SECOND DIVISION

Still not satisfied, respondents filed in the

VINSON B. PINEDA, G.R. No. 155224 same trial court[7] a motion
Petitioner, for payment of lawyers fees for P50 million.[8]
Present:
On April 14, 2000, the trial court ordered
PUNO, J., Chairperson, petitioner to pay P5 million to Atty. de Jesus, P2
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, million to Atty. Ambrosio and P2 million to Atty.
- v e r s u s - CORONA, Mariano.
AZCUNA and
G On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced the
ATTY. CLODUALDO C. DE JESUS, amount as follows: P1 million to Atty. de
ATTY. CARLOS AMBROSIO and Jesus, P500,000 to Atty. Ambrosio and P500,000 to
ATTY. EMMANUEL MARIANO, Atty. Mariano. The motion for reconsideration was
Respondents. Promulgated: denied. Hence, this recourse.

August 23, 2006 The issues raised in this petition are:

x----------------------------------------- (1) whether the Pasig RTC, Branch 151

---------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The subject of this petition for review is the
April 30, 2002 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68080 which modified the order [2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch
151, in JDRC Case No. 2568 entitled Ma. Aurora D.
Pineda v. Vinson B. Pineda.
The facts follow.
On April 6, 1993, Aurora Pineda filed an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage against
petitioner Vinson Pineda in the RTC of Pasig City,
Branch 151, docketed as JDRC Case No. 2568.
Petitioner was represented by respondents
Attys. Clodualdo de Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio and
Emmanuel Mariano.
During the pendency of the case, Aurora proposed a
settlement to petitioner regarding her visitation rights
over their minor child and the separation of their
properties. The proposal was accepted by petitioner
and both parties subsequently filed a motion for
approval of their agreement. This was approved by
the trial court. On November 25, 1998, the marriage
between petitioner and Aurora Pineda was declared
null and void.
Throughout the proceedings, respondent counsels
were well-compensated.[3] They, including their
relatives and friends, even availed of free products
and treatments from petitioners dermatology clinic.
This notwithstanding, they billed
petitioner additional legal fees amounting to P16.5
million[4] which the latter, however, refused to
pay. Instead, petitioner issued them several checks
totaling P1.12 million[5] as full payment for settlement.
[6]
had jurisdiction over the claim for
additional legal fees and
(2) whether respondents were entitled
to additional legal fees.
First, a lawyer may enforce his right to his
fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident of
the main action in which his services were rendered
or in an independent suit against his client. The
former is preferable to avoid multiplicity of suits.[9]
The Pasig RTC, Branch 151, where the case
for the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed, had
jurisdiction over the motion for the payment of legal
fees. Respondents sought to collect P50 million which
was equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties
awarded to petitioner in that case. Clearly, what
respondents were demanding was additional payment
for legal services rendered in the same case.
Second, the professional engagement
between petitioner and respondents was governed by
the principle of quantum meruit which means as much
as the lawyer deserves.[10] The recovery of attorneys
fees on this basis is permitted, as in this case, where
there is no express agreement for the payment of
attorneys fees. Basically, it is a legal mechanism
which prevents an unscrupulous client from running
away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel
without paying for it. In the same vein, it avoids unjust
enrichment on the part of the lawyer himself.
Further, Rule 20.4 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid
controversies with clients concerning their
compensation and to resort to judicial action only to
prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect
fees should be avoided and should be filed only when
circumstances force lawyers to resort to it.[11]
In the case at bar, respondents motion for
payment of their lawyers fees was not meant to collect
what was justly due them; the fact was, they had
already been adequately paid.
Demanding P50 million on top of the
generous sums and perks already given to them was
an act of unconscionable greed which is shocking to
this Court.
As lawyers, respondents should be reminded
that they are members of an honorable profession,
the primary vision of which is justice. It is respondents
despicable behavior which gives lawyering a bad
name in the minds of some people. The vernacular
has a word for it: nagsasamantala. The practice of law
is a decent profession and not a money-making trade.
Compensation should be but a mere incident.[12]
Respondents claim for additional legal fees
was not justified. They could not charge petitioner a
fee based on percentage, absent an express
agreement to that effect. The payments to them in
cash, checks, free products and services from
petitioners business all of which were not denied by
respondents more than sufficed for the work they did.
The full payment for settlement[13] should have
discharged petitioners obligation to them.
The power of this Court to reduce or even
delete the award of attorneys fees cannot be
denied. Lawyers are officers of the Court and they
participate in the fundamental function of
administering justice.[14] When they took their oath,
they submitted themselves to the authority of the
Court and subjected their professional fees to judicial
control. [15]
WHEREFORE, the petition is
hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2002 in CAG.R. CV
No. 68080 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of
additional attorneys fees in favor of respondents is
hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Bach Ongkiko v. Kalaw
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse
the Decision1 dated 8 October 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74445, entitled, Ongkiko
Kalaw Manhit & Accorda Law Offices v. Guenter
Bach.
The facts as culled from the records of the case
are as follows:
On 7 November 1994, petitioner Guenter Bach
engaged the services of respondent law firm Ongkiko
Kalaw Manhit & Accorda Law Offices to represent him
in a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 143, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-224.
The parties signed a Fee Agreement, for the legal
services to be rendered by respondent. The provision
for payment of the legal services reads:
1. (a)seven and one-half (7 %) of all cash
recoveries, including damages, interests,
attorneys fees and costs; as well as
2. (b)five percent (5 %) of the market value of
all properties awarded to [the petitioner] by
the court or obtained through the
compromise agreement, valued at the time
of recovery.2
However, on 5 December 1995, respondent withdrew
its appearance as counsel of petitioner, due to policy
differences. On 18 December 1995, respondent sent
the termination billing3 for the services they rendered
and billed petitioner the total amount of P1,000,000.00
plus 2% interest for every month of delay in payment,
based on the provision for termination of services
stated in their Fee Agreement, thus:
1. (C)Interest for late payment
All fees mentioned herein are payable within seven
(7) days from receipt of our statement of account. It is
understood that all late payments shall be subject to
interest payment at the rate of 2 % per month of
delay, a fraction of a month being considered as one
month, counted from the date the fees shall fall due,
without need of prior demand.
xxxx
1. (F)Termination Clause
It is understood that you may terminate our services
at any time. In such an event, we shall be entitled to
collect fees for legal services already performed and
results obtained based on quantum meruit.4
On 7 March 1996, respondent filed with the RTC a
Notice5 of Charging Lien over the properties of the
spouses Bach.
On 5 February 1997, the RTC issued an
Order6 directing the annotation of the charging lien in
the amount of P1,000,000.00 on all the titles of the
spouses Bachs personal and real properties
enumerated in the notice of charging lien.
On 11 February 1999, respondent received a copy
of the Order7dated 8 June 1998, granting petitioners
Motion to Withdraw his petition in Civil Case No. 95-
224.
Despite respondents demands for his legal fees,
petitioner failed and refused to pay. Thus, respondent
filed a Complaint8 for a sum of money also before the
RTC of Makati, Branch 148, docketed as Civil Case
No. 99-514.
Respondent prayed for the payment of the following:
P1,000,000.00 as the latters lawful fees for services
rendered in Civil Case No. 95-224, plus 2% interest
from date of final demand until paid; P250,000.00 as
exemplary damages; P200,000.00 representing
billable time spent in prosecuting the case, plus
another P150,000.00 for any appeal taken; and
P50,000.00 as litigation expenses and the cost of suit.
Within the period for filing an Answer, petitioner
filed a Motion9 to dismiss on the ground that
respondents claim had already been paid, waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished. Petitioner
contended that prior to respondents withdrawal as
counsel in Civil Case No. 95-224, petitioner had
already paid respondents services in the total amount
of P200,000.00.
On 9 August 1999, the Motion to Dismiss was
denied10 by the RTC for lack of merit. Petitioner failed
to file his Answer; thus, he was declared in default
and respondent was allowed to present its
evidence ex parte.11
On 24 January 2002, the RTC rendered its
judgment in favor of the respondent, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant and the latter is hereby ordered to pay
the following:
1. 1.The amount of P750,000.00 as plaintiffs
lawful fees for services rendered under
Civil Case No. 95-224, plus interest at the
rate of 2% per month from the date of
demand until paid;
2.P700,000.00 representing billable time which
was spent in prosecuting this case;
1. 3.P50,000.00 as and litigation expenses, and
2. 4.Costs of suit.
Not satisfied, petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which modified the RTC Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, Based on the foregoing premises, the
instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED and the
appealed January 24, 2002 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City-Branch 148 in Civil Case
No. 99-514 is hereby MODIFIED. Accordingly, the
award of P700,000.00 representing billable time
allegedly spent in the prosecution of the case a quo is
hereby DELETED. All other aspects of the appealed
DECISION are UPHELD.13
Hence, this Petition filed by petitioner Guenter Bach
raising the following issues to wit:
SC
WHETHER OR NOT UNDER THE CONCEPT
OF QUANTUM MERUIT, THE AMOUNT OF
P750,000.00 AS FEES FOR SERVICES RENDERED
WITH INTEREST PEGGED AT 2% A MONTH FROM
DATE OF DEMAND UNTIL FULLY PAID IS
REASONABLE
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS LEGAL BASIS
TO AWARD P50,000.00 AS AND FOR LITIGATION
EXPENSES AND COSTS OF SUIT.14
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the
P750,000.00 awarded to the respondent by way
of quantum meruit, with interest of 2% a month from
date of demand until fully paid, is excessive,
unreasonable and confiscatory. Thus, petitioner prays
for reduction of the same.
Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court approved
the attorneys fees in the total amounts of
P750,000.00 plus 2 % interest for the services
rendered by respondent in Civil Case No. 95-224.
In this regard, the rule is that the issue of the
reasonableness of attorneys fees based on quantum
meruit is a question of fact, and well-settled is the rule
that conclusions and findings of fact by the lower
courts are entitled to great weight on appeal and will
not be disturbed except for strong and cogent
reasons.
GR: The findings of the Court of Appeals by itself,
which are supported by substantial evidence, are
almost beyond the power of review by the
Supreme Court.15 Thus, in the exercise of the
Supreme Courts power of review the findings of facts
of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on
the Supreme Court.
XPN: There are, however, recognized exceptions to
this rule, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse
of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
facts are conflicting; (6) when in making the findings
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when the
findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of facts are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11)
when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.16 Exceptions (4) and (11) are present in
the case at bar, and so this Court shall make its own
determination of the facts relevant for the resolution of
the case.
Ordinarily, therefore, we would have remanded
this case for further reception of evidence as to the
extent and value of the services rendered by
respondent to petitioner. However, so as not to
needlessly prolong the resolution of a comparatively
simple controversy, we deem it just and equitable to
fix in the present recourse a reasonable amount of
attorneys fees in favor of respondent.
There are two concepts of attorneys fees. In the
ordinary sense, attorneys fees represent the
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his
client for the legal services rendered to the latter.
(come from the client) On the other hand, in its
extraordinary concept, attorneys fees may be
awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be
paid by the losing party to the prevailing party. (Come
from the opposing party)
The issue in this case concerns attorneys fees in
the ordinary concept.
Generally, the amount of attorneys fees due is
that stipulated in the retainer agreement which is
conclusive as to the amount of the lawyers
compensation. In the absence thereof, the amount of
attorneys fees is fixed on the basis of quantum
meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of the attorneys
services. Courts may ascertain also if the attorneys
fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable
under the circumstances. In no case, however, must a
lawyer be allowed to recover more than what is
reasonable,
pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys fees;
agreement as to fees.An attorney shall be entitled
to have and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services, with a view
to the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and
the professional standing of the attorney. No court
shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert
witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may
disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on
its own professional knowledge. A written contract
for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable. (Emphasis
supplied.)
We have identified the circumstances to be
considered in determining the reasonableness of a
claim for attorneys fees as follows: (1) the amount
and character of the service rendered; (2) labor, time,
and trouble involved; (3) the nature and importance of
the litigation or business in which the services were
rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the
amount of money or the value of the property affected
by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6)
the skill and experience called for in the performance
of the services; (7) the professional character and
social standing of the attorney; (8) the results
secured; and (9) whether the fee is absolute or
contingent, it being recognized that an attorney may
properly charge a much larger fee when it is
contingent than when it is not.
Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enumerates the following factors which
should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:
1. (a)the time spent and extent of services
rendered or required;
2. (b)the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved;
3. (c)the importance of the subject matter;
4. (d)the skill demanded;
5. (e)the probability of losing other employment
as a result of the acceptance of the
proffered case;
6. (f)the customary charges for similar services
and the schedule of fees of the IBP
Chapter to which he belongs;
7. (g)the amount involved in the controversy
and the benefits resulting to the client from
the service;
8. (h)the contingency or certainty of
compensation;
9. (i)the character of the employment, whether
occasional or established; and
10. (j)the professional standing of the lawyer.
In determining a reasonable fee to be paid to
respondent as compensation for their services
on quantum meruit, based on the factors
abovequoted, it is proper to consider all the facts and
circumstances obtaining in this case.
It is undisputed that respondent firm had rendered
services as counsel for the petitioners in Civil Case
No. 95-244. The services rendered consist of the
following:
1. 1.Respondent was able to annotate a
notice20 of lis pendenson the property of
Spouses Bach in Caloocan City covered by
TCT No. C-12112, thereby preventing easy
disposition of the property by Luzviminda
Bach;
2. 2.Respondent was likewise able to annotate
a notice21 of lis pendens on the property of
Spouses Bach in Pasig City covered by
TCT No. 48223, thereby preventing
 disposition of the property by Luzviminda
Bach;
3. 3.Further, respondent annotated a
notice22 of lis pendens on the property of
Spouses Bach in Dasmarias, Cavite
covered by TCT No. T-339282, thereby
preventing disposition of the property by
Luzviminda Bach;
1. 4.Additionally, respondent annotated a
notice23 of lis pendens on the property of
Spouses Bach in Tanza, Cavite, covered by
TCT No. T-255263, thereby preventing
disposition of the property by Luzviminda
Bach;
2. 5.Respondent also worked on the annotation
of the notice24of lis pendens on the property
of Spouses Bach in Makati, covered by
TCT No. S-62541, thereby preventing
disposition of the property by Luzviminda
Bach;
3. 6.Respondent worked on the annotation of a
notice of lis pendens on the property of
Spouses Bach in Dasmarias, Cavite,
covered by TCT No. T-380848, thereby
preventing disposition of the property by
Luzviminda Bach;
4. 7.Respondent annotated a notice25 of lis
pendens on the property of Spouses Bach
situated in Tagaytay City, covered by TCT
No. P-705, thereby preventing disposition
of the property by Luzviminda Bach;
5. 8.Respondent filed the Petition26 for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership of
Gains of petitioner with his wife;
6. 9.Respondent prepared an affidavit27 in favor
of petitioner attesting to the fact of
petitioners marriage and their properties
acquired during his marriage with
Luzviminda Bach:
1. 10.Respondent prepared an ex
parte motion28 to declare petitioners wife to
have waived her right to file answer for
failure to file the same within the period
granted by law and to direct the public
prosecutor to determine whether or not a
collusion exist;
2. 11.Respondent prepared a Petition29 for
appointment of a receiver and to compel
petitioners wife to render an accounting;
3. 12.Other services included the filling of
several oppositions30to certain motions filed
by petitioners wife;
4. 13.Respondent filed a motion31 to set the
case for preliminary investigation;
5. 14.Respondent filed an ex parte motion32 to
declare petitioners wife in default;
6. 15.Respondent submitted a supplemental
comment33 on the motion for leave to
withdraw funds from Certificate of
Participation filed by petitioners wife;
7. 16.Respondent filed a manifestation and
motion34 praying the court to direct
petitioners wife to designate her lead
counsel in the case;
8. 17.Respondent prepared a Reply35 to
comments on opposition of petitioner;
9. 18.Respondent was able to secure an
Order36 from the said court freezing the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)
1. account in the name of petitioners wife,
Luzviminda Bach, containing about
P6,500,000.00, representing the balance of
the proceeds from the sale of their conjugal
property in Pasig City;
2. 19.Respondent represented petitioner in
numerous hearings in Civil Case No. 95-
224, evidenced by the signatures of the
lawyers of respondent Law Firm in the
minutes dated 25 April 1995, 27 April, 1995,
14 June 1995, 27 June 1995, 1 August
1995, 11 August 1995, 22 September 1995,
10 October 1995, 17 October 1995, 1
December 1995, 7 December 1995, 29
March 1996 and 16 January 1997;37
3. 20.Conducted several preliminary and post
litigation conferences in the proceedings for
preliminary injunction leading to the
freezing of the bank account of the parties;
and
4. 21.Prepared and sent out numerous letters
to third parties and entities to protect the
interest of petitioner and notices to
petitioner updating him of the status of the
case and the courses of action taken by
respondent Law Firm.38
In sum, the services rendered by the respondent as
enumerated above and as admitted39 by Atty. Mario
Ongkiko during the ex parte hearing, consist of
annotating notice of lis pendens on the conjugal
properties of petitioner and his wife; filing the Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; preparing and
filing various pleadings and documents relevant to the
case; obtaining a freeze order of petitioners funds in
the UCPB; attending hearings in Civil Case No. 05-
224, and sending notices to petitioner updating the
latter of the status of the case.
Nothing in Civil Case No. 95-224 so far appears
complicated and no extraordinary skill was
needed for lawyers of respondent Law Firm to
accomplish what they had done in the case before
they withdrew their appearance.
We do not find herein a situation so intricate that
demands more than a careful scrutiny of the legal
matters involved. These are simply the normal duties
of a lawyer that he is bound by law to render to his
clients with utmost fidelity for which his client must not
be burdened to pay an extra price.
It bears stressing that at the time respondent firm
withdrew their appearance due to policy differences
with petitioner, the case was still in its initial stage.
Guided by the above yardstick and so much of the
pertinent data as are extant in the records of this case
and in the exercise of our sound discretion, we hold
that the amount of P500,000.00 is a reasonable and
fair compensation for the legal services rendered by
respondent to the petitioner.
The imposition of legal interest on the amount
payable to private respondent as attorneys fees is
unwarranted.
Even as we agree that parties can freely stipulate
on the terms of payment, still the imposition of interest
in the payment of attorneys fees is not justified. In the
case of Cortes v. Court of Appeals,40 we ruled that
Article 220941 of the Civil Code does not even justify
the imposition of legal interest on the payment of
attorneys fees as it is a provision of law governing
ordinary obligations and contracts. It deleted the 6%
interest imposed by the appellate court on the
payment of attorneys fees.
It ratiocinated by citing Mambulao Lumber Co. v.
Philippine National Bank,42 thus:
Contracts for attorneys services in this
jurisdiction stands upon an entirely different
footing from contracts for the payment of
compensation for any other services. x x x [A]n
attorney is not entitled in the absence of express
contract to recover
more than a reasonable compensation for his
services; and even when an express contract is
made, the court can ignore it and limit the recovery to
reasonable compensation if the amount of the
stipulated fee is found by the court to be
unreasonable.
This is a very different rule from that announced in
section 1091 of the Civil Code with reference to the
obligation of contracts in general, where it is said that
such obligation has the force of law between the
contracting parties. Had the plaintiff herein made an
express contract to pay his attorney an uncontingent
fee of P2,115.25 for the services to be rendered in
reducing the note here in suit to judgment, it would not
have been enforced against him had he seen fit to
oppose it, as such a fee is obviously far greater than
is necessary to remunerate the attorney for the work
involved and is therefore unreasonable. In order to
enable the court to ignore an express contract for
attorneys fees, it is necessary to show, as in other
contracts, that it is contrary to morality or public
policy (Art. 1255, Civil Code). It is enough that it is
unreasonable or unconscionable. (Emphases
supplied.)
We have held that lawyering is not a moneymaking
venture and lawyers are not merchants. 43 Law
advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that
yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards
for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that,
unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal
of freedom from governmental interference, is
impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject
to State regulation.44
A lawyer is not merely the defender of his clients
cause and a trustee of his clients cause of action and
assets; he is also, and first and foremost, an officer of
the court and participates in the fundamental function
of administering justice in society.45 It follows that a
lawyers compensation for professional services
rendered are subject to the supervision of the court,
not just to guarantee that the fees he charges and
receives remain reasonable and commensurate with
the services rendered, but also to maintain the dignity
and integrity of the legal profession to which he
belongs. Upon taking his attorneys oath as an officer
of the court, a lawyer submits himself to the authority
of the courts to regulate his right to charge
professional fees.46
Though we reduced the award of attorneys fees
and disallowed the imposition of interest thereon, the
fact that an attorney plays a vital role in the
administration of justice underscores the need to
secure to him his honorarium lawfully earned as a
means to preserve the decorum and respectability of
the legal profession. A lawyer is as much entitled to
judicial protection against injustice, imposition of fraud
on the part of his client as the client against abuse on
the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not
alone to see that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful
manner; it is also its duty to see that a lawyer is paid
his just fees. With his capital consisting only of his
brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost
not only in money but in expenditure of time and
energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial
tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to
escape payment of his just compensation. It would be
ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure
justice for his client, he himself would not get his
due.47
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in awarding
expenses of litigation. Article 2208, paragraphs 2, 5
and 11, of the Civil Code, authorize the recovery of
such fees (2) When the defendants act or omission
has compelled the plaintiff to litigate x x x or to incur
expenses to protect his interest; x x x (5) Where the
defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and
demandable claim; x x x and (11) In any other case
where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered. Considering the fact that respondent was
drawn into this litigation by petitioner to protect and
defend their interest and taking into account the
services already rendered by respondent to petitioner,
the sum of P30,000.00 as expenses of litigation and
cost of suit would be reasonable under the premises.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS to the effect that
the attorneys fees awarded to respondent is
REDUCED to P500,000.00, the legal interest of 2%
on the amount due to respondent is DELETED, and
the award of litigation expenses is REDUCED to
P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares-
Santiago,Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.
Judgment affirmed with modifications.
Notes.An award of attorneys fees must have a
factual, legal or equitable justification and cannot be
left to speculation and conjecture. (Mateo vs.
Diaz, 374 SCRA 33 [2002])
Attorneys fees may be awarded when a party is
compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his
interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other
party. (Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation
vs. Philippine Ports Authority, 378 SCRA 82 [2002])
IN RE CUNANAN
IN RE DILLON
AC-1928. August 3, 1978.*
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLON (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
Bar
Integration; Attorneys; Disbarment; Payment of
membership dues; Integration of the Bar, its concept
and purpose.An Integrated Bar is a State-
organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong,
as distinguished from bar associations organized by
individual lawyers themselves, membership in
which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the
Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in
carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as
obliged to hear his portion of its responsibilities.
Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
Integrated Bar is an official national body of which
all lawyers are required to be members. They are,
therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence
to a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon
proper cause appearing, a recommendation for
discipline or disbarment of the offending member.
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously
dictated by overriding considerations of public
interest and public welfare to such an extent as
more than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the
personal interests and personal convenience of
individual lawyers.
Same; Same; Same; Police power; Integration
of the Bar is a valid exercise of police power of the
State; Practice of law, nature of.Apropos to the
above, it must be stressed that all legislation
directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid
exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right
but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial
duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren
in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation,
and takes part in one of the most important
functions of the Statethe administration of justice
as an officer of the court. The practice of law
being clothed with public interest, the holder of this
privilege must submit to a degree of control for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has
created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr.
Justice Roberts explained, the expression affected
with a public interest is the equivalent of subject
to the exercise of the police power.
 Same; Same; Same; Courts; Supreme Court
authorized to adopt rules of court to effect
integration of the Philippine Bar; Purposes of
integration of the Bar.When, therefore. Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 6397 authorizing the
Supreme Court to adopt rules of court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit, it did so in the
exercise of the paramount-police power of the State.
The Acts avowal is to raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively. Hence, the
Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in
ordaining the integration of the Bar through its
Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and
the President of the Philippines in decreeing the
constitution of the IBP into a body corporate
through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4,
1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a
desire to meet the demands of pressing public
necessity. The State, in order to promote the
general welfare, may interfere with and regulate
personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons
and property may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general prosperity
and welfare of the State (U.S. Gomez, Jesus, 31
Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, Salus
populi eat suprema lex. The public welfare is the
supreme law. To this fundamental principle of
government the rights of individuals are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which
life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society will fall
into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70, Phil. 726).
It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain
some individuals from all freedom, and all
individuals from some freedom.
Same; Same; Same; Practice of law and
exercise of the legal profession clothed with public
interest and lawyers must be bound by such
regulations as might be established by the proper
authorities for
the common good; Reasons.Thus, when the
respondent Edillon entered upon the legal
profession, his practice of law and his exercise of
the said profession, which affect the society at large,
were (and are) subject to the power of the body
politic to require him to conform to such regulations
as might be established by the proper authorities
for the common good, even to the extent of
interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not
wish to submit himself to such reasonable
interference and regulation, he should not have
clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional
Law; Constitutionality and validity of Bar
integration sustained by explicit grant of precise
power to the Supreme Court under Art. X of the
1973 Constitution resting the Court with plenary
power in all cases regarding admistion to and
supervision of the practice of law.But the most
compelling argument sustaining the
constitutionality and validity of Bar Integration in
the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of
precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5)
of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the
Philippines. xxx Quite apart from the above, let it
be stated that even without the enabling Act
(Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the
language of the provision of the Constitution
granting the Supreme Court the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law, it at once becomes indubitable that
this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme
Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the
admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Membership
dues; Effect of Bar integration upon a lawyers
freedom of association; Compelling a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar not violative of the
constitutional freedom to associate but the only
compulsion a lawyer is subjected is the payment of
annual dues which is not violation of the
Constitution; Compulsion upon a lawyer if any
justified by exercise of police power of the State;
Reasons.The first objection posed by the
respondent is that the Court is without power to
compel him to become a member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court
Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his
constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not
to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to
be a member of the Integrated Bar is no violative of
his constitution freedom to associate. Integration
does not make a lawyer a member of any group of
which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed
557
the Bar examinations. All that integration
actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized
and incohesive group of which every lawyer is
already a member. Bar Integration does not compel
the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated
Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the States
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the professional in his fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory programthe lawyers. Assuming that
the questioned provision does in a sense compel a
lawyer to be member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police
power of the State.
Same; Same; Same: Same; Same; Provisions
of the Court Rule requiring payment of membership
dues by lawyers not violative of the Constitution;
The 1973 Constitution does not prohibit the
Supreme Court from requiring lawyers to pay
reasonable membership fees; Nature of membership
fees.The second issue posed by the respondent is
that the provision of the Court Rule repairing
payment of a membership fee is void. We see
nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the
Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Philippine
Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution)
which power the respondent acknowledgesfrom
requiring members of a privileged class, such as
lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent
that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out
the objectives and purposes of integration.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Penalties; E
nforcement of penalty provisions for non-payment of
membership dues not a deprivation of due process;
Reasons; Practice of law in the courts subject to
regulation and inquiry; Practice of law is not
property right but mere privilege.That respondent
further argues that the enforcement of the penalty
provisions would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes
on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the
practice of law is property right, in the sense of its
being one that entitles the holder of a license to
practise of law is a property right, in the sense of its
being one that en-
titles the holder of a license to practise a
profession, we do not here pause to consider at
length, as it is clear that under the police power of
the State, and under necessary powers granted to
the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondents right to practise law before the courts
of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to
imposed the fee as regulatory measure is
recognized, then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether
by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
arbitrary. But we must here emphasize that the
practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance
with the lawyers public responsibilities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Supreme
Court; Jurisdiction; The Supreme Court has power
and jurisdiction to strike the name of a lawyer from
its Roll of Attorneys; Courts jurisdiction provided
for in the 1973 Constitution.Relative to the issue
of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of
Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters
of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
supervision have been and are indisputably
recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such
are legion. The Courts jurisdiction was greatly
reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it
explicitly granted to the Court the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice . . .
. . . . and the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Bar . . . . . (Article X, Sec.
5[5]) The power to pass upon the fitness of the
respondent to remain a member of the legal
profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the
Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rule of
Court 139-A and ByLaws of the Integrated Bar
providing for payment of membership dues are
neither unconstitutional nor illegal; Respondent
lawyer disbarred and his name striken from the
Roll of Attorneys in the Supreme Court for repeated
failure to pay membership dues; Case at bar.We
thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of
Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are
neither unconstitutional nor illegal. x x x It is the
unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent
Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby
disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Martial A. Edillon is a duly
licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of
the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial
A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal
of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues to the IBP since the latters
constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then
President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
resolution to the Court for consideration and
approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24,
Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
. . . . Should the delinquency further continue until
the following June 29, the Board shall promptly
inquire into the cause or causes of the continued
delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem
appropriate, including a recommendation to the
Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
members name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice
of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail
to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the
respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
adverted to above; he submitted his comment on
February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay
the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP
President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply
to Editions comment: on March 24, 1976, they
submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June
3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were
required to submit memoranda in amplification of
their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth
submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the
respondents pleadings would show that the
propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar
of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The
respondent, however, objects to particular features
of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as
the Court Rule)1in accordance with which the Bar
of the Philippines was integratedand to the
provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III of the
IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to
recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent members name from the Roll of
Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article III of
the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of
the Court to issue the order applied for is found in
Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues.Subject
to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default
in the payment of annual dues for six months shall
warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one
year shall be a ground for the removal of the name
of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of
membership in the IBP is stated in these words of
the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization.There is hereby
organized an official national body to be known as
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, composed of
all persons whose names now appear or may
hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched
in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues.Every member of the
Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court. . . . .
_____________
1
Adopted in the Supreme Courts Resolution,
promulgated on January 9, 1973, ordaining the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines.
The core of the respondents arguments is that the
above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being
compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member
of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and
that as a consequence of this compelled financial
support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes, the above provisions of the
Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of
no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the
jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the
Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter
is not among the justiciable cases triable by the
Court but is rather of an administrative nature
pertaining to an administrative body.
The case at bar is not the first one that has
reached the Court relating to constitutional issues
that inevitably and inextricably come up to the
surface whenever attempts are made to regulate
the practice of law, define the conditions of such
practice, or revoke the license granted for the
exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very
same issues raised in a previous case before the
Court, entitled Administrative Case No. 526, In
the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the
Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al.,
Petitioners. The Court exhaustively considered all
these matters in that case in its Resolution
ordaining the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The
Court there made the unanimous pronouncement
that it was
. . . . fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing
conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in
Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials
and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine
Bar is perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable. . . .
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the
posture of the Court.
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to
which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar associations organized by individual
lawyers themselves, membership in which is
voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a
process by which every member of the Bar is
afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying
out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to
bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by
or under the direction of the State, an integrated
Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers
are required to be members. They are, therefore,
subject to all the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence
to a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon
proper cause appearing, a recommendation for
discipline or disbarment of the offending member.2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was
obviously dictated by overriding considerations of
public interest and public welfare to such an extent
as more than constitutionally and legally justifies
the restrictions that integration imposes upon the
personal interests and personal convenience of
individual lawyers.3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that
all legislation directing the integration of the Bar
have been uniformly and universally sustained as a
valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right
but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial
duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren
in the profession, to
______________
2
114 A.L.R. 101.
3
Memorandum of Authorities on the
Constitutionality of Bar Integration, cited in the
Report of the Commission Bar Integration on the
Integration of the Philippine Bar, Nov. 30, 1972; see
also Supreme Court Resolution of January 9, 1973,
ordaining the integration of the Philippine Bar.
the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in
one of the most important functions of the State
the administration of justiceas an officer of the
court.4 The practice of law being clothed with public
interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to
a degree of control for the common good, to the
extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S.
Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts
explained, the expression affected with a public
interest is the equivalent of subject to the exercise
of the police power (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S.
502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act
No. 63975authorizing the Supreme Court to adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see
fit, it did so in the exercise of the paramount police
power of the State. The Acts avowal is to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the
Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar
through its Resolution promulgated on January 9,
1973, and the President of the Philippines in
decreeing the constitution
______________
4
In re Integrating the Bar, 222 Ark. 35, 259 S.
W. 2d 114; Petition of Florida State Bar
Association, 40 So. 2d 902; Petition of Florida State
Bar Association, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280; In re
Edwards, 45 Idaho 676, 266 P. 665; Commonwealth
ex rel. Ward vs. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41 98 S. W. 2d
53; Ayres vs. Hadaway, 303 Mich. 589, 6 N. W. 2d
905; Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota,
216 Minn. 195; Petition for Integration of Bar of
Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d 515; Clark
vs. Austin, 101 S. W. 2d 977; In Re Integration of
Nebraska State Bar Assn., 133 Neb. 283, 275 N. W.
265, 114 A.L.R. 151; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292
291; Baker vs. Varser, 240 N.C. 260, 82 S.E. 2d 90;
In re Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma, 185
Okla. 505, 95 P. 2d 113; State ex rel Rice vs. Cozad,
70 S. Dak. 193, 16 N. W. 2d 484; Campbell vs. Third
District Committee of Virginia State Bar, 179 Va.
244, 18 S. E. 2d 883; Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis.
2d 230, 102 N. W. 2d 404.
5
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE
INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, approved
on September 17, 1971.
of the IBP into a body corporate through
Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973,
were prompted by fundamental considerations of
public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet
the demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general
welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal
liberty, property and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general prosperity
and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31
Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, Salus
populi est supreme lex. The public welfare is the
supreme law. To this fundamental principle of
government the rights of individuals are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which
life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society will fall
into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726).
It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain
some individuals from all freedom, and all
individuals from some freedom. But the most
compelling argument sustaining the
constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in
the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of
precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5)
of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the
Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration
of the Bar xxx.
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which
reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of
this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of
Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar
under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve
the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that
even withoutthe enabling Act (Republic Act No.
6397), and looking solely tothe language of the
provision of the Constitution granting theSupreme
Court the power to promulgate rules
concerningpleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law, it
at once becomes indubitable thatthis constitutional
declaration vests the Supreme Court withplenary
power in all cases regarding the admission to
andsupervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon
the legal profession, his practice of law and his
exercise of the said profession, which affect the
society at large, were (and are) subject to the power
of the body politic to require him to conform to such
regulations as might be established by the proper
authorities for the common good, even to the extent
of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did
not wish to submit himself to such reasonable
interference and regulation, he should not have
clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent
must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension,
however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is
that the Court is without power to compel him to
become a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his
constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not
to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to
be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative
of his constitutional freedom to associate.6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member
of any group
______________
6
In re Unification of New Hampsire Bar, 248 A.
2d 709; In re Gibson, 35 N. Mex. 550, 4P. 2d
643; Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.
W. 2d 404; Lathrop vs. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 6 L.
ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826; Railways Employes
Dept. vs. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225, 100 L. ed. 1112, 76
S. Ct. 714.
of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations.7 All that integration actually does is
to provide an official national organization for the
well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group
of which every lawyer is already a member.8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter
or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the States
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory programthe lawyers.9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in
a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State.10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is
that the provision of the Court Rule requiring
payment of a membership fee is void. We see
nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the
Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Philippine
Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution)
which power the respondent acknowledgesfrom
requiring members of a privileged class,
______________
7
Diokno, Jose W., Bar IntegrationA Sword
and a Shield for Justice (Manor Press, Q.C., 1962)
p. 17.
8
Fellers, James, Integration of the Bar
Aloha!, Journal of the Am. Judicature Society, Vol.
47, No. 11 (1964) p. 256.
9
Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102,
N.W. 2d 404; Lathrop vs. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 6
L. ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826.
 10
Hill vs. State Bar of California, 97 P. 2d
236; Herron vs. State Bar of California, 24 Cal. 53,
147 P. 2d 543; Carpenter vs. State Bar of
California, 211 Cal. 358, 295 P. 23; In re Mundy,
202 La. 41, 11 So. 2d 398; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24,
292 P. 291; In re Platz, 60 Nev. 24, 108 P. 2d 858; In
re Gibson, 35 N. Mex. 550, 4 P. 2d 643; Kelley vs.
State Bar of Oklahoma, 148 Okla. 282, 298 P. 623.
such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent
that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out
the objectives and purposes of integration.11
3. The respondent further argues that the
enforcement of the penalty provisions would
amount to a deprivation of property without due
process and hence infringes on one of his
constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is
a property right, in the sense of its being one that
entitles the holder of a license to practise a
profession, we do not here pause to consider at
length, as it clear that under the police power of the
State, and under the necessary powers granted to
the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondents right to practise law before the courts
of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which
penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is
not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.12
______________
11
Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 40
So. 2d 902; In re Integration of Bar of Hawaii, 432
P. 2d 887; Petition for Integration of Bar of
Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d 515; In re
Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291; In re Unification of
New Hampshire Bar, 248 A. 2d 709; In re Gibson,
35 N. Mex. 550, 4 P. 2d 643; State Bar of Oklahoma
vs. McGhnee, 148 Okla. 219, 298 P. 580; Kelley vs.
State Bar of Oklahoma, 148 Okla. 282, 298 P.
623; Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.
W. 2d 404.
12
In re Gibson, 4 P. 2d 643.
The following words of Justice Harlan are
apposite: The objection would make every
Governmental exaction the material of a free
speech issue. Even the income tax would be
suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths
that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious
objector, if his liberties were to thus extended,
might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of
war or of any other end condemned by his
conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of
private judgment has never yet been exalted above
the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of
Government. (Concurring opinion of Harlan, J.,
joined by Frankfurter, J., in Lathrop vs. Donohue,
367
But we must here emphasize that the practice of
law is not a property right but a mere
privilege,13 and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance
with the lawyers public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the
name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is
sufficient to state that the matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
lawyers and their regulation and supervision have
been and are indisputably recognized as inherent
judicial functions and responsibilities, and the
authorities holding such are legion.14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194),
in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was
confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,
sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky,
said: The power to regulate the conduct and
qualifications of its officers does not depend upon
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power
which is inherent in this court as a court
appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper
administration of justice . . . the argument that this
is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating
to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
misconceives the nature of the duty. It has
limitations no less real because they are inherent.
It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a
brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as
here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave
responsibility, to be assumed only with a
determination to uphold the ideals and traditions of
an honorable profession and to protect the public
from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of
the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not
be misused or prostituted. . .
The Courts jurisdiction was greatly reinforced
by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted
to the Court the power
_______________
U.S. 820, 6 L.ed. 2 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826, citing
Cardozo, J., with Brandeis and Stone, JJ.,
concurring, in Hamilton vs. Regents of Univ. of
California, 293 U.S. 245, 79 L.ed. 343, 55 S. Ct.
197.)
13
In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291.
Bar Flunkers Case, 50 O.G. 1602; In re
14
Aguas, 1 Phil. 1, and others.
to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice .
. . . . and the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Bar . . . . . (Article X, Sec 5(5)
the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent
to remain a member of the legal profession is
indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the
provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-
Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
complained of are neither unconstitutional nor
illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the
unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent
Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby
disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion
Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Respondent disbarred.
Notes.A contract for attorneys fees cannot be
used as a cloak for an exorbitant exaction. If after
receipt of such amount by the attorney, the
petitioner is still required to deposit a sum for the
same purpose, clearly there would be an exorbitant
exaction. The test certainly is one of fairness, and
in that sense the due process clause can be relied
upon to protect an attorneys client. (A.D. Santos,
Inc. vs. C.I.R, 72 SCRA 230; Bachrach vs.
Golingco, 39 Phil. 139).
An attorney must establish a clear right to his
claim for attorneys fees before he may be entitled
to a writ of mandatory injunction for deposit of his
alleged fees in court. (Integrated Construction
Services, Inc. vs. Relova, 65 SCRA 638).
Where there is no valid reason to investigate a
complaint against a lawyer, after the complainant
filed an affidavit of desistance, the case will be
dismissed. (Santiago vs. Bustamante, 76 SCRA
527).
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court ordaining the
organization of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines as well as the By-laws
of the IBP did not withdraw from the courts the
authority to investigate and decide complaints
against erring members of the Bar. (In re:
Brillantes, 76 SCRA 1).
An attorney abuses his right of recourse to the
Supreme Court where he files multiple petitions for
the same cause in false expectation of getting a
favorable action from one division as against the
adverse action of the other division. (Cabagul vs.
Court of Appeals, 67 SCRA 299).
IN RE SYCIP