PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST PART 3
WASSMER VS VELEZ
FACTS:
In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned
their marriage. They decided to schedule it on September
4, 1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as:
making and sending wedding invitations, bought her
wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding
necessities. But 2 days before the scheduled day of
wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising her that
he will not be able to attend the wedding because his
mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day before
the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer
advising her that nothing has changed and that he will be
returning soon. However, he never returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez.
Velez never filed an answer and eventually judgment was
made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary
and moral damages in favor of Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the
scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous events. He
further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for
breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is
no law upon which such an action may be grounded. He
also contested the award of exemplary and moral
damages against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by
Velez is not tenable and also unsubstantiated. It is true
that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was not a
simple breach of promise to marry. because of such
promise, Wassmer made preparations for the wedding.
Velezs unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
Wassmers cause of action is supported under Article 21
of the Civil Code which provides in part any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the
injured party to receive an award for moral damages as
properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further,
the award of exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the
circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching
his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and
oppressive manner this warrants the imposition of
exemplary damages against him.
LORENTE VS SANDIGANBAYAN
(see case digest part 2)
CIR VS FIREMENS FUND INSURANCE
(see case digest part 2)
REYES TRUCKING CORP VS PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.
1 (1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime
FACTS:
On October 10, 1989, an information was filed before the
Regional Trial Court, Isabela, charging Romeo Dunca y
de Tumol with reckless imprudence resulting in double
homicide and damage to property.
On October 23, 1989, the offended parties (Rosario P. Dy
and minor children and Angelina M. Balcita and minor son
Paolo) made a reservation to file a separate civil action
against the accused arising from the offense charged.
On November 29, 1989, the offended parties also filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, a complaint against
Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of the
accused based on quasi delict. The petitioner settled the
claim of the heirs of Feliciano Balcita (the driver of the
other vehicle involved in the accident).
The private respondents opted to pursue the criminal
action but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex
delicto they filed against petitioner.
On December 15, 1989, private respondents withdrew the
reservation to file a separate civil action against the
accused and manifested that they would prosecute the
civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal action.
However, they did not withdraw the separate civil action
based on quasi delict against petitioner as employer
arising from the same act or omission of the accused
driver.
Upon agreement of the parties, the trial court consolidated
both criminal and civil cases and conducted a joint trial of
the same
On June 6, 1992, the trial court rendered a joint decision
finding the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide
through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor
Vehicle Law, ordering the plaintiff in Civil Case to pay the
defendant the actual damages in the amount of P84,000
and ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case.
Private respondents moved for amendment of the
dispositive portion of the joint decision so as to hold
petitioner subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to
the private respondents in the event of insolvency of the
accused.
The trial court ruled by ordering the defendant Reyes
Trucking Corporation subsidiarily liable for all the
damages awarded to the heirs of Francisco Dy, Jr.
During the pendency of the appeal, the accused jumped
bail and fled to a foreign country. By resolution dated
December 29, 1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal of the accused in the criminal case.
On January 6, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered an
amended decision affirming that of the trial court.
ISSUE: W/N petioner (employer) may be held subsidiarily
liable for the damages in the criminal action against his
employee despite the filing of a separate civil action by
the offended parties against the petitioner.
HELD: In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the
choice between:
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and
(2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail
himself of any other remedy because he may not recover
damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of
the accused. This is the rule against double recovery.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST PART 3
In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a
separate civil action for damages against petitioner as
employer of the accused, based on quasi delict, under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Private respondents sued petitioner Rafael Reyes
Trucking Corporation, as the employer of the accused, to
be vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of the latter.
Under the law, this vicarious liability of the employer is
founded on at least two specific provisions of law.
The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation to Article
2180 of the Civil Code, which would allow an action
predicated on quasi-delict to be instituted by the injured
party against the employer for an act or omission of the
employee and would necessitate only a preponderance of
evidence to prevail.
Here, the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct
of the subordinate is direct and primary, subject to the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision
of the employee.
The enforcement of the judgment against the employer in
an action based on Article 2176 does not require the
employee to be insolvent since the nature of the liability of
the employer with that of the employee, the two being
statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary.
The second, predicated on Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, provides that an employer may be held
subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed by his
employee in the discharge of his duty.
This liability attaches when the employee is convicted of a
crime done in the performance of his work and is found to
be insolvent that renders him unable to properly respond
to the civil liability adjudged.
Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of
the accused who has been guilty for reckless
imprudence, can not be held subsidiarily liable
because of the filing of the separate civil action based
on quasi delict against it.
In view of the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing
of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same
was not instituted with the criminal action.
Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, arising from the
same act or omission of the accused.
Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1,
paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
when private respondents, as complainants in the criminal
action, reserved the right to file the separate civil action,
they waived other available civil actions predicated on the
same act or omission of the accused-driver.
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under
the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32,
33, and 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from
the same act or omission of the accused.
2
Consequently, the Court of Appeals and the trial court
erred in holding the accused civilly liable, and petitioner-
employer of the accused subsidiarily liable for damages
arising from crime (ex delicto) in the criminal action as the
offended parties in fact filed a separate civil action against
the employer based on quasi delict resulting in the waiver
of the civil action ex delicto.
It might be argued that private respondents as
complainants in the criminal case withdrew the
reservation to file a civil action against the driver
(accused) and manifested that they would pursue the civil
liability of the driver in the criminal action.
However, the withdrawal is ineffective to reverse the effect
of the reservation earlier made because private
respondents did not withdraw the civil action against
petitioner based on quasi delict.
In such a case, the provision of Rule 111, Section 1,
paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure is
clear that the reservation to file or the filing of a separate
civil action results in a waiver of other available civil
actions arising from the same act or omission of the
accused.
Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 2 enumerated what are
the civil actions deemed waived upon such reservation or
filing, and one of which is the civil indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code. Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure specifically
provides:
"A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the
others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to
file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others."
The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple
suits between the same litigants arising out of the same
act or omission of the offender.
However, petitioner as defendant in the separate civil
action for damages filed against it, based on quasi delict,
may be held liable thereon. Thus, the trial court grievously
erred in dismissing plaintiffs civil complaint. And the Court
of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision.
Unfortunately private respondents did not appeal from
such dismissal and could not be granted affirmative relief.
With regard to the second issue, the award of damages in
the criminal case was improper because the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal
action by the filing of a separate civil action against the
employer.
In this case, accused-driver jumped bail pending his
appeal from his conviction. Thus, the judgment convicting
the accused became final and executory, but only insofar
as the penalty in the criminal action is concerned. The
damages awarded in the criminal action was invalid
because of its effective waiver. The pronouncement was
void because the action for recovery of the civil liability
arising from the crime has been waived in said criminal
action.
As a final note, the court reiterate that "the policy against
double recovery requires that only one action be
maintained for the same act or omission whether the
action is brought against the employee or against his
employer. The injured party must choose which of the
available causes of action for damages he will bring.
UYPITCHING VS QUIAMCO
FACTS:
In Uypitching, et al. v. Quiamco, G.R. No. 146322,
December 6, 2006, there was a sale of a motorcycle with
mortgage as security for the payment of the balance of
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST PART 3
the purchase price. When the vendee failed to pay, the
seller went to the buyers establishment with the police
and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle which he even
mouthed slanderous statement. Sued for damages, he
contended that there is no liability for the exercise of the
right as seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged
vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to
foreclose on the mortgage in case of default.
ISSUE: Is the contention correct? Why?
HELD: No. True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover
the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect
its foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a well-
defined procedure for the recovery of possession of
mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain
possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on
foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover
such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to
obtain judicial foreclosure. (Filinvest Credit Corp. v. CA,
G.R. No. 115902, September 27, 1995, 248 SCRA 549).
The seller failed to bring the proper civil action
necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle.
Instead, he descended to the buyers establishment with
his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle
without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the
course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner
Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous statement.
No doubt, the seller, acting through its co-
petitioner Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the lawful
procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice
of respondent. Its acts violated the law as well as public
morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human
relations.
The basic principle of human relations, embodied
in Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.
Article 19, also known as the principle of abuse of
right, prescribes that a person should not use his right
unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise
he opens himself to liability. (HSBC v. Catalan, G.R. No.
159590-91, October 18, 2004; 440 SCRA 498). It seeks to
preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right
(or duty) as a means to unjust ends.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised
solely to prejudice or injure another. (HSBC v. Catalan).
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the
purpose for which it was established and must not be
excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to
harm another. (HSBC v. Catalan). Otherwise, liability for
damages to the injured party will attach.
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle
was taken at the sellers instance was not only attended
by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down
by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory
statement, the sellers exercise of the right to recover the
mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to
3
the buyer. On the other hand, the precipitate act of filing
an unfounded complaint could not in any way be
considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which
the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the
totality of the buyers actions showed a calculated design
to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule the buyer.
The seller acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the
prejudice of the buyer. Contrary to law, the seller willfully
caused damage to the buyer. Hence, they should
indemnify him.
PALMA DEVT CORP. VS MUN. OF MALANGAS, ZDS
FACTS: Palma Development Corporation is engaged in
milling and selling rice and corn wholesalers in
Zamboanga City. It uses the municipal port of Malangas,
Zamboanga del Sur as transshipment point for
its goods. The port& as well as the surrounding roads
leading to it belong to and are maintained by
the Municipality ofMalangas, Zamboanga del Sur.
Malangas passed Municipal Revenue Code No. 9 which
was subsequently approved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur in a Resolution:
Section 5G.01. Imposition of fees. There shall be
collected service fee for its use of the municipal road[s] or
streets leading to the wharf and to any point along the
shorelines within the jurisdiction of the municipality and for
police surveillance on all goods and all equipment
harbored or sheltered in the premises of the wharf and
other within the jurisdiction of this municipality in the
following schedule:
a) Vehicles and Equipment: rate of fee
1. Automatic per unit P10.00
2. Ford Fiera P10.00
3. Trucks P10.00
xxxxxxxxx
b) Other Goods, Construction Material products:
1. Bamboo craft P20.00
2. Bangus/Kilo 0.30
xxxxxxxxx
41. Rice and corn grits/sack 0.50
The service fees imposed by Section 5G./1 of the ordinan
ce was paid by Palma under protest. it contended that
under the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991,
municipal governments did not have the authority to tax
goods and vehicles that passed through their jurisdictions.
Palma filed with the RTC an action for declaratory relief
assailing the validity of Section 5G./1 of the municipal
ordinance. TC declared the entire Municipal Revenue
Code No. 09 was ultra vires and, hence, null and void.
ISSUE: whether Section 5G.01 of Municipal Revenue
Code No. 09 is valid
HELD:
When public safety and welfare so requires,
the sanggunian concerned may discontinue the collection
of the tolls, and thereafter the said facility shall be free
and open for public use.
Respondent claims that there is no proof that the P0.50
fee for every sack of rice or corn is a fraudulent legislation
enacted to subvert the limitation imposed by Section
133(e) of RA No. 7160. Moreover, it argues that allowing
petitioner to use its roads without paying the P0.50 fee for
every sack of rice or corn would contravene the principle
of unjust enrichment.
By express language of Sections 153 and 155 of RA No.
7160, local government units, through
their Sanggunian, may prescribe the terms and conditions
for the imposition of toll fees or charges for the use of any
public road, pier or wharf funded and constructed by
them. A service fee imposed on vehicles using municipal
roads leading to the wharf is thus valid.However, Section
133(e) of RA No. 7160 prohibits the imposition, in the
guise of wharfage, of fees -- as well as all other taxes or
charges in any form whatsoever -- on goods or
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST PART 3
merchandise. It is therefore irrelevant if the fees imposed
are actually for police surveillance on the goods, because
any other form of imposition on goods passing through the
territorial jurisdiction of the municipality is clearly
prohibited by Section 133(e).
Under Section 131(y) of RA No. 7160, wharfage is defined
as a fee assessed against the cargo of a vessel engaged
in foreign or domestic trade based on quantity, weight, or
measure received and/or discharged by vessel. It is
apparent that a wharfage does not lose its basic character
by being labeled as a service fee for police surveillance
on all goods.
Unpersuasive is the contention of respondent that
petitioner would unjustly be enriched at
the formers expense. Though the rules thereon apply
equally well to the government,[9]for unjust enrichment to
be deemed present, two conditions must generally
concur: (a) a person is unjustly benefited, and (b) such
benefit is derived at anothers expense or damage.[10]
In the instant case, the benefits from the use of the
municipal roads and the wharf were not unjustly derived
by petitioner. Those benefits resulted from the
infrastructure that the municipality was mandated by law
to provide.[11] There is no unjust enrichment where the
one receiving the benefit has a legal right or entitlement
thereto, or when there is no causal relation between ones
enrichment and the others impoverishment.
LEDESMA VS CA
FACTS:
A student, Violeta Delmo, was not able to graduate as
Magna Cum Laude, because the president, herein
petitioner Jose Ledesma, of the West Visayas College
neglected his duty to inform the student on the result of a
case against the student which has, as its punishment,
the removal of awards or citations of the student. Said
case was the extension of loans to students, which the
president contends to be against the school rules and
regulations, and which the student innocently performed
in her capacity as the treasurer of the Student Leadership
Club and in accordance to the Constitution and By-Laws
of the club, on the belief that said constitution was
presented and approved by the president. The student
appealed to the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools
after being denied for reconsideration by the president,
where upon investigation, it was found out that the student
acted in good faith and that her awards be reinstituted.
The president, upon receiving said decision, delayed
action and even e-mailed the director to reverse his
decision. The student therefore graduated as a plain
student and without honors and her award as Magna Cum
Laude was only entered on the scholastic records weeks
after the receipt by the president of the decision and after
the graduation.
ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages
under Article 27 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
HELD:
Yes. The presidents failure to graduate a student with
honors and blatant disregard of the students rights on the
account of him being embarrassed shows neglect of duty
without just cause, rendering him liable for damages
under Article 27 of the Civil Code. Undoubtedly, the
student and the students parents went through a painful
ordeal brought about by such neglect. Thus, moral and
exemplary damages under Article 27 are but proper.