1.CHEM.E. SYMPOSIUM SERIES NO.

110

EXPLOSION & FIRE AT A PHENOL PLANT

R F SCHWAB*

PHENOL PLANT EXPLOSION

March 9, 1982 (3.03 p.m.),

On March 9, 1982, Tank 412 containing 25,000 gallons of 50% cumene

hydroperoxide exploded. The resultant eruption and spill completely engulfed
Phenol Unit 1 in flames, set fire to a nearby 500,000 No.6 fuel oil tank,
plus a nearby tank farm. It severely damaged Unit 3 (which was next to it)
setting fire to one of the oxidizers in Unit 3. Phenol Unit 1, was almost
completely destroyed. The last of the fire was extinguished the following
morning.

Phenol Unit 2, which was only slightly damaged during the episode was back
in production about a month later. The rebuilt and redesigned Phenol Unit 3
returned to production in August 1983.

How it all Began

This episode began about 8.30 a.m., on March 9, 1982, when Boiler No.3
suffered failure in its fuel oil feed flow control and shut down completely.
This left only Boiler No.1 in service since Boiler No.2 was down at the time
for routine maintenance. Since Boiler No.1 was not able to sustain the plant,
Phenol Unit 1 and Unit 3 went into the stand-by mode.

Phenol Unit 1, was not in operation. However, Phenol 1 process structure

contained the preflasher unit which concentrates CHP from 31% in the last
oxidizer stage to 51% CHP before going to the flash columns (One in each
Process structure). This preflasher was in operation servicing the flash
columns in Units 2 and 3.

Once the Steam supply was restored from Boiler 3, Phenol Unit 2 started up
again without difficulty. However, the operators experienced some difficulty
in restarting Unit 3 flashcolumn since they could not establish vacuum.
During the attempts to establish vacuum in Unit 3 flash column, the bottoms
from this tower were being circulated to Tank M412 (located in Unit 1). The
steam valve for Unit 3 flash column reboiler leaked a significant amount of
steam which resulted in heating the flash column reboiler contents (a fact
that was not known to the operators at the time). Later investigation
clearly indicated that the leak was due to a valve casting defect. This
steam control valve had been in service for several years. During the
attempts to establieh the flash column vacuum, the bottoms were being
constantly recirculated to Tank M412, located in Phenol Unit 1. It was
established by the temperature recording devices that there was a slow rise
in temperature in Tank M412 from about 9.00 a.m. to the time of the explosion.

Manager, Process Safety & Loss Prevention, Allied-Signal Inc.

 1.CHEM.E. SYMPOSIUM SERIES NO. 110

Supervisors who were in and out of the control room all morning trying to
restart the flash column in Unit 3 paid little attention to the Unit 1
controls because Unit 1 was not operating. The operator who was supposed to
be tracking levels and temperatures of the operating equipment,inUnit 1
(including the preflasher) apparently did not track those temperatures and
levels.
Further, the day after the explosion, the investigating team found the high
temperature alarm on the multipoint recorder disconnected. We could not
establish who did this or why. It was exceptionally easy for the alarm
switch to become disconnected.

It should be noted that temperatures in Tank M412 are normally between

70-80 C and they were in that area at 10.00 a.m. At 3.00 p.m., the
temperature was recorded at 149 g. We now believe that we had already lost
control of the temperatures in this tank at about 1.30 to 2.00 p.m. and we
didn't know it.

At about 2.55 p.m., several witnesses noted Tanks M409, 410, 411 and 412,
which were all manifolded together, were venting "steamt'which was actually
cumene. Shortly before the explosion the relief valves on these tanks
lifted. The vent condenser, which services all 4 of these tanks was observed
to be discharging cumene vapor. A number of supervisors took action by
shutting down the preflasher, but events proved that it was too late. The
cumene vapor cloud rapidly engulfed Unit 1, part of Unit 3 and the tank farm
area. It found an ignition source and ignited. Seconds later the rapid
pressure build-up in Tank M412 caused the tank to fail at the bottom seam.
Part of Tank M412 thrown into Unit 1. A cone bottom separator tank next to
it was pulled from its foundation and thrown through several pumps and the
sprinkler riser for Unit 1.

Apparently, a significant amount of liquid CHP-Cumene was thrown 250 ft. to

the top of the main No. 6 Fuel Oil Tank setting it afire. Another "glob"
of liquid was thrown into tank farm 3, setting several tanks on fire.
Debris was thrown throughout the plant, some pieces of steel landing on
Interstate Highway 95 and in the Frankford Arsenal.

The violent rupture of Tank 412 can technically be called a thermal explosion
which can be defined as the exothermic decomposition of a confined unstable
material throughout its entire mass due to self heating. In this particular
case we had a situation where the cumene hydroperoxide solution was
decomposing throughout the entire day at a constantly increasing rate with
the temperature of the tank contents constantly rising until the pressure
build-up eventually resulted in a violent vessel failure.
The results of this tank failure resulted in a mild positive pressure pulse
followed by negative pressure wave. This was clearly illustrated by such
phenomena as an overhead door off of its tracks in the utility building
approximately 350 ft. away from Tank M412. Various valves and pieces of steel
were thrown surprisingly long distances. For example, several pieces were
thrown some 1200-1300 feet into the neighbouring US Government Arsenal
(Frankford Arsenal). Valves, other debris of some weight were found as far
as 600-700 feet from Tank M412. This included a number of pieces which
were found on 1-95 which passes adjacent to this facility.

Despite the extent of the incident there were no fatalities and no serious
injuries. There were a few minor lacerations, twisted knees and
hypertension problems.
 1.CHEM.E. SYMPOSIUM SERIES NO. 110

The emergency response system of the plant worked very well. There were a
total of 4 fire pumps in this plant. The two oldest were a steam turbine
driven 1500 gpm, 125 psi unit and an electric driven 1500 gpm, 125 psi pump
taking suction from a 6000,000 gallon tank filled automatically by the city
water mains. The electric driven unit operated continuously thwgkut the
-
emergency despite the fact that the transformer supplying power to the pump
was across the street from Unit 1, less than 100 feet from tank M412. Since
the steam supply for the plant was lost immediately we did not have the
services of the steam turbine in this emergency.
There were two relatively new diesel driven 2500 gpm fire pumps, one taking
suction from a 500,000 gallon tank (automatically filled from the city water
mains) which was emptied in 2 hours. The automatic,fillarrangement couldn't
keep up because water being taken from the city mains by fire fighting
efforts depleted the pressure. The second 2500 gpm diesel driven pump took
suction from a 20" city main and operated continuously- the emergency
though its fuel tank had to be refilled several times.

Despite the fact that we had a broken 6" sprinkler riser, and had numerous
monitor nozzles and hose streams in action, plus several operating sprinkler
systems in Units 2 B 3 we were able to maintain 70-80 psi in the fire
underground. The fire department connected several pumping units to the plant
fire mains which kept pressures at the proper levels. The Philadelphia Fire
Department responded promptly with 28 pieces of apparatus. In addition the
plant had two foam trucks which were effectively used.

The fire was declared under control at 12.30 a.m. (3/10/82) and was
extinguished about 10.00 8.m. (3/10/82).

Prevention of a Recurrence:

After this disaster several steps were taken to insure that this would not
happen again. One of the primary moves was the elimination of surge storage
capacity which in effect significantly reduced the inventory of flammable
-
liquids (cumene CHP) within the operating structures. In addition several
of the older smaller oxidizing tanks were taken out of the structure which
also reduced the inventory.

Instrumentation and control of the process was modernized to "state of the

art" which gave the operators keep much better information about what was
happening in the process.

A comprehensive training program for operators was also instituted in which

all operators were thoroughly trained in the new control system. Since that
time all new operators must go through a structured training program which
assures us that they understand the operation of the process and that all
parts of their training are documented.

Phenol 1 was not rebuilt. The damaged structure was essentially removed
except for a small section which still services some distillation columns.
This effectively "opened up" the area and relieved congestion.