Risknis Rbireport Rge

www.risk-technologies.com ; www.stw.
de
Projekat:
Saradnja sa Naftnom industrijom Srbije
Collaboration with Petroleum Industry of Serbia
Project:
RiskNIS: Risk management and use of risk-based approaches
in inspection, maintenance and HSE analyses
of NIS a. d. plants
(http://www.risknis.risk-technologies.com/)
TECHNICAL REPORT
RBI STUDY
Gas Refinery Elemir (RGE)
Version 1.0,
Status: Draft
Risk before
Risk after
Stuttgart
March 2009
STEINBEIS Foundation (www.stw.de) NIS-NAFTNA INDUSTRIJA SRBIJE (www.nis.yu)

Steinbeis Advanced Risk Technologies R-TECH
Contacts
Prof. Dr. A. S. Jovanovic, Director

Steinbeis Advanced Risk Technologies
Haus der Wirtschaft, Willi-Bleicher-Strae 19,
D- 70174 Stuttgart, Germany
Phone: +49 (711) 1839-781, +49 (172) 635 9190
Fax: +49 (711) 677 0605
E-mail: jovanovic@risk-technologies.com
www: www.risk-technologies.com
Prof. dr Petar Stanojevi,
NIS-Petroleum Industry of Serbia
Narodnog fronta 12, 21000 Novi Sad, Serbia
Phone: +381 (21) 481-2202, +381 (
Fax: +381 (21) 481 4485
E-mail: petar.stanojevic@nis.yu
www: www.nis.yu
Ms. Radmila Guntrum, dipl. ing,
Local Steinbeis office
Milentija Popovica 2, Novi Beograd
Phone: +381 (11) 311 2121, +381 (63) 889 1328
E-mail: guntrum@risk-technologies.com
RiskNIS RBI Qualitative Unit-Based page 2

Executive Summary
The overall proposed inspection plan for the equipment based on screening results (Table 10 API 581 qualitative risk
assessment results, for year 2009), shows overall reduction of almost 50% of equipment to be inspected pro year in
next 3 years.
On the other hand, about 10% of equipment has to be inspected more intensively with more adequate methods
and scope than it was practiced so far.
5 0 - 0%
4 D-101 D-102 2 - 2%
L C1A/B (potis) C1A/B

I D-1 T-3 T-4 T-6 T- T-1 T-101 T-2
3 (usis) C2A/B (potis) 14 - 14%
K 8 T-5 T-7
C2A/B (usis)
E
L
I D-103 D-104 D-11
D-27B D-27C D-27E
H D-111 D-112 D-12
E-10 E-102 E-103 E-
O D-120 D-121 D-
E-101/A E-101/B 104 E-11 E-110 E-
O 122 D-16 D-2 D-
E-1A/B E-20A FT- 113 E-116 E-12 E-
D 27A D-27D D-27F
103A FT-103B FT- 120 E-13 E-14 E-15
2 D-28A D-28B D- D-300 T-9 83 - 84%
104 FT-302 HP-1 E-16 E-17 E-18 E-19
28C D-28D D-28E
HP-2 JI-1 JI-2 PF- E-2 E-20B E-21 E-22
D-28F D-28G D-
1 PF-2 SP-1 E-23 E-24/A E-24/B
29A D-29B D-29C
E-25 E-3 E-4 E-5 E-
D-4 D-5 D-6 D-7
6A/B E-7 E-8 E-9
D-8 D-9 FT-301
1 0 - 0%
A B C D E
0 - 0% 15 - 15% 40 - 40% 36 - 36% 8 - 8% 99
CONSEQUENCES
Figure 1 Results of API Qualitative Analysis Component based applied on RGE equipment

5 0 - 0%
D-4 D-6 D-7 E-

D-5 E-102 E- 101/A E-101/B D-1 D-2 T-7 T-
4 18 - 72%
110 T-5 E-1A/B E-2 T-4 9
L
T-6 T-8
I
K
E
L
3 D-27A T-1 2 - 8%
I
H
O
O
D
2 D-300 T-101 T-2 D-102 T-3 5 - 20%
1 0 - 0%
A B C D E
0 - 0% 5 - 20% 14 - 56% 6 - 24% 0 - 0% 25
CONSEQUENCES
Figure 2 Preliminary results of API quantitative (detailed) Analysis Component based applied on selected RGE
equipment

Status of the current document

Draft, assumptions be verified by the RGE personnel and/or NIS responsible

Table of Contents
Contacts 2
Executive Summary ............................................... 3
Status of the current document ............................... 5
Table of Contents .................................................. 6
List of Figures ....................................................... 7
List of Tables ........................................................ 8
List of Acronyms.................................................... 9
Introduction......................................................... 10
Objective 10
Scope 10
Deliverables 10
METHODOLOGY .................................................... 11
RBI Methodology Overview .................................... 11
Preparation of Database ........................................ 11
HAZOP Study Procedure ........................................ 11
Identifying the Damage Mechanisms ....................... 15
Calculating the Likelihood of Failure ........................ 17
Calculating the Consequence of Failure.................... 18
Calculating the Risk .............................................. 18
Remaining Life Assessment ................................... 20
Developing an Inspection Plan ............................... 21
Performed activities and inputs ............................... 25

List of inputs 26
Unit and Process description .................................. 27

PFD Diagrams with line types................................. 30
HAZOP Analysis Results ......................................... 34
Conclusions and recommendations .......................... 52
References .......................................................... 53

List of Figures
Figure 1 Preliminary results of API Qualitative Analysis Component
based applied on prioritization of pump purchase for
selected RNP units .............................................. 3
Figure 2 HAZOP Study Workflow ....................................... 13
Figure 3 - Framework of RIMAP procedure within the overall

management system ......................................... 16
Figure 4 Methodology and application of detailed RBI .......... 17
Figure 5 CEN CWA 15740 (RIMAP) Risk Matrix .................... 19
Figure 6 NIS Risk matrix .................................................. 20
Figure 7 Web-based tool implementing API 581 Qualitative RBI

Workbook (English) ........................................... 25
Figure 8 Project web-site Member area .............................. 26
Figure 9: General view of RGE .......................................... 29
Figure 10 Overall PFD of RGE ........................................... 30
Figure 11 Overall PFD of RGE Part 1 of 3 ........................... 31
Figure 14 HAZOP Loop 1 .................................................. 34
Figure 15 Results of management system evaluation for RGE38
Figure 16 Risk matrix showing the position of the RGE in qualitative

unit analysis matrix ........................................... 39
Figure 17 API 581 Qualitative risk matrix for component level, for
year 2009 ........................................................ 41

List of Tables
Table 1 HAZOP Guide Words and Parameters ..................... 14
Table 2 Proposed action for different category of Likelihood Factor

...................................................................... 18
Table 3 Effectiveness of Inspection for General Thinning ...... 21
Table 4 Effectiveness of Inspection for Localized Thinning .... 22
Table 5 CUI for Carbon and Low Alloy Steels Inspection Categories
...................................................................... 22
Table 6 CUI for Stainless Steels Inspection Categories ......... 23
Table 7 Inspection Effectiveness for External Damage ......... 24
Table 8 Guidelines for Assigning Inspection Effectiveness for Furnace

Tube ............................................................... 24
Table 9 Management System Evaluation results with audit comments

...................................................................... 37
Table 10 API 581 qualitative risk assessment results, for year 2009
...................................................................... 41

List of Acronyms
Acronyms referred in the document are given below. Explanation of these acronyms can
be found from the text, where it is referred. Symbols used in the document are explained
in the text.
Term Definition
API American Petroleum Institute
CoF Consequence of failure
MTBF Mean Time Between Failure
NFPA National Fire Protection Association, USA
NDT Non-destructive testing/inspection
P&ID Process and Instrumentation Diagram
PoF Probability of failure
QRA Quantitative Risk Analysis
RBI Risk Based Inspection: methods to plan, implement and evaluate
inspections using risk based approach

Introduction
Objective
The objective of the study was to assess the risk profile of the RGE equipment through the application of the Risk
based inspection methodology and to prioritise equipment for inspection. Moreover, the goal was to demonstrate the
applicability of the overall approach to the NIS units.
Scope
The scope of the RBI study covered all the equipment items and related piping as originally agreed prior to the project.
The scope of work covered the following activities:
1. Understanding the system
This includes activities like HAZOP analysis, review of design assumptions, process flow diagrams, P& IDs,
survey of all maintenance, inspection documents (location, nature and criticality of flaws, thickness
measurements, corrosion rates etc.), repair and modification records, operating conditions, PSV settings,
stream data, materials of fabrication, vessel coating and insulation details. Review of financial data including
cost of plant shut down and averages cost of process plant.
2. Preparation of Simplified Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs) with all data essential to the RBI analysis of the
equipment items.
3. Development of corrosion circuits and determination of expert corrosion rates.
4. Data entry and analysis using Steinbeis R-Tech iRIS-Petrol software.
5. Preparation of documentation of corrosion rates and assessment of damage mechanisms and mode of failure.
6. Review of inspection records.
7. RBI analysis and results checking.
8. Preparation of RBI analysis report.
Deliverables
The deliverables of the RBI project include:
1) Database of equipment for the process units studied.
2) RBI analysis report for the units include the followings:
a) Six (6) sets of process flow diagrams showing the basic information used in the analysis.
b) Inspection plan guidelines for selected high risk items based on a plan period agreed with RGE. This
consist of tables and reports indicating the overall risk, likelihood and consequence factors, the
recommended inspection methods and coverage for each equipment item and the active or
potential damage mechanisms identified per equipment item.
c) The assumptions and conclusions of the RBI analysis.

METHODOLOGY
RBI Methodology Overview

It is commonly accepted that some inspection on the equipment and piping is necessary to validate the expected
condition of the items as well as to assure the integrity of the plant. However it is difficult to determine exactly how
much inspection effort is required. An RBI analysis assists to determine the required effort by providing three key
parameters, the likelihood of failure of the item, the consequence of failure of the item and the risk from the
combination of likelihood and consequence of failure. The purpose of a RBI analysis is to focus inspection activities on
those pieces of equipment where failure risks associated with an active damage mechanism are highest. The term risk
is a combination of the likelihood of failure and the consequence of failure.
It should be noted that releases have two main causes, one is failure due to material degradation, which can be
inspected for and the other is a system error, e.g. an operator error where inspection cannot assist.
Risk based inspection planning is a methodology (Figure 4 and Figure 5) which prioritizes inspection activities on the
basis of the actual risk reduction associated with each specific activity. It does this through the following steps:
Prepare a suitable database

Identify the main active damage mechanisms and possible scenaria HAZOP analysis
Perform qualitative Risk-based assessment according to the CEN CWA 15740.
Performed detailed analysis based on API RP BRD 581:2000
Calculate the likelihood of failure for each piece of equipment as function of the different damage mechanisms,
the rate of degradation and time in service.
Calculate the consequence of failure associated with each piece of equipment.
Combine the likelihood and the consequence numbers to calculate the risk associated with each piece of
equipment and rank the equipment according to the risk results.
Calculate the reductions achievable in the likelihood of failure through a suitable inspection program (This is
achieved by removing the uncertainty in the actual rate of degradation or condition of the item and thus
reducing the chance of failure).
Develop the inspection program based on the inspection costs versus the inspection benefits.
Preparation of Database
The summaries of process description and PFDs for the entire plant were first reviewed to obtain a preliminary
understanding of the process and the equipment functions. The equipment and piping items were identified from the
PFDs. Each item was entered in the master workspace in process order. This database was supported by piping
specifications, equipment data sheets, process stream compositions, operating conditions and other relevant
documents.
The preparation of this database was an extensive process. The datasheets in Excel format were used to gather the
data.
The key data are also marked on the PFDs for easy reference.
HAZOP Study Procedure

A HAZOP study is a formal technique to systematically examine the process design of a facility, with due regard for the
planned mode of operation, inspection and maintenance. A HAZOP has as aim to systematically examine a system
design, to identify potential hazards and operational problems from all possible causes, and to make judgements
whether planned design or operational safeguards are adequate, or if further mitigating actions are required.
A HAZOP study is performed by a HAZOP team, consisting of experienced engineers and operating personnel from
appropriate disciplines, facilitated by an independent chairman experienced in the use of the HAZOP methodology. The
team may include representation from both the design contractor and from their client who is to operate and maintain
the facility. Typically the team may include process engineers, project engineers, electrical & instrument engineers,
maintenance engineers and senior operating personnel. Other specialists may be drafted in to the meeting when
appropriate.
The HAZOP review is normally based on P&IDs of the planned facility, while PFDs, Cause and Effect Diagrams,
Hazardous Area Classification drawings and Layout Drawings may also be used to provide additional information.
During a HAZOP, the P&IDs will be broken down in to logical sub-systems (nodes), which may be a vessel, a line
interconnecting equipments, or some other logical sub-system.
The HAZOP technique involves the following steps:
1. Identify the node to be studied.

2. Define the design intent of the node and the normal operating parameters.
3. Apply a HAZOP deviation (e.g. NO/LESS FLOW) to the node.
4. Identify all possible causes for the deviation.
5. Identify for each cause all possible consequences, without regard for the safeguards in place.
6. Identify all available safeguards to prevent the cause or to limit the consequences.
7. Recommend any new safeguards where judged necessary.
8. Repeat steps 4 to 7, using the next HAZOP deviation.
9. Repeat steps 3 to 8 until all HAZOP deviations have been applied to the node.
10. Select the next node to be studied, repeating steps 1 to 9.
Steps 3 and 4 are repeated until all the guide-words have been applied and discussed and the team is satisfied that all
meaningful deviations have been considered. The team then goes back to Step 1 and repeats the process for the next
section or node. Figure 3illustrates the normal workflow of a HAZOP study.
Table 1gives the typical list of parameters, associated guidewords and their interpretations.
When a recommendation was proposed, the risk was ranked based on consequences and frequency, using the
COMPANY Risk Ranking Matrix.

Select a P&ID
Select a node/section
Describe the design

intentions and operation
requirements
Select a guideword
Brainstorm the potential

causes and consequences
Record findings in
Identify the safety HAZOP worksheets
measures in place
Not sufficient
Recommend improvement
measures
Yes
Assign responsible unit and

expected completion date
Yes
More guideword?
No
Yes
More node?
No
No
Yes
More P&ID Completed
Figure 3 HAZOP Study Workflow

Table 1 HAZOP Guide Words and Parameters
Deviations Interpretations
Guidewords Parameters
NO / LESS FLOW Flow rate is less than design/operational intent
MORE FLOW Flow rate is more than design/operational intent
AS WELL AS FLOW Another components also flows (e.g. contaminants)
PART OF FLOW One or more of the desired component flows are

missing
OTHER THAN FLOW The flow is not the product(s) intended (or wrong
grade/spec)
The flow is the wrong phase (e.g. liquid instead of

vapour)
REVERSE FLOW The flow is in the opposite direction to

normal/intent
NO/LESS PRESSURE The pressure is less than design/operational intent
MORE PRESSURE The pressure is more than design/operational intent
AS WELL AS PRESSURE Water hammer / reaction forces on elbows
REVERSE PRESSURE Excess vacuum (e.g. due to steam out / draining /

ejectors)
NO/LESS TEMPERATURE The temperature is less than design/operational

intent
MORE TEMPERATURE The temperature is more than design/operational

intent
NO/LESS LEVEL The level is less than design/operational intent
MORE LEVEL The level is more than design/operational intent
OTHER THAN CORROSION/EROSION External, process caused, dissimilar metals
OTHER THAN SPECS & BREAKS Location of spec breaks wrt maximum pressure /
temp / etc
FAILURE SERVICES
PROBLEMS STARTUP / SHUTDOWN
PROBLEMS MAINTENANCE
REQUIREMENTS INSPECTION
AVAILABILITY ACCESSIBILITY
ABNORMAL OPERATIONS
REQUIREMENTS / SAFETY SYSTEM

AVAILABILITY
SUPPLEMENTARY[1]
HIGH VACUUM
TENDENCY LIQUID CARRYOVER

Deviations Interpretations
Guidewords Parameters
MORE VIBRATION
ADEQUACY CONDITION MONITORING
PROBLEMS REACTION FOAMING
SOURCES IGNITION
VENTILATION LESS
RELIABILITY LOW
AVAILABILITY LIFTING EQUIPMENT
AVAILABILITY ONLINE MAINTAINABILITY
TRAINING HUMAN FACTORS
PROBLEMS SAMPLING
PROBLEMS DRAINING / VENTING
LOSS CONTAINMENT
PROBLEMS LAYOUT / ACCESS
PROBLEMS CONSTRUCTION
CONCERNS ENVIRONMENTAL
CONCERNS HEALTH
HIGH NOISE
HIGH RADIATION
HIGH VELOCITY
SEVERE CONDITIONS WEATHER
AVAILABILITY SPARE CAPACITY
AVAILABILITY HSE KITS
AVAILABILITY VENDOR SUPPORT
Identifying the Damage Mechanisms

In this study, the damage mechanisms of interest are those which develop over a period of time, gradually weakening
the pressure boundary integrity of components until failure is predicted.
These damage mechanisms include internal corrosion and external damage under insulation. Damage mechanisms for
the process units were identified based on supplied data, standard industry process knowledge and using the API Base
Resource Document together with R-Tech material and corrosion expertise.
The following inspectable active or potentially active damage mechanisms have been identified and the corrosion
circuits are also developed.
The potential damage mechanisms include:
External Damage (Corrosion under insulation) CUI
Internal thinning (generalized / Localized thinning)
Fatigue damage on the piping systems
Creep and other elevated temperature related damage mechanisms
Potential of brittle fracture in the process parts operating under temperatures below the ambient temperatures

Continuous
improvement and INITIAL ANALYSIS AND PLANNING
management change Objectives, system, criteria
Acceptance
Hazard identification
Redefinition of the
scope of analysis
Feedback
DATA COLLECTION AND VALIDATION
RISK SCREENING
Selection of systems, equipments, and components
Determination of possible failure modes and consequences
Integrity related,
Integrity related Safety system related or Functionality related
Functionality related?
Safety system related
RBI activities Safety system related RCM activities
Detailed Analysis Detailed Analysis

(Intermediate Levels) (Intermediate Levels)
Screening Analysis Screening Analysis
MULTILEVEL RISK ANALYSIS MULTILEVEL RISK ANALYSIS

Scenario (Structural failures) Scenario (Functional failures)
Probability of Failure (PoF) MTBF Assessment
Consequences of Failure (CoF) Probability of Failure (PoF)
Risk Consequences of Failure (CoF)
Risk
Risk acceptable? Mitigation measures

No
Yes
DECISION MAKING / ACTION PLAN

Operation review
Inspection planning
Monitoring
Maintenance planning
EXECUTION AND REPORTING
PERFORMANCE REVIEW / EVERGREEN PHASE

KPI Assessment
Evaluation reporting
Update periodically
Figure 4 - Framework of RIMAP procedure within the overall management system

The methodology and application of detailed RBI

Equipment Database containing the key data
Analys e the data
Apply Limit State Analysis and Reliability Index methods to calculate the
damage factors. Calculate inventories and consequences of failure
Consequences Likelihood Factors
Thinning CUI Cracking

Affected Area
Factor Factor Factor
Sum forward Sum forward
EQUIPMENT RISK RANKINGS:

Likelihood Item
Item Consequence GFF
Factor (sum) risk
Generic
Express ed as GFF modifier Cons * GFF *
Failure
an affected for each piec e Damage
Freq.
area of equipment Factor
no/y
Plan actions based on the results
ACTION PLANS:
Inspect: Other:
Inspection Other follow

- Prioritize items based on Risk and DF - Priorit ize actions based on Risk.
- Specify inspection methods based on This is aimed at items where the risk
the driving factor i.e. thinning, CUI etc. is driven purely by consequence and
and the location based on the not by an active damage mec hanism
equipment type / service. and may involve an upgade of
mitigation s ystems
Figure 5 Methodology and application of detailed RBI
Calculating the Likelihood of Failure

In this study the likelihood of failure of a piece of equipment or pipe is a direct function of the nature and rate of the
degradation mechanisms to which it is subjected. The essential steps are to:
Identify the damage mechanism(s)
Predict the rate of degradation
Assess the inspection history
Consider the age (Note - in this study a (5) years look ahead was made to give a risk profile for June 2012), this is to
identify equipment with risk that could exceed the inspection targets between the upcoming and the following plant
shut down).
When the likelihood of failure is being assessed, the calculation routine is based on the simple premise that unexpected
catastrophic failures occur when degradation happens faster than expected. The routine therefore looks at the what
if scenarios of the corrosion rate being either twice or even four times the predicted rate and calculates the likelihood
of failure compared with the operational conditions.
It also takes into account the current confidence in the condition based on the nature of the inspections previously
performed and their ability to characterise the extent and rate of the different damage mechanisms.

These factors are combined by the software to produce a value for the likelihood of failure for each damage
mechanism. This is expressed as a Likelihood Factor, which is a number to be applied to the generic failure frequency
of the particular item. If no damage mechanisms have been identified, the Likelihood Factor may be 0.5 indicating that
the component is 50% less likely to fail than the industry average for such components. If a severe damage
mechanism is found and the item has not been thoroughly inspected for some time the Likelihood Factor may be in the
thousands indicating that the component may be much more likely to fail than the industry average and that an
inspection is needed urgently.
The general approach is to address those items in the order of the decreasing Likelihood Factor, as indicated in Table 2.
Table 2 Proposed action for different category of Likelihood Factor
Likelihood Factor Value Action
Likelihood Factor >1000 Immediate action should be taken, prioritised by risk.

Select the highest risk item with a value in this range
and perform appropriate action. A first step should
always be careful checking of the input data for errors.
If this does not resolve the problem, a highly effective
inspection appropriate to the damage mechanism should
be performed.
100<Likelihood Factor<1000 Address these items next, again prioritising by risk.
10<Likelihood Factor<100 Address these items next, again prioritising by risk.
1<Likelihood Factor<10 Address these items last. Since values in this range
indicate a potential, but not necessarily severe, problem.
Action on these items may be delayed until all other
items have been addressed or until a convenient time,
such as a scheduled shutdown within the time frame
considered in the RBI analysis.
Calculating the Consequence of Failure

Based on the PFDs and discussion with the risk & process engineers, each item of equipment was assigned to an
inventory group. This group represents the fluid that could escape in the event of a leak at any one of the items in the
group. Each equipment item is then associated with two inventories, its own and the group inventory.
The consequences are calculated taking into account the nature and amount of the fluid released. The amount and
rate of fluid released depends upon factors such as the size of the hole, the fluid viscosity and density and the
operating pressure. The rupture of a large diameter high-pressure pipe or vessel obviously has a different
consequence than a pinhole leak at a small diameter low-pressure pipe and this method quantifies that difference.
Each piece of equipment or piping has a certain generic (industry average) probability of failing either by a pinhole type
leak, a medium size hole, a large hole or a rupture. The consequence of each type of failure is calculated and combined
with the probability for that failure; to calculate the overall risk associated with each piece of equipment.
Calculating the Risk

This is now a very simple step, where the risk associated with each piece of equipment is essentially given by the
formula:
RISK = Likelihood of Failure * Consequence of Failure
The risk is the combination of two key terms:
Likelihood of failure and
Consequence of failure
Understanding the two-dimensional aspect of risk allows new insight into the use of risk as an inspection prioritization
tool.
The consequences are calculated based on fluid properties, temperatures, pressures and inventory.
The likelihood is based on generic or average failure frequency data.

An analysis is then performed considering important failure mechanisms for each piece of equipment to determine if it
is more, or less likely to fail than average. The result is then used to modify the likelihood of failure in this study. The
consequence and the likelihood are then combined to give a risk value for each piece of equipment.
A high-risk item may be high risk due to either a high likelihood of failure or a low consequence of failure or conversely
a high consequence of failure and a low likelihood of failure.
An inspection program can only influence the value of the likelihood of failure, not the consequence. No matter how
much inspection is performed the consequence is unchanged.
Therefore, where a high-risk item is driven by the consequence value, other actions such as more precise analysis such
as Quantitative Risk Assessment and upgrading of mitigation system may be considered.
The overall ranking is then done according to the RIMAP risk matrix, shown in the Figure 6. Alternatively, the risk can
be represented in the NIS risk matrix, as shown in Figure 7.
<1
Very probable
year
>110-1 5 Very high risk
1-5 110-1 to
Examples of PoF scales
Probable 4 High risk

years 110-2
PoF category
5-10 110-2 to
Possible 3 Medium risk
years 110-3
10-50 110-3 to
Unlikely 2 Low risk
years 110-4
>100 (Very Low,

Very unlikely <110-4 1
years negligible risk)
CoF category
ptive
MTBF
PoF
Descri
A B C D E
Limited impact on Serious impact on
Warning issued Warning issued Temporary health
Health (Long term visibility) public health, threat public health, life
No effect Possible impact problems, curable
of chronical illness threatening illness
No aid needed First aid needed Temporary work Permanent work
Safety (Instant visibility) Fatality(ies)
Work disruption No work disability disability disability
Impact (e.g. spill) Minor impact On-site Off-site damage
Environment Negligible impact
contained (e.g. spill) damage Long term effect
Business () <10k 10-100 k 0.1-1 M 1-10 M >10 M
Security None On-site (Local) On-site (General) Off site Society threat
Image Loss None Minor Bad publicity Company issue Political issue
Public disruption None Negligible Minor Small community Large community
Examples of CoF scales
Figure 6 CEN CWA 15740 (RIMAP) Risk Matrix

Figure 7 NIS Risk matrix
Remaining Life Assessment

The remaining life for the equipment and piping items based on the hoop stress was performed according to the
recommendations given in the API 581 BRD, and Steinbes R-Tech Software iRIS-Petrol has been used for the analysis.
It accounts for both internal thinning and external corrosion rates. The remaining life is calculated as follows:
1) First, determine the Minimum Wall Thickness (tmin) to be used.
There are 3 options available for specifying this tmin:
using the Design Corrosion Allowance taken from design documents (which is a default option)
using User-defined Minimum Thickness taken from local codes or other considerations such as structural
stability.
using Calculated Minimum Thickness which is based on ASME code formula:
PR
t min
E jo int S 0.6 P
t allowance t original t min
2) Determine the Remaining Corrosion Allowance where:
Re mCorrAllow ( Initial Corrosion Allowance) (Total Wall Loss )

in which,
Initial Corrosion Allowance is determined from step (1)
and
Total Wall Loss = Internal Wall Loss + External Wall Loss

3) The Nominal Remaining Life is then calculated as follows:
NomRemLife = (RemCorrAllow) / (Total Corrosion Rate)
in which,
Total Corrosion Rate = Internal Thinning Rate + External Corrosion Rate
Steinbeis R-Tech iRIS-Petrol also provides an alternative calculation for remaining life known as the probabilistic
remaining life. It is based on a weighted average of the nominal remaining life for all possible thinning scenarios. For
internal thinning, 3 states are assumed and the probabilistic remaining life equation is as follows:
3
Probabilis tic Remaining Life ( Nominal Remaining Life)i X Pi
i 1
Whereby
State i = 1, is when the thinning rate is as given by the user
State i = 2, is when the thinning rate is 2 times the given rate
State i = 3, is when the thinning rate is 4 times the given rate
Pi is the probability of state i.
(Nominal Remaining Life)i is the remaining life calculated for state i.
A more complex equation is used when external thinning is included or where liner is involved.
Developing an Inspection Plan

The key piece of data for the development of an inspection plan is the Likelihood Factor. The Likelihood Factor for each
piece of equipment is a composite i.e.
Likelihood Factor (LF) = LFThinning + LFCUI(ClSCC) +
Since an inspection needs to be tailored to fit the particular type of damage expected at a particular piece of
equipment, the key considerations are:
High total Likelihood Factors
High overall risks
The Likelihood Factor per damage type.
Short or zero probabilistic remaining life.
As agreed with NIS, inspection planning targets are adopted for this inspection planning.
For each equipment item, the driving damage mechanism is identified for inspection. Based on the inspection planning
targets, the Likelihood Factor for the relevant driving damage mechanism is then reduced by assigning appropriate
number and effectiveness of inspection. This is generated by software as inspection.
The actual inspection scope to satisfy the assigned effectiveness is then developed based on API inspection guideline
for each relevant damage mechanisms, as given in the tables below.
Table 3 Effectiveness of Inspection for General Thinning
Inspection
Intrusive Non-intrusive
Effectiveness
Inspection Inspection
Category
A 50-100% examination of the surface 50-100% ultrasonic scanning coverage

Highly Effective (partial) internals removed) and (automated or manual) or profile
accompanied by thickness radiography
measurements
B Normally 20% examination (no Normally 20% ultrasonic scanning

Inspection
Effectiveness
Category
Usually Effective internals removed), and spot external coverage (automated or manual), or
ultrasonic thickness measurements profile radiography, or external spot
thickness (statistically validated)
C Visual examination without thickness 2-3% examination, spot external

Fairly Effective measurements ultrasonic thickness measurements, and
little or no internal visual examination
D External spot thickness readings only Several thickness measurements, and a

Poorly Effective documented inspection planning system
E No inspection Several thickness measurements taken

Ineffective only externally, and a poorly documented
inspection planning system
Table 4 Effectiveness of Inspection for Localized Thinning
Inspection
Effectiveness
Category
A 100% visual examination (with 50-100% coverage using automated

Highly Effective removal of internal packing, trays, ultrasonic scanning, or profile radiography
etc.) and thickness measurements in areas specified by a corrosion engineer
or other knowledgeable specialist
B 100% visual examination (with partial 20% coverage using automated ultrasonic
Usually Effective removal of the internals) including scanning, or 50% manual ultrasonic
manways, nozzles, etc. and thickness scanning, or 50% profile radiography in
measurements areas specified by a corrosion engineer or
other knowledgeable specialist
C Nominally 20% visual examination Nominally 20% coverage using automated

Fairly Effective and spot ultrasonic thickness or manual ultrasonic scanning, or profile
measurements radiography, and spot thickness
measurements at areas specified by a
corrosion engineer or other knowledgeable
specialist
D No inspection Spot ultrasonic thickness measurements

Poorly Effective or profile radiography without areas being
specified by a corrosion engineer or other
knowledgeable specialist
E No inspection Spot ultrasonic thickness measurements

Ineffective without areas being specified by a
corrosion engineer or other knowledgeable
specialist
Table 5 CUI for Carbon and Low Alloy Steels Inspection Categories
Inspection
Insulation Insulation Not
Effectiveness
Removed Removed
Category
Remove >95% of the insulation
A For the total surface area:
Highly Effective AND
>95% profile or real-time
visual inspection of the exposed radiography
surface area with follow-up by UT, RT
or pit gauge is required
B For the total surface area: For the total surface area:
Usually Effective
>95% external visual inspection prior >95% external visual inspection
to removal of insulation

Inspection
Insulation Insulation Not
Effectiveness
Removed Removed
Category
AND AND
remove >60% of total surface area of follow-up with profile or real
insulation including suspect areas time radiography of >60% of
total surface area of insulation
AND
including suspect areas
visual inspection of the exposed
or pit gauge as required
C For the total surface area: For the total surface area:
Fairly Effective
>95% external visual inspection prior >95% external visual inspection
AND
AND
follow-up with profile or real
remove >30% of total surface area of time radiography of >30% of
insulation including suspect areas total surface area of insulation
including suspect areas
AND
visual inspection of the exposed
>95% external visual inspection prior
D For the total surface area:
Poorly Effective
>95% external visual inspection
AND
AND
remove >5% of total surface area of
insulation including suspect areas follow-up with profile or real
time radiography of >5% of
AND
total surface area of insulation
visual inspection of the exposed including suspect areas
<5% insulation removal and inspection
E No inspection or ineffective
Ineffective OR inspection technique or <95% visual
inspection
no inspection or ineffective inspection
technique
Table 6 CUI for Stainless Steels Inspection Categories
Inspection Intrusive Non-intrusive

Effectiveness Inspection Inspection
Category
A For the total surface area: No inspection techniques yet available

Highly Effective meet requirements of "A".
>95% dye penetrant or eddy
current test with UT follow-up of
relevant indications.
B For the total surface area: For the total surface area:
Usually Effective
>60% dye penetrant or eddy >95% automated or manual
current testing with UT follow-up of ultrasonic scanning
all relevant indications.
OR
AE testing with 100% follow-up of
relevant indications.
C For the total surface area: For the total surface area:
Fairly Effective
all relevant indications.

Inspection Intrusive Non-intrusive

Effectiveness Inspection Inspection
Category
D For the total surface area: For the total surface area:
Poorly Effective
all relevant indications
OR
>60% radiographic testing
E Less than D effectiveness or no Less than D effectiveness or no
Ineffective inspection or ineffective inspection inspection or ineffective inspection
technique used technique used
Table 7 Inspection Effectiveness for External Damage
Inspection Effectiveness Inspection

Category
A Visual inspection of >95% of the exposed surface area with follow-up by UT, RT or
Highly Effective pit gauge as required
B Visual inspection of >60% of the exposed surface area with follow-up by UT, RT or
Usually Effective pit gauge as required
C Visual inspection of >30% of the exposed surface area with follow-up by UT, RT or
Fairly Effective pit gauge as required
D Visual inspection of >5% of the exposed surface area with follow-up by UT, RT or
Poorly Effective pit gauge as required
E Visual inspection of >5% of the exposed surface area with follow-up by UT, RT or
Ineffective pit gauge as required
Table 8 Guidelines for Assigning Inspection Effectiveness for Furnace Tube
Inspection Effectiveness Inspection

Category
A Visual inspection, UT thickness measurements of all tubes and strapping at UT

Highly Effective measurement locations. FMR at various locations
B Visual inspection, UT thickness measurements of all tubes

Usually Effective
C Visual inspection with UT thickness measurements of 75% of the tubes

Fairly Effective
D Visual inspection with spot UT measurements

Poorly Effective
E Visual
Ineffective

Performed activities and inputs

In order to be able to perform the given analysis, the following activities have taken place:
1. Training in RBI methodology and presentation of qualitative methods during the

Training RBI from October 30 to November 3 2006
2. First Certification RBI on November 27, 2006
3. Complete implementation of the qualitative assessment tool in a form of Web-based

software tool (see Figure 8)
4. Integration of the software tool in the project web site (Figure 9)

http://www.risknis.risk-technologies.com
5. Export facility in the software in order to allow offline completion of the

questionnaire (example of offline questionnaire is given in Error! Reference
source not found.)
6. Basic demonstration of the methodology and training in Stuttgart, December 2007,

O. Tot, D. Subotin
7. Data collection and assessment performed by NIS RGE team, extended with the
representatives of NIS, RNP and RNS in two sessions:
a. October 2008
b. December 2008
Figure 8 Web-based tool implementing API 581 Qualitative RBI Workbook (English)

Figure 9 Project web-site Member area
List of inputs
1. Input PFD diagrams from RGE
2. Description of the process and systems as discussed during the Workshop Dec. 2007
3. Detailed process analysis December 2008
4. Detailed data collection for the selected equipment types October and Dec. 2008
5. Answers to the NIS BRD questionnaire June 2007 March 2008
6. Management system evaluation, last performed in June 2008
7. Overview of inspection results for the given equipment Dec. 2008

Unit and Process description

Purpose of the unit/plant natural gas refining separation of the higher fractions of the carbon hydrates from the
lighter ones.
Inputs: natural gas
Outputs: refined gas, Propane 45 t/day, n-Butane 34 t/day, iso-Butane 38 t/day, Debutanised gasoline 60 t/day,
process oil 5 t/day and Gasoline Gt 4,2 t/day
Year of construction: 1963
Re-engineered and re-constructed for operations up to -23C in 1969.
Design life time- not given in the project documentation, most of the equipment has been designed according to the
ASME Section VIII, edition valid at the time of construction. This is equivalent to approx. ASME Section VIII, Division 1
according to the current standard edition. Re-qualification of the equipment to the latest code of construction (ASME)
has not been performed. Analysis of the design and qualification to the current regulation of pressure vessels in Serbia
has been performed on several occasions, mostly by the local Universities.
Elevation above see level: 80 m
Seismic zone: 7 (Mercalli), zone 3 according to API 581 classification.
Typical wind direction: NE-SW
Maximum soil load: 16 N/m2
Expected soil deformation: 6-10cm for 1,85 m depth of foundations
Underground water level: 4m below
Depth of soil freezing: 60 cm
Temperature range: 36 in summer to -30C in winter, corresponding to the -30 to -5 class in API 581
Wind loads (to be considered in strength calculations for equipment):
structures lower than 10 m: 687 N/m2
structures from 10-30 m: 803 N/m2
structures from 30-60m: 1003 N/m2
structures higher than 60m: 1177 N/m2
Snow weight: 740N/m2
Maximal rainfall in 24 hours: 120mm

Temperature zone: Temperate (rainfall between 500-1000 l/(m2 year)
Process stability: from 0-1 unplanned shutdowns per year, from 0-1 planned shutdowns per year. Process is very
stable
Detection systems: Process instrumentation i.e. high level of liquid propane detector, regulation and automation
system for operating parameter maintenance, security system AMOT for automatic shutdown of compressors,
high concentration of hydrocarbon detectors, 24 hour human supervision of the process parameters with
hand logging and hourly walk-around, local detectors, visual detection.

Insulation systems: Most of the insulation systems are manually activated, on the spot. The only exception is the
AMOT system for automatic shutdown of the compressors, AMOT, that can automatically shut down the compressor in
cases of high number of rotation, high level registered in D-1, increased vibrations, low pressure of the fluid (oil), high
temperature of cooling water.
Fire-fighting equipment: Portable fire-fighting equipment S-9, S-250,CO2-10,CO2-30, water cannons with foam
Temporary repairs and signs of deterioration: some signs of deterioration are present, however, they are logical
consequence of the overall equipment age. Temporary repairs and repairs with inappropriate materials have been
made during the 1990s, mainly due to the fact that it was not possible to obtain better equipment
Modification of the original design:
Re-design of the input part of the system T1, T101....
Change of the working fluid instead of the proprietary oil, refining-generated oil is used
History of incidents:
Propane leakage on the compressor, and auto-ignition of the fluid. Apart from material damage, there was no
other damage to the people or environment mainly due to an early detection of the incident and fast fire
extinguishing
Leakage of propane, butane and gasoline from the underground lines due to the corrosion of the underground
lines. Consequences propane and butane was easily spotted, and quickly fixed. Gasoline leakage was
discovered at a relatively late stage, due to the fact that it did not evaporate. Soil remediation has been done
by pumping up the gasoline from the soil, the whole operation lasted 2,5 months
Problems at the furnace firing the firing process is manual and can in some cases lead to the explosive
concentrations inside the furnace and consequent injury of the person performing firing. So far no serious
injuries have happened.
Safety and relief valves: the process is inherently clean, there is a potential for some corrosion mainly from the
outside. No significant fouling of the RV has been registered, however, in the general process of control, some of the
valves have been found not to be functioning.
Fluid information:
Present fluid in the system are:
Natural and refined gas - 3,8-17,0% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition temperature 640-645C, gas
with no smell or color, flammable and explosive, in higher concentration might cause suffocation. Danger
mark 23, F+, Risk mark R12, information marks S9,S16,S36/37/39
Approx. fluid composition: methane ~ 93%, ethane ~ 2,50%, propane ~ 0,30%, butane ~0,03%, other
carbon and nitrogen maximum 3,50%,mostly containing fractions C1-C4, daily throughput of 1200000 m3 per
day (or 500t)
Propane - 2,1-9,5% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition temperature 465C, gas with no smell or color,
flammable and explosive, in higher concentration might cause suffocation. Danger mark 23, F+, Risk mark
R12, information marks S9,S16,S36/37/39
Present quantities on site:
o Process 12m3 as liquid, 8m3 as gas
o Storage: maximal 926 m3(as liquid) and 232 m3(as gas)
Butane - 1,5-8,5% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition temperature 365C, gas with no smell or color,
flammable and explosive, in higher concentration might cause suffocation. Danger mark 23, F+, Risk mark
R12, information marks S9,S16,S36/37/39
Debutanized gasoline - 1,3-7,6% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition temperature 257C, liquid with no
color, flammable and polluting for soil and water. Danger mark 33 Xn,F, Risk marks
R11,R22/21,R52/53,R58,R65, information marks S36/39,S45,S61,S62
Heavy gasoline - 1,3-8,0% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition temperature 205-220C, liquid with no
color, flammable and polluting for soil and water. Danger mark 33 Xn,F, Risk marks

R11,R22/21,R52/53,R58,R65, information marks S36/39,S45,S61,S62

o Storage: maximal 36 m3(as liquid)
Methyl-alcohol 7,3-36% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition temperature 455C, liquid with no color,
flammable and poisonous. Danger mark T,F, Risk marks R11 R11,R23/24,25, information marks S-2,7,16,24
o Process: 50l (as liquid)
Water and steam
The overall view of RGE is shown on Figure 10.
Figure 11 shows the overall PFD diagram for RGE, whereas Figure 12, Figure 13 and Figure 14 show the same diagram
in more readable form.
br. Naz iv
1 P os lovna z grada
2 Laboratorija
3 S tara portirnic a
4 S tanic a z a om ek avanje vode
5 M ehani ars k a radionic a
6 G enerators k a z grada
7 Zgrada arhive
8 Ras hladne k ule
9 Ulaz na ahta
10 A uto punili te
11 P P baz en - velik i
12 P P c entar
13 P P baz en - m ali
14 P roiz vodni rez ervoari
15 Trafo s tanic a
16 M agac in
17 M agac in
18 Hangar
19 B ravars k a radionic a
20 S prem i te z a tehni k e gas ove
21 E lek tri ars k a i M RT radionic a
22 G ara a
23 P ortirnic a I
24 portirnic a II
25 P os trojenje
26 M as eni m era i protok a
27 P lanirana lok ac ija nove bak lje
Figure 10: General view of RGE

PFD Diagrams with line types
D-300 D-101 T-1 T-101 T-9 D-16 E-102 E-2 E-1 A/B E-120 D-120 D-102 T-2 E-104 E-3 D-1 E-5 D-104 E-103 E-6 A/B E-7 D-5 D-103 E-15 D-121 D-4 E-116 E-4 C-1,2 A/B C-102 D-122 F-1; F-201 E-24 A/B T-3 E-9 E-11 E-10 E-12 E-16 E-17 D-6 E-18 D-7 E-20 A/B T-8 E-21 E-22 E-23 D-8 F-302
F-301 E-110 E-101 A/B SC-1 T-4 D-2 T-7 E-19
TROFAZNI SEPARATOR DEHIDRATACIONA DEHIDRATACIONA KOLONA ZA SEPARATOR PROPANSKI PROPANSKI PROPANSKI SEPARATOR SEPARATOR APSORBER PROPANSKI PRIHVATNI IZMENJIVAC SEPARATOR PROPANSKI PROPANSKI PRIHVATNI PRIHVATNI VODENI CENTRIFUGALNI SEPARATOR ZA PRIHVATNA VODENI VODENI KOMPRESORI KOMPRESOR KOALESCER PEC DEETANIZER RIBOJLER KONDENZATOR IZMENJIVAC RIBOJLER PRIHVATNA IZMENJIVAC PRIHVATNA POSUDA ZA KONDENZATOR DEIZOBUTANIZER RIBOJLER VODENI KONDENZATOR PRIHVATNA FILTER ZA
FILTER ZA IZMENJIVAC IZMENJIVAC IZMENJIVAC IZMENJIVAC IZMENJIVAC PROPANSKI IZMENJIVAC IZMENJIVAC DESTILATOR PRIHVATNA DEBUTANIZER RIBOJLER
SEPARATOR POSUDA KOLONA POSUDA HLADNJAK HLADNJAK HLADNJAK POSUDA POSUDA HLADNJAK SUD TOPLOTE POSUDA HLADNJAK HLADNJAK SUD ZA SUD ZA PARE HLADNJAK RABLJENO ULJE POSUDA ZA HLADNJAK HLADNJAK WEIR KLARK COOPER-BESSEMER TOPLOTE POSUDA ZA TOPLOTE HLADNJAK POSUDA ZA SIROVI
GASNI TOPLOTE KOLONA SUENJE TOPLOTE TOPLOTE TOPLOTE TOPLOTE SEPARATOR HLADNJAK TOPLOTE TOPLOTE POSUDA SMEU N-BUTANA I
PROPAN PROPANA PROPAN PROPAN IZO-BUTAN GAZOLIN
KONDENZAT KONDENZATA IZO-BUTANA
1
E-103 PRC
PRC
151 3
LC
131 E-20A E-20B
HCV
150
E-12 E-18
HO HO E-1A E-120 I C-102 II 1
D-5 PREMA PREMA

E-24A E-8 1
TIC
T-5 D-9
LCV 4A
2 PIC FI
200 .1 13
7 E-23
210 LC 8 1 1
TRC FI
T-9 LCV
152A 152 200 .2
9
PRC PRC
TRC
151
LC
4
E-1B TIC 19 9
E-104
204 T-3 FRC PRC 9 TRC
1 1 1 E-6A FRC
6 9 4 10
KA T -3 PC T-6
E-110 5 E-24B E-9
15
HIC
PRC
PREMA TS 150
PRC
T-7 8
1
PC
301 T-101 E-2
PC
TIC 18
16
TS FRC
13
7
E-2 E-3 4B E-110 150 10
T-1 E-7
6 TIC
6
25
PCV FRC
301B E-6B E-11 FRC 13
19 29
10 LC od C-2A C-1A C-2B C-1B F-201 11
T-8
PCV
D-120 151
D-104 LC
E-2
23
19
6 208
301A C3 E-3 24
CW FRC
C3 C3 E-7 7
LC LC 26
E-102 35 D-8
1 154 FIQ
E-7 C-2A C-1A C-2B C-1B E-116 T-4 D-7
102
T-2 E-3 D-2 F-1 35 D-6 E-22
PCV
24
E-4 29 30
LC
10
OD/PREMA
PRC CW CW TRC
PREMA E-5
152 TRC 9
C-1A/B 8
UV
154
E-101A E-5
C3 C3
D-101 od E-4
TRC
E-19 E-21
LC LC C3 5
2 152 TRC CW 35
3 E-10 LC
LI LC
D-103 E-15 8
LC
101 LC LC
D-16 19 19
13
3 153
LC
E-101B LC CW CW
LG
155
SC-1
LG D-121 D-4 LC 11
7
GS ELEMIR
156
20 5 LC
LI TRC SV TRCAH
129
LCV
LC
D-1 6
7 7 160
101 D-102 114 TSH
163 FRC
E-102 FRC
FS
8
SV
6
P RCA
160
14
5
LS
157
FRC
PREMA E-2 PREMA E-3 PREMA E-7 8
TRC PRIHVATNA POSUDA ZA RABLJENO ULJE
LOIVI GAS
128 C3
KA D -9
ULAZNA AHTA FIQ

PRERAENI
103
GAS
KA T-4; T-6; FIQ FIQ

T-8 PCV
106
FIQ FIQ FIQ FIQ 201

ULAZ GASA
100 03-01 107 104
AS
150
FIQ
D-122 NORMALNI
IZOBUTAN
LCV BUTAN
OD
101 F-302 PS-4 GAZOLIN PROPAN
D-9 SMEA SMEA
U PRELIVNI PREMA PENTANA P-9A/B BUTANA
GR-1/GR-102
OD E-25
P-120A/B P-1A/B/C P-11 P-7A/B P-8A/B
AHT P-2A/B P-4A/B/C P-5A/B
D-300 LAH
301
LAL
301
LIC
301 P- 30
F-301
SIROVI GAZOLIN IZ
PROIZVODNIH
REZERVOARA
Legenda:
24.08. 2006
Propan U PRELIVNI
D-27A
N-butan AHT Jain/Subotin
Izobutan
Gazolin
Prirodni gas
S.Josipovic
Preradeni gas
A.Ilic
Apsorpciono ulje Projektni zadatak za izr. URP
Kondezat ugljovodonika
Toplo ulje rekonstr. sist. za prikupljanje i spaljivanje
Rashladni propan
Bogato ulje
fluida u pogonu za proizv. NTG El.
Rashladna voda
NIS Naftagas
TEHNOLOKA EMA POGONA TNG
TEG
Loivi gas 1
Pogon za proizv. NTG ELEMIR
Figure 11 Overall PFD of RGE

Figure 12 Overall PFD of RGE Part 1 of 3



HAZOP Analysis Results
During the first HAZOP Session, several technical issues have been discussed, one of those being analyzed with the
HAZOP methodology. The results are available on-line using the link:
http://www.risknis.risk-technologies.com
in the member-area section.
Figure 15 HAZOP Loop 1
Guide Consequence Safe Guard

ID Node Parameter Cause Safe Guards
Word Description Independent
No safety problem,
Feed entrance shut down or Two Safety
1 Flow Less Less Gas Supply FALSE
to D-300 continuation valves on D-300
depending on flow
Feed entrance No Supply Two Safety

2 Flow No No safety problem TRUE
to D-300 Cleaning gas line valves on D- 300
Feed entrance No safety problem, Two Safety

3 Pressure Lower Less Supply shut down or TRUE
to D-300 valves on D-300
continuation

Guide Consequence Safe Guard

ID Node Parameter Cause Safe Guards
Word Description Independent
depending on flow
Valve (LCV 301) to

Feed entrance Supply changes, Two Safety
4 Composition Higher F301 will be partly TRUE
to D-300 More C1-C2 Gas valves on D- 300
or completely closed
PV 401 is an
overflow valve and
Feed entrance Supply changes, will mitigate Two Safety
5 Composition Less TRUE
to D-300 Less C1-C2 Gas increase of level. valves on D- 300
Storage tank D-
27A.
Filter has to be
Feed entrance Filter in F-301 cleaned. Indication: Two Safety
6 Pressure Higher TRUE
to D-300 dirty. . Pressure increase valves on D- 300
continuously
Technical discussions
Technical problem 1
On the top of column T-5 sometimes a valve has to be opened. In some cases the gas (Decane) ignites and a flame
appears on the top of the valve. In this case the valve will be closed again.
Discussion: The temperature of the gas is 260 0C. There are two possible ignition sources. The first possibility is
electrostatic ignition. The second possibility is an ignition by hot surfaces. More probable is the ignition by a hot surface.
The gas will heat up the surface of the gas. Autoignition temperature of Decane is about 210 0C. By turbulence at the
end of the valve an explosive air/Decane mixture will be formed which ignites at the hot surface and lead to the flame.
Technical solution: This has not been discussed during the meeting. A possibility to mitigate the formation of an
explosive air/Decane mixture is to use a three way valve instead of the existing one. The third line will be connected to
a steam line. Both lines have to be opened instead of only the Decane line. This will have two effects. The surface will
be cooled down under the autoignition temperature and the explosive atmosphere will be inerted. Therefore an ignition
on the surface will not took place.
Technical problem 2
In combination with a pressure drop it may be that there is no liquid phase of Decane at the bottom of T4 (distillation
unit). This will lead to a gas flow to the connected pumps instead of a liquid flow. The gas will be ignited in the pumps.
Same problem will arise if no cooling is available for the pumps (will be cooled by water and cold oil). Normally two
pumps are in operation and one is stand by. A flow indicator for Decane is responsible for the flow of the cooling liquids
to the pumps.
Discussion: The reason for the ignition is the hot surface of the pumps where an air/Decane mixture will be ignited.
Technical solution: This has not been discussed during the meeting. A possible solution is as first a temperature
measurement at the pumps. In the line between distillation T4 and pump a valve can be integrated. This has to be
opened if the flow indicator for Decane and the temperature indicator at the pump indicate that there is no flow of
liquid Decane. The open line can be connected to the flare. The valve can be closed again if the flow indicator gives a
signal for liquid Decane flow.
Technical problem 3
Once per year the gas pipelines outside the establishment will be cleaned. Different kind of liquids and dusts has been
accumulated over the period of one year. The Naftagas plant is responsible for the collecting of these wastes. The
waste is delivered by a pressure wave through the incoming line for gas and is collected in the separator D-300. The
technical problem is twofold. In the loop1 discussed during the Hazop analysis a pressure surges occur (e.g. water
hammer, cavitational hammer). These pressure surges can lead to damages of plant's equipment (valves, pumps, pipe
bends) up to leakage of the pipe system. After the cleaning the gaseous line will be opened again. Again pressure
surges occur and parts of the equipment can be obstructed completely or partly by remaining particles. This is actual
the case for the heat exchanger E-110.

Discussion: There was only a general discussion on the hammer effect on the lines where the liquid phase is in. A more
detailed discussion was about the pressure wave which took place when the gaseous line will be reopened. As the heat
exchanger is not really working at the moment based on pollution with dust particles the questions raised up what can
happen furthermore in other parts of the plant.
It has been proposed not to concentrate on the possible damages and instead to concentrate of a mitigation of the
pressure wave. At the moment a valve in a 12 inch line with a 3 inch pipepass will be opened, It has been proposed to
include another valve in a 6 inch line with a 2 inch bypass to reduce the pressure wave.
The following proposals have not been discussed in this meeting.
The typical scenarios for the origin of pressure surges are fast closing valves triggered by the breakdown of auxiliary
power and fast acting control devices. The fast deceleration of the liquid results in high pressure surges upstream the
valve, because kinetic energy is transformed into potential energy. This effect is called water hammer that is explained
by the following example. In a horizontally installed 500 m long pipeline of the size DN 200 which transports water with
a velocity of 3 m/s at ambient temperature, the pressure increases by a fast closing valve from a stationary pressure of
6 bar up to 40 bar. Hereby the forces induced to pipe supports exceed the design criteria from 1-5 kN to 125 kN. Due
to liquid inertia, the transported liquid continues to flow downstream the valve with the initial speed, the pressure
decreases and a large expanding vapour bubble is formed directly downstream the valve. The pressure falls up to
saturation pressure of the liquid and is thus lower than the pressure in the system. Thereby the liquid stream is
decelerated and finally accelerated towards the closed valve (back flow). As a result of fast re-condensation of the
vapour bubble, the liquid flows against the closed valve and is stopped rapidly. The resulting pressure surge is referred
to as cavitational hammer. The amplitude of the first cavitational hammer downstream the valve is nearly as high as
the amplitude of the first water hammer upstream the valve.
Well-known methods for the prevention of water hammer in pipeline systems are e.g. the application of air vessels,
surge shafts, bladder accumulators, as well as the prolongation of closing and opening times of valves. The latter is the
easiest and the most favourable method. Due to technical and legal requirements for pipeline operation within the
chemical industries and power plants it is not always possible to decelerate the closing process undefined.
Air vessels, surge shafts or bladder accumulators are used if the pipeline system is not designed on the same level.
These applications are installed upstream the closing valve in its immediate proximity. When shutting off the medium
flows in to the loft and is braked by this.
Another possibility is the expansion of valve gears with facilities which decelerate the closure as soon as the last third
of the flow cross section is nearly reached. These can be dampers (often used with swing check valves) or
programmable positioners..
Technical problem 4
There is a leakage in the product lines C3 and C4 to the tanks. As the lines are underground the leakage and the size
of the leakage can not be detected. There is no leak detection system installed.
Discussion: Leakage is visible by bubbles on the ground if it is raining and by parts of non growing grass.
Technical solution: This has not been discussed during the meeting. As the amount of gas is unknown there is the
hazard of an explosion. The only possible solution is to repair or to exchange the lines or to build new lines on the
ground and to close the old ones.
Technical problem 5
There is a compressor in use where gaseous Propane will be compressed from 1.7 to 13-15 bars. There are two
problems. The first problem is in the case of a leakage in the compressor (Jet fire, explosion). Hot surfaces near by
have a temperature of 500 0C. The volume of the compressor is about 0.5 cbm. The second problem may occur if
liquid propane flows into the compressor. This will normally be mitigated by a measurement of gaseous and liquid
phase in the separator before. If this is not working an explosion is possible.
Discussion: This has not been discussed during the meeting.
Technical solution: There will be possibilities by using quick closing valves. This will mitigate the flow of liquid Propane
to the compressor. Further technical specification possible but not done.

Management Systems Evaluation

According to the API 581, Management system evaluation (self-assessment) has been performed. After this, an audit
of the results has been performed in order to revise the scores achieved.
The results are given in the table below and shown on Figure 16.
Table 9 Management System Evaluation results with audit comments
Maximal Actual Audit Audit comments

Id Section Title
Points Score results
The self assessment evaluation is

1. Leadership and Administration 70 43 40
confirmed

confirmed, however, it seems that not
2. Process Safety Information 80 72 65
everyone has instant access to needed
safety information needed (ie MSDS)

3. Process Hazard Analysis 100 49 45
confirmed
Version control of the documents and

agreed procedure of the where the latest
4. Management of Change 80 58 40
version of the i.e. PFD seems not to be
known to everyone
Operating procedures are not visibly

enough available to everyone. However,
due to the size of the team, this is
5. Operating Procedures 80 57 50 compensated in quick direct
consultations. Problems only in cases
when one of the responsible is not
reachable (i.e. illness, holidays etc.)

6. Safe Work Practices 85 72 70
confirmed
In the last couple of years a lot has been

done to improve the knowledge, however
7. Training 100 82 75
the lack of training in the previous
periods has left some traces.
The team is capable of maintaining the

integrity of the equipment as it is.
8. Mechanical Integrity 120 111 90 However, re-engineering or process
improvement initiatives are not always
considered as possible solutions
Due to the danger of the current startup

procedure, more has to be done to make
9. Pre-Startup Safety Review 60 58 45
sure that the startup is not considered as
routine task
10. Emergency Response 65 51 40 Not all elements needed for safety report

Maximal Actual Audit Audit comments

Id Section Title
Points Score results
and emergency response are available on

demand
The incident investigation practice is

normally performed, however, the
11. Incident Investigation 75 65 40 damage mechanisms are often not
investigated, instead of root causes often
only symptomatic reactions.
Contractors 45 42 25 Contractors are usually good managed,

however, there are QA problems in the
12. procurement process for the small
equipment (i.e. valves, safety valves,
etc.)
Assessments 40 20 20 The self assessment evaluation is

13.
confirmed
The RGE has obtained the above average

score even after the auditing process.
Total 1000 780 645 The overall impression is that the overall
team of process, maintenance engineers
and management is functioning very well
Figure 16 Results of management system evaluation for RGE

API 581 Qualitative (Unit-based) analysis results

The evaluation according to the API 581 qualitative method has been performed, and the overall risk of the RGE has
been determined to be MEDIUM (or C3). This has several reasons:
1. Size of the refinery it is rather small compared with other refineries or other units that are supposed to be
benchmarked by the same methodology
2. The process is fairly simple and stable
3. On the other hand, the process fluids (natural gas, propane, butane, gasoline) are both explosive and
flammable, therefore giving the C consequence class
4. The age of the equipment and the history of damage mechanisms result in the likelihood ranking of 3.
4
L
I
K
E
L RGE-1 Procesno
3
I postrojenje
H
O
O
D
2
A B C D E
CONSEQUENCES
Figure 17 Risk matrix showing the position of the RGE in qualitative unit analysis matrix

API 581 qualitative analysis (component based)

According to API 581, edition 1998, the qualitative analysis has been performed for 99 components, without connecting
piping and rotating machinery. The work for this equipment is still in progress.
The preliminary matrix for qualitative analysis is shown on Figure 18. The risk assessment results are shown in Table
10.
According to the ranking in the risk matrix, the inspection plan can be constructed, for next two years. According to the
risk assessment, the equipment having high and medium high risk should be inspected at least once a year.
Furthermore, for items with high risk, it is recommended to increase the inspection efficiency from class D (spot
testing) to class C, in order to have better risk control.
For the equipment that has annual maintenance tasks (heat exchangers cleaning, filters, condensers), the same
inspection interval has been maintained (i.e. each year), although according to the risk ranking this interval might be
increased. This is in line of maximization of the effort invested, i.e. to use the opportunity to inspect the equipment
when normal maintenance tasks are done.
The resulting inspection plan will result in increase of inspection on equipment identified as critical (6 pieces of
equipment), while decreasing the number of equipment to be inspected each year (i.e. in 2009 from 99 to 51).

5 0 - 0%
4 D-101 D-102 2 - 2%
L C1A/B (potis) C1A/B

I D-1 T-3 T-4 T-6 T- T-1 T-101 T-2
3 (usis) C2A/B (potis) 14 - 14%
K 8 T-5 T-7
C2A/B (usis)
E
L
I D-103 D-104 D-11
D-27B D-27C D-27E
H D-111 D-112 D-12
E-10 E-102 E-103 E-
O D-120 D-121 D-
E-101/A E-101/B 104 E-11 E-110 E-
O 122 D-16 D-2 D-
E-1A/B E-20A FT- 113 E-116 E-12 E-
D 27A D-27D D-27F
103A FT-103B FT- 120 E-13 E-14 E-15
2 D-28A D-28B D- D-300 T-9 83 - 84%
104 FT-302 HP-1 E-16 E-17 E-18 E-19
28C D-28D D-28E
HP-2 JI-1 JI-2 PF- E-2 E-20B E-21 E-22
D-28F D-28G D-
1 PF-2 SP-1 E-23 E-24/A E-24/B
29A D-29B D-29C
E-25 E-3 E-4 E-5 E-
D-4 D-5 D-6 D-7
6A/B E-7 E-8 E-9
D-8 D-9 FT-301
1 0 - 0%
A B C D E
0 - 0% 15 - 15% 40 - 40% 36 - 36% 8 - 8% 99
CONSEQUENCES
Figure 18 API 581 Qualitative risk matrix for component level, for year 2009
Table 10 API 581 qualitative risk assessment results, for year 2009
ID Name Likelihood Consequence Risk
2903 C1A/B (potis) 3 C Medium
2902 C1A/B (usis) 3 C Medium
2905 C2A/B (potis) 3 C Medium
2904 C2A/B (usis) 3 C Medium
2845 D-1 3 D Medium High
2855 D-101 4 C Medium High
2856 D-102 4 E High
2857 D-103 2 D Medium

2858 D-104 2 D Medium
2853 D-11 2 D Medium
2859 D-111 2 D Medium
2860 D-112 2 D Medium
2862 D-120 2 D Medium
2863 D-121 2 D Medium
2864 D-122 2 D Medium
2846 D-2 2 D Medium
2906 D-27A 2 D Medium
2907 D-27B 2 C Medium
2908 D-27C 2 C Medium
2917 D-27D 2 D Medium
2918 D-27E 2 C Medium
2919 D-27F 2 D Medium
2910 D-28B 2 D Medium
2911 D-28C 2 D Medium
2912 D-28D 2 D Medium
2913 D-28E 2 D Medium
2920 D-28F 2 D Medium
2921 D-28G 2 D Medium
2915 D-29B 2 D Medium
2916 D-29C 2 D Medium
2865 D-300 2 E Medium High
2847 D-4 2 D Medium

2848 D-5 2 D Medium
2849 D-6 2 D Medium
2850 D-7 2 D Medium
2851 D-8 2 D Medium
2852 D-9 2 D Medium
2875 E-10 2 C Medium
2893 E-101/A 2 B Low
2894 E-101/B 2 B Low
2895 E-102 2 C Medium
2896 E-103 2 C Medium
2897 E-104 2 C Medium
2898 E-110 2 C Medium
2899 E-113 2 C Medium
2900 E-116 2 C Medium
2901 E-120 2 C Medium
2866 E-1A/B 2 B Low
2867 E-2 2 C Medium
2885 E-20A 2 B Low
2886 E-20B 2 C Medium

2890 E-24/A 2 C Medium
2891 E-24/B 2 C Medium
2868 E-3 2 C Medium
2869 E-4 2 C Medium
2870 E-5 2 C Medium
2871 E-6A/B 2 C Medium
2872 E-7 2 C Medium
2873 E-8 2 C Medium
2874 E-9 2 C Medium
2931 FT-103A 2 B Low
2932 FT-103B 2 B Low
2933 FT-104 2 B Low
2923 FT-301 2 D Medium
2922 FT-302 2 B Low
2925 HP-1 2 B Low
2926 HP-2 2 B Low
2927 JI-1 2 B Low
2928 JI-2 2 B Low
2929 PF-1 2 B Low
2930 PF-2 2 B Low
2924 SP-1 2 B Low
2835 T-1 3 E High
2844 T-101 3 E High
2836 T-2 3 E High

2837 T-3 3 D Medium High
2839 T-5 3 E High
2841 T-7 3 E High
2843 T-9 2 E Medium High
Recomme Recommen
nded ded
Servic
Componen e Evaluati
Name Description Risk Interval Interval 2009 2010 2011
t Type Start on Date
(Class A (Class D
Date
inspection inspection
type) type)
trofazni Pressure
D-102 separator vessel 1969 2009 High 2 0.5 1 1 1
ulazni
T-1 separator Column 1962 2009 High 2 0.5 1 1 1
kolona za
T-101 suenje gasa Column 1988 2009 High 2 0.5 1 1 1
apsorpciona
T-2 kolona Column 1962 2009 High 2 0.5 1 1 1
preista
T-5 posnog ulja Column 1962 2009 High 2 0.5 1 1 1
T-7 deetanizer Column 1962 2009 High 2 0.5 1 1 1
Pressure Medium
D-101 separator vessel 1962 2009 High 4 1 1 1 1
Pressure Medium
D-1 prihvatni sud vessel 1962 2009 High 5 1 1 1 1
trofazni Pressure Medium

D-300 separator vessel 2000 2009 High 5 1 1 1 1
Medium
T-3 deetanizer Column 1962 2009 High 5 1 1 1 1
Medium
T-4 Column 1963 2009 High 5 1 1 1 1
Medium
T-6 depropanizer Column 1962 2009 High 5 1 1 1 1
Medium
T-8 deizobutanizer Column 1962 2009 High 5 1 1 1 1
Medium
T-9 Column 1962 2009 High 5 1 1 1 1

Recomme Recommen
nded ded
Servic
Componen e Evaluati
(Class A (Class D
Date
type) type)
KOMPRESORS Pressure
C1A/B (potis) KE BOCE vessel 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
KOMPRESORS Pressure
C1A/B (usis) KE BOCE vessel 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
KOMPRESORS Pressure
C2A/B (potis) KE BOCE vessel 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
KOMPRESORS Pressure
C2A/B (usis) KE BOCE vessel 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
Pressure
D-103 meusakuplja vessel 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
trofazni Pressure
D-104 separator vessel 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
Pressure
D-11 posuda vessel 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
Pressure
Pressure
Pressure
Pressure
Pressure
Pressure
trofazni Pressure
sakuplja Pressure
D-2 refluksa vessel 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
Pressure
D-27A rezervoar vessel 1963 2009 Medium 7 2 1
Pressure
D-27D rezervoar vessel 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
Pressure
D-27F rezervoar vessel 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
Pressure
Pressure
D-28B rezervoar vessel 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
Pressure
D-28C rezervoar vessel 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
Pressure
D-28D rezervoar vessel 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1

Recomme Recommen
nded ded
Servic
Componen e Evaluati
(Class A (Class D
Date
type) type)
Pressure
D-28E rezervoar vessel 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
Pressure
D-28F rezervoar vessel 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
Pressure
D-28G rezervoar vessel 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
Pressure
Pressure
Pressure
Pressure
D-4 prihvatni sud vessel 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
Pressure
D-5 ispariva vessel 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
sakuplja Pressure
sakuplja Pressure
sakuplja Pressure
Pressure
D-9 prihvatni sud vessel 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
FT-301 Filter Filter 1962 2009 Medium 7 1 1 1 1
Pressure
Pressure
Pressure
D-27E rezervoar vessel 1962 2009 Medium 8 2 1
Boiler -
Furnace
Tubes for
Fired
E-10 rebojler Heater 1962 2009 Medium 8 2 1
propanski
E-102 hladnjak Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
propanski
Heat
E-104 izmenjiva lote Exchanger 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
Boiler -
Furnace
E-11 predgreja 1962 2009 Medium 8 2 1
Tubes for

Recomme Recommen
nded ded
Servic
Componen e Evaluati
(Class A (Class D
Date
type) type)
Fired
Heater
Heat
E-110 izmenjiva Exchanger 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
Heat
Heat
kondenzator
E-12 para Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
Heat
E-120 Exchanger 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
vodeni
Heat
kondenzator
E-15 propana Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
Heat
E-16 predgreja Exchanger 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
Boiler -
Furnace
Tubes for
Fired
kondenzator
Boiler -
Furnace
Tubes for
Fired
propanski
kondenzator
E-20B para Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
Boiler -
Furnace
Tubes for
Fired
vodeni
kondenzator
propanski
E-24/A hladnjak Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1

Recomme Recommen
nded ded
Servic
Componen e Evaluati
(Class A (Class D
Date
type) type)
propanski
E-24/B hladnjak Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
Heat
propanski
vodeni
Heat
Heat
E-6A/B izmenjiva lote Exchanger 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
propanski
vodeni
Boiler -
Furnace
Tubes for
Fired
E-9 meubojler Heater 1962 2009 Medium 8 2 1
Heat
E-101/A izmenjiva lote Exchanger 1963 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1
Heat
E-101/B izmenjiva lote Exchanger 1963 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1
Heat
E-1A/B izmenjiva lote Exchanger 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1
kondenzator
E-20A para Condenser 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1
FT-103A Filter Filter 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1
FT-103B Filter Filter 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1
Filter sa
aktivnim
FT-104 ugljem Filter 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1
FT-302 Filter Filter 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1
Hidroforska Other
HP-1 posuda Equipment 1962 2009 Low 10 3 1
Hidroforska Other
HP-2 posuda Equipment 1962 2009 Low 10 3 1
Jono Other
JI-1 izmenjiva Equipment 1962 2009 Low 10 3 1
Jono Other
JI-2 izmenjiva Equipment 1962 2009 Low 10 3 1
PF-1 Peani filter Filter 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1

Recomme Recommen
nded ded
Servic
Componen e Evaluati
(Class A (Class D
Date
type) type)
Peani filter-
PF-2 bona filtrac. Filter 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1
Other
SP-1 Posuda za so Equipment 1962 2009 Low 10 3 1
Total to be inspected: 51 94 56

RBI Detailed quantitative analysis

THIS Chapter will be elaborated in the next version
5 0 - 0%
D-4 D-6 D-7 E-

D-5 E-102 E- 101/A E-101/B D-1 D-2 T-7 T-
4 18 - 72%
110 T-5 E-1A/B E-2 T-4 9
L
T-6 T-8
I
K
E
L
3 D-27A T-1 2 - 8%
I
H
O
O
D
2 D-300 T-101 T-2 D-102 T-3 5 - 20%
1 0 - 0%
A B C D E
0 - 0% 5 - 20% 14 - 56% 6 - 24% 0 - 0% 25
CONSEQUENCES
Figure 19 Preliminary results of API quantitative (detailed) Analysis Component based applied on selected RGE
equipment

Conclusions and recommendations
Presented results so far have DRAFT status; further refinement is planned for the level
of detailed analysis in order to obtain results that are acceptable for plant personnel.
The proper identification of damage mechanisms and inclusion of rotating equipment

and piping is planned for the next cycle of data update.
THIS Chapter will be elaborated in the next version

References
[1] Contract No: 45/609 of September 8, 2006
[2] API PUBL 581, Risk-Based Inspection Base Resource Document, 2000 Edition
[3] CEN CWA 15740 RIMAP, 2008

Risknis Rbireport Rge

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www.risk-technologies.com ; www.stw.

STEINBEIS Foundation (www.stw.de) NIS-NAFTNA INDUSTRIJA SRBIJE (www.nis.yu)

Prof. Dr. A. S. Jovanovic, Director

RiskNIS RBI Qualitative Unit-Based page 2

L C1A/B (potis) C1A/B

0 - 0% 15 - 15% 40 - 40% 36 - 36% 8 - 8% 99

RiskNIS RBI Qualitative Unit-Based page 3

D-4 D-6 D-7 E-

0 - 0% 5 - 20% 14 - 56% 6 - 24% 0 - 0% 25

RiskNIS RBI Qualitative Unit-Based page 4

Status of the current document

RiskNIS RBI Qualitative Unit-Based page 5

Executive Summary ............................................... 3

Status of the current document ............................... 5

Table of Contents .................................................. 6

List of Figures ....................................................... 7

List of Tables ........................................................ 8

Performed activities and inputs ............................... 25

Unit and Process description .................................. 27

HAZOP Analysis Results ......................................... 34

Conclusions and recommendations .......................... 52

RiskNIS RBI Qualitative Unit-Based page 6

Figure 2 HAZOP Study Workflow ....................................... 13

Figure 3 - Framework of RIMAP procedure within the overall

Figure 4 Methodology and application of detailed RBI .......... 17

Figure 5 CEN CWA 15740 (RIMAP) Risk Matrix .................... 19

Figure 6 NIS Risk matrix .................................................. 20

Figure 7 Web-based tool implementing API 581 Qualitative RBI

Figure 8 Project web-site Member area .............................. 26

Figure 9: General view of RGE .......................................... 29

Figure 10 Overall PFD of RGE ........................................... 30

Figure 11 Overall PFD of RGE Part 1 of 3 ........................... 31

Figure 12 Overall PFD of RGE Part 2 of 3 ........................... 32

Figure 13 Overall PFD of RGE Part 3 of 3 ........................... 33

Figure 14 HAZOP Loop 1 .................................................. 34

Figure 15 Results of management system evaluation for RGE38

Figure 16 Risk matrix showing the position of the RGE in qualitative

RiskNIS RBI Qualitative Unit-Based page 7

Table 2 Proposed action for different category of Likelihood Factor

Table 3 Effectiveness of Inspection for General Thinning ...... 21

Table 4 Effectiveness of Inspection for Localized Thinning .... 22

Table 6 CUI for Stainless Steels Inspection Categories ......... 23

Table 7 Inspection Effectiveness for External Damage ......... 24

Table 8 Guidelines for Assigning Inspection Effectiveness for Furnace

Table 9 Management System Evaluation results with audit comments

RiskNIS RBI Qualitative Unit-Based page 8

RiskNIS RBI Qualitative Unit-Based page 9

RiskNIS RBI Qualitative Unit-Based page 10

RBI Methodology Overview

Prepare a suitable database

HAZOP Study Procedure

RiskNIS RBI Qualitative Unit-Based page 11

RiskNIS RBI Qualitative Unit-Based page 12

Describe the design

Brainstorm the potential

Assign responsible unit and

Figure 3 HAZOP Study Workflow

RiskNIS RBI Qualitative Unit-Based page 13

Table 1 HAZOP Guide Words and Parameters

NO / LESS FLOW Flow rate is less than design/operational intent

MORE FLOW Flow rate is more than design/operational intent

AS WELL AS FLOW Another components also flows (e.g. contaminants)

PART OF FLOW One or more of the desired component flows are

The flow is the wrong phase (e.g. liquid instead of