism" and of terrorist
organizations are set up and constantly being updated according to criteria that are not always
known to the public, but are clearly determined by strategic interests.
The basic problem underlying all these military actions or threats of the use of force as the most
recent by the United States against Iraq consists in the absence of an agreed definition of
terrorism.
The dilemma facing the international community can best be illustrated by reference to the
contradicting categorization of organizations and movements such as Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) which is a terrorist group for Israel and a liberation movement for Arabs and
Muslims the Kashmiri resistance groups who are terrorists in the perception of India, liberation
fighters in that of Pakistan the earlier Contras in Nicaragua freedom fighters for the United
States, terrorists for the Socialist camp or, most drastically, the Afghani Mujahedeen (later to
become the Taliban movement): during the Cold War period they were a group of freedom fighters
for the West, nurtured by the United States, and a terrorist gang for the Soviet Union. One could go
on and on in enumerating examples of conflicting categorizations that cannot be reconciled in any
way because of opposing political interests that are at the roots of those perceptions.
How, then, can those contradicting definitions and conflicting perceptions and evaluations of one
and the same group and its actions be explained? In our analysis, the basic reason for these striking
inconsistencies lies in the divergent interest of states. Depending on whether a state is in the
position of an occupying power or in that of a rival, or adversary, of an occupying power in a given
territory, the definition of terrorism will "fluctuate" accordingly. A state may eventually see itself as
protector of the rights of a certain ethnic group outside its territory and will therefore speak of a
"liberation struggle," not of "terrorism" when acts of violence by this group are concerned, and vice-
versa.
The United Nations Organization has been unable to reach a decision on the definition of terrorism
exactly because of these conflicting interests of sovereign states that determine in each and every
instance how a particular armed movement (i.e. a non-state actor) is labeled in regard to the
terrorists-freedom fighter dichotomy. A "policy of double standards" on this vital issue of international
affairs has been the unavoidable consequence.
This "definitional predicament" of an organization consisting of sovereign states and not of
peoples, in spite of the emphasis in the Preamble to the United Nations Charter! has become even
more serious in the present global power constellation: one superpower exercises the decisive role
in the Security Council, former great powers of the Cold War era as well as medium powers are
increasingly being marginalized; and the problem has become even more acute since the terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001 I the United States.141

Remarkable confusion persists in regard to the legal categorization of acts of violence either by
states, by armed groups such as liberation movements, or by individuals.
The dilemma can by summarized in the saying "One countrys terrorist is another countrys freedom
fighter." The apparent contradiction or lack of consistency in the use of the term "terrorism" may
further be demonstrated by the historical fact that leaders of national liberation movements such as
Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Habib Bourgouiba in Tunisia, or Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria, to
The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of
the police or military. An illustration is when a group of persons are merely engaged in a drinking
spree. Yet the military or the police may consider the act as an act of terrorism and immediately
arrest them pursuant to G.O. No. 5. Obviously, this is abuse and oppression on their part. It must be
remembered that an act can only be considered a crime if there is a law defining the same as such
and imposing the corresponding penalty thereon.
So far, the word "terrorism" appears only once in our criminal laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated
January 16, 1981 enacted by President Marcos during the Martial Law regime. This decree is
entitled "Codifying The Various Laws on Anti-Subversion and Increasing The Penalties for
Membership in Subversive Organizations." The word "terrorism" is mentioned in the following
provision: "That one who conspires with any other person for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Philippines x x x by force, violence, terrorism, x x x shall be punished
byreclusion temporal x x x."
P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws the Communist Party of the
Philippines) enacted by President Corazon Aquino on May 5, 1985. These two (2) laws, however, do
not define "acts of terrorism." Since there is no law defining "acts of terrorism," it is President Arroyo
alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism. Her
judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate
arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over the media enterprises,
prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these
can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the
President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, this Court
declares that the "acts of terrorism" portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.
Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit acts beyond
what arenecessary and appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of
their authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal.
We first examine G.R. No. 171396 (David et al.)
The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable search and seizure of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."142 The plain import of the language of the
Constitution is that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by
a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection given by this
provision is that between person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate
clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.143
In the Brief Account144 submitted by petitioner David, certain facts are established: first, he was
arrested without warrant; second, the PNP operatives arrested him on the basis of PP
1017; third, he was brought at Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he was fingerprinted,
photographed and booked like a criminal suspect; fourth,he was treated brusquely by policemen
who "held his head and tried to push him" inside an unmarked car; fifth, he was charged with
Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang No. 880145 and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he was detained
for seven (7) hours; and seventh,he was eventually released for insufficiency of evidence.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
x x x.
Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest.
During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the
arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with
the invective "Oust Gloria Now" and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader
of the rally.146 Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even
if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition. Further, he also
stated that there is insufficient evidence for the charge of violation of BP 880 as it was not even
known whether petitioner David was the leader of the rally.147
But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is that not only was their right against
warrantless arrest violated, but also their right to peaceably assemble.
Section 4 of Article III guarantees:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
"Assembly" means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs. It is a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right
of speech. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right
to prevent. In other words, like other rights embraced in the freedom of expression, the right to
assemble is not subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior
issuance of a permit or authorization from the government authorities except, of course, if the
assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the
assembly itself, may be validly required.
The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising their
right to peaceful assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a
clear and present danger that warranted the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from
circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere
afterthought. Even the Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed to justify the arresting
officers conduct. In De Jonge v. Oregon,148 it was held that peaceable assembly cannot be made a
crime, thus:
Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for
peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings
cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceful
assembly are not to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting was held but
as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the
bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have
committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public
peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violations of valid laws. But it
is a different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes
upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis
for a criminal charge.
On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the
members of KMU et al. (G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum" newspapers. As a consequence of the search and
on the basis of Malacaangs directive canceling all permits previously issued by local government seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing
units. This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
principle that "freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of
prevent."149 Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing that an
the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of
assembly presents a clear and present danger that the State may deny the citizens right to exercise
petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently
it. Indeed, respondents failed to show or convince the Court that the rallyists committed acts
anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is
amounting to lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. With the blanket revocation of permits, the
essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
distinction between protected and unprotected assemblies was eliminated.

While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the "Metropolitan Mail" and
Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local
"We Forum" newspapers in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives
government units. They have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due
exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and seizure of materials for publication, the
notice and hearing on the determination of the presence of clear and present danger. Here,
stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of
petitioners were not even notified and heard on the revocation of their permits.150 The first time they
government officials to media, are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive
learned of it was at the time of the dispersal. Such absence of notice is a fatal defect. When a
government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no
persons right is restricted by government action, it behooves a democratic government to see to it
less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to
that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to procedure.
disobey.153 Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because
of its anti-government sentiments. This Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional
G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the right even if it involves the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on public affairs is
freedom of the press. Petitioners narration of facts, which the Solicitor General failed to refute, essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for
established the following: first, theDaily Tribunes offices were searched without warrant;second, the the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. The motto
police operatives seized several materials for publication; third, the search was conducted at about should always be obsta principiis.154
1:00 o clock in the morning of February 25, 2006; fourth,the search was conducted in the absence
of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building; and fifth, policemen
Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General admitted that the search of
stationed themselves at the vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices.
the Tribunes offices and the seizure of its materials for publication and other papers are illegal; and
that the same are inadmissible "for any purpose," thus:
Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government officials. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael
Defensor was quoted as saying that such raid was "meant to show a strong presence, to tell
JUSTICE CALLEJO:
media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this
government." Director General Lomibao further stated that "if they do not follow the standards
and the standards are if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do You made quite a mouthful of admission when you said that the policemen, when inspected the
not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 we will recommend Tribune for the purpose of gathering evidence and you admitted that the policemen were able to get
a takeover." National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio the clippings. Is that not in admission of the admissibility of these clippings that were taken from the
networks to "cooperate" with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He Tribune?
warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit
that violates rules set out for media coverage during times when the national security is
SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:
threatened.151

Under the law they would seem to be, if they were illegally seized, I think and I know, Your Honor,
The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in
and these are inadmissible for any purpose.155
the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may xxxxxxxxx
produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in
the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the
latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless
the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may These have been published in the past issues of the Daily Tribune; all you have to do is to get those
be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the past issues. So why do you have to go there at 1 oclock in the morning and without any search
CIDG operatives. warrant? Did they become suddenly part of the evidence of rebellion or inciting to sedition or what?

Not only that, the search violated petitioners freedom of the press. The best gauge of a free and SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
democratic society rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. In the Burgos v. Chief of
Staff152 this Court held that --
Well, it was the police that did that, Your Honor. Not upon my instructions.
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO: violate the citizens rights under the Constitution, this Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional
and illegal.
Are you saying that the act of the policeman is illegal, it is not based on any law, and it is not based
on Proclamation 1017. In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans concurring opinion, attached hereto, is
considered an integral part of this ponencia.
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
SUMMATION
It is not based on Proclamation 1017, Your Honor, because there is nothing in 1017 which says that
the police could go and inspect and gather clippings from Daily Tribune or any other newspaper. In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 a supervening event would have
normally rendered this case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal
acts were committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no guarantee that PP 1017, or
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
one similar to it, may not again be issued. Already, there have been media reports on April 30, 2006
that allegedly PP 1017 would be reimposed "if the May 1 rallies" become "unruly and violent."
Is it based on any law? Consequently, the transcendental issues raised by the parties should not be "evaded;" they must
now be resolved to prevent future constitutional aberration.
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by
As far as I know, no, Your Honor, from the facts, no. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However,
PP 1017s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees;
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO: (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as
well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of
prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under
So, it has no basis, no legal basis whatsoever? Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take
over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest.
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President acting as
Maybe so, Your Honor. Maybe so, that is why I said, I dont know if it is premature to say this, we do Commander-in-Chief addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017.
not condone this. If the people who have been injured by this would want to sue them, they Significantly, it also provides a valid standard that the military and the police should take only the
can sue and there are remedies for this.156 "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence."But the words "acts of terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and
made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While
Likewise, the warrantless arrests and seizures executed by the police were, according to the "terrorism" has been denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the military,
Solicitor General, illegal and cannot be condoned, thus: and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFPs authority in carrying out this portion of
G.O. No. 5.
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1)
There seems to be some confusions if not contradiction in your theory. the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the
rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members; (3) the imposition of
standards on media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of
SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO: the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other materials,
are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of
I dont know whether this will clarify. The acts, the supposed illegal or unlawful acts committed on PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
the occasion of 1017, as I said, it cannot be condoned. You cannot blame the President for, as you
said, a misapplication of the law. These are acts of the police officers, that is their responsibility.157 Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil, criminal or administrative
sanctions on the individual police officers concerned. They have not been individually identified and
The Dissenting Opinion states that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional in every aspect and given their day in court. The civil complaints or causes of action and/or relevant criminal
"should result in no constitutional or statutory breaches if applied according to their letter." Informations have not been presented before this Court. Elementary due process bars this Court
from making any specific pronouncement of civil, criminal or administrative liabilities.

The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances. Its ratiocination has been
exhaustively presented. At this point, suffice it to reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights are
the President of the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. When in ends in themselves. How to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic
implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which without unnecessarily trampling individual rights is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a
democratic state.During emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth and intensity from
normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our peoples liberty.
Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who studied the various competing
political philosophies is that, it is possible to grant government the authority to cope with crises
without surrendering the two vital principles of constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to
arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the government to the governed.158
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017
is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the
AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding
the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the
President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring
national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such
declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP
should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures
to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not
yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest
of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these
petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP
880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the
warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and
other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers
taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother,
a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin
and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against
her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages
against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after
trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those
further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any
person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him
P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the
costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner
Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or
submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and
consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of
private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from
using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial
court's decision, petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., 1 this Court ruled
that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in that
case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did
not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct, For this reason it is contended that the Court of
Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondent's
complaint.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among
other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in
using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct
because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr.,
this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be "impressed with
merit:"2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he
maintains that:
....
4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional
Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting
Cecilia from using the documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however
having appealed the said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a
restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial
court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's request for
petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be
looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and
 authenticity of the questioned annexes, At that point in time, would it have been
malpractice for respondent to use petitioner's admission as evidence against him in the
legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits
it is not malpractice.
Footnotes
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin
himself under oath, Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, 1
163 SCRA 111 (1988).
receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For
Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission and use the same in her action for 2
Id. at 120-121, 126.
legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.
3
1973 CONST., Art. IV, 4(1); 1987 CONST., Art. III, 3(1).
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration
that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's admission as to
their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. 4
Id.
By no means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers
in question. 5
1973 CONST., ART. IV, 4(2); 1987 CONST., Art. III, 3(2).

It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of 6
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the Rule 130, 22.
documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this
Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by 7
Rule 130, 24.
petitioner against the trial court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the
further use of the documents and papers became effective again.
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" 3 is no less vs.
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to
the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or
order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5 Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
BIDIN, J.:

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as
to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for
each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial
Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation
to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law
wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in
SO ORDERED. the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped
packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to
them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in
Regalado, Romero and Puno, JJ., concur. Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing
 therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of
the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland"
(Decision, p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages.
Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books,
cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's
representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4)
packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2').
Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was
sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr.
Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a
peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles
allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he
pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He
made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the
contents thereof(tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a
laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp.
5-6, October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that
date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job
Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job
Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita,
Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the
presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out
the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to
have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987;
Emphasis supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He
discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The
package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that
dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6,
1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents
thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3,
October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his
passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's
Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was
invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same
day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section
for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as
certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY
SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE
UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER
CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF
THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION
(Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be
held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had
its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 1 [3],
Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his
As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly served.
and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme who searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the
Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA knowledge and participation of police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal
383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and possession of narcotics.
seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's
Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of its
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and
seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried
seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals
over up to the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
(citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391
S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the
admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:
searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de
Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA
687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990). The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen the
owner of a motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel
case containing the evidence***complained of. The search was made on the motel
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were
owner's own initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious, called the local police,
invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized
informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available to the authorities.
government agencies.

The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be
obtained through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes
excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and
governmental action."
without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can
accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter
of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State? transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent
reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by
the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and
seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both instances,
the argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the
immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government,
included in which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions. . . . First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents
conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly
indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under
search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating
the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however
procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the
humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which
Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original
is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of
Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States,
116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the
same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in
parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI
construing the right against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:
agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to
the postulate of accused/appellant.
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as
shown in previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by
history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign
Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and
authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies;
look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no
as against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the
trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135).
Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer,
there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202
[1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122
[1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was
taken into custody of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was
initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional
meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties
guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection
against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the
query which he himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of
constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill
of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not
the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What
the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere
inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas , Record
of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the
law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if
it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of
the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by
the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it
matters not whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between
individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987
Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of
arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof (SeeSoliven v. Makasiar, 167
SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The
modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against
unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not
shift to anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against
the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with
appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed
as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the
constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure
equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's
constitutional rights to privacy and communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting him
despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial investigation
were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case and
found nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of his
constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the assistance of counsel. The law enforcers
testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they
have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given
full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the records, on
the other hand, is that appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as
testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused here, did
you investigate the accused together with the girl?
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused availed of his
constitutional right not to give any written statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62;
Original Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on
cross-examination. As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense that
appellant gave uncounselled confession while being investigated. What is more, we have examined
the assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of
appellant while under custodial investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction.
Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he
was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a
German national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30-
minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the
cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the next day
(October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-
serving and contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a
complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of
four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to
comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a)
person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana
flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The
Accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the
packages and ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo,
p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which
deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989];
People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the Interpol,
he was previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of
Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a
Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive from
appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244;
Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
armed force of the then de facto government.
The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the Nation. Thus, in view of this principle the resolution entitled Universal Declaration of Human
Rights approved by the general assembly of the United Nations , Philippines is a member. This
provides the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings
proclaimed without any distinction.
It has been said that the petitioner was engaged in subversive activities. If the only purpose of the
detention is to eliminate danger, government is not impotent to deal or prevent any threat. The
prolonged detention of herein petitioner is not the only way of governments keeping our country
safe and peaceful.
The writ will issue commanding the respondent to release the petitioner from custody upon terms.
The petitioner shall be placed under surveillance of the immigration authorities and insure that he
keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport him.
No cost will be charged.

Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke,
37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327
[1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show, appellant did not even
bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed,
the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the
contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the
contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a
person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At
this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.

Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed
judgment.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Mejoff vs Director of Prisons, 90 Phil 70, L- 4254 September 26, 1951

Facts : This is a second petition for habeas corpus by herein petitioner.
Mejoff is an alien of Russian decent. He was brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret
operative by the Japanese forces. Upon liberation, he was arrested as a Japanese spy. He was
deported having been found out that he has no travel documents and his entry here in the
Philippines was illegal. The Deportation Board ordered the immigration officials for his deportation
on the first transportation to Russia. He was moved in Cebu where two Russian ships were
scheduled, but each respective masters of the ship refused to take petitioner due to no authority to
do so. Thus, respondent was moved again to Bilibid Prison, Muntinglupa. Since then and until the
time this case was initiated he was still detained in the said jail.

Issue : Whether or not an aliens prolonged detention is unlawful.

Held : Petitioners entry here in the Philippines was not illegal since he was brought here by the

SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner, vs. Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General
CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO,
Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT
PORT, respondents.\ MORAN, C.J.: (1949)\Nature: En Banc Decision
Doctrine: Rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly
based on the generally accepted principals of international law. They form part of the law of our
nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the
recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our
government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Facts:
- A Military commission was empaneled under the authority of Executive Order 68 of the President of
the Philippines, which was issued on July 29, 1947. This is an act establishing a national war crimes
office and prescribing rules and regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals.
- Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding
General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines from 1943-1944, is charged before a
military commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with
having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them
to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the
Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war".
- Melville Hussey and Robert Port, American lawyers, were appointed prosecutors in behalf of USA.
- Kuroda challenges the legality of the EO No. 68 and the personality as prosecutors of Hussey and
Port.
- Kurodas arguments were: (1)EO No. is illegal on the gound that ut wiolates not only the provisions
of our constitutional law but also our local laws; (2) Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try
him for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because
the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947 and, therefore, he is
charged with crime not based on law, national or international; and (3) Hussey and Port have no
personality as prosecutors in this case because they are not qualified to practice law in Philippines
in accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is
violative of our national sovereignty.
Issues/Held: (1) WON EO No. 68 is valid and constitutional? [Yes it is a valid because it is based on
the generally accepted principles of international law which form part of our laws.]
(2) WON rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions form part of the law of the
nation even if Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them? [Yes, they form
part of our laws.]
(3) WON the American lawyers could participate in the prosecution of this case? [Yes, they can.]
Ratio: (1) The order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3,
that- The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day
including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international
jurisprudence established by the United Nation, all those person military or civilian who have
been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of
crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and
customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently, in
the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines has
acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of our
Constitution.
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as
Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs.
Styer. Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this
unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance and
enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.
(2) Rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based
on the generally accepted principals of international law. In fact, these rules and principles were
accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who were signatories to the
two Conventions. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if
the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution
has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the
recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our
government may have been or shall be a signatory.

Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines
was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound together with the
United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the
belligerent countries.

(3) There is nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel appearing before said
commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the
Rules of Court. Respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special
law and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. Secondly, the appointment of the
two American attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United
States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a
tribunal of our nation, should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has
been any relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United States
Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies.
---
DISSENTING OPINION of Justice Perfecto

(1) Executive Order No. 68., is null and void because, through it, the President of the Philippines
usurped power expressly vested by the Constitution in Congress and in the Supreme Court.

EO No. 68 confers upon military commissions jurisdiction to try all persons charged with war crimes.
It is clearly legislative in nature. The power to define and allocate jurisdiction for the prosecution of
person accused of any crime is exclusively vested by the Constitution in Congress. It also
appropriates the sum of P700,000 for the expenses of the National War Crimes office established by
the said EO No. 68. This constitutes another usurpation of legislative power as the power to vote
appropriations belongs to Congress.

It provides rules of procedure for the conduct of trial. This provision on procedural subject
constitutes a usurpation of the rule-making power vested by Constitution in the Supreme Court.
(2) Respondents suggest that the President issued EO No. 68 under the emergency powers granted
to him by Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, and
Commonwelath Act No. 671.

The above Acts cannot validly be invoked, because they ceased to have effect much before
Executive Order No. 68 was issued on July 29, 1947. Said Acts had elapsed upon the liberation of
the Philippines from the Japanese forces or, at the latest, when the surrender of Japan was signed
in Tokyo on September 2, 1945. It has never been the purpose of the National Assembly to extend
the delegation of legislative powers to the President beyond the emergency created by the war, as
to extend it farther would be violative of the express provisions of the Constitution. EO No. 68 is
equally offensive to the Constitution because it violates the fundamental guarantees of the due
process and equal protection of the law because it permits the admission of many kinds evidence by
which no innocent person can afford to get acquittal and by which it is impossible to determine
whether an accused is guilty or not beyond all reasonable doubt.
 1991.
The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and preliminary
injunction. Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case
No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al".

ISSUE:
Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the CRH?

HELD:
No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the CHR.
Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate, on its own
or on complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation, involving civil and political rights".
The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that the it
does not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or
need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an
restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly
said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of
preliminary injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the action is pending or
by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.
The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further proceeding
with CHR Case No. 90-1580.

SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994

FACTS:
On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the
petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution
of the vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear
before the CHR.
On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and
supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners'
authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and
political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political rights,
but their privilege to engage in business".
On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental motion
to dismiss. And petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated April 25,

PBM Employees Asso. v PBM 51 SCRA 189 (1973)
Facts: Petitioners informed the respondent employers of their schedule for a mass demonstration in
protest for the alleged abuses of the Pasig police. Respondent invoke that the demonstration is a
violation of their CBA agreement however petitioners contend it is an exercise of their freedom to
peaceable assembly to seek redress of their grievances against the abusive Pasig police and not a
strike against their employer. Respondent dismissed the petitioners and the court sustained their
demonstration is one of bargaining in bad faith.
Issue: Whether or not there was a restraint in the exercise of the right to peaceable assembly of the
petitioners.
Held: The court held that the primacy of human rights such as freedom of expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained. The
obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm was for
their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with
or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such common action to better shield
themselves against such alleged police indignities. Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees
of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the
employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the
demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice
likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees.
489 SCRA 160 Political Law The Executive Branch Presidential Proclamation 1017 Take
Care Clause Take Over Power Calling Out Power
Bill of Rights Freedom of Speech Overbreadth
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan
Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5
(GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring
down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all
permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of
their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his
arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and
they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA
news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also
arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his
actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of
PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist.
David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no
factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in
Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also
averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that
such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches
upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and
academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen
averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care power and take over
power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP.
It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the
said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is
constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC
ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5.
A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed
narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of
the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo
D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving
statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and
Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the
military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for
military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold
her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their
faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of
speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or
even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law
that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are
considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth
are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the
incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which
is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the
Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that
this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.
The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these
are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however
violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such
power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted
that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers
(as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province
of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in
the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.
To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s
exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying
out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the
Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency
contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes
rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but
her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs
authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid
exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)

The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable, except upon lawful order of
the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescrbied by law. Any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceeding section, shall inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.

FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1962, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private respondents between Dr. Martin and
his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against
her husband.

ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from
unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and
disqualification from medical practice.

HELD:
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injuction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infedility)
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to
the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court or which public safety or
order require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infedility. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage,
save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the
duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

People vs. Marti 193 SCRA 57

Facts :

Andre Marti and his wife went to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders, carrying with them four gift
wrapped packages to be delivered to his friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes (wife of the
proprietor) asked if she could inspect the packages, however, Marti refused assuring that it only
contained books, cigars and gloves as gift to his friend.
Before delivery to Bureau of Customs/Posts, the proprietor Job Reyes, following standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened Marti's boxes, a particular odor
emitted therefrom and he soon found out that the boxes contained dried marijuana leaves. He
reported the incident to the NBI who acknowledged custody of the incident. Marti was convicted for
violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Constitutional Issues :
1. Marti contends that the evidence had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable seach and siezure and privacy of communication.
Ruling :
1. Evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person,
acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. In the
absence of governmental interference, the libertied guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State.
2. Mere presence of NBI agents does not convert it to warrantless search and siezure. Merely to
look at that which is plain sight is not search. Having observed that which is open, where no
trespass has been committed is not search.
Commissioner Bernas :
The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy...is a protection
against the State. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the State.
Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other
individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere
inaccessible to any power holder.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRE MARTI (193 SCRA 57) Case Digest

Facts:

On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila
Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita
Reyes and ask if she could inspect the packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to
seal the package making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes,
husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of the package as
part of standard operating procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor
which made him took sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and
invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes
opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against
Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal
in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the
evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as evidence against him.

Issue:

Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights
governs the relationship between the individual and the state.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the
law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job
Reyes was the one who opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business.
The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes
into a warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at
that which is in plain sight is not a search.

The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
was AFFIRMED.