Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Dont dismiss civil rights era gains even though they were
incomplete.
Omi and Winant 13 Michael Omi, Associate Professor in the Ethnic Studies Department at
the University of California-Berkeley, holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of California-Santa
Cruz, and Howard Winant, Professor of Sociology at the University of California-Santa Barbara, Director of
the University of California Center for New Racial Studies, holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of
California-Santa Cruz, 2013 (Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias, Ethnic and Racial
Studies, Volume 36, Number 6, September, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Taylor & Francis
Online, p. 965-966)
What is distinctive about our own epoch in the USA (post-Second World War to the present) with respect to
race and racism?
Over the past decades there has been a steady drumbeat of efforts to contain and neutralize civil rights, to
restrict racial democracy, and to maintain or even increase racial inequality. Racial disparities in different
institutional sites employment, health, education persist and in many cases have increased. Indeed,
the post-2008 period has seen a dramatic increase in racial inequality. The subprime home mortgage
crisis, for example, was a major racial event. Black and brown people were disproportionately affected by
predatory lending practices; many lost their homes as a result; race-based wealth disparities widened
It would be easy to conclude, as Feagin and Elias do, that white racial
tremendously.
dominance has been continuous and unchanging throughout US
history. But such a perspective misses the dramatic twists and turns in
racial politics that have occurred since the Second World War and the
civil rights era.
Feagin and Elias claim that we overly inflate the significance of the changes wrought by the civil rights
movement, and that we overlook the serious reversals of racial justice and persistence of huge racial
inequalities (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21) that followed in its wake. We do not. In Racial Formation we
wrote about racial reaction in a chapter of that name, and elsewhere in the book as well. Feagin and Elias
devote little attention to our arguments there; perhaps because they are in substantial agreement with us.
While we argue that the right wing was able to rearticulate race and
racism issues to roll back some of the gains of the civil rights
movement, we also believe that there are limits to what the right could
achieve in the post-civil rights political landscape.
So we agree that the present prospects for racial justice are
demoralizing at best. But we do not think that is the whole story. US racial
conditions have changed over the post-Second World War period, in ways
that Feagin and Elias tend to downplay or neglect. Some of the major reforms of the
1960s have proved irreversible; they have set powerful democratic
forces in motion. These racial (trans)formations were the results of
unprecedented political mobilizations, led by the black movement, but not
confined to blacks alone. Consider the desegregation of the armed forces, as
well as key civil rights movement victories of the 1960s: the Voting
Rights Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act (Hart-Celler), as well [end
page 965] as important court decisions like Loving v. Virginia that declared
anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional. While we have the greatest respect for the
late Derrick Bell, we do not believe that his interest convergence hypothesis effectively explains all these
developments. How does Lyndon Johnsons famous (and possibly apocryphal) lament upon signing the Civil
Rights Act on 2 July 1964 We have lost the South for a generation count as convergence?
The US racial regime has been transformed in significant ways. As
Antonio Gramsci argues, hegemony proceeds through the incorporation of opposition (Gramsci 1971, p.
182). The civil rights reforms can be seen as a classic example of this process; here the US racial regime
under movement pressure was exercising its hegemony. But Gramsci insists that such reforms which
he calls passive revolutions cannot be merely symbolic if they are to be effective: oppositions must win
real gains in the process. Once again, we are in the realm of politics, not absolute rule.
So yes, we think there were important if partial victories that shifted the
racial state and transformed the significance of race in everyday life.
And yes, we think that further victories can take place both on the broad
terrain of the state and on the more immediate level of social interaction: in
daily interaction, in the human psyche and across civil society. Indeed we have argued that in
many ways the most important accomplishment of the anti-racist
movement of the 1960s in the USA was the politicization of the social. In
the USA and indeed around the globe, race-based movements demanded not only the inclusion of racially
defined others and the democratization of structurally racist societies, but also the recognition and
validation by both the state and civil society of racially-defined experience and identity. These demands
broadened and deepened democracy itself. They facilitated not only the democratic gains made in the USA
by the black movement and its allies, but also the political advances towards equality, social justice and
inclusion accomplished by other new social movements: second- wave feminism, gay liberation, and the
environmentalist and anti-war movements among others.
By no means do we think that the post-war movement upsurge was an
unmitigated success. Far from it: all the new social movements were subject to the same
rearticulation (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. xii) that produced the racial ideology of colourblindness and
its variants; indeed all these movements confronted their mirror images in the mobilizations that arose
Yet even their incorporation and
from the political right to counter them.
containment, even their confrontations with the various backlash phenomena
of the past few decades, even the need to develop the highly contradictory
ideology of colour- blindness, reveal the transformative character of
the politicization of the social. While it is not possible here to explore so extensive a
subject, [end page 966] it is worth noting that it was the long-delayed eruption of racial subjectivity and
self-awareness into the mainstream political arena that set off this transformation, shaping both the
democratic and anti- democratic social movements that are evident in US politics today.
The negative trends they identify are politically contingent.
Reforms have and can transform racial realities. Resistance is
not futile.
Omi and Winant 13 Michael Omi, Associate Professor in the Ethnic Studies Department at
the University of California-Berkeley, holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of California-Santa
Cruz, and Howard Winant, Professor of Sociology at the University of California-Santa Barbara, Director of
the University of California Center for New Racial Studies, holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of
California-Santa Cruz, 2013 (Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias, Ethnic and Racial
Studies, Volume 36, Number 6, September, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Taylor & Francis
Online, p. 968-969)
We still want to acknowledge that blacks have been catching hell and have
borne the brunt of the racist reaction of the past several [end page 968]
decades. For example, we agree with Feagin and Eliass critique of the
reactionary politics of incarceration in the USA. The new Jim Crow
(Alexander 2012) or even the new slavery that the present system practises is something
that was just in its beginning stages when we were writing Racial Formation. It is now recognized
as a national and indeed global scandal. How is it to be understood? Of
course there are substantial debates on this topic, notably about the nature of the prison-industrial
complex (Davis 2003, p. 3) and the social and cultural effects of mass incarceration along racial lines. But
beyond Feagin and Eliass denunciation of the ferocious white racism that is operating here, deeper
political implications are worth considering. As Alexander (2012), Mauer (2006), Manza and Uggen (2008)
the upsurge over
and movement groups like Critical Resistance and the Ella Baker Center argue,
recent decades in incarceration rates for black (and brown) men
expresses the fear-based, law-and-order appeals that have shaped
US racial politics since the rise of Nixonland (Perlstein 2008) and the
Southern strategy. Perhaps even more central, racial repression aims
at restricting the increasing impact of voters of colour in a
demographically shifting electorate.
There is a lot more to say about this, but for the present two key points stand out: first, it is not an area
for all the horrors
where Feagin and Elias and we have any sharp disagreement, and second,
and injustices that the new Jim Crow represents, incarceration,
profiling and similar practices remain political issues. These
practices and policies are not ineluctable and unalterable
dimensions of the US racial regime. There have been previous waves
of reform in these areas. They can be transformed again by mass
mobilization, electoral shifts and so on. In other words, resistance
is not futile.
Fatalism Destroys Agency
Fatalism Destroys Agency racism is not structurally
inevitable.
Omi and Winant 13 Michael Omi, Associate Professor in the Ethnic Studies Department at
the University of California-Berkeley, holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of California-Santa
Cruz, and Howard Winant, Professor of Sociology at the University of California-Santa Barbara, Director of
the University of California Center for New Racial Studies, holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of
California-Santa Cruz, 2013 (Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias, Ethnic and Racial
Studies, Volume 36, Number 6, September, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Taylor & Francis
Online, p. 961-962)
We were at first surprised by the extensive critique of our 1994 book by Joe Feagin and Sean Elias.
Although we do not know Elias, we have great respect and friendship for Joe Feagin and have learned from
his insightful work on race and racism over the years. We have shared conference panels with him and
endorsed his books (and he ours). In 2009, we published a somewhat critical but also appreciative review
of Feagins Systemic Racism: A Theory of Oppression (Routledge 2006) in Contemporary Sociology (March
2009). Elias subsequently wrote a critical response to our review (September 2009). Maybe this is
payback?
After surprise came intrigue and excitement: we realized that this was a great opportunity to examine
racial politics, race theory and the dynamics of racism in the USA today. In their criticism of our work,
Feagin and Elias have posed numerous crucial issues for that discussion. Let us have that debate.
Their essay has an overly tendentious tone and sometimes misreads and misinterprets our book. Still there
are many points of agreement between the racial formation and systemic racism theories. Where we
Feagin and Elias
disagree most strongly is over our respective understanding of racial politics.
focus so intensely on racism that they lose sight of the
complexities of race and the variations that exist among and within
racially defined groups. In their systemic racism account white racist
rule is so comprehensive and absolute that the political power and
agency of people of colour virtually disappear. Indeed, the white racial
frame (Feagin 2009) is so omnipotent that white racism seems to usurp
and monopolize all political space in the USA. Yes, counter framing is
present, but it appears marginal at best, unable effectively to challenge the pervasiveness, persistence
their
and power of white racism. Since Feagin and Elias dismiss ideas of racial democracy tout court,
perspective makes it difficult to understand [end page 961] how anti-racist
mobilization or political reform could ever have occurred in the
past or could ever take place in the future. They see racism as so
exclusively white that any notion of white anti-racism is virtually
ignored and completely unexplained.
Despite Feagin and Eliass good intentions of linking their analysis to
anti-racist practice, we believe their views have quite the opposite
effect: without intending to do so, they dismiss the political agency
of people of colour and of anti-racist whites. In Feagin/Eliass view,
systemic racism is like the Borg in the Star Trek series: a hive-mind
phenomenon that assimilates all it touches. As the Borg announce in
their collective audio message to intended targets, Resistance is
futile.
idea what we are doing for the 22nd century. And this is where
developing political insight comes in. Because we commit the error
of forgetting the systems we are talking about are human
systems. They are not systems in the way we talk about the laws of physics. A human system
can only exist by human actions maintaining them. Which means
every human system is incomplete. Every human being is by
definition incomplete. Which means you can go this way or you can go another way. The
system isnt actually closed. How do we know it? The reason we are seeing all of this
brutality in the world today is because the systems are breaking down. If the systems were working they
wouldnt have to worry. You know how have an effective system? You make people mentally be their own
prisoners. IF the system were really working, you wouldnt have to have the police because you all would
do it for them. Its the very fact that the system is breaking down that we are seeing heightened brutality.
The problem with heightened brutality is that it is not sustainable. There are studies, for instance, if you
military advisors in this country. They argue that
look at a paper called Mr. Y, done by the
using military force to maintain the United States is not sustainable. They
argue what is sustainable is for a nation to learn to be good citizens in
the world. Which means it has to build up its infrastructure, education, human relations, it has to deal
with the ecology, the environment, all of those things. And this is what many people are learning all over
the world. And so one of the things we have to bear in mind then is this: when we begin to engage in these
If we look at
struggles we have to understand how we have to think differently.
neoconservativism, they want to take us back to the 17th century,
Hobbseianism, its all about order, control. That is what you are seeing in the streets right now, here
in this country, and Latin America, and some parts of Europe. And then you have
neoliberalism. Neoliberalism wants to have free markets and at the same time it wants to
create a unique form of vulnerability which it places through 19th
century thought which is that you are supposed to look at yourself as
an individual. Neoliberals say that they dont believe in group rights, only individual rights. Now you
know what an individual is when you are dealing with a government or society. An individual is simply a
that conception of rights is to ensure you have a
vulnerable being. So in effect,
population thats completely vulnerable to the domination of the
system. Now the problem is, many people when they respond to neo-
conservatism and neo-liberalism, attack it through being anti-
globalism. Because weve got neo-conservative globalism and neo-liberal globalism. So what they do
is abrogate, they give up the concrete levels in which people can
build alternative ways of imagining a global future. Now, heres the
thing. On neo-liberalism, the idea is to make you forget the 20 th century. Why? The 20th century was the
age of revolution. They want you to think 19th, 18th, and 17th century. And then they tell you every
this is where Fanon is interesting.
revolutionary effort in the 20th century failed and
Because you see, he brings an insight that you need to
understand the concept of failure differently. And Ill give an example. A lot
of things that Ive worked with, in groups that Ive worked with, communities where we work together,
we always had people and somebody who says dont do
every time we have a project,
that. And youll say why? And theyll say we tried. You see where Im
getting at? If I couldnt do it, nobody could do it. But what they dont
understand is that their failure already started setting the
conditions for a new kind of relation. When I was president of the Caribbean
Philosophical Association I went and lectured in nearly every country in which there were slaves, to deal, in
2008, with the end of the British Atlantic slave trade.
If you hear the popular histories,
youll hear that slave revolts failed. The crappy history you have is that
one day a group of people in England, in France, in Denmark said you
know, slavery is a really bad thing, let us get rid of it. Now that is not
the actual history, everywhere I went and looked at the archives and local history,
every single instance, there was a slave revolt. Every single
one --- the Sharpe Rebellion in Jamaica is what led to the
question of getting rid of the Atlantic Slave Trade. If you look at
Denmark, if you look among the Dutch, the Dutch, had a much larger slave trade, the British were
pirates, they took it over. And when you go look at history, and Ill give you an example, a lot of yall dont
youll see
know that Denmark had a big, had a whole colonial structure. And if you go to Copenhagen,
a statute of a man, I forget his name, a governor, and it says freed the
slaves. Okay? Now, you go to St. Martin youll get the real story, here is the
story. It always boggles my mind how slavery functions, they had the fort, and they had enslaved
people bring the supplies and everything into the fort. It also boggles my mind that slave masters had
slaves cook for them, but anyways, the people would come in and deliver supplies and one
morning the governor woke up and outside the entire fort, it was
surrounded by black enslaved people wearing white. You better watch out when you see
some Africans wearing white. They have machetes, pitchforks and they just
looked at the fort. The governor looked out and said disband, and they
just stood there. And then he said, he ordered to aim the guns to them, disband or well
shoot. And the people stood, and then he ordered fire. And none of
the guns worked, because every day they came in they
replaced gunpowder with sand. And then you know what he said?
Well now youre all free. The thing about Danes is that they were all Lutherans, their
law was the governors law, and if he says youre free, youre free. And now, those islands were not of
use to the Danes and there was a period of equality, rights, and they sold the
islets to the United States that implemented segregation and all kinds of other
things, but the point is different. The point is you have one history
where it says he freed the slaves, and then the actual history
where the slaves freed themselves. Nowhere in history, this is the
Fanonian point, nowhere in history, any kind of domination, not just enslaved communities, were
talking about structural violence of many kinds, and people talk about, for instance: Who created
the womens movement? The answer is women, and men, but mostly
women, who cared about their liberation. We are able to look at the
world different because women fought. Its not that they sat down
and said treat me better. They got up and went out in the streets.
Every instance of anyone doing political activism really works.
The error people make is that they think just because in the
past, there were, so called overcome rebellions, they dont
realize that rebellions change the conditions. And thus there is no such
thing, this is why I brought in the Fanon example, he didnt fight with
the presumption he would win, he fought because he had to. And
why did he have to? It wasnt in the sense of self-defense, he had to precisely because he knew it
was the right thing to do. Real political work is about doing what is
necessary when an understanding because it should be done and its not
about you. If we come to the concrete levels, you need to argue, look closely at what youre doing,
if its going to be action beyond you, you know what you call that? If its only about you, its
not only narcissism and selfishness, and even hate, but if its about those
that transcend you, if you are not the reason, but because its right
and for subsequent generations, what do you call if when you
really do something for others? The word, and it connects to
the revolutionary force that you see in the entirety of the black
radical tradition, is a word that may sound corny, but its true,
the word is love. Theres a difference in political work
connected to love because its purpose is to make grow, and to
make happen that which is absent. Love and power, in that
sense, works.
They Say: Turns Case
Racist ideologies/whiteness isnt independent from political,
economic structures of the time. They simplify the complex
we need a historically specific approach
Adolph REED, Jr., Professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, 1 [Response to Eric
Arnesen, International Labor and Working-Class History, No. 60, Fall 2001, p. 69-80]
Whether or not he would agree that this potential exists, Professor Arne- sen has argued convincingly that
the interpretive payoff promised by the whiteness scholarship has not
been demonstrated. In addition to the limitations of conceptualization and execution that he so
thoroughly describes and the factors impelling toward them that I have thus far discussed, I believe that
the crucial conceptual inadequacy of the whiteness discourse, the source of
its deepest interpretive difficulties, is its failure to break completely with the
race/class dichotomy that defines its relationship to what Arnesen characterizes
as Marxism lite.
The terms of the race/class debate misdirect the effort to make sense
of the relation between class and race in America. This controversy
pivots on an axis bounded by two unhelpfully formalistic, artificially separated
poles. It is driven by a bias toward monocausal explanation and an
impossibly nave belief that the flux of history can be suspended to
permit distilling complex, mutually evolving, dialectical social
processes into neatly distinguishable analytical categories that can be
weighed against each other as independent social forces. Most pointedly,
both poles of this debate approach racial stratification as lying outside
the logical or normal development of American capitalist political
economy and social relationson the class pole as an
epiphenomenon or a random, idiosyncratic artifact; on the race pole as an
independent ontological reality. Attempts to overcome these defects
within the debates own terms have produced meaningless, reified
compromises such as the proposition that racism originally emerges
from capitalist social relations but then takes on a life of its own.
This is not the place to recount this hoary debates unfortunate history or to parse its myriad expressions.
it perpetuates a tendency to
To the extent that it organizes the whiteness discourse
formulate American racial dynamics on psychological or other bases
that are disconnected from political economy and the reproduction of
labor relations and attendant political and social structures. The
attempt to explain races role is thus disconnected from the material
foundation and engine of American social hierarchy and its
ideological legitimations. That leads this literature into culs-de-sac
of reification and ontology. Efforts to situate those formulations materially result in
convoluted notions like the possessive investment in whiteness, an updated version of the old idea of
white skin privilege that was spawned by an earlier instance of the race/class debate in the New Left.
this line of arguments inadequacies become clearest as they
Now, as then,
translate into programs for political action. The whiteness critique,
despite its self-consciously political aspirations, has generated nothing more
substantial or promising than moral appeals to whites to give up their
commitments to, or to abolish, whiteness. It is difficult to imagine how this
program could be anything more than an expression of hopeless
desperation or pointless selfrighteousness.
The initially intriguing impulse of the whiteness discourse propounded by Professor
Roediger and others, that race and class status are intertwined and that their relation
should be charted historically and theorized, has been undone by its acceptance of
the race/class debates frame. Whiteness ultimately provides an evanescent
and ahistorical racial metaphor for a longstanding epicycle of
American class relations, the filtering and sorting of pools of actual and
potential labor as populations organized into a system of ascriptive
hierarchy. As the sociologist Oliver Cromwell Cox argued more than half a century ago in Caste, Class,
and Race: A Study in Social Dynamics (Garden City, NY, 1948) (Part III of which has just been reissued by
Monthly Review Press as Race), that is what race is, no more and no less. Instructively,
Roedigers commitment to the race pole of the dichotomy induces him to misread Cox as reducing racism
mechanistically to a simple tool of the ruling class.
Rooting race as an ideology and evolving system of social hierarchy
within American capitalist labor relations more nearly puts us on the road to
pursuing the important questions suggested by the project that
produced whiteness studies. This approach, which requires
historically specific, concrete examination, points toward the shifting
role of racial hierarchy as a technology of civic status that, in
constraining or affirming legal and unofficial citizenship rights and
prerogatives, is a component of the larger political and economic
framework of class power. Workers normatively recognized civic status has
much to do with determining their pragmatic options and circumscribing
the contexts within which they define their interests. This perspective
also emphasizes the significance of political institutions, law, and
public policy in shaping identities and class relations.
Professor Roedigers Wages of Whiteness sought to explore how a developing racial ideology and system of
racial hierarchy defined civic status and contributed to white workers understandings of themselves and
their place in antebellum society. Despite the conceptual flaws and incompleteness of his account, it
located the whiteness idea within a specific matrix of social relations. As an academic subspecialty
congealed around this accounts central trope, the whiteness idea has become an
anachronistic, catch-all category that hovers above historical context
and political economy; it functions as an independent variablean
unchanging marker of civic acceptability to which differently identified
populations at different times have gained or been denied access. Not
only does this perception underwrite the many conceptual difficulties
and ambiguities that Professor Arnesen discusses, including the conflation of classification as
white, embrace of whiteness as a social position, and endorsement of white supremacist ideology; it is
also the opposite of a social constructionist view of race . Furthermore,
reading settled notions of whiteness back into the past
misunderstands the more complicated and fluid evolution of
race and racial categories, and their social meanings and
consequences, in American history. Most of all, this framework blurs the
problem it purports to address. The issue, after all, is not the sources,
content, or entailments of an abstract whiteness; it is how the idea of
race, racial ideologies, racial identities, and racial stratification have
emerged and operatedin varying ways in different contextsin the shaping of
American social relations and politics, among workers as well as others in the society.
Sombarts question is not necessarily inappropriate as a heuristic device, especially for those committed to
The
leftist political programs, so long as it is not encumbered with his teleological baggage.
whiteness literature by and large has not successfully jettisoned that baggage, and it has
compounded the problem through an ahistorical, fundamentally
idealist understanding of race and its relation to the concrete
reproduction of, and contestation within, the dynamics of American
political economy and social stratification.