REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUPREME COURT
MANILA

EN BANC

IN RE: URGENT PETITION FOR TRANSFER,

DISQUALIFICATION AND/OR
SUBSTITUTION OF JUSTICES
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.,
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
AND LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET),
A.M. No. _____
REP. REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES,
Petitioner.
x ---------------------------------------------------------- x

URGENT PETITION
(For Transfer, Disqualification and/or Substitution of
Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Diosdado M. Peralta
and Lucas P. Bersamin from the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal)

Petitioner, by counsel, respectfully states:

1. Petitioner Representative REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES

is a Filipino, of legal age and with address at Barangay
Lupac, Boac, Marinduque. Petitioner may be served copies of
processes, Resolutions, Decisions or any other pleading in
her office at the House of Representatives, Room 519, North
Wing, Batasan Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City.

2. Petitioner is the duly elected Representative for the

Lone District of the Province of Marinduque having had the
highest number of votes for the said position during the 13
May 2013 elections with 52,209 votes against Lord Allan Jay
Q. Velasco who got 48,311 votes.

3. Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco is the son of Justice

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. a member of this Honorable Court

1
and the Chairman of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET).

4. Petitioner was proclaimed the winner by the

Marinduque Provincial Board of Canvassers on 18 May 2013
and, at the time of her proclamation, no final judgment has
been rendered against her for her disqualification. Likewise,
no motion to suspend proclamation was filed to arrest her
proclamation by, and the Commission on Elections
(Comelec), has not issued an Order for the suspension of her
proclamation in accordance with Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 6646. To date, her proclamation has not been lawfully
annulled by the only constitutional body the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal vested with jurisdiction
over election contests, returns and qualifications of Member
of the House of Representatives, including pre-proclamation
controversies and annulment of proclamation.

5. Petitioner assumed office on 30 June 2013 and

discharged the functions of her office from that date up to
the present. Attached hereto as Annex A is a copy of the
Certification by the House of Representatives that Rep.
Reyes is the duly elected, incumbent and sitting Member of
the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque.

6. At present, there are two (2) quo warranto cases

against the Petitioner filed and pending with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) with another
petition filed as an intervention. The cases are:

6.1. Case No. 13-036 (Quo Warranto), entitled Noeme

Mayores Tan & Jeasseca L. Mapacpac v. Regina Ongsiako
Reyes (A copy of the Petition is attached hereto as Annex
B);

6.2. Case No. 130037 (Quo Warranto), entitled Eric D.

Junio v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes (A copy of the Petition is
attached hereto as Annex C); and

6.3. Petition-in-Intervention by Victor Vela Sioco (A copy

of the Petition-in-Intervention is attached hereto as
Annex D).

7. Aside from the foregoing cases, an election protest

filed by Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco, the son of Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. who is also the Chairperson of the

2
HRET, against the Petitioner, was dismissed by the HRET on
28 November 2013. A copy of the 28 November 2013
Resolution is attached hereto as Annex E.

8. As early as 28 November 2013, the HRET proclaimed

its jurisdiction over the case against Petitioner as
representative of the Lone District of Marinduque in the case
entitled Noeme Mayores Tan and Jeasseca L. Mapacpac
vs. Regina Ongsiako Reyes (Lone District of
Marinduque) in HRET Case No. 13-036. The HRET, in
Resolution No. 13-2421, said:

On July 11, 2013, petitioners filed a Petition

for Quo Warranto of even date against respondent,
alleging, among other things, that respondent is
ineligible for the position of Representative of the
Lone District of Marinduque because the latter had
been declared as not a Filipino Citizen.

However, in the petition, petitioners also

allege that:

2. Respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO

REYES, (Respondent hereafter) is a Filipino
citizen, a resident of Lupac, Boac,
Marinduque. Respondent may be served with
pleadings, summons and other processes in
her residence as stated above. (Underscoring
supplied)

By admitting that respondent is a Filipino

citizen, petitioners have no more cause of action
against respondent and, therefore, the petition
may be summarily dismissed for being insufficient
in form and substance under Rule 21 (1) of the
2011 HRET Rules.

In Resolution No. 13-093 date August 15,

2013, the Tribunal directed petitioners to show
cause, within a non-extendible period of ten (10)
days from receipt hereof, why their Petition for
Quo Warranto should not be dismissed for lack of
cause of action.

Records show that a copy of Resolution No.

13-093 was received on September 9, 2013 by a
1
A copy of the Resolution is attached hereto as Annex F.

3
 certain Pedro Salindong, the father of counsel for
petitioner, Atty. Danilo F. Salindong, at the latters
office address of record at JCLGE Building, 3573
Sandico St., Barangay Tejeros, Makati City.

To date, however, petitioners have not yet

complied with the show-cause order in Resolution
No. 13-093.

Specifically, Rule 21 of the 2011 HRET Rules

provides, among other things, that a petition for
quo warranto may be summarily dismissed by the
Tribunal without the necessity of requiring the
respondent to answer if the petition is insufficient
in form and substance.

Although the Tribunal had jurisdiction

over the present case, as the sole judge of
all contests relating, inter alia, to the
qualifications of the Members of the House
of Representatives, the petitioners, however,
have no more cause of action against the
respondent for reasons mentioned above. The
petition is, therefore, insufficient in form and
substance, meriting its dismissal. (Emphasis
supplied)

9. On 12 March 2014, Victor Vela Sioco filed with the

HRET a Petition-in-Intervention alleging, among others, that
herein Petitioner is illegally occupying the office of
Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque and the
HRET has therefore no jurisdiction over the cases against
her. The filing fees for the Petition were not paid until 14
March 2014.

10. Immediately, the Petition-in-Intervention was made

part of the agenda of the HRET for its session on the next
day, 13 March 2014. It cannot be determined who caused
the inclusion of the Petition-in-Intervention in the calendar of
the HRET for its session on 13 March 2014. It could not also
be determined whether there was a report on the non-
payment of the filing fees which is a ground for the summary
dismissal of the petition under Rule 21 of the HRET Rules.

11. However, on 13 March 2014 --- or a MERE ONE

DAY after the filing of the Petition-in-Intervention by

4
Victor Vela Sioco --- the HRET issued Resolution No. 14-081 2
with respect to HRET Case [HRET Case No. 13-036 (QW)] and
the case entitled Eric Del Mundo Junio vs. Regina Ongsiako
Reyes (Lone District, Marinduque) [HRET Case No. 13-037
(QW)], to wit:

Acting on both petitions for quo warranto, the

Tribunal, without necessarily giving due course to
the said petitions, REQUIRES respondent to
comment thereon within a non-extendible period
of ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

12. On the same day, and in the same cases, instead of

summarily dismissing the Petition-in-Intervention, the HRET
likewise promulgated Resolution No. 14-0823 which states:

Acting on the Petition-in-Intervention dated

March 12, 2014, filed by Victor Vela Sioco on even
date, the Tribunal, without necessarily giving due
course to the said petition-in-intervention,
REQUIRES the respondent to comment thereon
within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days
from receipt hereof.

13. The excerpts of the foregoing Resolutions ended

with the following note:

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. inhibited from this

case and stepped out of the room. Justice
Diosdado M. Peralta presided over the
deliberations in the instant case.

14. The Supreme Courts representatives to the HRET

are Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Diosdado M. Peralta and
Lucas P. Bersamin. Considering that it was supposedly only
Justice Velasco who allegedly inhibited from the proceedings
in the above cases and Justice Peralta acted as the Chairman
in Justice Velascos absence, it is reasonable to suppose that
Justice Bersamin also participated in the proceedings.

15. It must be recalled that Justice Bersamin voted with

the majority of the Justices of the Honorable Court in the
case entitled Reyes vs. COMELEC4 in its Decision dated 25
June 2013 while Justice Velasco inhibited therefrom and

2
A copy of which is attached as Annex G.
3
A copy of which is attached as Annex H.
4
G.R. No. 207264.

5
Justice Peralta was on official leave. In the Resolution 5 of the
Motion for Reconsideration, all three Justices took no part in
the proceedings with Justice Velasco specifically inhibiting
himself from the case.

Designation of HRET Members

16. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

provides for the designation of Justices as representatives of
the Judiciary to the HRET. The provision reads:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of

Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in
the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
(Emphasis supplied)

17. It must be stressed that the provision uses the term

designation, not appointment. Designation does not imply
permanency as opposed to an appointment. This distinction
was made clear by the Honorable Court in the case of
Binamira vs. Garrucho6 where the Court said:

Appointment may be defined as the

selection, by the authority vested with the power,
of an individual who is to exercise the functions of
a given office. When completed, usually with its
confirmation, the appointment results in security
of tenure for the person chosen unless he is
replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of
his office. Designation, on the other hand,
5
22 October 2013.
6
G.R. No. 92008; 30 July 1990.
6
 connotes merely the imposition by law of
additional duties on an incumbent official, as
where, in the case before us, the Secretary of
Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or
where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the
Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice
to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the
House of Representatives. It is said that
appointment is essentially executive while
designation is legislative in nature.

Designation may also be loosely defined as

an appointment because it likewise involves the
naming of a particular person to a specified public
office. That is the common understanding of the
term. However, where the person is merely
designated and not appointed, the
implication is that he shall hold the office
only in a temporary capacity and may be
replaced at will by the appointing authority.
In this sense, the designation is considered only an
acting or temporary appointment, which does not
confer security of tenure on the person named.
(Emphasis supplied)

18. And while the duty to designate the representatives

of the Judiciary to the HRET devolves upon the Chief Justice,
it is respectfully submitted that the power resides in the
Supreme Court as a whole under its expressly enumerated
powers7 and/or necessary or implied powers. The power to
designate necessarily carries with it the power to withdraw
the designation.

The Case for Disqualification and Transfer of Justice

Velasco

19. The Honorable Court must not begrudge a

forthright, upfront, and candid outpouring of misgivings,
apprehensions -- strong suspicions even -- by the Petitioner
and the general public at large given the unprecedented
and very peculiar circumstances of the subject case.

20. After all, the subject case involves, not only the
son of a sitting member of the Supreme Court, but the
7
Section 5 (6), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.

7
Justice-Father himself continues to head the body (i.e.
HRET) that is vested by the Constitution with the power to
decide whether to award the disputed Congressional seat
to his own son.

21. His inhibition notwithstanding, the Justice-Father

(a) remains the boss, head, and superior of
everyone in the HRET, (b) retains administrative
control over all the operations of the Tribunal, (c) is
vested with inseparable moral suasion over all HRET
employees, and (d) enjoys unavoidable camaraderie
with the judicial and congressional members of the
Tribunal.

22. There has never occurred an equivalent incident

in the entire history of the Supreme Court --- or in any
other Philippine governmental body for that matter --- where
a sons desire to be awarded a Congressional seat
would depend on a body headed by his own
Justice-Father. The Supreme Court runs the risk of
incurring historical infamy if it ignores this unprecedented
scenario and contents itself with a complacent and run-
of-the-mill inhibition by the Justice-Father from the case,
even if said Justice/Father/HRET-Head still retains
administrative control and moral suasion, and enjoys
collegial camaraderie in the HRET.

23. In addition to the peculiar scenario of Father-

Justice-HRET-Head-Empowered-To-Award-Seat-To-Son, the
Father-Justice himself has been THE CENTRAL FIGURE in
several controversies that do not work to assuage fears
but rather fan the flames of fears of injustice in the making.
Again, the Petitioner begs the Supreme Court not to
begrudge a further candid elucidation of misgivings, given
the peculiar circumstances of the instant case.

24. It must be remembered that multiple accusations

of misuse of influence have been leveled against the
Justice/Father/HRET-Head and the said accusations are
memorialized in no less than a book of investigative
journalism. 8

25. In these published and memorialized accusations,

the Justice/Father/HRET-Head himself was reported to
have engaged in a practice of calling up judges and

8
Vitug, Marites Danguilan. Shadow of Doubt Probing the Supreme Court, pp. 91-92.

8
justices to intercede in behalf of litigants and intervene in
pending cases. No less than six judges and justices have
been narrated in the book to have reported receiving calls
from the Justice/Father/HRET-Head who allegedly sought to
intervene in pending cases.9

26. If only to emphasize the grounded-basis of fears

of injustice engendered by the status of the
Justice/Father/HRET-Head, the propensity of the
Justice/Father/HRET-Head to intercede --- not only in favor
of litigants not related to him by blood --- but more
relevantly in favor of his son, is even the subject of
pointed accusations in the subject book of investigative
journalism. The book narrates detailed stories about how
Justice/Father/HRET-Head interceded with government
officials in pushing for the Congressional candidacy of his
son in the disputed province of Marinduque. 10
9
And true again to what Bantay Katarungan and Pea pointed out, Velasco
continued to intercede for litigants before the Court of Appeals and
lower courts. The judiciary and legal community are small and tight circles
where information such as this spreads quickly. Lawyers said Velasco was
notorious for pressuring judges this way: he would call the justice or judge
on the phone and attempt to influence the decision. If the judges did not
take his calls, Velasco went through other judges to relay his message, one
lawyer with good access to judges said. About six judges (at the regional
trial court, metropolitan trial court, and Court of Appeals) shared their
experience with Velasco with their colleagues.

In one instance, the lawyer continued, Velasco attempted to fast-track a

criminal case in a provincial RTC. One of his staff members called the
provincial RTC judgeto inform him that the Justice wanted to talk to him.
When the judge refused to talk to Velasco, he called two other judges in the
same Hall of Justice to pass on his message.

Over his years in the judiciary, lawyers and judges gave Velasco the
moniker practicing justice. Initially, it referred to his frequent
visits to his former law firm when he was a Court of Appeals justice,
as alleged by Pea. This since evolved to refer to his penchant to
intervene in cases, as the judiciary watchdog, Bantay Katarungan,
complained about to the JBC. (Vitug, Marites Danguilan. Shadow of Doubt
Probing the Supreme Court, pp. 91-92.Emphasis supplied)

10
But how far car a father help a son Win an election raceif he
happens to be a Indio, of the Supreme Court ? Not That far, if judicial ethics
were to be followed.

Justice Velasco, in this case, was navigating an ethical minefield. Accounts

from residents in Marinduque show that he was active in organizing Allan's
ticket. He invited at least two local officials to run with his son as councilor
and promised to underwrite campaign expenses; he was-also present in
Allan's meetings with local leaders in Iris beachfront residence in Turrijos,
Marinduque.

"He (Justice Velasco) called to invite me to run for counselor with his son
and to attend a mining in his residence. I couldnt attend the meeting and I
declined his offer," Marife Pastrana, barangay captain, said in an interview.
"He said I shouldn't worry about campaign expenses, he'll take care of the
funds" Pastrami said she preferred to stay on as barangay captain.

9
 27. It is true that the charges and accusations have
not been proven in any proceedings. But it is likewise
equally true that the charges and accusations remain
hanging, unresolved and are highly material
considerations in the application of the Supreme
Courts mantra-like admonition that (l)ike
Caesars wife, a judge must not only be pure but
above suspicion.

Norma Villar, also a barangay captain, received the same offer from Justice
Velasco. Villar declined as well.

Pastrami said she was able to attend a meeting in the elder Velascos
residence once. These meetings, hosted by Allan, gathered barangay
officials and were usually held on weekends. The Justice was usually around
and spoke with some of the local leaders, shook their hands, and asked
them to support his son.

Torrijos is a town of twenty live barangays, with about seven officials

(kagawad) each. The meetings in the Velasco residence were known in the
community.

After every meeting, the barangay officials were reimbursed for their
transport expenses, anywhere from P100 to P300 each. Justice Velasco did
not participate in distributing the cash.

"I know that government officials cannot engage in partisan political

activity which is why I refrain front activities which may be construed as
such," Justice Velasco wrote in reply to questions seal la him. I seldom go
to Marinduque and during those occasions, some people, including
government officials talk to me about the problems in Marinduque. I try to
avoid discussing with them the political plans of my son.

On the Court, Justice Velasco voted along personal lines in Quinto v.

Comelec which allowed appointive public officials to stay in their posts even
after filing their candidacies. This ruling benefitted his son, who was
Marinduque's provincial administrator at the time.

But Justice Velasco said that he "dissuaded him (Allan) from running and
explained the sacrifices and difficulties relating to a political career." Re
went on in his letter: "He decided that he has a good chance of winning in
view of his exposure as provincial administrator. I told him to fully
familiarize himself with election laws and Comelec rules and to act within
the confines of law."

In the Philippines, where family ties are strong, ethical conduct demands
much more from the Justices. Two sections in the New Code of Judicial
Conduct (2007) provide guidance on this sensitive area: Judges should not
"use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their private
interests, or those of a member of their family"; and "Judges shall not allow
family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct."

Allan Velasco needed all the help he could get to win the contest against
the Reyeses, an entrenched political family. The question is how much of
this would have come from his father? (Vitug, Marites Danguilan. Shadow of
Doubt Probing the Supreme Court, pp. 238-239. Emphasis supplied)

10
 Like Caesars wife, a judge must not only
be pure but above suspicion. A judges
private as well as official conduct must at
all times be free from all appearances of
impropriety, and be beyond reproach.

28. Time and again, the Supreme Court has

repeatedly admonished its judges of their obligation to be
like Caesars wife. In the eyes of judges and the public
at large, this subject case will now test whether the
Supreme Court practices what it preaches. It is not
enough that Justice/Father/HRET-Head inhibits himself
from the case, because he will continue to have access
and influence as HRET Head, and therefore, unlike Ceasars
wife, he will engender strong suspicions of impropriety.
He must not occupy the position of HRET Head but should
be properly reassigned to another position ( e.g. SET
Head), if the Supreme Court is to prove to all and sundry
that it leads by example and will live up to its own
teachings.

29. While all persons are presumed innocent until

proven guilty, the foregoing background is the one that the
Honorable Court has to contend with in presenting as its
representative to the public, Justice Velasco. More
specifically, that is the background under which the
Honorable Court, presented Justice Velasco to the public
when it designated him as its representative to, indeed the
Chairman of, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

30. Although Justice Velasco has ostensibly inhibited

himself from the cases against the Petitioner herein, the
foregoing is the background under which any decision he
makes will be viewed. It is the burden that the Honorable
Court has asked the public to carry when it designated him
to the HRET and it is a burden that is not easily dismissed.

The Propriety of Designating Justices

with Ties to Political Families to
Electoral Tribunals

31. Whether Justice Velasco likes it or not, the Velasco

family has become a political family with his son, Lord
Allan Jay Q. Velasco, running for the Congressional post for

11
the lone district of Marinduque coupled with his wife 11 herself
as a representative of a party-list group from the sector of
persons with disability the group of the blind.

32. The unresolved accusations and attendant

suspicions that the Justice/Father/HRET-Head intervenes
in pending cases is not helped, but in fact exacerbated, by
Justice Velascos involvement in what is formally a judicial
exercise but is essentially, an exercise in political horse-
trading that necessitated the introduction of the Justices as a
foreign element to temper the political influences.

33. Whether the Court likes it or not, a time will come

when the HRET will be faced with an issue that will involve
members of political families to which the justices of the
Court belong. This is true with respect to Justice Velasco and
possibly, Justice Bersamin.

34. For Justice Velasco, that time has come. Although

he has officially inhibited himself from the cases against the
Petitioner, the HRET the Members of which are not
hampered from continuing their interactions with Justice
Velasco in other pending HRET cases and administrative
issues is not thereby shielded from his influence. By
maintaining Justice Velasco as part of the HRET, that is the
image that the Honorable Court projects to the public and
the whole world.

35. Some government agencies may be oblivious to the

cries of other people regarding the government, but the
Honorable Court, more than any other institution, is
mandated to be sensitive to such lamentations on matters
involving justice. Thus, judicial officers are required not only
to avoid improprieties but appearance of improprieties, to
wit:

Notwithstanding the above findings, this

Court is not prepared to concede respondent
Judges liability as to Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which provides: A judge should
avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities. The failure of the
petitioners to present evidence that the
respondent acted with partiality and malice can
only negate the allegation of impropriety, but not
the appearance of impropriety. In De la Cruz v.
11
Lorna Velasco, representing Ang Mata ay Alagaan.

12
Judge Bersamira, this Court underscored the need
to show not only the fact of propriety but the
appearance of propriety itself. It held that the
standard of morality and decency required is
exacting so much so that a judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all his activities. The Court explains thus:

By the very nature of the bench,

judges, more than the average man, are
required to observe an exacting
standard of morality and decency. The
character of a judge is perceived by the
people not only through his official acts
but also through his private morals as
reflected in his external behavior. It is
therefore paramount that a judges
personal behavior both in the
performance of his duties and his daily
life, be free from the appearance of
impropriety as to be beyond reproach.
Only recently, in Magarang v. Judge Galdino
B. Jardin, Sr., the Court pointedly stated that:

While every public office in the

government is a public trust, no position
exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the judiciary.
Hence, judges are strictly mandated to
abide by the law, the Code of Judicial
Conduct and with existing
administrative policies in order to
maintain the faith of the people in the
administration of justice.

Judges must adhere to the highest

tenets of judicial conduct. They must be
the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence. A judges
conduct must be above reproach. Like
Caesars wife, a judge must not
only be pure but above suspicion. A
judges private as well as official
conduct must at all times be free
from all appearances of

13
 impropriety, and be beyond
reproach.

In Vedana v. Valencia, the Court

held:

The Code of Judicial Ethics

mandates that the conduct of a
judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect
to his performance of his judicial
duties, but also to his behavior
outside his sala as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of
morality: a public official is also
judged by his private morals. The
Code dictates that a judge, in order
to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with
propriety at all times. As we have
recently explained, a judges
official life can not simply be
detached or separated from his
personal existence. Thus:

Being the subject of constant

public scrutiny, a judge should
freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might
be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen.

A judge should personify

judicial integrity and exemplify
honest public service. The personal
behavior of a judge, both in the
performance of official duties and
in private life should be above
suspicion.

As stated earlier, in Canon 2 of the Code

of Judicial Conduct, a judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all his activities. A judge is
not only required to be impartial; he must
also appear to be impartial. Public confidence

14
 in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct of judges.

Viewed vis--vis the factual landscape of this

case, it is clear that
respondent judge violated Rule 1.02, as well as
Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Canon 3. In this
connection, the Court pointed out in Joselito Rallos,
et al. v. Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr., RTC Branch 5,
Cebu City, that:

Well-known is the judicial norm

that judges should not only be
impartial but should also appear
impartial. Jurisprudence repeatedly
teaches that litigants are entitled to
nothing less than the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge. The other elements
of due process, like notice and hearing,
would become meaningless if the
ultimate decision is rendered by a
partial or biased judge. Judges must
not only render just, correct and
impartial decisions, but must do so
in a manner free of any suspicion as
to their fairness, impartiality and
integrity.

This reminder applies all the more

sternly to municipal, metropolitan and
regional trial court judges like herein
respondent, because they are judicial
front-liners who have direct contact with
the litigating parties. They are the
intermediaries between conflicting
interests and the embodiments of the
peoples sense of justice. Thus, their
official conduct should be beyond
reproach.12 (Citations omitted and
emphasis supplied)

36. Under the background painted in the book Shadow

of Doubt, it may be argued that Justice Velascos continued
stay in the HRET, especially as its Chairperson, may
prejudice the institution. Petitioner respectfully submits that
it need not come to that. What the Honorable Court is faced
12
Angping vs. Ros (A.M. No. 12-8-160-RTC ; 10 December 2012).

15
with is not so much the question of whether Justice Velascos
stay in the HRET is prejudicial to the institution as much as
whether Justice Velascos continued stay therein creates an
appearance of impropriety considering the cases involving
his son and possibly, his wife.

37. Aside from the appearance of impropriety

generated by the fact that he continues to be an integral
part its HEAD, even --- of an institution that will decide on
the fate of his son, Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco, there are
badges, hints, and indications of impropriety despite the
claim of inhibition on the part of the Justice/Father/HRET-
Head. These are evidenced by the following:

37.1. The Petition-in-intervention of Victor Vela Sioco

that argues favorably in favor of the son of Justice Velasco,
Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco, was received by the Secretariat of
the Tribunal despite the fact that the Rules of the HRET do
not allow for petitions-in-intervention. 13

37.2. Despite the Secretary to the Tribunal being

empowered to determine whether a pleading filed with the
HRET is properly presented,14 the Petition-in-intervention
was readily accepted on 12 March 2014 and immediately
calendared as part of the agenda on 13 March 2014.

37.3. Despite not having paid the required fees for

initiatory pleadings, the Petition-in-intervention was readily
accepted by the Secretariat and the Tribunal and made part
of the agenda on the next day it was filed when the HRET
Rules require that it be summarily dismissed.

37.4. Worse, the Tribunal acted on the petition-in-

intervention by requiring the Petitioner to file, not an Answer
on the petition-in-intervention and the other two (2) pending
petitions, but a comment.

38. While Justice Velasco may have inhibited during the

deliberations on 13 March 2013, the undue haste a phrase
that is a recurring refrain involving the case of Justice
Velascos son15 it cannot be said that it did not rear its ugly
head in the acceptance of the questionable petition-in-
intervention despite non-payment of fees or in its being
13
The HRET Rules allow only for two (2) types of Petitions and these are for Protest
and Quo Warranto.
14
Rule 12 (1).
15
See Justice Brions Dissenting Opinion in Reyes vs. Comelec (G.R. No. No. 207264;
25 June 2013).

16
made part of the agenda of the Tribunal for its 13 March
2014 session.

39. That is the only conclusion that can be made

considering that, as Chairperson of the HRET, there is no
way that Justice Velasco can completely detach himself from
the cases involving his own son as the opponent of the
Petitioner in the congressional elections in Marinduque.

40. As Chairperson of the HRET, Justice Velasco has the

following powers and duties, to wit:

RULE 10. The Chairperson; Powers and Duties.

The Chairperson shall have the following powers
and duties:
(1) Act as the Chief Executive Officer of the
Tribunal;
(2) Exercise administrative supervision over
the Tribunal, including the Office of the
Secretary of the Tribunal and the administrative
staff of the Tribunal;
(3) Issue calls for the sessions and meetings
of the Tribunal and preside thereat, and preserve
order and decorum during the same; and pass
upon all questions of order subject to such
appeal as any member may take to the
Tribunal;
(4) Take care that the orders, resolutions, and
decisions of the Tribunal are enforced;
(5) Appoint, dismiss or otherwise discipline the
personnel of the Tribunal in accordance with Civil
Service laws and regulations. The confidential
employees of every Member shall serve at the
pleasure of such Member and in no case beyond
the tenure of such Member; and
(6) Perform such other functions and acts as may
be necessary or appropriate to ensure the
independence and efficiency of the Tribunal.

41. Given such all-encompassing powers, it is therefore

doubtful whether Justice Velasco, as Chairperson of the
Tribunal, can indeed distance himself from the cases
involving the Petitioner.

42. To cite an example, while the first two (2) HRET

cases above were filed sometime last year, it was not until a
Petition-in-Intervention was filed on 12 March 2014 that

17
action was taken by the Tribunal on the pending petitions by
involving Petitioner in the cases. Who set these cases as part
of the calendar for the 13 March 2014 deliberations of the
Tribunal is as yet to be disclosed by the Tribunal. Any
disinterested person cannot be faulted from suspecting
concluding even --- that given his powers, it was the
Chairperson of the Tribunal who set the cases in the calendar
of the HRET.

43. The same thing can be said of the Petition-in-

Intervention which was hastily acted upon one (1) day after
it was filed. Considering that Justice Velasco only inhibited
himself during the deliberations of the cases, any
disinterested person cannot be faulted from suspecting ---
concluding even --- that, at the very least, it was with his
tacit approval (if he was altogether involved) that the
petition-in-intervention was included in the calendar of the
HRET for hearing on 13 March 2014.

44. It is thus inconceivably unavoidable that Justice

Velasco, as Chairperson of the Tribunal, will have to involve
himself again or even suspected of having informally and
confidentially involved himself, at the very least, in the
setting of the cases or motions for deliberation by the HRET.

45. Considering the inevitability of involvement or

mere appearance of involvement on the part of Justice
Velasco, it is respectfully submitted that he be transferred to
the Senate Electoral Tribunal so that there can be no
occasion nor opportunity either for an actual impropriety or
appearance of impropriety. The transfer of Justice Velasco to
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, it is respectfully submitted,
would be the best course of action to remove any
appearance of impropriety in the proceedings of the HRET.

Propriety of Disqualification and Substitution

of Justice Bersamin as Member of the HRET

46. As regards Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, the fact that

he is also a member of a political family in Northern Luzon
may give rise for an occasion if not appearance of
impropriety. While there is no Bersamin in the House of
Representatives at present, his familys involvement in local
politics may provide not even actual motive but even mere
imputations of motive or appearance of improper motive,

18
that his decision was prompted by considerations of
political favors, horse-trading, or favor-swapping that
would affect political alignments in the intense politics in
the province of Abra.

47. Aside from being a part of a political family which

may give rise to an occasion or appearance of impropriety
per se, Petitioner respectfully moves for the substitution of
Justice Bersamin as a Member of the HRET considering that
he was one of the Justices who pre-judged the case of
Petitioner when he voted with the majority of the Court in its
Resolution dated 25 June 2013 in the case entitled Reyes vs.
COMELEC.16

48. To recall, the vote in the said Resolution of the

Honorable Court was 7-4 with Justice Bersamin voting with
the majority. In the said Resolution, the Court said:

As to the issue of whether petitioner failed to

prove her Filipino citizenship, as well as her one-
year residency in Marinduque, suffice it to say that
the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of
discretion in finding her ineligible for the position
of Member of the House of Representatives. 17

49. Not content therewith, the Court went on to discuss

point by point the pieces of evidence presented by both
parties in the case so as to leave no room aside from the
conclusion that These circumstances, taken together, show
that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioners citizenship.
Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt. 18

50. By going into the very pieces of evidence in the

case before the COMELEC, Justice Bersamin, in agreeing with
the Resolution, effectively pre-judged the case against
Petitioner especially since the grounds relied upon in the
COMELEC case appear to be the same claims in the quo
warranto petitions before the HRET.

51. By sitting in judgment before the case for quo

warranto filed with the HRET, it is unavoidable for the good
Justice Bersamin not to hark back to the pronouncements of
the Honorable Court in its 25 June 2013 Resolution which he
participated in.

16
G.R. No. 207264.
17
p. 10.
18
p. 13.

19
 52. It would now be unthinkable for Justice Bersamin
not to carry such judgment that he made in the 25 June
2013 Resolution of the Court into the deliberations in the
cases for quo warranto against the Petitioner before the
HRET if it would even come to that considering the
deviation from the established rules of the Tribunal that has
been so far decreed in the case of the Petitioner. 19

53. It is truly lamentable that this Petition has to be

filed given the clear case of disqualification of Justice
Bersamin. It is a testament to how the injunction for judges
and judicial officers to be like Ceasars wife has been
disregarded and cast aside. If the Supreme Court continues
to be silent and gives implicit imprimatur for Justice
Bersamin to retain his membership in the HRET, the Court
will add fuel to the long running yarn in the legal profession
that the injunction to be like Ceasars wife applies only to
judges but not to justices.

54. Justice Bersamin had more than one (1) year since
the promulgation of the Decision in the Reyes vs. Comelec
case within which to disqualify himself from the proceedings
before HRET. He has not done so and appears not inclined to
do so. It is in the spirit of renewing or maybe restoring the
integrity of the Courts that this petition to disqualify Justice
Lucas P. Bersamin is therefore being filed considering that he
was merely designated to the post.

A Case for the Substitution of Justice Peralta

55. With respect to Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, there

are indications that he is equally guilty of failing to appear
impartial. The good justice was on leave when the Decision
in the Reyes vs. Comelec Case was promulgated on 25 June
2013. While nothing can be ascribed to it by itself, his
subsequent conduct appears to be tainted with impropriety.

56. When the Honorable Court promulgated its

Resolution in the said case of Reyes vs. Comelec on 22
October 2013, Justice Peralta took no part thereon
presumably because he was part of the HRET. However, in
the case of Taada vs. Comelec,20 he did not recuse himself
19
Resolution No. 14-081 and 14-082 may seem like innocuous and harmless run of
the mill resolutions promulgated by any court or administrative agency but the HRET
Rules require the issuance of a summons requiring the submission of an answer in
ten (10) days, not a Resolution requiring the respondent to comment on the petitions
for quo warranto or, even, a petition-in-intervention.
20
G.R. No. 207199-200; 22 October 2013.

20
on account of his being a Member of the HRET and voted
with the majority.

57. Subsequent thereto, the HRET, on 28 November

2013 issued a Resolution, while declaring to have jurisdiction
over the case, dismissed above-mentioned case of Tan vs.
Reyes docketed as HRET Case No. 13-036 (QW) through its
Resolution No. 13-242.

58. On the same day, the HRET also granted the Motion
to Withdraw the Election Protest filed by Lord Allan Jay Q.
Velasco in HRET Case No. 13-028 via its Resolution No. 13-
228. Only a copy of the Resolution is attached hereto
because the Secretariat of the HRET decided not to issue a
certified true copy since undersigned counsel was not the
counsel of Petitioner in the Protest Case, despite counsel
having entered its appearance as Petitioners counsel in the
pending cases and despite he fact that the document
requested is a public document.

59. However, when it appeared that the House of

Representatives was not about to let Lord Allan Jay Q.
Velasco sit as Representative for the Lone District of
Marinduque, a Petition was filed with the Honorable Court for
Mandamus by Justice Velascos son and a Petition-in-
intervention was filed with the HRET for Justice Velascos son
to be recognized as the Representative for the congressional
district of Marinduque.

60. As stated above, the Petition-in-intervention by

Victor Vela Sioco was filed and accepted on 12 March 2013,
calendared for hearing on 13 March 2013 and favorably
acted upon by the Tribunal by requiring Petitioner to
Comment, NOT ANSWER, the petition-in-intervention as well
as the other two (2) pending petitions. The HRET was then
supposedly presided by Justice Peralta who, instead of
summarily dismissing the petition-in-intervention in
accordance with the HRET Rules, favorably acted on the
same.

61. It appears from the foregoing that the actions of the

HRET, presided by Justice Peralta, is in sync with the actions
taken by Justice Velascos son, or his followers, with the end
in view of having the latter sit in Congress in place of the
Petitioner. It must be underscored that it was only on 14
March 2014 that the filing fees21 for the petition-in-
21
A copy of the Official Receipts is attached hereto as Annex I.

21
intervention was paid and yet, the HRET presided by Justice
Peralta favorably acted on it on 13 March 2014.

62. Moreover, notwithstanding the earlier declaration of

the HRET that it has jurisdiction over the Tan vs. Reyes HRET
Case, the language used in the latter Resolution of 13 March
2014 in the quo warranto cases pending with the HRET for
Petitioner to Comment on and not Answer the Petitions is a
set up for, possibly and quite probably, the dismissal of the
cases on account of lack of jurisdiction premised on what it
may claim as Petitioners having been removed from office
on account of the Supreme Court ruling notwithstanding that
it is Petitioner who is the person recognized by the House of
Representatives as the duly elected Representative of
Marinduque in view of the absence of an HRET Decision
declaring her proclamation invalid or removing her from
office.

63. Considering the foregoing, Petitioner most

respectfully moves for the Honorable Court to likewise
substitute of Justice Peralta as one of its representatives in
the HRET in the cases involving the son of Justice Velasco.

The Supreme Court must impose

the like Caesars Wife standard
on Justices Velasco, Bersamin, and
Peralta

64. The Supreme Court --- Justices Velasco, Bersamin,

and Peralta in particular --- must hark back to the exacting
pronouncements of the High Court when even just the
mere use of a courts letterhead in a judges unofficial
communication was considered violative of the like
Caesars wife standard imposed by the Court on judges.
In the case of In Ladignon vs. Judge Garong (A.M. No. MTJ-
08-1712; August 20, 2008), the judge was found violating
the exacting standard that proscribes any appearance of
impropriety for his mere unofficial use of the courts
letterhead. This High Court ruled in this wise:

We agree with the Report that what is involved

here is the rule that "Judges shall avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities".1 Indeed, members of the Judiciary
should be beyond reproach and suspicion in their

22
conduct, and should be free from any appearance
of impropriety in the discharge of their official
duties as well as in their personal behavior and
everyday life. No position exacts a greater
demand for moral righteousness and uprightness
on the individual than a seat in the Judiciary.
Where we significantly differ with the Report is in its
sweeping implication that any use of a courts
letterhead for non-official transactions would
necessarily expose the user to liability for "impropriety"
or giving the "appearance of impropriety".

The Judges claim that he used an ordinary bond

papers and placed thereon his official station as return
address is not totally without merit. For, indeed, this is
not an unusual practice and it would be hypocritical to
deny its occurrence at all levels of the Judiciary. For
example, some members of the Judiciary may use a
social card with the letterhead of their office to indicate
their address as well as their station within the judicial
hierarchy; some also use notepads bearing their names,
designation and station.

A thin line, however, exists between what is

proper and what is improper in such use, and this was
the line that the respondent Judge crossed when he
used his letterhead and title the way he did. As the
Report stated, his use of the letterhead and his
designation as a Judge in a situation of potential dispute
gave "the appearance that there is an implied or
assured consent of the court to his cause." This
circumstance, to our mind, was what marked the
respondent Judges use of his letterhead and title as
improper. In other words, the respondent Judges
transgression was not per se in the use of the
letterhead, but in not being very careful and discerning
in considering the circumstances surrounding the use of
his letterhead and his title.

To be sure, this is not the first case relating to the

use of a letterhead that this Court has encountered and
passed upon. In Rosauro v. Kallos,2 we found the
respondent Judge liable for violating Rule 2.03 of the
Code of the Judicial Conduct when he used his
stationery for his correspondence on a private
transaction with the complainant and his counsel
parties with a pending case in his court. The Court held:

23
 By using his salas stationery other than for
official purposes, respondent Judge evidently used the
prestige of his office x x x in violation of Rule 2.03 of
the Code.

We do not depart from this rule on the use of

official stationary. We clarify, however, that the use of a
letterhead should not be considered independently of
the surrounding circumstances of the use the
underlying reason that marks the use with the element
of "impropriety" or "appearance of impropriety". In the
present case, the respondent Judge crossed the line of
propriety when he used his letterhead to report
a complaint involving an alleged violation of church
rules and, possibly, of Philippine laws. Coming from a
judge with the letter addressed to a foreign reader,
such report could indeed have conveyed the impression
of official recognition or notice of the reported violation.

The same problem that the use of letterhead

poses, occurs in the use of the title of "Judge" or
"Justice" in the correspondence of a member of the
Judiciary. While the use of the title is an official
designation as well as an honor that an incumbent has
earned, a line still has to be drawn based on the
circumstances of the use of the appellation. While the
title can be used for social and other identification
purposes, it cannot be used with the intent to use the
prestige of his judicial office to gainfully advance his
personal, family or other pecuniary interests. Nor can
the prestige of a judicial office be used or lent to
advance the private interests of others, or to convey or
permit others to convey the impression that they are in
a special position to influence the judge.3 To do any of
these is to cross into the prohibited field of impropriety.

Time and again, this Court has reminded

the members of the Judiciary that one who
occupies an exalted position in the
administration of justice must pay a high price
for the honor bestowed upon him; his private as
well as his official conduct must at all times be
free from the appearance of impropriety. Because
appearance is as important as reality in the
performance of judicial functions, a judge like
Ceasars wife must not only be pure and faithful

24
 but must be above suspicion.4 The respondent
Judge, even if he did not intend to take undue
advantage of the use of his letterhead and his title, at
least gave the appearance of impropriety when he did
so under the circumstances of his use. To this extent,
we find him sufficiently liable to merit the admonition
and warning of this Court regarding any future
inappropriate use of his letterhead and title. We limit
ourselves to an admonition and warning since this is
the respondents first brush with our ethical rules and
no bad faith or ill motive attended his actions.
(emphasis supplied)

65. If only to emphasize and remind the standards

made clear in the above-mentioned case, the Supreme
Court --- Justices Velasco, Bersamin and Peralta in particular
--- must listen to, and make themselves accountable to
the Supreme Courts very own admonition and
proscriptions in the above case, as follows:

Indeed, members of the Judiciary

should be beyond reproach and suspicion
in their conduct, and should be free from
any appearance of impropriety in the
discharge of their official duties as well as
in their personal behavior and everyday
life. No position exacts a greater demand
for moral righteousness and uprightness
on the individual than a seat in the
Judiciary.

x x x.

Time and again, this Court has reminded

the members of the Judiciary that one
who occupies an exalted position in the
administration of justice must pay a high
price for the honor bestowed upon him;
his private as well as his official conduct
must at all times be free from the
appearance of impropriety. Because
25
 appearance is as important as reality in
the performance of judicial functions, a
judge like Ceasars wife must not only
be pure and faithful but must be above
suspicion.

66. As a final note, more than avoiding appearances of

impropriety on the part of Justices Velasco, Bersamin and
Peralta, the Honorable Court is duty bound not to put its
Justices in a situation where the opportunity to commit
impropriety is highly possible if not probable thereby
presenting to the public unavoidably, appearances of
impropriety involving Justices of the Honorable Court. Hence,
the disqualification, transfer and substitution of Justices
Velasco, Bersamin and Peralta is imperative.

PRAYER

Premises considered, Petitioner most respectfully

moves for the Honorable Court to:

1. DISQUALIFY and TRANSFER JUSTICE PRESBITERO J.

VELASCO, JR. from the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) to the SENATE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and to TRANSFER JUSTICE ANTONIO T. CARPIO as
Chairman of the HRET;

2. DISQUALIFY JUSTICE LUCAS P. BERSAMIN as a

representative of the Supreme Court to the HRET on account
of his participation on the Decision of the Court in Reyes vs.
Comelec and to SUBSTITUTE on his behalf another Justice of
the Honorable Court who did not pre-judge the case of
Petitioner or is suffering from any condition that may
disqualify the Justice to be designated; and

3. DISQUALIFY JUSTICE DIOSDADO M. PERALTA as a

representative of the Supreme Court to the HRET on account
of his partial and prejudicial conduct as above-specified (or
failure to maintain appearance of impartiality and propriety)
and to SUBSTITUTE on his behalf another Justice of the
Honorable Court who did not pre-judge the case of Petitioner
or is suffering from any condition that may disqualify the
Justice to be designated.

26
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

Makati City, Philippines; 18 August 2014

ROQUE & BUTUYAN LAW OFFICES

Counsel for the Petitioner
Antel Corporate Center
Unit 1904, 19th Floor
121 Valero Street, Salcedo Village
Makati City 1227
Email: mail@roquebutuyan.com
Tel. Nos. 887-4445; 887-3894
Fax No. 887-3893

By:

H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR
Roll No. 36976
PTR No. 4264493/30 Jan 2014/Makati
IBP Lifetime No. 01749/PPLM
MCLE Exemption No. IV-000513/15 Feb 2013

JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN

Roll No. 36911
PTR No. 4264495 /30 Jan 2014 Makati
IBP Lifetime No. 01742/Quezon City
MCLE Comp. No. IV-0011417/Jan 11, 2013

ROGER R. RAYEL
Roll No. 44106
PTR No. 9308264/3 Feb 2014/Quezon City
IBP Lifetime No. 02159/Quezon City
MCLE Comp. No. IV-017519/19 Apr 2013

EXPLANATION

27
 A copy of the foregoing pleading was served by
registered mail due to the inadequacy of messengerial
service of the office.

ROGER R. RAYEL

Copy furnished:

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco Jr.

Justice Diosdado M. Peralta
Justice Lucas P. Bersamin
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Electoral Tribunal Building
Commonwealth Avenue
Quezon City

28