CASE NO. 1
1606, the Sandiganbayan has
Hannah Eunice D. Serana v. Sandiganbayan
and People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008
FACTS: Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior
student of the University of the Philippines-
Cebu. She was appointed by then President
Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a
student regent of UP, with a one (1) year
term from January 1 to December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, she discussed with
President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons
Hall Annex in UP Diliman. On September 4,
2000, together with her siblings and
relatives, she registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission the Office of the
Student Regent Foundation, Inc. One of the
projects of the OSFRI was the renovation of
the Vinzons Hall Annex to be renamed after
to the then President Estrada, President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall.
President Estrada gave him Fifteen Million
Pesos (P15, 000,000.00) to the OSFRI as
financial assistance for the proposed
renovation. The source of funds came from
the Office of the President. But the said
renovation failed to materialize. The
succeeding student regent, Bugayong and De
Guzman , Secretary-General of the KASAMA
sa UP, a system-wide alliance of student
councils within the state university, filed a
complaint for Malversation of Public Funds
and Property with the Office of the
Ombudsman .
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due
investigation, found probable cause to indict
Serana and her brother Jade Ian D. Sera for
Estafa. Serana moved to quash the
information. She claimed that Sandiganbayan
does not have any jurisdiction over the
offense charged or over her person, in her
capacity as UP student regent. She claimed
that R.A. No. 3019 as amended by R.A. No.
8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses
over which the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction. Sandigandbayan denied her
motion for lack of merit. Serana filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied
with finality.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over an estafa case?
HELD: Section 4(B) of P.D. 1606 which
defines the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan: Other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection A of this
section in relation to their office. While the first part
of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary
Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically
includes other executive officials whose positions
may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who
are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the said court.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction
that statutes should receive a sensible construction
so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute
must be expounded by reference to each other in
order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the
legislature. Evidently, from the provisions of Section
4(B) of P.D. No.
jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public
officials in relation to their office. Plainly, estafa is
one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply
subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense
is committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in
relation to their office.(2) Petitioner falls under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even if she does
not have a salary grade 27, as she is placed thereby
express provision of law. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D.
No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this
category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the
BOR performs function similar to those of a board of
trustees of a non-stock corporation.
By express mandate of law, petitioner is,
indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No.
1606.
CASE NO. 2
Facts:
Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Comptrollership of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines. Atty. Maria Olivia Roxas, Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the Field
Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman,
after due investigation, filed a complaint against
Garcia for violation of: 1) Section 8 of R.A. No.
6713(Code of Conduct of Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees); 2) Article 183, of the
Revised Penal Code; 3) Section 5 2(a)(1), (3) & (20)
of the Civil Service Law.
The wife and three sons were impleaded for
violation of R.A. No. 1379 (An act declaring forfeiture
in favor of the state any property found to have
been unlawfully acquired by any public officer or
employee and providing for the proceedings
therefor) insofar as they acted as conspirators,
conduits, dummies and fronts of petitioner in
receiving, accumulating, using and disposing of ill-
gotten wealth.
Also, a Petition with Verified Urgent Ex Parte
Application for the Issuance of A Writ Of Preliminary
Attachment was filed by Ombudsman before the
Sandiganbayan against Garcia, his wife and three
sons. The Ombudsman, after conducting inquiry
(similar to Preliminary Investigation) has determined
a prima facie case exists against Garcia since during
his incumbency as a soldier and public officer he
acquired huge amounts of money and properties
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such
public officer and his other lawful income.
Petitioner (as respondent a quo) filed a Motion to
Dismiss in Civil Case No. 0193 on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over forfeiture
proceedings under R.A. No. 1379 (civil action). On
the same day, petitioner filed the present Petition,
raising the same issue of lack jurisdiction on the part
of the Sandiganbayan.
Garcia argued in his Petition that the Sandiganbayan
is without jurisdiction over the civil action for
forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under
R.A. No. 1379, maintaining that such jurisdiction
actually resides in the Regional Trial Courts as
provided under Sec. 29 of the law, and that the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in civil actions
pertains only to separate actions for recovery of
unlawfully acquired property against President
Marcos, his family, and cronies as can be gleaned
from Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as
amended, and Executive Orders (E.O.) Nos. 1411and
14-A.
In their Comment, the Sandiganbayan submitted the
contrary, noting that the issue has been settled in
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan17 which ruled that
there is no issue that jurisdiction over violations of
[R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379 now rests with the
Sandiganbayan. They argued that under the
Constitution and prevailing statutes, the
Sandiganbayan is vested with authority and
jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture under R.A.
No. 1379 filed against petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379.
Held:
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. The seminal
decision of Republic v. Sandiganbayan squarely rules
on the issues raised by petitioner concerning the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the authority
of the Office of the Ombudsman. After reviewing the
legislative history of the Sandiganbayan and the
Office of the Ombudsman, the Court therein
resolved the question of jurisdiction by the
Sandiganbayan over violations of R.A. No. 3019 and
R.A. No. 1379. Originally, it was the Solicitor General
who was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings
before the then Court of First Instance of the city or
province where the public officer or employee
resides or holds office, pursuant to Sec. 2 of R.A. No.
1379. Upon the creation of the Sandiganbayan
pursuant to P.D. No. 1486, original and exclusive
jurisdiction over such violations was vested in the
said court. P.D. No. 1606 was later issued expressly
repealing P.D. No. 1486, as well as modifying the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by removing its
jurisdiction over civil actions brought in connection
with crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of said
court. Such civil actions removed from the
jurisdiction of the Sandigabayan include those for
restitution or reparation of damages, recovery of
instruments and effects of the crime, civil actions
under Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil Code, and
forfeiture proceedings provided for under R.A. No.
1379.
In the face of the prevailing jurisprudence and the
present state of statutory law on the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, petitioners argumentthat the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the petition
for forfeiture since it is civil in nature collapses
completely. The civil nature of an action for
forfeiture was first recognized inRepublic v.
Sandiganbayan, thus: [T]he rule is settled that
forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and,
therefore, civil in nature. It is logically congruent
that violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even though the
proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of
the illegally acquired property amounts to a penalty.
Petitioner should abandon his erroneous belief that
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over
petitions for forfeiture filed against President
Marcos, his family and cronies.
CASE NO. 3
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124644. February 5, 2004]
ARNEL ESCOBAL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of
the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez,
Executive Clerk of Court IV of the Sandiganbayan,
Hon. David C. Naval, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 21, Luz N.
Nueca, respondents.
FACTS:
Escobal is a graduate of the Phil Military Academy,
member of AFP and Phil Constabulary, and
Intelligence Group of the PNP.
While conducting surveillance operations on drug
trafficking at a restaurant in Naga City, he got
involved in a shooting incident resulting in death of
Rodney Nueca.
Amended information was filed with RTC charging
Escobal and Jun Bombita with murder. Escobal was
arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by
RTC.
After arraignment, Escobal filed a Motion to Quash
the Information alleging that as mandated by
Commonwealth Act No. 408, in relation to Sec 1, PD
1822 and Sec 95 of RA 6975, the court martial, not
the RTC has jurisdiction over criminal cases involving
PNP members and officers.
Escobal filed a Motion to Dismiss the case arguing
that since he committed the crime in the
performance of his duties, Sandiganbayan had
exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
RTC issued an Order declaring that EScobal
committed the crime charged while not in the
performance of his official function. It also added
that upon enactment of RA 7975, the issue had been
moot and academic. The amendatory law
transferred the jurisdiction over the offense charged
from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC since the
petitioner did not have a salary grade of 27.
The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution
to amend the Information to include allegation that
the offense charged was not committed by the
petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions,
nor in relation to his office. Escobal filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said order and asserted that
RTC failed to consider exceptions to the prohibition
and asserted further that RA 7975 could not be
applied retroactively.
RTC reversed and set aside its Order declaring that
Escobal was on official mission when the shooting
occurred and ordered public prosecutor to Re-Amend
the Information and transmit the records to
Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayan ordered the return of criminal
records to RTC for the reason that RTC retained
jurisdiction over the case, considering Escobal has a
salary grade of 23. The prosecution had already
rested its case and Escobal had commenced
presenting his evidence in RTC, following the rule on
continuity of jurisdiction, RTC should continue with
the case.
ISSUE: Whether RTC has jurisdiction over offense
committed by a public official with a salary grade of
23.
HELD: Yes. RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the
crime charged.
For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction
over crimes committed by public officers in relation
to their office, it is essential that the facts showing
the intimate relation between the office of the
offender and the discharge of official duties must be
alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely
allege in the Information that the crime charged was
committed by the offender in relation to his office
because that would be a conclusion of law.
Under the law, even if the offender committed the
crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a
position corresponding to a salary grade below 27,
the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial
Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner
was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade 23.
He was charged with homicide punishable
by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive
jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to
Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law which
may be applied retroactively.
Petition is DISMISSED.
CASE NO. 4
People of the Philippines vs. Henry T. Go
Ponente: Peralta, J.
Nature: Petition for review on Certiorari assailing
the Resolution of the Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan (SB) which quash the information
filed against herein respondent for alleged violation
of section 03 (g) of R.A 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Doctrine:
The death of one of two or more conspirators does
not prevent the conviction of the survivor or
survivors.Indeed, it is not necessary to join all
alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for
conspiracy. If two or more persons enter into a
conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to
the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of
each of them and they are jointly responsible
therefore. This means that everything said, written
or done by any of the conspirators in execution or
furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to
have been said, done, or written by each of them
and it makes no difference whether the actual actor
is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial.
The death of one of two or more conspirators does
not prevent the conviction of the survivor or
survivors. Thus, this court held that .....conspiracy is
in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot
conspire alone. The crime depends upon the joint
act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not
follow that one person cannot be convicted of
conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-
conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge
for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty
of the offense.
The avowed policy of the state and the legislative
intent to repress acts of public officers and private
persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt
practices, would be frustrated if the death of a
public officer would bar the prosecution of a private
person who conspired with such public officer in
violating the Anti Graft Law.The court agrees with
petitioner that the avowed policy of the state and
the legislative intent to repress acts of public
officers and private persons alike, which constitute
graft or corrupt practices, would be frustrated if
the death of a public officer would bar the
prosecution of a private person who conspired with
such public officer in violating the Anti- Graft Law.
FACTS:
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause
to indict, among others, respondent Henry Go for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there
was
likewise a finding of probable cause against
Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because
he died
prior to the issuance of the resolution finding
probable cause. The prosecution was given a period
of ten
(10) days within which to show cause why this case
should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused considering that the
accused is a private person and the public official
Arturo
Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already
deceased, and not an accused in this case. The
prosecution
complied with the above Order contending that the
SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person
of respondent by reason of his voluntary
appearance, when he filed a motion for
consolidation and when he posted bail. The
prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive
jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a
private person, because he was alleged to have
conspired with a public officer. The respondent filed
a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him
contending that, independently of the deceased
Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he
was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is
not a public officer nor was capacitated by any
official authority as a government agent, may not be
prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
The Sandiganbayan granted the Motion to quash
and dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the person of the respondent Go, despite him
being a private individual?
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the
affirmative. Settled is the rule that private persons,
when
acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be
indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the
pertinent
offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in
consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft
law to
repress certain acts of public officers and private
persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices
act or which may lead thereto. The only question
that needs to be settled in the present petition is
whether herein respondent, a private person, may
be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he
was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the
filing of the Information. Respondent contends that
by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is
no public officer who was charged in the Information
and, as such, prosecution against respondent may
not prosper. It is true that by reason of Secretary
Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer
with whom respondent can be charged for violation
of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the
allegation of conspiracy between them can no
longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is
already expunged. The only thing extinguished by
the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability.
His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it
remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy
between him and private respondent. The
requirement before a private person may be indicted
for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among
others, is that such private person must be alleged
to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The
law, however, does not require that such person
must, in all instances, be indicted together with the
public officer. If circumstances exist where the public
officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the
present case where the public officer has already
died, the private person may be indicted alone.
CASE NO. 5
RAMISCAL JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
In 1998, the Senate Committees on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation
(Blue Ribbon) and on National Defense and Security
(collectively, Senate Blue Ribbon Committee) carried
out an extensive joint inquiry into the "coup rumors
and the alleged anomalies" in the Armed Forces of
the Philippines-Philippine Retirement Benefits
Systems (AFP-RSBS). In its Report, the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee outlined, among others, the
anomalies in the acquisition of lots in Tanauan,
Batangas, Calamba, Laguna and Iloilo City by the
AFP-RSBS, and described the modus operandi of the
perpetrators as follows:
The modus operandi in the buying of the lots was to
cover the same transactions with two deeds of sale.
One deed of sale would be signed only by the seller
or sellers (unilateral deed). Another deed of sale
would be signed by the seller or sellers and the
buyer, AFP-RSBS (bilateral deed). These Unilateral
Deeds of Sale recorded lower consideration paid by
the System to the buyer(s) than those stated in the
Bilateral Deeds. The motivation was obviously to
evade payment of the correct taxes to the
government and save money for the seller(s),
broker(s) and who knows, probably even for the
kickbacks going to certain officials of RSBS, the
buyer.
Pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee to "prosecute and/or cause the
prosecution of Gen. Jose Ramiscal Jr. (Ret), past AFP-
RSBS President, who had signed the unregistered
deeds of sale covering the acquisition of certain
parcels of land," Ombudsman Investigators
conducted a fact-finding investigation. They
executed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint, stating that
based on their findings, B/Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr.,
among others, may be charged with falsification of
public documents and violation of Section 3(e) and
(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019.
ISSUE:
Whether private individuals can participate in
the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan..
HELD:
Parties, like the private respondents herein,
may, likewise, enter their appearance as offended
parties and participate in criminal proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan.The respondent law firm
entered its appearance as private prosecutor.
The petitioner avers that the crimes charged are
public offenses and, by their very nature, do not give
rise to criminal liabilities in favor of any private
party.
He contends that the Information in for
falsification of public document under paragraph 4,
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, do not
contain any allegation that the AGFOI or any private
party sustained any damage caused by the said
falsifications. The petitioner further argues that
absent any civil liability arising from the crimes
charged in favor of AGFOI, the latter cannot be
considered the offended party entitled to participate
in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
According to the petitioner, this view conforms to
Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure,
The court agreed with the contention of the
petitioner that the AGFOI, and even Commodore
Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, are not the offended
parties envisaged in Section 16, Rule 110, in relation
to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules, all
criminal actions covered by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direct
supervision and control of the public prosecutor.
Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of the
accused result in damage or injury to another, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability based on
the said criminal acts is impliedly instituted and the
offended party has not waived the civil action,
reserved the right to institute it separately or
instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action,
the prosecution of the action inclusive of the civil
action remains under the control and supervision of
the public prosecutor. The prosecution of offenses is
a public function.
Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the offended party may
intervene in the criminal action personally or by
counsel, who will act as private prosecutor for the
protection of his interests and in the interest of the
speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A
separate action for the purpose would only prove to
be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both
parties and further delay the final disposition of the
case. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With
the implied institution of the civil action in the
criminal action, the two actions are merged into one
composite proceeding, with the criminal action
predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the
criminal action is to punish the offender in order to
deter him and others from committing the same or
similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform
and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain
social order.
On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil
action is for the resolution, reparation or
indemnification of the private offended party for the
damage or injury he sustained by reason of the
delictual or felonious act of the accused.
The offended party may be the State or any of
its instrumentalities, including local governments or
government-owned or controlled corporations, such
as the AFP-RSBS, which, under substantive laws, are
entitled to restitution of their properties or funds,
reparation, or indemnification.
CASE NO. 6
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PHOTOKINA
MARKETING CORPORATION
VS.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO
Two (2) consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari filed under Rules 45 and 122 of the Rules
of Court:
G.R. No. 154473
Facts:
Respondent, Alfredo L. BENIPAYO, then Chairman of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), delivered a
speech in the Forum on Electoral Problems held at
Quezon City and this was subsequently published in
the issues of the Manila Bulletin. Petitioner,
PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, believing
that it was the one alluded to by the respondent in
his speech filed an Affidavit-Complaint for libel.
Arguing that he was an impeachable officer,
respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP-QC).
Despite the challenge, the City Prosecutor filed an
Information for libel against the respondent,
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407.
Petitioner further moved that the case be ordered
consolidated with the other libel case [Criminal Case
No. Q-02-103406, which is the subject of G.R. No.
155573] pending with RTC.
Respondent, for his part, moved for the dismissal of
the case on the assertion that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over his person for he was an
impeachable officer and thus, could not be
criminally prosecuted before any court during his
incumbency; and that, assuming he can be
criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the
Ombudsman that should investigate him and the
case should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.
The trial court issued the challenged Order
dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407 and it
ruled that the case had to be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction considering that the alleged libel was
committed by respondent in relation to his office he
delivered the speech in his official capacity as
COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it was the
Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the case to
the exclusion of all other courts.
Petitioners filed before the Court, on pure questions
of law, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
G.R. No. 155573
Respondent, as COMELEC Chair, delivered a
statement as a guest of the talk show televised
nationwide on the ANC-23 channel.
Petitioner, corporation, considered respondents
statement as defamatory, filed a Complaint-Affidavit
for libel. Respondent similarly questioned the
jurisdiction of the OCP-QC. The City Prosecutor,
however, consequently instituted Criminal Case No.
Q-02-109406 by filing the corresponding Information
with the RTC of Quezon City.
Respondent also moved for the dismissal of the
information raising similar arguments that the court
had no jurisdiction over his person, he being an
impeachable officer; and that, even if criminal
prosecution were possible, jurisdiction rested with
the Sandiganbayan.
The trial court issued the assailed Order dismissing
Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406 for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. The
RTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Displeased with the rulings of the trial court,
petitioners filed before this Court, on pure questions
of law, another Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
IT HAD NO JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE.
Ruling:
Yes. Petitions for review on certiorari are GRANTED.
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Republic Act No. 4363, is explicit on
which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written
defamations, thus:
The criminal and civil action for damages in
cases of written defamations as provided for in this
chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately
with the court of first instance [now, the Regional
Trial Court] of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published or
where any of the offended parties actually resides at
the time of the commission of the offense.
A subsequent enactment of a law defining the
jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply override, in
the absence of an express repeal or modification,
the specific provision in the RPC vesting in the RTC,
as aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations in writing
or by similar means. The grant to the
Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over offenses
committed in relation to public office , similar to the
expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not
divest the RTC of its exclusive and original
jurisdiction to try written defamation cases
regardless of whether the offense is committed in
relation to office.
CASE NO. 7
PANFILO LACSON v. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
G.R. No. 128096; 20 January 1999
Facts:
Eleven (11) persons believed to be members
of the Kuratong Baleleng, an organized crime
syndicate, were killed by the elements of Anti-Bank
Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Said
group was composed of several police units
including the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission
Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by herein
petitioner. Consequently, a police from the Central
Investigation Command (CIC), another unit
belonging to ABRITG, stated that what transpired
between the ABRITG and the gang members was a
summary execution. This led to the investigation of
the incident, finding that said encounter was a
legitimate police operation.
However, the review board modified the
findings and recommended for the indictment for
multiple murder against all of the respondents of the
case, including herein petitioner. Information for
murder were filed against the same before the
Sandiganbayan. The Ombudsman then filed an
amended information to the Sandiganbayan,
charging herein petitioner only as an accessory.
The petitioner then moved to question the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, contending that
since the amended information only charged him as
an accessory, his case would thereby fall within the
Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction. Petitioner asserted
that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is limited
only to cases where one or more of the principal
accused who are government officials with Salary
Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of
Chief Superintendent or higher. When the
Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information,
it ordered for the case to be transferred to the RTC
of Quezon City.
Consequently, while the case was pending to
be resolved, a law was passed defining and
expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (RA
8249), removing the word principal from principal
accused in Section 2 of RA 7975 (Old
Sandiganbayan Law). Aggrieved, petitioner
challenged the constitutionality of the law and
argued that it is prejudicial to his cause considering
that the law shall apply to all cases pending in any
court over which a trial has not begun.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction to try and decide the case.
HELD:
Yes. Sandiganbayan has the exclusive
original jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan also covers the
felonies committed by public officials and employees
in relation to their office. Since herein petitioner was
charged with murder, what determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is the official
position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is
one of those officers enumerated in the law. The
provisions of RA 7975 (Old Sandiganbayan Law) do
not make any preference to the criminal
participation of the accused public officer as to
whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice, or
accessory. In effect, the Congress, in enacting RA
8249 (New Sandiganbayan Law), did not mention
the criminal participation of the public officer as a
requisite to determine jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
CASE NO. 8
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU (in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court,
NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The Honorable FRANKLIN
DRILON (in his capacity as Secretary of Justice),
JOVENCITO R. ZUO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB, CARLOS
L. DE LEON, RAMONCITO C. MISON, REYNALDO J.
LUGTU, and RODRIGO P. LORENZO, the last six
respondents in their official capacities as members
of the State Prosecutor's Office), respondents.
FACTS:
Prosecutors filed with RTC Laguna 7 informations
charging Mayor Antonio Sanchez, Luis Corcolon,
Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr.,
George Medialdea and Zoilo Ama with the rape and
killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and killing of Allan
Gomez.
SC transferred the venue of the cases to RTC Pasig
after the Secretary of Justice expressed his
apprehension that the trial of said cases might result
in a miscarriage of justice because of the tense and
partisan atmosphere in Laguna in favour of Sanchez
and the relationship of an employee of the trial court
in one of the accused.
Sanchez argued that since most of the accused were
incumbent public officials or employees at the time
of the alleged commission of the crimes, the cases
against them should come under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan and not of the regular courts.
ISSUE:
Whether Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
offense committed by Sanchez as he is a public
officer.
HELD:
No. The case should be tried by the RTC and not
Sandiganbayan. Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No,
1606, as amended by P.D. No.1861, provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan
shall exercise:
a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code:
(2) Other offenses or felonies
committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in
government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes, where
the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a
fine of P6,000.00. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
The crime of rape with homicide with which the
petitioner stands charged obviously does not fall
under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and
corruption cases. Neither is it covered by paragraph
(2) because it is not an offense committed in relation
to the office of the petitioner.
There is no direct relation between the commission
of the crime of rape with homicide and the
petitioner's office as municipal mayor because
public office is not an essential element of the crime
charged. The offense can stand independently of the
office. Moreover, it is not even alleged in the
information that the commission of the crime
charged was intimately connected with the
performance of the petitioner's official functions.
We have read the informations in the case at bar
and find no allegation therein that the crime of rape
with homicide imputed to the petitioner was
connected with the discharge of his functions as
municipal mayor or that there is an "intimate
connection" between the offense and his office. It
follows that the said crime, being an ordinary
offense, is triable by the regular courts and not the
Sandiganbayan.
The petition is DISMISSED. The respondent judge is
DIRECTED to continue with the trial of Criminal
Cases Nos. 101141, 101142, 101143, 101144,
101145, 101146 and 101147 and to decide them
with deliberate dispatch.
CASE NO. 9
Serana vs Sandiganbayan
542 SCRA
Facts: Accused movant charged for the crime of
estafa is a government scholar and a student regent
of the University of the Phillipines, Diliman, Quezon
City. While in the performance of her official
functions, she represented to former President
Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of
the UP will be renovated and renamed as Pres.
Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall and for which
purpose accused requested the amount of
P15,000,000.00.
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over her person because as a UP student
regent, she was not a public officer due to the
following: 1.) that being merely a member in
representation of the student body since she merely
represented her peers; 2.) that she was a simple
student and did not receive any salary as a UP
student regent; and 3.) she does not fall under
Salary Grade 27.
The Ombudsman contends that petitioner, as a
member of the BOR is a public officer, since she had
the general powers of administration and exercise
the corporate powers of UP. Compensation is not an
essential part of public office.
Moreover, the Charter of the University of the
Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to
which accused-movant belongs, exclusively
exercises the general powers of administration and
corporate powers in the university. It is well-
established in corporation law that the corporation
can act only through its board of directors, or board
of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations.
Issue: WON a government scholar and UP student
regent is a public officer.
Held: Yes.
First, Public office is the right, authority, and duty
created and conferred by law, by which for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercise by him
for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer. (Laurel vs Desierto)
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the
public office. An investment in an individual of some
portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit
of the public makes one a public officer.
Second, Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly
vest the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Hence, it is not only the salary grade
that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR
performs functions similar to those of a board of
trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express
mandate of law, petitioner is a public officer as
contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Third, it is well established that compensation is not
an essential element of public office. At most, it is
merely incidental to the public office.
Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by express
mandate of P.D.No. 1606 and jurisprudence.
CASE NO. 10
Disini Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice, Feb. 18,
2014, 716 SCRA
Facts:
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional
and void.
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and
use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer,
a person can connect to the internet, a system that
links him to other computers and enable him,
among other things, to:
1.Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all
kinds of information that he needs for research,
study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity;
2.Post billboard-like notices or messages, including
pictures and videos, for the general public or for
special audiences like associates, classmates, or
friends and read postings from them;
3.Advertise and promote goods or services and
make purchases and payments;
4.Inquire and do business with institutional entities
like government agencies, banks, stock exchanges,
trade houses, credit card companies, public utilities,
hospitals, and schools; and
5.Communicate in writing or by voice with any
person through his e-mail address or telephone.
This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates
millions and billions of simultaneous and ongoing
individual accesses to and uses of the internet. The
cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current
generation for greater information and facility of
communication. But all is not well with the system
since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill
will who would want to use cyberspace technology
for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for
instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin
the reputation of another or bully the latter by
posting defamatory statements against him that
people can read.
And because linking with the internet opens up a
user to communications from others, the ill-
motivated can use the cyberspace for committing
theft by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his
bank account or credit card or defrauding him
through false representations. The wicked can use
the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for
exposing to pornography guileless children who
have access to the internet. For this reason, the
government has a legitimate right to regulate the
use of cyberspace and contain and punish
wrongdoings.
Notably, there are also those who would want, like
vandals, to wreak or cause havoc to the computer
systems and networks of indispensable or highly
useful institutions as well as to the laptop or
computer programs and memories of innocent
individuals. They accomplish this by sending
electronic viruses or virtual dynamites that destroy
those computer systems, networks, programs, and
memories. The government certainly has the duty
and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from
happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the
Cybercrime Prevention Act.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the
cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights. The government of course
asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put
order into cyberspace activities, punish
wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the
system.
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues
presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013 the
Court extended the original 120-day temporary
restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on
October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent government
agencies from implementing the cybercrime law
until further orders
Issue:
Whether RTC has jurisdiction of Cybercrime law?
Held:
The designation of special cybercrime courts of
course is not outside our power to undertake:
Section 21 of the Cybercrime Law grants the
Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over any violation
of the Cybercrime Law, and provides that special
cybercrime courts manned by specially trained
judges should be designated. Section 5, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand,
empowers this Court to promulgate rules on the
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.
*Military Court Jurisdiction:
Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 lays down the general
rule that members of the AFP and other persons
subject to military law who commit crimes or
offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code
(like coup detat), other special penal laws, or local
ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court,
except that, where the civil court, before
arraignment, has determined the offense to be
service-connected, then the offending soldier shall
be tried by a court martial, and with the further
exception that, where the President, in the interest
of justice, directs before arraignment that any such
crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or
offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles
54 to 70, Articles 70 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of
Commonwealth Act No, 408, as amended.
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses,
the court-martial may take into consideration the
penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal
Code, other special penal laws, or local government
ordinances.
CASE NO. 11
G.R. No. 178607: December 5, 2012
DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, in his capacity as President and
representative of UNLAD SHIPPING & MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HON. EDWIN
SORONGON (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 214 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City), SOCRATES ANTZOULATOS,
CARMEN ALAMIL, MARCELl GAZA and MARKOS A
VGOUSTIS, Respondents.
JUSTICE BRION
FACTS:
Dante Jimenez is the president of Unlad
Shipping & Management Corporation a local
manning agency while the private respondents are
some of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime
Services another local maritime agency. On August
19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong City against the respondents for
syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment. The
petitioner alleged that the respondents falsely
represented their stockholdings in TMSIs articles of
incorporation to secure a license to operate as a
recruitment agency from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA). On October 9, 2003,
respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their joint
counter-affidavit denying the complaint-affidavits
allegations. While Avgoustis and Alamil did not
submit any counter-affidavit. In May 4, 2004 the 3rd
Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the filing of
an information for syndicated and large scale illegal
recruitment against the respondents. The City
Prosecutor approved his recommendation and filed
the corresponding criminal information with the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City presided by
Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali. Subsequently, the
city prosecutor reexamined the case and filed a
motion with RTC to withdraw the information and the
respondents file their opposition and comments. an
August 1, 2005 resolution, the RTC denied the
motion to withdraw information as it found the
existence of probable cause to hold the respondents
for trial. Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of
warrants of arrest against the respondents, the
respondents appeal and was denied by the RTC, on
the ground that the court is the sole judge whether
or not a criminal case should be dismissed. Having
the said decision, the respondent filed for motion for
reconsideration and inhibition of Judge Capco-Umali,
for being biased or partial. In a January 4, 2006
order, Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited
herself from the case and did not resolve respondent
Alamils motion for reconsideration and the
petitioners motion to expunge.
The case was later re-raffled to
Branch 214, presided by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon.
The Regional Trial Court was dismissed and the
warrants was set aside for lack of probable cause.
On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for
reconsideration, stressing the existence of probable
cause to prosecute the respondents and that
respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any relief
from the RTC. While the CA in its August 7, 2006
joint order, the RTC denied the petitioners notice of
appeal since the petitioner filed it without the
conformity of the Solicitor General, who is mandated
to represent the People of the Philippines in criminal
actions appealed to the CA. Thus, the RTC ordered
the notice of appeal expunged from the records.
October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to
the CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing
the RTCs March 8, 2006, May 10, 2006, and August
7, 2006 orders. The CA Ruling its November 23,
2006 resolution, the CA dismissed outright the
petitioners Rule 65 petition for lack of legal
personality to file the petition on behalf of the
People of the Philippines. It noted that only the
Office of the Solicitor General has the legal
personality to represent the People, under Section
35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code. Petitioner was not the real
party in interest to institute the case, him not being
a victim of the crime charged to the respondents,
but a mere competitor in their recruitment business.
Denied the MR that followed. Petitioner: He has a
legal standing to assail the dismissal of the criminal
case since he is the private complainant and a real
party in interest who had been directly damaged
and prejudiced by the respondents illegal acts;
Alamil has no legal standing to seek any relief from
the RTC since she is a fugitive from justice.
Respondents: lacks a legal standing since the power
to prosecute lies solely with the State, acting
through a public prosecutor; Petitioner acted
independently and without the authority of a public
prosecutor in the prosecution and appeal of the
case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has legal personality
in assailing the dismissal of the case?
HELD: NO, the petitioner has no legal standing, in a
criminal case the party interest is the people of the
Philippines. As a rule "every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest," "who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party
entitled to the avails of the suit." "All criminal
actions commenced by complaint or by information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control
of a public prosecutor." In appeals of criminal cases
before the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the
appellate counsel of the People (Section 35(1),
Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code) SEC. 35. Powers and
Functions. The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall
have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and
its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in
all civil actions and special proceedings in
which the Government or any officer thereof
in his official capacity is a party.
The People is the real party in interest in a
criminal case and only the OSG can represent the
People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or
in this Court. As an exception is when the offended
party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action
on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due
process).
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal.
The twin resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.
CASE NO. 12
G.R. No. 175602 February 13, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN
VALDEZ, Accused-Appellants
FACTS:
The two accused were tried for three counts of
murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86,
in Quezon City. On January 20, 2005, after trial, the
RTC convicted them as charged, prescribed on each
of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count, and ordered them to pay to the heirs of each
victim actual damages, moral damages and civil
indemnity.
The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC.
The two accused then came to the Court on final
appeal, but on May 9, 2007, Edwin Valdez filed
a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court
granted on October 10, 2007, thereby deeming
Edwins appeal closed and terminated.1
On January 18, 2012, the Court promulgated its
judgment on the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez,
finding him guilty of three counts of homicide,
instead of three counts of murder, and meting on
him for each count of homicide the indeterminate
sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum
to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum,
Subsequently, Edwin sent to the Court Administrator
a self-explanatory letter3 dated March 12, 2012,
where he pleaded for the application to him of the
judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 on the
ground that the judgment would be beneficial to him
as an accused. He impleads favorable Humanitarian
consideration on his letter.
The Solicitor General interposed no opposition to the
plea.
The court granted the plea for reduction of Edwins
sentences. The final judgment downgraded the
crimes committed by Eduardo from three counts of
murder to three counts of homicide.
ISSUE: W/N the downgrading of Edwins sentence
was proper.
HELD:
The testimonial accounts of the States witnesses
entirely jibed with the physical evidence.
As to the matter of procedure, it is unavoidable for
the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three
homicides, instead of three murders, on account of
the informations not sufficiently alleging the
attendance of treachery.
It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of
the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the information, or from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, which are mere conclusions of law,
but by the actual recital of facts in the
The use of the gun as an instrument to kill was
not per se treachery, for there are other instruments
that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did
the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient
averment, for that term, standing alone, was
nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of
a fact.
The requirement of sufficient factual averments is
meant to inform the accused of the nature and
cause of the charge against him in order to enable
him to prepare his defense. This requirement
accords with the presumption of innocence in his
favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to
have no independent knowledge of the details of the
crime he is being charged with. To have the facts
stated in the body of the information determine the
crime of which he stands charged and for which he
must be tried thoroughly accords with common
sense and with the requirements of plain
The downgrading of the crimes committed would
definitely be favorable to him based on Section
11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
Although it is only appellant who persisted with the
present appeal, the well-established rule is that an
appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole
case open for review of all its aspects, including
those not raised by the parties. The records show
that Rodriguez had withdrawn his appeal due to
financial reasons. However, Section 11 (a) of Rule
122 of the Rules of Court provides that "an appeal
taken by one or more of several accused shall not
affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as
the judgment of the appellant court is favorable and
applicable to the latter." As we have elucidated, the
evidence against and the conviction of both
appellant and Rodriguez are inextricably linked.
Hence, appellants acquittal, which is favorable and
applicable to Rodriguez, should benefit the latter.
In People v. Arondain, the Court found accused
Arondain guilty only of homicide.1wphi1 Such
verdict was applied to his co-accused, Jose Precioso,
who was previously found guilty by the trial court of
robbery with homicide, despite the fact that Precioso
appealed but failed to file an appellants brief. The
Court also modified Preciosos civil liability although
the additional monetary award imposed on Arondain
was not extended to Precioso since it was not
favorable to him and he did not pursue the appeal
before the Court.
Accordingly, the court grants the plea of Edwin
Valdez.
CASE NO. 13
Miguel vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 172035
FACTS:
Vice Mayor and other local officials of Koronadal
City, South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman)
charging the petitioner, Fernando Miguel, with
violation of R.A. No. 3019, in connection with the
consultancy services for the proposed Koronadal City
public market.
The Ombudsman directed the petitioner to submit
his counter-affidavit. After moving for an extension,
the petitioner filed his counter-affidavit. Then, the
Ombudsman found probable cause against the
petitioner and some private individuals for violation
of R.A. No. 3019 and against the petitioner alone for
Falsification of Public Document under Article 171,
par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Ombudsman filed the corresponding
Informations with the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a reinvestigation. So,
the petitioner, through counsel, followed suit and
orally moved for a reinvestigation, which the
Sandiganbayan likewise granted. The
Sandiganbayan gave the petitioner ten (10) days
within which to file his counter-affidavit with the OSP.
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, the
petitioner asked the Sandiganbayan for a thirty-day
extension to submit his counter-affidavit. Shortly
before the expiry of the extension requested, the
petitioner asked the OSP for an additional thirty-day
period to file his counter-affidavit. Despite the two
extensions asked and granted, the petitioner asked
the OSP anew for a twenty-day extension period.
Despite the extension period asked and given, the
petitioner failed to file his counter-affidavit,
prompting Prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz to declare
that the petitioner had waived his right to submit
countervailing evidence. Then, Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto approved the resolution.
Prosecutor asked the Sandiganbayan for the
arraignment and trial of the petitioner and of the
other accused private individuals.
After several extensions sought and granted, the
petitioner filed a Motion to Quash and/or
Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against him.
The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners motion
because of the pending OSP reinvestigation this,
despite the OSPs earlier termination of the
reinvestigation for the petitioners continuous failure
to submit his counter-affidavit. The petitioner did
not question the denial of his motion.
The petitioner was arraigned; he pleaded not guilty
in both criminal cases.
The OSP filed a Motion to Suspend [the petitioner]
pendente lite. The petitioner filed his Vigorous
Opposition based on the obvious and fatal defect of
the information.
The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed
resolution suspending the petitioner pendente lite.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration of his
suspension order and demanded for a pre-
suspension hearing. The Sandiganbayan denied his
motion, prompting him to file this certiorari petition
to challenge the validity of his suspension order.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE ABSENCE OF AN ACTUAL PRE-
SUSPENSION HEARING RENDERS INVALID THE
SUSPENSION ORDER AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
RULING:
Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court considered
the opposition of the accused (motion to suspend
pendente lite) as sufficient to dispense with the
need to actually set the prosecutions motion for
hearing.
The same conclusion was reached in Juan v. People,
where the Court ruled:
In the case at bar, while there was no pre-
suspension hearing held to determine the validity of
the Informations that had been filed against
petitioners, we believe that the numerous pleadings
filed for and against them have achieved the goal of
this procedure. The right to due process is satisfied
nor just by an oral hearing but by the filing and the
consideration by the court of the parties' pleadings,
memoranda and other position papers.
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due
process requirement, when an accused public official
is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his
possible defenses against the mandatory suspension
under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no
reason to complain that no actual hearing was
conducted. It is well settled that to be heard does
not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be
heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to
be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of
procedural due process exists.
CASE NO. 14
PEOPLE VS SORIA
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179031
November 14, 2012
FACTS:
On February 26, 2000, AAA and her siblings
enjoyed the spaghetti their father (appellant)
brought home for merienda. After eating, AAA
went to the bedroom to rest. Thereafter, appellant
also entered the room and positioned himself on top
of AAA, took off her clothes and inserted his penis
into her vigina. AAA felt intense pain and thus told
her father that it was painful. At that point, appellant
apologized to his daughter, stood up, and then left
the room. The whole incident was incident was
witnessed by AAAs brother.
The pain persisted until AAAs vagina started to
bleed. She thus told her aunt about it and they
proceeded to a hospital for treatment. Her mother
was also immediately informed of her ordeal.
Subsequently, AAA was taken into the custody of
the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
Appellant denied committing the same. Instead, he
claimed that the filing of the rape case against him
was instigated by his wife, whom he confronted
about her illicit affair with a man residing in there
community.
On June 30, 2005, the trial court rendered its
Judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape against AAA and
sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of
DEATH
On appeal, the Court ruled that while the appellate
court was convinced that appellant raped AAA, it
nevertheless noted the prosecutions failure to
present her birth certificate as competent proof of
her minority. Thus, the CA concluded that the crime
committed by appellant against his daughter was
only simple rape and accordingly modified the
penalty imposed by the trial court from death to
reclusion perpetual and reduced the civil indemnity
awarded from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Trial Court gravely erred in
imposing the death penalty upon the accused
assuming arguendo that he is guilty of the crime
charged.
COURTS RULING:
Yes, the Trial Court gravely erred in imposing the
death penalty upon the accused.
Rape can now be committed either through sexual
intercourse or by sexual assault. Rape under
paragraph 1 of Article 266-A is referred to as rape
through sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge is the
central element and it must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. It is commonly denominated as
organ rape or penile rape and must be attended
by any of the circumstances enumerated in
subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.
On the other hand, rape under paragraph 2 of Article
266-A is commonly known as rape by sexual assault.
The perpetrator, user any of the attendant
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1, commits
this kind of rape by inserting his penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object into the genital or anal orifice of another
person. It is also called instrument or object rape,
also gender-free rape.
The Information in this case did not specify whether
the crime of rape was committed through sexual
intercourse or by sexual assault.
However, based on evidence the Court find
appellant guilty of rape by sexual assault. The Court
ruled that it cannot be denied that appellant
inserted an object into AAAs female organ. AAA The petition seeks to reverse and set aside the RTC-
categorically testified that appellant inserted
something into her vagina. She claimed to have
suffered tremendous pain during the insertion. The
insertion even caused her vagina to bleed
necessitating her examination at the hospital. Both
the trial court and the CA found AAAs testimony to
be credible. The Court find no compelling reason not
to lend credence to the same.
Under Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty for rape
by sexual assault is prison mayor. However, the
penalty is increased to reclusion temporal if the
rape is committed by any of the 10
aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in
this article. The Information alleged the qualifying
circumstances of relationship and minority. It was
alleged that appellants the father of AAA. During
the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated that
AAA is the daughter of appellant. During trial,
appellant admitted his filial bond with AAA.
Admission in open court of relationship has been
held to be sufficient and, hence, conclusive to prove
relationship with the victim.
With respect to minority, however, the Information
described AAA as a 7-year old daughter of
appellant. Her minority must be proved
conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself.
There must be independent evidence proving the
age of the victim, other than the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by
the accused. Documents such as her original or duly
certified birth certificate, baptismal certificate or
school records would suffice as competent evidence
of her age. Here, there was nothing on record to
prove the minority of AAA other than her
testimony, appellant absence of denial, and their
pre-trial stipulation. The prosecution also failed to
establish that the documents referred to above were
lost, destroyed, unavailable or otherwise totally
absent.
It is settled that when either one of the qualifying
circumstances of relationship and minority is
omitted or lacking, that which is pleaded in the
Information and proved by the evidence may be
considered as an aggravating circumstances. As
such, appellants relationship with AAA may be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape by sexual assault and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve years of
person mayor, as minimum, to twenty years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is also ordered
to pay AAA the amount P30,000.00 as indemnity,
P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
CASE NO. 15
Union Bank vs. People, 667 SCRA 113 (G.R. No.
192565)
FACTS:
Makati City decision dismissing the petition
for certiorari of petitioners Union Bank of the
Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi Tomas
(collectively, the petitioners). The RTC found that the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City
(MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion in denying the motion to quash the
information for perjury filed by Tomas.
The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union
Banks two (2) complaints for sum of money with
prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses
Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe.
The first complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-
0717, was filed before the RTC, Branch
109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was
filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC,
Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that
Tomas executed and signed the Certification against
Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of
deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by
falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate
against Forum Shopping in the second complaint
that she did not commence any other action or
proceeding involving the same issue in another
tribunal or agency.
Desi Tomas filed a motion to quash citing that the
Makati MTC has no jurisdiction as the document was
submitted and used in Pasay and that there was no
crime committed as not all of the elements of
perjury was present.
The lower courts denied the motion saying that
Makati has jurisdiction as it was notarized there and
ruled that she was sufficiently charged with perjury.
ISSUE: Whether, in a crime of perjury, the proper
venue is where it was notarized or where it was
used.
HELD: The SC ruled that Makati was the right
venue.
The SC cites Rule 110, Sec. 15 of the Rules of Court
where it was stated that criminal action shall be
instituted where the offense was committed or
where any of its essential elements occurred.
The SC, one-by-one stated the elements of perjury
and provided that Tomas did all things in Makati,
thus making Makati the right venue for the case.
CASE NO. 16
G.R. No. 192123 March 10, 2014
DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist
who has been pronounced guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of
Appeals (CA). He had been part of the team of
anesthesiologists during the surgical pull-through
operation conducted on a three-year old patient
born with an imperforate anus.
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2,
1992 with an imperforate anus. Two days after his
birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical
procedure to bring one end of the large intestine out
through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete
through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his
body.
On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was
admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through
operation. The petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr.
Solidum) was the anesthesioligist. During the
operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and
went into a coma. He regained consciousness only
after a month. He could no longer see, hear or
move.
Agitated by her sons helpless and unexpected
condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint
for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries with the City Prosecutors Office of Manila
against the attending physicians.
Upon a finding of probable cause, the City
Prosecutors Office filed an information solely
against Dr. Solidum.
The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila, but was transferred to the RTC
pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369 (The
Family Courts Act of 1997).
On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment
finding Dr. Solidum guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical
injuries. On January 20, 2010, the CA affirmed the
conviction of Dr. Solidum.
ISSUE(S):
1) whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal
negligence.
2) Wether or not Dr. Solidum was civilly liable
HELD:
1) No
2) No
RATIO:
Issue 1:
Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to
monitor and regulate properly the levels of
anesthesia administered to said Gerald Albert
Gercayo and using 100% halothane and other
anesthetic medications." However, the foregoing
circumstances, taken together, did not prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been
recklessly imprudent in administering the anesthetic
agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertidos findings did
not preclude the probability that other factors
related to Geralds major operation, which could or
could not necessarily be attributed to the
administration of the anesthesia, had caused the
hypoxia and had then led Gerald to experience
bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly concluded in his
report, instead, that "although the anesthesiologist
followed the normal routine and precautionary
procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding side
effects did occur."
The existence of the probability about other factors
causing the hypoxia has engendered in the mind of
the Court a reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidums
guilt, and moves us to acquit him of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical
injuries. "
Issue #2
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum
would not immediately exempt him from civil
liability. But we cannot now find and declare him
civilly liable because the circumstances that have
been established here do not present the factual
and legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal did
not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was
really no firm and competent showing how the injury
to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the
manner of administration of the anesthesia by Dr.
Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the
hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced by
Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly
liable would be to speculate on the cause of the
hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil
liability must not rest on speculation but on
competent evidence.
CASE NO. 17
Castillo vs. Salvador, July 2014
Facts:
The respondent Phillip Salvador and his brother
Ramon Salvador were charged with estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal
Code. The petitioner, Cristina B. Castillo is a
businesswoman who is engaged in real estate
business, educational institution, boutique, and
trading business. Petitioner met respondent through
a common friend in December 2000 and became
close since then. Petitioner eventually met
respondents brother and manager, Ramon Salvador.
She was then enticed by the respondent and his
brother to engage in freight and remittance
business.
As petitioner had deeply fallen in love with
respondent and since she trusted him very much as
he even acted as a father to her children when her
annulment was on-going, she agreed to embark on
the remittance business. In December 2001, they
went to Hong Kong and had the Phillip Salvador
Freight and Remittance International Limited
registered. A Memorandum of Articles of
Incorporation and a Certificate of Incorporation were
issued. She agreed with respondent and Ramon that
any profit derived from the business would be
equally divided among them and that respondent
would be in charge of promotion and marketing in
Hong Kong, while Ramon would take charge of the
operations of business in the Philippines and she
would be financing the business.
The business has not operated yet as petitioner was
still raising the amount of US$100,000.00 as capital
for the actual operation. When petitioner already
had the money, she handed the same to respondent
in May 2002 at her mothers house in Las Pias City,
which was witnessed by her disabled half-brother
Enrico B. Tan. However, the proposed business never
operated. When she asked respondent about the
money and the business, the latter told her that the
money was deposited in a bank. However, upon
further query, respondent confessed that he used
the money to pay for his other obligations. Since
then, the US$100,000.00 was not returned at all.
Respondent testified that he and petitioner became
close friends and eventually fell in love and had an
affair. His defence was that it was the petitioner who
suggested a remittance business upon seeing how
popular he was among the Filipino domestic helpers
when they travelled to Hong Kong and Bangkok. He
denied receiving the US$100,000.00 capital from the
petitioner. He claimed that no remittance business
was started in Hong Kong as they had no license,
equipment, personnel and money to operate the
same.
On April 21, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision
which rendered the accused, Philip Salvador guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and
is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of
prision correctional maximum as minimum to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal maximum as
maximum and to indemnify the private complainant
in the amount of US$100,000.00 or its equivalent in
Philippine currency.
Respondent appealed his conviction to the CA. On
February 11, 2010, the CA rendered its Decision
reversing the decision of the RTC. Petitioner then
files the instant petition on the civil aspect of the
case.
Issue:
Whether the award of damages be retained despite
the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case
Ruling:
No. The award of damages cannot be retained. Our
law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different
effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an
acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission complained of. This
instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person
who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any
act or omission cannot and can never be held liable
for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil
action, if any, which may be instituted must be
based on grounds other than the delict complained
of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule III of
the Rules of Court. The second instance is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of
the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the
accused has not been satisfactorily established, he
is not exempt from civil liability which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is
the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil
Code, where the civil action for damages is for the
same act or omission.
The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the crime as
charged had been committed by appellant, the
general presumption, "that a person is innocent of
the crime or wrong, stands in his favor. The
prosecution failed to prove that all the elements of
estafa are present in this case as would overcome
the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant.
Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt, respondent is not exempt from civil liability
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence
only.
In Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc.,
Preponderance of evidence is defined as the weight,
credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on
either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term "greater weight of the
evidence" or "greater weight of the credible
evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase
which, in the last analysis, means probability of the
truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the
court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.
However, in this case, no such civil liability is proved
even by preponderance of evidence.
Petitioner failed to show how she was able to raise
the money in such a short period of time and even
gave conflicting versions on the source of the same.
She also failed to require respondent to sign a
receipt so she could have a record of the transaction
and offered no plausible reason why the money was
allegedly hand-carried to Hong Kong. Moreover,
petitioners claim of trust as reason for not requiring
respondent to sign a receipt was inconsistent with
the way she conducted her previous transactions
with him and her behavior after the alleged fraud
perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the
actuation of someone who had been swindled.
Thus, the petition for the award of damages is
denied.
CASE NO. 18
G.R. No. 175256
Petitioner: Lily Lim
Respondent: Kuo Co Ping aka Charlie Co
G.R. No. 179160
Petitioner: Kuo Co Ping aka Charlie Co
Respondent: Lily Lim
Facts:
In February 1999, FR Cement Corporation (FRCC),
owner/operator of a cement manufacturing plant,
issued several withdrawal authorities for the account
of cement dealers and traders, Fil-Cement Center
and Tigerbilt. These withdrawal authorities state the
number of bags that the dealer/trader paid for and
can withdraw from the plant. Each withdrawal
authority contained a provision that it is valid for six
months from its date of issuance, unless revoked by
FRCC.
Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their
administrative manager, Gail Borja, sold the
withdrawal authorities covering 50,000 bags of
cement to Co for the amount of P3.15 million or
P63.00 per bag. On February 15, 1999, Co sold these
withdrawal authorities to Lim allegedly at the price
of P64.00 per bag or a total of P3.2 million. Using the
withdrawal authorities, Lim successfully withdrew
2,800 bags of cement, and sold back some of the
withdrawal authorities, covering 10,000 bags, to Co.
In April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw
the remaining 37,200 bags. Lim clarified the matter
with Co and Borja, who explained that the plant
implemented a price increase and would only
release the goods once Lim pays for the price
difference or agrees to receive a lesser quantity of
cement.
After failed demands, Lim filed a criminal case of
Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion
against Co before Branch 154 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City. She alleged that Co with
intent to defraud her, with grave abuse of
confidence, with unfaithfulness, received in trust
P2,380,800.00 as payment for the 37,200 bags of
cement but far from complying with his obligation,
misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his
own personal use and benefit the said amount of
P2,300,800.00 and despite demands, the accused
failed and refused to return said amount. On
November 19, 2003, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch
154, rendered its Order14 acquitting Co of the
estafa charge for insufficiency of evidence as the
first and second elements of the crime of estafa
were not established by the prosecutions evidence.
After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case,
the Pasig City RTC
also relieved Co of civil liability.
On March 14, 2005, Lim filed her notice of appeal on
the civil aspect of the criminal case. Her appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 and raffled to the
Second Division of the CA. On April 19, 2005, Lim
filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages before Branch 21 of the RTC of Manila. The
defendants in the civil case were Co and all other
parties to the withdrawal authorities. Lim asserted
two causes of action: breach of contract and abuse
of rights.
In reaction to the filing of the civil complaint for
specific performance and damages, Co filed motions
to dismiss the said civil case and Lims appeal in the
civil aspect of the estafa case. He maintained that
the two actions raise the same issue, which is Cos
liability to Lim for her inability to withdraw the bags
of cement, and should be dismissed on the ground
of lis pendens and forum shopping. The appellate
court (Second Division) favorably resolved Cos
motion and dismissed Lims appeal from the civil
aspect of the estafa case. It held that the parties,
causes of action, and reliefs prayed for in Lims
appeal and in her civil complaint are
identical. Both actions seek the same relief, which is
the payment of the value of the 37,200 bags of
cement. Thus, the CA Second Division dismissed
Lims appeal for forum shopping Lim filed the instant
petition for review.
Meanwhile, the Manila RTC denied Cos Motion to
Dismiss. The Manila RTC held that there was no
forum shopping because the causes of action
invoked in the two cases are different. It observed
that the civil complaint before it is based on an
obligation arising from contract and quasi-delict,
whereas the civil liability involved in the appeal of
the criminal case arose from a felony.
Co filed a petition for certiorari prayed for the
nullification of the Manila RTCs Order in Civil Case
No. 05-112396 for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion. The CA Seventeenth Division
denied Cos petition and remanded the civil
complaint to the trial court for further proceedings.
The CA Seventeenth Division agreed with the Manila
RTC that the elements of litis pendentia and forum
shopping are not met.
Co filed the instant Petition for Review. Upon Cos
motion, the Court resolved to consolidate the two
petitions.
Issue
Did Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil
case for specific performance and damages during
the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the
criminal case for estafa?
Ruling:
A single act or omission that causes damage to an
offended party may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender (1) civil
liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising
from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil
liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued
independently of the criminal proceedings. The
independent civil liability may be based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, as provided in Article 31
of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or
for tort53). It may also be based on an act or
omission that may constitute felony but,
nevertheless, treated independently from the
criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of
the Civil Code (in cases of defamation, fraud and
physical injuries). The civil liability arising from the
offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or
omissions that constitute the criminal offense;
hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the
criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex
delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal
offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is
instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the
criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until
the final outcome of the criminal action. The civil
liability based on delict is extinguished when the
court hearing the criminal action declares that the
act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist.
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of
the latter.
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves the
obligations arising from contract and from tort
whereas the appeal in the estafa case involves only
the civil obligations of Co arising from the otfense
charged. They present different causes actions,
which. under the law, are considered "separate,
distinct, and independent from each other. Both
cases can proceed to their final adjudication subject
to the prohibition on double recovery under Article
2177 of
Civil Code.
Thus, Lily Lim's petition is granted. The assailed
October 20, 2005 Resolution of the Second Division
of the is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Lily Lim's.
appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 is ordered
REINSTATED and the CA is DIRECTED to RESOLVE
the
same with DELIBERATE DISPATCH.
CASE NO. 19
CAPUSANAN v. LAROYA
collection agent Daphne Parrocho. Ernesto Rodrigues
issued a post-dated check. The check was presented
for payment on October 5, 1989 and was dishonored
for insufficiency of fund while both the accused
cannot be located at that time.
On October 25, 1989, an information was filed
against Romero and Rodriguez at the RTC in Butuan
city for estafa.
On the same day, the city fiscal filed with the same
court another information against the two (2)
accused for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22,
arising from the issuance of the same check. On
January 11, 1990, both accused were arraigned
before the Regional Trial Court, where they pleaded
not guilty to both informations.
On November 13, 1992, the parties submitted a joint
stipulation of facts, signed only by their respective
counsels. Thereafter, the case was submitted for
decision. On March 30, 1993, the trial court
promulgated a Joint Judgment acquitting the
accused for violation of BP 22 and convicting them
for estafa.

GR No. 145391, August 26, 2002 On March 30, 1993, accused filed their notice of
appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, on
November 12, 1997, accused Ernesto Rodriguez
Facts: The vehicle of Capitulo driven by Casupanan and died.
another by Laroya figured an
accident. After the unpleasant incident, the latter filed criminal case against
Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and the
Issue: both
former filed civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict, WONin the deathCircuit
Municipal of Ernesto Rodriguez
Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac. extinguished his criminal and civil liability ex delicto.

Subsequently, Laroya file a Motion to dismiss the civil case. For him, the
presence of the case constitutes forum shopping Ruling:
while Yes.
the Pursuant
civil aspectto the doctrine established in
arising
from delict is pending. For Casupanan, the civil People
case canvs. Bayotas,
proceed the death of the accused
independently
pending
since it is a separate and distinct civil action source appeal
from the Civilof his conviction extinguishes his
Code.
criminal liability as well as the civil liability ex
Issue: delicto. The criminal action is extinguished inasmuch
Whether the civil case filed by Casupanan be dismissed
as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
Held: No. Forum shopping exists if there are multiplicity accused,
of suitsthe
withcivil
sameaction instituted therein for
facts and
recovery
reliefs prayed for. However, it would not be violative of civil
if there is aliability ex delicto is ipso facto
law allowing
separate civil action from the civil aspect pending extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
in criminal case.
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
Here, the civil case should not be dismissed even notwithstanding the death
if there is multiplicity of the accused, if the
of suits.
The civil case filed by Casupanan is supported by the provisions of the Civil on a source of
same may also be predicated
Code referring to quasi-delicts different from obligation
the civil other than
actions delict.
pertaining to
crime.
The Court hereby affirms with modification the
appealed judgment. The Court hereby sentences
accused-appellant Martin Romero to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
CASE NO. 20 maximum, to indemnify Ernesto A. Ruiz in the
amount of one hundred fifty thousand pesos
G.R. No. 112985. April 21, 1999 (P150,000.00) with interest thereon at six (6%) per
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARTIN L. centum per annum from September 14, 1989, until
ROMERO and ERNESTO C. RODRIGUEZ fully paid, to pay twenty thousand pesos
Rule 111- Effect of Death on the Civil Action (P20,000.00) as moral damages and fifteen
thousand pesos (P15,000.00), as exemplary
Facts: damages, and the costs

SAIDECOR started its operation on August 24, 1989

as a marketing business with Martin Romero as the
President and General Manager and Ernesto
Rodriguez as the operations manager. Later, it
engaged in soliciting funds and investments from
the public guaranteeing an 800% return on
investment within fifteen (15) to twenty one (21)
days.
On September 14, 1989, Ernesto A. Ruiz went to
SAIDECOR office in Butuan City to make an
investment handing over P150, 000.00 to SAIDECOR
CASE NO. 21
FRANCISCO MAGESTRADO VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and ELENA M. LIBROJO
(G.R. NO. 148072, JULY 10, 2007)
Facts: Petitioner, Francisco Magestrado loaned a sum
of money from Private Respondent, Elena M. Librojo.
As a security for the said loan, Magestrado executed
a mortgage and surrendered the said title of the
property to Librojo. Private respondent Elena M.
Librojo filed a criminal complaint for perjury against
petitioner, before the MeTC of Quezon City. Alleging
that the petitioner willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and knowingly make an untruthful
statement under oath, Magestrado effected an
Affidavit of Loss before Notary Public falsely
asserting that he lost Owners Duplicate Certificate
of TCT No. N-173163, which document was used in
support of a Petition for Issuance of New Owners
Duplicate Copy of Certificate of Title and filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Petitioner
Magestrado then filed a motion for suspension of
proceedings based on a prejudicial question alleging
that the civil cases for recovery of a sum of money
for cancellation of mortgage, delivery of title and
damages both pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City must be resolved first. On his
contention that since the issues in the said civil
cases are similar or intimately related to the issues
raised in the criminal action. Hence, MeTC issued an
Order denying petitioners motion for suspension of
proceeding, appearing that the resolution of the
issues raised in the civil actions is not determinative
of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The
Petitions for Certiorari filed by the petitioner with
RTC and the CA were dismissed.
Issue: Whether the criminal case should be
suspended pending the outcome of the prejudicial
question of the civil case?
Held: No. The determination of whether the
proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a
prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and
issues raised in the pleading in the civil cases are so
related with the issues raised in the criminal case
such that the resolution of the issue in the civil case
would also determine the judgment in the criminal
case.
In the case at bar, the pending civil cases are
principally for the determination of whether a loan
was obtained by Magestrado from Elena Librojo and
whether the former executed a real estate mortgage
involving the property covered by TCT No. N-
173163. On the other hand, the criminal case
involves the determination of whether petitioner
committed perjury in executing an Affidavit of Loss
to support his request for issuance of a new owners
duplicate copy. It is evident that the civil case and
the criminal case can proceed independently of each
other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil
case, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of
the petitioner in the criminal case for perjury.
CASE NO. 22
Pimentel vs Pimentel
630 SCRA 436
FACTS:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel (private
respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide
against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Joselito received
a summon to appear before the Regional Trial Court
of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil
case for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Joselito then filed an urgent
motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC
Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolution of the action for
annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide against Joselito.
HELD:
The petition has no merit.
Pursuant to Section 7 Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
the elements of prejudicial question are as follows:
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed. The civil case for
the annulment was filed after the filing of the
criminal case for the frustrated parricide, thus,
requirement of the aforementioned rule was not met
as the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing
of the criminal action.
Moreover, the relationship between the offender and
the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide,
which distinguishes it from the crime of murder and
homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of
marriage is not similar or intimately related to the
issue in the criminal case stated. Furthermore, the
relationship between the two is not determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals. It stated that In the criminal case for
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the
offender commenced the commission of the crime of
parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform
all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil
action for annulment of marriage is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations. The Court of
Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between
petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it
would be immaterial to the criminal case because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts
constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had
already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled
that all that is required for the charge of frustrated
parricide is that at the time of the commission of the
crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
CASE NO. 23
G.R. No. 208587, July 29, 2015
JM DOMINGUEZ AGRONOMIC COMPANY, INC., HELEN
D. DAGDAGAN, PATRICK PACIS, KENNETH PACIS, AND
SHIRLEY DOMINGUEZ, Petitioners, v. CECILIA
LICLICAN, NORMA D. ISIP, AND PURITA DOMINGUEZ,
Respondents.
The Facts
During the annual stockholders meeting of
petitioner JM Dominguez Agronomic Company, Inc.
(JMD) held on December 29, 2007 at the Baguio City
Country Club, the election for its new set of directors
was conducted. Conflict ensued when petitioners
Patrick and Kenneth Pacis were allegedly not allowed
to vote on the ground that they are not registered
stockholders of JMD.
Tensions rose and respondents, allegedly, walked
out of the meeting. But since the remaining
stockholders with outstanding shares constituted a
quorum, the election of officers still proceeded,
which yielded the following result:
Officers:
1. Helen D. Dagdagan as President
2. Patrick D. Pacis as Vice-President
3. Kenneth D. Pacis as Secretary
4. Shirley C. Dominguez as Treasurer
After staging the walk-out, respondents, on even
date, executed a Board Resolution certifying that in
the stockholders meeting, the following were elected
directors and officers of JMD.
Board of Directors:
1. Cecilia D. Liclican Chairman and Presiding
Officer
2. Norma D. Isip
3. Purita C. Dominguez
4. Tessie C. Dominguez, and
5. Shirley C. Dominguez
Officers:
1. Cecilia D. Liclican as President and Presiding
Officer
2. Norma D. Isip as Vice-President
3. Gerald B. Cabrera as Corporate
Secretary/Treasurer and Oscar Aquino Financial
Consultant Auditor
In reaction to the foregoing developments,
petitioners Dagdagan, Patrick and Kenneth Pacis,
and Dominguez filed a Complaint against
respondents before the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City (RTC) for nullification of meetings,
election and acts of directors and officers, injunction
and other reliefs, raffled to Branch 59 of the court.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 6623-R, the case, after a
failed mediation, was referred for appropriate
Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) to Branch 7 of the
RTC.
Subsequently, JMD, represented by petitioners
Dagdagan and Patrick Pacis, executed an Affidavit-
Complaint7 dated December 15, 2008 charging
respondents Liclican and Isip with qualified theft.
The criminal cases for qualified theft were then
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 29176-R (based on
I.S. No. 3118) and 29175-R (based on I.S. No. 3111).
On March 10, 2009, the corresponding warrants
were issued for the arrests of Isip and Liclican.
In due time, respondents lodged a petition for
certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No.108617, to annul and set aside the two (2) March
10, 2009 Orders by the RTC Branch 7, anchored,
among others, on the alleged existence of a
prejudicial question. According to respondents,
petitioner stockholders, by filing the complaint-
affidavit, are already assuming that they are the
legitimate directors of JMD, which is the very issue in
the intra-corporate dispute pending in the RTC,
Branch 59.
The appellate court held that Judge Tiongson-Tabora
should have refrained from determining probable
cause since she is well aware of the pendency of the
issue on the validity of JMDs elections in Civil Case
No. 6623-R.
Issue:
Whether or not Civil Case No. 6623-R constituted a
prejudicial question warranting the suspension of
the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and
29176-R.
Ruling
In the case at bar, the CA correctly ruled that Judge
Tiongson-Tabora acted with grave abuse of
discretion when she ordered the arrests of
respondents Isip and Liclican despite the existence
of a prejudicial question.
As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question
generally exists in a situation where a civil action
and a criminal action are both pending, and there
exists in the former an issue that must be pre-
emptively resolved before the latter may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil
action is resolved would be determinative juris et de
jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case.24The rationale behind the principle is
to avoid two conflicting decisions,25and its
existence rests on the concurrence of two essential
elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.26ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Here, the CA aptly observed that Civil Case No.
6623-R, the intra-corporate dispute, posed a
prejudicial question to Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R
and 29176-R. To be sure, Civil Case No. 6623-R
involves the same parties herein, and is for
nullification of JMDs meetings, election and acts of
its directors and officers, among others. Court
intervention was sought to ascertain who between
the two contesting group of officers should rightfully
be seated at the companys helm. Without Civil Case
No. 6623-Rs resolution, petitioners authority to
commence and prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 29175-
R and 29176-R against respondents for qualified
theft in JMDs behalf remained questionable,
warranting the suspension of the criminal
proceedings.
The resolution of the prejudicial question did not, in
context, cure the grave abuse of discretion already
committed. The fact remains that when the RTC,
Branch 7 issued its challenged Orders on March 10,
2009, the Judgment in favor of petitioners was not
yet rendered. Consequently, there was still, at that
time, a real dispute as to who the rightful set of
officers were. Plainly, Judge Tiongson-Tabora should
not have issued the challenged Orders and should
have, instead, suspended the proceedings until Civil
Case No. 6623-R was resolved with finality.
The foregoing notwithstanding, it should be made
clear that the nullification of the March 10, 2009
Orders does not, under the premises, entail the
dismissal of the instituted criminal cases, but would
merely result in the suspension of the proceedings in
view of the prejudicial question.
CASE NO. 24
Fenequito vs. Vergara, Jr., 677 SCRA 113, G.R.
No. 172829 July 18, 2012
Facts:
The present petition arose from a criminal complaint
for falsification of public documents filed by herein
respondent against herein petitioners with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
On February 11, 2004, Information for falsification of
public documents was filed with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by the Assistant City
Prosecutor of Manila against herein petitioners. On
April 23, 2004, herein petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Case Based on Absence of Probable
Cause. After respondents Comment/Opposition4
was filed, the MeTC issued an Order dated July 9,
2004 dismissing the case on the ground of lack of
probable cause.
Aggrieved, respondent, with the express conformity
of the public prosecutor, appealed the case to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
On July 21, 2005, the RTC rendered judgment setting
aside the July 9, 2004 Order of the MeTC and
directing the said court to proceed to trial.
Petitioners then elevated the case to the CA via a
petition for review.
On March 9, 2006, the CA rendered its presently
assailed Resolution dismissing the petition. The CA
ruled that the Decision of the RTC is interlocutory in
nature and, thus, is not appealable.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but
the CA denied it in its Resolution dated May 22,
2006. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Wheter RTCs decision was interlocutory and
can be appealed?
Held: RTCs decision was interlocutory in nature.
As such, it cannot be appealed.
One of the grounds for the CAs outright dismissal of
Fenequito et al.s petition for review was because of
the latters failure to submit copies of pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent to the petition
filed, as required under Section 2, Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court.
It is settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a
natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of
law. An appeal being a purely statutory right, an
appealing party must strictly comply with the
requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. The
rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to
appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilities the
orderly disposition of appealed cases.
But even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the
present petition, the Court still finds no cogent
reason to depart from the assailed ruling of the CA.
This is because Fenequito et al. erroneously
assumed that the RTC Decision is final and
appealable, when in fact it is interlocutory. An order
is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case
completely, but leaves something more to be done
upon its merits. In contrast, a final order is one that
which dispose of the whole subject matter or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what
has been determined.
Granted, the assailed Decision of the RTC set aside
the Order of the MeTC and directed the court a quo
to proceed to trial by allowing the prosecution to
present its evidence. Hence, it is clear that the RTC
Decision is interlocutory as it did not dispose of the
case completely, but left something more to be done
on its merits.
CASE NO. 25
G.R. No. 181021 December 10, 2012
BURGUNDY REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSEFA "JING" C. REYES and SECRETARY RAUL
GONZALEZ of the DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Respondents.
Facts: Private respondent Josefa "Jing" C. Reyes
(Reyes), sometime in 1996, offered her services to
petitioner as the latter's real estate agent in buying
parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, which are to be
developed into a golf course. Convinced of her
representations, petitioner released the amount
of P23,423,327.50 in her favor to be used in buying
those parcels of land. Reyes, instead of buying those
parcels of land, converted and misappropriated the
money given by petitioner to her personal use and
benefit. Petitioner sent a formal demand for Reyes
to return the amount of P23,423,327.50, to no avail
despite her receipt of the said demand. As such,
petitioner filed a complaint for the crime of Estafa
against Reyes before the Assistant City Prosecutor's
Office of Makati City.
After a preliminary investigation was conducted
against Reyes, the Assistant Prosecutor of Makati
City issued a Resolution2 dated April 27, 2005. It is
recommended that respondent be indicted of the
crime of Estafa defined and penalized under the
Revised Penal Code.
Thereafter, an Information for the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) was filed against Reyes and raffled
before the RTC, Branch 149, Makati City. Undeterred,
Reyes filed a petition for review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), but it was dismissed by
the Secretary of Justice through State Prosecutor
Jovencito Zuo on June 1, 2006. Aggrieved, Reyes
filed a motion for reconsideration, and in a
Resolution4 dated July 20, 2006, the said motion was
granted. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but was denied by the Secretary of
Justice in a Resolution dated December 14, 2006.
Eventually, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA.Its
motion for reconsideration having been denied by
the CA in a Resolution dated December 20, 2007
hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue: THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DOJ SECRETARY, RAUL
GONZALEZ, CAPRICIOUSLY, ARBITRARILY AND
WHIMSICALLY DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD SHOWING THE [EXISTENCE] OF PROBABLE
CAUSE AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR ESTAFA
UNDER ARTICLE 315 1(b) OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE.
Ruling: The petition is meritorious.In reversing the
finding of probable cause that the crime of estafa
has been committed, the Secretary of Justice
reasoned out that, [the] theory of conversion or
misappropriation is difficult to sustain and that
under the crime of estafa with grave abuse of
confidence, the presumption is that the thing has
been devoted to a purpose or is different from that
for which it was intended but did not take place in
this case.1wphi1 The CA, in sustaining the
questioned resolutions of the Secretary of Justice,
ruled that the element of misappropriation or
conversion is wanting.
It must be remembered that the finding of probable
cause was made after conducting a preliminary
investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes
a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a
case.13 Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a
crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is
a probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof.14
This Court need not overemphasize that in a
preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor
merely determines whether there is probable cause
or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed, and that
the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should
be held for trial. It does not call for the application of
rules and standards of proof that a judgment of
conviction requires after trial on the merits. 15 The
complainant need not present at this stage proof
beyond reasonable doubt.16 A preliminary
investigation does not require a full and exhaustive
presentation of the parties' evidence. 17 Precisely,
there is a trial to allow the reception of evidence for
both parties to substantiate their respective
claims.18
The mere presumption of misappropriation or
conversion is enough to conclude that a probable
cause exists for the indictment of Reyes for Estafa.
As to whether the presumption can be rebutted by
Reyes is already a matter of defense that can be
best presented or offered during a full-blown trial.
To reiterate, probable cause has been defined as the
existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for which
he was prosecuted.22 Probable cause is a reasonable
ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be,
well founded on such a state of facts in the mind of
the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary
caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an
honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. 23 The
term does not mean "actual or positive cause"
nor does it import absolute certainty.24It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief.25 Thus, a finding of probable cause does
not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.26 It
is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged.27
CASE NO. 26
CITY PROSECUTOR ARMANDO P.
ABANADO, complainant,
v
JUDGE ABRAHAM A. BAYONA, Presiding Judge,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 7,
Bacolod City, respondent.
FACTS:
The case sprang from a criminal case entitled People
of the Philippines vs. Cresencio Palo, Sr. It was
initially handled by Investigating Prosecutor Dennis
Jarder who found no probable cause against Palo.
However, complainant, upon review, found that
there was a probable cause against Palo. Thus,
complainant disapproved Jarders Resolution and
filed the Information in court.
In connection with the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against accused Palo, respondent Judge
Bayona issued an order directing complainant
Abanado to present (1) a copy of the Memorandum
of Preliminary Investigation, (2) Resolution of the
Investigating Prosecutor Dennis Jarder, (3)
Memorandum of the transfer of case assignment
from designated Investigating Prosecutor to the City
Prosecutor, and (4) Exhibit to the Court, to enable
his court to evaluate and determine the existence of
probable cause.
With respect to item 3, complainant explained in a
letter that there was no memorandum of transfer of
the case from Investigating Prosecutor Jarder to him.
Respondent was dissatisfied with the explanation of
the Office of the City Prosecutor. In an Order,
respondent stated that the Jarders Resolution
dismissing the complaint was part and parcel of the
official records of the case and, for this reason, must
form part of the records of the preliminary
investigation. He further stated that because there
was a conflict between Jarders and complainants
resolutions, those documents were necessary in the
evaluation and appreciation of the evidence to
establish probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against Palo. He, thus, ordered
complainant to complete the records of the case by
producing the Jarders Resolution. The Office of the
City Prosecutor again sent a letter explaining the
impossibility of submitting it to the court. The letter
stated that the Resolution was no longer part of the
records of the case as it was disapproved by
complainant.
Respondent did not accept the explanations made
by the Office of the City Prosecutor. In an order, he
required complainant to explain why he should not
be cited for contempt. Complainant requested for a
ten-day extension to comply with it but respondent
denied the request. He likewise ordered the Clerk of
Court to issue a subpoena duces tecum ad
testificandum to Jarder directing him to testify on
the existence of his resolution dismissing the case
against Palo and to Office of the City Prosecutors
Records Officer Myrna Vaegas to bring the entire
record of the preliminary investigation of the Palo
case.
Aggrieved, complainant immediately filed a motion
for inhibition against respondent and a petition for
certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) to restrain
respondent from proceeding with the hearing of the
contempt proceedings. Complainants prayer for a
TRO was granted by Presiding Judge Pepito Gellada
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City.
Judge Gellada granted the petition for certiorari
holding that when a city or provincial prosecutor
reverses the investigating assisting city or provincial
prosecutor, the resolution finding probable cause
replaces the recommendation of the investigating
prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case.
The result would be that the resolution of dismissal
no longer forms an integral part of the records of the
case. It is no longer required that the complaint or
entire records of the case during the preliminary
investigation be submitted to and be examined by
the judge. The rationale behind this practice is that
the rules do not intend to unduly burden trial judges
by requiring them to go over the complete records
of the cases all the time for the purpose of
determining probable cause for the sole purpose of
issuing a warrant of arrest against the accused.
What is required, rather, is that the judge must have
sufficient supporting documents (such as the
complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn
statements of witnesses or transcripts of
stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his
independent judgment or, at the very least, upon
which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to
the existence of probable cause.
Complainant executed an administrative complaint
and the same was received by the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA). He alleged that
respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law
or procedure and gross misconduct. He essentially
asserted that respondent unduly burdened himself
by obsessing over the production of the records of
the preliminary investigation, especially Jarders
Resolution. Respondent, in his Comment with
Counter-Complaint for Disbarment of Prosecutor
Abanado, reiterated the importance of the Jarders
Resolution in deciding whether to issue a warrant of
arrest.
The OCA submitted its report and recommendation.
It noted Judge Gelladas Order which held that the
resolution of the city or provincial prosecutor finding
probable cause replaces the recommendation of the
investigating prosecutor. In such case, the resolution
recommending the dismissal is superseded, and no
longer forms an integral part of the records of the
case and it need not be annexed to the information
filed in court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conduct of a preliminary
investigation is an executive function
HELD:
Yes. The conduct of a preliminary investigation is
primarily an executive function.
Thus, the courts must consider the rules of
procedure of the Department of Justice in
conducting preliminary investigations whenever the
actions of a public prosecutor is put in question. The
Department of Justic-National Prosecution Service
(DOJ-NPS) Manual states that the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor should be attached to the
information only as far as practicable. Such
attachment is not mandatory or required under the
rules.
CASE NO. 27
HEIRS OF THE LATE NESTOR TRIA, petitioner
vs.
ATTY. EPIFANIA OBIAS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175887
November 24, 2010
Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review on Certiorari
BRIEF
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated
August 14, 2006 and Resolution2 dated December
11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 86210. The CA denied the petition for
mandamus/certiorari filed by the petitioners which
assailed the Order3 dated March 24, 2004 of the
Office of the President (OP) dismissing the murder
charge against the respondent.
FACTS
On May 22, 1998, at around 10:00 oclock in the
morning at the Pili Airport in Camarines Sur, Engr.
Nestor Tria, Regional Director of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Region V and
concurrently Officer-In-Charge of the 2nd
Engineering District of Camarines Sur, was shot by a
gunman while waiting to board his flight to Manila.
He was brought to a hospital but died the following
day from the lone gunshot wound on his nape.
Subsequently, the incident was investigated by the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
During its investigation, the NBI found that the
accused Aclan and Ona had been conducting almost
a daily surveillance at the office of the victim. In the
morning of the day of the incident, Atty. Obias,
together with Aclan, was at the house of the victim.
The victim was shot by Aclan at the back of his head
immediately after the victim and Atty. Obias shook
hands and talked at the airport.
The NBI also anchored their basis for the motive on
the part of Atty. Obias to kill the victim on the the
fact that the respondent acted as a broker between
the victims family and spouses Prudencio Jeremias
on the sale of a real property. The victims family
gave the respondent the full payment of P2.8 Million
for the sale with the agreement that Atty. OBIAS
would take care of all legal processes and
documentations until the Deed of Absolute Sale is
delivered to the TRIA family. After the death of TRIA,
the surviving spouse and heirs made several
attempts to contact Atty. OBIAS to demand
immediate delivery of the deed of sale, but the
latter deliberately avoided the TRIA family and,
despite verbal and written demands, she failed and
refused, as she still fails and refuses, to fulfill her
legal obligation to the TRIA family.
On July 31, 1998, NBI Regional Director Alejandro R.
Tenerife, Chairman of Task Force Tria, recommended
to the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur the
indictment of Roberto "Obet" Aclan y Gulpo, Juanito
"Totoy" Ona y Masalonga and Atty. Epifania "Fanny"
Gonzales-Obias, for the murder of Engr. Tria.
On July 2, 1999, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Camarines Sur issued a party or witness, "[t]he parties can be present
resolution8 directing the filing of an information for
murder against Aclan and Ona but dismissing the
case for insufficiency of evidence as against herein
respondent, Atty. Epifania Obias.
Petitioners appealed to the Department of Justice
(DOJ) assailing the Provincial Prosecutors order to
dismiss the charge against respondent. Based on
the findings that the respondent acted with
complicity, the DOJ Secretary modified the
resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor and directed
the latter to include respondent in the information
for murder filed against Aclan and Ona.
The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of
the DOJs resolution but the same was denied by the
Justice Secretary.
The respondent then filed a Notice of Appeal before
the Office of the President. Senior Deputy Executive
Secretary Waldo Q. Flores adopted the resolutions of
the DOJ and affirmed the same. Respondent thus
filed a motion for reconsideration, followed by a
Supplemental Pleading and Submission of Newly
Discovered Evidence. This newly discovered
evidence consisted of an affidavit of two witnesses,
Calayag and Jennis Nidea, alleging that the
respondent was not responsible for the offense.
Based on this newly discovered evidence submitted
by the respondent, Presidential Assistant Manuel C.
Domingo granted respondents motion for
reconsideration and reversed the DOJ resolutions.
Accordingly, the case against respondent was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Petitioners then filed before the CA a petition for
mandamus/certiorari, but the same was denied by
the CA.
Petitioners ultimately filed the present petition
before the Supreme Court alleging, among others,
that they were denied due process since they have
not confronted nor cross-examined the witnesses
who executed the additional affidavits.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
1. Whether or not the petitioners were denied due
process when they were not able to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses who executed the
additional affidavits which served as newly
discovered evidence.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Petitioners argument that the non-referral by the OP
to the DOJ of the appeal or motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondent had
deprived them of the opportunity to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses on those affidavits
belatedly submitted by the respondent is likewise
untenable. Under the procedure for preliminary
investigation provided in Section 3, Rule 112
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended,38 in case the investigating
prosecutor conducts a hearing where there
are facts and issues to be clarified from a
at the hearing but without the right to
examine or cross-examine. They may,
however, submit to the investigating officer
questions which may be asked to the party or
witness concerned."39Hence, the non-referral by
the OP to the DOJ of the motion for reconsideration
of respondent, in the exercise of its discretion, did
not violate petitioners right to due process.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence on
record, we find no such grave abuse when the
Secretary of Justice found probable cause to charge
the respondent with murder in conspiracy with Aclan
and Ona. The following facts and circumstances
established during preliminary investigation were
sufficient basis to incite reasonable belief in
respondents guilt: (a) Motive - respondent had
credible reason to have Engr. Tria killed because of
the impending criminal prosecution for estafa from
her double sale of his lot prior to his death, judging
from the strong interest of Engr. Trias family to run
after said property and/or proceeds of the second
sale to a third party; (b) Access - respondent was
close to Engr. Trias family and familiar with his work
schedule, daily routine and other transactions which
could facilitate in the commission of the crime
eventually carried out by a hired gunmen, one of
whom (Aclan) she and her father categorically
admitted being in her company while she visited
Engr. Tria hours before the latter was fatally shot at
the airport; (c) Suspicious Behavior -- respondent
while declaring such close personal relationship with
Engr. Tria and even his family, failed to give any
satisfactory explanation why she reacted
indifferently to the violent killing of her friend while
they conversed and shook hands at the airport.
Indeed, a relative or a friend would not just stand by
and walk away from the place as if nothing
happened, as what she did, nor refuse to volunteer
information that would help the authorities
investigating the crime, considering that she is a
vital eyewitness. Not even a call for help to the
people to bring her friend quickly to the hospital.
She would not even dare go near Engr. Trias body to
check if the latter was still alive.
All the foregoing circumstances, in our mind, and
from the point of view of an ordinary person, lead to
a reasonable inference of respondents probable
participation in the well-planned assassination of
Engr. Tria. We therefore hold that the OP in reversing
the DOJ Secretarys ruling, and the CA in affirming
the same, both committed grave abuse of
discretion. Clearly, the OP and CA arbitrarily
disregarded facts on record which established
probable cause against the respondent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated August 14,
2006 and Resolution dated December 11, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86210 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January 25, 2000
Resolution of then Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas
modifying the July 2, 1999 resolution of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur and directing
the latter to include respondent in the information
for murder filed against Aclan and Ona is hereby
REINSTATED and UPHELD.
No costs.
CASE NO. 28
LESSON / DOCTRINE:
In Metro Manila and in chartered cities, the filing of
criminal cases shall be commenced only by
information, except when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de oficio.
GERLIE M. UY and MA. CONSOLACION T.
BASCUG, Complainants
vs.
JUDGE ERWIN B. JAVELLANA, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT, LA CASTELLANA, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
AM No. MTJ-07-1666 (Formerly AM OCA IPI No. 05-
1761-MTJ)
05 September 2012
Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS
An administrative case was filed against Judge
Javellana arising from a verified complaint for gross
ignorance of the law and procedures, gross
incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper
and unbecoming of a judge, grave misconduct and
others, filed by Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug of
the Public Attorneys Office.
The complaint/allegations involve cases decided
and/or were handled by Judge Javellana and his
alleged business relation as co-agent in a surety
company. In People vs Lopez, a case of malicious
mischief, Judge Javellana did not apply the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure and, instead,
conducted a preliminary investigation in accordance
with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then
set the case for arraignment and pre-trial, despite
confirming that therein complainant and her
witnesses had no personal knowledge of the
material facts alleged in their affidavits, which
should have been a ground for dismissal of said
case.
ISSUE/S
Whether Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
RULING
Yes. Without any showing that the accused in People
vs Lopez, et al were charged with the special cases
of malicious mischief particularly described in Article
328 of the Revised Penal Code the appropriate
penalty for the accused would be arresto mayor in
its medium and maximum periods which under
Article 329(a) of the Revised Penal Code, would be
imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to
six (6) months. Clearly, this case should be
governed by the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. Also, the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure does not provide for a preliminary
investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case
under Rule 16, but in People vs. Lopez, Judge
Javellana conducted a preliminary investigation even
when it was not required or justified.
Section 11 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure states:
How commenced. The filing of criminal cases
falling within the scope of this Rule shall be etiher
by complaint or by information; Provided, however,
that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities,
such cases shall be commenced only by information,
except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de
oficio.
On the other hand, Section 1, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires
that a preliminary investigation be conducted before
the filing of a complaint or information for an offense
where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without
regard to the fine. As has been previously
established herein, the maximum penalty imposable
for malicious mischief in People vs. Lopez, et al is
just six (6) months.
CASE NO. 29
G.R. Nos. 94511-13. September 18, 1992
People of The Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs
Alejandro C. Valencia, Accused-Appellant
Facts:
1. This was about a person convicted of (a)
Homicide with the use of unlicensed firearm,
penalized by Reclusion Perpetua with
accessory penalties provided for by law and
further without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and (b) Less Serious
Physical injuries, penalized by imprisonment
of 6 months of arresto mayor with the
accessory penalties provided for by law
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
2. One night, a mother and her two children
were having supper. The former noticed the
accused, Alejandro Valencia was few steps
away from their shanty who was carrying a
sumpak, a homemade shotgun. She
immediately closed the door as she seized
with fear.
3. After a few moments, burst of gunfire was
heard and followed by cries of pain from her
children inside the house. She saw her
bloodied children who were immediately sent
to the hospital for cure.
4. She saw the accused running away carrying
the sumpak.
5. During the investigation, the policemen
discovered the presence of 6 pellets hole and
1 big hole size of the circumference of a
shotgun bullet on the door of the victims.
6. Through his brother, the accused was
apprehended and brought him in the
detachment for initial investigation.
7. The following day, 1 injured children died as
a result of the wounds she suffered while the
other child was discharged from the hospital
1 week after the incident.
8. The accused pleaded not guilty with the
following appeal.
a. The mother, being the witness has not
proven his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
in spite of the fact that there was
allegedly no preliminary investigation.
b. There was no sufficient evidence exists
proving his guilt on the ground that he
was allegedly the holder of the unlicensed
firearm.
c. The witness had flip-flopping allegations
as she could not tell the identity of the
suspect when she was queried at the
hospital.
9. From the foregoing, settled was the rule that
the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of the witnesses are accorded
great respect and finality in the appellate
court where the same are surrounded by the
evidence on record.
10. For there was no showing whatsoever of
motivated ill or evil design to testify against
the accused, her motive and integrity, her
testimony should be given full credit in the
light of the time-honored pronouncement
that the absence of such strengthens the
witnesses credibility.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant was deprived
of his right of preliminary investigation when he was
arrested without warrant.
Held:
A person who is LAWFULLY arrested, without warrant
pursuant to paragraph 1(bb), Section 5, Rule 113,
Rules of Court should be delivered to the nearest
police station and proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7. Under the latter section,
Rule 112, the prosecuting officer can file the
information other than the offended party, peace
officer on the basis of the affidavit of the offended
party or arresting officer or person.
However, prior to the filing of such complaint or
information, the person arrested may ask for
preliminary investigation by a proper officer in
accordance with this rule, BUT he must sign a waiver
of the provisions of Article 124 of the RPC as
amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in
case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible
person of his choice.
Since the records did not show whether the accused
asked from a preliminary investigation and in fact,
the latter signified his readiness to be arraigned, the
Court can only conclude that he waived his right to
have a preliminary investigation when he did, in
fact, pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment.
CASE NO. 30
PCGG vs. MA. MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ, et
al.
GR NO. 194159, October 21, 2015
Facts:
The PCGG through its Legal Consultant in-
charge of reviewing behest loan cases filed an
affidavit-complaint dated July 15, 2003 against
former officers/directors of the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP) namely Ferry, Tengco, Zosa,
Zalamea, Castell and Sison, as well as former
officers/stockholders of National Galleon Shipping
Corporation (Galleon), namely Cuenca, Tinio and
Roque charging them of violating Section 3(e) and
(g) of RA 3019. The affidavit-complaint contained all
findings of the PCGG Ad Hoc Committee that
loans/accommodations obtained by Galleon from
DBP totalling Php 2,039,284,390.85 as approved by
Resolution No. 3002 possessed the characteristics of
behest loans because, a) that Galleon was
undercapitalized, b) that the loan itself was under
collateralized; c) that major stockholders of Galleon
were known to be cronies of the former President
Marcos; and d) that certain documents pertaining to
the loan account were found to bear marginal
notes of President Marcos himself.
In a Resolution dated May 30, 2007, the
Ombudsman found no probable cause against
private respondents and dismissed the criminal
complaint on the grounds that evidence attached to
the case were not sufficient to establish probable
cause against the individual respondents,
considering that the documents presented by the
PCGG consisted mostly of hearsay, self-serving, and
mostly of little probative value. The PCGG moved for
reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated
April 13, 2009. Hence, a petition for certiorari
assailing the Resolution dated May 30, 2007 and the
Order dated April 13, 2009 of the Office of the
Ombudsman was filed in this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the
Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in
finding no probable cause to indict the
respondents of violating Section 3(e) and (g)
of RA 3019.
Held:
Yes. The Court finds that the Ombudsman
gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the
complaint against individual respondents for lack of
probable cause. Individual respondents were
accused of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019. All the
elements to indict the accused are presents. There
were charged also with violation of Section 3(g) of
the same law. The case reveals that Galleon made a
request for guarantees from DBP to cover its foreign
borrowings for the purpose of acquiring new and
second hand vessels. The DBP itself raised various
red flags regarding Galleons request but still agreed
to grant the same request under certain conditions
which were eventually not complied with. As a
result, Galleons obligations to DBP ballooned to Php
2,039,284,390.85 while security of such obligations
were only valued at Php 539,000,000.00 as of March
31, 1984.
The Ombudsman discredit the findings
adopted by the PCGGs Ad Hoc Committee for being
hearsay, self-serving, and of little probative value. In
the case of Estrada vs. Ombudsman, the Court
declared that hearsay evidence is admissible in
determining probable cause in preliminary
investigations because such investigation is merely
preliminary and does not finally adjudicate rights
and obligations of parties. Probable cause can be
established with hearsay evidence as long as there
is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. The
factual findings of the Ad Hoc Committee appears to
be based on official documents prepared by DBP
itself in connection with the behest loans extended
in favour of Galleon. These are facts sufficient to
support a prima facie case against the respondents.
The Court is convinced that there is probable
cause to indict individual respondents of violating
Section 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019. Hence, the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing the criminal complaint against the PCGG.
The petition is GRANTED. The Resolution dated May
30, 2007 and the Order dated April 13, 2009 of the
Office of the Ombudsman are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Ombudsman is directed to issue the
proper resolution indicting individual respondents of
violating Section 3(e) and (g) RA No. 3019.
CASE NO. 31
Facts: Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes (former
Governor Reyes) was implicated in the murder of Dr.
Gerardo Ortega. A special panel of prosecutors (First
Panel) was created by Secretary of Justice Leila de
Lima to conduct preliminary investigation. The First
Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and
dismissed the Affidavit-Complaint. Secretary of
Justice De Lima created a new panel of investigators
(Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case. The Second Panel found probable cause and
recommended the filing of informations on all
accused, including former Governor Reyes. Reyes
filed a case in the Court of Appeals, which found that
the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion when she created the Second Panel.
Issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse
of discretion when she issued Department Order
No. 710, and with regard to this:
a. Whether the issuance of Department Order
No. 710 was an executive function beyond the
scope of a petition for certiorari or prohibition;
and
b. Whether the Secretary of Justice is authorized
to create motu proprio another panel of
prosecutors in order to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case.
2. Whether this Petition for Certiorari has already
been rendered moot by the filing of the
information in court, pursuant to Crespo v.
Mogul.
Decision:
1. The Court of Appeals erred.
a. The determination by the Department of
Justice of the existence of probable cause is
not a quasi-judicial proceeding.
i. An administrative agency performs quasi-
judicial functions if it renders awards,
determines the rights of opposing parties, or
if their decisions have the same effect as
the judgment of a court.
ii. However, the actions of the Secretary of
Justice in affirming or reversing the findings
of prosecutors may still be subject to judicial
review if it is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
b. The Secretary of Justice has the discretion,
upon motion or motu proprio, to act on any
matter that may cause a probable miscarriage
of justice in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. This action may include, but is
not limited to, the conduct of a
reinvestigation.
i. The Secretary of Justice exercises control
and supervision over prosecutors and it is
within her authority to affirm, nullify,
reverse, or modify the resolutions of her
prosecutors. Decisions or resolutions of
prosecutors are subject to appeal to the
Secretary of Justice who, under the Revised
Administrative Code, exercises the power of
direct control and supervision over said
prosecutors; and who may thus affirm,
nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
2. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65
questioning the regularity of preliminary
investigation becomes moot after the trial court
 completes its determination of probable cause
and issues a warrant of arrest.
a. Once the information is filed in court, the
court acquires jurisdiction of the case and any
motion to dismiss the case or to determine
the accused's guilt or innocence rests within
the sound discretion of the court
CASE NO. 32
[GR No. 205472, January 25, 2016]
Amado I. Saraum, Petitioner, vs. People of the
Philippines, Respondent.
FACTS:
A buy-bust operation was formed regarding an
illegal drug activity in Sitio Camansi, Barangay
Lorega, Cebu City against a certain Pata. During
the operation, Pata eluded arrest as he tried to run
towards his shanty. Inside the house, the buy-bust
team saw Saraum and Peter Esperanza, who were
holding drug paraphernalia apparently in
preparation to have a shabu pot session. The
police operatives recovered from Saraums
possession a lighter, rolled tissue paper, and
aluminum tin foil (tooter).
Saraum was charged with violation of Section 12,
Article II (Possession of Paraphernalia for Dangerous
Drugs) of RA 9165, or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Saraum denied the commission of the alleged
offense. He testified that he was held by men with
firearms and they were already with Antik and
Pata, both of whom were his neighbors. Believing
that he had not committed anything illegal, he
resisted the arrest.
The RTC rendered the decision finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, CA
sustained the judgment of conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether Saraums warrantless arrest was valid.
HELD:
The Court denies the petition.
The elements of illegal possession of equipment,
apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous
drugs under Section 12, Article II of RA 9165 are: (1)
possession or control by the accused of any
equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia for or
intended for smoking, consuming, administering,
injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous
drug into the body; and (2) such possession is not
authorized by law. The prosecution has convincingly
established that Saraum was in possession of drug
paraphernalia, particularly aluminum tin foil, rolled
tissue paper, and lighter, all of which were offered
and admitted in evidence.
Saraum was arrested during the commission of a
crime, which instance does not require a warrant in
accordance with Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In arrest in
flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the
very moment he is committing or attempting to
commit or has just committed an offense in the
presence of the arresting officer. To constitute a
valid in flagrante delicto, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit to
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer.
The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the
right to search the shanty for objects relating to the
crime and seize the drug paraphernalia they found.
As these items were plainly visible, the police
officers were justified in seizing them. Since the
confiscated drug paraphernalia are the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice
but to sustain the judgment of conviction.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.
CASE NO. 33
WARRANTLESS ARREST
ALVIN COMERCIANTE y GONZALES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 205926
July 22, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE,J.:
_____________________________________________________
FACTS:
On or about the 30th day of July 2003, in the City of
Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not having been lawfully authorized
to possess any dangerous drugs, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly
have in his possession, custody and control Two (2)
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet (sic) each
containing 0.15 gram (sic) and 0.28 gram (sic) of
white crystalline substance with a total of 0.43
grams which was found positive to the test for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known
as "shabu", a dangerous drug.
According to the prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in
the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent Eduardo Radan
(Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS group and P03
Bienvy Calag II (P03 Calag) were aboard a
motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to
visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay Hulo,
Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30
kilometers per hour along Private Road, they
spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2)
men later identified as Comerciante and a certain
Erick Dasilla (Dasilla) - standing and showing
"improper and unpleasant movements," with one of
them handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking
that the sachets may contain shabu, they
immediately stopped and approached Comerciante
and Dasilla At a distance of around five (5) meters,
P03 Calag introduced himself as a police officer,
arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated
two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance from them. A laboratory examination
later confirmed that said sachets contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a
demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the
RTC, thus his acquittal. However, due to
Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to
evidence, the RTC considered his right to do so
waived and ordered him to present his evidence.
In his defense, Comerciante averred that P03 Calag
was looking for a certain "Barok", who was a
notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly,
he and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a
jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken
to a police station. There, the police officers claimed
to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and
were asked money in exchange for their release.
When they failed to accede to the demand, they
were brought to another police station to undergo
inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were charged
with illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless arrest validly exercised.
ACTIONS OF COURTS:
Regional Trial Court
The R TC found that P03 Calag conducted a valid
warrantless arrest on Comerciante, which yielded
two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu. In this
relation, the R TC opined that there was probable
cause to justify the warrantless arrest, considering
that P03 Calag saw, in plain view, that Comerciante
was carrying the said sachets when he decided to
approach and apprehend the latter. Further, the RTC
found that absent any proof of intent that P03 Calag
was impelled by any malicious motive, he must be
presumed to have properly performed his duty when
he arrested Comerciante.
Aggrieved, Comerciante appealed to the CA.
Court of Appeals:
CA affirmed Comerciante's conviction. It held that
P03 Calag had probable cause to effect the
warrantless arrest of Comerciante, given that the
latter was committing a crime in flagrante delicto;
and that he personally saw the latter exchanging
plastic sachets with Dasilla. According to the CA, this
was enough to draw a reasonable suspicion that
those sachets might be shabu, and thus, P03 Calag
had every reason to inquire on the matter right then
and there.
Dissatisfied, Comerciante moved for reconsideration
which was, however, denied. Comerciante then filed
a petition to the SC contending that P03 Carag did
not effect a valid warrantless arrest on him.
Consequently, the evidence gathered as a result of
such illegal warrantless arrest, i.e., the plastic
sachets containing shabu should be rendered
inadmissible, necessarily resulting in his acquittal.
Supreme Court:
Reversed the decision of RTC and CA.
HELD:
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure lays down the rules on lawful warrantless
arrests, as follows:
SEC.5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above,
the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Section 7 of Rule 112.
The aforementioned provision provides three (3)
instances when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully
effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on
personal knowledge of the arresting officer,
there is probable cause that said suspect was the
perpetrator of a crime which had just been
committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has
escaped from custody serving final judgment or
temporarily confined during the pendency of his
case or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to
operate, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a)
the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.
On the other hand, Section 5 (b) requires for its
application that at the time of the arrest, an offense
had in fact just been committed and the
arresting officer had personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the accused had committed it.
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge
of the fact of the commission of an offense is
absolutely required. Under Section 5 (a), the officer
himself witnesses the crime; while in Section (b),
he knows for a fact that a crime has just been
committed.
A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant
case reveals that there could have been no
lawful warrantless arrest made on
Comerciante. P03 Calag himself admitted that he
was aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of
around 30 kilometers per hour when he saw
Comerciante and Dasilla standing around and
showing "improper and unpleasant movements,"
with one of them handing plastic sachets to the
other. On the basis of the foregoing, he decided to
effect an arrest.
The Court finds it highly implausible that P03
Calag, even assuming that he has perfect vision,
would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy -
especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and
while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30
kilometers per hour - miniscule amounts of white
crystalline substance inside two (2) very small
plastic sachets held by Comerciante.
The Court also notes that no other overt act
could be properly attributed to Comerciante
as to rouse suspicion in the mind of P03 Calag
that the former had just committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime.
Verily, the acts of standing around with a
companion and handing over something to the
latter cannot in any way be considered
criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his
companion were showing "improper and unpleasant
movements" as put by P03 Calag, the same would
not have been sufficient in order to effect a
lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless
arrest. As such, the shabu purportedly seized from
him is rendered inadmissible in evidence for
being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.
Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, Comerciante must
necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from
all criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, petitioner Alvin Comerciante is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violating
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
CASE NO. 34
G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012
RODEL LUZ y ONG vs. PEOPLE
Ponente: SERENO, J.:
FACTS:
At around 3:00 am of March 2003, Rodel Ong Luz
was flagged down by PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza of the
Naga City Police Station, for violating a municipal
ordinance of driving a motorcycle without a helmet.
Alteza invited Luz to their nearby sub-station. While
Alteza and another police officer were issuing a
citation ticket, he noticed that Luz was uneasy and
kept on getting something from his jacket, thus, he
told Luz to take out the contents of the pocket of his
jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container.
After instructed to open the container, Alteza
noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it;
and upon Altezas instruction, Luz spilled out the
contents suspected as shabu.
Luz was charged of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs and later convicted by the RTC of the same
crime. The RTC found that Luz had been lawfully
arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to
a valid search, which led to the discovery of two
plastic sachets of shabu. The RTC also found Luzs
defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-
serving and unsubstantiated
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
Hence, this petition filed under Rule 45 for Review
on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was no lawful search and
seizure on the ground that there was no lawful
arrest.
Held:
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit.
There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was
flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he
was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason,
arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order
that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. (Sec 1, Rule 113, Rules of
Court) It is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary
submission to the custody of the one making the
arrest. Neither the application of actual force,
manual touching of the body, or physical restraint,
nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is
enough that there be an intention on the part of one
of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be
an intent on the part of the other to submit, under
the belief and impression that submission is
necessary.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with
a traffic violation is not the arrest, but the
confiscation of the drivers license.
In Berkemer v. McCarty, U.S. Supreme Court held
that, such questioning does not fall under custodial
interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal
arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the
expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the
length of time the procedure is conducted. The usual
traffic stop is more analogous to a "Terry stop" than
to a formal arrest.
According to the City Ordinance violated, the failure
to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is
penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a
warrant of arrest need not be issued if the
information or charge was filed for an offense
penalized by a fine only. Neither can a warrantless
arrest be made for such an offense.
This Court has held that at the time a person is
arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer
to read his Miranda rights. But these constitutional
requirements were complied only after petitioner
had been arrested for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.
The following are the instances when a warrantless
search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain
view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented
warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop
and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances. None of the above-mentioned
instances, especially a search incident to a lawful
arrest, are applicable to this case.
While he may have failed to object to the illegality of
his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during the illegal warrantless arrest.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are
inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of
the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and
calls for the acquittal of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in affirming the judgment of
conviction of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y
Ong is hereby ACQUITTED
CASE NO. 35
GEORGE ANTIQUERA vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 180661 December 11, 2013
FACTS:
Six Police Officers were conducting a police visibility
patrol in Pasay City when they saw two unidentified
men rush out of a house and boarded a jeep.
Suspecting a crime, they approached the house
which these two men came out from. Peeking
through a partially opened door of the house, the
officers saw accused Antiquera and his live-in
partner Corazon Cruz, engaged in a pot session. The
policemen entered the house, introduced
themselves and arrested Antiquera and Cruz. While
inspecting the immediate vicinity, PO1 Cabutihan
saw a jewelry box which contained Shabu and
unused drug paraphernalia. Accused disputed the
story and claimed that he and his partner were
sleeping when the police officers knocked at his
house.
The RTC rendered a decision finding them guilty of
illegal possession of paraphernalia for dangerous
drugs which the CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest of the accused by the
police officers was valid and considered as an arrest
in flagrante delicto considering that the door was
only partially open
HELD:
No.
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense. This is what constitutes an
arrest in flagrante delicto, when an overt act
constituting a crime is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. But the
circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest
made in in flagrante delicto. The testimony of PO1
Cabutihan provides that the door was only open
approximately 4-6inches and that they had to push
it to see what is inside because even as they peeked
through it, they saw no activity that warranted their
entering it. Neither did they consider securing first a
search warrant before entering the property. No
crime was plainly exposed to the view of the
arresting officers that authorized the arrest of
accused without warrant.
Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search
and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that
the police officers allegedly found in the house and
seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an
invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated
drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the
crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit
accused. His failure to object to the irregularity of his
arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his
conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest
does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility
of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless
arrest.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the RTC
and CA Decisions and ACQUITTED accused Antiquera
for lack of evidence sufficient to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
CASE NO. 36
People vs. Vasquez, 714 SCRA 01/15/2014
FACTS:
The case for illegal possession of drugs was raffled
to RTC but upon motion it was consolidated with the
case of illegal sale of drugs. On arraignment, the
appellant (Donald Vasquez) pleaded not guilty n
both charges. The pre-trial was held, but was
terminated without them entering to the detailed
facts of the case. During the trial the prosecution
stated the events that a confidential informant
reported to PO2 Trambulo about the illegal drug
activities and Fajardo from the buy bust team. It was
during that buy bust operation that Donald Vasquez
was arrested.
RTC, convicted the appellant of the crimes charged.
The RTC gave more credibility to the prosecutions
evidence given that the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty on the part of the
police officers was not overcome. On Appeal the CA
affirmed the conviction of the appellant. Hence in his
appeal he argued that the Police officers did not
have a search warrant or a warrant of arrest at that
time he was arrested. Inasmuch as the arrest was
illegal, the appellant avers that the evidence
obtained as a result thereof was precluded in court.
Issue:
Whether Donald Vasquez may assail the validity of
the arrest?
Held:
No.
Ruling: The court ruled that the appellant can no
longer assail the validity of his arrest. It was
reiterated in the case of People vs Tampis, that any
objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest
must be made before the accused enters his plea of
arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing
of the information against them before their
arraignment, appellants are now estopped from
questioning the legality of their arrest. His arrest
falls within the ambit of Section 5 (a) Rule 11354 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure when arrest made
without warrant is deemed lawful. With the validity
of the warrantless arrest in this case, it was held
that warrantless seizure of illegal drugs from the
appellant is likewise valid.
It was also held in the Case of People vs. Cabugatan
that, The interdiction against searches and seizures,
however is not absolute and such warrantless
searches and seizures have long been deemed
permissible by the jurisprudence in the instances of
(1) Search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain
view (3) customs searches (4) waiver of consented
searches (5) stop and frisk situations and search
incidental to a lawful arrest.
The Rules of Court recognizes permissible
warrantless arrest to (1) arrest in flagrante delicto
(2) arrest affected in hot pursuit and (3) arrest of
escaped prisoners. Donald cannot seek pardon by
invoking belatedly the invalidity of his arrest.
CASE NO. 37
Provincial Prosecutor Dorentino Z Floresta vs
Judge Eliodoro G uBIADAS
FACTS:
The complainant administratively charged
the herein respondent with gross ignorance of law ,
grave abuse of authority and violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
Complainant faults respondent for granting,
without giving notice to the prosecution, the petition
for bail of Jose Mangohig, Jr. , who was arrested by
virtue of warrant issued in Municipal Trial Court of
Subic, Zambales which found probable cause
against him for violation of section 5 (b), Art III of
R.A. 7610.
Respondent argued tha he informs the
petition for bail for Mangohig, Jr., who was then
under preliminary investigation, which motion was
filed on January 3, 2000 on which same date a copy
of said petition was furnished to the public
prosecutor, was as set by Mangohig, Jr heard on the
morning of January 4, 2000, during which there was
no appearance from Prosecutors Office; and that the
offense is ordinarily bailable, respondent granted
him bail.
The Office of Court Administrator(OCA)
stressed that the Rules of Court requires movant to
serve notice of his motion on all parties concerned
at least three days before the hearing thereof,
hence, respondent erred in granting the petition for
bail without hearing the prosecutors side.
The OCA accordingly recommend that the
respondent be fined in the amount of twenty
thousand pesos.
Issue :
Whether bail is a matter of right or judicial
discretion.
Whether or not the respondent is liable for
gross ignorance of the law in granting bail to the
respondent-detainee- Mangohig without hearing the
prosecution.
HELD :
Admission to bail as a matter of discretion
presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with
law and guided by the applicable legal principles.
The prosecution must first be accorded an
opportunity to present evidence because by the
very nature od deciding applications for bail, it is on
the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is
weight against in determining whether the guilt of
the accused is strong. In other words, discretion
must be exercised regularly, legally within the
confines of procedural due process, that is, after
evaluation of evidence submitted to the prosecution.
Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a
product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and
caprice and outright arbitrariness.
Section 18 of Rule 114 on application for bail,
no period is provided as it merely requires the court
to give a reasonable notice of hearing to the
prosecutor or require him to submit
recommendation, and the general rule on the
requirement of three day notice for hearing of
motions under section 4 of Rule 15 allows a court for
good cause to call for hearing his petition for bail in
shorter notice.
Mangohig was arrested for violation of
Section 5, Art III,R.A. 7610, punishable by reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua, for statutory rape
qualified by relationship, punishable by death.
Under the circumstances, by the respondent
assailed grant of bail, the prosecution was deprived
of due process for which he is liable for gross
ignorance of law or procedure which is serious
charge under Sec. 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court.
Wherefore, respondent, Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas,
Presiding Judge of RTC Bramch 72, Olongapo City, is
found GUILTY of undue delay in resolving a motion
and of ignorance of the law or procedure in granting
an application for bail without affording the
prosecution due process. He is accordingly FINED in
the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS, with
warning that the repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.
CASE NO. 38 Also, the failure to raise or the absence of an
RULE 114- Bail objection on the part of the prosecution in an
38. Zuno vs. Cabebe, 444 SCRA 382 application for bail does not dispense with the
[A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ. November 26, 2004] requirement of a bail hearing.
Chief State Prosecutor JOVENCITO R. ZUO, With regard to respondent judges contention that
complainant, vs. Judge ALEJADRINO C. CABEBE, the accused were entitled to their right to a speedy
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte, trial, there is no indication in the records of the
respondent. criminal case that the prosecution has intentionally
delayed the trial of the case. Even assuming there
FACTS: was delay, this does not justify the grant of bail
without a hearing.
In a Criminal Case for illegal possession of prohibited WHEREFORE, respondent Judge is found guilty of
or regulated drugs which was filed with the Regional violation of Supreme Court Rules, specifically Rule
Trial Court, the respondent judge issued an Order
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on
granting bail to the accused, even without the
latters application or motion for bail. the grant of bail. This administrative offense is
In this regard, the prosecution filed a motion for considered a less serious charge, punishable under
reconsideration. But instead of acting thereon, Section 9(4) and Section 11(B-2), Rule 140 of the
respondent judge issued an order inhibiting himself same Rules.
from further proceeding with the case. Complainant .CASE NO. 39
prosecutor thus prays that respondent judge be GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION vs. HON. FELIXBERTO
benefits and be disbarred from the practice of law.
T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ
Respondent denied the charges. While admitting
that he issued the Order granting bail to the accused G.R. No. 153675 (April 19, 2007)
without any hearing, the same was premised on the
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial, FACTS: Private respondent Muoz was charged
for there was delay in the proceedings due to
before a Hong Kong Court with bribery and
complainants frequent absences and failure of the
witnesses for the prosecution to appear in court, conspiracy to defraud. As a result, an order for his
resulting in the cancellation of the hearings. He arrest was issued which the Supreme Court later
added that the prosecution did not object to the upheld as valid.
grant of bail.
Petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
ISSUE: filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the
Whether the respondent judged erred in granting a extradition of private respondent. For his part,
bail without any hearing. private respondent filed, in the same case, a petition
RULING: Yes. A hearing is mandatory in granting for bail.
bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. In
order for the judge to properly exercise his
The petition for bail was initially denied, the judge
discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to
holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail
determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
in extradition cases and that private respondent is a
high "flight risk." After the first judge inhibited
The respondent judge granted bail to the accused
himself, the case was raffled off to another branch
without conducting a hearing, in violation of
presided by respondent judge Olalia. He reversed
Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
the decision on motion for reconsideration and
Criminal Procedure.
allowed private respondent to post bail, subject to
Included in the duties of the judge in case an
certain conditions.
application for bail is filed, is that where bail is a
matter of discretion, he shall (i) conduct a hearing of
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner argues that
the application for bail regardless of whether or not
the admission of private respondent to bail has no
the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show
Constitutional or statutory basis, the right being
that the guilt of the accused is strong for the
limited solely to criminal proceedings.
purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion; from there, (ii) decide whether the guilt
Issue: Whether the right to bail extends to a
of the accused is strong based on the summary of
potential extraditee.
evidence of the prosecution; and (iii) if the guilt of
the accused is not strong, discharge the accused
Ruling: Yes. While jurisprudence (US vs. Purganan)
upon the approval of the bail bond; otherwise the
states that the right to bail is available only in
petition should be denied.
criminal proceedings, the Court took cognizance of
Respondent judge did not conduct a hearing before
trends in international law which uphold the
he granted bail to the accused, thus depriving the
fundamental human rights and dignity of every
prosecution of an opportunity to interpose
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section 2,
objections to the grant of bail. The importance of a
Article II of our Constitution and the various treaties
bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be
the country has entered into giving recognition and
downplayed, these are considered aspects of
protection to human rights, particularly the right to
procedural due process for both the prosecution and
life and liberty.
the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or
denial of bail.
The Court departed from the Purganan ruling on the
following grounds: first, the exercise of the States
power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not
necessarily limited to criminal proceedings, but even
administrative proceedings, such as deportation and
quarantine. Second, Philippine jurisprudence has not
limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only, but even to persons in detention
during the pendency of administrative proceedings,
i.e. deportation cases (US v. Go-Sioco and Mejoff v.
Director of Prisons). Likewise, considering that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot
be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or
guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
An extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal
process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to
arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced
to transfer to the demanding state following the
proceedings. Private respondent has been detained
for over two years without having been convicted of
any crime. By any standard, such an extended
period of detention is a serious deprivation of his
fundamental right to liberty.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the
standard of proof required in granting or denying
bail should be "clear and convincing
evidence" (separate opinion of Reynato Puno in the
Purganan case). This standard should be lower than
proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee
must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that
he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private
respondent presented evidence to show that he is
not a flight risk. Consequently, the case was
remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the basis
of "clear and convincing evidence."
CASE NO. 40
G.R. No. 158754 August 10, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Special Division) and JOSE
"JINGGOY" ESTRADA, Respondents.
FACTS: In November 2000, as an
offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President of the
Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints
against the former President and members of his
family, his associates, friends and conspirators were
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. On April 4,
2001, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution
finding probable cause warranting the filing with the
Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations
against the former President and the other
respondents therein. One of the Informations was for
the crime of plunder under Republic Act [RA] No.
7080 and among the respondents was herein
petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, then mayor of San
Juan, Metro Manila.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a
warrant of arrest for Jinggoy and his co-accused.
On its basis, Jinggoy and his co-accused were
placed in custody of the law.
On April 30, 2001, Jinggoy filed a Very Urgent
Omnibus Motion alleging that: (1) no probable
cause exists to put him on trial and hold him
liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only
allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a
series or combination of overt or criminal acts
as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled
to bail as a matter of right. He prayed that he be
excluded from the Amended Information. In the
alternative, he also prayed that he be allowed to
post bail.
On June 28, 2001, he filed a Motion to Resolve
Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estradas Motion To Fix Bail On
Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An
Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts
Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A Non-
Bailable Offense As To Him.
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying
Jinggoys Motion to Quash and Suspend and Very
Urgent Omnibus Motion. His alternative prayer to
post bail was set for hearing after arraignment of all
accused.
Jinggoy moved for reconsideration of the Resolution.
Respondent court denied the motion and proceeded
to arraign him.
From the denial action of the Sandiganbayan
immediately adverted to, Jinggoy interposed a
petition for certiorari before this Court claiming that
the respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in, inter alia, (a) sustaining the
charge against him for alleged offenses and with
alleged conspirators with whom he is not even
connected, and (b) in not fixing bail for him. Pending
resolution of this petition, docketed as G.R. No.
148965, Jinggoy filed with the Sandiganbayan an
Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical
Reasons. The Ombudsman opposed the motion.
The Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the
motion for bail, with one Dr. Roberto Anastacio of
the Makati Medical Center appearing as sole witness
for Jinggoy. Jinggoy filed with the Court an Urgent
Motion praying for early resolution of his Petition for
Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations. He
reiterated his earlier plea for bail filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayans Resolution dated December 20,
2001 denying Jinggoys motion for bail for lack of
factual basis. According to the graft court, basing
its findings on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio,
Jinggoy failed to submit sufficient evidence to
convince the court that the medical condition of the
accused requires that he be confined at home and
for that purpose that he be allowed to post bail. On
February 26, 2002, the Court dismissed Jinggoys
petition in G.R. No. 148965.
Upon proper motion of Jinggoy, respondent
Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to
determine if the evidence of Jinggoys guilt is strong
as to warrant the granting of bail to him.
On April 17, 2002, Jinggoy filed before the
Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Application for Bail10
against which the prosecution filed its comment and
opposition. Bail hearings were then conducted,
followed by the submission by the parties of their
respective memoranda.
In the herein assailed Resolution of March 6, 2003,
respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division)
granted the omnibus application for bail.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Special
Division of the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in granting bail to Jinggoy Estrada.
HELD: The imputation of grave abuse of
discretion to the public respondent is
untenable. The Court rules that public
respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division)
did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when, after conducting numerous bail hearings
and evaluating the weight of the prosecutions
evidence, it determined that the evidence
against individual respondent was not strong
and, on the basis of that determination,
resolved to grant him bail.
Section 13 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution mandates:
Section 13. All persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law.
Even if the capital offense charged is bailable
owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt,
the right to bail may justifiably still be denied if
the probability of escape is great. Here, ever
since the promulgation of the assailed
Resolutions a little more than four (4) years ago,
Jinggoy does not, as determined by
Sandiganbayan, seem to be a flight risk. We
quote with approval what the graft court wrote in
this regard
It is not open to serious doubt that the movant
Jinggoy has, in general, been consistently respectful
of the Court and its processes. He has not ominously
shown, by word or by deed, that he is of such a
flight risk that would necessitate his continued
incarceration. Bearing in mind his conduct, social
standing and his other personal circumstances, the
possibility of his escape in this case seems remote if
not nil.
The likelihood of escape on the part individual
respondent is now almost nil, given his election on
May 10, 2004, as Senator of the Republic of the
Philippines. The Court takes stock of the fact that
those who usually jump bail are shadowy characters
mindless of their reputation in the eyes of the
people for as long as they can flee from the
retribution of justice. On the other hand, those with
a reputation and a respectable name to protect and
preserve are very unlikely to jump bail. The Court, to
be sure, cannot accept any suggestion that
someone who has a popular mandate to serve as
Senator is harboring any plan to give up his Senate
seat in exchange for becoming a fugitive from
justice.
CASE NO. 41
OKABE V GUTIERREZ
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with Estafa for failure to
deliver the money agreed upon with Cecilia
Maruyama through door-to-door delivery. The 2nd
Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came
out with a resolution finding probable cause for
estafa against the petitioner. The trial court issued a
warrant for the arrest of the petitioner with a
recommended bond of P40,000. The petitioner
posted a personal bail bond in the said amount, duly
approved by Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, the
Presiding Judge of Branch 79 of the RTC of Quezon
City, who forthwith recalled the said warrant. The
approved personal bail bond of the petitioner was
transmitted to the RTC of Pasig City. Upon her
request, the petitioner was furnished with a certified
copy of the Information, the resolution and the
criminal complaint which formed part of the records
of the said case. The petitioner left the Philippines
for without the trial courts permission, and returned
to the Philippines. She left the Philippines anew and
returned. The trial court issued an Order setting the
petitioners arraignment and pre-trial. On the same
day, the private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte
motion for the issuance of the hold departure order.
The trial court issued an order on the same day,
granting the motion of the private prosecutor for the
issuance of a hold departure order. The petitioner
filed a verified motion for judicial determination of
probable cause and to defer
proceedings/arraignment. The petitioner filed a Very
Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order
and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan because
of her minor children. She refused to enter her plea
with leave of court. When it was elevated to the CA,
her petition was partially granted. The CA ruled that
by posting bail and praying for reliefs from the trial
court, the petitioner waived her right to assail the
respondent judges finding of the existence of
probable cause.
Issue:
Whether or not posting a bail bond waives the right
to assail the trial courts issuance of warrant of
arrest.
Held:
No. We agree with the contention of the petitioner
that the appellate court erred in not applying
Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, viz.: SEC. 26.Bail not a bar to
objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular
preliminary investigation.An application for or
admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of
the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the
regularity or questioning the absence of a
preliminary investigation of the charge against him,
provided that he raises them before entering his
plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as
practicable but not later than the start of the trial of
the case. It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new
one, intended to modify previous rulings of this
Court that an application for bail or the admission to
bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver
of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest
on the legalities or irregularities thereon. The new
rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in People
v. Red.The new rule is curative in nature because
precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb
evils in procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing
curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes
are by their essence retroactive in application.
Besides, procedural rules as a general rule operate
retroactively, even without express provisions to
that effect, to cases pending at the time of their
effectivity, in other words to actions yet
undetermined at the time of their effectivity. Before
the appellate court rendered its decision on January
31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
was already in effect. It behooved the appellate
court to have applied the same in resolving the
petitioners petition for certiorari and her motion for
partial reconsideration.
CASE NO. 42 (no case digest uploaded yet as of
sending)
CASE NO. 43
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
FACTS: Senator Juan Ponce Enrile filed a petition for
certiorari to assail and annul the resolutions dated
July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014 issued by the
Sandiganbayan, where he has been charged with
plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that
the resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion
To Fix Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The objective of the petition for certiorari is to annul
the decision of the Sandiganbayan denying his
motion to fix bail and motion for reconsideration on
the following grounds: 1.) the prosecution failed to
show conclusively that Enrile, if ever convicted, is
punishable by reclusion perpetua; 2.) the
prosecution failed to show that the evidence of
Enriles guilt is strong; 3.) Enrile is not a flight risk.
(Antecedent) On June 5, 2014, the Office of the
Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with
plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their
purported involvement in the diversion and misuse
of appropriations under the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF). On June 10, 2014 and June
16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus
Motion and Supplemental Opposition, praying,
among others, that he be allowed to post bail should
probable cause be found against him. The motions
were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the
Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition.
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its
resolution denying Enriles motion, particularly on
the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity
considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily
surrendered or been placed under the custody of the
law. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the
arrest of Enrile.
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was
issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director
Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon
City, and was later on confined at the Philippine
National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his
medical examination.
ISSUE: Whether Senator Juan Ponce Enrile can bail?
HELD: Yes, the Supreme Court held that the
Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of
bail and unwarrantedly disregarded Sen. Enriles
fragile health and advanced age. Bail is a matter
right and is safeguarded by the constitution, its
purpose is to ensure the personal appearance of the
accused during trial or whenever the court requires
and at the same time recognizing the guarantee of
due process which is the presumption of his
innocence until proven guilty. The Supreme Court
further explained that Bail for the provisional liberty
of the accused, regardless of the crime charged
should be allowed independently of the merits
charged, provided his continued incarceration is
injurious to his health and endanger his life. Hence,
the Sandiganbayan failed to observe that if Sen.
Enrile be granted the right to bail it will enable him
to have his medical condition be properly addressed
and attended, which will then enable him to attend
trial therefore achieving the true purpose of bail.
In addition, It is the Philippines responsibility in
the international community under
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights .of
protecting and promoting the right of every person
to liberty and due processunder the obligation to
make available to every person under detention
such remedies which safeguard their fundamental
right to liberty. These remedies include the right to
be admitted to bail. He is also not a flight
risk because of his social and political standing and
his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon being charged in court. Lastly, the
fragile state of Enriles health is a compelling
justification for his admission to bail.
Bail as a matter of discretion
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987
Constitution and repeated in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of
the stage of the criminal prosecution.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of
any criminal offense, shall be bailable.
Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life
imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has
been established that the evidence of guilt is strong.
Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may
be granted according to the discretion of the court.
Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:
Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death,reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary. The application for
bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it
has not transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial
court convicting the accused changed the nature of
the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the
application for bail can only be filed with and
resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused
may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty
during the pendency of the appeal under the same
bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled
upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to
the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion
of any party, review the resolution of the Regional
Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either
case.
CASE NO. 44
Del Castillo vs.People, 664 SCRA
FACTS:
Police officers had conducted a search in
petitioners house after receiving a report that
he was engaged in selling shabu. Thereat,
petitioner had managed to escape after the
officers had served the warrant. Consequently,
the officers decided to closely guard the place
where the subject ran.
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson
Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner
searched the house of petitioner including the
nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for
cover. One of the barangay tanods was able to
confiscate from the nipa hut several articles,
including four (4) plastic packs containing white
crystalline substance. Consequently, the
articles that were confiscated were sent to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The
contents of the four (4) heat- sealed
transparent plastic packs were subjected to
laboratory examination, the result of which
proved positive for the presence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
During arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance
of his counsel, pleaded not guilty.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable of the charge against him in the
Information.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with the CA,
but the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC.
After the motion for reconsideration of petitioner
was denied by the CA, petitioner filed with this Court
the present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
The Court of Appeals erred in its application of the
element of possession as against the petitioner, as it
was in violation of the established jurisprudence on
the matter. had the said court properly applied the
element in question, it could have been assayed
that the same had not been proven.
RULING:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its
Comment dated February 10, 2009, argued that the
Court of Appeals did not err in finding him guilty of
illegal possession of prohibited drugs because it
stated that when prohibited and regulated drugs are
found in a house or other building belonging to and
occupied by a particular person, the presumption
arises that such person is in possession of such
drugs in violation of law, and the fact of finding the
same is sufficient to convict.
On the other hand, the Court emphasized that it
must be put into emphasis that this present case is
about the violation of Section 16 of R.A. 6425. In
every prosecution for the illegal possession
of shabu, the following essential elements must be
established: (a) the accused is found in possession
of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized
by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the
accused has knowledge that the said drug is a
regulated drug.
It furthermore ruled that while it is not necessary
that the property to be searched or seized should be
owned by the person against whom the search
warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing
that the property is under appellants control or
possession. The CA, in its Decision, referred to the
possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a
constructive one. The RTC, as well as the CA,
merely presumed that petitioner used the said
structure due to the presence of electrical materials,
the petitioner being an electrician by profession.
In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution do not also provide proof as to the
ownership of the structure where the seized articles
were found. During their direct testimonies, they just
said, without stating their basis, that the same
structure was the shop of petitioner. During the
direct testimony of SPO1 Pogoso, he even outrightly
concluded that the electrical shop/nipa hut was
owned by petitioner. However, during cross-
examination, SPO3 Masnayon admitted that there
was an electrical shop but denied what he said in his
earlier testimony that it was owned by petitioner.
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had
knowledge of the existence and presence of the
drugs in the place under his control and dominion
and the character of the drugs. With the
prosecution's failure to prove that the nipa hut was
under petitioner's control and dominion, there casts
a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a
criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own
starting perspective on the status of the accused - in
all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of
the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt,
or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a
moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the
conscience of those who act in judgment, is
indispensable to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
CASE NO. 45
MIGUEL V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Koronadal City, South Cotabato Vice Mayor (and
others) filed a complaint before the Ombudsman
against herein Petitioner for violation of RA 3019 in
connection with architectural and engineering works
in the proposed Koronadal public market.
Ombudsman required Petitioner to submit a counter-
affidavit, which was submitted after a request for
extension. Ombudsman found probable cause to file
the Information before Sandiganbayan charging
Petitioner with violation of RA 3019 and falsification
of public document. The information essentially said
that Petitioner committed the offense charged,
taking advantage of his position, and acting with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality
The next turn of events would show that prior to
arraignment, Petitioner asked several extensions to
file a counter-affidavit, which he repeatedly failed.
Petitioner orally moved for reinvestigation, and
extension of 10 days to file counter-affidavit, which
was granted Again asked for 30-day extension, and
before the expiry of that request, he again asked for
another 30 days. Both were granted, but asked for
another 20 days, which was also granted. Despite
the extensions given, he failed to submit his
counter-affidavit. This prompted the Prosecutor to
declare that petitioner has waived his right to
submit counter-availing evidence, and asked the
Sandiganbayan for the arraignment of Petitioner.
Petitioner then asked an extension to file a motion to
quash and/or reinvestigation, Sandiganbayan denied
due to the already pending reinvestigation and his
apparent failure to submit a counter affidavit.
Petitioner did not question this denial
Petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
Prosecution moved to suspend Petitioner pendente
lite, which Petitioner opposed. This was eventually
granted by Sandiganbayan. Motion for
reconsideration of Petitioner likewise denied , hence,
this Petition.
Issue:
Whether the Petitioner waived his right to present
evidence and be heard
Held:
Yes. Petitioner claims that Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion ordering his suspension despite
the information failing to prove the evident bad faith
and manifest impartiality. OSP argues that the
information sufficiently established all the elements
of the crime. Petitioner failed to cite how the evident
bad faith and manifest impartiality was not proven.
The test of w/n an information sufficiently describes
the crime charged is if the information describes the
crime in intelligible terms and in such particularity
with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly
informed of the crime charged. In this case, what
Petitioner is essentially assailing is that of evident
bad faith and manifest impartiality. At best, what
Petitioner can ask is a bill of particulars.
The main topic on right to present evidence and be
heard is attached to the validity of the suspension of
Petitioner RA 3019 mandates that a public officer
charged under that Act or under RPC shall be
suspended from office. The suspension requires a
prior hearing to determine the validity of the
information. The accused public official may
challenge the information even before the
suspension order on the grounds of: (1) Validity of
the proceeding that led to the filing of information,
(2) propriety of the prosecution on the grounds that
the act imputed did not have all the elements of the
crime Petitioner says that, according to a previous
jurisprudence, the trial court should issue a show
cause order against the prosecution before ordering
the suspension. However, in that same
jurisprudence he cited, the show cause order is
unnecessary when a motion to suspend pendent lite
was already filed. Moreover, the show cause order
(essentially a pre-suspension hearing) is aimed at
securing for the accused a fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity of the
information or the validity of the proceedings
against him. Such proceedings offer the accused to
be heard, and being heard and does not necessarily
mean oral pleadings before the court. It can also be
written pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard
either through oral arguments or written pleadings
has been granted no denial of due process exists.
Accused has repeatedly failed to present his
counter-affidavit despite being granted several
extensions. Moreover, the said suspension is not a
penalty. It is merely a preventive measure that
reflects the constitutional mandate that a public
office is a public trust.
CASE NO. 46
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARTURO LARA Y.
ORBISTA
G.R. No. 199877; 13 August 2012
FACTS:
On or about 31 May 2001 in Pasig City, the
accused, armed with a gun, conspired and
confederated with an unidentified person and with
violence and intimidation, stole and divested from
one Joselito M. Bautista cash amounting to
P230,000.00 and shot and assaulted the same
inflicting several wounds which led to the his death.
The money belonged to San Sebastian Allied
Services, represented by the witness Enrique
Sumulong. On the said date, Sumulong was
accompanied by Virgilio Manacob, Jeff Atie, and the
deceased after withdrawing the money supposedly
for the salary of the companys employees.
The accused pleaded not guilty and the trial
commenced. During the course of the trial, the
prosecution presented several witnesses including
Enrique Sumulong, SPO1 Cruz, and PO3 Calix.
The first witness testified that on 07 June
2001, while on his way to barangay San Miguel in
Pasig City, he saw the accused walking in Dr. Pilapil
Street. He then alerted the other witnesses about
this incident. Consequently, Sumulong, together
with four (4) policemen, went to the said street and
positively identified the accused. Having confirmed
the identity of the accused, the police approached
him and invited him at the police station for
questioning. The accused was then placed in a
police lineup and there, Manacob and Atie attested
that it was really the accused who robbed and killed
the deceased. Thereafter, the accused was informed
of his rights and subsequently detained.
In his defense, the accused stated that on
the said date of the robbery, he was at his house
fixing a sewer trench. Finding this as a weak alibi,
the Court considered the vicinity of his residence
and the crime scene located in the same barangay,
the RTC convicted him of robbery with homicide.
On appeal, the accused raised several errors
including the argument that he was not assisted by
counsel when the police placed him on the lineup,
which according to him, was a flagrant violation of
his right under Section 12, Article III of the
constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lara was denied his right to
counsel thereby making his arrest illegal, making it a
sufficient ground to invalidate the proceedings.
HELD:
No. Since the contention of Lara was a
belated invocation, the court did not find merit on
his appeal. Any objections to the legality of the
warrantless arrest should have been raised in a
motion to quash duly filed before the accused
entered his plea; otherwise, it is deemed waived.
Furthermore, the Court held that the illegal arrest is
not a ground to set aside conviction duly arrived at
and based on evidence that sufficiently establishes
his culpability. As regards his claim that he was
denied a counsel, the Court dismissed the same
stating that there was no legal compulsion to afford
him a counsel because the police lineup was not
part of the custodial investigation.
CASE NO. 47
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 198753, March 25, 2015
JOSE PEPE SANICO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND JENNIFER SON-
TENIO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Sanico and Marsito Batiquin were criminally charged
for trespassing and theft of minerals in MCTC of
Catmon-Carmen-Sogod, Cebu. MCTC rendered
judgment convicting Sanico and Batiquin with
violation of Sec 103 of RA 7942 or Phil Mining Act of
1995 but acquitted them for trespassing.
On April 22, 2009, Sanicos counsel filed a notice of
appeal of MCTC judgment. RTC ordered Sanico to file
his memorandum on appeal but he did not comply.
RTC dismissed the appeal for failure to file
Memorandum on Appeal.
On April 26, 2010, Atty. Dennis Caete, another
lawyer acting for Sanico, filed a motion for
reconsideration averring that Sanico was
preoccupied with the condition of his ailing wife who
subsequently died; and his counsel, Atty. Baring,
suffered from a medical condition which caused her
to forget how she got the case and whom to contact
as principal counsel.
RTC denied the motion for lack of verification and
affidavit of merit, and because the supposed
sickness of Sanicos wife and the lapses of Atty.
Baring were not justifiable reasons.
Atty. Caete filed a petition for review in CA
contesting his conviction, and assailing the dismissal
of his appeal, which was denied on the following
grounds, namely: (a) the docket fees were not paid;
(b) there was no proper proof of service of a copy of
the petition for review on the adverse party; (c) the
petitioner did not furnish to the RTC a copy of the
petition for review; (d) there was no affidavit of
service; (e) no written explanation for not resorting
to personal filing was filed; (f) the documents
appended to the petition were only plain
photocopies of the certified true copies; (g) no
copies of pleadings and other material portions of
the record were attached; (h) the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping were defective
due to failure to contain a statement that the
allegations therein were based on the petitioners
personal knowledge; (i) the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping did not contain
competent evidence of identity of the petitioner;
and (j) the serial number of the commission of the
notary public and the office address of the notary
public were not properly indicated.
CA also denied the motion for reconsideration and
held that a client is generally bound by the acts,
even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of
procedural technique.
ISSUE:
Whether Sanico is bound by the mistakes of his
counsel in the realm of procedural technique.
HELD:
No. The petitioner could reasonably expect that his
counsel would afford to him competent legal
representation. The mere failure of the counsel to
observe a modicum of care and vigilance in the
protection of the interests of the petitioner as the
client as manifested in the multiple defects and
shortcomings discovered in the petition for review
was gross negligence in any language because the
defects were plainly avoidable by the simple
application of the relevant guidelines existing in the
Rules of Court. If the incompetence of counsel was
so great and the error committed as a result was so
serious that the client was prejudiced by a denial of
his day in court, the litigation ought to be re-opened
to give to the client another chance to present his
case. The legitimate interests of the petitioner,
particularly the right to have his conviction reviewed
by the RTC as the superior tribunal, should not be
sacrificed in the altar of technicalities.
Although the right to appeal is statutory, it must be
respected and observed because it is an essential
component of due process.
CASE NO. 48
People v Ayson 175 SCRA 216 (1989)
Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the
Philippine Airlines and was allegedly involved in
irregularities in the sales of plane tickets. The PAL
management notified him of an investigation to be
conducted. That investigation was scheduled in
accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and
Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement
signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees'
Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A
letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to
settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the
Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that
he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he
was prevented from settling said amounts. He
proffered a compromise however this did not ensue.
Two months after a crime of estafa was charged
against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence
by the prosecution contained Ramos written
admission and statement, to which defendants
argued that the confession was taken without the
accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent
Judge did not admit those stating that accused was
not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to have counsel. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied.
Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge is
correct in making inadmissible as evidence the
admission and statement of accused.
Held: No. The judge should admit the evidence in
court as the accused was not under custodial
investigation when his statements were taken. One
cannot invoke violation of the right to counsel in
administrative proceeding. The right to self-
incrimination and custodial investigation are
accorded only when the accused is subjected to
custodial inquest which involves the questioning
initiated by police authorities after a person is taken
in custody or deprived of his freedom in any way.
Because the statements were obtained beyond the
purview of custodial investigation the evidence
should be admitted in court.
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down
in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the
accused include:
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be
used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these
rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he
has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must
be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
After such warnings have been given, such
opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and
agree to answer or make a statement. But unless
and until such warnings and waivers are
demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no
evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be
used against him. The objective is to prohibit
"incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a
police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-
incriminating statement without full warnings of
constitutional rights."
CASE NO. 49
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 151258
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
Vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, et. al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 154954
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,
Vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 155101
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,
Vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, et. al.,
Respondents.
G.R. No.s 178057 & 178080
February 01, 2012
Ponente: SERENO, J.
BRIEF
This is are 5 consolidated cases involving the death
of Leonardo Lenny Villa, a freshman law student of
the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law,
during initiation rites of the Aquila Legis Juris
Fraternity.
FACTS
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of
the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris
Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar
"Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido
"Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera,
Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and
Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
The neophytes had to undergo initiation rites that
were scheduled to last for three days. Initiation rites
include physical and psychological sufferings such
that the neophytes were punched, given knee blows
to their thighs, paddled and were required to
memorize and recite the principles of the Aquila
Legis Juris Fraternity.
The neophytes had survived their first two days of
initiation. However, after the neophytes had
concluded their second day of initiation, and after a
while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity
members Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal
demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of
initiation rites, Nelson Victorino, initially refused.
Upon insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he
reopened the initiation rites. After receiving again
several blows and paddles, the initiation for the day
was officially ended and the neophytes had their
dinner, then they slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly
roused by Lennys shivering and incoherent
mumblings. When his conditioned worsened, the
Aquilans rushed him to the hospital, but Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, two criminal cases for homicide was
filed against 35 Aquilans, one under Criminal Case
no. C-38340(91) and the other was Criminal Case
no. C-38340. The trial in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91) commenced thereafter. On the other
hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in
Criminal Case no. C-38340 was held in abeyance
due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.
Due to "several pending incidents," the trial court
ordered a separate trial for accused Escalona,
Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De
Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case
No. C-38340) to commence after proceedings
against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91) shall have terminated. On 8 November
1993, the trial court found the 26 accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340 involving
the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29
November 1993. For "various reasons," the initial
trial of the case did not commence until 28 March
2005, or almost 12 years after the arraignment of
the nine accused.
The trial court in Criminal Case no. 38340 dismissed
the charge against accused Concepcion on the
ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.
Meanwhile, on different dates between the years
2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective
Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA
reversed the trial courts Orders and dismissed the
criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to
speedy trial.
Petitioner Villa filed a Petition for Certiorari, praying
for the reversal of the CAs decision involving the
dismissal of the criminal charges against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca and Adriano.
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the
criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely,
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues
that the accused failed to assert their right to
speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She
also points out that the prosecution cannot be
faulted for the delay, as the original records and the
required evidence were not at its disposal, but were
still in the appellate court.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
1. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the
case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano
on the ground of their right to speedy trial.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been
enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. This right requires that there be a
trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive
delays. The right is deemed violated when the
proceeding is attended with unjustified
postponements of trial, or when a long period
of time is allowed to elapse without the case
being tried and for no cause or justifiable
motive. In determining the right of the accused to
speedy trial, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the
case. The conduct of both the prosecution and the
defense must be weighed. Also to be considered are
factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or
non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought
upon the defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs
dismissal of the case against accused Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the
violation of their right to speedy trial. The court held
thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case
would reveal that the following factors contributed
to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case
below:
xxx xxx xxx
5) The fact that the records of the case were
elevated to the Court of Appeals and the
prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the
court a quo requiring them to secure certified true
copies of the same.
xxx xxx xxx
While we are prepared to concede that some of the
foregoing factors that contributed to the delay of the
trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless
hold that their right to speedy trial has been utterly
violated in this case x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was]
due to the fact that the records of the case were
elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the
prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the
court a quo requiring it to secure certified true
copies of the same. What is glaring from the records
is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the
court a quo already issued an Order requiring the
prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to
secure the complete records of the case from the
Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply
with the said Order as in fact, the same directive
was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated
December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance
on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when
such order was complied with. It appears, however,
that even until August 5, 2002, the said records
were still not at the disposal of the trial court
because the lack of it was made the basis of the said
court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-
accused Concepcion x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27,
1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost
seven years, there was no action at all on the part of
the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by
both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest
of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by
petitioner Sarucas motion to set case for trial on
August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon,
the case remained dormant for a considerable
length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever
is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution
frowns upon x x x.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954,
acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby affirmed. The
appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080,
dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise affirmed.
Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby
dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio
Villareal deemed closed and TERMINATED.
CASE NO. 50
[G.R. Nos. 117485-86. April 22, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. MELCHOR ESTOMACA y GARQUE,
accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Estomaca an illiterate laborer was charged
with 5 counts of rape. In May 24, 1994, consequent
to five separate complaints, Criminal Cases were
filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Iloilo City
charging herein appellant, an illiterate laborer, with
rape committed on five separate occasions against
his own daughter, complainant Estelita Estomaca.
Melita is the eldest daughter of the accused, the
second husband of Melitas mother. Melita has a full-
blood younger brother around twelve (12) years old.
She has two (2) half-blood sisters (from) the first
marriage of her mother who are residing in Manila.
She was first raped July of 1993, and subsequently
on December of 1993, January of 1994, February of
1994, and march of 1994. But the accused on his
arraignment plead guilty on the two events and not
guilty for the three events of raped. As to two guilty
case, That sometime in the month of December,
1993, in the Municipality of San Joaquin, Province of
Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, that the accused was taking
advantage of his superior strength, abuse of
confidence and trust, he being the father of the
undersigned, with deliberate intent and by means of
force, threat and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with the undersigned who, at that time,
(was) 15 years of age. The accused also waived the
presentation of evidence in his defense, proving his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He was sentence
reclusion perpetua and indemnity for damages. But
the court was not convince regarding the procedural
aspect of the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Arraignment of the
accused is valid?
HELD:
No, Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the
arraignment should be made in open court by the
judge himself or by the clerk of court furnishing the
accused a copy of the complaint or information with
the list of witnesses stated therein, then reading the
same in the language or dialect that is known to
him, and asking him what his plea is to the charge.
The requirement that the reading be made in a
language or dialect that the accused understands
and knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the
whole of said Section 1 should be strictly followed by
trial courts. This the law affords the accused by way
of implementation of the all-important constitutional
mandate regarding the right of an accused to be
informed of the precise nature of the accusation
leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for
him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in
rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due
process clause under the Constitution. That the
compliant must be fully explained and understand
by the accused and can be translated in any
language that would be appropriate for the person
to fully understand. That the court ruled, that
Section 3 of Rule 116 which the trial court violated is
not a new rule for it merely incorporated the
decision of this Court in People vs. Apduhan Jr. and
reiterated in an unbroken line of cases. The bottom
line of the rule is that a plea of guilt must be based
on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the
searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused
on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea; and (2) the full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The
questions of the trial court failed to show the
voluntariness of the plea of guilty of the appellant
nor did the questions demonstrate appellants full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The
records do not reveal any information about the
personality profile of the appellant which can serve
as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free
and informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic
status, and educational background of the appellant
were not plumbed by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a
quo in Criminal Cases Nos. 43568 and 43571
convicting accused-appellant Melchor Estomaca y
Garque of two crimes of rape is hereby SET ASIDE.
Said cases are REMANDED to the trial court for
further and appropriate proceedings, with
instructions that the same be given appropriate
priority and the proceedings therein be conducted
with deliberate dispatch and circumspection.
CASE NO. 51
G.R. No. 171020 March 14, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO PANGILINAN y TRINIDAD, Accused-
Appellant.
FACTS:
For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed with modification the decision of
(RTC) of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5, finding
appellant Alfredo Trinidad Pangilinan guilty of two
counts of rape. The Court of Appeals upheld the two
death sentences imposed on appellant but modified
the award of damages.1vvphi1.nt
Two informations were filed charging appellant with
raping AAA, his daughter. Appellant, who was
arrested and detained with no bail recommended,
filed a petition for bail.
In the hearings for the petition for bail, the
prosecution presented the private complainant-
victim, BBB, and Dr. Melinda Layug.
From the evidence presented, the prosecutions
version of what transpired, as summarized by the
Office of the Solicitor General, is quoted by the Court
of Appeals:
Inasmuch as the penalty it imposed was the death
penalty, the trial court forwarded the records of the
case to the Supreme Court for automatic review
pursuant to Section 10, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules
of Criminal Procedure.14However, pursuant to our
ruling in People v. Mateo,15 the case was transferred
to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and
disposition.16
The Court of Appeals affirmed the death penalties
imposed by the trial court but modified the amounts
of damages awarded. The Court of Appeals elevated
the records of the case to the Supreme Court for
automatic review. Thereafter, in our resolution
dated 28 February 2006, the parties were required
to submit supplemental briefs, if they so desired,
within thirty (30) days from notice. The parties opted
not to file supplemental brief on the ground they
had fully argued their positions in their respective
briefs.
ISSUE:
W/N appellants rights and interests prejudiced by
the fact that he was arraigned only after his case
was submitted for decision
HELD:
We do not think so. Appellants belated arraignment
did not prejudice him. This procedural defect was
cured when his counsel participated in the trial
without raising any objection that his client had yet
to be arraigned. In fact, his counsel even cross-
examined the prosecution witnesses. His counsels
active participation in the hearings is a clear
indication that he was fully aware of the charges
against him; otherwise, his counsel would have
objected and informed the court of this blunder.
Moreover, no protest was made when appellant was
subsequently arraigned. The parties did not question
the procedure undertaken by the trial court. It is
only now, after being convicted and sentenced to
two death sentences, that appellant cries that his
constitutional right has been violated. It is already
too late to raise this procedural defect. This Court
will not allow it.
CASE NO. 52
DAAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NOS. 163972-77
Facts:
Joselito Daan together with co-accused Benedicto
Kuizon were charged for three counts of
malversation of public funds which they purportedly
tried to conceal by falsifying the time book and
payrolls for given period making it appear that some
laborers worked on the construction of the new
municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte and collected
their respective salaries thereon when, in truth and
in fact, they did not. Thus, in addition to the charge
for malversation, the accused were also indicted for
three counts of falsification of public document by a
public officer or employee.
The accused offered withdraw their plea of "not
guilty" and substitute the same with a plea of
"guilty", provided, the mitigating circumstances of
confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender
will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative,
if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused
proposed instead to substitute their plea of "not
guilty" to the crime of falsification of public
document by a public officer or employee with a
plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of
falsification of a public document by a private
individual. On the other hand, in the malversation
cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of
"not guilty" thereto with a plea of "guilty", but to the
lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to
render accounts.
The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion to
Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by
the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent
reason was presented to justify its approval. Hence,
this appeal.
Issue:
Whether Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners plea bargaining
offer.
Held:
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process
whereby the accused and the prosecution work out
a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case
subject to court approval. It usually involves the
defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to
only one or some of the counts of a multi-count
indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that
for the graver charge.
Records show that there was a favorable
recommendation by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to approve petitioner's motion to plea
bargain.
With respect to the falsification cases earlier
mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in
pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by
private individual defined and penalized under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code will strengthen
the cases against the principal accused, the
Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to
be the master mind of these criminal acts. After all,
the movants herein JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN was
merely designated as draftsman detailed as
foreman/timekeeper of the Municipality of Bato,
Leyte.
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO
RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total
amount of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued
by the provincial government of Leyte dated
February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to
the government has already been restituted by the
accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN
voluntarily surrendered in the instant cases.
Moreover, the accused is also willing to plead guilty
to a lesser offense which to our mind, merits
consideration.
Petition granted.
CASE NO. 53
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JANJALANI
G.R. No. 188314
January 10, 2011
FACTS:
On February 14, 2005 night, the bus conductor of
RRCG bus noticed two men running after the bus.
The two insisted on getting on the bus and so the
conductor obliged and let them in. Elmer Andales,
the bus conductor, immediately became wary due to
their unusual conduct. One of the two men sat two
seats behind the driver while the other sat at the
back of the bus. Both of them paid for two
passengers. At that point, Andales became certain
that the two were up to no good.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the
corner of Ayala avenue and EDSA, the two men
insisted on getting off the bus. The bus driver
initially did not want to let them off the bus due to a
Makati ordinance prohibiting the unloading except at
designated bus stop. Eventually, the bus driver gave
in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two
immediately got off the bus. Moments after, Andales
felt an explosion and saw that the bus was on fire.
He ran out of the bus and when he went back he
saw their passengers either lying on the ground or
looking traumatized.
After the explosion, the spokesperson for Abu
Sayyaff announced over radio that the explosion
was a valentines gift for the former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo.
Accused Trinidad, in an exclusive interview,
confessed his participation in the Valentines Day
bombing. Baharan, in another exclusive interview,
likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident.
Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview,
confessing that he had supplied the explosive
devises for the bombing.
The accused were then charged with multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only
Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested,
while the other accused members of Abu Sayyaf
remain at-large.
On their arraignment for the multiple murder
charge, Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a
plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment
for the multiple frustrated murder charge, accused
Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled
not guilty. Rohm pled not guilty to both charges.
The trial court asked whether accused Baharan and
Trinidad were amenable to changing their not guilty
pleas to the charge of multiple frustrated murder,
considering that they plan guilty to the heavier
charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent
inconsistency in their pleas. Defence counsel
conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and
explained to them the consequences of the pleas.
The two accused acknowledge the inconsistencies
and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment.
After the Information was read to them, Baharan and
Trinidad plead guilty to the charge of multiple
frustrated murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in
accepting accused-appellants plea of guilt despite
insufficiency of searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the said plea.
COURTS RULING:
The Court ruled that it was unnecessary to rule on
the sufficiency of the searching inquiry.
Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argued
that the trial court did not conduct a searching
inquiry after they had changed their plea from not
guilty to guilty.
Trial court judges are required to observe the
following procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court: When the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and
shall require that prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpability. The accused may
also present evidence in his behalf.
The requirement to conduct a searching applies
more so in cases of re-arraignment. In People vs
Galvez, the Court notes that since accused-
appellants original plea was not guilty, the trial
court should have exerted careful effort in inquiring
into why he changed his plea to guilty.
According to the Court: The stringent procedure
governing the section of a plea of guilt, especially in
a case involving the death penalty, is imposed upon
the trial judge in order to leave no room for doubt on
the possibility that the accused might have
misunderstood the nature of the charge and the
consequences of the plea.
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching
inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases
which it was the defence counsel who explained the
consequences of a guilty plea to the accused, as it
appears in the case.
Nevertheless, the Court ruled that they are not
unmindful of the context under which the re-
arraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu
surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused.
The Court observed that accused Baharan and
Trinidad previously plead guilty to another charge -
multiple murder - based on the same act relied upon
in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court
further notes that prior to the change of plea to one
of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two
other confessions of guilt - one through an
extrajudicial confession, and the other via judicial
admission. Considering the foregoing circumstances,
the Court deem it unnecessary to rule on the
sufficiency of the searching inquiry in this
instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is
not warranted, as the accuseds plea of guilt was not
the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under
consideration.
CASE NO. 54
ABS-CBN Corp. vs. Gozon, 753 SCRA 1
FACTS:
On August 13, 2004, petitioner ABS-CBN filed a
criminal complaint against respondent GMA for
(alleged) act of copyright infringement under
Sections 177 and 211 of the Intellectual Property
Code (RA 8293, as amended), because the
respondent aired footage of the arrival and
homecoming of OFW Angelo dela Cruz at NAIA from
Iraq without the petitioner's consent. ABS-CBN
stated that it has an agreement with Reuter's that
the petition will contribute news and content that it
owns and makes to Reuters in exchange of the
latter's news and video material, and Reuters will
ensure that ABS-CBN's materials cannot be aired in
the country. The respondent was a subscriber of
Reuter's and CNN live feeds. After it received the live
feed of Angelo Dela Cruz's arrival and homecoming
from Reuter's, it immediately aired the video from
that news feed. The respondent alleged that its
news staff was not aware that there was (a news
embargo) agreement between ABSCBN and Reuters.
Respondent alleged that it was not also aware that it
aired petitioner's footage.
Assistant City Prosecutor Dindo Venturanza issued
resolution on 3 December 2004 which found
probable cause to indict Dela Pea-Reyes and
Manalastas. The respondents appealed the
Prosccutor's resolution before DOJ. DOJ Secretary
Raul M. Gonzalez ruled in favor of respondents in his
resolution dated 1 August 2005 and held that good
faith may be raised as a defense in the case.
Meanwhile, DOJ Acting Secretary Alberto C. Agra
issued a resolution on 29 June 2010 which reversed
Sec. Gonzalez's resolution and found probable cause
to charge Dela Pea-Reyes, Manalastas, as well as to
indict Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, and Soho for
violation of the Intellectual Property Code (due to
copyright infringement).
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision on 9
November 2010, which granted the Petition for
Certiorari to reverse and set aside DOJ Sec. Alberto
Agra's resolution and a prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. The appellate court stated
that the petitioner has copyright of its news
coverage, but respondents act of airing five (5)
seconds of the homecoming footage without notice
of the No Access Philippines restriction of the live
Reuter's video feed, was undeniably attended by
good faith and thus, serves to exculpate from
criminal liability under the Intellectual Property
Code.
ISSUE: Whether there is probable cause to charge
respondents with infringement under Republic Act
No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual
Property Code. The resolution of this issue requires
clarification of the concept of "copyrightable
material" in relation to material that is rebroadcast
live as a news story. We are also asked to rule on
whether criminal prosecution for infringement of
copyrightable material, such as live rebroadcast, can
be negated by good faith.
HELD:
The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED ABS-CBNs
petition and ordered RTC Q.C. Branch 93 to continue
with the criminal proceedings against Grace Dela
Pea-Reyes and John Oliver Manalastas due to
copyright infringement. The other respondents, Atty.
Felipe Gozon, Gilberto Duavit Jr., Marissa L. Flores,
and Jessica A. Soho were held not liable for the
(criminal) act of copyright infringement. The Court
held that their mere membership in GMA7's Board of
Directors does not mean that they have knowledge,
approval, or participation in the criminal act of
copyright infringement., as there is a need for their
direct/active participation in such act. Also, there
was lack of proof that they actively participated or
exercised moral ascendancy over Manalastas and
Dela Cruz-Pena. Contrary to GMAs contention, the
Supreme Court deemed GMA's mere act of
rebroadcast of ABS-CBNs news footage (arrival and
homecoming of OFW Angelo dela Cruz at NAIA from
Iraq last 22 July 2004) for 2 mins and 40
secs.without the latter's authority creates probable
cause to find GMA's news personnel Manalastas and
Dela Pea-Reyes criminally liable for violating
provisions of Intellectual Property Code (Section
216217 of RA 8293, as amended) that imposes strict
liability for copyright infringement, since they have
not been diligent in their functions to prevent that
footage from being aired on television. They knew
that there would be consequences in carrying ABS-
CBNs footage in their broadcast which is why they
allegedly cut the feed from Reuters upon seeing
ABS-CBNs logo and reporter.
The difference of an act mala in se and mala
prohibita was stated in the present case. Acts mala
in se requires presence of criminal intent and the
person's knowledge of the nature of his/her act,
while in acts mala prohibita, presence of criminal
intent and the person's knowledge is not necessary.
The Court also stated that Philippine laws on
copyright infringement does not require criminal
intent (mens rea) and does not support good faith as
a defense. Thus, the act of infringement and not the
intent is the one that causes the damage.
It held that ABS-CBN's video footage is copyrightable
because it is under audiovisual works and
cinematographic works and works produced by a
process analogous to cinematography or any
process for making audiovisual recordings. It also
stated that news or the event itself is not
copyrightable. The Court differentiated idea and
expression idea meant as a form, the look or
appearance of a thing while expression is its reality
or the external, perceptible world of articulate
sounds and visible written symbols that others can
understand. Thus, the Supreme Court stated that
only the expression of an idea is protected by
copyright, not the idea itself, citing the US Supreme
Court's decision in Baker vs Selden (101 U.S. 99). In
the present case, expression applies to the event
captured and presented in a specific medium via
cinematography or processes analogous to it. The
Court also gave the four-fold test under the Fair Use
Doctrine (stated in section 185 of RA 8293 or the
Intellectual Property Code, as amended) to
determine fair
use:
a. The purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
non-profit educational purposes;
b. The nature of the copyrighted work;
c. The amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
d. The effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.
Fair use, which is an exception to copyright owners
monopoly of the work's usage, was defined by the
Supreme Court as privilege to use the copyrighted
material in a reasonable manner without the
copyright owner's consent or by copying the
material's theme or idea rather than its expression.
It also said that determination of whether the Angelo
dela Cruz footage is subject to fair use is better left
to the trial court where the proceedings are
currently pending.
CASE NO. 55
G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-
TANG, HON. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, AND HON.
ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE THIRD DIVISION OF
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
Facts:
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed
an Information3 for plunder against Enrile, Jessica
Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim,
and John Raymund de Asis before the
Sandiganbayan.
Enrile responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan
(1) an urgent omnibus motion (motion to dismiss for
lack of evidence on record to establish probable
cause and ad cautelam motion for bail)
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied Enriles
motions and ordered the issuance of warrants of
arrest on the plunder case against the accused
On July 10, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for bill of
particulars before the Sandiganbayan. On the same
date, he filed a motion for deferment of arraignment
since he was to undergo medical examination at the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH).
When the court session resumed, PJ Cabotaje-Tang
announced the Courts denial of Enriles motion for
bill of particulars essentially on the following
grounds:
(1)
the details that Enrile desires are substantial
reiterations of the arguments he raised in his
supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant
of arrest and for dismissal of information; and
(2)
the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are
best ventilated during trial.
Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied his
motion for bill of particulars despite the ambiguity
and insufficiency of the Information filed against
him. Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious
violation of his constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Enrile further alleges that he was left to speculate
on what his specific participation in the crime of
plunder had been. He posits that the Information
should have stated the details of the particular acts
that allegedly constituted the imputed series or
combination of overt acts that led to the charge of
plunder.
Enrile posits that his desired details are not
evidentiary in nature; they are material facts that
should be clearly alleged in the Information so that
he may be fully informed of the charges against him
and be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
Enrile adds that the grounds raised in his motion for
bill of particulars are cited in a context different from
his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
He maintains that the resolution of the probable
cause issue was interlocutory and did not bar the
submission of the same issue in subsequent
proceedings especially in the context of a different
proceeding.
ISSUE (S)
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan exercised its
discretionary power in an arbitrary or despotic
manner in denying Enriles motion for bill of
particulars
Held:
After due consideration, we resolve to partially
GRANT the petition under the terms outlined below.
a. We PARTIALLY GRANT the present petition for
certiorari, and SET ASIDE the Sandiganbayans
resolutions dated July 11, 2014, which denied
Enriles motion for bill of particulars and his motion
for reconsideration of this denial.
b. We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to
SUBMIT, within a non-extendible period of fifteen
(15) days from finality of this Decision, with copy
furnished to Enrile, a bill of particulars containing
the facts sought that we herein rule to be material
and necessary. The bill of particulars shall
specifically contain the following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Ratio
The constitutional right of the accused to be
informed
Under the Constitution, a person who stands
charged of a criminal offense has the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him
The objective is to describe the act with sufficient
certainty to fully appraise the accused of the nature
of the charge against him and to avoid possible
surprises that may lead to injustice. Otherwise, the
accused would be left speculating on why he has
been charged at all. The Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, in implementing the constitutional right
of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, specifically
require certain matters to be stated in the
Information for its sufficiency. The requirement aims
to enable the accused to properly prepare for his
defense since he is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts constituting the
offense charged.
In general, a bill of particulars is the further
specification of the charges or claims in an action,
which an accused may avail of by motion before
arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and
prepare for trial.
The rule requires the information to describe the
offense with sufficient particularity to apprise the
accused of the crime charged with and to enable the
court to pronounce judgment. The particularity must
be such that persons of ordinary intelligence may
immediately know what the Information means.
The general function of a bill of particulars, whether
in civil or criminal proceedings, is to guard against
surprises during trial. It is not the function of the bill
to furnish the accused with the evidence of the
prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor shall not be
required to include in the bill of particulars matters
of evidence relating to how the people intend to
prove the elements of the offense charged or how
the people intend to prove any item of factual
information included in the bill of particulars
Thus, if the Information is lacking, a court should
take a liberal attitude towards its granting and order
the government to file a bill of particulars
elaborating on the charges. Doubts should be
resolved in favor of granting the bill to give full
meaning to the accuseds Constitutionally
guaranteed rights.
Wherefore, the petition is granted as to the part of
Sandiganbayans resolutions dated July 11, 2014,
which denied Enriles motion for bill of particulars.
CASE NO. 56
People vs. Lacson, April 2003
Facts:
Herein petitioners file a motion for reconsideration
for the determination of several factual issues
relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the
dismissal of criminal cases filed against the
respondent and his co-accused. In the said criminal
cases, the respondent and his co-accused were
charged with multiple murders for the shooting and
killing of eleven male persons. The respondent
opposed petitioners motion.
Issues:
a) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases
had the express consent of the accused;
b) whether it was ordered by the court after notice
to the offended party;
c) whether the two-year period to revive it has
already lapsed;
d) whether there is any justification for the filing of
the cases beyond the two-year period;
Held:
a) No. The respondent did not give his express
consent to the provisional dismissal of the
case. The respondent allegedly admitted in his
pleadings filed with the Court of Appeals and
during the hearing thereat that he did not file
any motion to dismiss said cases, or even
agree to a provisional dismissal thereof.
b) No. There is no proof on record that all the
heirs of the victims were served with copies of
the resolution dismissing the said cases. In
fine, there never was any attempt on the part
of the trial court to notify all the heirs of the
victims of the respondents motion. No notice
of motion for provisional dismissal, hearing
and subsequent dismissal was given to the
offended parties.
c) No. The two-year period did not lapse yet. The
two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be
applied prospectively and not retroactively
against the State. The Judge dismissed the
case on March 29, 1999, and the New rule
took effect on Dec 1, 2000. It would only in
effect give the petitioners one year and three
months instead of two years. At that time,
they had no knowledge of the said rule and
therefore they should not be penalized for
that. To apply the time limit retroactively to
the criminal cases against the respondent and
his co-accused would violate the right of the
People to due process, and unduly impair,
reduce, and diminish the States substantive
right to prosecute the accused for multiple
murders.
d) To require the State to give a valid justification
as a condition sine qua non to the revival of a
case provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused before the effective
date of the new rule is to assume that the
State is obliged to comply with the time-bar
under the new rule before it took effect. This
would be a rank denial of justice. The State
must be given a period of one year or two
years as the case may be from December 1,
2000 to revive the criminal case without
requiring the State to make a valid
justification for not reviving the case before
the effective date of the new rule. Although in
criminal cases, the accused is entitled to
justice and fairness, so is the State.
CASE NO. 57
Panaguiton Jr vs Department of Justice
G.R. No. 167571
November 25, 2008
Facts:
Based from the facts culled from the records, in
1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various sums of
money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner.
On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business
associate, Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor
of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said
loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the
signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon
presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the
checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of
funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner
made formal demands to pay the amounts of the
checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon
Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint
against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before the Quezon
City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary
investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his
counter-affidavit. However, Tongson claimed that he
had been unjustly included as party-respondent in
the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in
the latter's personal capacity. Tongson averred that
he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he
himself had filed several criminal cases against
Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied
that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed
out that his signatures on the said checks had been
falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented
several documents showing Tongson's signatures,
which were purportedly the same as those
appearing on the checks. He also showed a copy of
an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson
himself had claimed to be Cawili's business
associate.
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City
Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause
only against Cawili and dismissed the charges
against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal
before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while
the case against Cawili was filed before the proper
court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after
finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign
the bounced checks and that he had deliberately
altered his signature in the pleadings submitted
during the preliminary investigation, Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo directed the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to
refer the questioned signatures to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the
resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of
merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma.
Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the
complaint against Tongson without referring the
matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's
resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that
the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No.
3326, as amended, which provides that violations
penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4)
years.
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through
Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed
the same, stating that the offense had already
prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then
Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in
his favor and declared that the offense had not
prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with
the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the
DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the
subject offense had already prescribed and ordered
"the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In
justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained
that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts
that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the
offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special
act, does not provide for the prescription of the
offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies
to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code
which governs the prescription of offenses penalized
thereunder.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004
resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by
the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to
attach a proper verification and certification of non-
forum shopping. In the instant petition, petitioner
claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave
error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds
and in ruling that the petition before it was patently
without merit and the questions are too
unsubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of
Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for
non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also
reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg.
22, a special law which does not provide for its own
prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4)
years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Issue:
Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating
B.P. Blg. 22 per Act No. 3326 and not Art. 90 of the
RPC, on the institution of judicial proceedings for
investigation and punishment?
Held:
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was
passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by
justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the
law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment," and the prevailing
rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed
with the justice of the peace for preliminary
investigation, the prescription of the offense is
halted.
Although, Tongson went through the proper
channels, within the prescribed periods. However,
from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit
with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August
1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed
resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had
elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's
control. After all, he had already initiated the active
prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995,
only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-
flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No.
3326.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep
on their rights and actively pursue their causes,
should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further
simply because of circumstances beyond their
control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the
delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
The court rules and so hold that the offense has not
yet prescribed. Petitioners filing of his complaint-
affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on
24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the
proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and
thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period
for the offenses they had been charged under B.P.
Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of
probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of
prescription there is no longer any impediment to
the filing of the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October
2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice
dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to
REFILE the information against the petitioner. No
costs.
CASE NO. 58
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HERMENEGILDO
DUMLAO
GR No. 168918, March 2, 2009
Facts: The Government Service Insurance Systems
of the meetings of the members of the GSIS B
Mr. Dumlao, the Board authorized its Man
Purchase Agreement (Agreement) with certain
After the investigation by the Ombudsman
information before the Sandiganbayan charg
violating Republic Act No. 3019 as the Agre
government. Mr. Dumlao filed a Motion to Q
him, the facts stated therein do not constitu
quorum in the members of the Board when t
 the Agreement non-existing. For the People, the bank's Board of Directors,
Ombudsman claims that without
the entering the said
case should proceed to trial for the prosecution totransaction
present their in case.
the bank's records, and without
transmitting a copy of the transaction to the
The Sandiganbayan granted the Motion for othersupervising
the reasondepartment of the bank.
that the evidence is
not sufficient.
On June 8, 2001, petitioner moved to quash these
Issue: Whether the grant of the Motion by the Sandiganbayan is proper
informations on two grounds: that the court had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged, and that the
Held: No. Under Section 3 of Rule 117 of the Revised factsRulescharged
on Criminaldo not constitute an offense.
Procedure
(Rules), the grounds to quash the information are: Essentially, the petitioner theorized that the
characterization of possession is different in the two
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offenses.
offense; If petitioner acquired the loan as DOSRI, he
(b) That the court trying the case has no owned the loaned
jurisdiction over money
the and therefore, cannot
offense charged; misappropriate or convert it as contemplated in the
offense of
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person estafa. Conversely, if petitioner
of the accused; committed estafa, then he merely held the money in
(d) That the officer who filed the information hadtrust
no for someone
authority to doelse
so;and therefore, did not acquire
(e) That it does not conform substantially to thea prescribed
loan in violation
form; of DOSRI rules.
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a
single punishment for various offenses is prescribed
In an Order by law;
dated August 8, 2001, the trial court
(g) That the criminal action or liability has beendenied
extinguished;
petitioner's Motion to Quash for lack of merit.
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, wouldcourt
The lower constitute a
agreed with the prosecution that the
legal excuse or justification; and assailed OSI letter was not the complaint-affidavit
(i) That the accused has been previously convicteditself; thus, or acquitted
it needof not comply with the
the offense charged, or the case against him was under
requirements dismissed
the Rules of Court. Since these
or otherwise terminated without his expressaffidavits
consent. were duly subscribed and sworn to before
a notary public, there was adequate compliance with
Meanwhile, one of the reasons for the dismissal the of the caseThe
Rules. after presentation
trial court furtherof held that the two
evidence by the prosecution is insufficiency of evidence.
offenses were separate and distinct violations,
hence the prosecution of one did not pose a bar to
Here, the dismissal of the case is not proper. theThe Sandiganbayan used to
other.
dismiss the information with reason not provided under the Section 3. The trial
court utilized the ground not raised by Mr. Dumlao, and in an
Petitioners inappropriate
Motion time
for Reconsideration was likewise
and context. denied in an Order dated September 5, 2001.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari
In effect, the Sandiganbayan prevent the prosecution
with the of its opportunity
CA, reiteratingtohisprovearguments before the
Mr. Dumlaos culpability. trial court. The CA denied the petition on both issues
presented by petitioner. Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of
CASE NO. 59 merit. Hence, this petition.

G.R. No. 162336, February 1, 2010
HILARIO P. SORIANO v PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Rule 117 Motion to Quash
Facts:
Sometime in 2000, the Office of Special
Investigation (OSI) of the BSP, through its officers,
transmitted a letter dated March 27, 2000 to
Jovencito Zuo, Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ. The
letter has five affidavits attached. These affidavits,
along with other documents, stated that spouses
Enrico and Amalia Carlos appeared to have an
outstanding loan of P8 million with the Rural Bank of
San Miguel Inc. (RBSM), but had never applied for
nor received such loan; that it was petitioner, who
was then president of RBSM, who had ordered,
facilitated, and received the proceeds of the loan;
and that the P8 million loan had never been
authorized by RBSM's Board of Directors and no
report thereof had ever been submitted to the BSP.
An Information, dated November 14, 2000 was for
estafa through falsification of commercial
documents, under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), in relation to Article
172 of the RPC and PD 1689. Another Information
dated November 10, 2000 was filed for violation of
Section 83 of RA 337, as amended by PD 1795. The
information alleged that, in his capacity as President
of RBSM, petitioner indirectly secured an P8 million
loan with RBSM, for his personal use and benefit,
without the written consent and approval of the
Issue: Is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 the
proper remedy against an Order denying a Motion to
Quash?
Ruling: No. This issue may be speedily resolved by
adopting our ruling in Soriano v. People, where we
held:
In fine, the Court has consistently held that a special
civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to
assail the denial of a motion to quash an
information. The proper procedure in such a case is
for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without
prejudice on his part to present the special defenses
he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after
trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered,
to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by
law. Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed
a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and
instead, they should have gone to trial and
reiterated the special defenses contained in their
motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional
circumstances in the present case that would justify
immediate resort to a filing of a petition for
certiorari. Clearly, the CA did not commit any
reversible error, much less, grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the petition.
CASE NO. 60
JOSEPH C. CEREZO VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, JULIET YANEZ, PABLO ABUNDA,
JR., AND VICENTE AFULUGENCIA
 (G.R. NO. 185230, June 1, 2011)
Facts: Joseph C. Cerezo, the petitioner filed a
complaint for libel against respondents Juliet Yaneza,
Pablo Abunda, Jr., Oscar Mapalo and Vicente
Afulugencia. Finding probable cause, the Prosecutor
filed the corresponding information against them,
but reversed its earlier finding and recommended
the withdrawal of information. Relying on the
recommendation of the prosecutor, the RTC ordered
the criminal case dismissed on the ground that it is
settled rule that the determination of the persons to
be prosecuted rests primarily with the Public
Prosecutor who is vested with quasi-judicial
discretion in the discharge in the of this function.
Being vested with such power, he can reconsider his
own resolution if he finds that there is reasonable
ground to do so.
However, upon petitioners motion for
reconsideration, the RTC granted the same and
reinstated the case after the DOJ Secretary reversed
the resolution the prosecutor.
Issue: Whether there was a valid termination of the
case so as to usher in the impregnable wall of
double jeopardy.
Held: The petition is impressed with merit. The rule
is that once a case is filed with the court, any
disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the
court. Hence, resolving a motion to dismiss a case or
to withdraw an information, the trial court should not
rely solely and merely on the findings of the public
prosecutor of the Secretary of Justice. To assess
independently the merits of the motion is the courts
bounden duty. Further, the assessment must be
embodied in a written order disposing of the motion.
While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the
ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is
not binding on court.
In this case, obviously the RTC judge failed to make
his own determination, evaluation or assessment of
the merit of the case. He blindly relied on the
manifestation and recommendation of the
prosecutor when he should have been more
circumspect and judicious in resolving the Motion to
dismiss and Withdraw information especially so
when the prosecution appeared to be uncertain,
undecided and irresolute on whether to indict
respondent.
Beyond the object, double jeopardy did not set in.
Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites
are present: 1. A first jeopardy attached prior to the
second; 2. The first jeopardy has been validly
terminated; and 3. A second jeopardy is for the
same offense as in the first.
A first jeopardy attaches only: a.) after a valid
indictment; b.) before a competent court; c.) after
arraignment; d.) when a valid plea has been
entered; and e.) when the accused has been
acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
CASE NO. 61
CO VS. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS
727 SCRA 503
FACTS:
New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by
Elizabeth Uy, filed a complaint for violation of B.P.
22 against William Co. In the absence of Uy and the
private counsel, the cases were tentatively
dismissed on 09 June 2003 in open court with
respect to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Uy received a copy of the said
Order on 02 July 2003, while her counsel-of-record
received a copy a day after. A year after, Uy filed a
Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases which was
granted. Co then filed a petition challenging the
revival of the said cases. He argues that the 09 June
2003 Order provisionally dismissing the criminal
cases should be considered as a final dismissal on
the ground that his right to speedy trial was denied.
Assuming that the criminal cases were only
provisionally dismissed, Co further posits that such
dismissal became permanent one year after the
issuance of the 09 June 2003 Order, not after notice
to the offended party. He also insists that both the
filing of the motion to revive and the trial court's
issuance of the order granting the revival must be
within the one-year period. Even assuming that the
one-year period to revive the criminal cases started
on 02 July 2003 when Uy received the 09 June 2003
Order, Co asserts that the motion was filed one day
late since year 2004 was a leap year.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisional dismissal of the
criminal case has become permanent.
HELD:
NO. The essential requisites of the first paragraph of
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which are
conditions sine qua non to the application of the
time-bar in the second paragraph thereof are: (1)
the prosecution with the express conformity of the
accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin
perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for a provisional
dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party is
notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of
the case; (3) the court issues an order granting the
motion and dismissing the case provisionally; (4) the
public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order
of provisional dismissal of the case.
In this case, there is no notice of any motion for the
provisional dismissal or of the hearing which was
served on the private complainant at least 3 days
before said hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule
15 of the Rules. Furthermore, the second paragraph
of the new rule should be construed to mean that
the order of dismissal shall become permanent one
year after service of the order of dismissal on the
public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution
without the criminal case having been revived.
Correlatively, when a party is represented by a
counsel, notices of all kinds emanating from the
court should be sent to the latter at his/her given
address pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules.
The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply
with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of
the order of dismissal.
Moreover, the contention that both the filing of the
motion to revive the case and the court order
reviving it must be made prior to the expiration of
the one-year period is not found in the Rules.
Further, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is
inconsequential to determine the timeliness of Uy's
motion to revive the criminal cases. Even if the
Court will consider that 2004 is a leap year and that
the one-year period to revive the case should be
reckoned from the date of receipt of the order of
provisional dismissal by Uy.
CASE NO. 62
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANTONIO SAYAO JR. y DE LEON, accused-
appellant
GR No. 124297
21 February 2001
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
FACTS
Complainant Jenny Sayao is the fourth of five
children of accused-appellant Antonio Sayao Jr and
his wife Teresa Sayao. The family lived in Brgy Ibaba,
Sta Rosa, Laguna. Jenny testified that accused-
appellant had been sexually molesting her since she
was in Grade I. IT began with accused-appellant
fondling her private parts, but in 1987, when she
was in Grade II and was eight years of age, accused-
appellant started having sexual intercourse with her.
The first incident of rape took place at around 3pm
of June 15, 1987. Afterwards, accussed-appellant
raped her several times. She estimated that she
must have been raped by her father at least 30
times, the last time being in February 1994, when
she was a 3rd year high student and 16 years of age.
Jenny said she kept quiet about her misfortune
because she was afraid of her father, a big man who
threatened to kill her if she told her anyone what he
was doing to her. But, after she had been raped in
February 1994, Jenny finally told her mother what
accused-appellant had done to her.
On 13 November 1995, the trial court rendered
judgment convicting accused-appellant and
sentencing him to suffer the death penalty and to
pay complainant civil indemnity, moral damages
and exemplary damages. Hence, the automatic
review of the decision.
Accused-appellant contends that the information in
this case is void for being vague and ambiguous as
to the date of the commission of the crime. As a
consequence, he claims that he has been deprived
of the opportunity to prepare his defense.
ISSUE/S
Whether the decision of the RTC may be overturned
for the vagueness and ambiguity of the information
filed against accused-appellant.
RULING
No. There may be inelegance in the way that the
information in this case had been drafted, but it is
not defective for being vague. First, Rule 110
provides that it is not necessary for the information
to allege the exact date and the time of the
commission of the crime is such is not an essential
ingredient of the offense. In the crime of rape, the
date of commission is not an essential element.
Second, even if the information fails to specify the
date of commission of the crime, accused-appellant
waived objection on this ground because he failed to
file either a motion for a bill of particulars or a
motion to quash the information. Third, the
vagueness of the information could not have
prejudiced accused-appellant since his denial and
alibi are so general that it cannot be said that his
defense hinges on the date of commission of the
crime.
In sum, it is held that the trial courts finding that
accused-appellant is guilty as charged is fully
substantiated by the evidence on record. However,
accused-appellant cannot be sentenced to death as
the information against him failed to allege Jennys
minority and her relationship to accused-appellant.
DECISION
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 31, San Pedro, Laguna is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant
Antonio Sayao Jr. y De Leon is found guilty of thirty
(3) counts of rape and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape,
subject to the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised
Penal Code. He is further ordered to pay Jenny Sayao
for each count of rape P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and the costs.