To All Students taking up CONSTI Law: Kindly coordinate with Ms.

Rowena Imperial Ramos

regarding your take home examination ... answers should be in a clean notebook. Deadline for
submission is on April 4, 2016 5:00 PM at the COL Faculty Office
Note: Please, the questionnaires are for your consumption only. I am not giving you the license
to disseminate the same to those who are not enrolled. Thank you

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Final Examinations
Instruction:
Read the questions/problems carefully.
Answer briefly and concisely
Do not write the questions on your answer booklet
Deadline of Submission of Test Booklet is April 4, 2016 at 3:00 P.M. at the Deans Office

1. Almeda, an agent of the PDEA, obtained from the RTC of Tarlac, Tarlac, a Search Warrant
(SW), commanding any officer of the law "to search the person, house or store of Mario for
shabu and drug paraphernalia."

On the same date, Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the PNP, went to house of Mario, and
after showing the SW to the Maria (Marios wife), & without the presence of Mario, who was ill
and confined at that time, proceeded w/ the execution thereof. Two grams of shabu and several
drug paraphernalia were seized by Almeda and a receipt thereof issued by him to Maria. Separate
criminal cases were filed against Mario. Mario denied that the items seized belongs to him and
challenged the legality of the SW and filed a motion to quash the said SW. The RTC judge
denied the petitioner's motion for the reason that though the SW was illegal, there was a waiver
on the part of the petitioner.

Issues :
a. Is the ruling of the RTC Judge correct? Explain your answer. (5 pts)

No, the RTC Judge denial in the motion of the petitioner is incorrect. No express waiver has
been made by Mr. Mario. He could not have objected because he was ill and confined at that
time. Certainly, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a
personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one
who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
b. Was there and express or implied waiver? (5pts)

No. Same with number 1. The failure on the part on the wife of Mario to resist or object to the
execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right, rather it is
merely a demonstration of regard for thesupremacy of the law.
The waiver may be either express or implied (67 C.J., p. 304). No express waiver has been made
in the case before us. It is urged, however, that there has been a waiver by implication. It is well-
settled that to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear, first, that the right
exists; secondly, that the persons involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; and, lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
It is true that the petitioner did not object to the legality of the search when it was made. She
could not have objected because she was sick and was not present when the warrant was served
upon Alfredo Salas. Certainly, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are
invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.

In the light of these circumstances, we find that the petitioner did not waive her constitutional
right. As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force,
or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search
or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law.

Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right andfor a search
warrant to be valid, (a) it must be issued upon probable cause; (b) theprobable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by the applicantor any other person; (c) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge mustexamine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as theapplicant may produce; and (d) the warrant issued
must particularly describe theplace to be searched and persons or things to be seized. In the case
at bar, theexistence of probable cause was determined not be the judge himself but by
theapplicant.2.

The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is apersonal right which
may be waived. The waiver may be either express or implied.It is well-settled that to constitute a
waiver of constitutional right, it must appearthat: (a) right exists, (b) persons involved had
knowledge, either actual orconstructive, of the existence of such right, and (c) said person had an
actualintention to relinquish said right. The constitutional immunity from unreasonablesearches
and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone exceptthe person whose rights
are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so inhis/her behalf. In the case at bar, she
could not have objected because she wassick and was not present when the warrant was served
upon. Moreover, uponknowing of the seizure of some of her documents and papers, she had sent
herlawyers to the office of the Anti-Usury Board to demand the return of thedocuments seized.

2. Congress passed a law relating to officials and employees who had served in the Government
for the period from September 21, 1972 up to February 25, 1986.
(a) One provision of the law declared all officials from the rank of assistant head of a
department, bureau, office or agency "Unfit" for continued service in the government and
declared their respective positions vacant. Is this Valid? Explain your answer. (5pts)

The provision of the law declaring all officials from the rank of assistant head of a department,
bureau, office or agency "Unfit" for continued service in the government and declared their
respective positions vacant is not valid. This provision requires unfair termination from
employment just because the individuals served in the previous governments and contravene the
CONSTITUTION where under Section 1 of the BR NO

(b) Another provision required all the other officials and employees to take an oath of loyalty to
the flag and government as a condition for their continued employment. Is this valid? Explain
your answer (5pts)

No. unconstitutional.

3. The Commission of the Bureau of Internal Revenue through Rev. Examiner Happy filed an
application for a Search Warrant against Mess & Co. and its President Macario for violation of
the provisons of the NIRC. As Judge Dredd was then conducting a hearing, the deposition of
Happy and his witness, Drey, was taken by the Clerk of Court. The deposition was later read to
the judge who asked the witness to take an oath as to the truth of his statements. The judge then
signed the Search Warrant and accordingly issued the same.

Issue:
a. Whether or not the requirements for the issuance of valid
SW were complied with. Explain you answer? (5 pts)

A valid search warrant must comply with the following requirements:

a. There must be probable cause;
b. The probable cause must be determined personally by a judge;
c. It must be issued after examination, under oath or affirmation, of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce;
d. It must particularly describe the things to be searched and seized;

Thus, in the present case search warrant was secured in lacking requirements. First, there was no
personal examination conducted by the Judge of the complainant which is Rev. Happy and his
witness Drey. The Judge did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could
possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause against Mess &
Co. and its President Macario. Likewise, the Judge was then conducting a hearing and only the
clerk of the court who took the deposition of Rev. Happy and his witness. Secondly, the things to
be seized were not particularly describe in the search warrant issued.
b. Explain the essential requisites for a valid warrant? (5 pts)

No search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause, to be determined
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be search and the persons or the things to
be seized. There must be an existing crime first and there is a probable cause to be determined
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be search and the persons or the things to
be seized.

4. a. Armando Salamanca, a notorious police character, came under custodial investigation for a
robbery in Caloocan City. From the outset, the police officers informed him of his right to remain
silent, and also his right to have a counsel of his choice, if he could afford one or if not, the
government would provide him with such counsel.

He thanked the police investigators, and declared that he fully understands the rights enumerated
to him, but that, he is voluntarily waiving them. Claiming that he sincerely desires to atone for
his misdeeds, he gave a written statement on his participation in the crime under investigation.
In the course of the trial of the criminal case for the same robbery, the written admission of
Salamanca which he gave during the custodial investigation, was presented as the only evidence
of his guilt. If you were his counsel, what would you do? Explain your answer. (5pts)

The record does not show that appellant had waived his constitutional rights in writing and in the
presence of counsel. Article III Section 12(1) of the Constitution provides that an admissible
confession must satisfy the following requisites: that the confession must be (a) voluntary; (b)
made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) express; and (d) in writing.
The records clearly show that the requisites were not complied with. Even if the admission or
confession of an accused is gospel truth, even if it was voluntarily given, is still inadmissible if it
was made without the assistance of counsel. Hence, the extrajudicial confession from the
accused is inadmissible in evidence.

b. In his extrajudicial confession executed before the police authorities, Jose Walangtakot
admitted killing his girlfriend in a fit of jealousy. This admission was made after the following
answer and question to wit:

T - Ikaw ay may karapatan pa rin kumuha ng serbisyo ng isang abogado para makatulong mo sa
imbestigasyong ito at kung wala kang makuha, ikaw ay aming bibigyan ng libreng abogado, ano
ngayon ang iyong masasabi?" "S - Nandiyan naman po si Fiscal (point to Assistant Fiscal
Aniceto Malaputo) kaya hindi ko na kinakailanganang abogado."
During the trial. Jose Walangtakot repudiated his confession contending that it was made without
the assistance of counsel and therefore Inadmissible in evidence. Decide. (5pts)

An assistant fiscal, or a fiscal for that matter, cannot exercise the function of defense counsel
even during custodial investigation. To allow such a happenstance would render illusory the
protection given to the accused during custodial investigation. What the Constitution requires in
Article III Section 12 (1) is the presence of competent and independent counsel, one who will
effectively undertake his client's defense without any intervening conflict of interest.

Moreover, the answer of the accused ("Nandiyan naman po si Fiscal kaya hindi ko na kailangan
ng abogado") is a palpable indication that she did not fully understand her in-custody rights,
hence it cannot be said that she knowingly and intelligently waived those rights. The confession
of Jose Walangtakot isinadmissible in evidence. The warning given tohim is insufficient in
accordance with the rulingin People v. Duero, 104 SCRA 379, he shouldhave been warned also
that he has the right toremain silent and that any statement he makesmay be used as evidence
against him. Besides,under Art. III, Sec. 12(1) of the Constitution, thecounsel assisting a person
being investigatedmust be independent. Assistant Fiscal AnicetoMalaputo could not assist Jose
Walangtakot. Asheld in People v. Viduya, 189 SCRA 403, hisfunction is to prosecute criminal
cases. To allowhim to act as defense counsel during custodialinvestigations would render
nugatory theconstitutional rights of the accused duringcustodial investigation. What the
Constitutionrequires is a counsel who will effectivelyundertake the defense of his client without
anyconflict of interest. The answer of JoseWalangtakot indicates that he did not fullyunderstand
his rights. Hence, it cannot be saidthat he knowingly and intelligently waived thoserights

5. Peter,, together with co-accused Jun and Mark were charged with a violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, for the transport of metamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu". The
drug was contained in tea bags inside tin cans which were placed inside their luggages. Upon
arrival from Hongkong, they boarded the taxis at the airport which were apprehended by CIS
operatives. Their luggages were subsequently searched where the tea bags were opened and
found to contain shabu. Only Peter and Jun were convicted. Mark was discharged as a state
witness, who turned out to be a " deep penetration agent" of the CIS in its mission to bust the
drug syndicate .

Rule on the legality of the search and seizure. Explain your answer (10 pts).

We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is
not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is
not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." 5

In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the
authorities had reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband
and transport it within the country. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from
surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a member.
Aside from this, they were also certain as to the expected date and time of arrival of the accused
from China. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the
requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is that there
was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.

In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the
authorities had reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband
and transport it within the country. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from
surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a member.
Aside from this, they were also certain as to the expected date and time of arrival of the accused
from China. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the
requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is that there
was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.

6. Some police operatives, acting under a lawfully issued warrant for the purpose of searching
for firearms in the House of X located at No. 10 Shaw Boulevard, Pasig, Metro Manila, found,
instead of firearms, ten kilograms of cocaine.
(1) May the said police operatives lawfully seize the cocaine? Explain your answer. (2pts)

Yes, anything not included in the warrant cannot be seized EXCEPT if its mala prohibita, in
which case, the seizure is justified under the plain view doctrine. Page 47. Bernas

(2) May X successfully challenge the legality of the search on the ground that the peace officers
did not inform him about his right to remain silent and his right to counsel? Explain your answer.
(5pts)

The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be
availed of by third parties. No warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized.

(3) Suppose the peace officers were able to find unlicensed firearms in the house in an adjacent
lot, that is. No, 12 Shaw Boulevard, which is also owned by X. May they lawfully seize the said
unlicensed firearms? Explain your answer. (3pts)

No. Police officers cannot search in another house different from what is described in the search
warrant though Mr. X also owned the said another house where what is controlling is what is
stated in the warrant,

7. A. The Filipino seamen detained at Kota Kinabalu, allegedly fishing in Malaysian territorial
waters, had been acquitted, after trial, by the sessions court in the same city. They could not be
released and returned to the Philippines, because the prosecution had appealed the judgment of
acquittal to the Supreme Court of Malaysia.

Assume the situations had been reversed and a Malaysian had been apprehended in Shasi, Sulu,
for an alleged offense, charged before the Regional Trial Court and after trial acquitted.

May the Provincial Fiscal of Sulu appeal such judgment of acquittal to the Supreme Court, like
what the Malaysians did in the case of the Filipino fishermen at Kota Kinabalu? Explain your
answer. (5pts)

No, because it would place the accused indouble jeopardy, contrary to Art. III, sec. 21 ofour
Constitution. PD No. 1599 prohibits anyperson not a citizen to explore or exploit any ofthe
resources of the exclusive economic zone and makes violation of the prohibition a
crimepunishable by a fine of P2,000.00 toP100,000.00 and/or imprisonment of not lessthan 6
months nor more than 10 years. If aliensare arrested for fishing within this zone but forsome
reason are acquitted, the decision againstthem cannot be appealed to the Court ofAppeals
because that would place them indouble jeopardy. This is so well established thatthe Supreme
Court turned down many pleas forre-examination of the doctrine first announcedin Kepner v.
United States. 11 Phil. 669 (1904).The doctrine is said to be part and parcel notonly of settled
jurisprudence but also ofconstitutional law. Nor does it matter that theaccused are aliens. This
guarantee has beenapplied even to aliens without thought of theircitizenship.(See e.g., People v.
Ang Chio Kio, 95 Phil. 475(1954) (Chinese previously convicted of murder); People v.Pomeroy,
97 Phil 927 (1955) ( American previously convictedof rebellion with murder, arson and robbery).
b. A Pajero driven by Joe sideswiped a motorcycle driven by Nelson resulting in damage to the
motorcycle and injuries to Nelson. Joe sped on without giving assistance to Nelson. The Fiscal
filed two informations against Joe, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with physical injuries under Art. 365, RPC, before the RTC; and (2) abandonment of
one's victim under par. 2 Art 275, before the MTC.
Joe was arraigned, tried and convicted for abandonment of one's victim in the MTC. He appealed
to the RTC. It was only a year later that he was arraigned in the reckless imprudence charge
before the RTC. He pleaded not guilty.

Subsequently, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC relative to the abandonment of one's
victim charge. Joe filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals, invoking his right to
double Jeopardy, contending that the prosecution for abandonment under Art. 275 of the Revised
Penal Code is a bar to the prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of the same Code.
Decide. (5pts)

Joe cannot claim that his conviction forabandoning his victim in violation of Article 275of the
Revised Penal Code is a bar to hisprosecution for negligence under Article 365 ofthe Revised
Penal Code. As held in Lamera v.Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 186, there is nodouble jeopardy,
because these two offensesare not identical. Reckless imprudence is acrime falling under the
chapter on criminalnegligence, while abandonment of one's victimis a crime falling under the
chapter on crimesagainst security. The former is committed bymeans of culpa, while the latter is
committed bymeans of dolo. Failure to help one's victim isnot an offense by itself nor an element
ofreckless imprudence. It merely Increases thepenalty by one degree.Double Jeopardy
(1997)No. 2: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manilaapproved an ordinance (No. 1000)
prohibitingthe operation in the streets within the city limitsof taxicab units over eight years old
(from yearof manufacture). The imposable penalty forviolation thereof is a fine of P4,000.00
orimprisonment for one year upon the erringoperator. Thereafter and while the cityordinance was
already in effect. Congressenacted a law (Republic Act No. 500)prohibiting the operation in the
streets of citiesthroughout the country of taxicab units beyondten years old. The imposable
penalty forviolation thereof is the same as in OrdinanceNo. 1000. A, an owner/operator of a
taxicab unitoperating in the City of Manila, was chargedwith violation of the city ordinance.
Uponarraignment, he pleaded not guilty; whereupon,trial was set five days thereafter. For failure
ofthe witnesses to appear at the trial, the CityCourt dismissed the case against A. The
CityProsecutor of Manila forthwith filed anotherinformation in the same court charging A
withviolation of Republic Act No. 500 for operatingthe taxicab unit subject of the information in
thefirst case. The accused moved to dismiss thesecond case against him invoking
doubleJeopardy.

8. Marina Neptunia, daughter of a sea captain and sister to four marine officers decided as a child
to follow in her father's footsteps. In her growing up years she was as much at home on board a
boat as she was in the family home by the sea. In time she earned a Bachelor of Science degree
in Marine Transportation, major in Navigation and Seamanship. She served her apprenticeship
for a year in a merchant marine vessel registered for foreign trade and another year on a
merchant marine vessel registered for coastwise trade. But to become a full-fledged marine
officer she had to pass the appropriate board examinations before she could get her professional
license and registration. She applied in January 1986 to take examination for marine officers but
her application was rejected for the reason that the law Regulating the Practice of Marine
Profession in the Philippines (Pres. Dec. No. 97 (1973) ) specifically prescribes that "No person
shall be qualified for examination as marine officer unless he is:

Marina feels very aggrieved over the denial and has come to you for advice. She wants to know:

(1) Whether the Board of Examiners had any plausible or legal basis for rejecting her application
in 1986. Explain briefly. (5pts)

a) The disqualification of females from thepractice of marine profession constitutes asinvidious

discrimination condemned by theEqual Protection Clause of that Constitution(Art. IV, Sec. 1) In
the United States, under asimilar provision, while earlier decisions of theSupreme Court upheld
the validity of a statuteprohibiting women from bartending unless shewas the wife or daughter of
a male owner(Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948)and denyingto women the right to practice
law(Bradwell v.State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130 (1873), recent
decisionshaveinvalidatedstatutesorregulationsproviding for differential treatment of
femalesbased on nothing stereotypical and
inaccurategeneralizations.TheCourtheldthat"classification based on sex, like classificationsbased
upon race, alienage, or national origin,are inherently suspect, and must therefore besubjected to
strict judicial scrutiny." Accordingly,the Court invalidated a statute permitting a male

(2) Whether the 1987 Constitution guarantees her the right to admission to take the coming
January 1988 marine officers examinations. Explain and cite relevant provisions. (5pts)

9. Recognizing the value of education in making the Philippine labor market attractive to foreign
investment, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports offers subsidies to accredited
colleges and universities in order to promote quality tertiary education. The DECS grants a
subsidy to a Catholic school which requires its students to take at least 3 hours a week of
religious instruction.

a) Is the subsidy permissible? Explain (4 pts)

No, the subsidy is not permissible. It willfoster religion, since the school gives
religiousinstructions to its students. Besides, it willviolate the prohibition in Section 29[2J,
ArticleVI of the Constitution against the use of publicfunds to aid religion. In Lemon vs
Kurtzman.403 U.S. 602, it was held that financialassistance to a sectarian school violates
theprohibition against the establishment of
religionifitfostersanexcessivegovernmententanglement with religion. Since the schoolrequires its
students to take at least three hoursa week of religious instructions, to ensure thatthe financial
assistance will not be used forreligious purposes, the government will have toconduct a
continuing surveillance. This involvesexcessive entanglement with religion
b) Presuming that you answer in the negative, would it make a difference if the subsidy were
given solely in the form of laboratory equipment in chemistry and physics? Explain (3pts)
c) Presume, on the other hand, that the subsidy is given in the form of scholarship vouchers
given directly to the student and which the student can use for paying tuition in any accredited
school of his choice, whether religious or non-sectarian. Will your answer be different? Explain

On February 25, 2004, in Locke v. Davey, the Supreme Court overturned a lower federal court
decision which had held the free exercise clause of the First Amendment to be violated by a
provision in a state constitution barring a state scholarship from being used for a theological
major at a religious college. Such no religious use provisions exist in a number of state
constitutions and have become the focus of a number of suits in the wake of the Supreme Courts
2002 decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. In Zelman the Court, by a 5-4 margin, upheld the
constitutionality under the establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment of a school
voucher program that gave tuition assistance to poor children in failing public schools in
Cleveland to enable them to attend private schools in the city, notwithstanding that most of the
schools were religious in nature. In so doing the Court substantially loosened the constraints that
previously applied to voucher programs under the establishment clause and shifted the attention
of voucher advocates and opponents to state constitutional provisions that have been, or might
be, construed to prohibit such programs. Supreme Court decisions prior to Zelman had evaluated
the constitutionality of voucher programs primarily on the basis of whether the recipients of the
vouchers had a genuine choice among secular and religious options about where to use them. If
the available educational choices were predominantly religious in nature, the Court held the
program to violate the establishment clause. If there were a number of secular as well as
religious options available, the Court held the programs to meet constitutional requirements. In
Zelman the Court substantially loosened this genuine choice criterion by holding that the
available universe of choice includes not only the private schools where the vouchers themselves
can be redeemed but also the full range of public school options available to parents. Following
Zelman, legal questions remained with respect to the effect of the more strict church-state
provisions of some state constitutions and whether those state limitations are consistent with
either the free exercise or equal protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution. As noted, the
Supreme Court addressed this issue in Locke v. Davey and found that Washington states
exclusion of the pursuit of a devotional theology degree from its otherwise inclusive scholarship
aid program did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. This report details the constitutional
standards that currently apply to indirect school aid programs and summarizes all of the pertinent
Supreme Court decisions, with particular attention to Zelman. It also summarizes the Courts
decision in Locke and other selected state and lower federal court cases concerning vouchers.
The report will be updated as events warrant. (3pts)

10. Pursuing reports that great quantities of prohibited drugs are being smuggled at nighttime
through the shores of Cavite, the Southern Luzon Command set up checkpoints at the end of the
Cavite coastal road to search passing motor vehicles. A 19-year old boy, who finished fifth grade,
while driving, was stopped by the authorities at the checkpoint. Without any objection from him,
his car was inspected, and the search yielded marijuana leaves hidden in the trunk compartment
of the car. The prohibited drug was promptly seized, and the boy was brought to the police
station for questioning.

(1) Was the search without warrant legal? Explain (5pts)

Yes. The following are the well-recognized instances where searches and seizures are allowed
even without a valid warrant: (1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest: (2) [Seizure]
of evidence in "plain view." (3) Search of a moving vehicle. (4) Consented warrantless
search; (5)Customs search; (6) Stop and Frisk; (7) Exigent and emergency
circumstances; (8) Search of vessels and aircraft; [and] (9) Inspection of buildings and other
premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations.

(2) Before interrogation, the policeman on duty informed the boy in English that he does "have a
right to remain silent and the right to counsel." However, there was no counsel available as it was
midnight. He declared orally that he did not need any lawyer as he was innocent, since he was
only bringing the marijuana leaves to his employer in Quezon City and was not a drug user. He
was charged with illegal possession of prohibited drugs. Is his waiver of the right to counsel
valid? Explain (5pts).

No, his waiver of the right to counsel is not valid. The right to counsel cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel. Though the boy declared orally of not needing a
counsel does not purport his constitutional right to counsel. Likewise, the boy must be informed
in a language known to and understood by him. He was not asked if he can understand English
which was the language used before the interrogation.