Garcia vs COMELEC, GR 216691, July 21, 2015

Is Federico vs Comelec a precedent in this to justify substitution?

The Board shall generate and print sufficient copies of the COCP and one (1) copy of the SOV to
be distributed as follows: a. MBOC/CBOC 1. To the Election Records and Statistics Department
(ERSD) of the Commission; 2. To be posted on the bulletin board of the municipal hall,
supported by SOVP; 3. To the Chairman, MBOC/CBOC; 4. To the Secretary, Sangguniang
Bayan/Panlungsod; 5. To the Municipal Treasurer; 6. To a winning Candidate for Mayor;
Winning Candidate for Vice Mayor; and 7. To each winning Candidate for members of the
Sangguniang Bayan/Panlungsod. (emphasis added) The wording of the aforequoted rule is
pregnant with meaning. First, its literal interpretation is that only the winning candidates have the
demandable right to be furnished a copy of the COCP. Second, it amplifies the general rule that
the prescriptive period ought to be reckoned from the actual date of proclamation, not from
notice through service of a COCP, since the losing candidates are not even required to be served
a copy of the COCP in the first place. Lastly, it warns the candidates to be more vigilant in
monitoring the results of the elections for them to be conscious of the deadline for filing an
election protest, should they opt to contest the results. In sum, the Court maintains the general
rule that the reglementary period for instituting an election protest should be reckoned from the
actual date of proclamation, not from the date of notice. Absent any circumstances analogous to
the factual milieu of Federico v. Comelec, 689 SCRA 134 (2013), a relaxation of the rules will
not be warranted.

Engle vs COMELEC, GR 215995, Jan. 19, 2016

Did Engle validly substitute his deceased husband inspite of the challenge on the latters CONA?

The COMELEC En Banc in its Resolution dated January 20, 2015 asserted that it cannot ignore
Lakas-CMD's non-compliance with Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9518 since the
COMELEC En Banc issued Minute Resolution No. 12-1133 dated December 11, 2012 applying
said provision strictly against the Liberal Party in the case of its local candidates for Camiguin
who were similarly declared independent candidates for failure to submit the authority to sign
CONAs before October 1, 2012. While we laud the COMELEC's attempt to apply the rule
equally among the political parties, it has only itself to blame for the present situation. It bears
stressing here that election rules regarding formal matters are deemed mandatory before the
elections and only directory after the elections. In the case of the Liberal Party candidates in
Camiguin, the COMELEC En Banc rendered a formal ruling on their status as independent
candidates, months before the election, such that the Liberal Party was officially notified that its
candidates in Camiguin can no longer be substituted in the event of their death, withdrawal or
disqualification. Thus, the mandatory application of the rules was justified. In petitioner's case,
no official pronouncement was made by the COMELEC regarding her husband's status as an
independent candidate and the validity of her filing a COC as his substitute until July 5, 2013,
long after the elections were held. Indeed, it behooved the COMELEC to similarly resolve
petitioner's case prior to the elections had it wanted to treat all political parties equally.

In light of the foregoing discussion that petitioner may validly substitute her husband in the May
13, 2013 Elections, it is no longer necessary to resolve the third issue on whether the COMELEC
properly proclaimed private respondent, the second-placer in the vice-mayoral race of
Babatngon, in place of petitioner, as well as the rest of the issues raised in the pleadings

UTAK vs COMELEC, GR No. 206020, April 14, 2015

Does the power of the COMELEC to regulate franchgise extend to regulating the posting of
campaign materials on PUVs, Private Vehicles and transport Materials?

No. The prohibition under the certain provisions of RA 9615 are content-neutral regulations
since they merely control the place where election campaign materials may be posted, but the
prohibition is repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for
a valid content-neutral regulation.

The restriction on free speech of owners of PUVs and transport terminals is not necessary to a
stated governmental interest. First, while Resolution 9615 was promulgated by the COMELEC
to implement the provisions of Fair Elections Act, the prohibition on posting of election
campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals was not provided for therein. Second, there
are more than sufficient provisions in our present election laws that would ensure equal time,
space, and opportunity to candidates in elections. Hence, one of the requisites of a valid content-
neutral regulation was not satisfied.