CASE PAGE NUMBER

Fortich v Corona 289 scra 629 20-31

Cruz, Diaz v IAC 134 scra 417 2-3

People v Ramos 83 scra 1 33-39

Bautista, Corpus v Sarmiento 128 scra 587 4-6

Vda de Bacang v CA 135 scra 137 7-8

Santiago v CA 184 scra 590 9-10

Calderon v Solicitor General 215 s 876 11-14

Binan Laguna v CA 219 scra 69 15-19

Dauz v Eleosida 1 scra 990 32

134 SCRA 417
G.R. No. L-63612 January 31, 1985
SERAFIN DELA CRUZ, ELADIO MACENAS and RODRIGO DIAZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, EDEN GUEVARA DE
BARADI and JOSE BARADI, respondents.

RELOVA, J.:
Petitioners seek to set aside the orders, dated October 20, 1982, of respondent judge dismissing their
complaint, as well as the order, dated January 14, 1983, denying the motion for reconsideration, and
the decision of respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, dated February 22, 1983, denying this
petition for certiorari for lack of merit; and, pray that We order respondent judge to hear Civil Case
No. Q-34657, for annulment of titles with damages.
Respondent appellate court rendered its decision on the basis of the following statement of facts:
(a) That sometime on March 11, 1982 the herein petitioners filed a complaint for 'Annulment and
cancellation of T.C.T. Nos. 274534, 274535, 274537 and 274539 with damages' in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVI. Said case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-34657 and
was assigned to the respondent Judge, Hon. Antonio P. Solano;
(b) That after summons was served, private respondents herein immediately filed their Motion to
Dismiss on the sole ground of 'lack of jurisdiction' of the court below to take cognizance of the said
case;
(c) That herein petitioners in due time filed their' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,' Annex B, invoking
in support thereof paragraph [b] of Section 44 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended;
(d) That on July 26, 1982, respondent Judge issued an 'Order' denying the private respondents'
motion to dismiss for lack of merit; (Annex C, Petition)
(e) That on August 13, 1982, the private respondents filed their 'Motion for Reconsideration'
contending among other things that the respondent Court has no jurisdiction over the case;
(f) That herein petitioner filed their pleading in 'Opposition' thereto;
(g) That on October 20, 1982, the Honorable respondent Judge, issued the challenged 'Order' in
favor of the private respondents in this case and therein granted the Motion for Reconsideration
(Annex E, Petition) thereby revoking his previous order dated July 26, 1982 (Annex D, Petition). As a
consequence, petitioners' complaint was dismissed.
(h) That on November 24, 1982 petitioners filed their own 'Motion for Reconsideration' wherein they
submitted and insisted that the respondent Court has the exclusive and original jurisdiction to pass
upon the issues raised in petitioners' complaint;
(i) That the private respondents in due time filed their opposition;
(j) That on January 14, 1983, the Honorable Respondent Judge, issued an 'Order' denying the
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration which order was received by petitioners' counsel on January
31, 1983. (pp. 88-89, Rollo)
Petitioners filed with respondent Intermediate Appellate Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus instead of appealing from the order dismissing the complaint for annulment of titles. The
appellate court, on February 22, 1983, promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to be without merit, the
same is hereby DENIED any further due course and DISMISSED. (p. 93, Rollo)
This petition for certiorari filed before Us rests on the allegation that the respondent judge had abused
his discretion in issuing the order of October 20, 1982, and the subsequent order of January 14,
1983; and that respondent appellate court did abuse its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it dismissed the petition "without even a comment from the respondents." (p. 22, Rollo)
Required to comment on this petition respondents averred that "petitioners' remedy was an appeal
from the Order of dismissal of the Hon. Judge Antonio P. Solano and not a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, (and) it would be an empty gesture to require the private respondents to
comment on the petition. The Intermediate Appellate Court could validly render a decision, as it did,
and avoid delay in the administration of justice." (p. 116, Rollo)
Indeed, We consider instant petition to be without merit. Time and again We have dismissed petitions
for certiorari to annul decisions or orders which could have, but have not, been appealed. Where the
Court has jurisdiction, over the subject matter, as respondent judge has in this case, the orders or
decision upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders or decision within its jurisdiction, and
however erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari. This special civil action does
not lie where the remedy by appeal has been lost because said remedy cannot take the place of an
appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, this petition must be denied, as it is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, (Chairman), and Alampay, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-45137 September 23, 1985
FE J. BAUTISTA and MILAGROS J. CORPUS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MALCOLM G. SARMIENTO, District Judge, Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch
I and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CUEVAS, J.:
In this special civil action of certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, petitioners assail
respondent Judge Malcolm G. Sarmiento's denial of their Motion to Dismiss filed in the nature of
demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 808 for Estafa entitled "PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. FE BAUTISTA, MILAGROS CORPUS and TERESITA VERGERE ", pending before the defunct
Court of First Instance of Pampanga Branch I.
An information charging Fe Bautista, Milagros Corpus and Teresita Vergere with estafa was filed
before the sala of Judge Malcolm G. Sarmiento. The third accused, Teresita Vergere, was granted a
separate trial. To prove its case, the prosecution presented during the trial the private complainant,
Dr. Leticia C. Yap, as its only witness. Thereafter, petitioners, believing the prosecution failed to prove
their guilty beyond reasonable doubt, moved to dismissal the case by way of demurrer to the
evidence.
In an Order dated June 3, 1976 respondent judge denied said motion. 1 The Order states:
Fe Bautista and Milagros Corpus, accused, through counsel, filed a "Moton to Dismiss" (Demurrer to
Evidence) to the information charging the two accused for Estafa, The other third accused Teresita
Vergere, granted as separate trial.
The grounds alleged in the Motion to Dismiss are as follows: First, the infrmation alleges that the
two accused received jewelries from Dr. Leticia C. Yap on April 19, 1975 on consignment. The
defense' contention is that the jewelries were received by the said accused by virtue of purchase and
sale. The defense overlooks the other allegation in the Information specifically alleging:
That these pieces of jewelries should be sold by the accused on commission basis and to pay or to
deliver the proceeds thereof to Dr. Leticia C. Yap if sold, and if not sold to return said jewelries. ...
In spite of represented demands made on the said accused, said accused failed and refused and still
fails and refuses to return the jewelries or deliver the proceeds thereof to the damage and prejudice
of said Dr. Leticia C. Yap in the total amount of P77,300.00.
The meaning of consignment is not a sale.
It means that the goods sent by one person to another, to be sold or disposed of by the latter for and
on account of the former. The transmission of the goods.
Agency is within the foregoing meaning by Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Vol. 1, pp. 619-620)
The offended party testified that the accused acted as her agents for the sale of the jewelries. Second
ground, that the prosecution failed to establish the prior demand to prove misappropriation on the part
of the accused. Exhibits B and B-1 are documentary evidence to establish demand through Atty.
Gorospe made by the offended party prior to the filing of the case. This letter of demand was
subsequently made after several previous oral demands were made by the complainant on said
accused.
The Court believes that the prosecution established a prima facie case of Estafa alleged in the
Information against said accused on the evidence presented so far on record.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby denies the defense' Motion to Dismiss and orders the
trial of this case for the reception of evidence of the accused on July 9, 1976 at 8:00 o'clock in the
morning.
SO ORDERED.
Accordingly, a motion for reconsideration was duly filed 2 but was likewise denied "for lack of
merit 3 Hence, this petition.
Initially, it is necessary to point out that the remedy of certiorari is improper, The respondent Judge's
order denying the petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to the evidence is
merely an interlocutory order, It cannot, therefore, be the subject of a petition for certiorari. What
should have been done was to continue with the trial of the case and had the decision been adverse,
to raise the issue on appeal. 4
The rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, however, admits an exception. This is when
the questioned order is an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. 5 But, even granting petitioners
the benefit of the exception, still certiorari would not lie. For, as would be shortly explained, there was
no arbitrary exercise of judicial authority.
It is the contention of petitioners that respondent Judge lost jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of the
case and that he was in duty-bound to acquit them, considering his findings in denying their motion to
dismiss that "....the prosecution established a prima facie case of Estafa alleged in the Information
against said accused on the evidence presented so far on record". Petitioners further argue that in a
criminal case, conviction can be had only upon proof beyond reasonable doubt and not on a mere
prima facie case.
Since the denial of the motion to dismiss was anchored on a finding of a prima facie case, a clear
understanding of the term and its implications is in order.
A prima facie case is that amount of evidence which would be sufficient to counter-balance the
general presumption of innocence, and warrant a conviction, if not encountered and controlled by
evidence tending to contradict it, and render it improbable, or to prove other facts inconsistent with it,
and the establishment of a prima facie case does not take away the presumption of innocence which
may in the opinion of the jury be such as to rebut and control it. Ex parte Parr 288 P. 852, 855, 106
Cal.
App. 95. 6
There is no denying that in a criminal case, unless the guilt of the accused is established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal. But when the trial court denies petitioners'
motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution had established
a prima facie case against them, they assume a definite burden. It becomes incumbent upon
petitioners to adduce evidence to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the prima facie case against
them. 7 This is due to the shift in the burden of evidence, and not of the burden of proof as petitioners
would seem to believe.
When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, as in the case at bar,
the burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It remains throughout the trial with the party upon
whom it is imposedthe prosecution. It is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party
depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of the trial. 8 This burden of going forward
with the evidence is met by evidence which balances that introduced by the prosecution. Then the
burden shifts back.
A prima facie case need not be countered by a preponderance of evidence nor by evidence of greater
weight. Defendant's evidence which equalizes the weight of plaintiff's evidence or puts the case in
equipoise is sufficient. As a result, plaintiff will have to go forward with the proof. Should it happen
that at the trial the weight of evidence is equally balanced or at equilibrium and presumptions operate
against plaintiff who has the burden of proof, he cannot prevail. 9
In the case at bar, the order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, required them to present their
evidence. They refused and/or failed to do so. This justified an inference of their guilt. The inevitable
result was that the burden of evidence shifted on them to prove their innocence, or at least, raises a
reasonable doubt as to their guilt.
Petitioners, likewise, assign as error the order of respondent Judge directing them to present their
evidence after the denial of their motion to dismiss. By doing so, they contend that respondent Judge
would, in effect, be relying on the possible weakness of the defense' evidence, rather than on the
strength of the prosecution's own evidence in resolving their guilt or innocence,
We find petitioners' aforesaid submission utterly devoid of merit. Such a procedure finds support in
the case of Arbriol vs. Homeres 10 wherein we held that
Now that the Government cannot appeal in criminal cases if the defendant would be placed thereby in
double jeopardy (Sec. 2, Rule 118), the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of the evidence after
the prosecution has rested terminates the case then and there. But if the motion for dismissal is
denied, the court should proceed to hear the evidence for the defense before entering judgment
regardless of whether or not the defense had reserved its Tight to present evidence in the event its
motion for dismissal be denied The reason is that it is the constitutional right of the accused to be
heard in his defense before sentence is pronounced on him. Of course if the accused has no
evidence to present or expressly waives the right to present it, the court has no alternative but to
decide the case upon the evidence presented by the prosecution alone. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, finding the order complained of to be well-taken and there being no grave abuse of
discretion that attended its issuance, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against petitioners.
The Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga where this case is now assigned, is
hereby ordered to continue immediately with the trial of Criminal Case No. 808 until its final
disposition.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Aquino (Chairman), J., in the result.
125 SCRA 187
Vda de BACANG VS CA
G.R. No. L-50143 October 24, 1983
MARIA TEVES VDA. DE BACANG, MILAGROS TEVES VDA. DE ACEBRON, BENITA TEVES
VDA. DE CORDOVA, LICERIA MONTESA VDA. DE SANTOS, MENAS CABANAG married to
Bede Lasmarias, ANTONIA CABANAG married to Vicente Tugday ESPERANZA AGUAVIVA
VDA. DE CABANAG, BENEDICTO CABANAG JR., minor represented by his Guardian Ad
Litem ESPERANZA AGUAVIVA VDA. DE CABANAG, MARIA ANTONIA CABANAG married to
Nichol Laxina, MILAGROS CABANAG, ARTURO DIONSON, FRANCISCA PIS-AN VDA. DE
MONTESA, MARIA ANTONIETA MONTESA, Minor represented by her Guardian Ad
Litem FRANCISCA PIS-AN VDA. DE MONTESA, MARCIANA MONTESA. TEOFILO MONTESA,
ALEXANDER MONTESA, JULIETA MONTESA married to Rosendo Chavez, MANUELA
MONTESA married to Alejandrino Villanueva, JOAQUIN MONTESA, GASPAR MONTESA,
CORNELIA MONTESA married to Herman Gregorio, CANDELARIO MONTESA and FERMIN
EMILIANO MONTESA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, NINTH DIVISION, SERAFIN L. TEVES, JOSEFA TEVES married to
Ramon Escano, EMILIO TEVES, MILAGROS TEVES married to Johnny Reyes Raymond,
PEDRO TEVES, MILAGROS DONIO, MARIA EVELYN TEVES married to Herminio Teves Jr.,
CATALINO TEVES, PILAR TEVES RAYMOND, MATEO TEVES, MANUEL TEVES, TRINIDAD
TEVES married to Manual Sagarbarria, LOURDES TEVES married to Ramon Llanderal,
REMEDIOS TEVES, ANTONIO TEVES married to Arsenio Garcia, ROSARIO LONGA VDA. DE
TEVES, minors PAULA TEVES, GINA LUCIA TEVES, RAMON JUAN TEVES, JUAN CARLOS
TEVES and JUAN TEVES, JR., represented by their Guardian Ad Litem ROSARIO LONGA VDA.
DE TEVES, JOSE LUIS TEVES, MARIA BONA TEVES and RAMON TEVES, respondents.
Felix S. Magdales for petitioners.
Geminiano M. Eleccion for respondents M. Donio Teves and Jose Teves Escano. Vicente Jayme for
respondent Emilio Teves.
Lenin Victoriano for respondent Mateo Teves, et al.
Teodorico P. Reyes for Serafin Teves.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Adriano Law Office for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:
The issue in this case is whether a 1975 action to recover the alleged hereditary shares in Hacienda
Nuestra Seora del Pilar, Lots Nos. 275 and 276 of the Bais, Negros Oriental cadastre, with an area
of 671 hectares, originally belonging to Manuel Abella, who died in 1890, is barred by prescription
and res judicata.
Manuel Abella died intestate, survived by two children, named Emilio and Joaquin, begotten with his
first wife Enriqueta Teves, and three other Children named Manuela, Hermenigildo and Carmen,
begotten with his Second wife, Leona Teves. All the five children carried the surname Teves. Manuel
Abella had another son named Manuel Abella y Regulo who was left in Spain and who died as a
soldier during the Cuban war.
Before his death, he transferred his said hacienda to his children by means of a simulated sale to
Joaquin for his share and another simulated deed of sale to the other four, Emilio, Carmen,
Hermenegildo, and Manuela, for their shares but this second sale was in Emilio's name only because
the other three children were still minors who lived with Emilio in the family home,
Emilio died in 1911, survived by his wife Pilar Lajato, and five children named Serafin, Julian, Manuel,
Rosa and Maria. On September 26, 1912, the three children by the second wife, Manuel, Carmen,
and Hermenegildo, sold their hereditary shares in the said hacienda for P10,500 to Pilar Lajato and
her children. That sale is known in the record as Exhibit A.
Intestate proceedings for the settlement of Emilio Teves' estate were pending in the lower court from
1912 to 1919. No claim against the said estate or its administrator was filed during that period by the
said three children.
In 1920, the same three children in Civil Case No. 576 sued the vendees, Pilar Lajato and her
children for the annulment of the said deed of sale and the recovery of their shares in the hacienda.
The trial court sustained the validity of the sale and dismissed the action. This Court dismissed the
appeal of the three children on February 1, 1924 (Annex G of Petition in CA).
In the cadastral proceeding, the hacienda was claimed by the five children of Emilio Teves. Original
Certificates of Title Nos. 9162 and 13742 were issued in their names on February 16 and December
19, 1931. Later, Rosa and Maria sold their shares to their brothers, Serafin, Julian and Manuel, all
surnamed Teves.
More than forty-three (43) years after the issuance of those titles, or on October 3, 1975, the instant
case was filed by the children of Carmen Teves and the children and grandchildren of Manuela Teves
(Carmen and Manuela were children of the second wife of Manuel Abella) against Serafin L. Teves
and the children of the deceased Manuel L. Teves and Julian L. Teves.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds, inter alia, of res judicata, prescription,
laches and estoppel.
The lower court denied the motion. The order of denial was assailed by certiorari and prohibition in
the Court of Appeals. In its decision of November 6, 1978, the Appellate Court reversed the order of
denial of Judge Alejandro R. Boncaros and dismissed the action.
The plaintiffs appealed to this Court. They contend that the Appellate Court erred (1) in entertaining
the petition for certiorari, appeal in due time being the remedy; (2) in not declaring void the decision in
Civil Case No. 576 and the deed of sale (Exh. A) and (3) in holding that the action was barred by res
judicata, prescription, estoppel and laches, since it made six erroneous findings on these grounds.
We hold that the appeal is palpably bereft of merit. Petitioners' 1975 action is clearly barred by valid
prior judgments and prescription (See Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872, December 3, 1974, 61 SCRA
284; Gallanosa vs. Arcangel, L-29300, June 21, 1978, 83 SCRA 676; Sinco vs. Longa 51 Phil. 507).
Private respondents' Torrens titles over the hacienda have long become indefeasible. Since the
grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy and
adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Santiago v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 46845, April 27, 1990, 184 SCRA 590
G.R. No. L-46845 April 27, 1990
Hon. PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Branch 2, Bataan, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LUZMINIA T. BAGALAWIS, AMADO SAMSON, JULIETA T. BAGALAWIS,
CESAR SICAT, CARLOS T. BAGALAWIS, FIDES ARMENGOL and the EXPORT PROCESSING
ZONE AUTHORITY, * respondents.
Cleofe B. Villar-Verzola for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review brought by a trial judge seeking the reinstatement of his order which was
reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner was the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch 2, where the
petition of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) for expropriation was raffled. The subject of
the expropriation was two parcels of land, Lot Nos. 190 and 293 covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 22484 and 22485 respectively, owned by private respondents who were, therefore, named
as defendants in the proceeding. The power of EPZA to initiate expropriation proceedings was not an
issue. The controversy was focused on the just compensation EPZA should pay the private
respondents for their land. For the purpose, three (3) commissioners were appointed by the petitioner
judge who later submitted their findings. But before a judgment could be rendered the parties arrived
at an agreement as to the amount of compensation and the further sale to EPZA of another parcel of
land covered by TCT No. 22493. Consequently, new TCT's were issued in EPZA's name. In view of
this development, the parties moved for the dismissal of the case but was denied by the petitioner
who ordered the submission to him of the deeds of sale.
Petitioner judge is of the opinion that having acquired jurisdiction over the case, he retains such
authority and, considering that the amicable settlement was reached during the pendency of the
proceeding, he has the power to determine whether the agreement was contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order and policy.
Examining the deeds of sale, the petitioner judge found that the compensations agreed upon by the
parties were grossly above both the market value as declared by the private respondents and as
determined by the Provincial Assessor, and are, therefore, contrary to Presidential Decree No. 76
which provides that just compensation, in cases of expropriation, shall be the current and fair market
value as declared by the owner or the market value as determined by the assessor whichever is
lower.
The first deed of sale concerns Lot No. 190 and the other parcel of land covered by TCT No. 22483
not subject of the expropriation proceeding which were both sold for Three Hundred Forty Nine
Thousand, Six (P349,006.00) Pesos. The declared market value for Lot 190 was Four Hundred Sixty
Four Thousand, Seven Hundred (P464,700.00) Pesos while the assessor determined it to be One
Hundred Twenty Three Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty One Pesos and Ninety Six Centavos
(P123,981.96). Sold for One Million Three Hundred Ninety Five Thousand, Nine Hundred Sixty Eight
(P1,395,968.00) Pesos was Lot No. 293 as contained in the second deed of sale. The declared
market value for this lot was Twenty Nine Thousand, Nine Hundred Thirteen Pesos and Sixty
Centavos (P29,913.60) while the assessor placed it at Twenty Seven Thousand Four Hundred
Twenty Pesos and Eighty Centavos (P27,420.80). Accordingly, in an order dated October 29, 1975,
petitioner judge rejected the "amicable settlement," declared it invalid and set the case for further
proceeding. The parties' motion for reconsideration having been denied, they elevated the matter to
the Court of Appeals which, as aforementioned, set aside the order of petitioner rejecting the
amicable settlement and instead declared it valid. Petitioner judge, evidently motivated in protecting
the government from what he perceived as a manifestly inequitous and illegal contract, filed this
present petition for review.
While the issue in the Court of Appeals and that raised by petitioner now is whether the latter abused
his discretion in nullifying the deeds of sale and in proceeding with the expropriation proceeding, that
question is eclipsed by the concern of whether Judge Pedro T. Santiago may file this petition at all.
And the answer must be in the negative, Section 1 of Rule 45 allows a party to appeal
by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals by filing with this Court a petition for review
on certiorari. But petitioner judge was not a party either in the expropriation proceeding or in
the certiorari proceeding in the Court of Appeals. His being named as respondent in the Court of
Appeals was merely to comply with the rule that in original petitions for certiorari, the court or the
judge, in his capacity as such, should be named as party respondent because the question in such a
proceeding is the jurisdiction of the court itself (See Mayol vs. Blanco, 61 Phil. 547 [19351, cited in
Comments on the Rules of Court, Moran, Vol. II, 1979 ed., p. 471). "In special proceedings, the judge
whose order is under attack is merely a nominal party; wherefore, a judge in his official capacity,
should not be made to appear as a party seeking reversal of a decision that is unfavorable to the
action taken by him. A decent regard for the judicial hierarchy bars a judge from suing against the
adverse opinion of a higher court,. . . ." (Alcasid v. Samson, 102 Phil. 785, 740 [19571)
ACCORDINGLY, this petition is DENIED for lack of legal capacity to sue by the petitioner.
SO ORDERED. Narvasa, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
While concurring in the main with the ponencia, I believe that Judge Santiago should be admonished
for his disregard of a well-known doctrine imposing upon the judge the duty of detachment in cases
where his decision is elevated to a higher court for its review. The judge is not an active combatant in
such proceeding and must leave it to the parties themselves to argue their respective positions and
for the appellate court to rule on the matter without his participation. In the case at bar, Judge
Santiago is not merely a nominal respondent but the petitioner himself, energetically espousing his
order and insisting on its affirmance by this Court after its reversal of the Court of Appeals. He has
thus ceased to be judicial and become adversarial. Such a posture is not only procedurally untenable
but, worse, is likely to generate the suspicion that his interest in the case is less than impartial and
impersonal. I myself do not for a moment entertain this doubt as Judge Santiago's purpose is
obviously to protect the government. One cannot quarrel with this objective. Nevertheless, it seems to
me that the more circumspect policy is to recognize one's role in the scheme of things, remembering
always that the task of a judge is to decide and not litigate.

Footnotes
* Impleaded as party respondent in the resolution of this Court dated October 28, 1977.
Calderon v. Solicitor General, G.R. Nos. 103752-53, November 25, 1992, 215 SCRA 876, 881.

G.R. Nos. 103752-53 November 25, 1992

HON. AMADO M. CALDERON in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 11,
Malolos, Bulacan, petitioner,
vs.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL and MAURO DIONISIO, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
This is a joint petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 103753) and mandamus (G.R. No. 103752).
In G.R. No. 103753, petitioner seek the review of the decision dated December 17, 1991 and the
resolution dated January 28, 1992 of the Court of Appeals declaring null and void petitioner's orders
dated April 29, 1991 and April 23, 1991 which motu propio increased the bail bonds posted by private
respondent who was accused violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (CA-G.R. SP No. 25801), without
citing justifiable reason therefor.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 103752, petitioner prays for judgment commanding respondent
Solicitor General to forthwith represent him by filing a petition before this Court by way of appeal from
the decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 25801.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On January 29, 1990, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed three separate informations for
violations Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan (Malolos) against
accused-private respondent involving the following amounts: P114,902.00 (Criminal Case 240-M-90),
P141,710.00 (Criminal Case 241-M-90) and P110,923.00 (Criminal Case 242-M-90). These three
informations were assigned to different salas.
Subsequently, the Provincial Prosecutor recomended bail of P1,000.00 for each case, and
conformably with the recommendations, private respondent filed three separate bail bonds of
P1,000.00 for his provisional liberty.
On petition of private respondent, the aforementioned cases were consolidated in the sala of
petitioner.
On April 29, 1991, "after noting from the records that the bonds posted by the private respondent was
only P1,000.00 for each of the three case" petitioner issued an order increasing the bail bond to
P25,000.00 (Criminal Case No. 240-M-90); P35,000.00 (Criminal Case No. 241-M-90) and
P25,000.00 (Criminal Case No. 242-M-90). 1
On May 9, 1991, private respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of said order
contending that the recommended bail in the amount of P1,000.00 was in accordance with the Bail
Bond Guide for the National Prosecution Service pursuant to the Ministry of Justice Circular No. 36
dated September 1, 1981. 2 But on August 23, 1991, petitioner denied the motion and directed the
issuance of the warrant of arrest against private respondent. 3
On August 27, 1991, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with an urgent prayer for preliminary injunction to nullify and set aside the orders dated
April 29, 1991 and August 23, 1991 issued by the petitioner, reiterating that the recommended bail
bonds were accordance with the guidelines on bail bonds issued by the then Ministry of Justice and
that the increase of the bail bond was violative of his constitutional rights against excessive bail. 4
On September 4, 1991, the Court of Appeals required the Solicitor General representing the People
of the Philippines to comment on the petition and show cause why a preliminary injunction should not
be issued within ten days from receipt. 5
On December 17, 1991, the Appellate Court nullified the questioned orders issued by petitioner for
failure to show the reasons for the increase of the bail bonds as required by Section 17 of Rule 114 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. Moreover, the Court of Appeals added that the
unwarranted increase of amount violated private respondent's constitutional right against excessive
bail. 6
On January 13, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration after he was refused representation
by the Office of the Solicitor General. 7 On January 28, 1992, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. 8
Hence, this joint special civil action for certiorari and mandamus.
The two issues to be resolved in this case are whether or not petitioner has standing to file this instant
petition for certiorari and whether or not a writ of mandamus may issue commanding the Solicitor
General to appear in behalf of petitioner.
This joint petition for certiorari and mandamus must fail. We see no necessity in discussing the merits
of petitioner's order dated April 29, 1991 which motu proprio increased the bail bond or private
respondent because this joint petition for certiorari and mandamus suffers from a procedural infirmity.
To recall, this case originally started as "People of the Philippines v. Mauro Dionisio," in three
separate informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. After petitioner raised the bail bonds
of accused, the latter elevated his case before the Appellate Court entitled; "Mauro Dionisio v. Hon.
Amado Calderon, Presiding Judge, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan Branch II." Subsequently, petitioner
believing that he was a real party in interest filed this instant petition
for certiorari and mandamus against the Solicitor General and the accused Mauro Dionisio.
Petitioner, with his years in experience in the judiciary, should have known that he has no standing to
file this instant petition because he is merely a nominal party as gleaned from Section 5 of Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court which states that:
Defendants and the costs in certain case. When the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of
a court or judge, the petitioner shall joint, as parties defendant with such court or judge, the person or
persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty to such person
or persons to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf or in behalf of the court or
judge affected by the proceedings, and cost awarded in such proceedings in favor of the
petitioner shall be against the person or persons in interest only and not against the court or judge.
(Emphasis supplied).
Accordingly, a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party. In such
capacity, therefore, he should not appear as a party seeking the reversal of the decision that is
unfavorable to the action taken by him. 9
In the case at bar, private complainant being the real party interested in upholding petitioner's
questioned orders increasing the bail bonds, had the legal personality to file the instant case. Since
he did not even bother to assail the decision of the Court of Appeals holding petitioner's actuations as
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, then much less should petitioner go out of his way
to file this joint petition for certiorari and mandamus.
Judge Calderon should be reminded of the well-known doctrine that a judge should detach himself
from case where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d'etre for such
doctrine is the fact so the judge is not an active combatant in such proceeding and must leave the
opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate court to decide the issues
without his active participation. By filing this case, petitioner in a way ceased to be judicial and has
become adversarial instead. 10
Considering that petitioner has no standing to file this certiorari proceeding, then logically his petition
for mandamus also deserves scant consideration. Nonetheless, we feel that we would be making a
significant contribution to jurisprudence if we definitely settled the question of whether mandamus will
lie to compel the Solicitor General to represent a judge whose decision has been nullified by the
Court of Appeals. It is our considered opinion that petitioner cannot compel the Solicitor General to
defend his unwarranted act of increasing the private respondent's bail. As a special civil
action, mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty but not to compel the
performance of the discretionary duty. 11
In the case at bar, petitioner contends that pursuant to paragraph (1) of Section 35, Chapter 12, of
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, it is the specific legal duty of the Solicitor General "to
represent the government and its officers before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and other
courts and tribunals in all civil action and special proceedings in which the government or any officer
thereof in his official capacity is a party." To buttress his contention, he cites our recent case Ramon
A. Gonzales v. Fransisco Chavez. 12
Petitioner has not read carefully our decision. In the Gonzales case, we held that the Solicitor General
may not just drop a case without any legal and valid reason because his discretion is not unlimited.
To quote, "(L)ike the Attorney General who has absolute discretion in choosing to prosecute or to
abandon a prosecution already started, our own Solicitor General may even dismiss, abandon,
discontinue or compromise suits either with or without stipulation with the other party." We added that,
"upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the
management of the case. He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in
court or he may opt not to file a case at all. He may do everything within his legal authority but always
conformably with the national interest and the policy of the government on the matter at hand."
On the basis of the aforequoted jurisprudence, it is evident that since the Solicitor General has the
right to decide when and how to defend or prosecute a case, his duty, therefore, is discretionary and
not ministerial. A duty is ministerial when the discharged of the same requires neither the exercise of
official discretion nor judgment. 13
What would be the consequence if the Solicitor General were compelled to appear and defend
petitioner's act of increasing private respondent's bail? Obviously, he would acting contrary to the bail
bond guidelines of the Executive Department, specifically the Department of Justice. Taking up the
cudgels for the petitioner would place him at cross purpose with the avowed policies of the Executive
Department of which he is undeniably a part, as expressed in the different circulars issued by said
agency.
Clearly, the pleadings show that petitioner is not entitled to the mandamus he seeks from this Court,
for he has neither shown a clear legal right to the thing demanded nor demonstrated that it is the
Solicitor General's imperative duty to defend him on the sole ground that he is public officer.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the writ
of mandamus applied for is hereby DENIED.
G.R. No. 94733, 17 February 1993, 219 SCRA 69, 76
G.R. No. 94733 February 17, 1993
MUNICIPALITY OF BIAN, LAGUNA, represented by Hon. Bayani Alonte, Municipal Mayor of
Bian, Laguna, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JESUS M. GARCIA, respondents.
Neol Cangco Zarate for private respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
This is an appeal via certiorari from the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on
May 31, 1990 in CA-G.R. SP No. 19582 1 wherein it set aside the order granting a writ of execution
pending appeal issued on December 14, 1989 by Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court at Bian,
Laguna in Civil Case No. B-3201 thereof; and further annulled the judgment rendered by the
Municipal Trial Court of Bian, Laguna in an ejectment case, docketed as Civil Case No. 2473, and
which case is pending on appeal in the aforestated Civil Case No. B-3201. Respondent court having
denied the reconsideration in its resolution of August 9, 1990, 2 petitioners have taken this recourse to
us against the backdrop of the antecedents hereunder chronologically detailed.
On September 27, 1989, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 2473 for unlawful detainer, with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, against private respondent in the Municipal Trial Court of
Bian, Laguna alleging that it was no longer amenable to the renewal of its 25-year lease contract
with private respondent over the premises involved because of its pressing need to use the same for
national and provincial offices therein.
On October 5, 1989, private respondent filed his answer to the complaint contending that the contract
of lease for the original period of 25 years had not yet expired and, assuming that it had expired, he
has exercised his option to stay in the premises for another 25 years as expressly provided in the
said contract. On October 9, 1989, petitioner filed its reply to private respondent's answer.
On October 16, 1989, private respondent filed this time a "Motion for Preliminary Hearing as if a
Motion to Dismiss Has Been Filed" on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action,
reiterating its argument that the original term of 25 years stipulated in the contract of lease had not yet
expired and that, at any rate, under said contract he has the exclusive option to renew the same for
another 25 years.
After some further exchanges consisting of petitioner's opposition to private respondent's aforesaid
motion for preliminary hearing, the latter's reply thereto, and the parties' respective position papers,
the municipal trial court rendered judgment on October 26, 1989 ordering private respondent to
vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case. 3
On November 8, 1989, private respondent filed a "Manifestation/Motion" before said trial court
praying that the issues raised in the motion for preliminary hearing, apparently because it was in the
nature of a motion to dismiss, be first resolved instead of rendering judgment on the pleadings.
Thereafter, on November 10, 1989, private respondent received a copy of the decision of the trial
court, hence he filed a notice of appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Laguna on November 20, 1989,
which was assigned to Branch 24 thereof at Bian, Laguna.
On December 5, 1989, petitioner filed before said court a motion for execution pending appeal and on
December 14, 1989, Hon. Jose Mar. Garcia, presiding judge of said branch of the regional trial court
granted petitioner's aforesaid motion for discretionary execution. 4 The following day, December 15,
1989, a writ of execution was issued directing the deputy sheriff or his duly authorized representative
to enforce the terms of the judgment of the court a quo. 5
On December 29, 1989, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing the aforesaid order of
execution pending appeal on the ground that petitioner failed to furnish private respondent with a
copy of the motion therefor filed by it in the aforementioned Civil Case No. B-3201, contrary to
Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, hence the invalidity of the lower court's order of December
14, 1989 which granted the writ of execution. Petitioner seasonably filed its comment and/or
opposition to said petition.
Resolving this issue posed by the pleadings, respondent court rendered judgment on May 31, 1990
setting aside the questioned order for being violative of the requirement in Section 6, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court which provides that no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of prior
notice thereof to the adverse party. Aside from annulling the controversial order, however, respondent
court likewise annulled the judgment of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 2473, which judgment is
pending on appeal in Civil Case No. B-3201 of the aforesaid regional trial court. Respondent court
granted the second additional relief on the ground that the decision is contrary to the agreement of
the parties which should be considered the law between them. 6
The assailed judgment and ratiocinations of respondent court are best reproduced for convenient
reference:
FIRSTLY, the respondent Municipality filed a Motion For Execution pending appeal. Petitioner
contends that said motion did not comply with Section 4, Rule 15 and the ruling of Azajar vs. Court of
Appeals (145 SCRA 333). Under Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, no motion shall be acted
upon by the Court without proof of such motion. The respondent Court by doing so acted with serious
abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction to issue a writ of
execution pending appeal.
SECONDLY, petitioner assails the decision of the lower court on the ground that it failed to consider
that the judgment proceeded from an inferior court which was improvidently and irregularly rendered
when it failed to resolve first the issue raised in the motion to dismiss. This refers to a situation where
the lease contract shall be for twenty five (25) years, renewable for another twenty five (25) years at
the option of the lessee or his heirs. . . .
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and considering the evidence and the highest consideration
of law and applicable jurisprudence, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted. The order dated
December 14, 1989 in Civil Case No. B-3201, issued without notice to petitioner together with the writ
of execution pending appeal, being null and void, is therefore ordered set aside, being contrary to
Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The judgment of the inferior court in Civil Case No. 2475
(sic, 2473) is likewise ordered annulled, being contrary to the agreement of the parties which is
considered the law between them. 7
Petitioner duly filed a motion for reconsideration of said judgment on the ground that the Court of
Appeals should have confined itself to the questioned order of the respondent regional trial court
dated December 14, 1989 and subject of private respondent's petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction in CA-G.R. SP No. 19582.
As earlier stated, respondent court denied said motion, hence, the instant petition wherein the
petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals overstepped the bounds of its authority in annulling the
decision of the municipal trial court even if said decision was not an issue raised by private
respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 19582 and which decision is in fact pending on appeal with the
regional trial court. 8
In his comment, private respondent refutes petitioner's contention and claims that the issue of the
merits of the judgment of the municipal trial court was sufficiently raised and controverted, hence,
respondent court was not in error when it passed judgment on the same. Moreover, private
respondent makes the riposte that it is a cherished rule in procedural law that a controversy should be
settled in one single proceeding in order to avoid multiplicity of suits.
We are favorably impressed with the merits of the instant petition.
Respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction in a certiorari proceeding involving an incident in a
case to rule on the merits of the main case itself which was not on appeal before it. The validity of the
order of the regional trial court, dated December 14, 1989, authorizing the issuance of a writ of
execution during the pendency of the appeal therein was the sole issue raised in the petition
for certiorari filed in respondent Court of Appeals. 9 The allegation that the decision of the municipal
trial court was improvidently and irregularly issued was raised by private respondent only as an
additional or alternative argument to buttress his theory that the issuance of a discretionary writ of
execution was not in order, as can be gleaned from the text of said petition itself, to wit:
V. ERRORS/ISSUES
xxx xxx xxx
Besides, when the respondent Judge issued the writ, it (sic) failed to consider that the judgment
rendered by the inferior court was improvidently and irregularly issued, when said court failed to
resolve first the pending Motion To Dismiss, a procedural process before any judgment on the
merit(s) may be had. 10
Further, even assuming that the said issue was squarely raised and sufficiently controverted, the
same cannot be considered a proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 which
is limited only to challenges against errors of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the municipal trial court
over the ejectment case filed by the petitioner against private respondent is not disputed. Thus,
assuming that the said lower court committed a mistake on the merits of the case, it was nonetheless
in the due exercise of its jurisdiction. The error, if any was committed by the trial court, was at most
one of judgment or procedure correctible by ordinary appeal.
Neither can it be said that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion or exceeded its
jurisdiction when it failed to conduct a preliminary hearing, as prayed for in private respondent's
"Motion for Preliminary Hearing as if a Motion to Dismiss Has Been Filed," before summarily
rendering judgment on the merits of the case. The said motion of private respondent is anchored on
the ground that the complaint allegedly states no cause of action since the original term of 25 years
stipulated in the contract of lease had not yet expired and assuming that it had expired, private
respondent had made known to petitioner his exclusive option to renew it for another 25 years. 11
Section 5, Rule of the Rules of Court pertinently provides:
Sec. 5. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. Any of the grounds for dismissal provides for in
this Rule, except improper venue, preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss
had been filed.
The aforequoted provision allows the grounds for a motion to dismiss to be set up as affirmative
defenses in the answer if no motion to dismiss has been filed.
However, contrary to the claim of private respondent, the preliminary hearing permitted under the said
provision is not mandatory even when the same is prayed for. It rests largely on the sound discretion
of the trial court. The use of the word "may" in said provision shows that such a hearing is not a
matter of right demandable from the trial court. Where the provision reads "may," this word shows
that it is not mandatory but discretional. It is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity,
permission and possibility. 12
Moreover, a preliminary hearing on an affirmative defense for failure to state a cause of action is not
necessary. As we have ruled in Heirs of Juliana Clavano vs. Genato, et al.: 13
. . . respondent Judge committed an error in conducting a preliminary hearing on the private
respondent's affirmative defenses. It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based on the
ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted to the court for
determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself. Whether those allegations are
true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion. The issue rather
is: admitting them to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of
the complaint? Stated otherwise, the sufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the
complaint in order to sustain a dismissal on this ground. No extraneous matter may be considered nor
facts not alleged, which would require evidence and therefore, must be raised as defenses and await
the trial. In other words, to determine sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the
complaint, and no other should be considered.
The respondent Judge departed from this rule in conducting a hearing and in receiving evidence in
support of private respondent's affirmative defense, that is, lack of cause of action.
It is a familiar doctrine in this jurisdiction that certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction
and that no error or mistake committed by a court will be corrected by certiorari unless said court had
acted in the premises without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or with such grave abuse of discretion
as would amount to lack of jurisdiction. It is available only for these purposes and not to correct errors
of procedure or mistake in the judge's finding or conclusions. 14
If a judgment of a municipal trial court is sought to be reviewed, the remedy is an appeal to the
regional trial court, not the filing of a special civil action of certiorari. Appeal, whether from an interior
court or a regional trial court, is antithetical to a special civil action of certiorari. 15 When the remedy of
appeal is available, the extraordinary remedy of certiorari cannot be resorted to because the
availability of appeal proscribes recourse to the special civil action of certiorari. 16
Indeed, the respondent Court of Appeals went beyond the realm of its authority and its
pronouncements on the judgment rendered by the municipal trial court on the ejectment case
were ultra jurisdictio. That judgment was on appeal before the regional trial court. Respondent court's
authority was, therefore, limited to ruling upon the issue of whether or not the regional trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order directing the issuance of a discretionary writ
of execution against private respondent. Whether or not the municipal trial court committed a mistake
in arriving at its decision is an issue that is beyond the authority of respondent court to decide. It is
lodged in another and appropriate forum with appellate powers the exercise of which should not be
usurped or preemted by respondent Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is GRANTED. The decision of respondent Court Appeals dated
May 31, 1990, insofar as it annulled the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Bian, Laguna in Civil
Case No. 2473, and its resolution of August 9, 1990 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this
case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna for further appropriate
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
289 SCRA 629????
[G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998]
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA,
MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike staged by some alleged farmer-beneficiaries in front
of the Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City on October 9, 1997 commanded
nationwide attention that even church leaders and some presidential candidates tried to intervene for
the strikers cause.
The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision [1] of the Office of the President (OP), issued
through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, which approved the
conversion of a one hundred forty-four (144)-hectare land from agricultural to agro-
industrial/institutional area. This led the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called Win-Win Resolution[2] on November 7, 1997,
substantially modifying its earlier Decision after it had already become final and executory. The
said Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent
of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to
qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
But, did the Win-Win Resolution culminate in victory for all the contending parties?
The above-named petitioners cried foul. They have come to this Court urging us to annul and set
aside the Win-Win Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao of the
Department of Agrarian Reform from implementing the said Resolution.
Thus, the crucial issue to be resolved in this case is: What is the legal effect of the Win-Win
Resolution issued by the Office of the President on its earlier Decision involving the same subject
matter, which had already become final and executory?
The antecedent facts of this controversy, as culled from the pleadings, may be stated as follows:
1. This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the
Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the
petitioners. The property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371 [3] of the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
2. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now
Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under
the Crop Producer and Growers Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired
in April, 1994.
3. In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value
at P2.38 million.[4]
4. NQSRMDC resisted the DARs action. In February, 1992, it sought and was granted by the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB
Case No. X-576, a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction which ordered the DAR Region X
Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office (MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), and their
authorized representatives to desist from pursuing any activity or activities concerning the subject
land until further orders.[5]
5. Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR Regional Director issued a memorandum,
dated May 21, 1992, directing the Land Bank to open a trust account for P2.38 million in the name of
NQSRMDC and to conduct summary proceedings to determine the just compensation of the subject
property. NQSRMDC objected to these moves and filed on June 9, 1992 an Omnibus Motion to
enforce the DARAB order of March 31, 1992 and to nullify the summary proceedings undertaken by
the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank on the valuation of the subject property.
6. The DARAB, on October 22, 1992, acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by (a) ordering the
DAR Regional Director and Land Bank to seriously comply with the terms of the order dated March
31, 1992; (b) nullifying the DAR Regional Directors memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, and the
summary proceedings conducted pursuant thereto; and (c) directing the Land Bank to return the
claim folder of Petitioner NQSRMDCs subject property to the DAR until further orders. [6]
7. The Land Bank complied with the DARAB order and cancelled the trust account it opened in the
name of petitioner NQSRMDC.[7]
8. In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by Governor
Carlos O. Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6,[8] dated January 7, 1993, designating certain areas along
Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is
situated.
9. What happened thereafter is well-narrated in the OP (TORRES) Decision of March 29, 1996,
pertinent portions of which we quote:
Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting
or re-classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from agricultural to
industrial/institutional with a view of providing an opportunity to attract investors who can inject new
economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people.
Parenthetically, under said section, 4th to 5th class municipalities may authorize the classification of
five percent (5%) of their agricultural land area and provide for the manner of their utilization or
disposition.
On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use Committee approved the said
Ordinance. Accordingly, on 11 December 1993, the instant application for conversion was filed by Mr.
Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development
Association).
Expressing support for the proposed project, the Bukidnon Provincial Board, on the basis of a Joint
Committee Report submitted by its Committee on Laws, Committee on Agrarian Reform and Socio-
Economic Committee approved, on 1 February 1994, the said Ordinance now docketed as Resolution
No. 94-95. The said industrial area, as conceived by NQSRMDC (project proponent) is supposed to
have the following components:
1. The Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes the following: Institute for Continuing
Higher Education; Institute for Livelihood Science (Vocational and Technical School); Institute for
Agribusiness Research; Museum, Library, Cultural Center, and Mindanao Sports Development
Complex which covers an area of 24 hectares;
2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn processing for corn oil, corn starch, various
corn products; rice processing for wine, rice-based snacks, exportable rice; cassava processing for
starch, alcohol and food delicacies; processing plants, fruits and fruit products such as juices;
processing plants for vegetables processed and prepared for market; cold storage and ice plant;
cannery system; commercial stores; public market; and abattoir needing about 67 hectares;
3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks for recreation, horse-back riding,
memorial and mini-zoo estimated to cover 33 hectares; and
4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-room hotel, restaurants, dormitories and
a housing project covering an area of 20 hectares.
The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated January 4, 1995, adopted by the
Department of Trade and Industry, Bukidnon Provincial Office, as one of its flagship projects.The
same was likewise favorably recommended by the Provincial Development Council of Bukidnon; the
municipal, provincial and regional office of the DAR; the Regional Office (Region X) of the DENR
(which issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate on June 5, 1995); the Executive Director,
signing By Authority of PAUL G. DOMINGUEZ, Office of the President Mindanao; the Secretary of
DILG; and Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo D. Clemente.
In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration, Provincial Irrigation Office, Bagontaas
Valencia, Bukidnon, thru Mr. Julius S. Maquiling, Chief, Provincial Irrigation Office, interposed NO
OBJECTION to the proposed conversion as long as the development cost of the irrigation systems
thereat which is P2,377.00 per hectare be replenished by the developer x x x. Also, the Kisolon-San
Vicente Irrigators Multi Purpose Cooperative, San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, interposed no
objection to the proposed conversion of the land in question as it will provide more economic benefits
to the community in terms of outside investments that will come and employment opportunities that
will be generated by the projects to be put up x x x.
On the same score, it is represented that during the public consultation held at the Kisolan
Elementary School on 18 March 1995 with Director Jose Macalindong of DAR Central Office and
DECS Undersecretary Clemente, the people of the affected barangay rallied behind their respective
officials in endorsing the project.
Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation, however, on November 14, 1994, the
DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands under Section 65 of
R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying the instant application for the conversion of the subject land
from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same under the compulsory coverage of
CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries on the following grounds:
1. The area is considered as a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility;
2. The land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA);
3. The existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable;
4. There is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries;
5. The procedures on how the area was identified and reclassified for agro-industrial project has no
reference to Memo Circular No. 54, Series of 1993, E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and E.O. No. 124,
Series of 1993.
A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was filed on January 9, 1995 by applicant but the
same was denied (in an Order dated June 7, 1995). [9]
10. Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director to proceed with the compulsory
acquisition and distribution of the property. [10]
11. Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed [11] the order of denial to the Office of the
President and prayed for the conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same would be
more beneficial to the people of Bukidnon.
12. To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretarys order, NQSRMDC, on June 29, 1995, filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction,[12] docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 37614.
13. Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable Paul G. Dominguez, then Presidential Assistant for
Mindanao, after conducting an evaluation of the proposed project, sent a memorandum[13] to the
President favorably endorsing the project with a recommendation that the DAR Secretary reconsider
his decision in denying the application of the province for the conversion of the land.
14. Also, in a memorandum[14] to the President dated August 23, 1995, the Honorable Rafael Alunan
III, then Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), recommended the
conversion of the subject land to industrial/institutional use with a request that the President hold the
implementation of the DAR order to distribute the land in question.
15. On October 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37614, issued a
Resolution[15] ordering the parties to observe status quo pending resolution of the petition. At the
hearing held in said case on October 5, 1995, the DAR, through the Solicitor General, manifested
before the said court that the DAR was merely in the processing stage of the applications of farmers-
claimants and has agreed to respect status quo pending the resolution of the petition. [16]
16. In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary Ruben D.
Torres, issued a Decision in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29, 1996, reversing the DAR
Secretarys decision, the pertinent portions of which read:
After a careful evaluation of the petition vis--vis the grounds upon which the denial thereof by
Secretary Garilao was based, we find that the instant application for conversion by the Municipality of
Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To be sure, converting the land in question from
agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities for employment and bring about real
development in the area towards a sustained economic growth of the municipality. On the other hand,
distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries (who are not even tenants, as there are none) does not
guarantee such benefits.
Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility it
maybe appropriate to mention that, as claimed by petitioner, while it is true that there is, indeed, an
irrigation facility in the area, the same merely passes thru the property (as a right of way) to provide
water to the ricelands located on the lower portion thereof. The land itself, subject of the instant
petition, is not irrigated as the same was, for several years, planted with pineapple by the Philippine
Packing Corporation.
On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA) and
that the existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable, suffice it to
state that the said NCA was declared null and void by the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) as early as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the DARAB
correctly pointed out that under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657, the subject property could not validly be
the subject of compulsory acquisition until after the expiration of the lease contract with Del Monte
Philippines, a Multi-National Company, or until April 1994, and ordered the DAR Regional Office and
the Land Bank of the Philippines, both in Butuan City, to `desist from pursuing any activity or activities
covering petitioners land.
On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing family has already contributed
substantially to the land reform program of the government, as follows: 300 hectares of rice land in
Nueva Ecija in the 70s and another 400 hectares in the nearby Municipality of Impasugong,
Bukidnon, ten (10) years ago, for which they have not received just compensation up to this time.
Neither can the assertion that there is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for
the beneficiaries hold water as, in the first place, there are no beneficiaries to speak about, for the
land is not tenanted as already stated.
Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject property for agro-
industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law granting autonomy to local
government units in the management of their local affairs. Stated more simply, the language of
Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no room for any other interpretation. By
unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local government units autonomy in their local affairs including
the power to convert portions of their agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization
and disposition to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities.
WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said legal mandate and in view of the
favorable recommendations of the various government agencies abovementioned, the subject Order,
dated November 14, 1994 of the Hon. Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform, is hereby SET
ASIDE and the instant application of NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby APPROVED.[17]
17.On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP decision.
18 On September 11, 1996, in compliance with the OP decision of March 29, 1996, NQSRMDC and
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) executed a Memorandum of
Agreement whereby the former donated four (4) hectares from the subject land to DECS for the
establishment of the NQSR High School.[18]
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it discovered
that the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out that during the
pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed against
DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the
DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title on August 11,
1995 and had it transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. T-
50264[19] of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused the
issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in the
name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536[20] of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.
19. Thus, on April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a complaint [21] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon (Branch 9), docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for annulment and
cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others. The RTC then issued a
Temporary Restraining Order on April 30, 1997 [22] and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 19,
1997,[23] restraining the DAR and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or wresting from
NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.
20. Meanwhile, on June 23, 1997, an Order[24] was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D.
Torres denying DARs motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary
period of fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had
already become final and executory.
21. The DAR filed on July 11, 1997 a second motion for reconsideration of the June 23, 1997 Order
of the President.
22. On August 12, 1997, the said writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC was challenged by
some alleged farmers before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44905, praying for the lifting of the injunction and for the issuance of a
writ of prohibition from further trying the RTC case.
23. On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front of the
DAR Compound in Quezon City to protest the OP Decision of March 29, 1996. On October 10, 1997,
some persons claiming to be farmer-beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC property filed a motion for
intervention (styled as Memorandum In Intervention) in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424, asking that the OP
Decision allowing the conversion of the entire 144-hectare property be set aside.[25]
24. President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with the strikers and promised to resolve their
grievance within the framework of the law. He created an eight (8)-man Fact Finding Task Force
(FFTF) chaired by Agriculture Secretary Salvador Escudero to look into the controversy and
recommend possible solutions to the problem. [26]
25. On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the strikers protest by issuing the so-
called Win/Win Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of the President, through Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres, dated March 29, 1996, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. NQSRMDCs application for conversion is APPROVED only with respect to the approximately forty-
four (44) hectare portion of the land adjacent to the highway, as recommended by the Department of
Agriculture.
2. The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares traversed by an irrigation canal and
found to be suitable for agriculture shall be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries in accordance
with RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law with a right of way to said portion from the
highway provided in the portion fronting the highway. For this purpose, the DAR and other concerned
government agencies are directed to immediately conduct the segregation survey of the area,
valuation of the property and generation of titles in the name of the identified farmer-beneficiaries.
3. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to carefully and meticulously determine who
among the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
4. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby further directed to expedite payment of just
compensation to NQSRMDC for the portion of the land to be covered by the CARP, including other
lands previously surrendered by NQSRMDC for CARP coverage.
5. The Philippine National Police is hereby directed to render full assistance to the Department of
Agrarian Reform in the implementation of this Order.
We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113 farmers on October 10, 1997 without
ruling on the propriety or merits thereof since it is unnecessary to pass upon it at this time.
SO ORDERED.[27]
A copy of the Win-Win Resolution was received by Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon, Mayor
Rey B. Baula of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November 24, 1997 [28] and, on December 4,
1997, they filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition (under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court) and injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction (under Rule 58, ibid.), against then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona and
DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene[29] was filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries,
through counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were previously identified by
respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare property subject of this
case. The motion was vehemently opposed[30] by the petitioners.
In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners claim that the Office of the
President was prompted to issue the said resolution after a very well-managed hunger strike led by
fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the
Office of the President to come up with this purely political decision to appease the farmers, by
reviving and modifying the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final and
executory in an Order of 23 June 1997.[31] Thus, petitioners further allege, respondent then Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his
jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997. [32] They availed of this
extraordinary writ of certiorari because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[33] They never filed a motion for reconsideration of the subject Resolution
because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise to seek a
reconsideration .[34]
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition and prayed that it be dismissed
outright on the following grounds:
(1) The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review directly with the
Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;
(2) The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Win-Win Resolution
before filing the present petition; and
(3) Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.
These are the preliminary issues which must first be resolved, including the incident on the motion for
intervention filed by the alleged farmer-beneficiaries.
Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is
necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction.An error of
judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is
reviewable only by an appeal.[35] On the other hand, an error of jurisdictionis one where the act
complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction.[36] This error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.[37]
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-
judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions,[38] including the Office of the President,[39] may
be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition for review[40] within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution,[41] whether the appeal involves questions of fact,
of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. [42]
However, we hold that, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable
considering that the present petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is patently
illegal[43] and was issued with grave abuse of discretion and beyond his (respondent Secretary
Renato C. Coronas) jurisdiction[44] when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision
of March 29, 1996 which had long become final and executory. In other words, the crucial issue
raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal
under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is an
original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly
done. The pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
x x x x x x x x x.
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases in which the act of the lower
court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.[45]
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the assailed illegal act
may file a verified petition (for certiorari) in the proper court. The proper court where the petition
must be filed is stated in Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:
SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or
omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in
the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial
agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (4a)
Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court
have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, [46] prohibition[47] and
mandamus.[48] But the jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the
challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, the petition must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a quasi-
judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by
law or the Rules of Court. We have clearly discussed this matter of concurrence of jurisdiction
in People vs. Cuaresma, et. al.,[49] through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:
x x x. This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional
Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of
their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court
of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latters competence to issue the extraordinary writs
was restricted to those in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as
a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming
regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. (Citations omitted)
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly
to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been
the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: [50] Uy
vs. Contreras, et. al.,[51] Torres vs. Arranz,[52] Bercero vs. De Guzman,[53] and Advincula vs. Legaspi,
et. al.[54] As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in
the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands
upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the
interest of speedy justice[55] and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present
controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be
discussed later, we find the assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their
petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-
entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:[56]
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has
suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher
interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper
procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of
the case."
As to the second issue of whether the petitioners committed a fatal procedural lapse when they failed
to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed resolution before seeking judicial recourse, suffice it
to state that the said motion is not necessary when the questioned resolution is a patent nullity, [57] as
will be taken up later.
With respect to the third issue, the respondents claim that the filing by the petitioners of: (a) a petition
for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 37614) with the Court of
Appeals; (b) a complaint for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR
and 141 others (Civil Case No. 2687-97) with the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon; and
(c) the present petition, constitute forum shopping.
We disagree.
The rule is that:
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with
respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigation commenced in the courts while
an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes
and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This specially
so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction (citations
omitted).
The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping has been laid down
in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34), x x x and that is, forum shopping exists where
the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in the other, as follows:
There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, as well as identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the identity on
the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under
consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.'[58]
It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum shopping. The test for
determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration. A cursory examination of the
cases filed by the petitioners does not show that the said cases are similar with each other. The
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR Secretarys order to
proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject property. On the other hand,
the civil case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of title issued in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the following grounds: (1) the
DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDCs title, used documents which were earlier
declared null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title was made without
payment of just compensation; and (3) without notice to NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The
present petition is entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks the nullification of the assailed
Win-Win Resolution of the Office of the President dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was
issued long after the previous two cases were instituted.
The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for intervention filed by alleged
farmer-beneficiaries, which we have to deny for lack of merit. In their motion, movants contend that
they are the farmer-beneficiaries of the land in question, hence, are real parties in interest. To prove
this, they attached as Annex I in their motion a Master List of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the
alleged master list was made pursuant to the directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed Win-
Win Resolution which directs the DAR to carefully and meticulously determine who among the
claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries. However, a perusal of the said document reveals that
movants are those purportedly Found Qualified and Recommended for Approval. In other words,
movants are merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be benefited or injured
by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest means
a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest. [59] Undoubtedly, movants interest over the land in question is a
mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.
Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants based their motion is, as intimated
earlier, null and void. Hence, their motion for intervention has no leg to stand on.
Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory Decision dated March 29,1996 can still be
substantially modified by the Win-Win Resolution.
We rule in the negative.
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are
embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise
provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such
period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in
exceptionally meritorious cases. (Emphasis ours)
It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character
whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of
March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration
thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision.
Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain
the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion
became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and
Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for
reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second
motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided in
the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained
considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the
Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-
opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become
final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.[60] we held:
Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had long
become final and executory, the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-established
in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to
their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment
within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata [Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956), Ipekdijna
Merchandizing Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA
72.] The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by
competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or
administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having
general judicial powers [Brillantes v. Castro, supra at 503].
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial
body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write
finis to disputes once and for all.[61] This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without
which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must
always be maintained by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such
principle must immediately be struck down.
Therefore, the assailed Win-Win Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of March 29,
1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void. Such void resolution, as aptly stressed by Justice
Thomas A. Street[62] in a 1918 case,[63] is a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain
at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head. [64]
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Resolution dated
November 7, 1997, issued by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, is hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Motion For Leave To Intervene filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries
is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Melo, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-15950 April 20, 1961
GERVACIO DAUZ, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. FELIPE ELEOSIDA, ET AL., respondents-appellees.

Teodoro V. Nano for petitioner-appellant.

Felipe T. Eleosida and Epifanio Estrella for respondent-appellees.
BENGZON, Actg. C.J.:
Gervacio Dauz has appealed directly to this Court from the decision of the Cotabato court of first
instance dismissing his petition for certiorari and prohibition. No factual questions are raised.
On November 25, 1958, this appellant was prosecution before the justice of the peace of Kidapawan,
Cotabato, because being a general merchant in that locality, and as such required to pay license fees
under the local Ordinance No. 21, series of 1956, he willfully failed to pay the second, third and fourth
quarter fees for the year 1958.
Summoned to answer, Gervacio Dauz filed a motion quash on the ground that the facts charged did
not constitute a criminal offense. The justice of the peace denied the motion. Whereupon, he
instituted in the court of first instance this petition for certiorari and prohibition contending mainly that
as he had paid the first quarter for year 1958, the remedy of the Government was to collect civil
action not a criminal prosecution the other quarter fees, plus the surcharges which the same
Ordinance had fixed.
The Hon. Juan A. Sarenas, judge, dismissed the petition, explaining that petitioner's remedy was to
appeal, if he should after hearing on the merits, be convicted in the justice of the peace court.
We think His Honor acted correctly. There is no doubt that the complaint alleged violation of an
ordinance; there is also no question that the ordinance provided the penalty of not more than P200.00
fine, or imprisonment not to exceed 6 months or both. So the offense, if any, was within the original
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court. [Republic Act 296, sec. 87].1 Whether or not Dauz' having
paid the first quarter for the year 1958 constituted a defense, is a matter which he should prove and
discuss upon the trial on the merits, and if that defense should fail, the way is open for him to appeal
to the court of first instance.
Needless to add, where appeal is available, certiorari and prohibition do not lie.
For these reasons, the decision dismissing Dauz' petition is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Paredes, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-25265 May 9, 1978
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
SOCORRO C. RAMOS, defendant-appellee, PHOENIX PUBLISHING HOUSE INC., intervenor.
G.R. No. L-25644 May 9, 1978
SOCORRO C. RAMOS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PLACIDO RAMOS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch III, CFI, Manila; and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by State Prosecutor DELIA P.
MEDINA, respondents.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifica P. de Castro and Solicitor
Sumilang V. Bernardo for People of the Philippines.
Florence D. Regalado for Socorro C. Ramos.
Sevilla & Aquino Law Office for Intervenor.

SANTOS, J.:
The above-entitled cases the first an appeal and the second a special civil action are decided
jointly because they raise a common issue which arose from the prosecution of a common
defendant, Socorro C. Ramos, for alleged violations of the copyright lawviz, whether or not the
extra day in the leap year, 1964 should be taken into consideration in the computation of the two-year
period of prescription provided in Section 24 of the copyright law.
The factual and procedural antecedents follow.
On September 3, 1965, two criminal cases No. 80006 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch III, and No. 80007 also of the same Court, Branch XIV identical in every respect, except for
the fact that they pertain to different editions of the same textbook, were filed against Socorro C.
Ramos, for alleged violations of Act 3134, otherwise known as the Copyright Law, as amended. The
information in Criminal Case No. 80007 alleged
That on or about July to September, 1963, in the City of Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, as the proprietor aid general manager of the National Book Store,
as enterprise engaged in the business of publishing, selling and distributing books, did then and
there, wilfully and illegaly sell and distribute spurious and pirated copies of the high school textbook,
entitled General Science Today for Philippine School, First Year, by Gilam, Van Houten and Cornista,
said accused knowing that said book was duly copyrighted by the Phoenix Publishing House, Inc.,
and was being distributed exclusively by its sister corporation, Alemar's or Sibal and Sons, Inc. 1
On September 7, 1965, identical motions to quash 2 were filed by accused Ramos on the ground of
prescription, alleging therein, inter alia, that:
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, the delivery of the alleged offense was made as early as July 17, 1963 and all
subsequent knowledge or discoveries of posterior sales and possession of said books by the
respondents, including that involved in the police search of September 4, 1963 were only
confirmatory of the first. Under 91 of the Revised Penal Code and in the light of the afore-quoted
ruling announced in the Pangasinan Trans. Co. case, supra; the prescriptive period, therefore,
commenced to run on the day after such discovery on July 17, 1963 and, accordingly, the offense has
long since prescribed since under the Copyright Law, Act 3134:
Sec. 24. All actions, suits, or proceedings arising under this Act shall be originally cognizable by the
Court of First Instance of the Philippine Islands and shall prescribe after two years from the time the
cause of action arose.
Assuming arguendo, that the last actual sale should be the starting point of computation, again the
offense charged has prescribed, since, as already pointed out, the documented evidence on this point
shows that the last sale was made on August 30, 1963.
The prosecution, also in both cases, filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash 3 raising two issues,
to wit:
1. That the issue of prescription in this case can be resolved only after the presentation of evidence
and hence, it is premature to raise that issue before trial
2. That, as the violation committed by the defendant was a continuing offense, the two-year
prescriptive period may be counted from September 3, 1963, or one day before the search in
defendants' premises , which confirmed her possession of spurious and pirated copies of the textbook
in question.
The prosecution's theory is that "(T)he crime being a continuing offense, the statute of limitations
begins to run from the completion of the last act or series of acts which constitute the offense, " and
this last act was committed on September 3, 1963. Therefore when the information was filed on
September 3, 1965, it was filed within the two-year period, albeit the last day of the prescriptive
period.
Again, in both the accused filed a "Reply to Opposition to Motion to Quash." 4 She alleged that even
assuming that the crime is a continuing offense, the prescriptive period should start from August 30,
1963, the date of the last invoiced sale, and not September 3, 1963, as there was no indubitable
proof that she had sold copies of the questioned book on that date. Nonetheless, accused contended
that even if the prescriptive period should start from September 3, 1963, as proposed by the
prosecution, the two-year period was tolled on September 2, 1965. She pointed out that two years
mean a period of 730 days in accordance with Article 13 of the New Civil Code, and 1964, being a
leap year consisting of 366 days, the 730th day fell on September 2, 1965. Hence, "... . when the
information was filed on September 3, 1965, the offense, if any, had already prescribed. "
The prosecution filed a Rejoinder 5 in both cases alleging as follow:
l. That February 28, and 29, 1964, should be regarded as one day only, and consequently, the two-
year period commencing on September 3, 1963 would end on September 3, 1965;
2. That under Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period was interrupted by the filing of the proceedings in
the fiscal's office;
3. That prescription would not lie in this case because the complainant never waived the right to
prosecute the defendant.
Accused Ramos, also in cases, filed an Urgent Motion to Strike the Rejoinder, 6 on the ground that it
was filed after the case had been submitted for resolution. She prayed that "in the event that the
same should at all be considered and allowed, that the accused be notified thereof and granted
reasonable opportunity to file a surrejoinder...".
It appears that the Rejoinder was admitted by both trial courts, but a Surrejoinder 7 was filed only in
Criminal Case No. 80006. Here, the accused traversed the prosecution's contentions in the
Rejoinder, thus:
1. Under applicable and specific provisions of Philippine law, the two-year period of prescription
commencing on September 3, 1963 ended on September 2, 1965 ...;
2. The filing (of) proceedings in the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila did not interrupt the prescriptive
period.
In Criminal Case No. 80007, Hon. Jesus De Veyra granted the motion to quash by an order dated
October 7, 1965. 8 Pertinent portion of his order reads:
. . . . And now to the main issue - whether the crime has prescribed. In the Opposition to the Motion to
Quash, the Prosecution, in its insistence on the theory of a continuing crime, admits that the two-year
prescriptive period should run from September 3, 1963. This case was filed on September 3, 1965
- one day too late. Article 13, CCP provides that year shall mean a period of 365 days. This had been
applied to criminal cases (People v. del Rosario, 51 O.G., 2686). 1964 was a leap year so that when
this case was filed, it was filed one day too late.
The Motion to Quash is, therefore, granted and this case dismissed on the ground that the crime has
already prescribed. (Emphasis supplied.)
9
The prosecution appealed the above order to this Court on October 15, 1965.
Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 80006, the motion to quash was not resolved until December 23,
1965. On this date, Hon. Placido Ramos denied the motion to quash, and set the arraignment of the
accused on January 12, 1966, thus
Wherefore, finding the information to have been filed well within the statutory period of two years from
the date of the last offense committed by the accused the Court denies the motion to quash.
The arraignment of the accused is hereby set on January 12, 1966 at 8:30 A.M.
The trial court refused to accept the prosecution's view that the prescriptive period should run from
September 3, held instead, that the same should commence on September 4, 1963.
xxx xxx xxx
The evidence shows that on September 4, 1963, the Manila Police by virtue of a search warrant
procured by the offended party, seized, among other articles, 69 copies of General Science Today for
Philippine Schools, First Year, by Gilman, Van Houten and Cornista and one copy of the same
textbook for Second Year (Exhibit 5). The evidence likewise shows that on September 3, 1963, the
National Book Store, run and managed by the accused, sold one said textbook, Exhibit 'D' and Exhibit
'2'. The mere possession by the accused on September 4, 1963 of several copies of this textbook
which is the textbook alleged to be spurious and pirated, indicates that said accused was distributing
or selling said textbook on September 4, 1963 . . . This being the case, it follows of necessity that the
period of prescription commenced to run from September 4, 1963 and two years from this date, by
excluding the first and including the last, would expire on September 4, 1965 and hence, the action,
which was instituted on September 3, 1965 is well within the prescriptive period.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, the trial court ignored the accused's theory on leap year:
Even if the last sale of said textbook could be considered to have taken place on September 3, 1963,
Exhibits 'D' and '2', the Court is also of the opinion that the two-year period would expire September
3, 1965.
The argument that inasmuch as 1964 is a leap year the two-year period must contain 731 days, as
contemplated by Article 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, is, in the opinion of the Court, without
merits for this particular legal provision that a year is understood to be of 365 days each is applicable
only in determining the number of days a year must legally contain but not for the purpose of
ascertaining the period of prescription based on years. In the computation of the period of
prescription, a year should be construed as the calendar year comprising the whole period from
January 1 to December 31, regardless of the number of days it contains. Consequently, in this
particular case, if it is considered that the last sale took place on September 3, 1963, the two-year
period, following the rule exclude the- first-and-include-the-last, will expire on September 3, 1965.
The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 10 Two more pleadings were filed, 11 after which, the
trial court finally denied said motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, 12 and reset the arraignment
of the accused on February 24, 1966 at 8:30 A.M.
The accused thus filed with this Court this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, 13 with the
following prayer:
(a) Forthwith issue, upon filing by petitioner of a bond in such amount as this Honorable Court may
fix, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining, enjoining and prohibiting respondents from further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 80006 of the Court of First instance of Manila, Branch III, daring the
pendency of this Action:
(b) After due hearing, to render judgment in favor of petitioner and against respondents
(1) Annulling and setting aside the Orders of the respondent Judge of December 23, 1965 (Annex 'G')
denying petitioner's motion to quash, and of January 20, 1966 (Annex 'K') denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration;
(2) Ordering respondent Judge to dismiss Criminal Case No. 80006 aforesaid; and
(3) Making the writ of preliminary injunction hereafter La be issued permanent and final.
This Court on February 11, 1966, issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the trial Court from
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 80006. 14 Also on the same date, the two cases, G.R. No. L-
25265 and G.R. No. L-25644, were consolidated.
1. In G.R. No. L-25265, the appeal, then Solicitor General Arturo Alafriz filed a four-page brief dated
December 21, 1965 15 wherein he recommended affirmance of the order of 'Judge De Veyra
quashing the information, and the dismissal of the appeal, for the simple reason that "the order
appealed from is in accordance with law." Accused, now appellee Ramos, filed a brief dated January
21, 1966 16 reiterating her previous allegations in the lower court.
The Phoenix Publishing House, Inc., the offended party, filed a motion to intervene in this appeal, on
the following grounds:
a) That the Solicitor General, instead of prosecuting the appeal, recommended its dismissal
b) That, to protect its interest, it is necessary that the movant be allowed to intervene and to submit
memorandum to sustain its view that the criminal action against the accused had not yet
prescribed. 17
Over the opposition of the accused-appellee, this Court granted the same. 18 Accordingly, the
Phoenix Publishing House, Inc. filed its Memorandum 19 wherein it alleged that the trial court erred
I. IN ACTING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH WITHOUT REQUIRING THE
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE PLEA OF PRESCRIPTION.
II. IN NOT APPLYING TO THIS CASE THE FOUR-YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD PROVIDED
FOR IN ACT NO. 3326.
III. IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION PROCEEDINGS IN THE
MANILA CITY FISCAL'S OFFICE AND IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INTERRUPTED
PRESCRIPTION.
IV. IN NOT CONSIDERING FEBRUARY 28 AND 29, 1964, AS ONE DAY FOR PURPOSES OF
PRESCRIPTION.
Accused-appellee, Ramos, filed a Reply Memorandum 20 refuting intervenor's assignment of errors.
Subsequent pleadings 21 focused on whether February 28, and 29 of a leap year should be counted
as one day or separate days in computing the period of prescription.
2. In G.R. No. L-25644-the special civil action the issues raised in the foregoing assignment of
errors were relied upon in respondent People's Answer. 22 And, following respondent Judge Ramos'
reasoning, it was contended that the period of prescription should start from September 4, 1963, and
not September 3, 1963, as originally proposed by the prosecution. Furthermore, as an affirmative
defense, it was alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus since Judge Ramos did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in refusing to quash the
information. Respondent contended that the "(P)etitioner's remedy is to appeal the judgment of
conviction rendered after a trial on the merits. " This allegation was opposed by petitioner
Ramos; 23 she insisted that she had a cause of action for certiorari prohibition and mandamus.
Respondent People filed a Reply Memorandum 24 disputing petitioner's allegations.
We are, thus, faced with conflicting orders of two different Branches of the Court of First Instance of
Manila-one holding that the crime has prescribed, the other that it has not.
1. Now to resolve the preliminary issues:
a. On the propriety of the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.
We find for petitioner. As We had occasion to hold in Quizon vs. Baltazar, 76 SCRA 559:
As to the contention of respondents that the denial of a motion to quash is not a ground for certiorari
and prohibition, suffice it to state that to allow an accused to undergo the ordeals of trial and
conviction when the information or complaint against him is patently defective or the offense charged
therein has been indisputably shown to have already prescribed is unfair and unjust for which reason,
procedurally, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate.
As to mandamus, We are incline to agree with respondent's allegation that "petitioner has no cause of
action for mandamus which is a writ intended to control the exercise of a purely ministerial function.
To quash an information is not a ministerial function," 25 However, mandamus as a remedy is a
superfluity here, considering that petitioner can obtain full relief thru certiorari and prohibition.
 26
b. On the applicability of the four-year prescriptive period provided in Act No. 3326.
The same is not applicable. Said Act provides:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe
in accordance with the following rules: (a)........... (b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; ... (Emphasis supplied.)
Act No. 3326 applies only if the special act does not provide for its own prescriptive period. It has no
application here, where the Copyright Law provides for its own prescriptive period, viz:
Section 24. All actions, suits, or proceedings arising under this Act shall be originally cognizable by
the Courts of First Instance of the Philippines and shall prescribe after two years from the time the
cause of action arose.
2. Now on the main issue of prescription. The question to be resolved is the proper computation of
the two-year period of prescription from September 3, 1963. Resolution of this issue hinges, in turn,
on whether February 28, and 29 of a leap year, 1964, should be counted as one day, as proposed by
the prosecution; or as separate days, as alleged by the defense.
This issue which was in 1965 still undetermined is now a settled matter. It was held in 1969
in Namarco vs. Tuazon 27 that February 28 and 29 of a leap year should be counted as separate days
in computing periods of prescription. Thus, this Court, speaking thru former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, held that where the prescriptive period was supposed to commence on December 21,
1955, the filing of the action on December 21, 1965, was done after the ten-year period has lapsed
since 1960 and 1964 were both leap years and the case was thus filed two (2) days too late. Since
this case was filed on September 3, 1965, it was filed one day too late; considering that the 730th day
fell on September 2, 1965 the year 1964 being a leap year.
In explaining the rationale for its holding, the Court took pains to trace the antecedent decisional and
statutory bases for its conclusion, thus
Prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, the Supreme Court thereof held, on March 30, 1887,
that, when the law spoke of months, it meant a 'natural' month or 'solar' month, in the absence of
express provision to the contrary. Such provision was incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain,
subsequently promulgated. Hence, the same Supreme Court declared that, pursuant to Article 7 of
said Code, 'whenever months are referred to in the law. it shall be understood that months are of 30
days,' not the 'natural', 'solar' or 'calendar' months, unless they are 'designated by name,' in which
case, 'they shall be computed by the actual number of days they have.' This concept was, later,
modified in the Philippines, by Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, pursuant to which
'month shall be understood to refer to a calendar month.' With the approval of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (RA 386) we have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with
which a month is to be considered as the regular 30-month and not the solar or civil month with the
particularity that, whereas the Spanish Civil Code merely mentioned 'months, days or nights,' ours
has added thereto the term 'years' and explicitly ordains in Article 13 that it shall be understood that
years are of three hundred sixty-five days. 28
With respect to the opinion of some members of the Court that Article 13 of the Civil Code is
unrealistic, the Court adverted to the proper remedy thus
Although some justices of the Supreme Court are inclined to think that Article 13 of the Civil Code
defining 'years' to mean 365 days is not realistic, the remedy is not judicial legislation. If public
interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised Administrative Code, this may be
done through legislative process, not by judicial decree. 29
Finally, there is no merit in the allegation that the reckoning of the prescriptive period should start
from September 4, 1963. This was the date when the police authorities discovered several pirated
books in accused's store. But the accused was charged, in both Criminal Cases Nos. 80006 and
80007, with having allegedly sold and distributed spurious and pirated copies of the textbook in
question, not of illegal possession of the same. The prosecution's claim that the preliminary
investigation proceedings in the Manila City Fiscal's Office and in the prosecution Division of the
Department of Justice interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, is also without merit. We held
in People vs. Tayco 30 that the running of the period of prescription is interrupted not by the act of the
offended party in reporting the offense to the final but the filing of the complaint or information in
court.
WHEREFORE, the order dated October 7, 1965 of the Court of First Instance of Manila Branch XIV in
Criminal Case No. 80007 dismissing the case on the ground of prescription, is AFFIRMED. The order
dated December 23, 1965 of the same court, Branch III, in Criminal Case No. 80006, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the case is DISMISSED, on the ground that the crime charged therein had
already prescribed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Acting (Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Guerrero, JJ., concur,
Fernando, J. and Aquino, JJ., took no part.
Guerrero, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.