Section 9.

Private property shall not be taken for showing that they have been denied the ability to exploit a
public use without just compensation. property interest that they heretofore had believed was
available for development is quite simply untenable.
- n deciding whether a particular governmental action has
PENN CENTRAL TRANSPO v. NYC
effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the
F: In 1965, New York adopted the Landmarks Preservation
character of the action and on the nature and extent of the
Law to protect its historical landmarks and neighborhoods. Its
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole - here, the city
primary method of achieving its goals is not by acquisitions of
tax block designated as the "landmark site."
historic properties, but rather by involving public entities in
-Court has no "set formula" for determining when "justice and
land-use decisions affecting these properties and providing
fairness" require that economic injuries caused by public
services, standards, controls, and incentives that will encourage
action be compensated by the government.
preservation by private owners and users.
-A "taking" may more readily be found when the interference
- The Landmarks Preservation Commission is the body that
with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by
implements the law. It is in charge of designating a building or
government, see, e. g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
a district to be landmarks or historical sites. The Board of
(1946), than when interference arises from some public
Estimate will approve or deny the designation and the owners
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
may seek judicial review of the decision. Another part of the
promote the common good.
ordinance requires the approval from the Commission to alter
-Zoning laws generally do not affect existing uses of real
the exterior appearance, structure, or character of the site or
property, but "taking" challenges have also been held to be
building. Worth noting: Under two ordinances, owners of
without merit in a wide variety of situations when the
landmark sites may transfer development rights from a
challenged governmental actions prohibited a beneficial use to
landmark parcel to proximate lots. Grand Central, owned by
which individual parcels had previously been devoted and thus
Penn Central, was declared a landmark, as well as the whole
caused substantial individualized harm.
lot it sits on. They opposed the designation but did not avail
-In a different case concerning cedar tree rust damaging apple
themselves of the remedies.
trees, the Court held that the State might properly make "a
-Thereafter, to increase its income, Penn entered into a
choice between the preservation of one class of property and
renewable 50-year lease contract with UGP properties to
that of the other."
construct a 55-story building over the terminal. The
-Collected doctirnes: when there is destruction of property, or
Commission's reasons for rejecting certificates respecting
rendering it wholly useless, there is need for compensation for
Breuer II Revised are summarized in the following statement:
the government. The right of property prevail over public
"To protect a Landmark, one does not tear it down. To
interest
perpetuate its architectural features, one does not strip them
-The Court recognizes that in a number of settings, that States
off."
and cities may enact land-use restrictions or controls to
-The Commission did not approve the 2 plans submitted but
enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and
Penn did not seek judicial review. They directly went to court
desirable aesthetic features of a city.
and assailed the Landmark Law for its application took
-Equally without merit is the related argument that the
properties without just compensation. The petitioners said the
decision to designate a structure as a landmark "is inevitably
law arbitrarily deprived them of their property.
arbitrary or at least subjective, because it is basically a matter
-Trial court granted relief but it was reversed by the CA.
of taste," Reply Brief for Appellants, thus unavoidably singling
-CA saw that there was no "taking" since the Landmarks Law
out individual landowners for disparate and unfair treatment.
had not transferred control of the property to the city, but only
The argument has a particularly hollow ring in this case. For
restricted appellants' exploitation of it; and that there was no
appellants not only did not seek judicial review of either the
denial of due process because (1) the same use of the Terminal
designation or of the denials of the certificates of
was permitted as before; (2) the appellants had not shown that
appropriateness and of no exterior effect, but do not even now
they could not earn a reasonable return on their investment in
suggest that the Commission's decisions concerning the
the Terminal itself; (3) even if the Terminal proper could never
Terminal were in any sense arbitrary or unprincipled. But, in
operate at a reasonable profit, some of the income from Penn
any event, a landmark owner has a right to judicial review of
Central's extensive real estate holdings in the area must
any Commission decision, and, quite simply, there is no basis
realistically be imputed to the Terminal; and (4) the
whatsoever for a conclusion that courts will have any greater
development rights above the Terminal, which were made
difficulty identifying arbitrary or discriminatory action in the
transferable to numerous sites in the vicinity, provided
context of landmark regulation than in the context of classic
significant compensation for loss of rights above the Terminal
zoning or indeed in any other context.
itself.
-On the different applications of the law to different
landmarks: Landmarks Law has a more severe impact on
I: 1. W/N the restrictions effect a taking of private property
some landowners than on others, but that in itself does not
for public use
mean that the law effects a "taking." Legislation designed to
2. IF SO, W/N the transferable development rights afforded
promote the general welfare commonly burdens some more
appellants constitute "just compensation" within the meaning
than others.
of the Fifth Amendment.
-COMPARISON WITH CAUSBY: Appellants' final broad-
based attack would have us treat the law as an instance, like
H: 1. NO. Apart from our own disagreement with appellants'
that in United States v. Causby, in which government, acting
characterization of the effect of the New York City law, the
in an enterprise capacity, has appropriated part of their
submission that appellants may establish a "taking" simply by
property for some strictly governmental purpose. Apart from
the fact that Causby was a case of invasion of airspace that
destroyed the use of the farm beneath and this New York City
law has in nowise impaired the present use of the Terminal,
the Landmarks Law neither exploits appellants' parcel for city
purposes nor facilitates nor arises from any entrepreneurial
operations of the city. The situation is not remotely like that in
Causby where the airspace above the property was in the flight
pattern for military aircraft. The Landmarks Law's effect is
simply to prohibit appellants or anyone else from occupying
portions of the airspace above the Terminal, while permitting
appellants to use the remainder of the parcel in a gainful
fashion.
- The New York City law does not interfere in any way with
the present uses of the Terminal. Its designation as a landmark
not only permits but contemplates that appellants may
continue to use the property precisely as it has been used for
the past 65 years: as a railroad terminal containing office space
and concessions. So the law does not interfere with what must
be regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation concerning
the use of the parcel. More importantly, on this record, we
must regard the New York City law as permitting Penn
Central not only to profit from the Terminal but also to obtain
a "reasonable return" on its investment.
- While the Commission's actions in denying applications to
construct an office building in excess of 50 stories above the
Terminal may indicate that it will refuse to issue a certificate of
appropriateness for any comparably sized structure, nothing
the Commission has said or done suggests an intention to
prohibit any construction above the Terminal. The
Commission's report emphasized that whether any
construction would be allowed depended upon whether the
proposed addition "would harmonize in scale, material, and
character with [the Terminal]."
2. To the extent appellants have been denied the right to build
above the Terminal, it is not literally accurate to say that they
have been denied all use of even those pre-existing air rights.
Their ability to use these rights has not been abrogated; they
are made transferable to at least eight parcels in the vicinity of
the Terminal, one or two of which have been found suitable
for the construction of new office buildings. Although
appellants and others have argued that New York City's
transferable development-rights program is far from ideal, the
New York courts here supportably found that, at least in the
case of the Terminal, the rights afforded are valuable. While
these rights may well not have constituted "just compensation"
if a "taking" had occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubtedly
mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has imposed on
appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken into account in
considering the impact of regulation.
OSG v. AYALA
F: Respondents Ayala, Shangri-la, and Robinsons maintain
and operate shopping malls all over Manila, while SM Prime
Constructs is operates and leases commercial buildings.
-The shopping malls operated or leased out by respondents
have parking facilities for all kinds of motor vehicles, either by
way of parking spaces inside the mall buildings or in separate
buildings and/or adjacent lots that are solely devoted for use
as parking spaces. Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and
SM Prime spent for the construction of their own parking
facilities. Respondent Shangri-la is renting its parking facilities,
consisting of land and building specifically used as parking
spaces, which were constructed for the lessor's account.
-Respondents expend for the maintenance and administration
of their respective parking facilities. They provide security
personnel to protect the vehicles parked in their parking
facilities and maintain order within the area. In turn, they
collect the following parking fees in the range of 10-30 pesos
per 3-4 hours.
-The parking tickets or cards issued by respondents to vehicle
owners contain the stipulation that respondents shall not be
responsible for any loss or damage to the vehicles parked in
respondents' parking facilities.
-After 3 public hearings, SENATE issued Senate Committee
Report No. 225 which:
[found] that the collection of parking fees by shopping
malls is contrary to the National Building Code and is
therefor [sic] illegal. While it is true that the Code merely
requires malls to provide parking spaces, without specifying
whether it is free or not, both Committees believe that the
reasonable and logical interpretation of the Code is that the
parking spaces are for free. Figuratively speaking, the Code
has "expropriated" the land for parking something
similar to the subdivision law which require developers to
devote so much of the land area for parks.
Moreover, Article II of R.A. No. 9734 (Consumer Act of
the Philippines) provides that "it is the policy of the State to
protect the interest of the consumers, promote the general
welfare and establish standards of conduct for business and
industry". Obviously, a contrary interpretation (i.e.,
justifying the collection of parking fees) would be going
against the declared policy of R.A. 7394.
-DPWH has the authority to implement the National Building
Code.
-The Resolution recommended that the OSG enjoin said
malls and for The Department of Trade and Industry,
pursuant to the provisions of the Consumer Act of the
Philippines to enforce the provisions of the Code relative to
parking in shopping malls, and for congress to amend the
National Building Code to prohibit the collection of mall
parking fees.
-SM heard of the possible action and penalties awaiting the
respondents and filed for a petition for declaratory relief.
-OSG then filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and
Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction) against respondents.
-After granting the injunction, Judge Ibay consolidated the
cases and later ruled in favor of the respondents and found
that it was not within the spirit or the letter of the National
Building Code mandating the creation of parking lots that
such utilities would be provided to the public for free. In fact,
it was found that parking lots are business considerations that
entice patrons.
-CA affirmed and further clarified some things left undecided
by the RTC. OSG argued provisions on the required sizing of
the parking slots and the maximum site occupancy subject to
zoning requirements, which tie in with the declaration of
policy, as leaning toward the free-of-charge parking. But it di
not rule on the validity of the IRR of the National Building
Code.
I: 1. W/N the IRR of the National Building Code requires
free-of-charge parking
2. W/N the regulation (which is usually inherent in police
power) constitutes a taking
H: 1. NO. The explicit directive of the afore-quoted statutory
and regulatory provisions, garnered from a plain reading
thereof, is that respondents, as operators/lessors of
neighborhood shopping centers, should provide parking and
loading spaces, in accordance with the minimum ratio of one
slot per 100 square meters of shopping floor area. There is
nothing therein pertaining to the collection (or non-collection)
of parking fees by respondents. In fact, the term "parking fees"
cannot even be found at all in the entire National Building
Code and its IRR.
-RTC and CA were right to apply Art. 1158. Obligations
derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined
in this Code or in special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated
by the precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what has
not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book.
- OSG uses 2 cases to justify action: in Republic and City of
Ozamis, the concerned local governments regulated parking
pursuant to their power to control and regulate their streets; in
the instant case, the DPWH Secretary and local building
officials regulate parking pursuant to their authority to ensure
compliance with the minimum standards and requirements
under the National Building Code and its IRR. With the
difference in subject matters and the bases for the regulatory
powers being invoked, Republic and City of Ozamis do not
constitute precedents for this case.
- It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that "the power to
regulate and control the use, occupancy, and maintenance of
buildings and structures carries with it the power to impose
fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this case,
absolutely, the imposition of such fees".
- It has been settled law in this jurisdiction that this broad and
all-compassing governmental competence to restrict rights of
liberty and property carries with it the undeniable power to
collect a regulatory fee.
-It looks to the enactment of specific measures that govern the
relations not only as between individuals but also as between
private parties and the political society. True, if the regulatory
agencies have the power to impose regulatory fees, then
conversely, they also have the power to remove the same.
-Even so, it is worthy to note that the present case does not
involve the imposition by the DPWH Secretary and local
building officials of regulatory fees upon respondents; but the
collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who use
the mall parking facilities.
-Assuming arguendo that the DPWH Secretary and local
building officials do have regulatory powers over the collection
of parking fees for the use of privately owned parking facilities,
they cannot allow or prohibit such collection arbitrarily or
whimsically. Whether allowing or prohibiting the collection of
such parking fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and local
building officials must pass the test of classic reasonableness
and propriety of the measures or means in the promotion of
the ends sought to be accomplished.
-The National Building Code regulates buildings, by setting
the minimum specifications and requirements for the same. It
does not concern itself with traffic congestion in areas
surrounding the building. It is already a stretch to say that the
National Building Code and its IRR also intend to solve the
problem of traffic congestion around the buildings so as to
ensure that the said buildings shall have adequate lighting and
ventilation. Moreover, the Court cannot simply assume, as the
OSG has apparently done, that the traffic congestion in areas
around the malls is due to the fact that respondents charge for
their parking facilities, thus, forcing vehicle owners to just park
in the streets. The Court notes that despite the fees charged by
respondents, vehicle owners still use the mall parking facilities,
which are even fully occupied on some days. Vehicle owners
may be parking in the streets only because there are not
enough parking spaces in the malls, and not because they are
deterred by the parking fees charged by respondents. Free
parking spaces at the malls may even have the opposite effect
from what the OSG envisioned: more people may be
encouraged by the free parking to bring their own vehicles,
instead of taking public transport, to the malls; as a result, the
parking facilities would become full sooner, leaving more
vehicles without parking spaces in the malls and parked in the
streets instead, causing even more traffic congestion.
2. YES. The title to and/or possession of the parking facilities
remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their
collection of parking fees from the public, for the use of said
facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or
confiscation of their properties. The State is not only
requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latter's
properties for use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that
they give the public access to said parking spaces for free. Such
is already an excessive intrusion into the property rights of
respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the right to
use a portion of their properties as they wish, they are further
prohibited from profiting from its use or even just recovering
therefrom the expenses for the maintenance and operation of
the required parking facilities.
-THIS CASE DIFFERENTIATES POLICE POWER
FROM EMINENT DOMAIN.
-Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking
police power to justify the regulation by the State, through the
DPWH Secretary.
- Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is
usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and
enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power to
regulate, however, does not include the power to prohibit. A
fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to
confiscate. Police power does not involve the taking or
confiscation of property, with the exception of a few cases
where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in
order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and
order and of promoting the general welfare; for instance, the
confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and
firearms.
- Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in
the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the
said power may not be availed of only to impose a burden
upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title
and possession.
-It is a settled rule that neither acquisition of title nor total
destruction of value is essential to taking. It is usually in cases
where title remains with the private owner that inquiry should
be made to determine whether the impairment of a property is
merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking.
-A REGULATION THAT DEPRIVES ANY PERSON OF
THE PROFITABLE USE OF HIS PROPERTY
CONSTITUTES A TAKING AND ENTITLES HIM TO
COMPENSATION, UNLESS THE INVASION OF
RIGHTS IS SO SLIGHT AS TO PERMIT THE
REGULATION TO BE JUSTIFIED UNDER THE
POLICE POWER. SIMILARLY, A POLICE
REGULATION THAT UNREASONABLY RESTRICTS
THE RIGHT TO USE BUSINESS PROPERTY FOR
BUSINESS PURPOSES AMOUNTS TO A TAKING OF
PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE OWNER MAY
RECOVER THEREFOR.
-OSGs petition denied.
SUMULONG v. GUERRERO
F: NHA filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land
covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo
Rizal) including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and
Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters
and 3,333 square meters respectively.
-Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate
possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount
of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank,
representing the "total market value" of the subject twenty five
hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224
which defines "the policy on the expropriation of private
property for socialized housing upon payment of just
compensation."
-RESPONDENT Judge issued the writ of possession upon
acknowledgment of the deposit.
-Petitioners cry for due process for their deprivation of their
property. The court denied their MR.
I: 1.W/N PD 1224 is violative of the constitutional right to
property
2. W/N assailed PD allowed the taking of the property upon
payment based on arbitrary fixed valuations and without due
process
H: 1. PD 1224 satisfies public use requirement BUT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for the next preceeding issue
On public use (requirement for the exercise of eminent
domain): Petitioners say that socialized housing purpose of PD
1224 is not for public use because it only benefits the few.
-"Socialized housing" is defined as, "the construction of
dwelling units for the middle and lower class members of our
society, including the construction of the supporting
infrastructure and other facilities." It is a slums relocation
program.
- IT IS ACCURATE TO STATE THEN THAT AT
PRESENT WHATEVER MAY BE BENEFICIALLY
EMPLOYED FOR THE GENERAL WELFARE
SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF PUBLIC USE.
- Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a
matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects
public health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general
welfare. The public character of housing measures does not
change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied
by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A
beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to provide
housing for all who need it, all at once.
-The Constitution tasks the government to undertake urban
land reform and housing programs (art 8, sec. 9)
-On the small lots of the petitioners being taken when there
are bigger lots around the area: The propriety of exercising
the power of eminent domain under Article XIII, section 4 of
our Constitution cannot be determined on a purely
quantitative or area basis. Not only does the constitutional
provision speak of lands instead of landed estates, but I see no
cogent reason why the government, in its quest for social
justice and peace, should exclusively devote attention to
conflicts of large proportions, involving a considerable number
of individuals, and eschew small controversies and wait until
they grow into a major problem before taking remedial
action.
-Government must adhere to NUMBER OF PEOPLE TO
BE BENEFITED TEST: The interest of the private land
owners should not stand in the way of progress and the benefit
of the greater majority of the inhabitants of the country.
2. YES. JUST COMPENSATION means the value of the
property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the
condition of the property and its surroundings, its
improvements and capabilities, should be considered.
-Court earlier ruled in a different case that the valuations and
standards must vary and should depend on the circumstances
surrounding the property.
-ON DUE PROCESS: The complaint and simultaneous
deposit did not give the owner the opportunity to assail the
accuracy of the valuations: It is violative of due process to deny
to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the
tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic
concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of
minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the
judgment of a court promulgated only after expert
commissioners have actually viewed the property, after
evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented,
and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and
just determination have been judiciously evaluated.
-Writ of possession annulled. Remanded.
PHIL. COLUMBIAN ASSN. v. HON. PANIS
F: In 1982, petitioner, a sports club, instituted ejectment
proceedings against herein private respondents, owners and
occupants of the land, before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila. Judgment was rendered against the said occupants,
ordering them to vacate the lot and pay reasonable
compensation therefor. This judgment was affirmed by the
RTC, the CA and subsequently by the SC. Upon which a
motion for the execution of judgment was filed by Columbian.
-ANTECEDENT FACTS: The land subject of this case is the
4,842.90 square meter lot, which was formerly a part of the
Fabie Estate. As early as November 11, 1966, the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila passed Ordinance No. 5971,
seeking to expropriate the Fabie Estate. Through negotiated
sales, the City of Manila acquired a total of 18,017.10 square
meters of the estate, and thereafter subdivided the land into
home lots and distributed the portions to the actual occupants
thereof.
The remaining area of 4,842.90 square meters, more or less,
was sold in 1977 by its owner, Dolores Fabie-Posadas, to
petitioner. Since the time of the sale, the lot has been occupied
by private respondents.
-On May 23, 1989, the City Council of Manila, with the
approval of the Mayor, passed Ordinance No. 7704 for the
expropriation of the 4,842.90 square meter lot.
-On June 28, 1990, the City of Manila filed a complaint
against petitioner before the RTC for the expropriation of the
lot subject of the ejectment proceedings aforementioned.
-Petitioner, in turn, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,
alleging, inter alia, that the City of Manila had no power to
expropriate private land; that the expropriation is not for
public use and welfare; that the expropriation is politically
motivated; and, that the deposit of P2 million of the City of
Manila representing the provisional value of the land, was
insufficient and was made under P.D. 1533, a law declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
-RTC denied the motion to dismiss of petitioner and also
asked that the parties nominate commissioners to ascertain the
valuations on the land. City of Manila filed an ex-parte motion
for the issuance of a writ of possession in consideration of the
2M deposit. The court gave separate orders granting writ and
dismissing Columbians prayer for preliminary injunction.
I: 1. W/N LGUs have can exercise eminent domain
2. W/N there was just compensation and due process
H: 1. YES. Petitioner forgot that the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila, R.A. No. 409, expressly authorizes the City of
Manila to "condemn private property for public use" (Sec. 3)
and "to acquire private land . . . and subdivide the same into
home lots for sale on easy terms to city residents" (Sec. 100).
-The Revised Charter of the City of Manila expressly grants
the City of Manila general powers over its territorial
jurisdiction, including the power of eminent domain.
-QUOTING SUMULONG GUERRERO: That only a few
could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property
does not diminish its public use character. It is simply not
possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need
them.
-PUBLIC USE: Public use now includes the broader notion of
indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular,
urban land reform and housing.
2. YES.
JUST COMPENSATION: The amount of P2 million
representing the provisional value of the land is an amount not
only fixed by the court, but accepted by both parties. The fact
remains that petitioner, albeit reluctantly, agreed to said
valuation and is therefore estopped from assailing the same. It
must be remembered that the valuation is merely provisional.
The parties still have the second stage in the proceedings in the
proper court below to determine specifically the amount of just
compensation to be paid the landowner
DUE PROCESS: Nomination of commissioners, ability of the
petitioners to file motions for reconsideration, in all instances
the petitioners were heard in court.
CITY of MANILA v. ESTRADA
F: The City of Manila sought to expropriate an entire parcel
of land with its improvements for use in connection with a new
market at that time being erected in the district of Paco.
-A complaint was filed setting forth the necessary allegations,
answer, joined, and commissioners were appointed, who, after
viewing the premises and receiving evidence, and being unable
to agree, submitted two reports to the court.
-The court duly rendered its decision, confirming the majority
report as the improvements, but the reducing the price of the
land from P20 per square meter, as fixed by the majority
report, to P15 per square meter.
-Estrada as one of the defendants claim that the land should be
valued at P25/sqm.
-Motions for a new trial having been made by both parties and
denied by the court, both parties appealed from that part of
the decision fixing the value of the land at P15 per square
meter. The record was therefore elevated to this court for a
review of the evidence and assigned errors of the parties. This
court held that P10 per square meter was just compensation
for the land, and rendered its decision accordingly.
-3 real estate men formed the commission and valued the land
between P6-P10 /sqm.
-In this case it seems that the land desired by the city was part
of a parcel fronting on Calle Herran, whose other boundaries
were the Paco Estero, some private property, and a small
callejon.
I: W/N there was just compensation
H:
-The portion desired by the city comprised the entire Herran
frontage of the owner. The commissioners appraised the total
area, consisting of 1,399.03 square meters at P6.50 per square
meter. The city desired only 353.21 square meters facing on
Calle Herran, and the commissioners therefore found
consequential damages to the remainder, due to depriving it of
its Herran frontage, to be P4.50 per square meter. These
consequential damages were included in the price paid by the
city for the land taken, making the apparent price of the
P353.21 square meters P7,002.05, or P19.85 per square meter.
-As to the market value of the land (the subject of the present
case), whatever may be its price on the market, in my opinion,
by comparing previous sales of land in the same or similar
conditions and circumstances, and having in mind the only
sale which has been made in twenty years of land equally or
similarly situated to this, I believe that it is all that can serve as
a standard to ascertain the value in the market of the land in
question.
-The court justifies such action, first, upon the ground that the
great preponderance of the evidence submitted to the
commissioners showed P10 per square meter was just
compensation for the land taken, and second, upon the power
of the court to revise the report of the commissioners when the
amount awarded is grossly inadequate or grossly excessive.
- "The difficulty is not with the rule, but with its
application. For the determination of the market value
of land, which is that the sum of money which a person,
desirous but not compelled to buy and on an owner
willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a
price to be given and received therefore, is beyond doubt
difficult. The test is legally correct, but it cannot be
applied to land with the accuracy with which it can be
applied to stocks, bonds and personal property
generally. Still, it is this test which admittedly must be
applied, even when the value of the land and the
damages are found in separate sums."
- It is very difficult matter to limit the scope of the inquiry as to
what the market value of condemned property is. The market
valued of a piece of land is attained by a consideration of all
those facts which make it commercially valuable.
-Stocks Yard Case: "The marker value of the property means
its actual value, independent of the location of plaintiffs road
thereon, that is, the fair valued of the property as between one
who wants to purchase and one who wants to sell it; not what
could be obtained for it in peculiar circumstances when
greater that its fair price could be obtained; not its speculative
value; not the value obtained through the necessities of
another.
-"It long has been settled, that the assessment of damages
where lands are acquired by eminent domain evidence is
admissible of the price received from sales of land similar in
character, and situated in the vicinity, if the transactions are
not so remote in point of time that a fair comparison
practically is impossible."
- Evidence of other sales is competent if the character of such
parcels as sites for business purposes, dwelling, or for whatever
other use which enhances the pecuniary value of condemned
land is sufficiently similarly to the latter that it may be
reasonably assumed that the price of the condemned land
would be approximately near the price brought by the parcels
sold. The value of such evidence, of courts, diminishes as the
differences between the property of sold and the condemned
land increase. The property must be in the immediate
neighborhood, that is, in the zone of commercial activity with
which the condemned property is identified, and the sales
must be sufficiently coeval with the date of the condemnation
proceedings as to exclude general increases or decreases in
property values due to changed commercial conditions in the
vicinity. No two are ever exactly alike, and as the difference
between parcels sold and the land condemned must necessarily
be taken into consideration of comparing values, we think it
much better that those differences should be shown as part of
the evidence of such sales.
- It is true that the condemned land had improvements upon it
while the parcel sold was vacant land. But it is also true that
the values of these improvements were estimated as separate
and distinct items, and the value of the land was estimated
without regard to the improvements upon it. A sale of vacant
land is evidence of the value of neighboring land.
- "This fact of sales is not always the only factor in determining
the weight of the testimony of a witness as to value. A witness
may, in forming his opinion, consider the uses and capabilities
of the property, as well as the priced at which like property in
the neighborhood has been sold. He may also base his opinion
of value upon his knowledge or observation of the growth and
development of towns and cities, a general knowledge of trade
and business, rental value, the interest which the land would
pay upon an investment, its productiveness, ease of cultivation,
its situation in a particular community, and other elements."
CONTINUE PRINTED
SAN ROQUE v. REPUBLIC
F: The subject parcels of land are located in Lahug, Cebu.
Ismael D. Rosales, Pantaleon Cabrera, and Francisco Racaza
originally owned the parcels of land. On 5 September 1938,
the aforementioned parcels of land and 17 others, were the
subjects of an expropriation proceeding initiated by the then
Commonwealth of the Philippines to carry out the
development program of the Philippine Army as provided in
the National Defense Act, i.e., military reservation.
-Judge Felix Martinez ordered the initial deposit of P9, 500.00
as pre-condition for the entry on the lands to be expropriated.
-Said amount was subsequently disbursed in full but due to the
destruction of the vouchers, journal and cash book in the
Office of the Provincial Treasurer during the last World War,
the names of the payees could not reasonably be ascertained
-A Decision was rendered condemning the parcels of land.
However, the title of the subject parcel of land was not
transferred to the government.
- Eventually, the land was subdivided and the TCT was
cancelled and the Register of Deeds issued new titles. 2 parcels
were acquired by Herein petitioners. In 1995, San Roque
began construction of townhouses on the land- as claimed in
good faith.
-1996, herein defendant filed a case claiming that due to the
decision on the expropriation case, they owned the parcels of
land and that the TCTs issued to San Roque were null and
void.
-On August 25, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision 5
dismissing the Republic's complaint and upholding SRRDC's
ownership over the subject properties as supported by
SRRDC's actual possession thereof and its unqualified title
thereto. CA reversed the RTC decision on the finding that the
appeal from the CFI Decision in the expropriation case was
never perfected by the original owners of the subject
properties, and thus, the expropriation of Lot No. 933 became
final and binding on the original owners, and SRRDC, which
merely stepped into the latter's shoes, is similarly bound.
I: 1. W/N CA erred in deeming the decision final and
executor, not open to question.
2. W/N there was just compensation
3. W/N Republic is barred by laches
4. W/N San Roque was in good faith
H:
-ON THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE INCOMPLETE AND
INEFFECTUAL EXPROPRIATION:
Valdhueza case: In Valdehueza, we held that the registered
lot owners were not entitled to recover possession of the
expropriated lots considering that the titles contained
annotations of the right of the National Airports Corporation
(now CAA) to pay for and acquire said lots.
Republic v. Lim: we rejected the Republic's invocation of our
Decision in Valdehueza to retain ownership over said lots,
and upheld the principle that title to the expropriated property
shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full
payment of just compensation. We struck down the Republic's
claim of ownership over Lot No. 932 in light of its blatant
disregard of the explicit order in Valdehueza to effect
payment of just compensation.
Federated Realty Corp: Court upheld Federated Realty
Corporation's (FRC's) clear and unmistakable right, as the title
holder, to the lot in question, necessitating the issuance of a
writ of injunction to prevent serious damage to its interests.
And applied the settled principle in land registration that a
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person
named therein.
1. YES. The CA's categorical pronouncement that the CFI
Decision had become final as no appeal was perfected by
SRRDC's predecessor-in-interest is, therefore, contradicted by
the Republic's own allegation that an appeal had been filed by
the original owners of Lot No. 933. Not only did the CA fail to
resolve the issue of the Republic's failure to register the
property in its name, it also did not give any explanation as to
why title and continuous possession of the property remained
with SRRDC and its predecessors-in-interest for fifty-six years.
2. NO. In Republic v. Lim, we emphasized that no piece of
land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling
owner until compensation is paid.
The Republic submits that the P9,500.00 initial deposit it
made was disbursed in full to the owners of the 18 lots subject
of expropriation, and assumes that the owners of Lot No. 933
were among the recipients of such disbursement. The
Republic admits that records of payment were destroyed by
fire during World War II, and it cannot be ascertained who
received the money. It would rely simply on the presumption
that official duty had been regularly performed in assuming
that the owners of the 18 lots expropriated were adequately
paid. We are not convinced.
-The Republic's bare contention and assumption cannot defeat
SRRDC's apparent ownership over the subject properties.
- Thus, we ruled that the Republic's failure to pay just
compensation precluded the perfection of its title over Lot No.
932. In fact, we went even further and recognized the right of
the unpaid owner to recover the property if within five years
from the decision of the expropriation court the expropriator
fails to effect payment of just compensation.
- TIME AND AGAIN, WE HAVE DECLARED THAT
EMINENT DOMAIN CASES ARE TO BE STRICTLY
CONSTRUED AGAINST THE EXPROPRIATOR. 30
THE PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION FOR
PRIVATE PROPERTY TAKEN FOR PUBLIC USE IS AN
INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE FOR THE EXERCISE OF
THE STATE'S SOVEREIGN POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN. FAILURE TO OBSERVE THIS
REQUIREMENT RENDERS THE TAKING
INEFFECTUAL, NOTWITHSTANDING THE AVOWED
PUBLIC PURPOSE. TO DISREGARD THIS
LIMITATION ON THE EXERCISE OF
GOVERNMENTAL POWER TO EXPROPRIATE IS TO
RIDE ROUGHSHOD OVER PRIVATE RIGHTS.
3. YES. 56 years, Bessie.
- The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel or
laches by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. This
rule, however, admits of exceptions. One exception is when
the strict application of the rule will defeat the effectiveness of
a policy adopted to protect the public such as the Torrens
system.
- Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
- In Republic v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the
immunity of government from laches and estoppel is not
absolute. (this case, the government took 20 years to take
action).
4.YES. The trial court correctly held that title registered under
the Torrens system is notice to the world. 48 Every person
dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness
of its certificate of title and the law will not oblige him to go
beyond what appears on the face thereof to determine the
condition of the property.
The conveyance history of the subject properties is clearly
shown on the titles of SRRDC's predecessors-in-interest.
Absent a showing that SRRDC had any participation,
voluntary or otherwise, in the transfers by the original owners
of Lot No. 933, prior to its eventual acquisition of the same,
we affirm that SRRDC is a buyer in good faith and an
innocent purchaser for value.
- An innocent purchaser for value is one who, relying on the
certificate of title, bought the property from the registered
owner, without notice that some other person has a right to, or
interest in,
RA 9443: confirms and declares valid all existing TCTs and
Reconstituted Certificates of Title duly issued by the Register
of Deeds of Cebu Province and/or Cebu City covering any
portion of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate. Thus, by legislative
fiat, SRRDC's titles covering Lot Nos. 933B-3 and 933B-4
must be recognized as valid and subsisting.
REPUBLIC v. BPI
F: 1998, DPWH filed with the RTC of Las Pias a case for
expropriation against portions of the properties of BPI and
Bayani Villanueva. DPWH needed 281 sqm for the
construction of the Zapote-Alabang Flyover.
-Neither BPI nor Villanueva objected to the propriety of the
expropriation; hence, the trial court constituted a Board of
Commissioners to determine the just compensation. In their
Report dated 29 September 1998, the Board of
Commissioners recommended the amount of P40,000.00 per
square meter as the fair market value. On 25 November 1998,
the trial court in its Decision set the fair market value at
P40,000.00 per square meter. The decision reached finality
Dec 11 1998.
-Meanwhile, BPI filed on 16 December 1998 a Motion for
Partial New Trial 12 to determine the just compensation of its
building, which was not included in the Decision dated 25
November 1998 that fixed the just compensation for the
parcels of land. In the motion, BPI claimed that its motion was
timely filed since it received a copy of the Decision on 01
December 1998. 13 The trial court granted partial new trial in
an Order dated 06 January 1999.
-Due to the failure of counsel for petitioner, despite notice, to
appear during the scheduled hearing for the determination of
the just compensation of the building, the trial court allowed
BPI to present its evidence ex-parte. RTC decided that the just
compensation for the building was due for 2.3M.
-Petitioner moved for reconsideration due to the fact that there which may arise from the expropriation. If the consequential
was non-compliance with the rules of court. Granted a.nd benefits exceed the consequential damages, these items should
previous judgment vacated. As BPI nominated a new be disregarded altogether as the basic value of the property
commissioner for the determination of just compensation for should be paid in every case.
the building, Republic filed a Manifestation and Motion - The Court would like to stress that there is a stark absence in
objecting the paying of additional just compensation because the records of any proof that DPWH communicated its
the original plan affecting the subject property was not amended plan to BPI or to the trial court. On the other hand,
implemented. The width of the sidewalk at the premises under the trial court found that BPI was not notified of the reduction
consideration was actually reduced from 2.50 m to 2.35 m . . . and had relied only on the DPWH letter dated 12 August
to avoid the costly structure of that bank. 1997 saying that it was not possible to reduce the width of the
-In its opposition, BPI claimed that it was not aware that the sidewalk.
original plan was not implemented. It received no
correspondence from the DPWH on the matter, except for the NPC v. MANALASTAS
letter dated 12 August 1997 from DPWH addressed to BPI, F: Sometime in 1977-1978, NP, a GOCC, constructed a 230
stating in part that: KV transmission line for the Naga-Tiwi line and a 69 KV
We regret to inform you that adjustment of the RROW transmission line for the Naga-Tinambac line on respondents'
limit of our project along this section is not possible as it will parcel of land covered by TCT No. 26263, affecting an area of
affect the effective width of the sidewalk designated at 2.50 26,919 square meters. Petitioner entered said land without the
m. wide.
knowledge or consent of respondents, without properly
-BPI also argued that even "if a 3-meter setback is observed,
initiating expropriation proceedings, and without any
only 75% of the old building could be utilized . . . [and]
compensation to respondents-landowners. Because of said
cutting the support system of the building . . . would affect the
transmission lines, respondents alleged that they could no
building's structural integrity."
longer use their land as part of a subdivision project as
This motion was denied. Republic was asked to nominate.
originally intended, which ultimately caused financial loss to
RTC ruled: 1,905,600 was due as just compensation for the
their family. Thus, in July 2000, respondents filed a complaint
building of BPI. (based on existing market value). CA affirmed.
against petitioner and its officers with the Regional Trial
Court of Naga City (RTC). Respondents demanded the
I: 1. W/N RTCs decision reached finality before the appeal
removal of the power lines and its accessories and payment of
made by BPI
damages, or in the alternative, payment of the fair market
2. W/N the additional compensation is unfounded and
value of the affected areas totaling 26,000 square meters of
without legal basis
respondents' land at P800.00 per square meter.
-On appeal to the CA, herein petitioner argued that the RTC
H: 1. NO. Absent any proof of service to BPI of the Decision,
erred in factoring the devaluation of the peso in the
the period of 15 days within which to file its motion for partial
computation of the fair market value of respondents' land. In a
new trial did not begin to run against BPI. However, BPI's
Decision dated September 9, 2010, the CA affirmed the RTC
admission that it received a copy of the Decision on 01
judgment with modification, reducing the award to Celedonia
December 1998 is binding on it, and was correctly considered
and Enrico Mariano (respondents' co-plaintiffs below) to
by the Court of Appeals as the reckoning date to count the 15-
P1,678,908.00.
day period.
I: 1. W/N estoppel operates against government and if
2. NO.
inflation is included in the computation
- The general rule is that the just compensation to which
the owner of the condemned property is entitled to is the
H: 1. ESTOPPEL
market value. 47 Market value is that sum of money which a
INFLATION & INTEREST: if property is taken for
person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner
public use before compensation is deposited with the
willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to
court having jurisdiction over the case, the final
be paid by the buyer and received by the seller. The general
compensation must include interest on its just value to
rule, however, is modified where only a part of a
be computed from the time the property is taken to the
certain property is expropriated. In such a case, the
time when compensation is actually paid or deposited
owner is not restricted to compensation for the
with the court. In fine, between the taking of the
portion actually taken, he is also entitled to recover
property and the actual payment, legal interest accrue
the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining
in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but
part of the property.
not better than) the position he was in before the taking
- No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant
occurred.
consequential damages. Consequential damages are awarded
-In other words, the just compensation due to the landowners
if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of
amounts to an effective forbearance on the part of the State
the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in value.
a proper subject of interest computed from the time the
The rules on expropriation clearly provide a legal basis for the
property was taken until the full amount of just compensation
award of consequential damages.
is paidin order to eradicate the issue of the constant
- Berkenkotter case: to determine just compensation, the
variability of the value of the currency over time.
trial court should first ascertain the market value of the
- This allowance of interest on the amount found to
property, to which should be added the consequential
be the value of the property as of the time of the
damages after deducting therefrom the consequential benefits
taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at
12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the
constant deflation and inflation of the value of the
currency over time.
The foregoing clearly dictates that valuation of the land for
purposes of determining just compensation should not include
the inflation rate of the Philippine Peso because the delay in
payment of the price of expropriated land is sufficiently
recompensed through payment of interest on the market value
of the land as of the time of taking from the landowner.
- estoppel generally finds no application against the State
when it acts to rectify mistakes, errors, irregularities, or illegal
acts, of its officials and agents, irrespective of rank. This
ensures efficient conduct of the affairs of the State without any
hindrance on the part of the government from irnplementing
laws and regulations, despite prior mistakes or even illegal acts
of its agents shackling government operations and allowing
others, some by malice, to profit from official error or
misbehavior. The rule holds true even if the
rectification prejudices parties who had meanwhile
received benefits.
- additional compensation in the form of exemplary
damages and attorney's fees should likewise be
awarded as a consequence of the government
agency's illegal occupation of the owner's property
for a very long time, resulting in pecuniary loss to the
owner. Indeed, government agencies should be admonished
and made to realize that its negligence and inaction in failing
to commence the proper expropriation proceedings before
taking private property, as provided for by law, cannot be
countenanced by the Court.
DE KNECHT v. BAUTISTA
F: Around 1970, Department of Public Works and
Communications prepared a plan to extend EDSA to Roxas
Boulevard. The original proposal set the extension to pass
through Cuneta Avenue, a straight route. In 1974, Sec of
Dept. of Public Highways directed the city engineer to not
issue temporary or permanent permits for the construction or
improvement of building located within the proposed
extension of Cuneta Avenue. Shortly thereafter, Dept. of
Public Highways decided to make the extension go through
Fernando Reign and Del Pan streets- lined with old substantial
houses. The owners of the residential houses filed a formal
petition to Pres. Marcos to ask him to order the Ministry of
Public Highways to stick to the original plan. Human
Settlements Commission investigated upon presidential orders
and recommended that the original plan be stuck with.
HOWEVER, Ministry ignored the report and
recommendation.
1979, the government filed in the Court of First Instance
presided by respondent Judge Bautista, a complaint for
expropriation against the owners of the houses standing along
Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets, among them the herein
petitioner.
-Petitioner filed for motion to dismiss. Yet the judge issued a
writ of possession.
-Petitioner claims: The choice of property must be
examined for bad faith, arbitrariness or capriciousness and due
process requires determination as to whether or not the
proposed location was proper in terms of the public interests.
Respondents answer to the sudden change: It may be
conceded that the Cuneta Avenue line goes southward and
outward (from the city center) while the Del Pan Fernando
Rein Streets line follows northward and inward direction. It
must be stated that both lines, Cuneta Avenue and Del Pan
Fernando Rein Streets lines, meet satisfactorily planning and
design criteria and therefore are both acceptable. In selecting
the Del Pan - Fernando Rein Streets line the Government did
not do so because it wanted to save the motels located along
Cuneta Avenue but because it wanted to minimize the social
impact factor or problem involved."
-
I: W/N the choice was arbitrary.
H: YES.
- It is recognized, however, that the government may not
capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private property should
be taken.
- "It is obvious then that a landowner is covered by the mantle
of protection due process affords. It is a mandate of reason. It
frowns on arbitrariness, it is the antithesis of any governmental
act that smacks of whim or caprice. It negates state power to
act in an oppressive manner. It is, as had been stressed so
often, the embodiment of the sporting idea off air play. In that
sense, it stands as a guaranty of justice. That is the standard
that must be met by any governmental agency in the exercise
of whatever competence is entrusted to it. As was so
emphatically stressed by the present Chief Justice, Acts of
Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due
process only under pain of nullity, . . . .' "
- "With due recognition then of the power of Congress to
designate the particular property to be taken and how much
thereof may be condemned in the exercise of the power of
expropriation, it is still a judicial question whether in the
exercise of such competence the party adversely affected is the
victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection
clause will not allow."
-The Human Settlements Commission reported: that the
right-of-way acquisition cost difference is minimal. The factor
of functionality militates strongly against the selection of
alignment 2 while the factor of great social and economic
impact bears grieviously on the residents of alignment 1.
-From all the foregoing, the facts of record and
recommendations of the Human Settlements Commission, it is
clear that the choice of Fernando Rein Del Pan Streets as
the line through which the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue
should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and
should not receive judicial approval.
MANOTOK v. NHA
F: Two presidential decrees are being assailed. PD 1669 which
pro vides for the expropriation of the property known as the
"Tambunting Estate" and PD 1670 which provides for the
expropriation of the property along the Estero de Sunog-
Apog. In both cases, the petitioners maintain that the two
decrees are unconstitutional and should be declared null and
void for it deprives petitioners of their properties without due
process, just compensation, and right to equal protection.
-1977, the presient issued a Letter of Instruction No.555
instituting a nationwide slum improvement and resettlement
program. No.557 was for slum improvement as a national
housing policy. Pursuant to LOI No. 555, Manila issued EO
6-77 adopting the Metropolitan Manila Zonal Improvement
Program which included the properties known as the
Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area which the NHA
described as blighted communities.
- 1978, a fire razed almost the entire Tambunting Estate.
Following this calamity, the President and the Metro Manila
Governor made public announcement that the national
government would acquire the property for the fire victims.
The President also designated the NHA to negotiate with the
owners of the property for the acquisition of the same. This,
however, did not materialize as the negotiations for the
purchase of the property failed.
-1978, the President issued Proclamation No. 1810 declaring
all sites identified by the Metro Manila local governments and
approved by the Ministry of Human Settlements to be
included in the ZIP upon proclamation of the President. The
Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area were among the
sites included.
-1980, the President issued the challenged Presidential Decrees
Nos. 1669 and 1670, which respectively declared the
Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area expropriated
-JUST COMPENSATION STIPULATIONS: For
Tambunting: P17,000,000.00 which shall be payable to the
owners within a period of five (5) years in five (5) equal
installments.
Sunog-Apog: P8,000,000.00, which shall be payable to the
owners within a period of five (5) years in five equal
installments.
-1980, the National Housing Authority, through its general-
manager, wrote the Register of Deeds of Manila, furnishing it
with a certified copy of P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670 for
registration, with the request that the certificates of title
covering the properties in question be cancelled and new
certificates of title be issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.
-Register of Deeds needs the certificates of title of the
properties for the implementation.
-NHA contacted petitioners and said that they have deposited
5M in PNB and that she is free to withdraw her share in the
properties upon surrender by her of the titles pertaining to her
properties. If she does not avail, NHA will take legal steps
against her.
-Manotok says that the amounts fixed by the decrees do not
constitute just compensation.
- In the meantime, some officials of the NHA circulated
instructions to the tenants-occupants of the properties in
dispute not to pay their rentals to the petitioners for their
lease-occupancy of the properties in view of the passage of
P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670. Hence, the owners of the
Tambunting Estate filed a petition to declare P.D. No. 1669
unconstitutional. The owners of the Sunog-Apog area also
filed a similar petition attacking the constitutionality of P.D.
No. 1670.
I: 1. W/N the Presidential Decrees afforded the petitioners
judicial review of the decision
H: 1. NO. Not only are the owners given absolutely no
opportunity to contest the expropriation, plead their side, or
question the amount of payments fixed by decree, but the
decisions, rulings, orders, or resolutions of the NHA are
expressly declared as beyond the reach of judicial review.
-There was a disregard in the decree for Section 2 of Rule 67
which requires the court having jurisdiction over the
proceedings to promptly ascertain and fix the provisional value
of the property for purposes of the initial taking or entry by the
Government into the premises.
-The due process clause cannot be rendered nugatory every
time a specific decree or law orders the expropriation of
somebody's property and provides its own peculiar manner of
taking the same. Neither should the courts adopt a hands-off
policy just because the public use has been ordained as existing
by the decree or the just compensation has been fixed and
determined beforehand by a statute.
Dohany v Rogers: "The due process clause does not
guarantee to the citizen of a state any particular form or
method of state procedure. Under it he may neither claim a
right to trial by jury nor a right of appeal. Its requirements are
satisfied if he has reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
present his claim or defense, due regard being had to the
nature of the proceeding and the character of the rights which
may be affected by it.
- IN OTHER WORDS, ALTHOUGH DUE PROCESS
DOES NOT ALWAYS NECESSARILY DEMAND THAT
A PROCEEDING BE HAD BEFORE A COURT OF LAW,
IT STILL MANDATES SOME FORM OF PROCEEDING
WHEREIN NOTICE AND REASONABLE
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ARE GIVEN TO THE
OWNER TO PROTECT HIS PROPERTY RIGHTS. WE
AGREE WITH THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS THAT
THERE ARE EXCEPTIONAL SITUATIONS WHEN, IN
THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN, THE REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS
MAY NOT NECESSARILY ENTAIL JUDICIAL
PROCESS. BUT WHERE IT IS ALLEGED THAT IN
THE TAKING OF A PERSON'S PROPERTY, HIS
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW HAS BEEN
VIOLATED, THE COURTS WILL HAVE TO STEP IN
AND PROBE INTO SUCH AN ALLEGED VIOLATION.
- "With due recognition then of the power of Congress to
designate the particular property to be taken and how much
thereof may be condemned in the exercise of the power of
expropriation, it is still a judicial question whether in the
exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is the
victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection
clause will not allow."
-THE BASIS FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN IS NECESSITY.
- In the instant petitions, there is no showing whatsoever as to
why the properties involved were singled out for expropriation
through decrees or what necessity impelled the particular
choices or selections. In expropriations through legislation,
there are, at least, debates in Congress open to the public,
scrutiny by individual members of the legislature, and very
often, public hearings before the statute is enacted.
-The Tambunting estate is a valuable commercial property
with a multi-million company fronting its entrance.
-The Sunog-Apog area shows a well-developed area
subdivided into residential lots with either middle-income or
upper class homes. There are no squatters. The area is well-
developed with roads, drainage and sewer facilities, water
connections to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System, electric connections to Manila Electric Company, and
telephone connections to the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company.
-The decrees, do not by themselves, provide for any form of
hearing or procedure by which the petitioners can question the
propriety of the expropriation of their properties or the
reasonableness of the just compensation. Having failed to
provide for a hearing, the Government should have filed an
expropriation case under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of
Court but it did not do so. Obviously, it did not deem it
necessary because of the enactment of the questioned decrees
which rendered, by their very passage, any questions with
regard to the expropriation of the properties, moot and
academic. In effect, the properties, under the decrees were
"automatically expropriated." This became more evident
when the NHA wrote the Register of Deeds and requested her
to cancel the certificate of titles of the petitioners, furnishing
said Register of Deeds only with copies of the decrees to
support its request.
-ON THE JUST COMPENSATION AND THE COURTS
APPLICATION: the market value stated by the city assessor
alone cannot substitute for the court's judgment in
expropriation proceedings. It is violative of the due process
and the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution to deny
to a property owner the opportunity to prove that the
valuation made by a local assessor is wrong or prejudiced.
OTHER INVALID STIPULATIONS:
- The provision of P.D. 1669 an 1670 which allows NHA, at
its sole option, to put portions of the expropriated area to
commercial use in order to defray the development costs of its
housing projects cannot stand constitutional scrutiny.
REPUBLIC v. DE KNECHT
F: Regarding the previous De Knecht case on the EDSA
extension.
- On August 8, 1981 defendants Maria Del Carmen Roxas
Vda. de Elizalde, Francisco Elizalde and Antonio Roxas
moved to dismiss the expropriation action in compliance with
the dispositive portion of the aforesaid decision of this Court
which had become final and in order to avoid further damage
to same defendants who were denied possession of their
properties. The Republic filed a manifestation on September
7, 1981 stating, among others, that it had no objection to the
said motion to dismiss as it was in accordance with the
aforestated decision.
- 1983, the Republic filed a motion to dismiss said case due to
the enactment of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 340 expropriating
the same properties and for the same purpose. The lower court
in an order of September 2, 1983 dismissed the case by reason
of the enactment of the said law. The motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied in the order of the lower
court dated December 18, 1986.
-De Knecht appealed from said order to the Court of Appeals
wherein in due course a decision was rendered on December
28, 1988, 2 the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order appealed from is hereby
SET ASIDE. As prayed for in the appellant's brief another Order is
hereby issued dismissing the expropriation proceedings (Civil Case
No. 51078) before the lower court on the ground that the choice of
Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets as the line through which the
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue should be extended is arbitrary and
should not receive judicial approval.
No pronouncement as to costs."
-Hence the Republic filed that herein petition for review of the
aforestated decision.
I: 1. W/N BP BLG. 340 is the proper fround for the dismissal
of the expropriation case. (if lower court erred in dismissing
case upon judicial notice of BP. BLG. 340)
2. W/N DPWHs choice of land to be expropriated is still an
issue under the circumstance (since the said choice has been
supplanted by the legislatures choice)
3.W/N the law of the case theory should be applied.
H: CHECK PRINTED COPY
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.
HOME BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOC. v.
BLAISELL
F:
I:
H:
-see copy
RUTTER v. ESTEBAN
F: 1941, Rutter sold to Esteban 2 parcels of land in anila for
9.6K and of which P4,800 were paid outright, and the balance
of P4,800 was made payable as follows: P2,400 on or before
August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943,
with interest at the rate of 7 per cent per annum.
-Of which P4,800 were paid outright, and the balance of
P4,800 was made payable as follows: P2,400 on or before
August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943,
with interest at the rate of 7 per cent per annum.
-To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first
mortgage over the same parcels of land has been constituted in
favor of the plaintiff. The deed of sale having been registered,
a new title was issued in favor of Placido J. Esteban with the
mortgage duly annotated on the back thereof.
-esteban defaulted in the 2 installments as well as the interest
that accrued.
-This case was instituted to collect the remaining balance as
well as the liquidation of the properties mortgaged.
-Esteban claims this is a pre-war obligation contracted on
August 20, 1941; that he is a war sufferer, having filed his
claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission for the
losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last war; and
that under section 2 of said Republic Act No. 342, payment of
his obligation cannot be enforced until after the lapse of eight
years from the settlement of his claim by the Philippine War
Damage Commission, and this period has not yet expired.
-The court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint
holding that the obligation which plaintiff seeks to enforce is
not yet demandable under the moratorium law.
- The only question to be determined hinges on the validity of
Republic Act No. 342 which was approved by Congress on
July 26, 1948. It is claimed that this act if declared applicable
to the present case is unconstitutional being violative of the
constitutional provision forbidding the impairment of the
obligation of contracts (Article III, section 1, Constitution of
the Philippines).
I: W/N RA 342 is unconstitutional
H: YES.
-Statutes declaring a moratorium on the enforcement of
monetary obligations are not of recent enactment. These
moratorium laws are not new. "For some 1,400 years western
civilization has made use of extraordinary devices for saving
the credit structure, devices generally known as moratoria.
The moratorium is a postponement of fulfillment of
obligations decreed by the state through the medium of the
courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of the
sovereign power."
- Thus, such laws "were passed by many state legislatures at
the time of the civil war suspending the rights of creditors for a
definite and reasonable time, . . . whether they suspend the
right of action or make dilatory the remedy."
- The true test, therefore, of the constitutionality of a
moratorium statute lies in the determination of the period of
suspension of the remedy. It is required that such suspension
be definite and reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of
the constitution.
- This argument, however, does not now hold water. While
this may be conceded, it is however justified as a valid exercise
by the State of its police power.
- HOME BUILDING AND LOAD ASSN.: "Although
conceding that the obligations of the mortgage contract were
impaired, the court decided that what it thus described as an
impairment was, notwithstanding the contract clause of the
Federal Constitution, within the police power of the State as
that power was called into exercise by the public economic
emergency which the legislature had found to exist". This
theory was upheld by the Supreme Court. Speaking through
Chief Justice Hughes, the court made the following
pronouncements:
"Not only is the constitutional provision qualified by the
measure of control which the State retains over remedial
processes, but the State also continues to possess authority to
safeguard the vital interest of its people. It does not matter that
legislation appropriate to that end 'has the result of modifying
or abrogating contracts already in effect.' . . . Not only are
existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as
between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes
of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of
the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against
impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by
virtue of which contractual relations are worth while, a
government which retains adequate authority to secure the
peace and good order of society. This principle of harmonizing
the constitutional prohibition with the necessary residuum of
state power has had progressive recognition in the decisions of
this court."
- "The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise
of its continuing and dominant protective power
notwithstanding interference with contracts. . . . "
- "Similarly, where the protective power of the State is
exercised in a manner otherwise appropriate in the regulation
of a business it is no objection that the performance of existing
contracts may be frustrated by the prohibition of injurious
practices. . . . "
" . . . The question is not whether the legislative action affects
contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the
legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures
taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end. . . . "
- But the ruling in the Blaisdell case has its limitations which
should not be overlooked in the determination of the extent to
be given to the legislation which attempts to encroach upon
the enforcement of a monetary obligation. It must be noted
that the application of the reserved power of the State to
protect the integrity of the government and the security of the
people should be limited to its proper bounds and must be
addressed to a legitimate purpose. If these bounds are
transgressed, there is no room for the exercise of the power, for
the constitutional inhibition against the impairment of
contracts would assert itself.
- We can site instances by which these bounds may be
transgressed. One of them is that:
the impairment should only refer to the remedy and not
to a substantive right
The State may postpone the enforcement of the
obligation but cannot destroy it by making the remedy
futile
Another limitation refers to the propriety of the remedy.
The rule requires that the alteration or change that the new
legislation desires to write into an existing contract must not
be burdened with restrictions and conditions that would
make the remedy hardly pursuing.
-THE POLICE POWER, MAY ONLY BE INVOKED AND
JUSTIFIED BY AN EMERGENCY, TEMPORARY IN
NATURE, AND CAN ONLY BE EXERCISED UPON
REASONABLE CONDITIONS IN ORDER THAT IT
MAY NOT INFRINGE THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION AGAINST IMPAIRMENT OF
CONTRACTS
-The purpose of the law is to afford to prewar debtors an
opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving them a
reasonable time within which to pay their prewar debts so as
to prevent them from being victimized by their creditors.
- But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations
had been pending since 1945 as a result of the issuance of
Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their
enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of
Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable
during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to
afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which
in plain language means that the creditors would have to
observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before they could
effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as
1941.
-WHEN MORATORIUM LAWS ARE VIOLATIVE:
-W. B. Worthen Co. vs. Thomas: "without limitation as to
amount or restriction with respect to particular circumstances
or relations, of all monies paid or payable to any resident of
the state under any life, sick, accident or disability insurance
policy, from liability for the payment of the debts of the
recipient", and an attempt was made to apply the statute to
debts owing before its approval. The court held that "such an
exemption, applied in the case of debts owing before the
exemption was created by the legislature, constitutes an
unwarranted interference with the obligation of contracts in
violation of the constitutional provision",
- W. B. Worthen vs. Kavanaugh: "changes in the remedies
available for the enforcement of a mortgage may not, even
when the public welfare is invoked as an excuse, be pressed so
far as to cut down the security of a mortgage without
moderation or reason or in a spirit of oppression. . . . A State is
free to regulate the procedure in its courts even with reference
to contracts already made, and moderate extensions of the
time for pleading or for trial will ordinarily fall within the
power so reserved; but a different situation is presented when
extensions are so piled up as to make the remedy a shadow."
- Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank vs. Radford: "property
rights of holders of farm mortgages are unconstitutionally
taken

- We do not need to go far to appreciate this situation. We can

see it and feel it as we gaze around to observe the wave of
reconstruction and rehabilitation that has swept the country
since liberation thanks to the aid of America and the innate
progressive spirit of our people. This aid and this spirit have
worked wonders in so short a time that it can now be safely
stated that in the main the financial condition of our country
and our people, individually and collectively, has practically
returned to normal notwithstanding occasional reverses caused
by local dissidence and the sporadic disturbance of peace and
order in our midst.

ABELLA v. NLRC
F:
I:
H:

PRESLEY v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOC.

F:
I:
H:

MINERS ASSOC v. FACTORAN

F:
I:
H:

ORTIGAS v. FEATI BANK

F:
I:
H:

SWS v. COMELEC (supra)