TAADA VS TUVERA (1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for
writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending
that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition. However, petitioners maintain
that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the
performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given
due course.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner may file a petition for mandamus against the respondents to compel them to
publish the unpublished laws on the basis of their right to be informed on matters of public concern.

RULING:

Yes. Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give
the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct
as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette.
The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be
given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement

of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force and effect.
TANADA v TUVERA (1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985 wherein the Court
affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval. Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for advisory
opinion. February Revolution took place, which subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file
a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court).

ISSUE:

Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

RULING:

The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its
previous publication.

Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or
as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve
if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the
public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and
not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule
upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

Bengzon v. Drilon

FACTS:

Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving
pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos issued a decree repealing
section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers
and enlisted members of the AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the
automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the
retired justices was not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave
the wrong information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an attempt to overcome her
earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this petition.

It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its publication,
thus there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was superfluous
because it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not
also produce any effect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the
payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or valid.

RULING:

The act of the President of vetoing the provision in the Appropriation Bill which set aside certain sum
of money for the payment of the adjusted retirement pension of retired justices of the SC and CA was
invalid because in fact, the President was vetoing RA No. 1797 and the ruling of the Supreme Court
in the Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA. The president has no power to set aside and override
the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend
statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.

It was held in the case of Tanada V. Tuvera that all laws must be published in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation before it can take effect. In this case, PD No. 644, as already ruled
by the SC in the pertinent Administrative Case, did not become a valid law because it was not duly
published. Absence such publication, the law shall be invalid. PD No. 644 never became a law,
therefore RA No. 1797 remains in force and so does the automatic readjustment feature of the
pension of the retired SC and CAS justices. Therefore the President cannot veto the appropriation
made by Congress.
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC. v. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES -
PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE,DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,

FACTS:

On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels
ofland in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Paraaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for
amilitary reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was
later onrenamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No. 208,amending Proclamation No. 423, which
excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it fora national shrine. The excluded area is
now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under theadministration of herein respondent
Military Shrine Services

Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO). Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangays Lower
Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it
open for disposition under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730. At the bottom of
Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which reads:"P.S.

This includes Western Bicutan (SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos

The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official
Gazette on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum. Years later, President Corazon C.
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as
published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation
No. 423 and declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and
730.Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio
including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued
General Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further
unauthorizedoccupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio. On 27
August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI)filed a
Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP). Thus, on 1September
2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution granting the Petition and declaring the portions of land in
question alienable and disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting.
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of
Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not be
defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, which was denied by the COSLAP.MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of
Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP Resolutions. The Court of Appeals First Division rendered
the assailed Decision granting MSS-PVAOs Petition.

Both NMSMI and WBLOAI appealed the said Decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the handwritten addendum was considered published also at the time the
Proclamationwas published.
RULING:

No. Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots), their
claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No.
2476.They allege that the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the
reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation just
below the printed version of Proclamation No. 2476.However, it is undisputed that the handwritten
addendum was not included when Proclamation No.2476 was published in the Official Gazette. The
resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the
determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect of
law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides: ART. 2. Laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it
is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. Under the above
provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself
has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a different effectivity date
other than after fifteen days following the completion of the laws publication

in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed
with.The issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark case Taada v.
Hon.Tuvera.Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as
published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect. Furthermore, under
Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication of any law, resolution or
other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus,
whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but
speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart
from the words appearing in the law.

This Court cannot rule that a word appears inthe law when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain
Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano, we ruled that under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.' This does not mean, however, that courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting
the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of separation of
powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws, particularly
where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself
the task of legislating." The remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another
legislation that would amend the law to include petitioners' lots in the reclassification.