ativism, along with their underlying philosophical assumptions, to demon-

strate how these orientations are integral to the psychological explorations

of the aforementioned analysts. From their work, he evaluates whether the
currerla assumption of universal validity of psychoanalyric theory is hdpful
or problematic for understanding the self of Indians and Japanese as com-
pared to that of Westerners. As a practicing psychoanalyst himself, Roland
then turns to his o m resolution of various thorny problems involving mod-
ern Western philosophical assumptions integral to psychoanalysis-assump-
tions that can confound the understanding of others from radically different
cultures,
In Chaptel. 3, "Ethics, Rdativ;sm, and the Self," Mary I. Bockover pre-
sents a comparative study of traditional Western ethics and Confucian phi-
losophy, Specifically, she formulates a major critique of rrxdirional ghiloso-
phy and ethics by reference to ethical relativism, especially as conceptualized
in the works of Bernard WiIXiams and other recent Western ~ h i l o sLo ~ h e r s .
1

Bockover argucs that Confucian philosophy and some Western approaches

can meet the challenges posed by relativism. She also discusses the way in
which these Eastern and Western orientations generate fundamentally differ-
ent conceptions of morality and, in turn, differem conceptions of "self." In
the process, Bockover explains how all the various systems of Western ethics
embrace a central objective and challenge that give rise to a concept of per-
son qua abstract individbtal. By way of comntst, she then examines the main
concern and challenge of "ethics" according to Confucian philosophy and
describes how the concept of person qua inherently social being emerges in
this system of thought. Finally, she argucs that e m these clearly differing
views of ethics and self share a COmmosl predicament: ethical indeterminacy.
In Chapter 4, "Classical Confucian and Contemporary Feminist Perspec-
tives on the Self: Some Parallels and Their Implications," Henry Roscmont,
Jr., considers several recent feminist critiques of philosophy, finding many
parallels with classical Confucianism. In most contemporary Western dis-
course in moraI and pditical philosophy, the self is characwrized as an au-
tonomous, rights-bearing individual. Rosemont contrasts this view of the
self with the ancient Confucian concept of the role-carrying person, clairn-
ing, first, that the latter closely approximates the caring person described in
much current feminist writing in the West and, second, that this Confu-
cian/feminist person is more appropriate to the analysis of moral problems
than is the autonomous, rights-bearing indiwldual.
In Chapter 5, "Buddho-Taoist and Western Metaphysics of the Self,"
Kennettt K. Inada claims that our experiential,
L
locus stems from the nature of
becoming, But whcrcas the discourse of Wcsccrn philosophers is grounded
in the concept of being, that of Buddhists and Taoists is grounded in the con-
cept of nonbeing. The dificrence is great, and in many ways it informs us of
the subtle variations in Eastern and Western cultures, Indeed, the tension be-