Samuel Andy Pratama S.

/ 1506747944

We should use online voting in Indonesia

Internet voting is something that we should use in Indonesia. Since the first election in 1955,
weve been using the same practice by using paper ballots, with only small changers regarding
the shape or else. But, in the wake of digital tecnologies, we shouldve catch up with the latest
thing in the continuation of voting methods, which is Internet voting. With all the problems
infested the conventional voting system, I suggests that we should turn to the latest technology,
which is Internet voting. Internet voting is conducting a vote via internet. A handful of countries
have conducted Internet voting trials over the past decade, including France, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On of the major trials in the United
States are the Arizona Democratic Presidential Primary in 2000. All of these trials have been
conducted at the local and regional levels of government, targeting specific populations of voters.
However, the nation that has advanced the farthest with the deployment of Internet voting has
been Estonia, a former Soviet republic on the Baltic Sea and now a full member of the European
Union. Since 2000, Estonia has conducted two national elections in which all voters could use
Internet voting. This paper will talk about the reasons why we should use internet voting in
Indonesia, by comparing the results of the Arizona trials and the practice in Estonia. But this
paper will also elaborates about the history of voting and the arguments from both sides of the
proponents and the opponents of internet voting.

History told us about the development of methods to vote in an election. The oldest type of
voting methods would be paper ballots, which the first use of them to conduct an election
appears to have been in Rome in 139 BCE. There are some way voter could input their vote on
the paper ballots, either by punching holes in the ballots (with a supplied punch device) opposite
their candidate or ballot issue choice, or by marking with a pen. Until the 1990s, there was also
a type voting machine in USA called lever machines. It worked like this: a voter entered the
machine and pulled a lever to close the curtain, thus unlocking the voting levers. The voter then
made his or her selection from a list of switches denoting the appropriate candidates or measures.
However, it still deemed impractical, since the vote results still need to be counted individually.

The United States Presidential Election in 2000 between George W. Bush and Al Gore put voting
technology in the national spotlight. Inaccurate registration lists, unclear ballot designs, high
numbers of spoiled ballots, and questions about voter intent on cards where the chad, the small
piece of paper punched out of punchcard ballots, was not fully punched out were among the
problems. "Hanging chad," "dimpled chad," and "pregnant chad" are phrases that enter everyday
conversation. It was then that many Americans first recognized that their electoral system had
serious problems with flawed voter registration lists, obsolete voting machines, poorly designed
ballots, and inadequate procedures for interpreting disputed votes. Here in Indonesia, lies another
problem. The 2014 Presidential Election is one of the divisive election the nation had ever faced.
The one who lose the election, Prabowo Subianto even says that1 there was a massive, structural
and systematic cheating during the 2014 election, while withdrawing himself from the process
just a mere hours after the election was conducted. The election also faced a rise in the number of
those people who doesnt vote. A significant 29,8% of the voter list doesnt vote in the election,
rises from 27,7% in the 2009 Election.2 Thats why we need some changes in the voting system.

Proponents of Internet voting make several arguments in its favor. First, Internet voting may
make it easier for voters to participate in an election because every computer that has an online
connection becomes a potential polling site. Internet voting also might lower the cost of voting
for the entire electorate, and it has the potential to eliminate problems such as those that might
have kept millions of voters from participating in the 2000 presidential election. No longer
would voters have to trudge down to a school, church, or community center in order to vote. No
longer would factors like bad weather, long lines, or confusion over the location of polling places
impede voter participation. Insteadin the comfort of their home or office, a public library, or an
Internet cafindividuals could log on and vote without having to make a special effort. The
1 Quiano, Kathy, Madison Park, and Casey Tolan. "Winner of Indonesia Presidential Race
Breaks the Mold." CNN. Accessed November 18, 2016.
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/21/world/asia/indonesia-election-result/.

2 Angga. "Terburuk Sepanjang Sejarah, Golput Pilpres Capai 56,7 Juta." Harianterbit.com.
Accessed November 18, 2016.
http://www.harianterbit.com/2015/read/2014/07/23/5622/26/26/Terburuk-Sepanjang-Sejarah-
Golput-Pilpres-Capai-567-Juta.
Internet also could be used to register voters and to allow them to check the status of their
registration, thus reducing problems that often plague the first steps in the electoral process.
Internet voting could especially lower the cost of participation for certain special populations.
Consider, for example, four types of voters. First, imagine a soldier overseas or a sailor on a
nuclear submarine. Both are serving their country, yet their ability to vote is limited because of
the logistics of obtaining an absentee ballot and getting it back in time to be counted. In the last
presidential election, military personnel encountered numerous problems in the voting process.
With the Internet, they could vote from anywhere in the world, confident that their vote would be
received and counted.

Second, consider voters confined to a wheelchair. They want to participate in the electoral
process like everyone else, but in most of the places that is difficult for them to do. According to
a General Accounting Office study conducted during the United States 2000 presidential
election, more than 80 percent of polling places across the nation had some barrier that prevented
citizens in a wheelchair from accessing the poll site. With Internet voting, disabled voters could
cast their ballot from their own home without having to navigate the myriad of obstacles that
await them at the polling place.

Third, imagine an executive who travels frequently or a working single parent. Both might want
to vote on election day but find it difficult or impossible to do so because of events beyond their
control. For example, the executive may have to take an unexpected trip out of town the day
before the election or the single parent may have to work longer than usual on Election Day and
then rush to get his or her children from the daycare center. Under current election procedures,
these potential voters generally cannot obtain an absentee ballot on short notice. In each case,
with Internet voting, these individuals could find it easier to vote because they could do so
without having to make a trip to the polls. Internet voting could expand the opportunities to vote
for many citizens, especially those who have a hard time getting to the polls. As much as
Indonesian Peace-keeping soldiers in Lebanon may want to do their civic duty at a polling place
in their hometown, the Defense Ministry is not going to fly them back to Indonesia to vote. The
Internet could allow active-duty military personnel to vote from the front lines or at sea, and they
could be assured that their vote would be counted. Some places in Indonesia are really remote
that some elections has to be postponed due to late logistics. For example, the case of the remote
Yahukimo, Papua, where the legislative election have to be postponed for 2 days in 2014.3

Finally, Internet voting might pull the hardest-to-reach votersthose between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-fiveinto the political process. As noted, younger Indonesians typically are
well-versed in using the Internet. They have a tremendous amount of experience in surfing the
Net and like the idea of using new, cutting-edge technologies. Internet voting could help increase
voting among this group, which historically has voted at very low rates. The Internet also could
help many young people who are attending college away from home to vote without having to
make a special trip home or request an absentee ballot. If Internet voting can mobilize and attract
hard-to-reach voterslike young people, who typically vote at very low rates but often are tech-
savvythen it could benefit Indonesian democracy

However, theres still some problems that might hinder the implementation of internet voting in
Indonesia. The biggest challenge would be the penetration of internet in Indonesia. While its
true that Indonesias internet users have increased, the infrastructure is still a bit wobbly. The
internet speed in Indonesia is the lowest amongst the G20 countries4 and some places are not
even has telephone signal. This is because the size of Indonesia, consisted of many islands, with
makes it difficult to build new infrastructures to hold an internet voting. The second one is the
security issues. Internet voting has numerous fundamental security problems5 that leave it
vulnerable to a variety of well-known cyber-attacks (denial-of-service attacks, spoofing, viral
attacks on voter PCs, and so forth), any one of which could be catastrophic. Such attacks could
occur on a large scale, and could be launched by anyone in the world, ranging from a disaffected

3 @VIVAcoid. "Logistik Terlambat, Pemilu Di Yahukimo Akan Telat 2 Hari - VIVA.co.id."

VIVA.co.id. 2014. Accessed November 14, 2016.
http://www.viva.co.id/haji/read/495184-logistik-terlambat--pemilu-di-yahukimo-akan-
telat-2-hari.

4 "G20 Quiz: You Think We Are Thinner, Sadder and Less of an Emitter than We Are." ABC
News. 2015. Accessed November 17, 2016. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-11-18/what-
we-learned-g20-quiz/5896530.

5Jefferson, David, Aviel D. Rubin, Barbara Simons, and David Wagner. "Analyzing Internet
Voting Security." Communications of the ACM 47, no. 10 (2004): 59. Accessed November 10,
2016. doi:10.1145/1022594.1022624.
lone individual to a well-financed enemy agency outside the reach of country law. These attacks
could result in large-scale, selective voter disenfranchisement, and/or privacy violation, and/or
vote buying and selling, and/or vote switching even to the extent of reversing the outcome of
many elections at once, including the residential election. Some of the attacks could succeed and
yet go completely undetected. Even if detected and neutralized, such attacks could have a
devastating effect on public confidence in elections. It is impossible to estimate the probability of
a successful cyber-attack; but it shows that the attacks we are most concerned about are quite
easy to perpetrate. In some cases there are kits readily available on the Internet that could be
modified or used directly for attacking an election. The vulnerabilities described before cannot
be fixed by design changes or bug fixes in system. Instead, they are fundamental in the
architecture of the Internet and of the PC hardware and software that is ubiquitous today. The
vulnerabilities cannot be eliminated for the foreseeable future without a wholesale redesign and
replacement of much of the hardware and software security systems in the PC and the Internet,
or else some unforeseen radical security breakthrough(s).

Voters personal computers are unlikely to be as carefully defended as corporate ones, and hence
voters machines are especially susceptible to attack. Attacks can be easily automated; hackers
routinely scan thousands or even millions of computers in search of those that are easiest to
compromise. Alternatively, a malicious third party could cast an unauthorized ballot that appears
to come from the voter. A shared computer, for example at a cybercafe or public library, is even
more insecure. The owner, the system administrator, or even a prior visitor could have installed
remote spying or subversion software. Voting from workplaces entails similar risks. Preinstalled
software applications also pose risks. Backdoors placed in software and activated when a user
tries to vote could invisibly monitor or subvert the voting process. Software security
vulnerabilities could allow a remote attacker to take complete control of a computer using remote
control software. Successful penetration of even well-defended computers is routine. One of the
most dangerous forms of remote attack is a virus or worm that spreads itself and contains a
malicious payload designed to take control of machines and wreak havoc with a future election6.
Since virus-checking software defends against only previously known viruses, virus checkers
often are unable to keep up with the spread of new viruses and worms. In 2001, the Code Red

6 Staniford, S., Paxson, V., and Weaver, N. How to own the Internet in your spare
time. Usenix Security (2002).
worm infected 360,000 computers in 14 hours, and in 2003 the Slammer worm7 brought down
many ATM machines and compromised many Internet hosts8. Modern worms are even more
virulent, are often spread by multiple methods, are able to bypass firewalls and other defenses,
and can be difficult to analyze. For example, it took quite a while to determine that SoBig.F was
a Trojan horse designed to plant spam engines9. Attackers can build new viruses, or modify
existing viruses sufficiently that they will avoid detection. Virus construction kits are available
on the Internet. In addition, attackers have the advantage that they can test new versions of
viruses using the same publicly available virus checkers that potential victims use, thus
confirming that the virus will not be detected before its release.

After seeing the arguments of both sides, we should see how it was in practice in the trials. First,
were gonna see the Arizona trials. In the Arizona trial, all registered Democratic voters40.46
percent of all registered Arizona voters, or 843,323 peoplereceived a personal identification
number (PIN) in the mail sometime in February or early March and a form to request a
traditional paper absentee ballot. The PINs were generated by election.com, the company
conducting the election for the Arizona Democratic party. Beginning after midnight on Tuesday,
March 7, 2000, through midnight on Friday, March 10, 2000, voters could log on to two different
websites, one run by the Arizona Democratic party and the other by election.com, to cast their
vote. At both websites voters had to accept the rules of the election, enter their PIN, and answer
two personal questions for verification purposes. The PIN and the personal information then
were cross-referenced against the voter registration database. After voters were authenticated,
they were allowed to vote for their preferred candidate. After selecting a candidate, voters were
asked to confirm their choice, and on confirmation they received electronic verification that their
vote had been cast. After the close of the Internet voting period, 124 polling places throughout

7 5. Moore, D., Paxson, V., Savage, S., Shannon, C., Staniford, S., and Weaver, N.
Inside the Slammer worm. IEEE Security and Privacy (2003).

8 "W32.SQLExp.Worm." Symantec. Accessed November 30, 2016.

https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-012502-
3306-99.

9 "W32.Sobig.F@mm." Symantec. Accessed November 30, 2016.

https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-081909-
2118-99.
the state opened for business. In-person or kiosk Internet voting occurred on Saturday, March 11,
throughout Arizona. The PINs issued by election.com were used to prevent double voting.

There are some problems in the process of the Arizona trials. counties with small nonwhite
populations made more use of the Internet voting method in the 2000 presidential primary and
counties with large nonwhite populations used it less. Counties with more elderly people, more
nonwhites, more unemployed people, and a more rural population all showed significantly less
use of Internet voting. We can concludes that nonwhites appear to have been much less willing or
able to use the Internet voting option than the usual voting options. A host of technical problems
also plagued the 2000 Arizona Internet primary. Phillips and von Spakovsky noted that voters
reported not receiving their PIN in the mail, losing their PIN, and being unable to obtain a new
PIN from the Democratic Party. Many voters apparently had problems with their Internet
browsers, including incompatibilities between the voting system and certain computer systems
(especially Macintosh computers) and some older Internet browsers. Voters having these
problems also found it difficult to obtain technical support10. Other minor technical problems
arose, including problems with computers that would not accept cookies, ballots that did not
appear on computer screens, confusing directions on how to vote, and problems with verifying
the voters personal information. The number of Arizona Democrats who had problems that
prevented them from voting on the Internet might have been significantly greater. Because the
Arizona preference primary was a private election, not state run, no significant postelection
report on the conduct of the Internet voting trial has been made public.

We now turn to the internet voting in Estonia. There are four features to the Estonian experience
that makes Internet voting workable alternative: (1) widespread Internet penetration (2) a legal
structure that addresses Internet voting issues, (3) an identification system that allows for digital
authentication of the voter, and (4) a political culture that is supportive of Internet voting.
According to data from the European Commission, Internet access in Estonia is widespread and
is increasing rapidly (from 31% of households with Internet access in 2004 to 53% in 2007); it
has an Internet penetration rate that is among the top 12 in the European Union11. Broadband
access is widespread in Estonia and Estonians are used to accessing their government services

10 Deborah M. Phillips and Hans A. von Spakovsky, Gauging the Risks of Internet
Elections, Communications of the ACM, vol. 44, no. 1 (January 2001), p. 80.
over the Internet. The Estonians have a legal system that supports the development and use of
Internet voting12. One of these key statutes is the Digital Signature Act (DSA) of 2002. The DSA,
and related administrative legislation, allows individuals to use approved digital signatures to
authenticate themselves in online transactions (especially government transactions), including
voting. Given the importance of authentication in any remote transaction, from banking to e-
mail, having a law that governs how and when such digital signatures can be used is critical to
making a system like Internet voting work. Estonia is not the only nation with a digital signature
law. The United States, for example, has a DSA. However, in Estonia, this act is especially
meaningful because, concomitant with the passage of the DSA, Estonia began the process of
mandating and introducing an identity card that included a digital certificate embedded in the
card that could be used for online authentication of an individual, when combined with the
individual's unique personal identification number (PIN). The user uses the digital signature in
the following manner. First, the user needs a smart card reader that fits into an available
computer port. This reader, which costs approximately seven dollars ($7), can read the digital
signature on the Estonian identity card. The user then connects to the Internet and goes to the
government Web site that is the central portal for all government transactions. On this Web site,
the individual's card and PIN are combined and the user is authen- ticated. A photo of an identity
card being used to access the government's e-government portal can be seen in. The national
identity card with a digital signature truly makes Estonia unique in that all citizens can utilize
Internet voting. Even if an individual does not have a computer with a reader, there are public
computers with these readers that any Estonian can use. This can be contrasted starkly with the
American experience where there is no system at the state or federal level to provide individuals
with digital signatures. Even if there were such a system in the United States, where most state
laws explicitly do not allow the use of digital signatures for transactions such as registration or
authentication in elections. Even in nations throughout Europe that have conducted trials of
Internet voting, the lack of a nation- wide digital-signature program provides an obstacle that has

11 "Europe Internet Usage Stats Facebook Subscribers and Population Statistics."

Internet World Stats. Accessed November 20, 2016.
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats4.htm.

12 Drechsler, Wolfgang, and Ulle Madise. 2002. "E- Voting in Estonia." Trames 51):
234-44
to be overcome in the process of voter authentication. With an authentication system in place, the
second component of the legal framework that facilitates Internet voting was put in place in
200213. A series of statutes- the Local Communities Election Act, the Referendum Act, and the
Riigikogu Election Act- were passed in March and June 2002. Each statute enabled the use of
Internet voting in specific types of Estonian elections and specified the administration of such
elections.

Studies about Estonian election14 shows several important results that suggest that e-voting
enhances participation for some groups. When compared to other modes of voting, e-voting is
more attractive for younger voters and less so for elderly people. This trend raises the question
whether there will be a replacement effect, as elderly voters leave the electorate over time and
younger Internet voters replace them, creating a much larger Internet electorate. This finding also
suggests that the e-voting system does not introduce undemocratic biases into the electoral
process, in particular, biases that are fundamentally socio-economic. The e-voting system does
not provide political bias either. When other factors are controlled for, there is, for example, no
left-right political bias among e-voters. We also see from both objective and attitudinal data that
e-voting is convenient for voters. First and foremost, 85.8% of Internet voters said that they
voted online because it was convenient. Second, there is some evidence from the studies that e-
voting may mobilize more casual voters- those individuals who state that they either vote "from
time to time" or never. Small but significant percentages of the voters who cast ballots online
stated that they "probably wouldn't have" or "for sure wouldn't have" voted if Internet voting had
not been an option. The studies also examined the use of the Internet as a tool for voters to learn
about candidates and parties and as a tool that parties and candidates can use to target voters.The
studies find that voters are more likely than non-voters to use the Internet to learn more about the
campaign. In almost every case, voters used the Internet more than non-voters for campaign
purposes. The studies find that Internet voters are greater consumers of online information
compared to both Election Day voters and advance polling station voters. Internet voters were 20

13 Ibid

14 Alvarez, R. Michael, Thad E. Hall, and Alexander H. Trechsel. "Internet Voting in

Comparative Perspective: The Case of Estonia." PS: Political Science & Politics 42,
no. 03 (July 2009): 497-505. Accessed November 24, 2016.
doi:10.1017/s1049096509090787.
percentage points more likely to have read about the elections online and to have used the
Internet to inform themselves about politics compared to traditional Election Day voters. Online
information about candidates and political parties was used by almost 30% of voters, and by 37%
of Internet voters, in their search for election information; almost 24% of voters and 30% of
Internet voters used the Internet explicitly to find information about the candidates.

From the results of the Arizona trials and the practice of internet voting in Estonia, we could
conclude that there are two reasons that why we should use internet voting in Indonesia. First, It
could enhance the participation from other people who were either cannot participate in the
election due to some reasons (due to disability or in the military), or the one who doesnt
interested in the election (younger people and casual voters). But in order to achieve this, we
should have a good internet facilities first, so that the problems in Arizona will not be happened
again in Indonesia. We could follow the steps of the Estonian government, by creating legal
framework to ensure a good internet facilities to accomodate a ID capable of recognizing digital
signatures, and stable election rules that doesnt change from time to time.