II. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS (Arts.

246-266)

ART 246 PARRICIDE

Elements:
(1) Person is killed;
(2) Deceased is killed by the accused;
(3) Deceased is the
(a) legitimate/illegitimate father
(b) legitimate/illegitimate mother
(c) legitimate/illegitimate child
* should not be less than 3 days old, otherwise crime is infanticide
(d) other legitimate ascendant
(e) other legitimate descendant
(F) legitimate spouse
Essential element: relationship of offender with the victim; except for spouses, only relatives by blood
and in direct line. Hence, adopted are not included.

PEOPLE V. MALABAGO
ART 246 Parricide of a spouse
FACTS: 1. respondent was charged with parricide for killing his wife
2. accused-appellant came and interrupted his wife and mother-in-laws conversation. He and Letecia
began arguing. Guillerma turned away but heard the couples altercation over money and appellants
jealousy of someone. Suddenly, Guillerma heard a loud sound and she thought that appellant slapped
Letecia on the face. Letecia cried out Agay! Looking out the store window, Guillerma saw Letecias face
bloodied with a slash along her right ear. Appellant was facing Letecia, and with a bolo in his hand, struck
her again, this time hitting the lower left side of her face, from the lips down to the neck. Letecia fell to the
ground. Guillerma rushed towards her daughter and shouted for help. She was lifeless.
ISSUE: WON Malabago committed parricide
HELD: YES
RATIO: Parricide is committed when:
(1) a person is killed;
(2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
(3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim.13 In the case of parricide of
a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage
certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be
considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected to.
Appellant did not object to Guillerma's testimony and sworn statement that he and Letecia were husband
and wife. Moreover, the testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased is an admission
against his penal interest. It is a confirmation of the semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.19

PEOPLE V. DESALISA
ART 246 - PARRICIDE
FACTS: Emmanuel Desalisa, a 22-yr old farmer, lived w/ his 18-yr old legal wife, Norma, who was then 5
mos pregnant and their 2-yr old daughter in a small nipa hse on a hill at Pinaductan, Sorsogon. The whole
neighborhood consists of 3 houses. The other 2 houses are about 150 meters away: the house of his
parents-in-law and the house of Carlito Dichoso. The view of the houses is obstructed by the many fruit
trees and shrubs prevalent in the area.
On Oct 9, 1983, Vicente Dioneda, the father-in-law of the accused, testified that the latter went to their
house and left his 2 yr-old. The next day, at about 6 or 7AM, Vicente went to the house of the accused only
to find plates scattered on the floor, the kettle w/ cooked rice untouched, and the other rope holding the
hammock missing. He went out of the house and noticed the couples pig to be hungry. He thought of
feeding it w/ coconut meat from the tree w/c was nearby. He saw the back of the body of his daughter. He
called her and touched her back. However, her body swayed. It was only then that he realized that she was
hanging from a branch of the jackfruit tree. Her neck was suspended about 4 inches above the ground. Her
neck was tied w/ the missing rope of the hammock. There were no eyewitnesses to the incident.
Accused-appellant often manhandled his daughter because he suspected her of having a paramour and
that the baby in her womb was not his. He believed that one Ariate was courting his wife. Desalisa invokes
the defense of denial. He speculates that it was his wife who was jealous. She suspected him of having an
affair w/ the daughter of Manoy Charito.

HELD: The accused has the opportunity to commit the crime. The house where they lived is up a hill and
isolated. The whole neighborhood consists only of 3 houses. No one can go up the hill to visit w/o being
known to the neighbor. Moreover, the motive of jealousy is evident for what can be more humiliating to a
man aside from a wife being unfaithful to be refused entry to ones very home? Although the accused did
not flee after the crime, there is no case law holding that non-flight is conclusive of proof of innocence.
The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation can not be appreciated against accused-appellant
absent any proof as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time elapsed before it was
carried out. Neither may the aggr circumstance of nighttime be appreciated against him because there is
no proof that it was purposely sought or taken advantage of or that it facilitated the commission of the
crime.
However, the aggr circumstance of uninhabited place is present. The uninhabitedness of a place is
determined not by the distance of the nearest house to the scene of the crime but WON there was
reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some help in the place of commission. Considering that the
killing was done during nighttime and many fruit trees and shrubs obstructed the view of the neighbors
and passersby, there was no reasonable possibility for the victim to receive any assistance.
Accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of parricide w/
unintentional abortion and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay civil indemnity
of PhP50K. Being a single indivisible penalty, reclusion perpetua is imposed regardless of any mitigating or
aggr circumstances.

DOCTRINE: The uninhabitedness of a place is determined not by the distance of the nearest house to the
scene of the crime but whether or not in the place of the commission, there was reasonable possibility of
the victim receiving some help.

PEOPLE V. JUMAWAN
ART 246
FACTS: Rodolfo Magnaye was married on 26 January 1974 to Presentacion Jumawan, one of the accused in
the above entitled criminal case. They separated their conjugal abode. Presentacion lived with her sister
while Magnaye lived with his mom. One night, Rodolfo informed his mom that he and Presentacion will talk
about their marriage. On the same day, Presentacion reported to the police that Magnaye made an
attempted robbery to her sisters store in the market but she did not reveal in her report that they are
related nor that people chased after him. The next day, Rodolfos mother looked for him in the market
since he did not come home. 4 people directed her to Rodolfos corpse by the waters; thus,
During the trial, 2 witnesses testified that they saw the 4 accused with Rodolfo Magnaye near the BLTB
station and their testimony shows that the four appellants conspired and cooperated in the assassination
of Rodolfo Magnaye.

HELD: The victim and his wife had a rendezvous in the evening of June 19, 1976, in order to discuss the
fate of their marriage. White it is not known if they actually conversed, the purpose of the rendezvous was
in fact accomplished; the marriage was terminated by the murder of the husband.
The report to the police by Presentacion that Rodolfo Magnaye had attempted to rob the store of
Sebastiana Jumawan was a crude diversionary tactic to enable Cesario and Manuel to transfer the cadaver
to another place.
The accused denied the allegations and said that they were not at the scene on the night of the crime.
Presentation should have been accused of parricide but as it is, since her relationship to the deceased is
not

alleged in the information, she, like the others, can be convicted of murder only qualified by abuse of
superior strength.
Although not alleged in the information, relationship as an aggravating circumstance should be assigned
against the appellants. True, relationship is inherent in parricide, but Presentation stands convicted of
murder. And as to the others, the relationships of fatherinlaw and brotherinlaw aggravate the crime.

The penalty for murder with an aggravating circumstance is death. However, for lack of necessary votes,
the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
At about 9:30 oclock in the evening of 19 June 1976 one Mr. Vicente Recepeda While he was infront of the
public market on the way to the former BLTB station he heard the noise of pigs being butchered and being
in the business of buying pigs and chicken he went to the direction of [the] slaughter house to inquire
about the prices of pigs and chicken.
Before reaching the slaughter house he heard the noise (sic) of a person being attacked by three (3)
persons and a woman inside a store which was lighted. He saw accused Francisco Jumawan holding the
hands of Rodolfo Magnaye while accused Manuel Jumawan was behind Rodolfo Magnaye with his arm
around the neck of Rodolfo Magnaye while Cesario Jumawan was infront of Rodolfo Magnaye with his left
hand holding the collar of Rodolfo Magnaye and in his right hand he was holding a small pointed bolo with
which he stabbed Rodolfo Magnaye below the right nipple

PEOPLE V. AYUMAN
ART 246
FACTS: On April 22, 1997 at around 10:15 in the morning, Ermita Ayuman, the wife of the accused, rushed
her five-year old son Sugar Ray to the Emergency Room of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center. When a
nurse, took the child's vital signs, it appeared that he was dead on arrival. Ermita's statement was noted in
the emergency room record. An autopsy was done to the dead body of Sugar Ray. On April 23, 1997, Sugar
Ray was buried. The accused was nowhere to be found. Neither did he report for work from April 23 to May
21, 1997. During the burial, Ermita cried and shouted, "Dong, forgive your father. Dong, don't leave us."
Afterwards, she went to the precinct and gave a testimony to SPO1 Catulong against her husband for
killing their son. At that time, his son was already buried. The couple then went to the Office of the
Prosecutor to "tell the truth."
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of the crime of parricide.
Held: YES. The elements of the crime of parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by
the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of the
accused or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse; The key element here is the relationship
of the offender with the victim. All the above elements were sufficiently proven by the prosecution,
specifically on the basis of circumstantial evidence. And also, the circumstances cited by the trial court,
when viewed in their entirety, were as convincing as direct evidence and as such, negate the innocence of
the accused. Otherwise stated, the prosecution established beyond a shadow of doubt, through
circumstantial evidence, that accused committed the crime of parricide.
1. Appellant has the propensity in maltreating his son. He himself testified that he disciplined the victim by
inflicting on him serious corporal punishment akin to the military approach; 15
2. Marino Jalalo, appellants neighbor, testified that whenever the victim committed a mistake, appellant
would bring him in a room and punish him. He often heard the victim crying as he was being hit by
appellant with a belt or a stick. This happened about 3 to 4 times a month;
3. Appellant was at home on April 22, 1997 when Ermita rushed the victim to the NMMC where he was
declared dead on arrival;
8. During the interment, Ermita shouted, Dong, forgive your father.
10. Appellant did not return home immediately. In fact, he was not present during the wake and the burial
of his own son, conduct so unnatural for a father like him.
The foregoing circumstances, when viewed in their entirety, are as convincing as direct evidence and as
such, negate appellants innocence. Otherwise stated, the prosecution established beyond a shadow of
doubt, through circumstantial evidence, that appellant committed the crime of parricide.
Here is a father who mercilessly abused his own son and refused to bring him to the hospital, although on
the verge of death, for prompt medical treatment. Such a heartless conduct is condemnable and is
extremely contrary to human nature. Every father is expected to love his children and shower them with
acts of affection and tenderness

ART 247 DEATH OR PHYSICAL INJURIES BY SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES

Elements:
(1) A legally married person, or a parent, surprises his spouse or his daughter, the latter under 18 years of
age and living with him in the act of sexual intercourse with another person;
(2) He or she kills any or both of them, or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious physical injury in
the act or immediately thereafter;
(3) He has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or that she has not
consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.

PEOPLE V. TRIGO
Art 247
For the death of his wife, Alicia Dequina Trigo, the accused-appellant, Bertito Trigo, was charged with the
crime of PARRICIDE.
Trigo appealed that the COURT A QUO ERRED IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESS MARCOS FUENTES AND IN ABSOLUTELY DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED
BY THE DEFENSE. The witness, Marcos Fuentes, knew the spouses Bertito and Alicia Trigo because he
bought from them their house located in Capiz. He was at the market of the town of Pontevedra; that he
met Alicia Trigo at the said market and even greeted her; that he did not notice at the time whether Alicia
was with a companion or not; that after awhile, a commotion took place; that when he stood up he saw
Bertito Trigo stabbing Alicia; that he saw blood spurting from Alicia's left chest; that Bertito Trigo was at the
time in front of Alicia and holding the latter with one of his arms; that there were no other persons near
Alicia when he saw the latter bleeding; that Alicia later fell on the ground; and that he was about 50
meters from where the incident took place.
However, accused said that he and his wife were walking in the market to buy goods for their store when
he saw Orline Buaco draw from his waist a weapon; that Buaco tried to stab him but he (accused) was able
to evade the blow; that it was his wife who got hit by the blow delivered by Buaco; and after his wife was
hit, Buaco successively stabbed her.

ISSUE: credibility of prosecution witness Marcos Fuentes. YES

RATIO: It is a well-established rule that in criminal prosecutions on the matter of credibility of witnesses,
the findings of the trial court are given weight and the highest degree of respect by appellate courts
because the former is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. We find no strong and cogent
reason to depart from this established rule. The testimony of Marcos Fuentes which stated that he saw
appellant stab his wife.

The direct and circumstantial evidence established at the trial sufficiently prove the guilt of accused-
appellant. As aforestated, the trial court's findings of fact are generally given due respect. Appellant has
the burden, therefore, to convince this Court that a departure from this rule is justified upon satisfactory
showing that the trial court misapplied some facts of weight and substance as would alter the result of the
proceedings. He failed to do so

PEOPLE V. TALISIC
Art 247
Accused-appellant was charged with parricide for the killing of his wife. At the trial, he pleaded not guilty.
He, however, admitted the killing allegedly after surprising his wife in the act of sexual intercourse with
another man. He declared that upon catching sight of the indelity, he immediately drew his bolo and
hacked but missed the other man who had sufcient time to pull up his pants, button up, elude said attack
and escape unscathed. He further claimed that he did not recognize the man or even see his face but
insisted that the color of the latter's short pants was yellow. The trial court rendered judgment of
conviction nding that it is very unlikely for a wife in her right senses to indulge in marital indelity knowing
that her husband is just around the corner and would soon come back because he was just away for a
short while to fetch water. The trial court also found that, it is very unlikely that after the victim was caught
in agrante, she would just stay put, watch her husband run berserk, chasing her paramour with a lethal
weapon (bolo). Hence, this appeal by the accused. cdtai
The Supreme Court held that ndings of fact of the trial court are generally upheld on appeal, and that
"[e]vidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be
credible in itself."
Even assuming arguendo that appellant did indeed surprise his wife in flagrante delicto, his account of
subsequent events is implausible.
Having admitted the killing, the accused must now bear the burden of showing the applicability of Article
247. Accordingly, the defense must prove the following:
"1. That a legally married person (or a parent) surprises his spouse (or his daughter, under 18 years of age
and living with him), in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person.
2. That he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious physical injury in
the act or immediately thereafter.
3. That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has
not consented to the indelity of the other spouse." 13

We stress that the burden of proof to show the concurrence of all three elements rests on the defense.
Most critically, Appellant Jimmy Talisic must prove that he caught his wife in agrante delicto; that he killed
her while she was in the very act of voluntary sexual intercourse with another man or immediately
thereafter. Sadly for him, he has miserably failed to do so.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that appellant did indeed surprise his wife in agrante delicto, his
account of subsequent events is implausible. It is difcult to believe his story of how, upon catching sight of
the in delity, he immediately drew his bolo and hacked but missed the other man who, amazingly, had
suf cient time to pull up his pants, button up, elude said attack and escape unscathed. Further, his claim
that he did not recognize the man or even see his face is irreconcilable with his insistence that the color of
the latter's short pants was yellow. His declarations as to the location of the alleged paramour's short
pants are also con icting. Worse, the defense of appellant is belied by his own incredible and inconsistent
testimony.

PEOPLE V. ABARCA
Art 247
FACTS: Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder.

Abarca was reviewing for the bar exam in manila while his wife was having an illicit relationship with
Khingsley Koh. He found them having voluntary sexual intercourse when he went to his residence in Leyte.
He got a gun in tacloban and thereafter found koh in his hangout playing mahjong. He shot him and
accidentally shot the spouses Amparados, the couple who were staying in the room adjacent to Kohs.
They had slight physical injuries as caused by Abarcas shooting.

ISSUE: WON Abara is guilty for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder.
HELD: NO. SC stated that ART 247, defining death inflicted under exceptional circumstances, should be
applied, complexed with double frustrated murder.
The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . .
immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he should commit the
killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing
should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been influenced by
external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage.

But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder when he
discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. We
cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.

PEOPLE V. OYANIB
TOPIC: Article 247 - Death Under Exceptional Circumstances
FACTS:
Manolito Oyanib & Tita Oyanib were legally married. Years thereafter they separated. Tita had affairs w/
other men. Manolito reminded her that they were still legally married, but Tita still continued with her
affairs.
One day, Manolito came to see Tita to inform her of a meeting w/ their sons school regarding their
sons failed subject. He then came upon Tita and his paramour, Jesus Esquierdo, having sex w/ the
latter on top of the other w/ his pants down to his knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the check and Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus. Tita left
the room, got a Tanduay bottle and hit Manolita with it in the head. Tital then stabbed Manolito in the
arm with the broken Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita as well.
Thereupon, Edgardo, owner of the house where Tita was staying entered the room. Manolito hid but
later gave himself up.
He was found guilty of homicide and parricide and was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 6
month, 1 day to 6 yrs of prision correccional as minimum to 6 yrs 1 day to 8 yrs of prision mayor as
maximum and to pay P50K civil indemnity and
costs for the death of Jesus and to reclusion perpetua, to pay P50K and costs for the death of his wife
Tita.
He appealed, admitting the killings but arguing that he killed them both under the exceptional
circumstance provided in A247 RPC
ISSUE: WON hes entitled to the exceptional privilege under RPC A247
HELD: YES. He invoked Art. 247, RPC as an absolutory and an exempting cause. An absolutory cause is
present where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no
penalty imposed.
Having admitted the killing, it is inucumbent upon accused to prove the exempting circumstanbces to the
satisfaction of the court in order to be relived of any criminal liability.
RPC A247 prescribes the ff essential elements for such defense:
o That a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person;
o That he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and
o That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or
she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.
Accused must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise, his defense would be
untenable.
The death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing
upon his spouse in the act of infideltity. Simply put, the killing of the husband of his ide must concur with
her flagrant adultery
The Court finds the accused to have acted within the circumstances contempleated in Art. 247, RPC
The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording offended spouse the opportunity to avail
himself of RPC A247.
The vindication of a Mans honor is justified because of the scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law is
strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with death. But killing the errant spouse
as a purification is so sever that it can only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante
delicto, & it must be resorted to only w/ great caution so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted
only during the sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter (People v. Wagas)

Court thus sentenced Manolito to 2 yrs & 4 mos of destierro and shall not be permitted to enter or be w/in
a 100 km radius from Iligan City.

PEOPLE V. TAKBOBO
TOPIC: ART 247 DEATH UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
FACTS:
Accused Ruben Takbobo, a middle-aged fisherman from Cebu, is charged with killing his wife, Lucia,
using a knife AND bolo, which instantaneously killed her.
Though pleading guilty, the court still orders prosecution and defense to submit evidence as to motive.
Lucia was killed on March 25, 1991, at night time. This was all witnessed by their youngest daughter
Madilyn, who woke up in the middle of the night due to the noise of the quarreling.
She testifies as a child witness that she saw her father grab the bolo and hunting knife towards her mom,
before hacking Lucia at the feet, then the neck, then the hands, then the armpit, then on the breast.
Shortly after the incident, accused Ruben went to the authorities voluntarily, explaining the story,
without any mention of his motive for killing her, nor the fact that he came home from fishing shortly
before the killing.
However, it was mentioned that the accused has a short temper, and on two separate occasions, wielded
the bolo to his other daughters, but only with minor cuts.
Accused though, told the court that he killed Lucia because he caught her sleeping with another man.
The testimony of the accused states that coming
home at 3:00 am from fishing, he finds his neighbor, Cadiz Catulong, sleeping with his wife and that his
wife isnt wearing underwear. Accused tried to kill Cadiz, but Lucia pushed him away, causing Cadiz to
escape through the window.
In the process, he struck his wife, then ran outside to look for Cadiz but to no avail

ISSUE: WON Takbobo is entitled of the exceptional circumstance provided for in ART 247 of the RPC
HELD: NO. Though the exceptional circumstance provided for in Art 247 of the RPC couldve been applied,
but the accused failed to present any evidence in his favor. The Court ruled that for this to apply, there
must be at least clear and convincing evidence, to apply such exemption. The burden of evidence now, has
been shifted to accused, which he failed to give credence to. He needs strength of his own evidence and
not the weakness of the prosecution.

Also, the Court held that his statement that he killed his wife by accident AND that he was really aiming for
Cadiz for sleeping with her is NEGATED by the number of stab wounds certified in the medico-legal report,
and affirmed by the testimony of the child. Also the report shows that the deceased was wearing panties.

ART 248 MURDER

Elements:
(1) Person was killed;
(2) Accused killed him;
(3) Killing attended by any of the following qualifying circumstances (EPIC2 SW2AT)
(a) with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
(b) in consideration of a price, reward or promise;
(c) by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or
assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other
means involving great waste and ruin;
(d) on occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity;
(e) with evident premeditation;
(f) with cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging
or scoffing at his person or corpse.
(4) The killing is not parricide or infanticide.

PEOPLE V. MANERO
Art 248
Facts:
11 April 1985, around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the Manero brothers, along with Rodrigo Espia, Severino
Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Plenago and Roger Bedano, were inside the eatery of one Reynaldo Diocades. They were
conferring with Arsenio Villamor, Jr., private secretary to the Municipal Mayor of Tulunan, Cotabato, and his two (2)
unidentified bodyguards. Plans to liquidate a number of suspected communist sympathizers were discussed. On the
same occasion, the conspirators agreed to Edilberto Manero's proposal that should they fail to kill Fr. Peter Geremias.

Later, at 4:00 o'clock, the Manero brothers, together with Espia and the four (4) others, all with assorted
firearms, proceeded to the house of "Bantil", which was also in the vicinity of Deocades' carinderia and without any
provocation, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at the forehead of "Bantil". "Bantil" was able to parry the gun, albeit
his right finger and the lower portion of his right ear were hit. Then they grappled for its possession until "Bantil" was
extricated by his wife from the fray. But, as he was running away, he was again fired upon by Edilberto. Only his
trousers were hit. "Bantil" however managed to seek refuge in the house of a certain Domingo Gomez. 10 Norberto, Jr.,
ordered his men to surround the house and not to allow anyone to get out so that "Bantil" would die of hemorrhage.

At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle. He entered the house of Gomez.
While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Plenago towed the motorcycle outside to the center of the highway.
Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle was
ablaze, the felons raved and rejoiced.

Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. In a flash, Edilberto fired at the head of the
priest. As Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, his hands clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if that
was the only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body three (3)
times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to
scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the terrified onlookers, his brothers danced and sang "Mutya
Ka Baleleng" to the delight of their comrades-in-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from
possible assistance.

Issue: Whether or not, accused are guilty of Murder and Attempted Murder by conspiracy.

Held:
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to commit
it. 22 It is not essential that all the accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the offense. 23 It is
enough that an accused participates in an act or deed where there is singularity of purpose, and unity in its execution
is present. 24

The findings of the court a quo unmistakably show that there was indeed a community of design as evidenced
by the concerted acts of all the accused. Thus

The other six accused, all armed with high powered firearms, were positively identified with Norberto Manero,
Jr. and Edilberto Manero in the carinderia of Reynaldo Deocades in La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato at 10:00 oclock in
the morning of 11 April 1985 morning . . . they were outside of the carinderia by the window near the table where
Edilberto Manero, Norberto Manero, Jr., Jun Villamor, Elpidio Manero and unidentified members of the airborne from
Cotabato were grouped together. Later that morning, they all went to the cockhouse nearby to finish their plan and
drink tuba. They were seen again with Edilberto Manero and Norberto Manero, Jr., at 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of
that day near the house of Rufino Robles (Bantil) when Edilberto Manero shot Robles. They surrounded the house of
Domingo Gomez where Robles fled and hid, but later left when Edilberto Manero told them to leave as Robles would
die of hemorrhage. They followed Fr. Favali to Domingo Gomez house, witnessed and enjoyed the burning of the
motorcycle of Fr. Favali and later stood guard with their firearms ready on the road when Edilberto Manero shot to
death Fr. Favali. Finally, they joined Norberto Manero, Jr. and Edilberto Manero in their enjoyment and merriment on the
death of the priest.

From the foregoing narration of the trial court, it is clear that appellants were not merely innocent bystanders
but were in fact vital cogs in perpetrating the savage murder of Fr. Favali and the attempted murder of Rufino Robles
by the Manero brothers and their militiamen. Accused all assumed a fighting stance to discourage if not prevent any
attempt to provide assistance to the fallen priest. They surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez to stop Robles and
the other occupants from leaving so that the wounded Robles may die of hemorrhage. Undoubtedly, these were overt
acts to ensure success of the commission of the crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. The
appellants acted in concert in the murder of Fr. Favali and in the attempted murder of Rufino Robles. While accused-
appellants may not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective action showed a common intent to
commit the criminal acts.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR.

TOPIC: ART 248 MURDER

Facts:
In 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman to her home at Campanilla Street, Dasmarinas Village,
Makati. Roland John Chapman went with them. When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop about a
block away from her house, as she wanted to walk the rest of the way for she did not want her parents to know that
she was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the
radio.

While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car,
approached them, and asked: Who are you? (Show me your) I.D. When Leino handed his I.D., the accused grabbed
and pocketed the I.D., without bothering to look at it.

Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: Why are you bothering us?
Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his upper body,
staggered for a moment, and asked: Why did you shoot me? Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside
Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone. Accused then turned his ire on
Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: Do you want a trouble? Leino said no and took a step backward.

The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she became hysterical and started screaming
for help. She repeatedly shouted: Oh, my God, hes got a gun. Hes gonna kill us. Will somebody help us? All the
while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered
Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away
from him. Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of accuseds car.
Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen circled around accuseds car, trying to put some distance between them.
The short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut
up and sit down beside Leino. Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk.

For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the
upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen
fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was happening and saw accused return to his car and drive away. Leino
struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least 3 people who saw the incident.

As a result of the incident, 3 separate criminal cases were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he was
charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and
wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman subsequently died after 97 days of confinement at
the hospital and during the course of the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder was amended to MURDER.

Issue: Whether or not, Teehankee is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.

Held:
According to the the accused, the trial court erred in not holding that the prosecution failed to establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. First, he claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his involvement in previous
shooting incidents. Second, the NBI failed to conduct an examination to compare the bullets fired from the gun at the
scene of the crime with the bullets recovered from the body of Chapman. Third, the prosecution eyewitnesses
described the gunmans car as white, but the trial court found it to be silver etallic gray. Fourth, the accused could not
have been the gunman, for Mangubat said that he overheard the victim Hultman plead to the gunman, thus: Please,
dont shoot me and dont kill me. I promise Mommy, Daddy. The accused also contends that a maid in a house near
the scene of the crime told Makati police Alberto Fernandez that she heard Maureen say: Daddy dont shoot. Dont.
Fifth, the NBI towed accuseds car from Dasmarinas Village to the NBI office which proved that the same was not in
good running condition. Lastly, the result of the paraffin test conducted on appellant showed he was negative of
nitrates.
The accused points to other possible suspects, viz:. ANDERS HULTMAN, since one of the eyewitnesses was quoted in
the newspapers as having overheard Maureen plead to the gunman: Huwag, Daddy.; and, (b) JOSE MONTAO,
another resident of Dasmarias Village, who had a white Lancer car, also bearing license plate number 566.

The accused, however, cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because the trial judge violated the rule on res inter
alios acta when he considered his involvement in previous shooting incidents. This rule has long been laid to rest. The
harmless error rule is also followed in our jurisdiction. In dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial, the court
examines its damaging quality and its impact to the substantive rights of the litigant. If the impact is slight and
insignificant, the court disregards the error as it will not overcome the weight of the properly admitted evidence
against the prejudiced party.

In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports about the troublesome character of appellant is a
harmless error. The reference is not the linchpin of the inculpatory evidence appreciated by the trial judge in convicting
the accused. As aforestated, the accused was convicted mainly because of his identification by 3 eyewitnesses with
high credibility.

The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal gun with the bullets found at the scene of the
crime. The omission, however, cannot exculpate the accused. The omitted comparison cannot nullify the evidentiary
value of the positive identification of the accused.

There is also little to the contention of the accused that his Lancer car was not in running condition. Allegedly, this was
vicariously proved when the NBI towed his car from Dasmarias Village where it was parked to the NBI office. Again,
the argument is negated by the records which show that said car was towed because the NBI could not get its ignition
key which was then in the possession of the accused. Clearly, the car was towed not because it was not in running
condition. Even the accuseds evidence show that said car could run. After its repairs, the accuseds son, Claudio
Teehankee III, drove it from the repair shop in Banawe, Quezon City to Dasmarinas Village, in Makati, where it was
parked.

Nor was the SC impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the eyewitnesses description of the color of the gunmans
car. Leino described the car as light-colored; Florece said the car was somewhat white (medyo puti); Mangubat
declared the car was white; and Cadenas testified it was silver metallic gray. These alleged discrepancies amount to no
more than shades of differences and are not meaningful, referring as they do to colors white, somewhat white and
silver metallic gray. Considering the speed and shocking nature of the incident which happened before the break of
dawn, these slight discrepancies in the description of the car do not make the prosecution eyewitnesses unworthy of
credence.

The accuseds attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman, the adoptive father of Maureen Hultman, deserves
scant consideration. The accused cites a newspaper item where Maureen was allegedly overheard as saying to the
gunman: Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy. The evidence on record, however, demonstrates that Anders Hultman could
not have been the gunman. It was clearly established that Maureen could not have uttered said statement for two (2)
reasons: Maureen did not speak Tagalog, and she addressed Anders Hultman as Papa, not Daddy. Moreover, Leino
outrightly dismissed this suspicion. While still in the hospital and when informed that the Makati police were looking
into this possibility, Leino flatly stated that Anders Hultman was NOT the gunman. Leino is a reliable witness.

The accused cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was negative of nitrates. Scientific experts concur
in the view that the paraffin test has . . . proved extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can definitely
establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established from this test alone
that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The person may have handled one or more of
a number of substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks,
fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may
also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products of combustion of
tobacco. In numerous rulings, we have also recognized several factors which may bring about the absence of
gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears
gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. In the
case at bar, NBI Forensic Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified and confirmed that excessive perspiration or washing of
hands with the use of warm water or vinegar may also remove gunpowder nitrates on the skin. She likewise opined
that the conduct of the paraffin test after more than seventy-two (72) hours from the time of the shooting may not
lead to a reliable result for, by such time, the nitrates could have already been removed by washing or perspiration. In
the Report on the paraffin test conducted on appellant, Forensic Chemist Elizabeth Ayonon noted that when the
accused was tested for the presence of nitrates, more than 72 hours has already lapsed from the time of the alleged
shooting.

PEOPLE V. ENGITO
TOPIC: ART 248 murder
FACTS: CA found Engito guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with less serious physical injuries and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Prosecutions evidence:
At about 3:00 o'clock dawn of September 22, 1991, Felipe Requerme, a motorela driver who, while driving his motorela
with his wife on board, from Lapasan towards Poblacion, Cagayan de Oro City, picked up a passenger near the
Nazareno church. The passenger was later identified as the deceased, Engr. Wilfredo Achumbre. Achumbre asked him
to bring him across the Marcos bridge towards his home. After traveling a distance of 300 meters more or less,
Requerme's motorela was bumped by a white motor vehicle. The vehicle kept pushing the motorela causing it to run
very fast for the next 400 meters. Because of the violent push the motorela turned around facing the direction from
where it came from and fell on its right side.

Felipe Requerme screamed for help thinking that his wife was pinned underneath. A tamaraw pick-up stopped near
them and he immediately informed that they were intentionally hit by a white vehicle.

Mrs. Requerme testified that when she was riding along with his husband, their motorela was bumped by a white
motor vehicle. She observed that the face of the driver of the vehicle bumping them was bloody. Mrs. Requerme
shouted and waived her hand signaling the driver to stop but the driver kept pushing the motorela violently. She pleas
for appellant to stop bumping and pushing the motorela but it did not deter him. He continuously rammed the
motorela until it fell on its side injuring the driver and the driver's wife, Rosita. Wilfredo, who was able to jump out of
the vehicle, was ran over by appellant causing his instantaneous death.

Defendants evidence
Maintaining that the death of the victim was purely an accident, accused Thadeos Enguito, a co-employee of the
victim, declared that he and the deceased. Appellant testified that at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning he was about
to bring Achumbre to his house. At the crossroads going to the house of Achumbre, he (Achumbre) refused to step
down, compelling Enguito to go back to where they came from. Enguito observed that Achumbre was already drunk.
Achumbre invited Enguito to eat bulalo but the latter refused and because Achumbre still refused to alight from the
pick-up, Enguito decided to go home. Nearing the house of Enguito, Achumbre suddenly stepped on the brakes and
attempted to take over the vehicle. The Ceres Kia stopped and Enguito quickly jumped out and run toward his house
with Achumbre pursuing him. After a short while Achumbre was able to catch up with Enguito and he (Achumbre) said,
"You are a braggart" and mauled him. Enguito failed to put up a fight because Achumbre was very much bigger having
a height of approximately 5'11". Achumbre's blows resulted to Enguito's dizziness and when his mind was cleared, he
noticed that Achumbre already left. The Ceres Kia pick-up which, Achumbre wanted to take away from him was left
parked near Enguito.

Accused Enguito drove back and he claimed he accidentally run over the deceased who jumped from a motorela while
he was on his way to report the incident to the police authorities.

After trial, RTC found Engito guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with Less Serious Physical
Injuries.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that since the prosecution's evidence showed that accused killed the victim by
means of motor vehicle, he should be guilty of the crime of murder and not of homicide.

In this appeal, appellant claimed that he should be acquitted of less serious physical injuries as the same was caused
by the failure of the driver to balance the motorela when the deceased Achumbre jumped out from the rear, and
questioned the failure of the appellate court to consider passion and voluntary surrender as mitigating circumstances.

ISSUE: WON Engito should be convicted of murder

HELD: YES. The accused is convicted of he complex crime of Murder with Less Serious Physical Injuries

The defense disregards the basic rule in criminal law that a person is responsible for all the consequences of his
unlawful or wrongful act although such consequences were different from those which he originally intended. 8 Even if
it be assumed that the real intention of accused-appellant was to surrender the victim to the police for mauling him,
his act of pursuing the victim, who was a passenger of the motorela, resulted in the injuries of the driver and the other
passenger of the motorela. Appellant himself testified 9 that when he followed the motorela, he was "very near" 10
and that he saw the deceased Achumbre jump out on the right side of the motorela but he went ahead; he allegedly
"tried to evade, but he was so near." 11 Upon seeing that Achumbre was trying to jump out of the motorela, accused-
appellant should have known that by closely following, pushing and bumping the motorela, he could injure the
passengers, which is what happened in this case. Moreover, accused-appellant ignored the pleas of Rosita Requerme,
the other passenger and wife of the driver of the motorela, for him to stop bumping and pushing the motorela. 12
Instead, he persisted resulting in the motorela turning on its side and in the opposite direction. Verily, the act of
accused- appellant in relentlessly pursuing the motorela is a manifestation of his intention to perpetrate the crime.
The indictment against accused-appellant is murder attended by the use of motor vehicle. The use of a motor vehicle
qualifies the killing to murder if the same was perpetrated by means thereof. 13 Appellant's claim that he merely used
the motor vehicle, Kia Ceres van, to stop the victim from escaping is belied by his actuations. By his own admission, he
testified that there was a police mobile patrol near the crossing. 14 Accused-appellant could have easily sought the
assistance of the police instead of taking the law into his own hands. Moreover, accused-appellant already noticed the
deceased trying to jump out of the motorela 15 but he still continued his pursuit. He did not stop the vehicle after
hitting the deceased 16 who was hit when he (Achumbre) was at the railing of the Marcos bridge. 17 Accused-
appellant further used the vehicle in his attempt to escape. He was already more than one (1) kilometer away from the
place of the incident that he stopped his vehicle upon seeing the police mobile patrol which was following him

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. STEPHEN MARK WHISENHUNT

G.R. No. 123819, November 14, 2001
ART 248

Facts: On September 23, 1993, Demetrio Ravelo, driver of Whisenhunt, reported for work at 8:30 a.m. at the latters
condominium unit at San Juan. He brought Elsa to accused-appellants condominium unit.

After a few days, while Demetrio was in the servants quarters watching television, accused Whisenhunt came in. He
asked Demetrio how long he wanted to work for him. Demetrio replied that he was willing to work for him forever, and
expressed his full trust in him. Upon hearing this, accused-appellant shed tears and embraced Demetrio and told him
that Elsa was dead.

The two of them went to Shoppesville at the Greenhills Shopping Center and bought a big bag with a zipper and
rollers, colored black and gray. When they returned to the condominium, accused asked Demetrio to help him wrap the
body in the black garbage bags. Then, they brought the bag down and loaded it in the trunk of accused-appellants
car. After that, they boarded the car. Demetrio took the wheel and accused-appellant sat beside him in front.

It was almost 2:00 p.m. when Demetrio and accused-appellant left the condominium. Accused-appellant told Demetrio
to drive around Batangas and Tagaytay City where they disposed the victims body parts and belongings.

Issue: Whether or not, Whisenhunt is guilty of Murder.

Held: The qualifying circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the corpse of the victim was correctly appreciated by
the trial court. The mere decapitation of the victims head constitutes outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim,
thus qualifying the killing to murder. In this case, accused-appellant not only beheaded Elsa. He further cut up her
body like pieces of meat. Then, he strewed the dismembered parts of her body in a deserted road in the countryside,
leaving them to rot on the ground.

that the trial court correctly gave full faith and credit to the testimony of Demetrio, driver of the accused who
described Elsa's dismembered body as he found it in accused's bathroom; findings of the forensic biologist on the
examination of hair samples and bloodstains all confirm Elsa's death inside accused's bedroom; that accused would be
the only suspect to her killing. While there was no eyewitness to the death of Elsa, the confluence of the testimonial
and physical evidence against the accused creates an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence that naturally leads
to the conclusion that accused was the author of the crime, to the exclusion of all others.

Hence, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder, qualified by outraging and
scoffing at the victims person or corpse. This circumstance was both alleged in the information and proved during the
trial.

PEOPLE V. ULEP
ART 249
FACTS: In the aftermath of an incident where a certain Buenaventura Wapili went berserk at Mundog Subdivision,
Poblacion Kidapawan, Cotabato, Police Officer Ernesto Ulep was found guilty of murder for killing Wapili.
Chronological: Around 2 AM, Buenaventura Wapili was having a high fever and was heard talking insensibly to himself
in his room. His brother-in-law Leydan heard a disturbance inside the room, as if Wapili was smashing the furniture.
Unable to pacify Wapili, Leydan called Pastor Bonid of the Alliance Church of Kidapawan to help him "pray over" Wapili,
but they could not enter the latter's room as he became wild and violent. Suddenly, Wapili bolted out of his room
naked and chased Leydan. Thereafter, Leydan with the aid of two of his neighbors attempted to tie Wapili with a rope
but was unsuccessful as Wapili was much bigger in built and stronger than anyone of them. Wapili, who appeared to
have completely gone crazy, kept on running without any particular direction. Thus, Leydan went to the house of a
policewoman Plando, a neighbor, and asked for assistance. As Wapili passed by the house of Plando, he banged
Plandos vehicle parked outside. Using a hand-held radio, Plando then contacted SPO1 Ernesto Ulep, SPO1 Edilberto
Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto 19 Espadera and SPO2 Crispin Pillo, all members of the PNP assigned to secure the
premises of the nearby Roman Catholic Church of Kidapawan. SPO1 Ulep together with SPO1 Espadera and SPO2 Pillo
arrived at the scene. The three police officers, all armed with M-16 rifles, alighted from the jeep when they saw the
naked Wapili approaching them. The kind of weapon Wapili was armed with is disputed. The police claimed that he was
armed with a bolo and a rattan stool, while Wapili's relatives and neighbors said he had no bolo, but only a rattan
stool. Ulep fired a warning shot in the air and told Wapili to put down his weapons or they would shoot him. But Wapili
retorted "pusila!" ("fire!") and continued advancing towards the police officers. When Wapili was only about 2-3 meters
away from them, ULEP SHOT THE VICTIM WITH HIS M-16 RIFLE, HITTING HIM IN VARIOUS PARTS OF HIS BODY. As the
victim slumped to the ground, Ulep came closer and pumped another bullet into his head and literally blew his brains
out. the trial court rendered judgment convicting the accused of murder and sentencing him to death.
Appellant prays for his acquittal on the basis of his claim that the killing of the victim was in the course of the
performance of his official duty as a police officer, and in self-defense.
Issue: Whether or not PO1 Ulep should not be charged with murder as a justifying circumstance of performance of a
lawful duty is attendant
Held: The accused was charged with the crime of homicide with a special mitigating circumstance of incomplete
justification
Ratio: while accused-appellant is to be commended for promptly responding to the call of duty when he stopped the
victim from his potentially violent conduct and aggressive behavior, he cannot be exonerated from overdoing his duty
during the second stage of the incident. When the latter fall to the ground, he at that point no longer posed a threat
and was already incapable of mounting an aggression against the police officers. Shooting him in the head was
obviously unnecessary.

It cannot therefore be said that the fatal wound in the head of the victim was a necessary consequence of accused-
appellant's due performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office. Likewise, the evidence at hand does
not favor his claim of self-defense. The elements in order for self-defense to be appreciated are: (a) unlawful
aggression on the part of the person injured or killed by the accused; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it; and, (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. There was no
unlawful aggression on the part of the person injured since he was already on the floor, bloodied.
We find in favor of accused-appellant the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise
of a right.

PEOPLE V. ANTONIO
Facts:
On November 1, 1996. Antonio, Tuadles, and a certain Danny Debdani, then president of the IBC, had agreed
to meet at the club for another poker session, their third night in a row. Antonio arrived at the club first, followed by
Tuadles at around midnight. Debdani, however, failed to appear, so after waiting for sometime, Antonio and Tuadles
decided to play pusoy dos, a game for two (2) players only. They continued playing until morning, pausing only
when either of them had to visit the restroom. They stopped playing at around 9:00 oclock in the morning of
November 2, 1996, to eat breakfast.

When it came time to tally their scores and collect the winnings from the loser, an argument arose. It is at this point
where the prosecution and the defense presented two very different scenarios. The prosecution alleged and sought to
prove that in the course of an argument, without warning or cause, Antonio pulled his gun from behind his back and
shot Tuadles at very close range, thus employing treacherous means to accomplish the nefarious deed. The pivotal
evidence presented by the prosecution was the testimony of one Jose Jimmy T. Bobis, a security guard who testified as
to how the shooting of Tuadles occurred.

On the other hand, the defense hinged its opposing arguments on the testimony of accused Antonio himself, who
testified that their argument was caused by Tuadles refusal to pay Antonios winnings. In the middle of a heated
altercation where they traded expletives, Tuadles suddenly grabbed Antonios gun from atop a sidetable. Fearing for
his life, Antonio claimed that he reached for Tuadles hand and they grappled for possession of the gun. As they
wrestled, a single shot roared, Tuadles fell face down to the floor, and Antonio was left too stunned to recall who had
actually pulled the trigger. In fine, Antonio alleged that the shooting was accidental, and his only motivation was to
defend himself. He also refuted the testimony of the prosecutions eyewitness, averring that SG Bobis could not have
seen the actual shooting since he (Bobis) and co-accused SPO4 Juanito Nieto, who were alerted by Antonios yells,
reached the scene when Tuadles had already been shot and was lying on the floor.

On November 18, 1996, an Information was filed against Antonio for the crime of murder. Also charged as accessories
were SPO4 Nieto and SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.

Issue: Whether or not, treachery is employed by Antonio which qualifies the killing to Murder.

Held: There is no basis for the trial courts conclusion that accused Antonio consciously and deliberately adopted his
mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself.[34] It ruled that treachery
qualified the killing to murder. The trial court did not explain the basis for the qualification except for a terse citation
that there was a sudden attack and the victim had no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. There was no
treachery in this case.

It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There must be a conscious and deliberate adoption
of the mode of attack for a specific purpose.

All the evidence shows that the incident was an impulse killing. It was a spur of the moment crime.

It is also clear that appellant Antonio did not set out or plan to kill Tuadles in the first place. His criminal act was an
offshoot of their argument which neither of them had foreseen. Hence, there was no treachery because treachery
requires that the mode of attack must have been thought of by the offender and must have sprung from an
unforeseen occurrence.

It was Antonio's sudden anger and heated passion which drove him to pull his gun and shoot Tuadles. Said passion,
however, cannot co-exist with treachery. In passion, the offender loses his reason and control. In treachery, on the
other hand, the means employed is adopted consciously and deliberately. One who, in the heat of passion, loses his
reason and self-control, cannot consciously employ a particular means, method or form of attack in the execution of
the crime. Thus, the killing of Tuadles by appellant Antonio was not attended by treachery. Antonio can only be
convicted of the lesser crime of Homicide under Art. 249 of RPC.

PEOPLE V. TAC-AN
ART 248
F: Appellant Renato Tac-an, then eighteen (18) years and seven (7) months of age, and the deceased Francis Ernest
Escano III, fifteen (15) years old, were classmates in the third year of high school of the Divine Word College in
Tagbilaran City. They were close friends, being not only classmates but also members of the same gang, the Bronx
gang. Renato had been to the house where Francis and his parents lived, on one or two occasions. On those occasions,
Francis' mother noticed that Renato had a handgun with him. Francis was then advised by his mother to distance
himself from Renato. 4
Francis withdrew from the Bronx gang. The relationship between Renato and Francis turned sour. Sometime in
September 1984, Renato and Francis quarrelled with each other, on which occasion Francis bodily lifted Arnold
Romelde from the ground. Arnold was friend and companion to Renato. The quarrel resulted in Renato and Francis
being brought to the high school principal's office. The strained relationship between the two (2) erstwhile friends was
aggravated in late November 1984 when Francis learned that Renato, together with other members of the Bronx gang,
was looking for him, apparently with the intention of beating him up. Further deterioration of their relationship
occurred sometime in the first week of December 1984, when graffiti appeared on the wall of the third year high
school classroom and on the armrest of a chair in that classroom, deprecating the Bronx gang and describing Renato
as "bayot" (homosexual). Renato attributed the graffiti to Francis.

One day, Renato went home during school hours and got his gun. He went back to school and went to the classroom of
Francis, holding a revolver, shouted "Where is Francis?" after 3 shots, he finally shot Francis on the head where he fell
on the floor bloodied. Renato then went out of the classroom. Thereafter, a teacher, apparently unaware that it was
Renato who had gunned down Francis, approached Renato and asked him to help Francis as the latter was still alive
inside the room. Renato thereupon re-entered the room, closed the door, saying: "So, he is still alive. Where is his
chest?" Standing over Francis sprawled face down on the classroom floor, Renato aimed at the chest of Francis and
fired once more. The bullet entered Francis' back below the right shoulder, and exited on his front chest just above the
right nipple. Renato locked the classroom door so that no one could enter.

ISSUE: W/N Tac-an is guilty of murder

HELD: Yes
RATIO: the circumstance that Renato, having been informed that Francis was still alive, re-entered Room 15 and fired
again at Francis who lay on the floor and bathed with his own blood, manifested Renato's conscious choice of means of
execution which directly and especially ensured the death of his victim without risk to himself. We are compelled to
agree with the trial court that treachery was here present and that, therefore, the killing of Francis Ernest Escano III
was murder.

PEOPLE V. PUGAY
ART 248
F: The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run errands
for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public
plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel. Later, the accused Pugay and
Samson with several companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As
the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by
tickling him with a piece of wood. Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay
suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel and poured its contents on the body of the
former. the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the police officers brought
Gabion, the two accused and five other persons to the Rosario municipal building for interrogation. Police officer
Reynaldo Canlas took the written statements of Gabion and the two accused, after which Gabion was released. The
two accused remained in custody. THEREAFTER, the trial court charged the 2 accused for murder.
I: W/N the 2 accused were guilty of murder
H: NO. Pugay is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence while Samson is only guilty of the crime of
homicide defined
R: there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention
between the two accused-appellants immediately before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity
between the deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It
is also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective
criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased is individual and
not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him.

PUGAY - guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence; Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris
wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can
contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring
the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising
from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased.
SAMSON homicide; There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the
body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the
latter on fire if it were otherwise.

UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION
Elements:
(1) There is a pregnant woman;
(2) Violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion;
(3) The violence is intentionally exerted;
(4) Result of violence fetus dies, either in the womb or expelled therefrom

PEOPLE V. SALUFRANIA
UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION
FACTS: On 7 May 1976, Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman was charged before the CFI of Camarines Norte,with the complex
crime of parricide with intentional abortion. It was alleged that the accused Filomeno Salufrania assault and use
personal violence on his wife, MARCIANA ABUYO-SALUFRANIA by then and there boxing and stranging her, causing
upon her injuries which resulted in her instantaneous death; and by the same criminal act committed on the person of
the wife of the accused, who was at the time 8 months pregnant, the accused caused the death of the unborn
child,committing both crimes of PARRICIDE and INTENTIONAL ABORTION as defined and punished under Art. 246 and
Art. 256, paragraph I, of the Revised Penal Code.
At the trial court, Dr. Juan L. Dyquiangco Jr., Pedro Salufrania testified that,he was called upon by the Municipal Judge of
Talisay to examine the corpse of Marciana Abuyo-Salufrania that was exhumed from its grave in which the cause of
death was cardiac arrest.

Dr. Dyquiangco testified that after conducting the post mortem examination, he issued a certification thereof (Exhibit
"A"); that he issued a death certificate for the deceased, made on the basis of the information that the cause of death,
as cardiac arrest, was indicated on said death certificate only after the post mortem examination. The lower court
allowed the son of the accused, Pedro Salufrania, The lower court stated that, by reason of interest and relationship,
before Pedro Salufrania was allowed to testify against his father-accused Filomeno Salufrania, after careful examination
by the prosecuting officer and the defense counsel under the careful supervision of the court a quo, to determine
whether, at his age of 13 years old, he was already capable of receiving correct impressions of facts and of relating
them truly and, also, whether he was compelled and/or threatened by anybody to testify against his father-accused.He
stated that his father Filomeno Salufrania and his mother Marciana Abuyo quarrelled at about 6:00 o'clock in the
evening, he saw his father box his pregnant mother on the stomach and, once fallen on the floor, his father strangled
her to death; that he saw blood ooze from the eyes and nose of his mother and that she died right on the spot where
she fell. His brother,Eduardo Abuyo and had refused and still refused to live with his father-accused, because the latter
has threatened to kill him and his other brothers and sister should he reveal the true cause of his mother's death.The
brother in law and sister of the deceased victim,Narciso Abuyo also declared that after the burial of Marciana Abuyo,
the three (3) children of his deceased sisterrefused to go home with their father Filomeno Salufrania; that when asked
why, his nephew Alex Salufrana told him that the real cause of death of their mother was not stomach ailment and
headache, rather, she was boxed on the stomach and strangled to death by their father; that immediately after
learning of the true cause of death of his sister, he brought the matter to the attention of the police authorities .

The CFI found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion. Since
the accused was sentenced to death, this becomes an automatic review before the Supreme Court.

Appellant alleges that, assuming he indeed killed his wife, there is no evidence to show that he had the intention to
cause an abortion.

ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in its ruling of complex crime with parricide and intentional abortion?
HELD: YES
RATIO:
In this contention, appellant is correct. He should not be held guilty of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional
Abortion but of the complex crime of Parricide with Unintentional Abortion.
The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom.

The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion because he boxed his
pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then strangled her. We find that appellant's intent to cause
an abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate
strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact, appellant must
have merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion. The evidence on record, therefore,
establishes beyond reasonable doubt that accused Filomeno Salufrania committed and should be held liable for the
complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. The abortion, in this case, was caused by the same violence
that caused the death of Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by the herein accused upon his
victim.

The accused is liable for complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion for it was merely incidental to the
killing.

ART 249 HOMICIDE

Elements:
(1) Person was killed;
(2) Offender killed him without any justifying circumstances;
(3) Offender had the intention to kill, which is presumed;
(4) Killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide

PEOPLE V. PORRAS
TOPIC: Art 249; DEFENSE OF ALIBI; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER THE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED BY THE
WITNESSES; INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES
Facts: An appealed judgment for the People, found appellants John Jenn Porras and Sergio Emelo guilty of MURDER of
Rosendo Mortel and Sergio Emelo for FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE of Sgt. __. However, appellants contended that there are
14 alleged errors committed by the trial court such as (1) misappreciation of facts; (2) giving credence to the
inconsistent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Jose Malumay (guy in a bike from Sangley Point) and Maribel
German (cashier at Cathys Refreshment). Appellants impugn the credibility of the prosecution witnesses by citing the
seeming inconsistency between the testimonies of Maribel German, who apparently saw one assailant, and Jose
Malumay, who, on the other hand, claimed to have seen two assailants.

ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in convicting the accused for despite the inconsistent testimonies of the witnesses
HELD: No -- JOHN JENN PORRAS and SERGIO EMELO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide,

Ratio: The established rule of evidence is that inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to
minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight
of their testimony. 9 Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, if only in minor details, reinforce rather than
weaken their credibility, for it is usual that witnesses to a stirring event should see differently some details of a
startling occurrence. 10 Discrepancies on minor details, which do not destroy the substance of the witness' testimony
show that the witness was not rehearsed.
it is a settled rule that there can be a conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved
form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the perpetrator of the crime, 23 as in this case. In order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to
convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz:
(a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The record reveals that there were at least eleven circumstances correctly considered by the trial court in arriving at
its judgment of conviction, viz:
(1) moments before the incident of June 20, 1990, appellants were seen inside the Cavite City PNP Station looking for
Pfc. Roldan Emelo;
(2) appellant Sergio Emelo was then wearing a white T-shirt, maong pants and rubber shoes while appellant John Jenn
Porras was wearing a sleeveless cream T-shirt, maong pants and was carrying a maong jacket;
(3) on the same evening just before the incident, appellant John Jenn Porras, then wearing a maong jacket, was seen
on board the tricycle of Marcelo Real, together with a man wearing a white T-shirt;
(4) the two assailants were described by Jose Malumay as respectively wearing a dark attire and white T-shirt;
(5) one of the persons who shot Rosendo Mortel was described by Maribel German as wearing a T-shirt, maong pants
and rubber shoes; 29 (6) the assailants of Rosendo Mortel boarded a tricycle to flee from the scene of the crime;
(7) Sergio Emelo was identified by Sgt. Catalino Bermas as the person on board the tricycle that fled from the scene of
the crime;
(8) Sergio Emelo was identified by Sgt. Catalino Bermas as the person who shot him during the chase;
(9) a magazine pouch, camouflaged holster with the name Emelo, .38 caliber empty shells and live bullets were found
immediately after the shooting on the floor of the tricycle used by the appellants;
(10) Rosendo Mortel and Sgt. Catalino Bermas both sustained gunshot wounds from a .38 caliber handgun; and
(11) the flight of the appellants which was not sufficiently explained. There is no reason for us to disagree with the trial
court on these matters.
These findings are fully supported by the evidence on record and constitute an unbroken chain of events which by
their concordant combination and cumulative effect, more than satisfy the requirements for the conviction of the
appellants.

The trial court, however, erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery in Criminal Case No. 245-91.
Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, or as conclusively as the killing itself. and to appreciate it,
two conditions must concur, viz:
(a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate, and
(b) that said means of execution be deliberately and consciously adopted.
In this regard, the prosecution failed to definitively establish the manner in which the initial assault against the
deceased victim was committed to justify the appreciation of treachery.

With respect to the shooting of Sgt. Catalino Bermas who was fully aware of the risks in pursuing appellants was, at
best, done in a spur of the moment, an act which can hardly be characterized as treacherous for it was nowhere
proved that the same was deliberately adopted to deny Sgt. Bermas the opportunity to defend himself.

The actual participation of the appellants in the killing of Rosendo Mortel having been established by the prosecution,
they are therefore equally liable pursuant to the rule on conspiracy that the act of one is the act of all. 39 Conspiracy
was duly proven by the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses pointing to acts done in concert by the
appellants to carry out their unlawful design, but only with respect to the killing of Rosendo Mortel. Thus, appellant
Sergio Emelo alone should be held liable for the crime of Frustrated Homicide.

Crim Case 245-91 JOHN JENN PORRAS and SERGIO EMELO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide
Crim case 246-91 affirmed trial courts decision that Sergio Emelio is guilty of Frustrated Homicide

PEOPLE V. CASTILLO
ART 249
FACTS: appellants were charged of the crime of forcible abduction in accordance with article 342 of the Revised Penal
Code. Seran Castillo was a persistent and ardent suitor of Carolina Isidro. One afternoon, Marcelo Lugod, his co-
appellant, forcibly dragged and carried Carolina Isidro from the store she was tending and took her to a waiting
carretela. They reached the municipal building for a civil rites marriage but she did not accept Castillo so she left.
ISSUE: Were lewd designs sufciently proven to constitute the case one of forcible abduction?
HELD: Yes
RATIO: It is admitted that Seran Castillo was a rejected suitor of Carolina Isidro with no hope of having here in
marriage. His persistent offers of love and marriage had been decidedly spurned. It was in the evening of March 27
when he took the girl by force, and at that time the ofce of the justice of the peace is usually closed and no marriages
are therein solemnized much less at a moment's notice without previously fulfilling the requisites provided by law.
Castillo took the girl in a carretela to a distance much farther than the municipal building to Aliaga, and he proceeded
with her to that building only by the warning of a grave danger ahead. In the carretela he forcibly embraced her,
kissed her, and handled her against her will.

CORTEZ V. CA
TOPIC: ART 249 MURDER; failure to reveal testimony immediately
FACTS: Arcadio Cortez, Paulino Sampang and one Benjamin Villanueva were charged with the crime of murder for the
deaths of Escolastica Pingol and Luis Baltazar and frustrated murder for the injuries sustained by Santiago Baltazar.
One night, Santiago Baltazar was awakened and he heard voice which he recognized as that of Arcadio Cortez for he
knew him long before the incident He peeped through a hole and there on the ground he saw and recognized, for the
moon was very bright, another man, Paulino Sampang, whom he knew very well before the incident. He went
downstairs and saw the accused. He saw Cortez and the latter moved away from him and holding a (G)aran, told
Baltazar: "Go back to your wife." Baltazar started moving towards the house and upon reaching the foot of the stairs,
he faced them (Arcadio Cortez and Paulino Sampang.) At this instance, Cortez and Sampang began shooting at the
house and also at him. Baltazar was hit in the right thigh. He fell and lost consciousness; he regained his
consciousness, he tried to rise but he was again shot in the ear and consequently fell unconscious a second time.
When he regained his consciousness, he saw his wife and son already dead. He was hospitalized for 2 weeks and while
there, he was visited by two P.C. men, one of them was Major Lim. They asked him whom he suspected and he said he
didn't know
Subsequently, petitioners contend that there was insufficient identification in law to sustain a judgment of conviction.
They assert that although Santiago Baltazar identified them in court, he failed to reveal their names to P.C.
investigators, the morning after the crime was committed thus showing that there was no proper identification in law
to sustain their convictions.
ISSUE: W/N the delay in divulging the name of the perpetrators of the crime impairs the credibility of the witness and
his testimony
HELD: NO
RATIO: Santiago Baltazar sufficiently accounts for his failure to reveal immediately the identity of the culprits. It is
both credible and convincing. His fear and apprehension for the safety of his family and his guarded suspicion of the
identity of the investigators were reasonable reactions of an ordinary man agitated by a frightful and shocking
occurrence. He had just witnessed the violent deaths of his wife and youngest son. With the memory of the traumatic
experience still fresh in his mind, he reasonably entertained the belief that to reveal the identities of the culprits would
be tantamount to inviting their retribution.
On the totality of the evidence therefore, the Court finds the guilt of the petitioners to have been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.

ART 251 DEATH IN TUMULTOUS AFFRAY

Tumultuous affray is a commotion in a confused manner to an extent that it would not be possible to identify who the
killer is if death results, or who inflicted the serious physical injury, but the person or persons who used violence are
known.
If there is conspiracy, this crime is not committed. The crime would be murder or homicide.
If nobody could still be traced to have employed violence upon the victim, nobody will answer.
The crimes committed might be disturbance of public order, or if participants are armed, it could be tumultuous
disturbance, or if property was destroyed, it could be malicious mischief.

In death by tumultuous affray, the following elements must concur:

1. That there be several persons;
2. That they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally;
3. That these several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner;
4. That someone was killed in the course of the affray;
5. That it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased;
6. That the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be identified.

PEOPLE V. DALABAJAN
ART 251
FACTS: During a dance party, Melencio dela Cruz saw Hernando Dalabajan kick and stab one Amado Zabalo, Jr. as the
latter was corning out of the barangay hall. Amado tried to escape but Hernando, Dominador, Fernando and their other
relatives pursued him. The three accused-appellants helped one another in hitting Amado with bladed instruments,
wooden clubs and a boat paddle on different parts of his body, resulting in his death. Thereafter, the three accused left
the already unmoving body of the victim which was face down in the water and proceeded back towards the seashore.
At this juncture, Melencio dela Cruz, who was hiding behind the bushes by the seashore from where he watched the
incident happen, then went to the house of the victim and reported the incident to the latter's relatives. A case of
murder was then instituted. However, after it was submitted for decision but prior to the promulgation thereof Amado
Zabalo, Sr., the victim's father, executed an Affidavit of Desistance. Melencio dela Cruz, the sole eyewitness for the
prosecution, also executed an affidavit recanting his testimony and instead stating that he did not witness the incident.

Meanwhile, Hernando Dalabajan contended that during the party, from out of nowhere Amado suddenly appeared and
hacked him with a bolo hitting him on his right elbow. Hernando ran away but Amado chased him. When Hernando
stumbled to the ground Amado hacked him again hitting him. He then clubbed Amado the people around ganged up
on the latter.

ISSUE: WON Zabalo died as a result of tumultuous affray

HELD: NO

RATIO: [SECOND AND FIFTH ELEMENT NOT PRESENT] In the case at bench, there were no groups of persons organized
for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally. Consequently, there was no affray among
several groups of persons in the course of which Amado Zabalo, Jr. died. The fact is that there was only one group of
persons, the accused themselves, who caused an attack on a single victim. This group of persons, motivated as they
were, attacked and killed the aforesaid victim. The persons who assaulted and killed the victim were clearly identified.
Since it was ascertained as to who actually killed the deceased, the death of the victim cannot be said to have been
caused in a tumultuous affray.

Dalabajan insist that testimony of the sole eyewitness, Melencio dela Cruz, be disregarded for being manifestly
fabricated, more so now that the latter has executed an affidavit of desistance. A recantation does not necessarily
cancel an earlier declaration. Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original
testimony if credible. The retraction is an afterthought and should not be given probative value. The affidavit of
desistance executed by the victim's father also merits scant consideration. It was filed long after the trial had
concluded. It cannot serve as basis for the acquittal of the appellants.

NOTES: Dalabajans are a famous fam in Palawan, most people in the dance party are Dalabajans, the tanods are
related to dalabajans

PEOPLE V. SION
FACTS: Cesar Abaoag, while inside his house lying down on his bed, heard the sound of stone throwing at the nearby
house of his brother, Fernando Abaoag. When he went out to see who were throwing stones, Cesar saw his brother
Fernando already outside his house. He also saw Johnny Juquilon hurl a big stone against Fernando. Upon being hit on
the left eyebrow, Fernando turned his back towards Felix Sion, Edong Sion and Miguel Disu who were also throwing
stones towards his direction. Appellant Felipe Sion, who was near the victim, stabbed Fernando with a very sharp
double bladed dagger, hitting him first on the left side just below the armpit, then on the left waistline and finally on
the right side of the neck below the jaw. Cesar tried to help his brother, but Miguel Disu hurled a stone on him. When
he heard Felipe Sion shouting to his companions to kill Cesar, he fled and ran to his brother's house and informed
Fernando's wife, Felicitas Abaoag, about the helpless condition of Fernando Felicitas and Cesar went to the place of the
incident and saw her husband lying prostate on the ground very weak in the state of dying. When she inquired what
happened, Fernando answered "naalaak" which in English means "I was hit." Fernando also told his wife that his
assailants were Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Edong Sion, Johnny Juquilon and Felix Sion. The victim was rushed to the
hospital but he was pronounced dead on arrival.
ISSUE: WON Fernando Abaog died as a result of tumultuous affray
H: NO
R: [SECOND AND FIFTH ELEM NOT PRES] it was ascertained beyond doubt that appellant Sion inflicted the fatal
stab wounds; hence, this claim must be rejected. The confluence of the acts of the appellants and their co-accused
manifested a community of interest and unity of purpose and design to take the victim's life. There was no "free-for-all
rumble."

PEOPLE V. MARAMARA
Facts:
An information for murder was filed against appellant before the Regional Trial Court of Masbate in connection with the
killing of one Miguelito Donato. At his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial commenced
thereafter. The prosecution presented as witnesses the victim's younger brother, Ricardo Donato and father Regarder
Donato. The evidence for the prosecution disclosed that on 18 November 1991, at about 12 midnight thereof, Ricardo
Donato was dancing with a girl in a benefit dance held in the yard of appellant's house in Barangay Calpi, Claveria,
Masbate. Dante Arce, a friend of appellant, approached Ricardo and boxed him on the chest. Frightened, the girl ran
away while Ricardo scampered toward the fence for safety. Miguelito Donato, elder brother of Ricardo, was about two
(2) meters away from the fence. Not for long, appellant shot the victim, hitting the latter on the left breast. The victim
was rushed to the hospital where he died the next day. Before the victim expired, he informed his father, that it was
appellant who shot him.

the trial court rendered a guilty verdict for the crime of Murder and without any mitigating circumstances and the
existence of treachery in using a firearm in taking the life of Miguelito Donato. Appellant then appeals that the death of
Donato was a result of a tumultuous affray

ISSUE: WoN the victim died as a result of tumultuous affray

Held: NO
RATIO: [FIFTH ELEMENT NOT PRESENT] There is no merit in accused-appellant's position that he should be held
liable only for death caused in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code. It was in such situation
that accused came at the scene and joined the fray purportedly to pacify the protagonists when Miguelito attacked him
causing four (4) stab wounds in different parts of his body two on the stomach, one on the left nipple, and one on
the left arm. Then accused-appellant with his handgun shot Miguelito.
Assuming that a rumble or a free-for-all fight occurred at the benefit dance, Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code
cannot apply because prosecution witnesses Ricardo and Regarder Donato positively identified accused-appellant as
Miguelito Donato's killer.
The Court finds accused-appellant Cresenciano Maramara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide,

SISON V. PEOPLE
FACTS: On July 27, 1986, in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta
by the Marcos loyalists. Despite being denied a permit, three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal Monument of the
Luneta and started an impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and delivered speeches in between. When the
authorities arrived and no permit could be produced, they were told told to disperse. One of the leaders, Atty. Oliver
Lozano, turned to his group and said Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ngmga Cory infiltrators and a commotion ensued. They
eventually fled, and later, some of them convergedat the Chinese garden of Luneta. A small group of loyalists
converged at the Chinese Garden, Phase III of the Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular movie starlet and
supporter of President Marcos who angrily ordered "Gulpihin ninyo ang mga Cory hecklers!" A few minutes later, Annie
Ferrer was arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang gumanti tayo ngayon!" consequently, another
commotion occurred where the loyalists started attacking persons in yellow, one of which was Salcedo. He was chased,
boxed, kicked and mauled. One Ranulfo Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them, but several accused came
forward and resumed mauling Salcedo despite his pleas for mercy. He died upon arrival at the Philippine
GeneralHospital of hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic.
The RTC rendered a decision nding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo
guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualied by treachery. On appeal, CA found them guilty of murder qualied
by abuse of superior strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide. Appellants claim that the lower courts erred
in nding the existence of conspiracy among the principal accused and in convicting them of murder qualied by
abuse of superior strength, not death in tumultuous affray.
ISSUE: WON Salcedo died caused by a tumultuous affray
HELD: NO
RATIO: In death by tumultuous affray, the following elements must concur:
1. That there be several persons;
2. That they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally;
3. That these several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner;
4. That someone was killed in the course of the affray;
5. That it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased;
6. That the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be identified.

[THIRD ELEMENT IS ABSENT] A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they
engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author
thereof cannot be ascertained.
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and one individual.
Confusion may have occurred because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually
after the loyalists ed to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after said dispersal that one distinct group
identi ed as loyalists picked on one defenseless individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inicting
punches, kicks and blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal
aggression at this stage of the incident.

[SECOND ELEMENT IS ABSENT] There was conspiracy among the appellants since at the time they were committing
the crime, their actions impliedly showed a unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death
of Salcedo.

ART 254 DISCHARGE OF FIREARMS

Elements:
(1) Offender discharges a firearm against or at another person.
(2) Offender has no intention to kill that person

RA 10591

PEOPLE V. LADJAALAM
ART 254 DISCHARGE OF FIREARMS
SYNOPSIS: Appellant Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as "Warpan," appeals the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC which found him guilty of three out of the four charges lodged against him. He was found guilty (1) for
maintaining a drug den; (2) for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition; and (3) for the crime of Direct Assault
with Multiple Attempted Homicide.
The Supreme Court affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court and found appellant guilty only of direct
assault and multiple attempted homicide and maintaining a drug den. The Court ruled that that the trial court erred in
convicting appellant of illegal possession of firearms. According to the Court, a simple reading of Section 1 of Republic
Act 8294 shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense
of simple illegal possession of firearms. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this
case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.
FACTS: 1) In the afternoon of September 24, 1997, more than thirty (30) policemen proceeded to the house of
appellant and his wife to serve the search warrant when they were met by a volley of gunfire coming from the second
floor of the said house. They saw that it was the appellant who fired the M14 rifle towards them.
2) After gaining entrance, two of the police officers proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant
firing the rifle. As he noticed their presence, the appellant jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring house.
He was subsequently arrested at the back of his house after a brief chase.
3) Several firearms and ammunitions were recovered from appellants house. Also found was a pencil case with fifty
(50) folded aluminum foils inside, each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride.
4) A paraffin test was conducted and the casts taken both hands of the appellant yielded positive for gunpowder
nitrates.
5) Records show that appellant had not filed any application for license to possess firearm and ammunition, nor has he
been given authority to carry firearms.
Issue: Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
HELD: No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall unlawfully possess any firearm or
ammunition shall be penalized, unless no other crime was committed. Furthermore, if homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. Since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal
possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.

PEOPLE V. TAC-AN
Art 254
Facts: Appellant Renato Tac-an, then eighteen (18) years and seven (7) months of age, and the deceased Francis
Ernest Escano III, fifteen (15) years old, were classmates in the third year of high school of the Divine Word College in
Tagbilaran City. They were close friends, being not only classmates but also members of the same gang, the Bronx
gang. Renato had been to the house where Francis and his parents lived, on one or two occasions. On those occasions,
Francis' mother noticed that Renato had a handgun with him. Francis was then advised by his mother to distance
himself from Renato. Thereafter, their relationship turned sour.

One day, Renato went home during school hours and got his gun. He went back to school and went to the classroom of
Francis, holding a revolver, shouted "Where is Francis?" after 3 shots, he finally shot Francis on the head where he fell
on the floor bloodied. Renato then went out of the classroom. Thereafter, a teacher, apparently unaware that it was
Renato who had gunned down Francis, approached Renato and asked him to help Francis as the latter was still alive
inside the room. Renato thereupon re-entered the room, closed the door, saying: "So, he is still alive. Where is his
chest?" Standing over Francis sprawled face down on the classroom floor, Renato aimed at the chest of Francis and
fired once more. The bullet entered Francis' back below the right shoulder, and exited on his front chest just above the
right nipple. Renato locked the classroom door so that no one could enter.

ISSUE: WON Tac-an should have a separate charge for unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm
H/R: Yes.
There is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in homicide or murder.
Under an information charging homicide or murder, the fact that the death weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot
be used to increase the penalty for the second offense of homicide or murder to death (or reclusion perpetua under
the 1987 Constitution). The essential point is that the unlicensed character or condition of the instrument used in
destroying human life or committing some other clime, is not included in the inventory of aggravating circumstances
set out in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.
We note that the information in Criminal Case No. 4007 after charging appellant with unlawful possession of an
unlicensed firearm and ammunition, went on to state that said firearm and ammunition had been used to shoot to
death Francis Ernest Escano III. We note also that the amended information in Criminal Case No. 4012 after charging
appellant with the unlawful killing of Francis Ernest Escano III, stated that the killing had been done with the use of an
unlicensed firearm. We believe these additional allegations in the two (2) informations did not have the effect of
charging appellant with having committed the same offense more than once.
However, in sentencing Renato to suffer the penalty of death for the crime of murder, the trial court did take into
account as a "special aggravating circumstance" the fact that the killing of Francis had been done "with the use of an
unlicensed firearm." In so doing, we believe and so hold, the trial court committed error.

SAYCO V. PEOPLE
ART 254
FACTS: The facts are not disputed. Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bais City
with illegal possession of rearms. petitioner does not deny that he was in possession of the subject rearm and
ammunitions but he insists that he had the requisite permits to carry the same, specifically: Memorandum Receipt for
Equipment (Non-expendable Property), and 2) Mission Order.
However, the RTC and MTCC gave no signi cance to the foregoing documents. The MTCC held that permits do not
constitute the license required by law because "they were not issued by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms
and Explosives Unit, but by the Commanding Of cer of the Philippine Army who is not authorized by law to issue
licenses to civilians to possess rearms and ammunitions."
The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of rearms is the accused's lack of license or permit to possess or
carry the rearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. 21 To establish the corpus delicti, the prosecution has
the burden of proving that the rearm exists and that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same. These facts have all been proven.
ISSUE: whether petitioner's Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order constitute sufcient authority for him to possess
the subject rearm and ammunitions and carry the same outside of his residence, without violating P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by R.A. No. 8294.
H/R: NO. As cited by the Solicitor General, it is a settled jurisprudence that a memorandum receipt and mission order
cannot take the place of a duly issued rearms license, 23 and an accused who relies on said documents cannot invoke
good faith as a defense against a prosecution for illegal possession of rearms, as this is a malum prohibitum. 24
Petitioner interposed no new argument that would convince this Court to abandon a deep-rooted jurisprudence.
THEREFORE, Petitioner is guilty of the crime of illegal possession of rearms and ammunition.

EVANGELISTA V. PEOPLE
ART 254
FACTS: Evangelista came from Luwanda, Angola, and flew from Dubai International Airport to the Philippines. Upon
arrival at the NAIA, he was arrested by the Customs police for the possession of the firearms without the
corresponding permit or license from competent authority. Prosecutor was able to prove that petitioner is not a
licensed/registered rearm holder.

Issue: Whether the petitioner can be acquitted since he could not have committed the crime imputed against him for
he was never in custody and possession of any rearm or ammunition when he arrived in the Philippines

Held: NO. To be guilty of the crime of illegal possession of rearms and ammunition, one does not have to be in actual
physical possession thereof. The law does not punish physical possession alone but possession in general, which
includes constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to the owner's control.

As held in People v. Dela Rosa, the kind of possession punishable under PD 1866 is one where the accused possessed
a rearm either physically or constructively with animus possidendi or intention to possess the same. Animus
possidendi is a state of mind. As such, what goes on into the mind of the accused, as his real intent, could be
determined solely based on his prior and coetaneous acts and the surrounding circumstances explaining how the
subject firearm came to his possession.

Contrary to the arguments put forward by petitioner, we entertain no doubt that the crime of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition for which he was charged was committed in the Philippines. The accomplishment by
petitioner of the Customs Declaration Form upon his arrival at the NAIA is very clear evidence that he was already in
possession of the subject firearms in the Philippines.

In contrast, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the present charge happened in
Dubai. It may be well to recall that while in Dubai, petitioner, even in a situation between life and death, firmly denied
possession and ownership of the firearms. Furthermore, there is no record of any criminal case having been filed
against petitioner in Dubai in connection with the discovered firearms. Since there is no pending criminal case when he
left Dubai, it stands to reason that there was no crime committed in Dubai. The age-old but familiar rule that he who
alleges must prove his allegation applies

ART 256 INTENTIONAL ABORTION

Elements:
(1) There is a pregnant woman;
(2) Violence is exerted, or drugs or beverages administered, or that the accused otherwise acts upon such pregnant
woman;
(3) As a result of the use of violence or drugs or beverages upon her, or any other act of the accused, the fetus dies,
either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom;
(4) The abortion is intended.

ART 257 UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION

Elements:
(1) There is a pregnant woman;
(2) Violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion;
(3) The violence is intentionally exerted;
(4) Result of violence fetus dies, either in the womb or expelled therefrom

US V. JEFFREY
ART 257

Teodorica Saguinsin was in a Chinese shop, a man named D, B. Jeffrey appeared and, without any apparent reason
whatever, struck the woman three times on the hip with a bottle that he was carrying, in consequence of which the
woman fell to the ground with an abundant hemorrhage from the womb; she was immediately taken to her home in a
carretela, and being three months pregnant she had a miscarriage on the following day. The woman was ill and unable
to attend to her usual duties for fortyfive days.

Jeffrey was with the crime of lesiones menos graves. It is clearly shown that the crime of abortion, defined and
punished by article 411 of the Penal Code, has been committed, in consequence of the maltreatment received by
Teodorica Saguinsin, a married woman who for three months had been pregnant, she fell to the ground, and had a
severe hemorrhage and, being unable to return to her home, was taken there in a vehicle, with the assistance of
Basilisa Pascual, who witnessed the occurrence, On the following day she had a miscarriage. Jeffrey admitted that he
had a dispute with the woman but he only gave her a little push.

ISSUE: W/N Jeffrey was the cause of unintentional abortion YES

HELD: Even though it was not the criminal intent of the defendant to cause the abortion, the fact that, without any
apparent reason whatever, he maltreated Teodorica Saguinsin, presumably not knowing that she was pregnant, as
author of the abuse which caused the miscarriage, he is liable not only for such maltreatment but also for the
consequences thereof, to wit, for the abortion \ and it was also proven that on the said occasion the defendant was
drunk, which circumstance explains how he came to strike the woman with a bottle without any known motive.

For the reasons above set forth, and holding that the crime committed is that of abortion and not that of lesiones, it is
our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be set aside,

PEOPLE V. GENOVES
ART 257
FACTS: appellant and deceased Soledad Rivera were laborers in adjoining cane fields. Soledad claimed that the yoke
of the plow which appellant was repairing belonged to her and tried to take it by force. Appellant struck her with his
fist, causing her to fall to the ground. She got up and returned to the fray, whereupon she received another blow with
the fist on the left cheek which caused her again to fall to the ground. Immediately after the incident deceased
proceeded to the municipal building, and complained about the maltreatment. At the time Soledad was heavy with
child, and as she complained to the chief of police of pain in the abdomen, she was seen by the president of the
sanitary district. According to testimony deceased was in good health the day before.
From the time of the incident there was hemorrhage and pain which were symptoms of premature delivery. Deceased
remained in this condition until June 10, 1934. On that date the condition culminated in the painful and difficult
premature delivery of one of the twin babies that she was carrying, but the other baby was never born as Soledad died
of hemorrhage before the other baby could be delivered. Both babies were dead.
HELD: The abortion in this case is unintentional abortion. It is generally known that a fall is liable to cause premature
delivery, and the evidence shows a complete sequel of events from the assault to her death. The accused must be
held responsible f or the natural consequences of his act.
The other defense is that the accused did not strike the deceased, but this fact is clearly established by the
prosecution. We find the mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that inflicted and
provocation, as the offended party by force induced the appellant to use force on his part.

PEOPLE V. SALUFRANIA
ART 257- UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION
FACTS: On 7 May 1976, Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman was charged before the CFI of Camarines Norte,with the complex
crime of parricide with intentional abortion. It was alleged that the accused Filomeno Salufrania assault and use
personal violence on his wife, MARCIANA ABUYO-SALUFRANIA by then and there boxing and stranging her, causing
upon her injuries which resulted in her instantaneous death; and by the same criminal act committed on the person of
the wife of the accused, who was at the time 8 months pregnant, the accused caused the death of the unborn
child,committing both crimes of PARRICIDE and INTENTIONAL ABORTION as defined and punished under Art. 246 and
Art. 256, paragraph I, of the Revised Penal Code.
At the trial court, Dr. Juan L. Dyquiangco Jr., Pedro Salufrania testified that,he was called upon by the Municipal Judge of
Talisay to examine the corpse of Marciana Abuyo-Salufrania that was exhumed from its grave in which the cause of
death was cardiac arrest.

Dr. Dyquiangco testified that after conducting the post mortem examination, he issued a certification thereof (Exhibit
"A"); that he issued a death certificate for the deceased, made on the basis of the information that the cause of death,
as cardiac arrest, was indicated on said death certificate only after the post mortem examination. The lower court
allowed the son of the accused, Pedro Salufrania, The lower court stated that, by reason of interest and relationship,
before Pedro Salufrania was allowed to testify against his father-accused Filomeno Salufrania, after careful examination
by the prosecuting officer and the defense counsel under the careful supervision of the court a quo, to determine
whether, at his age of 13 years old, he was already capable of receiving correct impressions of facts and of relating
them truly and, also, whether he was compelled and/or threatened by anybody to testify against his father-accused.He
stated that his father Filomeno Salufrania and his mother Marciana Abuyo quarrelled at about 6:00 o'clock in the
evening, he saw his father box his pregnant mother on the stomach and, once fallen on the floor, his father strangled
her to death; that he saw blood ooze from the eyes and nose of his mother and that she died right on the spot where
she fell. His brother,Eduardo Abuyo and had refused and still refused to live with his father-accused, because the latter
has threatened to kill him and his other brothers and sister should he reveal the true cause of his mother's death.The
brother in law and sister of the deceased victim,Narciso Abuyo also declared that after the burial of Marciana Abuyo,
the three (3) children of his deceased sisterrefused to go home with their father Filomeno Salufrania; that when asked
why, his nephew Alex Salufrana told him that the real cause of death of their mother was not stomach ailment and
headache, rather, she was boxed on the stomach and strangled to death by their father; that immediately after
learning of the true cause of death of his sister, he brought the matter to the attention of the police authorities .

The CFI found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion. Since
the accused was sentenced to death, this becomes an automatic review before the Supreme Court.

Appellant alleges that, assuming he indeed killed his wife, there is no evidence to show that he had the intention to
cause an abortion.

ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in its ruling of complex crime with parricide and intentional abortion?
HELD: YES
RATIO:
In this contention, appellant is correct. He should not be held guilty of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional
Abortion but of the complex crime of Parricide with Unintentional Abortion.
The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom.

The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion because he boxed his
pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then strangled her. We find that appellant's intent to cause
an abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate
strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact, appellant must
have merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion. The evidence on record, therefore,
establishes beyond reasonable doubt that accused Filomeno Salufrania committed and should be held liable for the
complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. The abortion, in this case, was caused by the same violence
that caused the death of Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by the herein accused upon his
victim.

The accused is liable for complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion for it was merely incidental to the
killing.
CHAPTER II Physical Injuries
ART 262-266

Art 262 mutilation

Mode 1. Intentionally mutilating another by depriving him, either totally or partially, of some essential organ for
reproduction; (Mutilation)
Elements:
(1) There be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation, such as the penis or ovarium;
(2) The mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately

Mode 2. Intentionally making other mutilation, that is, by lopping or clipping off any part of the body of the offended
party, other than the essential organ for reproduction, to deprive him of that part of his body. (Mayhem)

Intent to mutilate must be established. If there is no intent, the crime is only serious physical injury.
CASTRATION - intentionally mutilating another by depriving him, either totally or partially, of some essential organ for
reproduction
MAYHEM - intentionally making other mutilation other than some essential organ for reproduction and to deprive him
of that part of the body

US v. Bogel
F: The guilt of the accused of the crime of robbery. It was further proven that one of the accused, on the occasion of
the robbery, stabbed a woman named Fabiana in one eye, and that as a result of the wound thus inflicted she lost the
use of the eye.
H: Unless the putting out of an eye by stabbing is a mutilation in the sense which is used in paragraph 2 of article 503,
it is manifest that the penalty to be imposed in this case is that prescribed in paragraph 3 and not paragraph 2 of said
article. Par 3 states that One guilty of robbery with violence or intimidation to the person will be punished: With cadena
temporal when for the purpose of or on occasion of the robbery any of the wounds are inflicted which are penalized in
paragraph 2 of article 416 of the Penal Code."

Mutilation is understood as the lopping or clipping off (cercenamiento) of some part of the body, and it is evident that
the putting out of an eye does not fall under this definition.

Aguirre v Secretary of Justice

Petitioner: Gloria Pilar Aguirre
Respondent: Secretary of the Department of Justice, Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz, Pedro Aguirre, Dr. Agatep, Dr.
Pascual
Art. 262 Mutilation - The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who
shall intentionally mutilate anotherby depriving him, either totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction

Facts:
Laureano (Larry) Aguirre was adopted from an orphanage by Pedro Aguirre andLourdes Aguirre
Developmental milestones were noted to be delayed. He started to walk and speak a single word at around age 5. He
was enrolled in Colegio de San Agustin at age 6where he showed significant learning difficulties that he had to repeat
1st and 4th grades.
Psychological evaluation revealed mild to moderate mental retardation, special education training was advised and
he was transferred to St. John Marie Vianney
Pedro Aguirre (Larrys guardian) wanted to have him sterilized and approached Dr Agatep to perform the procedure
Dr Pascual conducted tests on Larry to ascertain whether he could validly give his consent to the operation
In November of 2001, respondent Dr. Agatep, a urologist/surgeon, was approached concerning the intention to have
Larry, then 24 years of age, vasectomized. Prior to performing the procedure on the intended patient, respondent Dr.
Agatep required that Larry be evaluated by a psychiatrist in order to confirm and validate whether or not the former
could validly give his consent to the medical procedure on account of his mental deficiency.
Larrys mental deficiency could be associated with possible perinatal insults, which is consistent with the
neuroimaging findings. Mental retardation associated with neurological problems usually has poorer prognosis. Larry is
very much dependent on his family for his needs, adaptive functioning, direction and in making major life decisions. At
his capacity, he may never understand the nature, the foreseeable risks and benefits, and consequences of the
procedure (vasectomy) that his family wants for his protection. Thus, the responsibility of decision making may be
given to his parent or guardian.
The findings concluded that the responsibility of making the decision may be given to his parent or guardian
Dr Agatep gave Larry a vasectomy with consent of Pedro Aguirre
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre (common law sister) charged respondents for mutilation
Gloria Aguirre contended that the bilateral vasectomy conducted on petitioner's brother, Larry Aguirre, caused the
perpetual destruction of Larry's reproductive organs of generation or conception and that it was performed
intentionally and deliberately to deprive Larry forever of his reproductive organ and his capacity to procreate, thus, it
amounted to mutilation
Issues: WON the respondents are liable for the crime of mutilation
Held: No, they are not liable for mutilation
Ratio: The vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived Larry of his reproductive organ which is still very much
part of his physical self.
-The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and
penalized under Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., [t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived
(sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his physical self. He ratiocinated that:
While the operation renders him the inability (sic) to procreate, the operation is reversible and therefore, cannot be
the permanent damage contemplated under Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code.24
Mutilation. x x x Vasectomy does not in anyway equate to castration and what is touched in vasectomy is not
considered an organ in the context of law and medicine, it is quite remote from the penis x x x.

A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the elements55 of mutilation under the first paragraph of
Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for
generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of
some essential organ for reproduction. According to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the
crime of mutilation as defined and penalized above, i.e., [t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived (sic)
Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his physical self. Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however,
would want this Court to make a ruling that bilateral vasectomy constitutes the crime of mutilation.
This we cannot do, for such an interpretation would be contrary to the intentions of the framers of our penal code.

vasectomy denies a man his power of reproduction, such procedure does not deprive him, either totally or partially, of
some essential organ for reproduction. Notably, the ordinary usage of the term mutilation is the deprivation of a
limb or essential part (of the body),60 with the operative expression being deprivation. In the same manner, the
word castration is defined as the removal of the testies or ovaries.61 Such being the case in this present petition, the
bilateral vasectomy done on Larry could not have amounted to the crime of mutilation as defined and punished under
Article 262, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. And no criminal culpability could be foisted on to respondent Dr.
Agatep, the urologist who performed the procedure, much less the other respondents. Thus, we find sufficient
evidence to explain why the Assistant City Prosecutor and the DOJ ruled the way they did. Verily, We agree with the
Court of Appeals that the writ of certiorari is unavailing; hence, should not be issued.

Other notes: Gloria Aguirre appealed the foregoing resolution to the Secretary of the DOJ by means of a Petition for
Review. DOJ dismissed the petition for lack of merit. She appealed to the CA but CA also dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit. SC held that DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when the latter affirmed the public prosecutors finding of lack of probable cause for respondents Pedro Aguirre,
Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual to stand trial for the criminal complaints of falsification and mutilation in relation
to Republic Act No. 7610. SC denied petition for lack of merit.

PEOPLE V. BUKA
Facts: 3 criminal cases were filed against Beren Mandong and Angel Pral, for, to wit: (1) the murder of Elena Pamoso,
(2) the murder of Estelita Imarga, and (3) frustrated murder of Felipe Noquera. The 3 victims were riding a weapons
carrier on the way to Gen san when it was ambushed by armed men which caused the death of the 2 and physical
injuries to Noquera. The driver of the weapons carrier and the other passengers testified that they saw the ambushers
and there were more than 5 of them, who fired at them.
The accused denied the allegations and gave their alibis. All the foregoing doctrines play a vital role against the
defense of alibi of the accused. It could not be improbable for the accused to have been at the scene of the ambush
from the place where they allegedly were on the date of December 14, 1978, considering the distance which is
approachable within few (sic) minutes or hours. Were it a fact that the accused were not definitely identified by
witnesses for the prosecution, then the accused (sic) defense of alibi assumes importance. But such was not the case,
for the accused were definitely identified by the prosecution witnesses to be the companions of the ambushers on that
fatal day. Not only were they definitely identified but that after the commission of the offense, on December 14, 1978
these two accused went into hiding and were only arrested on November 6,1981 or there about (sic), after a period of
over two years. The denials of the accused to have (sic) participated in the ambushcade (sic) are ineffective to
overcome the evidence of the prosecution, particularly the positive testimonies of Felipe Noquera and Luis Esconde,
passenger (sic) of the weapons carrier when the ambush was committed. Surprisingly the conduct of these accused
right after the shooting incident has been very suspicious, for immediately thereafter all the accused escaped and
could no longer be found. Compared to the true identification and testimonies of the prosecution witnesses this court
does not doubt their veracity for being disinterested witnesses and whose impartiality has not been placed in doubt.
In convicting each of the accused for murder as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 1893 and 1985 and frustrated murder
in Criminal Case No. 1894, the trial court considered the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation since the "ambush or shooting was so sudden and unexpected assault (sic) perpetrated by all the
accused insured the killing of the two defenseless victims Estelita Imarga and Elena Pamoso and the frustrated death
(sic) of Felipe Noquera."11
Issue: WON the accused should be charged for 2 counts of murder and 1 count of frustrated murder
Held: no
Ratio: Accordingly, the Appellants are guilty of homicide on two (2) counts and of attempted homicide, with the
generic aggravating circumstances of treachery and band.
The Appellants cannot be convicted for the crime of Murder because, as testified to by Dr. Casimiro Mansilla, the
doctor who examined the victim, Felipe Noquera, the latter would have lived even without medical attendance
because the "wound was just a slight physical injury." Per the medical certificate,42 the following were the injuries
inflicted on Noquera "require medical attendance for the period of seven (7) to nine (9) days, unless complications set
in or manifestations due to internal injuries which are not apparent at the time of the examination appear later."
A crime is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.43 However, if the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance, the crime is only attempted.44 It is quite obvious ious that, in respect to Noquera, the
crime never passed the "attempted" stage.

Physical Injuries Attempted or Frustrated Homicide

The offender inflicts physical injuries. Attempted homicide may be committed, even if no
physical injuries are inflicted.
Offender has no intent to kill the offended party The offender has an intent to kill the offended party.
The reason why there is no attempted or frustrated crime of physical injuries is because this felony is defined by the
gravity of the injury. It is a crime of result. As long as there is no injury, there can be no attempted or frustrated stage
thereof.

Classification of physical injuries:

(1) Between less serious physical injuries and serious physical injuries, you do not consider the period of medical
treatment. You only consider the period when the offended party is rendered incapacitated for labor.
(2) When the injury created a deformity upon the offended party, you disregard the healing duration or the period of
medical treatment involved. At once, it is considered serious physical injuries.
(3) Deformity requires the concurrence of the following conditions:
(a) The injury must produce ugliness;
(b) It must be visible;
(c) The ugliness will not disappear through natural healing process.

PEOPLE V. Fortich
Facts: Accused-appellants Permonette Joy Fortich and Rudy Gaid were each charged with two counts of forcible
abduction with rape, 1 one count of robbery with frustrated homicide 2 and one count of robbery.
Sisters Marilou and Maritess Nobleza together with friends Rolly Imperio and Luis Tumang, proceeded to Alta Tiera
Hotel in Carmen Hill in an Isuzu pick-up when two armed men suddenly emerged from the rear end of the vehicle and
fired a single shot which hit the pick-up. The sisters were ordered to get inside the vehicle while they hit Imperio and
Tumang and robbed them of their personal possessions. Appellants then drove the pick- up with Marilou and Maritess
at the back seat. After a while, they parked the vehicle, and Gaid transferred to the backseat with Marilou while
Maritess was made to sit up in front with Fortich. At the point of a gun, Gaid consummated his bestial act against
Marilou, while Maritess was ravaged by Fortich. Appellants switched victims twice before divesting them of their
personal belongings and the pick-up's stereo and tools. Accused-appellants were each charged with two counts of
forcible abduction with rape, one count of robbery with frustrated homicide and one count of robbery.
Issue: WON the accused appellants are guilty for robbery with frustrated homicide and robbery NO

Held: The trial court, however, erred in designating the crime committed as robbery with frustrated homicide. There is
no such crime. 19 There should have been two separate informations: one for robbery and another for frustrated
homicide. Notwithstanding the erroneous charge in the information, the Court finds no reason to overturn the
conviction of appellants for the crime of simple robbery.

The asportation by appellants of the personal properties was done by means of violence against or intimidation upon
the persons of Imperio and Tumang. It appears further that Imperio suffered cranial injury which allegedly required
three stitches to repair. Inasmuch as the doctor who issued the medical certificate did not testify thereon, said
certificate is hearsay evidence as to the nature of the injuries inflicted and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence. In
People v. Pesena, it was ruled that when there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party for labor or of
the required medical attendance, it is only slight physical injuries.
As regards the injuries suffered by Tumang, notwithstanding the non-presentation of Dr. Aldanese at the trial, Tumang's
credible testimony bolstered by documentary evidence, such as progress payments and professional fees for
neurological management and craniatomy excision of depressed fracture, proved that the latter suffered less serious
physical injuries, as defined in Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code.
With respect to the charge of frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 3977, the trial court correctly observed that the
element of intent to kill was not present. It must be stressed that while Fortich was armed with a handgun, he never
shot Tumang but merely hit him on the head with it.

The physical injuries inflicted upon Imperio and Tumang by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are penalized
under Article 294, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code.

LI V. PEOPLE
Facts: One morning in April 1993, street brawl ensued between Christopher Arugay and his neighbor, Kingstone Li.
Arugay sustained multiple stab wounds causing his death while Li sustained hack wounds on the head and contusions.
Two different versions of the incident were presented. According to the first version, Arugay was watching the
television with his sisters Cristy and Baby Jane and Tan, boyfriend of Baby Jane, when they heard a noise caused by Li
and Sangalang who were then bathing naked outside their house. Enraged, Arugay went outside and confronted the
two which eventually ended up with Li striking Arugay with a baseball bat on the head and later stabbing him with a
knife. Sangalang was also seen stabbing the victim at least once with a knife. The second version, offered by Li
however presented that Li was watching the television with a friend when Arugay and his girlfriend hurled objects and
kicked the gate of his house. Upon seeing that Arugay has gotten himself two kitchen knives, Li armed himself with a
baseball bat. Li managed to evade Arugays thrusts and successfully hit him with the bat on the shoulder with which
Arugay ran back to his house and emerged carrying a bolo. Arugay tried to hit Li with the bolo but Li raised his right
hand to protect himself but Arugay was able to hit him on his right temple, right wrist, and right shoulder. Li passed
out. Sangalang was also present when the incident started. Arugay died of multiple stab wounds while Li was brought
to the hospital.

RTC charged Li with homicide and ruled the existence of conspiracy although concluded that it was Sangalang, and not
Li, who stabbed Arugay. Court of Appeals affirmed RTCs decision but opined that since it has not been established
which wound was inflicted by either one of them, they should both be held liable and each one is guilty of homicide,
whether or not a conspiracy exists.

Issue: Whether or not there was conspiracy between Li and Sangalang. If there is not, what acts are imputable to Li.

Held: No, RTC erred in concluding an implied conspiracy. The facts that Li and Sangalang were in the same house at
the same time; and that they both armed themselves before going out to meet Arugay are not in themselves sufficient
to establish conspiracy.

Sangalang stabbed Arugay only after petitioner had become unconscious. Before that point, even as Li struck Arugay
with a baseball bat, it was not proven that Li had asked for, or received, any assistance from Sangalang. Based on
these circumstances, Sangalang and Li had not acted in concert to commit the offense. After Arugay had struck hack
wounds on Li and as Li lay incapacitated, possibly unconscious, it remained highly doubtful whether he had any further
participation in the brawl. At that point, Sangalang, emerged and stabbed Arugay to death. In fact, the stabbing of
Arugay could very well be construed as a spur-of-the-moment reaction by Sangalang upon seeing that his friend Li was
struck by Arugay. It cannot be assumed that Sangalang did what he did with the knowledge or assent of Li, much more
in coordination with each other. It was also proved that Li, already weak and injured, could possibly inflict fatal stab
wounds on Arugay.

The only injury attributable to Li is the contusion on the victims right arm that resulted from Li striking Arugay with a
baseball bat. In view of the victims supervening death from injuries which cannot be attributed to Li beyond
reasonable doubt, the effects of the contusion caused by Li are not mortal or at least lie entirely in the realm of
speculation. When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the required medical
attendance, the offense is only slight physical injuries,

Absent any clear showing of conspiracy, Kingstone Li cannot answer for the crime of Eduardo Sangalang. Petitioner
Kingstone Li is ACQUITTED of the charge of Homicide for lack of evidence beyond reasonable doubt. However, he is
found GUILTY of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES.

RA 8049 ANTI HAZING LAW

VILLAREAL V. PEOPLE
FACTS: In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified
their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).

The neophytes, including victim, Lenny Villa, were subjected to initiation rites. After the second day of initiation rites
has ended, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon
the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon
and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received
several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him
complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no
longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended,
and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially,
Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though,
that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him
through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital.
Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against 35 Aquilans.

Issue: WON the accused should be guilty of the violation of RA 8049 or the anti-hazing act NO.
Ratio: No crime without a law punishing it
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala in seadhered to
under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law
on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the
nature of hazing unique as against typical crimes cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as
an inherently wrong conduct or mala in seat the time.
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness, which made the
resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of
care not to cause them injury in the process. With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victims death was the cumulative
effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and contributed
to the infliction of physical injuries
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall cover only accused
Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused fraternity
members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua(life imprisonment).
Since there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing
laws at the time of his death.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall cover only accused
Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused fraternity
members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua (life
imprisonment).272 Since there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule
according to existing laws at the time of his death. The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond
reasonable doubt, Victorino et al.s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny Villa.273 As
to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally extinguished

Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that serves as prerequisite for admission to an
organization.146 In hazing, the recruit, pledge, neophyte, initiate, applicantor any other term by which the
organization may refer to such a personis generally placed in embarrassing or humiliating situations, like being
forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar tasks or activities.147 It encompasses different forms of conduct that
humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically endanger those who desire membership in the organization.148 These acts
usually involve physical or psychological suffering or injury.14

ART 266-A Rape (amended by RA 8353)

ELEMENTS
Mode 1: Rape through sexual intercourse without consent of the woman: (Traditional Rape)
Elements:
(1) Offender is a man;
(2) Offender had carnal knowledge of a woman;
(3) Such act is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:
(a) By using force, threat or intimidation;
(b) When the woman is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
(d) When the woman is under 12 years of age (Statutory Rape) or is demented.

Mode 2: Rape Through Sexual Assault

Elements:
(1) Offender commits an act of sexual assault;
(2) The act of sexual assault is committed by any of the following means:
(a) By inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice; or
(b) By inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person;
(3) The act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:
(a) By using force or intimidation; or
(b) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or
(d) When the woman is under 12 years of age or demented.
Classification of rape
(1) Traditional Rape
Offended party is always a woman
Offender is always a man.
(2) Sexual assault
Rape can now be committed by a man or a woman, that is, if a woman or a man uses an instrument on anal
orifice of male, she or he can be liable for rape.
Inserting a finger inside the genital of a woman is rape through sexual assault within the context of object

PEOPLE V. ORITA
ART 266-A RAPE
TOPIC: Stages of Rape Attempted and Consummated
FACTS: Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19year old freshman student while the Appellant was a Philippine
Constabulary (PC) soldier. In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant arrived at her boarding house. Her
classmates had just brought her home from a party. Shortly after her classmates had left, she knocked at the door of
her boarding house all of a sudden, somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck. She then recognized appellant
who was a frequent visitor of another boarder.
She pleaded with him to release her, but he ordered her to go upstairs with him. With his left arm wrapped around her
neck and his right hand poking a balisong to her neck, appellant dragged complainant up the stairs With the
Batangas knife still poked to her neck, they entered complainants room.
Upon entering the room, appellant pushed complainant who hit her head on the wall. With one hand holding the knife,
appellant undressed himself. He then ordered complainant to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her Tshirt. Then
he pulled off her bra, pants and panty. He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her
hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. She followed his order as he continued to poke the knife to her. At said
position, however, appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of his penis entered her as she kept on
moving
Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount him. In this position, only a small part again of his
penis was inserted into her vagina. At this stage, appellant had both his hands flat on the floor. Thereafter,
complainant was able to escape.

The trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape.

ISSUE: 1) WON the trial court erred in declaring that the crime of frustrated rape was committed by the accused
HELD: YES Frustrated stage does not apply to rape
RATIO:
The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrators will.
A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the commission of the crime by overt
acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from performing all of the acts which should produce the
crime. In other words, to be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or
agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which
should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform. If he has performed all of the acts
which should result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it can not be an
attempt. The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is no
intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of the crime and the
moment when all of the acts have been performed which should result in the consummated crime; while in the former
there is such intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which should
produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his
purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more
is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the
felony is consummated. We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not
essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female
organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is
attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender
merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and
manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated
stage in rape can ever be committed.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED. The accused Ceilito Orita is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

OTHER NOTES: Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a woman
(Blacks Law Dictionary)

PEOPLE V. CAMPUHAN
TOPIC: Distinction of consummated and attempted rape
FACTS: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel, went down from the second floor of their
house to prepare Milo for her children. At the ground floor she met Primo Campuhan, a helper of her brother, who was
then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. As she
was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayoko, ayoko!" prompting her to rush upstairs.
There, she saw Campuhan inside her childrens room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were already
removed, while his short pants were down to his knees. According to Corazon, Campuhan was forcing his penis into
Crysthels vagina.
Corazon called for help and Campuhan was subdued. The barangay officials were called. Physical examination of the
victim yielded negative results. The medico-legal officer on Crysthels body noted no evident sign of extra-genital
physical injury as her hymen was intact.
Campuhan said he was innocent but the trial court found him guilty of statutory rape and sentenced him to the
extreme penalty of death.
Campuhans defense was that it was almost inconceivable that Corazon could give such a vivid description of the
alleged sexual contact when from where she stood she could not have possibly seen the alleged touching of the sexual
organs of Campuhan on Crysthel. He asserts that the absence of any external signs of physical injuries or of
penetration of Crysthels private parts more than bolsters his innocence.
Issue: There is no doubt that Campuhan is guilty of rape. However, is it attempted rape or consummated rape?
Held: It was attempted rape.
What consummates rape anyway? Statutory rape is consummated by carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years.
Jurisprudence has held that in concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not
an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere touching of the external genitalia by the
penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. But the act of touching
should be understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the female organ and not mere
touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum.
It was held that when an accused failed to achieve an erection, had a limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which
could not fit into the victim's vagina, nonetheless rape was consummated if the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain,
to insert his penis into the victims vagina and reaches the labia of her pudendum or that the penis of the accused
touched the middle part of her vagina.
Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of
organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victims vagina, or the mons pubis. There
must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not
merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape because the labias,
which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the
vaginal surface, and to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface. Thus,
the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
In this case, rape was not consummated because it merely constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency,"
or as earlier stated, a "strafing of the citadel of passion." There was no bombardment of the drawbridge" according to
Justice Bellosillo. Why? The prosecution utterly failed to discharge its onus of proving that Campuhans penis was able
to penetrate Crysthels vagina however slight. Furthermore Corazons testimony could not prove that she saw inter-
genital contact. Campuhans kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible. Not even a vantage
point from the side of the accused and the victim would have provided Corazon an unobstructed view of Primos penis
supposedly reaching Crysthels external genitalia.
Lastly, Crysthel said that Campuhans penis did not penetrate her organ. Under Art. 6 (attempted/frustrated), in
relation to Art. 335 (rape), of the RPC, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape - and only
of attempted rape - are present in the instant case, hence, the accused should be punished only for it.

SCIENCE NOTES: The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the
perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc.
The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface.
The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the
inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner
surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora
is the labia minora.
As stated above, the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke
the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the
pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the
female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most,
it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.

PEOPLE V. MAHINAY
TOPIC: Rape with homicide, When and how rape is committed
FACTS: Appellant Larry Mahinay started working as houseboy with Maria Isip. His task was to take care of Isips house
which was under construction adjacent to her old residence situated inside a compound But he stayed and slept in an
apartment also owned by Isip, located 10 meters away from the unfinished house. The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12
years old, was Isips neighbor in Dian Street. She used to pass by Isips house on her way to school and play inside the
compound yard, catching maya birds together with other children. While they were playing, appellant was always
around washing his clothes. Inside the compound yard was a septic tank.
One morning, a certain Boy found the dead body of Ma. Victoria inside the septic tank. Boy immediately reported what
he saw to the victims parents. The lifeless body of Ma. Victoria was retrieved from the septic tank. She was wearing a
printed blouse without underwear. Her face bore bruises.
The policemen returned to the scene of the crime. At the second floor of the house under construction, they retrieved
from one of the rooms a pair of dirty white short pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by
Elvira Chan to belong to her daughter, Ma. Victoria. They also found inside another room a pair of blue slippers which
Isip identified as that of appellant. Also found in the yard, three armslength away from the septic tank were an
underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers positively identified by Isip as appellants
belongings.
After a series of followup operations, appellant was finally arrested in Batangas. He was brought to the Valenzuela
Police Station. On July 7, 1995, with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes, appellant executed an extrajudicial
confession wherein he narrated in detail how he raped and killed the victim. Also, when appellant came face to face
with the victims mother and aunt, he confided to them that he was not alone in raping and killing the victim. He
pointed to Zaldy and Boyet as his coconspirators

Thus, on July 10, 1995, appellant was charged with rape with homicide.

ISSUE: WON appellant committed the felony of rape with homicide YES
RATIO: The circumstantial evidence clearly establishes the felony of rape with homicide defined and penalized under
Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11, R.A. 7659, which provides:
When and how rape is committedRape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances.
1.) By using force or intimidation;
2.) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3.) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The gravamen of the offense of rape, prior to R.A. 8353, is sexual congress with a woman by force and without
consent.16 (Under the new law, rape may be committed even by a woman and the victim may even be a man).17 If
the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent becomes immaterial18 not only because force is not
an element of statutory rape,19 but the absence of a free consent is presumed when the woman is below such age.
Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the woman is 12 years of age or over at the
time she was violated, as in this case, not only the first element of sexual intercourse must be proven but also the
other element that the perpetrators evil acts with the offended party was done through force, violence, intimidation or
threat needs to be established. Both elements are present in this case.
Based on the evidence on record, sexual intercourse with the victim was adequately proven. This is shown from the
testimony of the medical doctor who conducted post mortem examination on the childs body.

Besides, as may be gleaned from his extrajudicial confession, appellant himself admitted that he had sexual congress
with the unconscious child. From the wounds, contusions and abrasions suffered by the victim, force was indeed
employed upon her to satisfy carnal lust. Moreover, from appellants own account, he pushed the victim causing the
latter to hit her head on the table and fell unconscious. It was at that instance that he ravished her and satisfied his
salacious and prurient desires. Considering that the victim, at the time of her penile invasion, was unconscious, it
could safely be concluded that she had not given free and voluntary consent to her defilement, whether before or
during the sexual act.

Coming now to the penalty, the sentence imposed by the trial court is correct. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. 7659 when by reason or on occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be death. Four members of the Courtalthough maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions
expressed in People v. Echegaray42 that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional
nevertheless submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death
penalty should accordingly be imposed.

OTHER NOTES: the Court, as guardian of the rights of the people lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties
which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of
making an arrest and again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation40 in accordance with the 41
Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438. It is hightime to educate our law enforcement agencies who
neglect either by ignorance or indifference the socalled Miranda rights which had become insufficient and which the
Court must update in the light of new legal developments.

PEOPLE V. FABRO
TOPIC: Evidence when rape victim is unconscious
FACTS: MARIO FABRO was convicted for the rape of private complainant, Rebecca Seguancia
Private complainant was working for Reyval Lopez as one of his five fulltime, livein maids. Among her coworkers was
Janet Fabro, appellants wife. One night, Rebecca bought band-aids for Lopez in the market. On her way, she passed an
IhawIhaw restaurant where she saw appellant. Without uttering a word, he started to trail her. She asked him to stop
following her, but her words fell on deaf ears.4
Finding the Alicia store already closed, private complainant headed back home to Lopezs house. Appellant suggested
they go to his cousin to buy bandaid. She ignored him. Suddenly, he grabbed her left hand and dragged her for about
eight (8) to ten (10) meters to a dark, deserted area. He kissed her on the lips.5 She struggled,6 somehow managing
to bite his hand. She tried to escape, but he was able to grab and pull her back. He wrapped his hands around her
neck, as if to strangle her. It was then that she lost consciousness. She could not remember how long she passed out.7
It took a gunshot of unknown origin to rouse private complainant back to consciousness. She found herself lying on the
ground with appellant by her side, zipping up his pants.8 Her back and private parts hurt, and she discovered sticky
matter on her sexual organ. She also realized that her pants were no longer on her.
Accused-appellant presented a different version of the story. After trial, the RTC convicted appellant for the crime of
rape. CA affirmed appellants conviction but modified the trial courts judgment by imposing instead the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: WON the prosecution was able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt YES
HELD: To establish rape under Article 335 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, two elements must be shown: that the
accused had carnal knowledge of the offended party; and that coitus was done through the use of force or
intimidation. This the prosecution was able to do in the case at bench.
The use of force by appellant on private complainant on the night of May 14, 1989 was set forth clearly in her
testimony. She said that he grabbed his hand and dragged her for about ten (10) meters. When she struggled with
him, he held her by the neck, choked her, and caused her to faint. Even appellant admitted private complainants
unconsciousness in his direct examination.

Also, Reyval Lopez testified that when private complainant arrived home that night, her hair was in disarray and there
were bruises on her arms.27 Further, her medical examination revealed that she had a linear abrasion on the anterior
aspect of her left elbow. All these establish the force and physical violence exerted on private complainant by
appellant.

Appellant, however, argues that the prosecution insufficiently established the fact of sexual intercourse. He pounds on
private complainants failure to give direct testimony on the matter - It is but to be expected that if the sexual assault
was committed against the victim while the latter was in a state of unconsciousness, she would not be able to testify
on the actual act of sexual intercourse. It is precisely when the sexual intercourse is performed when the victim is
unconscious that the act constitutes the statutory offense of rape (e)specially when, as in the instant case, the loss of
consciousness was the result of appellants act of violence.

In the case at bench, private complainant struggled with appellant until she fainted. When she came to, she was
aching, naked from the waist down, and lying next to appellant who was zipping up his pants. She found her t shirt
soiled, and upon the nest of her maidenhood lay sticky matter. All these stand as mute testimony to her wicked fate at
the hands of appellant while she was unconscious.
Furthermore, the results of private complainants physical examination does not negate the commission of rape. While
the doctor found no vaginal or hymenal laceration or spermatozoa in her private parts, appellants acquittal does not
follow. It is settled that neither complete penetration28 nor ejaculation29 is necessary to constitute rape. What is
essential is that there be penetration of the female organ, no matter how slight.30 In addition, we note the ranting
letter appellant wrote to Reyval Lopez and his commonlaw wife showing his guilt.

Clearly, appellant had sexual intercourse with private complainant through the use of force. He was, thus, correctly
convicted of rape by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

PEOPLE V. ECHEGARAY
TOPIC: imposition of death penalty for accused rapists
FACTS: Facts: The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the
crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which
time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-
appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's
grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. This was
dismissed.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services
of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines.
A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant.
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters
relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3)
purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

Issue: Whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty.

Ratio: One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against threatened and actual evil.
Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that define and punish illegal acts that may be
committed by its own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences the
criminals in accordance with these laws.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or not the death
penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel
and unusual punishments.
Harden- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the
United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.
Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally
wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our
criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law
regardless of their private opinions,"
Munoz- A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly
declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed
unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed,
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough
Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution than the form in which
the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the death penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact legislation re-imposing the death
penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Senate
proceeded to a two-step process consisting of: first, the decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death penalty
or not; and second, the vote to pass on the third reading the bill re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes.
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no abstention, the Chair declared that the
Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty in the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the death penalty was not completely abolished
by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the death penalty and gave Congress the discretion to review it
at the propitious time.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly
identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by
reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily penalized by death. The
proper time to determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to
pass on a death sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the
trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to say, however, that the
aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness
of the crime for the trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which are
punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the House of Representatives reveals that,
while both Chambers were not wanting of oppositors to the death penalty, the Lower House seemed less quarrelsome
about the form of the death penalty bill as a special law specifying certain heinous crimes without regard to the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code and more unified in the perception of what crimes are heinous and that the fact
of their very heinousness involves the compulsion and the imperative to suppress, if not completely eradicate, their
occurrence. Be it the foregoing general statement of Representative Sanchez or the following details of the nature of
the heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental, there was
clearly, among the hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to their cause.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty
"for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of
Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1) that Congress define or
describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as
heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance of
circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or
description set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly
motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of heinousness must be squarely applied.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed
with each other. Because the subject crimes are either so revolting and debasing as to violate the most minimum of
the human standards of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications and consequences so destructive,
destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our socio-political and economic agenda as a developing
nation, these crimes must be frustrated, curtailed and altogether eradicated.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death
penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and
statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the
death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in
society.
It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming upsurge of such crimes", for
the same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice,
public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds
compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes."

SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because:

the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a
person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject
poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry
they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of
their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be
permanently prevented from doing so
People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice and
charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every person has a right.
It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon
decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself.

PEOPLE V. SALVANO
TOPIC: RAPE Punishment for rape of daughter who is a minor
FACTS: The father, David Silvano had been sexually abusing her daughter, Sheryl, since she was 13 years old. One
evening, while Sheryl was sleeping in her room, she was awakened by her father, the accused in this case. The
accused then started scolding Sheryl for her coming late. The accused, who appeared tipsy, started undressing Sheryl
by lifting her Tshirt, as a form of punishment for her coming home late, which punishment she has been experiencing
from the accused since she was 13 years old. Thereafter, the accused started doing sexual acts to his daughter. One
morning after the incident, Sheryl did not come home after school where she stayed with her grandmother instead.
She confided to her mother and grandmother of the incidents with her father and she filed a case of rape.
Consequently, the lower court rendered judgment convicting appellant of the crime charged, sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of death.
ISSUE: WON the appellant is guilty of qualifiedrape punishable by death penalty? YES.
HELD: the fundamental presumption of innocence7 enjoyed by appellant was overcome with the requisite quantum of
proof in criminal cases and his guilt sufficiently established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.8
The qualified rape of an underaged relative for which appellant was charged is classified as a heinous crime and
penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Section 11, Republic Act (R.A.) 7659,9
which provides:
When and how rape is committedRape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances.
1.) By using force or intimidation;
2.) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3.) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1.) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the commonlaw spouse of the parent of the victim;

In proving such felony, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary elements of 1.) sexual congress 2.) with a
woman 3.) by force and without consent,11 and in order to warrant the imposition of death penalty, the additional
elements that 4.) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape and 5.) the offender is a parent (whether
legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim should also be alleged and proven. All such elements are undisputedly
present in this case. The victim herein at the age of sixteen (16) years was subjected to forced sexual intercourse by
appellant, as duly shown in her testimony:

Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits
herself against her will to the rapists lust because of fear for her life or personal safety.19 The force, violence or
intimidation in rape is a relative term, depending not only on the age, size, and strength of the parties but also on their
relationship with each other.20 Herein victim is only 16 years old, about 56 and weighs 128 lbs. as compared to her
father who is in his early 40s, about 62, weighs 210 lbs.21 and a former driver/messenger in the Italian embassy.22
Considering also that the assailant is no less than the victims own father who wields parental influence over her
person, the crime undoubtedly was committed with facility.23 The latters moral ascendancy over the former
substitutes for violence or intimidation.24 A woman at such young age like the victim herein can only cower in fear and
yield into submission. Rape is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which a man keeps a
woman in a state of fear and humiliation. Thus, it is not even impossible for a victim of rape not to make an outcry
against an unarmed assailant.25

PEOPLE V. BONAAGUA
TOPIC: RAPE Acts of lasciviousness
FACTS: In four (4) separate Informations, Ireno was charged by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pinas City with
four (4) counts of Rape under Paragraph 2, Article 266A of the RPC, for inserting his tongue and his finger into the
genital of his minor daughter, AAA. The prosecution presented its evidence on the incidents when AAA was raped.
o One Christmas afternoon inside a room while AAA was lying in bed and her brothers were playing outside the
house
o On the evening of the same day. accusedappellant threatened to kill her mother by placing the latters body in
a drum and have it cemented if she would report the incidents.
o Twice one afternoon inside her fathers room at the carwash station where he removed her shorts and panty
then proceeded to touch and insert his finger into her vagina.
One afternoon, AAA complained of severe abdominal pain where her mother brought her to the hospital. The results
revealed that there was a healed superficial laceration at the 9 oclock position on the hymen of AAA. This medical
finding forced AAA to reveal to her mother all the incidents of rape committed by accusedappellant. After being
discharged from the hospital, AAAs mother took her to the Police Headquarters of Sariaya, Quezon to file a complaint
for rape against accusedappellant.
After the Bonaagua presented his defense, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), convicting Ireno with four (4) counts of Rape.
The CA modified the RTCs decision finding Ireno guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610,
instead of Rape. . The CA opined that since the prosecution failed to establish the act of insertion by Ireno of his finger
into the vagina of AAA, Ireno could only be found guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness.
ISSUE: WON CA was correct in charging the accused with the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness YES
HELD: Acts of Lasciviousness, as defined in Article 336 of the RPC, has the following elements:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.
Corollarilly, Section 2 (h) of the rules and regulations43 of R.A. No. 7610 defines Lascivious conduct as:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or
opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.

Undeniably, all the aforestated elements are present in the case. Ireno committed lascivious acts against AAA by
touching her breasts and licking her vagina and the lascivious or lewd acts were committed against AAA, who was 8
years old at the time as established by her birth certificate.45 Thus, the CA correctly found Ireno guilty of the crime of
Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.

It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the slightest penetration of the male organ or
even its slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora of the vagina already consummates the crime, in like
manner, if the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also be considered
as already consummating the crime of rape through sexual assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
Notwithstanding, in the present case, such logical interpretation could not be applied. It must be pointed out that the
victim testified that Ireno only touched her private part and licked it, but did not insert his finger in her vagina. This
testimony of the victim, however, is open to various interpretation, since it cannot be identified what specific part of
the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the principle that the guilt of an accused must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt, the statement cannot be the basis for convicting Ireno with the crime of rape through sexual
assault.

PEOPLE V. JUMAWAN
TOPIC: RAPE MARITAL RAPE
FACTS: Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.

On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant, raped
her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the
accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.

As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between her and
the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded
with equal degree of enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her
panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically
painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.

One night, in the spouses bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie
thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior
prompted him to ask angrily: Why are you lying on the cot?, and to instantaneously order: You transfer here to our
bed.

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming
menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it
against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and
transferred to the bed.

The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by tapping
his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.

The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on to her panties,
he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.

The accused-appellant then raised KKKs daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on them. She tried
to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal
desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: Don t do that to me because Im not feeling well.

Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because
he took over the control and management of their businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital affairs.
the RTC sustained the version proffered by the prosecution by giving greater weight and credence to the spontaneous
and straightforward testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses. The trial court also upheld as sincere and genuine the
two daughters testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for daughters to testify against their own father for a
crime such as rape if the same was not truly committed.

The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimony of the victim herself and the corroborative
declarations of MMM and OOO, was able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements of rape under R.A. No.
8353. The accusedappellant had carnal knowledge of KKK by using force and intimidation.

ISSUE: Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

HELD: YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their wives bodies. Sexual
intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.
Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until now. It appears, however, that the
old provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to Hales irrevocable implied consent theory, albeit in a
limited form. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino,[104] a husband may not be guilty of rape under Article 335
of Act No. 3815 but, in case there is legal separation, the husband should be held guilty of rape if he forces his wife to
submit to sexual intercourse.[105]
In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (UNCEDAW).

The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender equality. In 1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated
the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC.[109] The law reclassified rape as a crime against person and
removed it from the ambit of crimes against chastity. More particular to the present case, and perhaps the laws most
progressive proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and criminalizing
its perpetration,
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended
party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the
penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio.

The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations of the 10th Congress on the
laws progenitors, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on tagging the crime as marital
rape due to conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to include and
penalize marital rape under the general definition of rape,

Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
B. Sexual violence refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but
is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object,

Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates
her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party
to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

A woman is no longer the chattelantiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual intercourse with his
wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being with dignity
equal[120] to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a
sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its international commitments
and accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on marital activities[121] that have lost their relevance in a
progressive society.

OTHER NOTES: Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from nonmarital rape cases in terms of the elements
that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause. The Constitutional
right to equal protection of the laws[126] ordains that similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give
undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others; no person or class of persons shall be denied the same
protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by other persons or other classes in like circumstances
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b)
sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrators own spouse. The single definition for
all three forms of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those
committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by their husband and those raped by
any other man alike.

PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS
TOPIC: Rape rape of sex worker; state policy on the heinous offense of rape
Facts: Rosilyn first met accusedappellant, Romeo Jalosjos, sometime in February 1996 at his office located near
Robinsons Galleria. Rosilyn and Simplicio were brought there and introduced by a talent manager by the name of
Eduardo Suarez. Accusedappellant promised to help Rosilyn become an actress. When he saw Rosilyn, accused
appellant asked how old she was. Simplicio answered, 10. She is going to be 11 on May 11. Accusedappellant
inquired if Rosilyn knows how to sing. Simplicio told Rosilyn to sing, so she sang the song, Tell Me You Love Me.
Accusedappellant then askedifRosilynhasnicelegsandthenraisedherskirtup tothe midthighs. He asked if she was already
menstruating, and Simplicio said yes. Accusedappellant further inquired if Rosilyn already had breasts. When nobody
answered, accusedappellant cupped Rosilyns left breast. Thereafter, accusedappellant assured them that he would
help Rosilyn become an actress as he was one of the producers of the TV programs, Valiente and Eat Bulaga. On
their 3rd meeting, Roslyn went to accuseds condo in RitzTowers where the accused did sexual acts to Rosilyn such as:
kissing her lips, raising her shirt, touching her breasts and inserting his finger and tongue into Rosilyns vagina. The
next day when Rosilyn wakes up, she finds 5,000 on the table. These acts happened for several days.
One afternoon, Rosilyn ran away from home with the help of Yamie Estreta, one of their boarders. Yamie accompanied
Rosilyn to the Pasay City Police, DSWD and NBI.
After trial, the court convicted Romeo Jalosjos as principal in the two (2) counts of statutory rape defined and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Considering that Rosilyn is a selfconfessed sex worker, is Jalosjos is guilty of rape? YES.
Held: The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
In statutory rape, mere sexual congress with a woman below twelve years of age consummates the crime of statutory
rape regardless of her consent to the act or lack of it. The law presumes that a woman of tender age does not possess
discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, it was held that carnal knowledge of
a child below twelve years old even if she is engaged in prostitution is still considered statutory rape. The application
of force and intimidation or the deprivation of reason of the victim becomes irrelevant. The absence of struggle or
outcry of the victim or even her passive submission to the sexual act will not mitigate nor absolve the accused from
liability.49
In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that accusedappellant had carnal knowledge
of Rosilyn. Moreover, the prosecution successfully proved that Rosilyn was only eleven years of age at the time she
was sexually abused. As such, the absence of proof of any struggle, or for that matter of consent or passive
submission to the sexual advances of accusedappellant, was of no moment. The fact that accusedappellant had sexual
congress with elevenyear old Rosilyn is sufficient to hold him liable for statutory rape, and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

It must be stressed that rape is a technical term, the precise and accurate definition of which could not have been
understood by Rosilyn. Indeed, without the assistance of a lawyer, who could explain to her the intricacies of rape, she
expectedly could not distinguish in her affidavits and consequently disclose with proficient exactitude the act or acts of
accusedappellant that under the contemplation of law constitute the crime of rape. This is especially true in the
present case where there was no exhaustive and clearcut evidence of full and complete penetration of the victims
vagina. It may well be that Rosilyn thought, as any layman would probably do, that there must be the fullest
penetration of the victimsvagina to qualify a sexual act to rape.

PEOPLE V. CRISOSTOMO
TOPIC: RAPE Statutory rape; penalty
FACTS: RTC found Joel Crisostomo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape by sexual assault and one
count of statutory rape.
o First case: act of sexual assault by using a lighted cigarette as an instrument or object and [inserting] the same
into the genital orifice of AAA,[6] a minor who is six (6) years of age, thereby causing the labia majora of the
vagina of said minor to suffer a third degree burn
o Second case: act of sexual assault by using a lighted cigarette as an instrument or object and [inserting] the
same into the anal orifice of AAA, a minor who is six (6) years of age, thereby causing the perianal region of
the said anal orifice of said minor to suffer a third degree burn
o Third case: Accused raped said minor and burnt her buttocks by the use of a lighted cigarette
The RTC found Crisostomo guilty of the 3 criminal informations and is sentenced to suffer Indeterminate Penalty of
imprisonment of Prision Mayor to Reclusion Temporal for sexual assault; and the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for
statutory rape. However, the CA modified the penalties imposed to suffer imprisonment ranging from Prision Mayor to
Reclusion Temporal; and the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility of parole for rape.

ISSUE: WON appellant is guilty of statutory rape Yes

HELD: Article 266A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides: Rape is committed d. When the offended party is
under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above should be
present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual
assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital
or anal orifice of another person.

When the offended party is under 12 years of age, the crime committed is termed statutory rape as it departs from
the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age.
Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes
that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years.[24]
In this case, the prosecution satisfactorily established all the elements of statutory rape. AAA testified that on April 8,
1999, appellant took off her clothes and made her lie down. Appellant also removed his clothes, placed himself on top
of AAA, inserted his penis into her vagina, and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her. At the time of the rape,
AAA was only six years of age. Her birth certificate showed that she was born on April 4, 1993. AAAs testimony
was corroborated by Dr. Emmanuel Reyes who found AAA to have fresh and bleeding hymenal lacerations.

SC affirmed CAs modifications that pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346,[31] the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed on the appellant but without eligibility for parole.[32] The CA thus correctly imposed the said penalty on
appellant.

PEOPLE V. GADUYON
TOPIC: RAPE under Art 266-A and of sexual abuse under RA7610
FACTS: This is a case of a father defiling his 12year old daughter on three separate occasions. RTC found Gaduyon
(appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape,3 qualified object rape4 and sexual abuse5 committed
against his own daughter AAA.
o First: On August 21, 2002, the mother and sisters of AAA attended the wake of her auntie in Caloocan City.
AAA and her father, the appellant, were thus the only ones left in the family residence in San Mateo, Rizal.
appellant fondled her breasts and touched her arms.10 Appellant threatened AAA not to tell her mother
about the incident or else something bad might happen to the latter.
o Second: the following day, AAA was awakened when appellant lowered her shorts and panty.12 Appellant
spread her legs and inserted his penis into her vagina.13 AAA felt pain but could do nothing but cry.14
Appellant pulled out his penis and inserted it again into AAAs vagina.
o Third: A month after, AAA was sleeping in a doubledeck bed and her sister was in the lower portion. Appellant
then inserted his index finger into AAAs vagina.
Defense denied the allegations but RTC found him guilty of 2 counts of rape, sentencing him to suffer death; and 1
count of sexual abuse, sentencing him to suffer a sentence of prision correccional. Thereafter, CA affirmed RTCs
decisions.

Art. 266A. Rape, When and How Committed.Rape is committed By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances: When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented

rape can now be committed either through sexual intercourse or through sexual assault. In rape under paragraph 1 or
rape through sexual intercourse, carnal knowledge is the crucial element which must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt.61 This is also referred to as organ rape or penile rape62 and must be attended by any of the circumstances
enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1. There must be evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt
that the perpetrators penis touched the labia of the victim or slid into her female organ, and not merely stroked the
external surface thereof, to ensure his conviction of rape by sexual intercourse.63
On the other hand, rape under paragraph 2 of the above quoted article is commonly known as rape by sexual assault.
The perpetrator, under any of the attendant circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1, commits this kind of rape by
inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal
orifice of another person. It is also called instrument or object rape, also genderfree rape, or the narrower
homosexual rape

On the other hand, RA 7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act, defines and penalizes child prostitution and other sexual abuse. Sexual abuse includes the
employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to
engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children. Lascivious
conduct means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner
thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the
same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person

In paragraph (b), the following requisites must concur: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
and (3) the child, whether male or female is below eighteen (18) years of age.66 This paragraph punishes sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other
sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through
coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.67

Appellant is guilty of the two kinds of rape under Art. 266A of the RPC and of sexual abuse under RA 7610.
Our examination of the testimony of AAA reveals that there was carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse through
force, threat and intimidation on August 22, 2002. Appellant also committed rape by sexual assault when he inserted
his finger into the genitalia of AAA on October 9, 2002. He also subjected AAA, a minor at 12 years of age, to
sexual abuse by means of lascivious conduct through intimidation or influence, when he mashed her breasts and
stroked his arms
PROPER PENALTY: In view, however, of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of the penalty of
death, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, should be imposed. With regard to the crime of
sexual abuse under RA 7610, the penalty provided for violation of Section 5, Article III thereof is reclusion temporal in
its medium period to reclusion perpetua. As the crime was committed by the father of [AAA,] the alternative
circumstance of relationship should be appreciated. In crimes against chastity, such as Acts of Lasciviousness,
relationship is always aggravating.81 With the presence of this aggravating circumstance and no mitigating
circumstance, the penalty in Criminal Case No. 6573 shall be applied in its maximum period reclusion perpetua

PEOPLE V TEODORO
TOPIC: RAPE Recantation of testimony
FACTS: Tomas Teodoro was found guilty for of two counts of statutory rape of his 8yr old daughter, and condignly
meted him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count
o First: late that night, he returned home drunk, and his arrival roused the children from their sleep, because
they had not yet eaten; he made his children sleep. later in the night, he roused AAA, and ordered her to strip
naked; that she initially defied him, but he himself then undressed her; that he took off his pants and drawers
down to his knees, exposing his penis; that he went on top of her, inserted his penis in her vagina, and made
push and pull movements; that she felt a sharp pain inside her vagina
o Second: BBB (mother of AAA) was again away from the house, having gone to Manila. Teodoro committed the
rape in a fashion similar to that in the first rape.
During the trial, AAA9 and BBB10 testified for the Prosecution, but two years later recanted and turned hostile towards
the Prosecution, now telling the RTC that Teodoro had only touched AAAs vagina.

The RTC rendered its judgment convicting Teodoro on both counts of statutory rape notwithstanding the recantations
by AAA and BBB. On appeal, Teodoro focused on the RTCs rejection of AAAs recantation. He argued in his appellants
brief17 that no rape was committed. Unimpressed, the CA sustained the RTC, and ignored AAAs recantation for being
dictated by her familys financial difficulties.

ISSUE: WON the recantation of AAA should be accepted NO

HELD: Even during her intended recantation, AAA cried most of the time. Such demeanor reflected how much she
despised what he had done to her twice. As such, her supposed recantation did not conceal the impelling motive for it
being that her mother and her family still needed the material support of Teodoro. This was confirmed even by BBB,
whose own testimony on AAAs supposed recantation. BBB was then rearing four young children by Teodoro (the
youngest being born when he was already detained),31 as well as AAA and her five siblings that BBB had from an
earlier relationship.32 She unabashedly needed the material support of Teodoro; hence, she prevailed on AAA to
withdraw her charges against him. But a recantation under such insincere circumstances was unacceptable.
As a rule, recantation is viewed with disfavor firstly because the recantation of her testimony by a vital witness of the
State like AAA is exceedingly unreliable, and secondly because there is always the possibility that such recantation
may later be repudiated.33 Indeed, to disregard testimony solemnly given in court simply because the witness recants
it ignores the possibility that intimidation or monetary considerations may have caused the recantation. Court
proceedings, in which testimony upon oath or affirmation is required to be truthful under all circumstances, are
trivialized by the recantation. The trial in which the recanted testimony was given is made a mockery, and the
investigation is placed at the mercy of an unscrupulous witness. Before allowing the recantation, therefore, the court
must not be too willing to accept it, but must test its value in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party
adversely affected to cross examine the recanting witness both upon the substance of the recantation and the
motivations for it.34 The recantation, like any other testimony, is subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant
circumstances, including the demeanor of the recanting witness on the stand. In that respect, the finding of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons necessitate its re-
examination, the reason being that the trial court is in a better position to hear firsthand and observe the deportment,
conduct and attitude of the witnesses.

PEOPLE V. LAOG
TOPIC: RAPE AND MURDER Special complex crime
FACTS: Appellant Laog was convicted for the murder of one Jennifer and the rape of AAA.
AAA testified that at around six oclock in the evening of June 6, 2000, she and her friend, Jennifer PatawaranRosal,
were walking along the rice paddies on their way to apply for work at a canteen. Suddenly, appellant, who was holding
an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them and forcibly brought them to a grassy area at the back of a concrete wall.
Without warning, appellant struck AAA in the head with the lead pipe. When Jennifer saw this, she cried out for help
but appellant also hit her on the head with the lead pipe, knocking her down. Appellant stabbed Jennifer several times
with the ice pick and thereafter covered her body with thick grass. He turned to AAA and hit her in the head several
times more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the face. While AAA was in such defenseless position, appellant
pulled down her jogging pants, removed her panty, and pulled up her blouse and bra. He then went on top of her,
sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina. After raping AAA, appellant also covered her with grass. At
that point, AAA passed out. The defense denied the allegations and said that appellant was at home watching TV at
the time of the crime.

The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes. On appeal, CA affirmed with modification the
trial courts judgment.
ISSUE: Whether the accused-appellant is guilty of the crimes charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt YES
HELD: It must be underscored that the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victims testimony and
not the findings of the medicolegal officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape; the victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict.37 Thus we have ruled that a
medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely corroborative in character and is not an
indispensable element for conviction in rape. What is important is that the testimony of private complainant about the
incident is clear, unequivocal and credible,38 as what we find in this case.
While we concur with the trial courts conclusion that appellant indeed was the one who raped AAA and killed Jennifer,
we find that appellant should not have been convicted of the separate crimes of murder and rape. An appeal in a
criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one not raised by the parties.39 The facts
alleged and proven clearly show that the crime committed by appellant is rape with homicide, a special complex crime
provided under Article 266B, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.
In People v. Larranaga,41 this Court explained the concept of a special complex crime, as follows:
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law provides a single penalty for two or
more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes
under the Revised Penal Code are: xxx (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must
necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made
the subject of separate complaints.
Article 266B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single penalty for the composite acts of rape and
the killing committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape.
o When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape of AAA and the killing of Jennifer both
perpetrated by appellant, he is liable for rape with homicide under the above provision. There is no doubt that
appellant killed Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for help once she is able to run away, and also to
silence her completely so she may not witness the rape of AAA, the original intent of appellant. His carnal desire
having been satiated, appellant purposely covered AAAs body with grass, as he did earlier with Jennifers body, so
that it may not be easily noticed or seen by passersby. Appellant indeed thought that the savage blows he had inflicted
on AAA were enough to cause her death as with Jennifer. But AAA survived and appellants barbaric deeds were soon
enough discovered.

The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with homicide were consummated, and it is
immaterial that the person killed in this case is someone other than the woman victim of the rape.

Therefore, SC AFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accusedappellant Conrado Laog y Ramin is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Rape With Homicide under Article 266B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.

No. 8353, and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

RA 7610 - ANTI CHILD ABUSE LAW

PEOPLE V. OPTANA, 2001

TOPIC: RA7610 and ART 335 RPC
FACTS: Maria Rizalina Onsiano filed four (4) Informations for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610, or known
as the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse and four (4) Informations for Rape were filed against herein
accused appellant Deolito Optana.
Maria Rizalina Onsiano is the daughter of Nida A. Onsiano. Nida Onsiano met the accusedappellant, Deolito Optana
They decided to live together in 1986 without the benefit of marriage even if accusedappellant knew that Nida
Onsiano already had a daughter. Out of this commonlaw relationship, the couple had seven children.

One day, while the mother was out of the house, Maria Rizalina was ordered to undress but she refused. The accused-
appellant slapped her face twice on her cheeks and threatened to box her.5 He finally succeeded in removing her
clothes. The accusedappellant kissed Maria Rizalina on the mouth, on her breast, and on her private parts. Thereafter,
accusedappellant removed his shorts, held both hands of Maria Rizalina and went on top of her while she was lying on
the wooden bed. (Riza is only 12yo)

On several occasions, whenever Nida Onsiano was out of the house since she was busy selling wares in the market,
accused appellant raped Maria Rizalina. Thereafter, Nida Onsiano noticed that Maria Rizalinas tummy was quite
protruding while the latter was sleeping on the floor. Maria Rizalina at first refused to answer her mothers inquisitions
but finally revealed that the accusedappellant raped her. They went to the OBGYNE and found Rizalina 67 months
pregnant. Maria Rizalina told her that her stepfather repeatedly raped her.

After Maria Rizalinas statement was taken at the police station, a formal complaint was filed against the accused
appellant. Considering Maria Rizalinas minor age, she was referred to the Municipal Social Welfare and Development
Office for assistance. Initial interviews revealed that Maria Rizalina was so confused considering that her mother was
pressuring her to withdraw the complaint against the stepfather. It was then recommended that Maria Rizalina be
committed to the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
Accused-appellant denied the allegations. Moreover, Nida Onsiano corroborated the accusedappellants testimony.

Thereafter, the RTC found Optana guilty of the crime of rape as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code and for violation of Section 5(b) of Republic Act 7610,

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in convicting Optana for violating both the Child Abuse Act and Art 335 YES
*note: Art 335 (RAPE) and 266-A are repealed by RA8353

HELD:
RA 7610 Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge
in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse:
Provided, that when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article
335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period;

ART. 335. When and how rape is committed.Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two
next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Anent the numerous informations filed, the trial court corrected the erroneous filing of these informations as it
explained:
Charging the accused with two different offenses for the same act committed on the same date against the said victim
is erroneous as it is illegal, except where the law itself so allows. Section 5 (b), Republic Act 7610, however, does not
so allow. The said law in fact provides that if the child is below 12 years old, the accused must be prosecuted under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Conversely, if the child is above 12 years old but below 18 years old, then the
accused must be prosecuted under Republic Act 7610 for the so called child abuse.

The trial court correctly convicted the accused for Rape under Article 335 of the RPC in Criminal Case No. 48595 for it
was clearly proven that the accused had carnal knowledge with the victim through force and intimidation on that
fateful day in September, 1993. This was the first time the accused raped Maria Rizalina who was able to give a
detailed account of this traumatic experience. She was below 12 years old at that time. While Maria Rizalina also
testified that she was raped several times after September, 1993, the prosecution, however, failed to establish the
material details as to the time, place, and manner by which these offenses were committed. There is still a need for
proof beyond reasonable doubt that the offenses alleged in the informations were indeed committed.38 Thus, the trial
court acquitted the accused under Criminal Case Nos. 48295, 48395, 48495, 48695, 48895, 48995 for want of
sufficient evidence.
Aside from the first incident of rape, all what Maria Rizalina could say was that she was molested by the accused for
the last time on October 28, 1995. Whether there was force and intimidation to qualify this incident as rape was,
unfortunately, not proven. Nonetheless, there is no dispute that Maria Rizalina was sexually abused by the accused on
this occasion. Hence, the trial court convicted the accused under Criminal Case No. 48795 for violation of Sec. 5(b) of
R.A. 7610 or the Child Abuse Law.

The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 that must be proven in addition to the elements of acts
of lasciviousness are as follows:
(1) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
(2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
(3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group. Under RA 7610, children are persons below eighteen years of age or those
unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of their age or mental disability or condition.
It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit, but also one in which a
child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct. Hence, the foregoing provision penalizes not
only child prostitution, the essence of which is profit, but also other forms of sexual abuse of children. This is clear from
the deliberations of the Senate.
From the above disquisition, the accused is certainly guilty for sexual abuse committed on his stepdaughter, using his
moral ascendancy in intimidating the victim to engage in sexual intercourse with him.

PEOPLE V. ABELLO
TOPIC: Rape by Sexual Assault and Acts of Lasciviousness
FACTS: Appellant Heracleo Abello (Abello) stands convicted of one (1) count of violation of paragraph 2, Article 266-A
of the (RPC), as amended; and two (2) counts of violation of sexual abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (Child
Abuse Law).

The victim (AAA) is the step-daughter of Abello and is suffering from polio. At the time of the incident, the victim was
21 years old. One early morning, AAA was sleeping in their house She was suddenly awakened when Abello . . .
mashed her breast. Days after, Abello again mashed the breast of AAA practically under the same previous situation
while the latter was sleeping. In these two occasions AAA was able to recognize Abello because of the light coming
from outside which illuminated the house. Then on July 8, 1998, at around 2:00 a.m., Abello this time placed his soft
penis inside the mouth of AAA. The latter got awaken when Abello accidentally kneeled on her right hand. AAA
exclaimed "Aray" forcing the accused to hurriedly enter his room. He was nevertheless seen by AAA. The victim on the
same date reported the incident to her sister-in-law and mother.

Amidst the accusation of raping and twice sexually abusing AAA, Abello interposed the defense of denial. In all of the
instances, Abello claimed that he merely stepped on the victim at the sala on his way to his room after retiring home.
The RTC found Abello guilty under the three Informations one (1) count of violation of paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the
(RPC), as amended; and two (2) counts of violation of sexual abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (Child Abuse
Law).

ISSUE: WON the court erred in convicting Abello of the crime of violation of paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended; and of the crime of violation of Section 5, Article III of R.A.No.7610.

HELD: YES.
Rape by sexual assault
R.A. No. 8353 which took effect on October 22, 1997 introduced into the Philippine legal system the concept of rape by
sexual assault. This amendment not only reclassied rape as a crime against persons, but also expanded the denition
of rape from the traditional concept of a sexual intercourse committed by a man against an unwilling woman.
The second paragraph of Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended denes rape by sexual assault as committed by any
person who, under any of the circumstance mentioned in paragraph 1 . . . shall commit an act of sexual assault by
inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.

The elements of rape by sexual assault are:

(1) That the offender commits an act of sexual assault;
(2) That the act of sexual assault is committed by any of the following means:
(a) By inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice; or xxx
(3) That the act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:

AAA's testimony covers the commission of the sexual assault through the insertion of Abello's male organ into her
mouth; AAA also consistently identi ed Abello as the perpetrator of the sexual assault. These statements satisfy the rst
and second elements of the rape.
Her testimony that she was roused from sleep with Abello's male organ inserted in her mouth, goes into the third
element of the crime. 28 In this respect, we observe that both the RTC and the CA failed to notice the variance
between the allegations in the Information for rape and that proven at the trial on the mode of committing the offense.
The Information alleges "force and intimidation" as the mode of commission, while AAA testied during the trial that she
was asleep at the time it happened and only awoke to find Abello's male organ inside her mouth.

Acts of lasciviousness
Abello was convicted of two (2) counts of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which denes
and penalizes acts of lasciviousness committed against a child:

lascivious conduct is a crime committed through the intentional touching, either directly or through the clothing of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh or buttocks with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person, among others. Records show that AAA duly established this element when she
positively testi ed that Abello fondled her breasts on two separate occasions while she slept.

The essential elements of this provision are:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
3. The child whether male or female, is below 18 years of age
The second element requires that the lascivious conduct be committed on a child who is either exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. This second element requires evidence proving that: (a) AAA was
either exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse and (b) she is a child as dened under R.A. No. 7610.

The implementing rules elaborated on this de nition when it dened a "child" as one who is below 18 years of ageor over
said age who, upon evaluation of a quali ed physician, psychologist or psychiatrist, is found to be incapable of taking
care of herself fully because of a physical or mental disability or condition or of protecting herself from abuse.

While the records show that the RTC, the CA and the investigating prosecutor who led the corresponding Informations,
considered AAA's polio as a physical disability that rendered her incapable of normal function, no evidence was in fact
presented showing the prosecution's compliance with the implementing rules. Specically, the prosecution did not
present any evidence, testimonial or documentary, of any medical evaluation or medical nding from a qualied
physician, psychologist or psychiatrist attesting that AAA's physical condition rendered her incapable of fully taking
care of herself or of protecting herself against sexual abuse. Under the circumstances, we cannot consider AAA a child
under Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 7610.

In light of these conclusions, we cannot hold Abello liable under R.A. No. 7610. However, we still nd him liable for acts
of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, as amended

SC convicts Abello GUILTY of (1) rape by sexual assault dened and penalized under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended; and (2) acts of lasciviousness, dened and penalized under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.

MALTO V. PEOPLE
TOPIC: Distinction of RA7610 from Rape; Sweetheart Defense
FACTS: At the time of incident, AAA, the complainant, was 17 yrs old. She was a college student at Assumption
College. On the other hand, the petitioner, Michael John Z. Malto, was a 28-yr old professor of AAA in philosophy in the
first semester of school yr 1997-1998. The petitioner pursued AAA and they became sweethearts. In November 26,
1997, after threatening AAA of ending their relationship, AAA gave in to the petitioner to engage in sexual intercourse
with him inside the motel. In July 1999, AAA ended their relationship and she learned that he was either intimately
involved with or was sexually harassing his students in Assumption College and in other colleges where he taught and
that the accused was terminated from De La Salle University Aguinaldo and Assumption College. It was then that
AAA realized that she was actually abused by the petitioner. AAA confided all that happened between her and
petitioner to her mother, BBB.

BBB filed an administrative complaint to the school and a criminal case in the City Prosecutor of Pasay City.
The petitioner, in his defense, alleged that they only became sweethearts when AAA was already 19 while he was
already out of Assumption College.

The trial court convicted Malto for violation of Article III, Section 5 (a) paragraph 3 of RA 7610 that was modified by the
Court of Appeals as violation of paragraph (b) and not of paragraph (a) of Section 5.

ISSUE: Whether or not Malto is guilty of violation of RA 7610?

HELD: YES. Malto is found guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, not rape.
VIOLATION OF SECTION 5(B), ARTICLE III OF RA 7610 AND RAPE ARE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT CRIMES
The offense for which he was convicted is punished by a special law while rape is a felony under the Revised Penal
Code.28 They have different elements.29 The two are separate and distinct crimes. Thus, petitioner can be held liable
for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 despite a finding that he did not commit rape.

In contrast to the offense punished under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, the crime of rape has the following
elements:
(1) the offender is a man who had carnal knowledge of a woman and
(2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; xxx

Section 5(b), Art III of RA7610

The first element of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertains to the act or acts committed by the accused. The
second element refers to the state or condition of the offended party. The third element corresponds to the minority or
age of the offended party.

The first element - Petitioner committed lascivious conduct against and had sexual intercourse with AAA
The second element - due to the moral ascendency and influence of petitioner, AAA indulged in lascivious acts with or
allowed him to commit lascivious acts on her. Thus, she was deemed to be a child subjected to other sexual abuse
The third element - AAA was a child as she was below 18 years of age. She was therefore within the protective mantle
of the law.
Since all three elements of the crime were present, the conviction of petitioner was proper.
CONSENT OF THE CHILD IS IMMATERIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES INVOLVING VIOLATION OF SECTION 5,
ARTICLE III OF RA 7610
Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his kisses and touches and consented to have sexual intercourse with him. They
engaged in these acts out of mutual love and affection. But may the sweetheart theory be invoked in cases of child
prostitution and other sexual abuse prosecuted under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610? No.
The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and rape, felonies committed against or without the consent of
the victim. It operates on the theory that the sexual act was consensual. It requires proof that the accused and the
victim were lovers and that she consented to the sexual relations.30
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense
is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to
sexual intercourse with another person.

AQUINO V. ACOSTA
TOPIC: R.A. 7877 - Sexual harassment
FACTS: Atty. Susan Aquino, Chief of the Legal and Technical Staff of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), charged Judge
Ernesto Acosta, presiding judge of the same court with sexual harassment under R.A. 7877 and violation of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics and Code of Professional Responsibility.
First: after her vacation in the United States, she brought gifts for the three judges of the CTA, including
respondent. In the afternoon of the same day, he entered her room and greeted her by shaking her hand.
Suddenly, he pulled her towards him and kissed her on her cheek.
Second: while respondent was on official leave, he called complainant by phone, saying he will get something
in her office. Shortly thereafter, he entered her room, shook her hand and greeted her, Merry Christmas.
Thereupon, he embraced her and kissed her. She was able to free herself by slightly pushing him away.
Third: On the first working day in January, 2001, respondent phoned complainant, asking if she could see him
in his chambers in order to discuss some matters. When complainant arrived there, respondent tried to kiss
her but she was able to evade his sexual attempt. She then resolved not to enter his chambers alone.
Fourth: after the Senate approved the proposed bill expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, while complainant
and her companions were congratulating and kissing each other, respondent suddenly placed his arms around
her shoulders and kissed her.
Fifth: In the morning of February 14, 2001, respondent called complainant, requesting her to go to his office.
She then asked Ruby Lanuza, a clerk in the Records Section, to accompany her. Fortunately, when they
reached his chambers, respondent had left.
Sixth: The next day, Acosta asked Aquino to go to his office so Aquino asked Ruby to accompany her. Ruby
went with her and at first, Respondent seemed to be at a loss for words and kept glancing at Ruby who was
searching for something at the secretarys desk. When Ruby left, Respondent then approached complainant
saying, me gusto akong gawin sa iyo kahapon pa. Thereupon, he tried to grab her. Complainant
instinctively raised her hands to protect herself but respondent held her arms tightly, pulled her towards him
and kissed her.
The respondent denied the allegations that he sexually harassed her six times. He claimed that he has always treated
her with respect, being the head of the CTA Legal Staff.

After trial in the Court of Appeals, Judge Salonga found that In sum, no sexual harassment had indeed transpired on
those six occasions. Judge Acostas acts of bussing Atty. Aquino on her cheek were merely forms of greetings, casual
and customary in nature. No evidence of intent to sexually harass complainant was apparent, only that the innocent
acts of besobeso were given malicious connotations by the complainant. In fact, she did not even relate to anyone
what happened to her. Undeniably, there is no manifest sexual undertone in all those incidents.

ISSUE: WON Judge Acosta is guilty of sexual harassment under RA7877

HELD: NO. SC agrees with Justice Salonga.
Administrative complaints against members of the judiciary are viewed by this Court with utmost care, for proceedings
of this nature affect not only the reputation of the respondents concerned, but the integrity of the entire judiciary as
well. We have reviewed carefully the records of this case and found no convincing evidence to sustain complainants
charges. What we perceive to have been committed by respondent judge are casual gestures of friendship and
camaraderie, nothing more, nothing less. In kissing complainant, we find no indication that respondent was motivated
by malice or lewd design. Evidently, she misunderstood his actuations and construed them as work related sexual
harassment under R.A. 7877.

A mere casual buss on the cheek is not a sexual conduct or favor and does not fall within the purview of sexual
harassment under R.A. No. 7877. Section 3 (a). The elements of sexual harassment are as follows:
1) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor,
or any other person has authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another;
2) The authority, influence or moral ascendancy exists in a working environment;
3) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, or any
other person having authority, influence or moral ascendancy makes a demand, request or requirement of a sexual
favor.
Indeed, from the records on hand, there is no showing that respondent judge demanded, requested or required any
sexual favor from complainant in exchange for favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotion or privileges
specified under Section 3 of R.A. 7877. Nor did he, by his actuations, violate the Canons of Judicial Ethics or the Code
of Professional Responsibility