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1. Cario v. CHR
G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991
HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education,
Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City
Schools of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA
BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL
CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:p
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted
by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from
the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and
reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or
government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission
take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular
subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government
agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on
Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of
hearing and adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence
taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in
the present action. These facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases
recently resolved by this Court 2 or otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder
set forth.
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school
teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association
(MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described
as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the
alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again
been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake
said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on
September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to
negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of
Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes,
converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc.
Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were
served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or
face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate
dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their
replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the
week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private
respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had
agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4
2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private
respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and
given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for
ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced
(unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was
consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR
complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber
were, among others, named respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers, opted
for a formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the administrative
proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for
issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for
suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating
Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the
hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout
signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually
resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario dated December 17, 1990, rendered after
evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted
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by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the
suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cario), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR
Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an
attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking
teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445,
supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as
G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher
associations, a few named individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous
similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to
be impleaded."
5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements
dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while
they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their
replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons
completely unknown to them. 10
6. Their complaints and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by
the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) were docketed as "Striking Teachers
CHR Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a
"dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cario requiring
his attendance therein. 11
On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec.
Cario) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission,
with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C.
Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain
that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended without formal notice,
and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the
grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with
which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter
issued an Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition:
To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its
investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers
are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very badly,
Secretary Isidro Cario, of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr.
Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon
Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the
Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any
and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the
Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on
the basis of complainants' evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was
granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted
on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no
cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14
8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments
affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated,
viz.:
a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cario in Case
No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the
suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and
b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and
95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the
individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters
complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner
Cario to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants,
preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17
9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec.
Cario's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit
their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall
proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents
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counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of
law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the
administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights
which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its
"utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from
those in the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably
to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590,
supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor
General, in behalf of petitioner Cario, has commenced the present action of certiorari
and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel
bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has
also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC
Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear
and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues:
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause
exists for the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their
superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of
MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize,"
justify their mass action or strike.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with
character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon
and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the
Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that
the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said
matters, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the
power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or
even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the
power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like
alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and
that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power
is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is
not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the
law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes
of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission
does not have. 22
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers
of the Commission on Human Rights.
The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23
Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on
Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers
and functions are the following 25
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt
for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for
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preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to
enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and
to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty
obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine
the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions
bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and
categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own
initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such
rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for
contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any
person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of
any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the
conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its
findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice,
or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge.
Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and
quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or
probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe
or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to
an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of
course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or
intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the
facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step
by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and
inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the
taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation,"
"investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of
which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry,
judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain
matter or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,
decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle
finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues
raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge"
means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . .
to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority.
To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge"
means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn.
. . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32
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Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the
matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it
means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by
the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More
particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of
(a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute
and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying
on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those
actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of
Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting
administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of
by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and
what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to
him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance
of the issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears that appeals have been seasonably
taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court
itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary
of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial
evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not
having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of
Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political
rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for
reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an
adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the
Supreme Court.
The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It
has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary
or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground
traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions involved. This
would accord success to what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy
to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the
administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be adverse to them.
This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.
In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no
useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those
reached by Secretary Cario, it would have no power anyway to reverse the
Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service
Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it
concludes that Secretary Cario was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate
Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service
Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman
and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking
Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ, concur.
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2. Villaluz vs. Zaldivar
G.R. No. L-22754 December 31, 1965
RUBEN A. VILLALUZ, petitioner,
vs.
CALIXTO ZALDIVAR, ET AL., respondents.
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo and Juan T. David for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Petitioner seeks his reinstatement as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office with
payment of back salaries in a petition filed before this Court on April 1, 1964.
He alleged that he was nominated as chief of said office on May 20, 1958 and two
days thereafter his nomination was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments;
that on May 26, 1958 he took his oath of office as such after having been informed of
his nomination by then Acting Assistant Executive Secretary Sofronio C. Quimson;
that in a letter dated January 28, 1960 addressed to the President of the Philippines
by Congressman Joaquin R. Roces as Chairman of the Committee on Good
Government of the House of Representatives, the latter informed the former of the
findings made by his Committee concerning alleged gross mismanagement and
inefficiency committed by petitioner in the Motor Vehicles Office which are summed
up in the letter, as follows: (1) malpractice in office resulting in huge losses to the
government; (2) failure to correct inadequate controls or intentional toleration of the
same, facilitating thereby the commission of graft and corruption; and (3) negligence
to remedy unsatisfactory accounting; that as a result of said findings. Congressman
Roces recommended the replacement of petitioner and of his assistant chief Aurelio
de Leon as well as the complete revamp of the offices coming under the Motor
Vehicles Office by the new chief who may be appointed thereafter; that having been
officially informed of the content of said letter, then Secretary of Public Works and
Communications furnished petitioner with a copy thereof requiring him to explain
within 72 hours why no administrative action should be taken against him relative to
the charges contained in the letter; that petitioner answered the letter as required
wherein he explained and refuted in detail each and everyone of the charges
contained in the letter of Congressman Roces; that on February 15, 1960, the then
Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo suspended petitioner as Administrator of the
Motor Vehicles Office, having thereupon created an investigating committee with the
only purpose of investigating the charges against petitioner and his assistant Aurelio
de Leon, and to undertake the investigation a prosecution panel was created headed
by Special Prosecutor Emilio A. Gancayco; that after the investigation said committee
submitted its report to the President of the Philippines who thereafter issued
Administrative Order No. 332 decreeing the removal from office of petitioner; that as
a result of petitioner's removal Apolonio Ponio was appointed to take his place as
acting administrator; and that, after having been officially notified of his removal,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and/or reinstatement, and when this was
denied, he filed the instant petition before this Court.
Respondents in their answer denied the claim of petitioner that the charges contained
in the letter of Congressman Roces were not directed against him but against his office
in general for the truth is that he was, specifically charged with mismanagement, gross
inefficiency and negligence in the performance of his duties as Chief of the Motor
Vehicles Office, and as a result he was required to the same within 72 hours to explain
why no disciplinary action should be taken against him. Respondents also denied that
petitioner was investigated without being accorded due process is required by law for
in fact he was given every reasonable opportunity to present his defense, to secure
the attendance of witnesses, and to produce documents in his behalf in a manner
consistent with administrative due process. Respondent also averred that the
President of the Philippines, contrary to petitioner's claim, has jurisdiction to
investigate and remove him since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the
non-competitive or unclassified service under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260.
Respondents finally averred that the letter of Congressman Joaquin R. Roces is in
effect a valid administrative complaint because it contained specific charges which
constitute just causes for his suspension and removal; that said charges need not be
sworn to for the Chief Executive, as administrative head of petitioner, is empowered
to commence administrative proceedings motu proprio pursuant to Executive Order
No. 370, series of 1941, without need of any previous verified complaint. And as
special defense respondents averred that petitioner is guilty of laches for having
allowed almost four years before instituting the present action.
There is merit in the claim that petitioner, being a presidential appointee, belongs to
the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government and is such he can only
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be investigated and removed from office after due hearing the President of the
Philippines under the principle that "the power to remove is inherent in the power to
appoint" as can be clearly implied from Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260. Such is
what we ruled in the recent case of Ang-Angco wherein on this point we said:
There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may
extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who
belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong
to the classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to
remove is inherent in the power to appoint (Lacson v. Romero, supra), but not with
regard to those officers or employees who belong, to the classified service for as to
them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our
Constitution which says that the "Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior
officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the head of departments" (Article
VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). (Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al., L-17169, November
30, 1963).
Consequently, as a corollary to the foregoing ruling, we may state that the
Commissioner of Civil Service is without jurisdiction to hear and decide the
administrative charges filed against petitioner because the authority of said
Commissioner to pass upon questions of suspension, separation, or removal can only
be exercised with reference to permanent officials and employees in the classified
service to which classification petitioner does not belong. This is also what we said in
the Ang-Angco case when, in interpreting Section 16 (i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we
emphasized that only permanent officers and employees who belong to the classified
service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service.
There is, therefore, no error of procedure committed by respondents insofar as the
investigation and disciplinary action taken against petitioner is concerned, even if he
is under the control and supervision of the Department of Public Works, in view of the
reason we have already stated that he is a presidential appointee who comes
exclusively under the jurisdiction of the President. The following rationale supports this
view:
Let us now take up the power of control given to the President by the Constitution over
all officers and employees in the executive departments which is now involved by
respondent as justification to override the specific provisions of the Civil Service Act.
This power of control is couched in general terms for it does not set in specific manner
its extent and scope. Yes, this Court in the case of Hebron v. Reyes, supra, occasion
to interpret the extent of such power to mean "the power of an officer to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter," to distinguish
it from the power of general supervision over municipal government, but the decision
does not go to the extent of including the power to remove an officer or employee in
the executive department. Apparently, the power merely applies to the exercise of
control over the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of the
act. It only means that the President may set aside the judgment or action taken by a
subordinate in the performance of his duties.
That meaning is also the meaning given to the word "control" as used in administrative
law. Thus, the Department Head pursuant to Section 79 (c) is given direct control of
all bureaus and offices under his department by virtue of which he may "repeal or
modify decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus or offices," and under Section 74 of the
same Code, the President's control over the executive department only refers to
matters of general policy. The term "policy" means a settled or definite course or
method adopted and followed by a government, body or individual, and it cannot be
said that the removal of an inferior officer comes within the meaning of control over a
specific policy of government. (Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al., supra)
With regard to the claim that the administrative proceedings conducted against
petitioner which led to his separation are illegal simply because the charges preferred
against him by Congressman Roces were not sworn to as required by Section 72 of
Republic Act No. 2260, this much we can say: said proceedings having been
commenced against petitioner upon the authority of the Chief Executive who was his
immediate administrative head, the same may be commenced by him motu proprio
without previous verified complaint pursuant to Executive Order No. 370, series of
1941, the pertinent provisions of which are is follows:
(1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced a government officer or employee
by the head or chief of the bureau or office concerned motu proprio or upon complaint
of any person which shall be subscribed under oath by the complainant: Provided,
That if a complaint is not or cannot be sworn to by the complainant, the head or chief
of the bureau or office concerned may in his discretion, take action thereon if the public
interest or the special circumstances of the case, so warrant.1
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Finally, on the theory that the instant petition partakes of the nature of quo warranto
which seeks petitioners reinstatement to his former position as Administrator of the
Motor Vehicles Office, we are of the opinion that it has now no legal raison d'etre for
having been filed more than one year after its cause of action had accrued. As this
Court has aptly said: "a delay of slightly over one (1) year was considered sufficient ...
to be an action for mandamus, by reason of laches or abandonment of office. We see
no reason to depart from said view in the present case, petitioner herein having
allowed about a year and a half to elapse before seeking reinstatement." (Jose V.
Lacson, et al., L-10177, May 17, 1957).

WHEREFORE, petition is denied. No costs.

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3. Ruiz vs. Drilon with the comment required of the public respondents, considering that the pleadings
and other papers already filed by the other parties in this case are adequate to enable
G.R. No. 101666 June 9, 1992 the Court to act upon the present petition.

DR. ELISEO L. RUIZ, President of Central Luzon State University (CLSU), Muoz,
Nueva Ecija, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. ISIDRO
CARIO, in his capacity as DECS Secretary; ATTY. RENO CAPINPIN, Director III,
DECS, in his capacity as Chairman, Investigating Committee; DALMACIO CASISON,
in his capacity and as Member, Investigating Committee; EDUARDO PARAY, LUIS
CASTRO, HIPOLITO MALAMUG, NEMESIO TORRES and NOLASCO HIPOLITO,
respondents.
No. 103570 June 9, 1992
DR. ELISEO L. RUIZ, President, Central Luzon State University (CLSU), Muoz,
Nueva Ecija, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as DECS
Secretary; MARINA S.J. PANGAN, in her capacity as Asst. Secretary of DECS and
DR. FORTUNATO BATTAD, respondents.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:p
I
The Court NOTED the sixth motion for extension of time to submit a comment to the
petition for certiorari and prohibition, (G.R. No. 101666) filed by the Solicitor General
on behalf of the public respondents Executive Secretary and the Secretary of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports ("DECS"), and Resolved to DISPENSE
II
On 6 May 1991, President Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order ("AO") No.
218 dismissing petitioner Eliseo Ruiz for cause from his office as President of the
Central Luzon State University ("CLSU"). 1
In two (2) orders dated 2 July 1991 and 3 September 1991, the Executive Secretary,
acting by authority of the President, denied petitioner's first and second motions for
reconsideration therefrom, the first for lack of merit and the second for being pro forma.
Consequently, AO No. 218 became final and executory. 2
On 1 October 1991, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) with the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R.
No. SP-12656. 3 Petitioner there sought to annul, as products of grave abuse of
discretion, President Aquino's order dated 13 September 1991 appointing Dr.
Fortunato Battad as the new CLSU President, as well as DECS Undersecretary
Marina Pangan's order dated 24 September 1991 directing petitioner to turn-over the
CLSU Presidency to Dr. Battad. The Court of Appeals issued the TRO prayed for by
petitioner. 4
Eight days later, on 9 October 1991, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court the
present petition (G.R. No. 101666) for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a TRO
for the purpose of annulling, for alleged grave abuse of discretion, the issuance of AO
No. 218 as well as of the orders of the Executive Secretary denying his motions for
reconsideration therefrom. 5 The Court did not issue the TRO prayed for by petitioner.
6 This petition made no mention of the petition for prohibition with prayer for TRO filed
8 days earlier with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. SP-21656).
On 9 January 1992, the Court's Circular No. 28-91 dated 3 September 1991 having
gone into effect on 1 January 1992, petitioner filed a manifestation and compliance
dated 6 January 1992, where for the first time, he disclosed to this Court the other
judicial proceedings which he had commenced in connection with the issuance of AO
No. 210. 7
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On 29 January 1992, after due proceedings, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision in CA-G.R. No. SP-26165, dismissing the petition for lack of merit and finding
the same to be a case of forum shopping. 8 Petitioner sought review of this decision
by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court, which petition
was docketed as G.R. No. 103570 and assigned to the Second Division. 9 This case
was consolidated with G.R. No. 101666, by this time pending with the Court En Banc,
by a resolution dated 2 April 1992.
Meanwhile, on 28 January 1992, the Court issued a resolution requiring petitioner to
show cause why the petition in G.R. No. 101666 should not be dismissed as an
apparent case of forum shopping, considering that the parties involved, issues raised
and the reliefs sought therein are substantially identical with those in CA-G.R. No. SP-
26165. 10
Petitioner submitted a manifestation and compliance dated 6 January 1992 obviously
in anticipation of the 29 January 1992 Resolution of the Court, as well as an undated
compliance filed on 2 March 1992 in response to the same resolution. He denies
having engaged in forum shopping and contends: (1) his cause of action in CA-G.R.
No. SP-26156 consists of the illegality of the actions taken by the Office of the
President and by the DECS in implementing AO No. 218, which may render moot the
Court's review of the intrinsic merits of AO No. 218, an entirely different cause of action
in itself; and (2) he never attempted to hide the fact, either before this Court or the
Court of Appeals, that he had instituted both actions "for separate reasons, apart
though related from each other," such candor being "an elementary consideration in
the determination of the issue whether he committed forum shopping or not." 11
Deliberating on the present consolidated Petitions, the Court finds the explanations
proffered by petitioner and his counsel as justifications for the procedural maneuvers
undertaken in this case to be completely unsatisfactory and considers the Petitions to
be clear cases of deliberate forum shopping.
The Court views with considerable disfavor the legal maneuvers undertaken by
petitioner and his counsel of record, Atty. Crispulo S. Esguerra, to defeat his removal
from office. It is evident that petitioner, in violation of Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court, had split a single cause of action consisting of the alleged illegality of his
removal from office by the President through AO No. 218, by seeking judicial review
of (1) AO 218 with the Court and at the same time (2) having the enforcement aspect
of the President's action and the filling up of the resulting vacancy reviewed by the
Court of Appeals. It also appears to the Court that petitioner carried out these acts in
order to obtain a TRO (albeit with a limited twenty-day lifetime) from the Court of
Appeals, issued as a matter of course, in order to stop the execution and
implementation of AO No. 218, and afterwards, to try to get a TRO with an indefinite
lifetime from this Court for the same purpose, in case his petition in the main action of
CA-G.R. No. SP-26165 would be dismissed on the merits by the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, during the period when the proceedings in G.R. No. 101666 and CA-G.R.
No. SP-26165 were simultaneously pending action before two (2) different for a
petitioner created for himself a situation where he could hope to get (after the 20-day
life of the Court of Appeals TRO) a judicial order from either forum which could stop
the execution of AO No. 218 with more permanency (i.e., either a TRO with an
indefinite lifetime from the Supreme Court or the grant of his petition for prohibition by
the Court of Appeals). Thus the Court of Appeals, aware of the institution of G.R. No.
101666, 12 committed no reversible error in considering the action before it as
another, independent case and as an instance of forum shopping.
Petitioner sought to maintain the two (2) segments of his single causes of action again
by instituting G.R. No. 103570, in a bid to ensure that the decision on the merits in
CA-G.R. No. SP-26165 will not attain finality and enforceability, even though the
matters involved therein are essentially the incidents of the case already pending
review in G.R. No. 101666.
Forum shopping effected by a party litigant through the deliberate splitting of causes
of actions and appeals in the hope that even as one case (in which a particular remedy
is sought) is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open,
is a deplorable practice because it results in the unnecessary clogging of the already
heavily burdened dockets of the courts. 13
Section 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by the Court on 11 January
1983, relative to the implementation of section 9 of BP 129, granting the Intermediate
Appellate Court (now the Court of Appeals) equal original jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, etc., whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, provides that if such a petition is filed before the Court of Appeals and is
still pending therein, a similar petition cannot be filed in the Supreme Court. A violation
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN

of this rule has also been considered a clear case of forum shopping, an act of
malpractice proscribed as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. The
Rule itself provides that a violation thereof constitutes: (1) cause for the summary
dismissal of both petitions; and (2) contempt of court for which the party or counsel
concerned may be held accountable. 14
The pretended candor of petitioner and his counsel here does not persuade. Petitioner
never informed the Court of the existence of CA-G.R. No. SP-26165 when he filed his
petition in G.R. No. 101666, the first opportunity available to him to be completely
candid with the Court. It was the private respondents in their comment to the petition
filed on 16 November 1991, who gave the Court first notice of the other proceeding.
15 It is obvious that petitioner filed his subsequent manifestation because he was no
longer able to deny the existence of the proceeding before the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner's attempt to trifle with the highest court of the land in this manner renders
him liable for forum shopping. 16
company where he was holding a directorship; and (d) he collected financial
contributions from the faculty and students in disregard of the provisions of R.A. No.
5546. 18 These acts constitute dishonesty and grave misconduct, and furnish legal
basis for dismissal from the public service. 19
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. No. 101666, as well
as the Petition for Review in G.R. No. 103570, are hereby DISMISSED as clear cases
of forum shopping and for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A,-
G.R, No. SP-26165 dated 29 January 1992 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Petitioner's counsel, Atty. Crispulo S. Esguerra. is hereby ADMONISHED and
WARNED that repetition of the same or similar acts of forum shopping will be more
severely punished. A copy of this Resolution shall be attached to the personal record
of Atty. Crispulo S. Esguerra in the office of the Bar Confidant. Costs against petitioner.

III

In addition to the foregoing, the Court deliberated upon the merits of the consolidated
Petitions and considers that petitioner has failed to show any grave abuse of discretion
or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondents in
rendering the assailed administrative orders.

Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any

investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled
only to an administrative decision that is based on substantial evidence made of record
and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and the evidence
presented against him during the hearings of the investigating committees. 17 There
is no doubt that he has been accorded his rights.

AO No. 218 made certain findings of fact on the basis of which petitioner was removed
from office. Those findings included the facts that (a) petitioner terminated the CLSU's
Executive Vice-President, offered new academic courses, undertook unprogrammed
projects resulting in wastage of university property, all without the necessary approval
of the Board of Regents; (b) he directed the purchase at uncanvassed prices of
chemicals unsuitable for the required school purposes from a firm owned by him; (c)
he executed, on behalf of CLSU, a crop harvest sales agreement in favor of a
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
4. Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion
[G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000]
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ,
respondents. Esmso
DECISION
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis the vast and
overwhelming powers of government. His only guarantee against oppression and
tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in times
of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizens basic due
process rights, or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle sounds
and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of
incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime
both in the state where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have
escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the
Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need
for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper
implementation of said treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty
Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of
the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition
Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the
ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes
correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents
accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or
consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting State). Kycalr
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs U. S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the
Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern
District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the
papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with
violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):
A)......18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two
[2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
B)......26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty
5 years on each count);
C)......18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum
Penalty 5 years on each count);
D)......18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty 5
years on each count);
E)......2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts;
Maximum Penalty less than one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and
authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to
Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the
"technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents
in support thereof. The panel found that the "official English translation of some
documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are some other
matters that needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo). Calrky
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent,
through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting
copies of the official extradition request from the U. S. Government, as well as all
documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers.
Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in
abeyance in the meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminarily, he be given at least a copy of,
or access to, the request of the United States Government, and after receiving a copy
of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondents July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated
July 13, 1999 (but received by private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the
foregoing requests for the following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and
supporting documents from the United States Government, pending evaluation by this
Department of the sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in accordance
with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition law. Article 7 of the
Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates the
documentary requirements and establishes the procedures under which the
documents submitted shall be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary
requirements under our domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary
investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We merely
determine whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law and treaty
have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not
available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be
extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and
extradition documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a request for
ample time to evaluate said documents. Mesm
2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury
information and documents obtained through grand jury process covered by strict
secrecy rules under United States law. The United States had to secure orders from
the concerned District Courts authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand
jury information to Philippine government and law enforcement personnel for the
purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said information is
not authorized by the United States District Courts. In this particular extradition request
the United States Government requested the Philippine Government to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of the subject information. This Departments denial of your
request is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that
the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United States in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. The Department of Justice under
P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition requests.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection
with an extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
to which we are a party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties
to it and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law
enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or
convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private
respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him
an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to
evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein
petitioners letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from
considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and
to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing
any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with an
application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo). Scslx
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter
raffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which is presided
over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who
appeared in his own behalf, moved that he be given ample time to file a memorandum,
but the same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day,
disposing:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary of
Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to maintain the status quo by
refraining from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further
proceedings in connection with the request of the United States Government for the
extradition of the petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial
court; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the
United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service on respondents of this
Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as
agreed upon by the counsels for the parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00
oclock in the morning. The respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their written
comment and/or opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or before
said date.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE:
Slxs c
I.
BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE
ACTS COMPLAINED OF, I. E., TO DESIST FROM REFUSING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST AND
DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY
TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN
PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS,
CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO
CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.
PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING LEGAL
DUTIES UNDER THE EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE
EXTRADITION LAW;
III.
THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS
FACE, FORMALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND
IV.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION
AND ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also
issued, as prayed for, was a temporary restraining order (TRO) providing: slx mis
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from
this Court, You, Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents, representatives or
any person or persons acting in your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
and DESIST from enforcing the assailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued by public
respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684.
GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of
the Philippines, this 17th day of August 1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)
The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as
directed, filed their respective memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues
are patent. However, a review of these issues as well as the extensive arguments of
both parties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the
two basic due process rights of notice and hearing? An affirmative answer would
necessarily render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic (the issues
of which are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative
resolution would call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated
August 24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the filing
of the extradition petition with the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event
that private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a
breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under
the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach,
is there any conflict between private respondents basic due process rights and the
provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into
the substantive merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which
concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of the
filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the
trial court. Missdaa
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US
Extradition Treaty which was executed only on November 13, 1994, ushered into force
the implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the
Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal of
an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign
authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with
any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed
on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." The
portions of the Decree relevant to the instant case which involves a charged and not
convicted individual, are abstracted as follows:
The Extradition Request
The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest
issued by the authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or
some other instruments having equivalent legal force;
2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as
to the name and identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known,
the acts or omissions complained of, and the time and place of the commission of
these acts; Sda adsc
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the
designation or description of the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the
request; and
4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.
(Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
Section 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides:
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to
meet the requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall
forward the request together with the related documents to the Secretary of Justice,
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge
of the case.
The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task
of evaluating the sufficiency of the request and the supporting documents is the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the
executive authority must ascertain whether or not the request is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity
and probable location of the person sought;
2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case;
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the
offense for which extradition is requested;
4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the offense; Rtc
spped
5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the prosecution
or the execution of punishment for the offense;
6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or
paragraph 4 of said Article, as applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide
probable cause for his arrest and committal for trial if the offense had been committed
there;
8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent
authority; and
9. A copy of the charging document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the
accompanying documents received in support of the request had been certified by the
principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State resident in the
Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy Note No.
951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not
be granted if the executive authority of the Requested State determines that the
request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation."
The Extradition Petition
Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request
and its supporting documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he
shall deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate
and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1],
Section 5, P. D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with
the proper regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that the court take
the extradition request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.). Korte
The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for
extradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue an order summoning the prospective
extraditee to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order.
The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph [1],
Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.
The Extradition Hearing
The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding
is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9
thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the
Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides that
the attorney having charge of the case may, upon application by the Requesting State,
represent the latter throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the
extradition and giving the reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence of a prima
facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to
the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately executory
(Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal
cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except for the
required 15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).
The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is
extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions
mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also determines
whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political one
(Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following
query presents itself: What is the nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings? Sclaw
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary
of Justice is to file the extradition petition after the request and all the supporting
papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official
who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and
under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not the request
is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable
under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph
[1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty
of filing the extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there
was failure to abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is
true that the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on
June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours later, the Department of Justice
received the request, apparently without the Department of Foreign Affairs discharging
its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its accompanying documents. The
statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs that his
Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post office, for which reason he simply
forwarded the request to the Department of Justice, indicates the magnitude of the
error of the Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its responsibilities.
Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to determine the completeness
of the documents and to evaluate the same to find out whether they comply with the
requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection that although the Department of Justice had
no obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, the Department also had to go
over them so as to be able to prepare an extradition petition (tsn, August 31, 1999,
pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this stage where private respondent insisted on the
following: (1) the right to be furnished the request and the supporting papers; (2) the
right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period of time to oppose the
request, and to present evidence in support of the opposition; and (3) that the
evaluation proceedings be held in abeyance pending the filing of private respondent's
opposition to the request. Kyle
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority,
one abdicating its powers and the other enlarging its commission. The Department of
Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation that
it is adopting the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message that if it
were to evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow private respondent to
participate in the process of evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the
Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition request and
supporting documents and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the request
and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice,
eminent as he is in the field of law, could not privately review the papers all by himself.
He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the DFA Secretary
or his undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative
determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class
by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to
say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive
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authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and
sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and
on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable; and
(c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that
the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal
legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3,
RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an
investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the
exercise of an administrative bodys quasi-judicial power. Ex sm
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation
of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c)
rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative
Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1).
Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one
of the determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to
exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26).
This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and
investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p.
27), or to require disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports,
testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p.
64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence,
which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agencys performance of its rule-
making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to
prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to
rule on the functions of an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It
does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts
and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining
whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory
functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon
the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for
investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and
circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final
pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion
and judgment. Mse sm
The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to
evaluate extradition documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the
rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its
only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the
law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition.
Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine
whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The
bodys power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can
be filed in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation
procedure is characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the
wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty
of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the
provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request.
This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party
may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the
request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he shall be
automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is submitted (Paragraph 4).
Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of 20 days after which the
arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically, although the
Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that once a request
is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be continuously
detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US
Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if no request is submitted. Practically,
the purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from the Requested State.
Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the
extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as
during the evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very
imminent one. Sc lex
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Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is
akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the
consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets
off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a
prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal
law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes
of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to
make available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain
constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions. Further,
as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are rights
formerly available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier stage in
the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination
(tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the
right against self-incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative
proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative
investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with immorality, which could result
in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The Court, citing the
earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the
revocation of ones license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation
than forfeiture of property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth
against a respondent which was filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft
Law. Again, we therein ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture of
property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such
forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier case of Almeda,
Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American jurisprudence,
laid down the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the
proceeding is under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can
be included in the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may
be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant
to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding
does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the
proceeding is civil in nature. x law
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of ones
property or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us,
involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy
of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys
precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the
time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to
eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal
aspect of the process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a preliminary
investigation since both procedures may have the same result the arrest and
imprisonment of the respondent or the person charged. Similar to the evaluation stage
of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of
an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the
deprivation of his liberty.
Petitioners reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8,
Petitioners Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal
legislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not well-taken. Wright is not authority
for petitioners conclusion that his preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary
investigation. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the
applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with
the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding
enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised
in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good,
which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be
due process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with due
process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression
and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States
accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. Sc
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The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only
worded in exactly identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they are
alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which
the provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, their
dynamic and resilient character which make them capable of meeting every modern
problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to the present to meet the
exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of due process
are interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law
the capacity for progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in order to avoid
the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of
the due process clause "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and
exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of
fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owners Association vs. City Mayor of Manila,
20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of justice which inhere
in the very idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process which requires
the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life,
liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights
of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and
competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing
pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings
as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are
entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice,
they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the
position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding,
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the respondents basic due
process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the
affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits
and other supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the
respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant. Scmis
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such
as:
1. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the
summary abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive
suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local
Government Code, B. P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters
showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats to public
health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal
prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent
is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without
prejudice to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the
property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them
had not been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings fall under any of the described
situations mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are
quite noteworthy considering that the subject treaty involves the U.S. Government.
Mis sc
American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition which
is based on the Extradition Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and
international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the
governor of the asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to the demanding
state. The Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are given a liberal
construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as swiftly
as possible of persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged with crime
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
(31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged fugitive, the
requisition papers or the demand must be in proper form, and all the elements or
jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on the face of the papers,
such as the allegation that the person demanded was in the demanding state at the
time the offense charged was committed, and that the person demanded is charged
with the commission of the crime or that prosecution has been begun in the demanding
state before some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents
are then filed with the governor of the asylum state, and must contain such papers
and documents prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy of the
instrument charging the person demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an
affidavit made before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect to said
charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said papers are necessary in order
to confer jurisdiction on the governor of the asylum state to effect the extradition (35
C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of the indictment,
information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and other instruments
accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive
or his attorney is directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been held
to be a right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d
103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853). Mis spped
In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation
to the executive authority of the Requested State of a requisition or demand for the
return of the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular officer having
authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815).
In petitioners memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter
dated September 13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice, summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles, which are
basically governed by a combination of treaties (with special reference to the RP-US
Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In urgent
cases, requests for the provisional arrest of an individual may be made directly by the
Philippine Department of Justice to the U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In
the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is transmitted
subsequently through the diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to the
Department of Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State prepares a
declaration confirming that a formal request has been made, that the treaty is in full
force and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal legal
representation in extradition proceedings, that the offenses are covered as
extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the documents have been
authenticated in accordance with the federal statute that ensures admissibility at any
subsequent extradition hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the
prospective extraditee (18 U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to hold
a hearing to consider the evidence offered in support of the extradition request (Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditable
to the foreign country. The court must also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over
the defendant and jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being sought
for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits extradition; and (c) there is
probable cause to believe that the defendant is the person sought and that he
committed the offenses charged (Ibid.) Spped
5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability after
having received a "complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his
jurisdiction" with having committed any of the crimes provided for by the governing
treaty in the country requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted that a long
line of American decisions pronounce that international extradition proceedings
partake of the character of a preliminary examination before a committing magistrate,
rather than a trial of the guilt or innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it
incorporates its determinations in factual findings and conclusions of law and certifies
the persons extraditability. The court then forwards this certification of extraditability
to the Department of State for disposition by the Secretary of State. The ultimate
decision whether to surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of State (18 U.S.C.
3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the
motives of the requesting government in seeking his extradition. However, a person
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
facing extradition may present whatever information he deems relevant to the
Secretary of State, who makes the final determination whether to surrender an
individual to the foreign government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins
and ends with one entity the Department of State which has the power to evaluate the
request and the extradition documents in the beginning, and, in the person of the
Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act on the courts determination of
extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs which
should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having satisfied itself on the
points earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department
of Justice for the preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly, however,
the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case, perfunctorily turned over the
request to the Department of Justice which has taken over the task of evaluating the
request as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and prosecuting the
petition for extradition. Jo spped
Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should
the person sought to be extradited be given due process rights by the Philippines in
the evaluation stage. He emphasizes that petitioners primary concern is the possible
delay in the evaluation process.
We agree with private respondents citation of an American Supreme Court ruling:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends
is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the
Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might
fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in particular,
that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the
overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy
government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)
The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine Government
that no right that of liberty secured not only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines
Constitution but of the United States as well, is sacrificed at the altar of expediency.
(pp. 40-41, Private Respondents Memorandum.) Spped jo
In the Philippine context, this Courts ruling is invoked:
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the
individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that
there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it
be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional
shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the
most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the
bypassing of an individuals rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking
a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as
against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right (Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343,
375-376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioners argument that extradition is a tool of criminal
law enforcement. To be effective, requests for extradition or the surrender of accused
or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated or
fast-tracked proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are, however, not always
incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary does not mean
precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic principles inherent in
"ordered liberty." Miso
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that
point, there is no extraditee yet in the strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may
not occur. In interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may not, in the
absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since
after a close evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold that federal and
statutory requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been met (31
Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the
requested state has the power to deny the behest from the requesting state.
Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition documents the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the requirements of the law and
the treaty, he shall not forward the request to the Department of Justice for the filing
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
of the extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid requirements will
not vest our government with jurisdiction to effect the extradition.
In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable
efforts in assuring compliance with the requirements of the law and the treaty since it
even informed the U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition papers
(such as those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and
those that are not properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that
consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the lawyers in his
Department and those from the U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous nature
of the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of time due
to its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that urgently necessitates
immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can be dispensed with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative
action. Is private respondent precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing
at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant
characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one hand, there is yet no extraditee, but
ironically on the other, it results in an administrative determination which, if adverse to
the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The grant of the request
shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as Section
2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after
the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation proceeding itself
by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law.
The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be
dispensed with and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise
invokes Section 7 of Article III which reads: Nex old
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the
Philippines, namely: (1) the right to information on matters of public concern, and (2)
the corollary right of access to official records and documents. The general right
guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on matters of public concern.
In its implementation, the right of access to official records is likewise conferred. These
cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law"
(Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely
on the premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone
can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondents letter-request dated
July 1, 1999 do not fall under the guarantee of the foregoing provision since the
matters contained in the documents requested are not of public concern. On the other
hand, private respondent argues that the distinction between matters vested with
public interest and matters which are of purely private interest only becomes material
when a third person, who is not directly affected by the matters requested, invokes the
right to information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directly
affected thereby, his right to information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public concern escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking,
every act of a public officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of
public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996
ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public
may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives or simply because
such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people
and any citizen has "standing".Mani kx
When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said
action has a direct bearing on his life, and may either cause him some kind of
deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the basic right to be notified under Section 1
of the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to information on matters of public
concern. As to an accused in a criminal proceeding, he invokes Section 14, particularly
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the
control of the government (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be contained in official records,
and in documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official
government action from the U. S. Government. No official action from our country has
yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters of foreign
relations with the U. S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this
constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of public
concern since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the
balance must be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for
the proper functioning of the government. During the evaluation procedure, no official
governmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence the
invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition
hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government
by then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request.
The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant
controversy: Would private respondents entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in
the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due process clause
in the Constitution?
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon
the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the
Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the
grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign
relations. Maniks
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in
good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also
compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations."
Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of
the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in
the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts)
are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule
of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it
is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally
accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in
the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p.
55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be
made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates
that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez,
101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2
SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are
accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact
that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or
imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal
sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules
of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes
effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where
the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines,
both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution
(Ibid.). Manikan
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or
national law? En contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pitted
against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld.
Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as
implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process
rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings.
From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and
during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and
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hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the
law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also
manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he
describes the evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the
sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An
application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against
the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law
precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American
jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate
extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even
request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state,
and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35
C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to
prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the secrecy
surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The
confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioners revelation that
everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable during trial.
The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has authorized
the disclosure of certain grand jury information. If the information is truly confidential,
the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not
even during trial. Oldmis o
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as
American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the
conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar situations
in jurisprudence for an application by analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a
preliminary investigation since both procedures may result in the arrest of the
respondent or the prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional
arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US
Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following petitioners
theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a period
of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15,
Article III of the Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public
safety requires it"? Petitioners theory would also infer that bail is not available during
the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the extradition petition has already been
filed in court since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor,
notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ll
persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended " Can
petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and
hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees in the Bill of Rights could
thus be subservient thereto? Ncm
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process
in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity
to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270
SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276
SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs.
Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In
essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is
enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31
[1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in
the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioners fears that the Requesting State may
have valid objections to the Requested States non-performance of its commitments
under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount
consideration.
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How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to
the four corners of Presidential Decree No. 1069?
Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs.
Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271
SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential
Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in
Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and Functions
and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal
Assistance for Members of the Integrated National Police who may be charged for
Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the Integrated
National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other purposes), as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary dismissals may be effected
without the necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due
process still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:
... [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an
employee may be removed or dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain
instances. It is equally clear to us that an employee must be informed of the charges
preferred against him, and that the normal way by which the employee is so informed
is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural
requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still remain consistent with the
constitutional provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that the
employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable
opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses against the
charges levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his defenses.
Ncmmis
(at p. 671)
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld
the due process rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger
of loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to
his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioners favorable
action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondents liberty is
easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction, which is aptly
described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA
677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice
outside legality," since private respondents due process rights, although not
guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We
would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over
guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the
principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of
liberty and government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger
arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies
of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable
period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil
Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic by this decision, the
same is hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED. 6/2/00 2:12 PM
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5. Pefianco vs. Moral
[G.R. No. 132248. January 19, 2000]
HON. ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, petitioner, vs. MARIA LUISA C. MORAL, respondent.
Ne-xold
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
SECRETARY ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) seeks to nullify through this petition for review the Decision of the Court
of Appeals[1] dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by then DECS Secretary
Ricardo T. Gloria for lack of merit, as well as its Resolution dated 13 January 1998
denying reconsideration thereof.
On 26 July 1994 former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint against
respondent Maria Luisa C. Moral, then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the
National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. The complaint charged respondent Moral with the pilferage of
some historical documents from the vaults of the Filipiniana and Asian Division (FAD)
of the National Library which were under her control and supervision as Division Chief
and keeping in her possession, without legal authority and justification, some forty-
one (41) items of historical documents which were missing from the FAD vaults of the
National Library.
The DECS Investigating Committee conducted several hearings on the complaint.
Atty. Jose M. Diaz, Special Prosecutor from the Department of Justice, represented
the DECS Secretary in the administrative case while respondent was represented by
her own private counsel. On 25 September 1996 Secretary Gloria issued a resolution
finding respondent "guilty of the administrative offenses of dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, for the
commission of pilferage of historical documents of the national library, to the prejudice
of the national library in particular, and the country in general." She was ordered
dismissed from the government service with prejudice to reinstatement and forfeiture
of all her retirement benefits and other remunerations.
On 30 September 1996 respondent received a copy of the resolution. Thereafter, or
on 1 October 1996, she received another resolution correcting the typographical errors
found on the first resolution. Respondent did not appeal the judgment.
On 2 October 1996 respondent filed a Petition for the Production of the DECS
Investigation Committee Report purportedly to "guide [her] on whatever action would
be most appropriate to take under the circumstances."[2] Her petition was, however,
denied. Man-ikx
Unfazed, she filed a Reiteration for DECS Committee Report and DECS Resolution
dated September 25, 1996, which Secretary Gloria similarly denied in his Order of 23
October 1996. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the motion was merely
"noted" in view of the warning in the 23 October 1996 Order that the denial of the
request for the production of the Investigation Committee Report was final.[3] As
earlier stated, respondent did not appeal the Resolution dated 30 September 1996
dismissing her from the service. Instead, she instituted an action for mandamus and
injunction before the regular courts against Secretary Gloria praying that she be
furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS
Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy
of the said report.[4]
Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of
action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court. In its
assailed Decision of 24 November 1997 the appellate court sustained the trial court
and dismissed Secretary Glorias petition for lack of merit holding that -
FIRST. Petitioner Gloria acted prematurely, not having filed any motion for
reconsideration of the assailed order with the respondent judge before filing the instant
petition to this Court. This constitutes a procedural infirmity x x x x SECOND. Even if
the aforesaid procedural defect were to be disregarded, the petition at hand,
nevertheless, must fail. The denial of the motion to dismiss is an option available to
the respondent judge. Such order is interlocutory and thus not appealable. The proper
recourse of the aggrieved party is to file an answer and interpose, as defenses, the
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objection(s) raised by him in said motion to dismiss, then proceed with the trial and, in
case of adverse decision, to elevate the entire case on appeal in due course.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals on 13
January 1998, Secretary Gloria filed the instant petition for review.
Meanwhile, Secretary Gloria was replaced by Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco who was
thereafter substituted in the case for Secretary Gloria.
The issues before us are: whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition
for certiorari for failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying the motion to dismiss, and in holding that the trial court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss.
Petitioner contends that there is no need to file a motion for reconsideration as the
trial courts order denying the motion to dismiss is a patent nullity, and a motion for
reconsideration would practically be a useless ceremony as the trial court virtually
decided the case, and that there is no law requiring the DECS to furnish respondent
with a copy of the Report of the DECS Investigation Committee so that the petition for
mandamus has no leg to stand on hence should have been dismissed for lack of cause
of action. Manik-s
Excepting thereto respondent argues that the denial of the motion to dismiss is
interlocutory in nature as it did not dispose of the case on the merits, and petitioner
still has a residual remedy, i.e., to file an answer, thus her substantive rights have not
been violated as she contends; that respondent is clearly entitled to the remedy of
mandamus to protect her rights; and, that petitioner has not shown any law, DECS
order or regulation prohibiting the release of the petitioned documents for reasons of
confidentiality or national security.
We grant the petition. Section 3, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
mandatorily requires that the resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and
distinctly state the reasons therefor -
After hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion or order the
amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground
relied upon is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor
(underscoring supplied).
Clearly, the above rule proscribes the common practice of perfunctorily denying
motions to dismiss "for lack of merit." Such cavalier disposition often creates difficulty
and misunderstanding on the part of the aggrieved party in taking recourse therefrom
and likewise on the higher court called upon to resolve the issue, usually on certiorari.
The challenged Order of the trial court dated 23 April 1997 falls short of the
requirements prescribed in Rule 16. The Order merely discussed the general concept
of mandamus and the trial courts jurisdiction over the rulings and actions of
administrative agencies without stating the basis why petitioners motion to dismiss
was being denied. We are reproducing hereunder for reference the assailed Order -
This treats of the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Gloria on 14 March 1997 to
which petitioner filed their (sic) opposition on April 8, 1997.
Respondent premised his motion on the following grounds: (a) Mandamus does not
lie to compel respondent DECS Secretary to release the Report of the DECS
Investigating Committee because the Petition does not state a cause of action; (b)
The DECS Resolution dismissing petitioner is legal and valid, and therefore, the writ
of preliminary injunction cannot be granted to enjoin its execution; while petitioner
alleged among others that she has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial
duty, this being its main objective. "Purely ministerial" are acts to be performed in a
given state of facts, in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal
authority without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. While the discretion of a Constitutional Commission
cannot be controlled by mandamus x x x x the court can decide whether the duty is
discretionary or ministerial x x x xMan-ikan
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Generally, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the
administrative departments of the government. This is generally true with respect to
acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and finding of fact. Findings of
fact by an administrative board or official, following a hearing, are binding upon the
courts and will not be disturbed except where the board or official has gone beyond
his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily
and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion or as when there is
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or to
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law x
xxx
WHEREFORE, in regard to the foregoing, the motion to dismiss by herein respondent
is hereby denied for lack of merit and is hereby ordered to file its (sic) responsive
pleadings within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order. Copy furnished petitioner
who is likewise given ten (10) days to submit his (sic) comment or opposition.
Indeed, we cannot even discern the bearing or relevance of the discussion therein on
mandamus, vis-a-vis the ground relied upon by petitioner in her motion to dismiss, i.e.,
lack of cause of action, and the dispositive portion of the order. The order only
confused petitioner and left her unable to determine the errors which would be the
proper subject of her motion for reconsideration. Judges should take pains in crafting
their orders, stating therein clearly and comprehensively the reasons for their
issuance, which are necessary for the full understanding of the action taken. Where
the court itself has not stated any basis for its order, to be very strict in requiring a prior
motion for reconsideration before resort to higher courts on certiorari may be had,
would be to expect too much. Since the judge himself was not precise and specific in
his order, a certain degree of liberality in exacting from petitioner strict compliance with
the rules was justified.
Ordinarily, certiorari will not lie unless the lower court, through a motion for
reconsideration, has been given an opportunity to correct the imputed errors on its act
or order. However, this rule is not absolute and is subject to well-recognized
exceptions. Thus, when the act or order of the lower court is a patent nullity for failure
to comply with a mandatory provision of the Rules, as in this case, a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with and the aggrieved party may assail the act or
order of the lower court directly on certiorari.[5] Ol-dmiso
On the second issue, the nature of the remedy of mandamus has been the subject of
discussions in several cases. It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does
not lie to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of
a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty
be absolutely expressed, it must nevertheless be clear. The writ will not issue to
compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to
do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither
confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power
already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.[6]
In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has
a clear legal right to the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it is the
ministerial duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof.
Consequently, she is not entitled to the writ prayed for.
Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS
resolution dismissing her from the service.[7] By her failure to do so, nothing prevented
the DECS resolution from becoming final and executory. Obviously, it will serve no
useful purpose now to compel petitioner to furnish her with a copy of the investigation
report.
Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish
respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, we unequivocally
held in Ruiz v. Drilon[8] that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to
be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee
created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the
administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her
during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been
accorded these rights.
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Respondents assertion that the investigation report would be used "to guide [her] on
what action would be appropriate to take under the circumstances,"[9] hardly merits
consideration. It must be stressed that the disputed investigation report is an internal
communication between the DECS Secretary and the Investigation Committee, and it
is not generally intended for the perusal of respondent or any other person for that
matter, except the DECS Secretary. As correctly ruled by Secretary Gloria in his Order
of 2 October 1996 -
Respondents (Moral) counsel is reminded that the Report of the DECS Investigating
Committee is not an integral part of the Decision itself x x x x [t]he report is an internal
communication between the Investigating Committee and the DECS Secretary, and,
therefore, confidential until the latter had already read and used the same in making
his own determination of the facts and applicable law of the case, to be expressed in
the Decision he may make. Nc-m
which imposes a ministerial duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the
investigation report, hence her petition clearly lacked a cause of action. In such
instance, while the trial courts order is merely interlocutory and non-appealable,
certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the same since it is rendered with grave abuse
of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of 24
November 1997 sustaining the trial courts denial of petitioners motion to dismiss, as
well as its Resolution dated 13 January 1998 denying reconsideration, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The petition for mandamus filed by respondent before the court a
quo to compel petitioner to furnish her a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee
Report is DISMISSED for want of cause of action.
SO ORDERED.

The Report remains an internal and confidential matter to be used as part - - although
not controlling - - of the basis for the decision. Only when the party adversely affected
by the decision has filed and perfected an appeal to the Civil Service Commission may
all the records of the case, including the aforesaid Report be forwarded to the CSC.
In the latter appellate tribunal, the respondents counsel may be allowed to read and/or
be given a copy of the Report to enable the appellant to file an intelligent and
exhaustive appellants Brief Memorandum.

More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to
the Civil Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and
conclusion of law upon which respondents removal from office was grounded. This
resolution, and not the investigation report, should be the basis of any further remedies
respondent might wish to pursue, and we cannot see how she would be prejudiced by
denying her access to the investigation report.

In fine, the trial courts Order of 23 April 1997 denying petitioners motion to dismiss is
not a mere error of judgment as the Court of Appeals held, but a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because, to capsulize, the Order
is a patent nullity for failure to comply with the provisions of the rules requiring that a
resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons
therefor; and, respondent is clearly not entitled to the writ of mandamus as she did not
appeal the DECS resolution dismissing her from service, and there is no law or rule
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6. Camara vs. Municipal Court
U.S. Supreme Court
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)
Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco
No. 92
Argued February 15, 1967
Decided June 5, 1967
387 U.S. 523
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA,
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
Syllabus
Appellant was charged with violating the San Francisco Housing Code for refusing,
after three efforts by city housing inspectors to secure his consent, to allow a
warrantless inspection of the ground-floor quarters which he leased and residential
use of which allegedly violated the apartment building's occupancy permit. Claiming
the inspection ordinance unconstitutional for failure to require a warrant for
inspections, appellant while awaiting trial, sued in a State Superior Court for a writ of
prohibition, which the court denied. Relying on Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, and
similar cases, the District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the ordinance did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. The State Supreme Court denied a petition for hearing.
Held:
1. The Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a
warrantless code enforcement inspection of his personal residence. Frank v.
Maryland, supra, pro tanto overruled. Pp. 387 U. S. 528-534.
(a) The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is enforceable against the
States through the Fourteenth, through its prohibition of "unreasonable" searches and
seizures is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by governmental officials. P. 387 U. S. 528.
(b) With certain carefully defined exceptions, an unconsented warrantless search of
private property is "unreasonable." Pp. 387 U. S. 528-529.
(c) Contrary to the assumption of Frank v. Maryland, supra, Fourth Amendment
interests are not merely "peripheral" where municipal fire, health, and housing
inspection programs are involved whose purpose is to determine the existence of
physical conditions not complying with local ordinances. Those programs, moreover,
are enforceable by criminal process, as is refusal to allow an inspection. Pp. 387 U.
S. 529-531.
(d) Warrantless administrative searches cannot be justified on the grounds that they
make minimal demands on occupants;
Page 387 U. S. 524
that warrant in such cases are unfeasible; or that area inspection programs could not
function under reasonable search warrant requirements. Pp. 387 U. S. 531-533.
2. Probable cause upon the basis of which warrants are to be issued for area code
enforcement inspections is not dependent on the inspector's belief that a particular
dwelling violates the code, but on the reasonableness of the enforcement agency's
appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole. The standards to guide the magistrate
in the issuance of such search warrants will necessarily vary with the municipal
program being enforced. Pp. 387 U. S. 534-539.
3. Search warrants which are required in nonemergency situations should normally
be sought only after entry is refused. Pp. 387 U. S. 539-540.
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4. In the nonemergency situation here, appellant had a right to insist that the
inspectors obtain a search warrant. P. 387 U. S. 540.
237 Cal.App.2d 128, 46 Cal.Rptr. 585, vacated and remanded.
Page 387 U. S. 525
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, this Court upheld, by a five-to-four vote, a state
court conviction of a homeowner who refused to permit a municipal health inspector
to enter and inspect his premises without a search warrant. In Eaton v. Price, 364 U.
S. 263, a similar conviction was affirmed by an equally divided Court. Since those
closely divided decisions, more intensive efforts at all levels of government to contain
and eliminate urban blight have led to increasing use of such inspection techniques,
while numerous decisions of this Court have more fully defined the Fourth
Amendment's effect on state and municipal action. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643;
Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23. In view of the growing nationwide importance of the
problem, we noted probable jurisdiction in this case and in See v. City of Seattle, post,
p. 387 U. S. 541, to reexamine whether administrative inspection programs, as
presently authorized and conducted, violate Fourth Amendment rights as those rights
are enforced against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 385 U.S. 808.
Appellant brought this action in a California Superior Court alleging that he was
awaiting trial on a criminal charge of violating the San Francisco Housing Code by
refusing to permit a warrantless inspection of his residence, and that a writ of
prohibition should issue to the criminal court because the ordinance authorizing such
inspections is unconstitutional on its face. The Superior Court denied the writ, the
District Court of Appeal affirmed, and the Supreme Court of California denied a petition
for hearing. Appellant properly raised and had considered by the California courts the
federal constitutional questions he now presents to this Court.
Though there were no judicial findings of fact in this prohibition proceeding, we shall
set forth the parties' factual allegations. On November 6, 1963, an inspector
Page 387 U. S. 526
of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of Public Health
entered an apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for possible
violations of the city's Housing Code. [Footnote 1] The building's manager informed
the inspector that appellant, lessee of the ground floor, was using the rear of his
leasehold as a personal residence. Claiming that the building's occupancy permit did
not allow residential use of the ground floor, the inspector confronted appellant and
demanded that he permit an inspection of the premises. Appellant refused to allow the
inspection because the inspector lacked a search warrant.
The inspector returned on November 8, again without a warrant, and appellant again
refused to allow an inspection. A citation was then mailed ordering appellant to appear
at the district attorney's office. When appellant failed to appear, two inspectors
returned to his apartment on November 22. They informed appellant that he was
required by law to permit an inspection under 503 of the Housing Code:
"Sec. 503 RIGHT TO ENTER BUILDING. Authorized employees of the City
departments or City agencies, so far as may be necessary for the performance of their
duties, shall, upon presentation of proper credentials, have the right to enter, at
reasonable times, any building, structure, or premises in the City to perform any duty
imposed upon them by the Municipal Code. "
Page 387 U. S. 527
Appellant nevertheless refused the inspectors access to his apartment without a
search warrant. Thereafter, a complaint was filed charging him with refusing to permit
a lawful inspection in violation of 507 of the Code. [Footnote 2] Appellant was
arrested on December 2 and released on bail. When his demurrer to the criminal
complaint was denied, appellant filed this petition for a writ of prohibition.
Appellant has argued throughout this litigation that 503 is contrary to the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments in that it authorizes municipal officials to enter a private
dwelling without a search warrant and without probable cause to believe that a
violation of the Housing Code exists therein. Consequently, appellant contends, he
may not be prosecuted under 507 for refusing to permit an inspection
unconstitutionally authorized by 503. Relying on Frank v. Maryland, Eaton v. Price,
and decisions in other States, [Footnote 3] the District
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Page 387 U. S. 528
Court of Appeal held that 503 does not violate Fourth Amendment rights because it
"is part of a regulatory scheme which is essentially civil, rather than criminal in nature,
inasmuch as that section creates a right of inspection which is limited in scope and
may not be exercised under unreasonable conditions."
Having concluded that Frank v. Maryland, to the extent that it sanctioned such
warrantless inspections, must be overruled, we reverse.
I
The Fourth Amendment provides that,
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."
The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this
Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions
by governmental officials. The Fourth Amendment thus gives concrete expression to
a right of the people which "is basic to a free society." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25,
338 U. S. 27. As such, the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 374 U. S. 30.
Though there has been general agreement as to the fundamental purpose of the
Fourth Amendment, translation of the abstract prohibition against "unreasonable
searches and seizures" into workable guidelines for the decision of particular cases is
a difficult task which has for many years divided the members of this Court.
Nevertheless, one governing principle, justified by history and by current experience,
has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a
search of private property without proper consent
Page 387 U. S. 529
is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant. See, e.g.,
Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48; McDonald
v. United States, 335 U. S. 451; Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20. As the Court
explained in Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 333 U. S. 14:
"The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern not only
to the individual, but to a society, which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and
freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right
of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or
government enforcement agent."
In Frank v. Maryland, this Court upheld the conviction of one who refused to permit a
warrantless inspection of private premises for the purposes of locating and abating a
suspected public nuisance. Although Frank can arguably be distinguished from this
case on its facts, [Footnote 4] the Frank opinion has generally been interpreted as
carving out an additional exception to the rule that warrantless searches are
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Eaton v. Price, supra. The District
Court of Appeal so interpreted Frank in this case, and that ruling is the core of
appellant's challenge here. We proceed to a reexamination of the factors which
Page 387 U. S. 530
persuaded the Frank majority to adopt this construction of the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches.
To the Frank majority, municipal fire, health, and housing inspection programs
"touch at most upon the periphery of the important interests safeguarded by the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection against official intrusion,"
359 U.S. at 359 U. S. 367, because the inspections are merely to determine whether
physical conditions exist which do not comply with minimum standards prescribed in
local regulatory ordinances. Since the inspector does not ask that the property owner
open his doors to a search for "evidence of criminal action" which may be used to
secure the owner's criminal conviction, historic interests of "self-protection" jointly
protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments [Footnote 5] are said not to be
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involved, but only the less intense "right to be secure from intrusion into personal
privacy." Id. at 359 U. S. 365.
We may agree that a routine inspection of the physical condition of private property is
a less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's search for the fruits and
instrumentalities of crime. For this reason alone, Frank differed from the great bulk of
Fourth Amendment cases which have been considered by this Court. But we cannot
agree that the Fourth Amendment interests at stake in these inspection cases are
merely "peripheral." It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private
property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is
suspected of criminal behavior. [Footnote 6] For instance, even the most law-abiding
citizen
Page 387 U. S. 531
has a very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances under which the sanctity of
his home may be broken by official authority, for the possibility of criminal entry under
the guise of official sanction is a serious threat to personal and family security. And
even accepting Frank's rather remarkable premise, inspections of the kind we are here
considering do, in fact, jeopardize "self-protection" interests of the property owner.
Like most regulatory laws, fire, health, and housing codes are enforced by criminal
processes. In some cities, discovery of a violation by the inspector leads to a criminal
complaint. [Footnote 7] Even in cities where discovery of a violation produces only an
administrative compliance order, [Footnote 8] refusal to comply is a criminal offense,
and the fact of compliance is verified by a second inspection, again without a warrant.
[Footnote 9] Finally, as this case demonstrates, refusal to permit an inspection is itself
a crime, punishable by fine or even by jail sentence.
The Frank majority suggested, and appellee reasserts, two other justifications for
permitting administrative health and safety inspections without a warrant. First, it is
argued that these inspections are "designed to make the least possible demand on
the individual occupant." 359 U.S. at 359 U. S. 367. The ordinances authorizing
inspections are hedged with safeguards, and at any rate the inspector's particular
decision to enter must comply with the constitutional standard of reasonableness even
if he may enter without a warrant. [Footnote 10] In addition, the argument
Page 387 U. S. 532
proceeds, the warrant process could not function effectively in this field. The decision
to inspect an entire municipal area is based upon legislative or administrative
assessment of broad factors such as the area's age and condition. Unless the
magistrate is to review such policy matters, he must issue a "rubber stamp" warrant
which provides no protection at all to the property owner.
In our opinion, these arguments unduly discount the purposes behind the warrant
machinery contemplated by the Fourth Amendment. Under the present system, when
the inspector demands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing whether
enforcement of the municipal code involved requires inspection of his premises, no
way of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power to search, and no way of
knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization. These are
questions which may be reviewed by a neutral magistrate without any reassessment
of the basic agency decision to canvass an area. Yet only by refusing entry and risking
a criminal conviction can the occupant at present challenge the inspector's decision
to search. And even if the occupant possesses sufficient fortitude to take this risk, as
appellant did here, he may never learn any more about the reason for the inspection
than that the law generally allows housing inspectors to gain entry. The practical effect
of this system is to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the
field. This is precisely the discretion to invade private property which we have
consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the
need to
Page 387 U. S. 533
search. See cases cited p. 387 U. S. 529 supra. We simply cannot say that the
protections provided by the warrant procedure are not needed in this context; broad
statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review, particularly when
those safeguards may only be invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty.
The final justification suggested for warrantless administrative searches is that the
public interest demands such a rule: it is vigorously argued that the health and safety
of entire urban populations is dependent upon enforcement of minimum fire, housing,
and sanitation standards, and that the only effective means of enforcing such codes
is by routine systematized inspection of all physical structures. Of course, in applying
any reasonableness standard, including one of constitutional dimension, an argument
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that the public interest demands a particular rule must receive careful consideration.
But we think this argument misses the mark. The question is not, at this stage, at least,
whether these inspections may be made, but whether they may be made without a
warrant. For example, to say that gambling raids may not be made at the discretion of
the police without a warrant is not necessarily to say that gambling raids may never
be made. In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a general
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is not
whether the public interest justifies the type of search in question, but whether the
authority to search should be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part
upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental
purpose behind the search. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 384 U. S.
770-771. It has nowhere been urged that fire, health, and housing code inspection
programs could not achieve their goals within the confines of a reasonable search
warrant requirement. Thus, we do not find the public need argument dispositive.
Page 387 U. S. 534
In summary, we hold that administrative searches of the kind at issue here are
significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such
searches, when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure, lack the
traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual, and
that the reasons put forth in Frank v. Maryland and in other cases for upholding these
warrantless searches are insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the Fourth
Amendment's protections. Because of the nature of the municipal programs under
consideration, however, these conclusions must be the beginning, not the end, of our
inquiry. The Frank majority gave recognition to the unique character of these
inspection programs by refusing to require search warrants; to reject that disposition
does not justify ignoring the question whether some other accommodation between
public need and individual rights is essential.
II
The Fourth Amendment provides that, "no Warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause." Borrowing from more typical Fourth Amendment cases, appellant argues not
only that code enforcement inspection programs must be circumscribed by a warrant
procedure, but also that warrants should issue only when the inspector possesses
probable cause to believe that a particular dwelling contains violations of the minimum
standards prescribed by the code being enforced. We disagree.
In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search be
obtained, "probable cause" is the standard by which a particular decision to search is
tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness. To apply this standard,
it is obviously necessary first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly
justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected
Page 387 U. S. 535
interests of the private citizen. For example, in a criminal investigation, the police may
undertake to recover specific stolen or contraband goods. But that public interest
would hardly justify a sweeping search of an entire city conducted in the hope that
these goods might be found. Consequently, a search for these goods, even with a
warrant, is "reasonable" only when there is "probable cause" to believe that they will
be uncovered in a particular dwelling.
Unlike the search pursuant to a criminal investigation, the inspection programs at issue
here are aimed at securing city-wide compliance with minimum physical standards for
private property. The primary governmental interest at stake is to prevent even the
unintentional development of conditions which are hazardous to public health and
safety. Because fires and epidemics may ravage large urban areas, because unsightly
conditions adversely affect the economic values of neighboring structures, numerous
courts have upheld the police power of municipalities to impose and enforce such
minimum standards even upon existing structures. [Footnote 11] In determining
whether a particular inspection is reasonable -- and thus in determining whether there
is probable cause to issue a warrant for that inspection -- the need for the inspection
must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code enforcement.
There is unanimous agreement among those most familiar with this field that the only
effective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum standards required by
municipal codes is through routine periodic
Page 387 U. S. 536
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inspections of all structures. [Footnote 12] It is here that the probable cause debate is
focused, for the agency's decision to conduct an area inspection is unavoidably based
on its appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole, not on its knowledge of conditions
in each particular building. Appellee contends that, if the probable cause standard
urged by appellant is adopted, the area inspection will be eliminated as a means of
seeking compliance with code standards, and the reasonable goals of code
enforcement will be dealt a crushing blow.
In meeting this contention, appellant argues, first, that his probable cause standard
would not jeopardize area inspection programs because only a minute portion of the
population will refuse to consent to such inspections, and second, that individual
privacy, in any event, should be given preference to the public interest in conducting
such inspections. The first argument, even if true, is irrelevant to the question whether
the area inspection is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
second argument is, in effect, an assertion that the area inspection is an unreasonable
search. Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness
Page 387 U. S. 537
other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search
entails. But we think that a number of persuasive factors combine to support the
reasonableness of area code enforcement inspections. First, such programs have a
long history of judicial and public acceptance. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. at 359
U. S. 367-371. Second, the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be
prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique would
achieve acceptable results. Many such conditions -- faulty wiring is an obvious
example -- are not observable from outside the building, and indeed may not be
apparent to the inexpert occupant himself. Finally, because the inspections are neither
personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a
relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy. Both the majority and the
dissent in Frank emphatically supported this conclusion:
"Time and experience have forcefully taught that the power to inspect dwelling places,
either as a matter of systematic area-by-area search or, as here, to treat a specific
problem, is of indispensable importance to the maintenance of community health; a
power that would be greatly hobbled by the blanket requirement of the safeguards
necessary for a search of evidence of criminal acts. The need for preventive action is
great, and city after city has seen this need and granted the power of inspection to its
health officials, and these inspections are apparently welcomed by all but an
insignificant few. Certainly the nature of our society has not vitiated the need for
inspections first thought necessary 158 years ago, nor has experience revealed any
abuse or inroad on freedom in meeting this need by means that history and dominant
public opinion have sanctioned."
359 U.S. at 359 U. S. 372.
Page 387 U. S. 538
". . . This is not to suggest that a health official need show the same kind of proof to a
magistrate to obtain a warrant as one must who would search for the fruits or
instrumentalities of crime. Where considerations of health and safety are involved, the
facts that would justify an inference of 'probable cause' to make an inspection are
clearly different from those that would justify such an inference where a criminal
investigation has been undertaken. Experience may show the need for periodic
inspections of certain facilities without a further showing of cause to believe that
substandard conditions dangerous to the public are being maintained. The passage
of a certain period without inspection might of itself be sufficient in a given situation to
justify the issuance of a warrant. The test of 'probable cause' required by the Fourth
Amendment can take into account the nature of the search that is being sought. 359
U.S. at 359 U. S. 383 (MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting)."
Having concluded that the area inspection is a "reasonable" search of private property
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it is obvious that "probable cause" to
issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular
dwelling. Such standards, which will vary with the municipal program being enforced,
may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building (e.g., a multi-family
apartment house), or the condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily
depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling. It has been
suggested that so to vary the probable cause test from the standard applied in criminal
cases would be to authorize a "synthetic search warrant," and thereby to lessen the
overall protections of the Fourth Amendment. Frank v. Maryland, 359
Page 387 U. S. 539
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN

U.S. at 359 U. S. 373. But we do not agree. The warrant procedure is designed to
guarantee that a decision to search private property is justified by a reasonable
governmental interest. But reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid
public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to
issue a suitably restricted search warrant. Cf. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling,
327 U. S. 186. Such an approach neither endangers time-honored doctrines
applicable to criminal investigations nor makes a nullity of the probable cause
requirement in this area. It merely gives full recognition to the competing public and
private interests here at stake and, in so doing, best fulfills the historic purpose behind
the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable government invasions of privacy.
See Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. at 364 U. S. 273-274 (opinion of MR. JUSTICE
BRENNAN).
III
Since our holding emphasizes the controlling standard of reasonableness, nothing we
say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without a warrant, that the
law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations. See North American Cold
Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 (seizure of unwholesome food);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (compulsory smallpox vaccination);
Compagnie Francaise v. Board of Health, 186 U. S. 380 (health quarantine); Kroplin
v. Truax, 119 Ohio St. 610, 165 N.E. 498 (summary destruction of tubercular cattle).
On the other hand, in the case of most routine area inspections, there is no compelling
urgency to inspect at a particular time or on a particular day. Moreover, most citizens
allow inspections of their property without a warrant. Thus, as a practical matter, and
in light of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant specify the property to
be searched, it seems likely that warrants should normally be sought only after entry
is refused unless
IV
In this case, appellant has been charged with a crime for his refusal to permit housing
inspectors to enter his leasehold without a warrant. There was no emergency
demanding immediate access; in fact, the inspectors made three trips to the building
in an attempt to obtain appellant's consent to search. Yet no warrant was obtained,
and thus appellant was unable to verify either the need for or the appropriate limits of
the inspection. No doubt, the inspectors entered the public portion of the building with
the consent of the landlord, through the building's manager, but appellee does not
contend that such consent was sufficient to authorize inspection of appellant's
premises. Cf. Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483; Chapman v. United States, 365 U.
S. 610; McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451. Assuming the facts to be as the
parties have alleged, we therefore conclude that appellant had a constitutional right to
insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may not
constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection. It appears from
the opinion of the District Court of Appeal that, under these circumstances, a writ of
prohibition will issue to the criminal court under California law.
The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

Page 387 U. S. 540

there has been a citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing
immediate entry. Similarly, the requirement of a warrant procedure does not suggest
any change in what seems to be the prevailing local policy, in most situations, of
authorizing entry, but not entry by force, to inspect.
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN

7. Salazar vs. Achacoso

06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?
G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990
S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha
HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner, ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng
vs. booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa Phils. ay
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng ibang
Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents. company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Card
ko.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.
2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom
said complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following telegram:

SARMIENTO, J.: YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA
ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR.
This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE
arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment. FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.

The facts are as follows: 4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to
operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso
xxx xxx xxx issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:

1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay HORTY SALAZAR
City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz: Mandaluyong, Metro Manila

04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito at Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and
nagbibigay ng salaysay. Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency
being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the
S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the
ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. Horty means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have
Salazar 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to
05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang panloloko sa recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;
iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor
S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar. Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.
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This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws.
Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987.
5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita
B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty.
Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement
Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong
policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of
News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St.,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie
Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure
order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the
premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was
accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show
credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon
twelve talent performers practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more
waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted
for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:
Gentlemen:
On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we
respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her residence last January
26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law
and against the will of the owner thereof. Among our reasons are the following:
1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure
and Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates "due process of law"
guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution.
2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which
guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose."
3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5) others (including
2 policemen) are the private residence of the Salazar family, and the entry, search as
well as the seizure of the personal properties belonging to our client were without her
consent and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation, together with grave
abuse of the color of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile under
Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code.
Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00)
in all (and which were already due for shipment to Japan) are returned within twenty-
four (24) hours from your receipt hereof, we shall feel free to take all legal action, civil
and criminal, to protect our client's interests.
We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters.
7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the
instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the
Pasig Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836. 1
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts
sought to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we
consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.
The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of
search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue
squarely raised by the petitioner for the Court's resolution.
Under the new Constitution, which states:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 2
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it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case, it was
declared that mayors may not exercise this power:
xxx xxx xxx
But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the
state of the law as it was in September, 1985. The law has since been altered. No
longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary
investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government
Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus
officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its
ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized."
The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the
function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of
arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being
evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase, "such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of
said 1973 Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary
investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. 4
Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:
We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant
to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral
and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of
arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the
success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not
necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as
the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and
indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when
he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No.
1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional. 5
Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an
amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President
Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative
powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then
Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers:
(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power
to recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment.
6
On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the
avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The
Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers:
(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest
and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after proper
investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security
and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall
order the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the
recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or
authorized to do so. 7
On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018,
giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well:
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives
shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-
holder of authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a
danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-
seekers. The Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of
documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment
activities and the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be
engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been
licensed or authorized to do so. 8
The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian
rule in its twilight moments.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue
search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process.
To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code,
unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo 9 is not well-taken. Vivo
involved a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised
Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in
deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his
duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is
valid. 10 It is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive
in matters involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11
xxx xxx xxx
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs.
Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be
exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the
peace and domestic tranquility of the nation." Justice Johnson's opinion is that when
the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued presence in the
country is injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of express law,
deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re
McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).
The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is
detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam
vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956). 12
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously,
exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases,
like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti,
that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant:
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and
Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency
being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the
seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the
means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to
recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor
Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws. 13
We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it
is null and void, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants
describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters,
cabinets, tables, communications/ recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone
and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper
and any and all documents/communications, letters and facsimile of prints related to
the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to
promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as
Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and
3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and
other subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,
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1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892; 2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom
the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final
2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969; order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542; WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code
is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED
4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure
Order No. 1205.
5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong
Silang." No costs.

In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search for SO ORDERED.
"books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings
and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the
operations of the Community Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme
Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in
connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too
general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any
"paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General
Statutes (the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a general
warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of the articles sought to be seized under
the search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in English
history; the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press,
when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they
pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and
Puritan." Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not
the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks
with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state
security. 14

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:

1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no
other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search:
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
8. Catura vs. CIR
G.R. No. L-27392 January 30, 1971
PABLO CATURA and LUZ SALVADOR, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and CELESTINO TABANIAG, et al.,
respondents.
Joselito J. de la Rosa for petitioners.
Ernesto Estrella for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
It is a novel question that presents itself before this Court in this petition for the review
of a resolution of respondent Court of Industrial Relations. Specifically, it is whether
respondent Court, in the exercise of its power of investigation to assure compliance
with the internal labor organization procedures under Section 17 of the Industrial
Peace Act,1 can require a labor organization's "books of accounts, bank accounts,
pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to [its]
finances" be delivered and deposited with it at the hearing to conduct such
investigation in accordance with a complaint duly filed without the officials of such
labor organization, therein named as respondents and petitioners before us, being
heard prior to the issuance of such order. The respondent Court, first acting through
Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador and thereafter en banc, upheld its power to do
so. The challenge to such competence sought to be fortified by the allegation of the
absence of procedural due process was rejected. After a careful study of the matter,
we cannot say that thereby respondents Court was in error. We have no reason to
reverse.
As set forth in the brief for the petitioners, Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, the
President and Treasurer, respectively, of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration Employees Association, a legitimate labor organization duly registered,
there was, on December 27, 1966, a complaint against them under Section 17 filed
by the prosecution division of the respondent Court, the principal complainants being
now respondent Celestino Tabaniag as well as other employees constituting more
than ten percent of the entire membership of such labor organization. In the complaint,
it was charged that during the tenure of office of petitioners before us as such
President and Treasurer, they were responsible for "unauthorized disbursement of
union funds" with complainants on various occasions during the latter part of 1966
demanding from them "a full and detailed report of all financial transaction of the union
and to make the book of accounts and other records of the financial activities of the
union open to inspection by the members," only to be met with a refusal on their part
to comply. It was further asserted that the executive board of such labor organization
passed a resolution calling for a general membership meeting so that petitioners could
be confronted about the status of union funds, but then, Pablo Catura, as President,
cancelled such meeting.lwph1.t There was thereafter a general membership
resolution reiterating previous demands "for a full and detailed report of all financial
transactions of the union," but again there was no response, thus compelling the
members to refer the matter to the Department of Labor which duly issued subpoenas
for the presentation of such book of accounts to petitioners without any success. After
setting forth that complainants had exhausted all remedies provided in the union's
constitution and by-laws, which were all unavailing, the complaint sought, after due
hearing and judgement, to declare present petitioners, as respondents, guilty of unfair
labor practice under the above provision of the Industrial Peace Act, for them to cease
and desist from further committing such unfair labor practice complained of, and to
render a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the union as well as to
make the book of accounts and other records of these financial activities open to
inspection by the members.2
Thereafter, on December 28, 1966, respondent Celestino Tabaniag and the other
members, as petitioners in the above complaint before respondents Court, sought an
injunction to prevent now petitioners Pablo Catura who, it turned out, was again
elected as President in an election on November 15, 1966, from taking his oath of
office in view of his alleged persistence in the abuse of his authority in the
disbursement of union funds as well as his refusal to make a full and detailed report
of all financial transactions of the union.3
Then came the order of December 29, 1966, by Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador
which, instead of granting the injunction sought, limited itself to requiring and directing
"personally the respondents Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, president and treasurer,
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
respectively, of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees'
Association, to deliver and deposit to this Court all the said Association's book of
accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other
documents related to the finances of the said labor union at the hearing of this petition
on January 3, 1967 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. Said respondents are hereby
required to comply strictly with this Order."4 There was a motion for reconsideration
on January 2, 1967 by now petitioners Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador on the ground
that they were not heard before such order was issued, which moreover in their
opinion was beyond the power of respondent Court. With Associate Judge Ansberto
P. Paredes dissenting, the order was sustained in a resolution by the Court en banc
on February 28, 1967. Hence the present petition filed on April 3, 1967.
The petition was given due course by this Court in a resolution of April 13, 1967 with
a preliminary injunction issued upon petitioners' posting a bond of P2,000.00.
Respondents did not take the trouble of filing an answer within the period expired on
June 17, 1967 and petitioners were required to submit their brief within thirty days
under this Court's resolution of July 14, 1967. Such a brief was duly filed on September
19 of that year. There was no brief for respondents. The case was thus deemed
submitted for decision on October 4, 1968.
In the light of the interpretation to be accorded the applicable legal provisions and after
a careful consideration of the contention that such a power to issue the challenged
order cannot be deemed as possessed by respondent Court which moreover did not
accord petitioners procedural due process, we have reached the conclusion, as set
forth at the opening of this opinion, that petitioners cannot prevail. The order as issued
first by Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador and thereafter by respondent Court en
banc must be sustained.
1. The controlling provisions of law to the specific situation before this Court
concerning the power of investigation of respondent Court to assure compliance with
internal labor organization procedures with the corresponding authority to investigate
to substantiate alleged violations may be found in paragraphs (b), (h), and (l) of the
aforecited Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act. Thus: "The members shall be
entitled to full and detailed reports from their officers and representatives of all financial
transactions as provided in the constitution and by-laws of the organization."5 ... "The
funds of the organization shall not be applied for any purpose or object other than
those expressly stated in its constitution or by-laws or those expressly authorized by
a resolution of the majority of the member." 6 ... "The books of accounts and other
records of the financial activities of a legitimate labor organization shall be open to
inspection by any officer or member thereof."7
To repeat, the complaint before respondent Court against petitioners as President and
Treasurer of the union, specifically recited an unauthorized disbursement of union
funds as well as the failure to make a full and detailed report of financial transactions
of the union and to make the book of accounts and other records of its financial
activities open to inspection by the members. Clearly, the matter was deemed serious
enough by the prosecutor of respondent Court to call for the exercise of the statutory
power of investigation to substantiate the alleged violation so as to assure that the
rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization as specifically set forth in
Section 17 be respected. All that the challenged order did was to require petitioners,
as President and Treasurer of the labor organization, to "deliver and deposit" with
respondent Court all of its book of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds,
receipts, vouchers and other documents related to its finances at the hearing of the
petition before it on January 3, 1967.
On its face, it cannot be said that such a requirement is beyond the statutory power
conferred. If it were otherwise, the specific provisions of law allegedly violated may
not be effectively complied with. The authority to investigate might be rendered futile
if respondent Court could be held as having acted contrary to law. To paraphrase
Justice Laurel, the power to investigate, to be conscientious and rational at the very
least, requires an inquiry into existing facts and conditions. The documents required
to be produced constitutes evidence of the most solid character as to whether or not
there was a failure to comply with the mandates of the law. It is not for this Court to
whittle down the authority conferred on administrative agencies to assure the effective
administration of a statute, in this case intended to protect the rights of union members
against its officers. The matter was properly within its cognizance and the means
necessary to give it force and effectiveness should be deemed implied unless the
power sought to be exercised is so arbitrary as to trench upon private rights of
petitioners entitled to priority. No such showing has been made; no such showing can
be made. To repeat, there should be no question about the correctness of the order
herein challenged.
2. Nor is the validity of the order in question to be impugned by the allegation that
there was a denial of procedural due process. If the books and records sought to be
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN

delivered and deposited in court for examination were the private property of
petitioners, perhaps the allegation of the absence of due process would not be entirely
lacking in plausibility. Such is not the case however. The pertinent section of the
Industrial Peace Act makes clear that such books of accounts and other records of
the financial activities are open to inspection by any member of a labor organization.
For the court to require their submission at the hearing of the petition is, as above
noted, beyond question, and no useful purpose would be served by first hearing
petitioners before an order to that effect can be issued. Moreover, since as was shown
in the very brief of petitioners, there was a motion for reconsideration, the absence of
any hearing, even if on the assumption purely for argument's sake that there was such
a requirement, has no cured. So it was held by this Court in a recent decision. Thus:
"As far back as 1935, it has already been a settled doctrine that a plea of denial of
procedural due process does not lie where a defect consisting of an absence of notice
of hearing was thereafter cured by the alleged aggrieved party having had the
opportunity to be heard on a motion for reconsideration. 'What the law prohibits is not
the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of
opportunity to be heard.' There is then no occasion to impute deprivation of property
without due process where the adverse party was heard on a motion for
reconsideration constituting as it does 'sufficient opportunity' for him to inform the
Tribunal concerned of his side of the controversy. As was stated in a recent decision,
what 'due process contemplates is freedom from arbitrariness and what it requires is
fairness or justice, the substance rather than the form being paramount,' the
conclusion being that the hearing on a motion for reconsideration meets the strict
requirement of due process."8

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied. The writ of preliminary injunction
issued under the resolution of April 13, 1967 is dissolved and declared to be without
any further force or effect.
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
9. Evangelista vs. Jarencio
G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975
SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Presidential
Agency on Reforms and Government Operations, and the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY
ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (PARGO), petitioner,
vs.
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XXIII, and FERNANDO MANALASTAS, Assistant City Public Service Officer
of Manila, and ALL OTHER CITY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY
SITUATED, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Ist. Assistant Solicitor General
Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners.
Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent
Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando
Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc.", which reads as follows:
IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ
of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued
restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys
and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in
connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent]
and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent]
under Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised
Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential
Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order
No. 4 of January 7, 1966. 2 Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following
functions and responsibilities: 3
b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and
corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other
activities which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to
submit proper recommendations to the President of the Philippines.
c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts
Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of
graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... .
h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn
complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and
to file and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all
the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or
subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the
investigation. 4
Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the
Agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service
Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear
as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a certain
investigation pending therein."
Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25,
1968 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition,
certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed its legality.
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge issued the aforementioned Order:
IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ
of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued
restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys
and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in
connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent]
and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent]
under Section 530 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).
Because of this, petitioners 5 elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for
reconsideration first filed on the fundamental submission that the Order is a patent
nullity. 6
As unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is whether the Agency, acting thru its
officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding
investigations.
It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact,
the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. 7 Investigations are
useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and
licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining
general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than
illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. 8 An
administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in
proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole
purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial
nature may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings
of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for
correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations
for actions. 10
We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power
from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to
"summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation"
11 with the authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces
tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications
as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." 12 Such subpoena power
operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted
sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as
respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-
paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h)
interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting the very
purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious
activities and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the
Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore
imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under
sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive
Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function should the
subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the
established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.
Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged strictures of a subpoena
issued under the Rules of Court 13 to abridge its application. The seeming proviso in
Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code that the right to summon witnesses
and the authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces
tecum or otherwise shall be "subject in all respects to the same restrictions and
qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character" cannot be validly
seized upon to require, in respondents' formulation, that, as in a subpoena under the
Rules, a specific case must be pending before a court for hearing or trial and that the
hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the court's judicial or
adjudicatory functions 14 before a non-judicial subpoena can be issued by an
administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It must be emphasized, however, that
an administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly, what
the Rules speaks of is a judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a
competent court, and not an administrative subpoena. To an extent, therefore, the
"restrictions and qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative
Code could mean the restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or when
the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy of the books,
documents or things does not appear. 15
Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of
investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable
cause is shown 16 and even before the issuance of a complaint. 17 It is not necessary,
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be
pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation
be for a lawfully authorized purpose. 18 The purpose of the subpoena is to discover
evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered
evidence so justifies. 19 Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony
sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized
purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to have information that might
shed some helpful light. 20 Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon
evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations it does not follow that
an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have
and exercise powers of original inquiry. The administrative agency has the power of
inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence,
but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just
because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties
are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform
itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law. 21 In sum, it may be stated
that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the
authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is
reasonably relevant. 22
There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency
upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of
Manila in anomalous transactions 23 fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and
that the information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of
which he is claimed to be in possession, 24 is reasonably relevant to the
investigations.
We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative
investigations, generally, in scope similar to adversary proceedings. 25 In Cabal v.
Kapunan, Jr., 26 the Court ruled that since the administrative charge of unexplained
wealth against the respondent therein may result in the forfeiture of the property under
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a proceeding criminal or penal in nature, the
complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness stand without encroaching upon
his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Later, in Pascual, Jr. v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 27 the same approach was followed in the administrative
proceedings against a medical practitioner that could possibly result in the loss of his
privilege to practice the medical profession. Nevertheless, in the present case, We
find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is not facing any administrative charge. 28
He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of
anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of
submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the
corresponding charges. 29 Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts
as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be
unwise. 30 Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any
attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-
incrimination.
A question of constitutional dimension is raised by respondents on the inherent power
of the President of the Philippines to issue subpoena. 31 More tersely stated,
respondents would now challenge, in a collateral way, the validity of the basic
authority, Executive Order No. 4, as amended in part by Executive Order No. 88.
Unfortunately, for reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of executive orders,
which are commonly said to have the force and effect of statutes 32 cannot be
collaterally impeached. 33 Much more when the issue was not duly pleaded in the
court below as to be acceptable for adjudication now. 34 The settled rule is that the
Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it. 35
Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner
Quirico Evangelista to respondent Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal
competence of the Agency to issue.
WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1, 1968, is
hereby set aside and declared of no force and effect.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN

10. Office Court Admin vs. Canque asked from her the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos in exchange for
the release of the formers common-law husband, Jovencio Patoc, and the dismissal
OFFICE OF THE COURT A.M. No. P-04-1830 of his criminal cases in court. Patoc was charged with violation of Republic Act No.
ADMINISTRATOR, [Formerly A.M. No. 04-6-151-MCTC] 9165 before the sala of Judge Victor R. Teves of the said court.
Petitioner,
Present: The NBI operatives conducted an entrapment operation on June 3, 2004 at about 9:30
A.M. in the sala of Judge Teves. They arrested Canque after she received the amount
PUNO, C.J., of P40,000.00, previously marked with invisible ink and dusted with fluorescent
QUISUMBING, powder, from Ypanto in the presence of NBI Investigator Jedidah S. Hife. Canque was
YNARES-SANTIAGO, brought to the Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI for laboratory examination.
CARPIO, Forensic Chemist Rommel D. Paglinawan, in his Physics Report,[1] found that the
- versus - CORONA, right and left hands of Canque were positive for the presence of fluorescent powder.
CARPIO MORALES,* The NBI report further stated that prior to the entrapment, Patocs mother had already
CHICO-NAZARIO,* given the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos to Canque in the presence
VELASCO, JR., of Ypanto for the dismissal of Patocs first case for possession of shabu on November
NACHURA, 30, 2003. The case remains pending to date.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, In a letter dated June 3, 2004, Atty. Reynaldo O. Esmeralda, Acting Regional Director,
BRION, NBI-Region VII, endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas the case of
PERALTA, and Canque for immediate inquest. Thereafter, Informations for direct bribery and violation
SYLVIA CANQUE, Clerk of Court, BERSAMIN, JJ. of Sec. 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, were filed in the Regional Trial
12th MCTC, Moalboal-Badian- Court (RTC) of Barili, Cebu and were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. CEB-BRL-1058
Alcantara-Alegria, Cebu, Promulgated: and CEB-BRL-1057, respectively.
Respondent. In November 2003, Auditors from Region VII, Cebu City, conducted the periodic audit
June 4, 2009 on the cash and accounts of accountable officers of the provinces of Cebu, Bohol and
x-------------------------------------------------x Negros Oriental. After the audit of the cash and accounts of Canque, the Auditors
found that she had a cash shortage of P304,985.00. A letter of demand[2] was sent
DECISION to her to produce the missing funds and to submit a written explanation within seventy-
two (72) hours why the shortage occurred.
Per Curiam: On August 3, 2004, the office of the Cluster Director, Commission on Audit, Quezon
City received the initial report on the result of the examination of the cash and accounts
of Canque.[3] Attached to said report were the chronological statements on the events
The instant case stemmed from the Investigation Report of the National Bureau of that transpired in the course of the audit submitted by Ma. Violeta Lucila T. Luta, State
Investigation (NBI)-Region VII on the entrapment operation on Sylvia R. Canque, Auditor II, Team Leader. On August 6, 2004, the Supervising Auditor forwarded to the
Clerk of Court, 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Moalboal-Badian-Alcantara- Office of the Chief Justice the initial report on the results of the investigation conducted
Alegria, Cebu. on the cash and accounts of Canque. The initial report stated that Canque had a
The Investigation Report showed that on June 1, 2004, Marissa Y. Ypanto of Barangay shortage in her cash collection amounting to P304,985.00 and recommended her
Polo, Alcantara, Cebu filed a letter-complaint before the NBI alleging that Canque
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
immediate relief from her position and any other position involving money or property
accountability.[4]
In a Resolution dated June 29, 2004, the Court treated the NBI entrapment on Canque
as an administrative complaint for grave misconduct and directed her to comment
thereon. She was immediately placed under suspension until further orders by the
Court. The case was referred to a Consultant of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) for investigation, report and recommendation.
In her Comment,[5] Canque claimed that sometime in November 2003, Rebecca
Patoc came to her office to inquire about the bail for her son, Jovencio. When she
learned from the judge that the bail was P200,000.00, but that it could be reduced to
P100,000.00 if there was no objection from the Chief of Police, Rebecca came back
two (2) days later with a Motion for Reduction of Bail. After two weeks, Rebecca came
with Ypanto. Canque instructed them to proceed to a bonding company in Barili. She
alleged that at Shamrock Restaurant, Rebecca gave P20,000.00 as premium payment
for the bail bond to a certain Ote Erojo, who in turn delivered to Rebecca a copy of the
Release Order, promising to send her the bond undertaking by mail. On December 8,
2003, Jovencio and Ypanto brought the surety bond to Canque at the latters office.
In May 2004, another case for drug pushing was filed against Jovencio. Canque
admits to seeing Ypanto only on two (2) occasions: during the preliminary investigation
on May 24 and on May 31 when Ypanto asked her when the ten-day period for the
filing of Jovencios Counter-Affidavit would expire.
Canque further averred that on June 3, 2004, the last day for the filing of the Counter-
Affidavit, Ypanto came with a woman who introduced herself as Jovencios sister who
had just arrived from Holland. The woman got an envelope from her bag and handed
it to Ypanto. Ypanto tried to give it to Canque, but the latter did not touch it when she
saw that it was not the Counter-Affidavit. The woman allegedly got the envelope from
Ypanto and tried to place it at the back of the palm of Canque where it lightly touched
her skin. The woman then showed her ID and told Canque that she was an NBI agent.
Other NBI agents rushed in and arrested Canque.
In a Resolution dated November 9, 2004, the Court, upon the recommendation of the
OCA, reassigned the case to the Executive Judge, RTC, Cebu City for investigation,
report and recommendation, considering that all the persons concerned were
residents of Cebu City.
Executive Judge Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr. conducted a hearing on October 18, 2005,
attended by Canque, NBI agents Gregorio Algoso, Jr., Reynaldo Villordon and
Jedidah Hife. The notice sent to Ypanto was returned with the information that she
had died.
The Investigation Report[6] states, viz.:
Jedidah S. Hife, a special investigator of the National Bureau of Investigation Central
Visayas Regional Office, identified her Affidavit, dated June 3, 2004.
In that Affidavit, Hife declared that on June 3, 2004, at about 9 oclock in the morning
of June 3, 2004, at the office of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Moalboal-Badian-
Alcantara-Alegria, Cebu, she and other NBI agents arrested Sylvia Canque in an
entrapment operation.
She had been instructed to accompany Marissa Ypanto, pretending to be her friend,
and to give a pre-arranged signal to other NBI agents at the proper time.
Thus, she and Marissa Ypanto had entered a room inside the courtroom, and there
Marissa introduced her to Sylvia Canque as her friend. Marissa had brought with her
marked money in the amount of P40,000.00, for which Sylvia had asked from her in
exchange for the dismissal of a case for violation of RA 9165 against Jovencio Patoc,
and eventually the release of the latter.
Sylvia Canque and Marissa went outside. Hife followed and overheard Sylvia tell
Marissa that the money was for the fiscal. Sylvia showed them a Joint Affidavit
executed by PO1 Jeremias Geromo and PO3 Estanislao Avenido, the police officers
who had arrested Jovencio.
They returned inside the courtroom. Sylvia Canque asked Marissa how much money
she had. Marissa said that she was carrying P50,000.00, and gave the envelope to
Canque, who wrote P50,000.00 on it. The latter put the envelope inside her bag, and
got it out, and put it in again she seemed undecided, and then she again asked
Marissa how much the envelope contained. Marissa suggested that she count the
money.
While Sylvia was counting the money, Hife gave the pre-arranged signal. NBI agents
Reynaldo Villordon and Michael Angelo Abarico entered the courtroom followed by
other agents, accosted Sylvia Canque and recovered from her the marked money
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
amounting to P40,000.00. Thereupon, they put Canque under arrest and informed her
of her Constitutional rights.
At the NBI office, laboratory examination found Sylvia Canque positive for fluorescent
powder. She was then booked and fingerprinted.
NBI agents Gregorio Y. Algoso, Jr. and Reynaldo C. Villordon identified and confirmed
the allegations in the Joint Affidavit which they executed on June 3, 2004.
On June 1, 2004, their office received a letter from a Jonald Ungab, concerning a
certain Marissa Ypanto of Brgy. Polo, Alcantara, Cebu, who had complained about
Sylvia R. Canque, Clerk of Court of the 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Moalboal-
Basian-Alcantara-Alegria, who had asked from her the amount of P40,000.00 in
exchange for the release of her common-law husband, Jovencio Patoc, and the
dismissal of the case filed against him, which was then being heard in the sala of
Judge Victor R. Teves.
In accordance with their plan to entrap Sylvia Canque, Jedidah accompanied Marissa
Ypanto, who introduced Jedidah to Sylvia Canque as a friend. Marked money
prepared by the Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI, consisting of six five-hundred-
peso bills, in the total amount of P40,000.00, had been given to Ypanto, who was to
hand it to Sylvia Canque. When the transaction was done, and Jedidah had given the
pre-arranged signal indicating that the money had been received by Sylvia Canque,
they immediately went inside the office of Sylvia Canque, introduced themselves and
arrested her. They brought Sylvia Canque to the NBI office to be examined for the
presence of fluorescent powder on her hands, booked, photographed and
fingerprinted.
Villordon added that, being just nearby, he saw Marissa give the money to Sylvia
Canque, who counted it. At this point, Jedidah gave the pre-arranged signal, and the
agents went inside. His co-agent Michael Albarico announced that they were NBI
agents. All of which took Sylvia Canque by surprise.
Physics Report No. 04-P-3306, dated June 3, 2004, of the Forensic Chemistry Section
of the National Bureau of Investigation states that the examination conducted on June
3, 2004, at 12:30 p.m. revealed that the left and right hands of Sylvia Canque bore the
presence of yellow fluorescent powder.
For her part, Sylvia Canque identified and confirmed the allegations she made in her
Comment, dated July 21, 2004, adding nothing to the same.
Still and all, Canque insisted that it was Jedidah who put the envelope on her forearm,
and that she did not count the money inside it. In fact, it was NBI Director Esmeralda
who counted the money in his office. Until then the envelope was unopened. She
denied having written P50,000.00 on the envelope.
Findings
Canque admitted that an entrapment operation was conducted on her. Laboratory
tests found her hands positive for the presence of fluorescent powder. But Canque
denied touching the money herself, claiming that it was Jedidah Hife who put the
envelope on the back of her palm. But if the envelope were (sic) just put on her
forearm, and what was dusted with fluorescent powder was the money, which was
inside the envelope, why were Canques hands found positive for the presence of the
powder?
The undersigned gives credence to the testimony of the NBI agents, which was
coherent, and given in a forthright manner. No ulterior motive to lie could be ascribed
to the agents. Thus, the undersigned finds the facts to be as narrated by the agents.[7]
The Investigating Judge found respondent Canque guilty of grave misconduct and
recommended the penalty of dismissal, with forfeiture of all her benefits and
disqualification from re-employment in the government service.
In a Resolution dated February 7, 2006, the Court referred the Investigation Report to
the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In its Report dated June 13, 2006, the OCA recommended that the Investigation
Report of Investigating Judge Dumdum be set aside and the complaint be investigated
anew upon finding that Canque was not informed of her right to be heard by herself
and counsel during the investigation which allegedly amounted to a denial of her right
to due process; and for the Audit Report of Shortage in the amount of P304,985.00
and other actuations and deficiencies of respondent Canque to be set in the next En
Banc Agenda.
On September 5, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to file a
Comment, within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice, on the Audit Report
of the COA finding a shortage in her cash collection amounting to P304,985.00.
Respondent failed to comment. Thus, in an En Banc Resolution dated December 4,
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
2007, the Court considered respondent to have waived her right to file Comment and
referred, for the second time, the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
In a Memorandum dated July 23, 2008, the Office of the Court Administrator found
Canque liable for gross neglect of duty, gross dishonesty and grave misconduct and
recommended her dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any
government office or instrumentality, including government-owned and controlled
corporations. It further recommended that she be ordered to restitute the amount of
P304,985.00 representing the shortage in the collection of court funds.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator.
Grave misconduct is a malevolent transgression of some established and definite rule
of action more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer
or employee which threatens the very existence of the system of administration of
justice.[8] It manifests itself in corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of established rules.[9] It is considered as a grave offense under the Civil
Service Law[10] with the corresponding penalty of dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in government service.
In the case at bar, respondent violated Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel which states that [c]ourt personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift,
favor or benefit on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift shall influence
their official actions. This is sufficiently established by the evidence on record. First,
respondent was caught red-handed, in a legitimate entrapment operation, demanding
and receiving money from complainant Ypanto in connection with the immediate
release of the latters common-law husband Jovencio from police custody; and the
dismissal of the criminal charges against him which were pending before the MCTC,
Moalboal-Badian-Alcantara-Alegria, Cebu her official station. While respondent was
in the act of counting the marked money, she was validly placed under arrest and
apprised of her constitutional rights. Second, her hands were found to have smudges
of the yellow fluorescent powder used to mark the bills when her hands were subjected
to ultraviolet light examination. These results of the entrapment operation clearly
establish the guilt of respondent who has merely denied, without support, the
allegations against her.
This is not all.
Respondent likewise failed to observe the standard of behavior required of clerks of
court as the chief administrative officers of their respective courts as shown by the
initial audit report of the COA finding her remiss in the performance of her
administrative duties as clerk of court. These infractions consist of her failure to update
the court cashbook, as well as her failure to explain the missing collection records[11]
for the Fiduciary Fund (FF) and the shortage in her cash collection amounting to
P304,985.00. These acts of respondent are in violation of her duties and
responsibilities as clerk of court in the collection and custody of legal funds and fees.
Clerks of court are responsible for court records and physical facilities of their
respective courts and are accountable for the courts money and property deposits
under Section B, Chapter 1 of the 1991 Manual for Clerks of Court and the 2002
Revised Manual for Clerks of Court, viz.:
The Clerk of Court has general administrative supervision over all the personnel of the
Court. As regards the Courts funds and revenues, records, properties and premises,
said officer is the custodian. Thus, the Clerk of Court is generally also the treasurer,
accountant, guard and physical plant manager thereof.
Thus, as custodians of the courts funds, revenues, records, properties and premises,
clerks of court are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of the same.
The cited acts of respondent clearly show her failure to discharge her functions as
clerk of court constituting gross neglect of duty, gross dishonesty and grave
misconduct. Each offense is punishable with dismissal even for the first time of
commission under Section 22 (a), (b) and (c) of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service
Laws.
We have held time and again that the Court will not hesitate to impose the stiffest
penalty on those who atrociously display serious lack of integrity, uprightness and
honesty demanded of an employee in the judiciary. Neither shall we tolerate or
condone any conduct that would violate the norms of public accountability and
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN

diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system,[12] as
in the case at bar.

Lastly, the Court does not agree with the finding of the Office of the Court Administrator
in its first Report dated June 13, 2006 recommending that the Investigation Report of
Investigating Judge Dumdum be set aside and that the complaint be investigated
anew since Canque was not informed of her right to be heard by herself and counsel
during the investigation an omission allegedly amounting to a denial of her right to due
process. The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence he may have in support of his
defense. Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to
administrative proceedings. Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated
with due process in its strict judicial sense.[13] A formal or trial-type hearing is not
required.

In the case at bar, despite respondents protestations, the records readily show that
she was afforded the opportunity to present her side as she was directed to file her
comment on the complaint. She was notified of the hearing and was in fact present
during the entire proceedings. As to the issue on the legality of her arrest, respondent
has failed to submit evidence in support of her bare claims.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Sylvia R. Canque, Clerk of Court, 12th MCTC,
Moalboal-Badian-Alcantara-Alegria, Cebu is found GUILTY of GRAVE
MISCONDUCT, GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY and GROSS DISHONESTY. She is
hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued
leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of
the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations and financial
institutions. She is further ordered to RETURN to the Court the amount of P304,985.00
to cover the shortage in the collection of court funds. In case of her failure to restitute
the said amount, in full or in part, the Employees Leave Division of the Office of
Administrative ServicesOCA is directed to compute the balance of respondents
accrued leave credits and forward such computation to the Finance Division of the
Fiscal Management OfficeOCA for the determination of its monetary value. The said
amount plus other benefits that respondent may be entitled to shall be applied to the
above shortage incurred.
SO ORDERED.
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN

G.R. No. L-17778 November 30, 1962

IN RE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ARMANDO RAMOS, JESUS L.

CARMELO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Probe Committee, Office of the Mayor
of Manila, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ARMANDO RAMOS, respondent-appellee.

City Fiscal Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.

Armando Ramos for and in his own behalf as respondent-appellee.

REGALA, J.:

On February 3, 1960, the Mayor of Manila issued an executive order creating a

committee "to investigate the anomalies involving the license inspectors and other
personnel of the License Inspection Division of the Office of the City Treasurer and of
the License and Permits Division of this Office (of the Mayor)." He named Mr. Jesus
L. Carmelo as chairman of said committee.

It appears that the committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos, a private citizen
working as a bookkeeper in the Casa de Alba, requiring him to appear before it on
June 3, 8, 9, 15 and 16 and August 4 and 11, 1960, in connection with an
administrative case against Crisanta Estanislao but that Ramos, on whom the
subpoenas were duly served, refused to appear.

Claiming that Ramos' refusal tended "to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administrative proceedings," petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition to declare Armando Ramos in contempt. After hearing, during which petitioner
was required to show a prima facie case, the trial court dismissed the petition. The
lower court held that there is no law empowering committees created by municipal
mayors to issue subpoenas and demand that witnesses testify under oath. It also held
that to compel Ramos to testify would be to violate his right against self-incrimination.

It appears that in a statement given to investigators of the Office of the Mayor, Ramos
admitted having misappropriated on several occasions, sums of money given to him
11. Carmelo vs. Ramos by the owner of Casa de Alba for the payment of the latter's taxes for 1956-1959 and
that this fact had not been discovered earlier because Ramos used to entertain
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
employees in the City Treasurer's office at Casa de Alba where Ramos was a
bookkeeper as stated above. The trial court held that to compel Ramos to confirm this
statement in the administrative case against certain employees in the Office of the
City Treasurer would be to compel him to give testimony that could be used against
him in a criminal case for estafa of which the owner of Casa de Alba was the offended
party. From that decision, petitioner appealed to this Court.
The main issue in this ease is the power, if any, of committee, like the committee of
which petitioner is the chairman, to subpoena witnesses to appear before it and to ask
for their punishment in case of refusal.
The rule is that Rule 64 (Contempt)1 of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and
superior courts and does not comprehend contempt committed against administrative
officials or bodies like the one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly considered
and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Section 580
of the Revised Administrative Code. (People v. Mendoza; People v. Dizon, 49 O. G.
No. 2, 541.)
Petitioner invokes Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides as
follows:
Powers incidental to taking of testimony. When authority to take testimony or
evidence is conferred upon an administrative officer or upon any nonjudicial person,
committee, or other body, such authority shall be understood to comprehend the right
to administer oaths and summons witnesses and shall include authority to require the
production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all
respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of
a similar character.
Saving the provisions of section one hundred and two of this Act, any one who, without
lawful excuse, fails to appear upon summons issued under the authority of the
preceding paragraph or who, appearing before any individual or body exercising the
power therein defined, refuses to make oath, give testimony, or produce documents
for inspection, when thereunto lawfully required, shall be subject to discipline as in
case of contempt of court and upon application of the individual or body exercising the
power in question shall be dealt with by the judge of first instance having jurisdiction
of the case in the manner provided by law.
One who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he has "authority to take
testimony or evidence" before he can apply to the courts for the punishment of hostile
witnesses. (Francia v. Pecson, et al., 87 Phil. 100.)
Now, what authority to take testimony does petitioner's committee have from which
the power to cite witnesses may be implied, pursuant to section 580?
To be sure, there is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor creating the
committee about such a grant of power. All that the order gives to this body is the
power to investigate anomalies involving certain city employees.
Petitioner contends that the Mayor of Manila has the implied power to investigate city
officials and employees appointed by him to the end that the power expressly vested
in him to suspend and remove such officials of employees (Sec. 22, Republic Act No.
409) may be justly and fairly exercised. We agree with this proposition and We held
so in the case of Pagkanlungan v. De la Fuente, 48 O.G. No. 10, p. 4332. But We do
not agree with the petitioner that a delegation of such power to investigation implies
also a delegation of the power to take testimony or evidence of witnesses whose
appearance may be require by the compulsory process of subpoena. Thus, in denying
this power to an investigating body in the Office of the Mayor of Manila, We said in
Francia v. Pecson, et al., supra: "Were do not think the mayor (of Manila) can delegate
or confer the powers to administer oaths, to take testimony, and to issue subpoenas."
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the provisions of section 580 of the Administrative
Code are applicable to the City of Manila as these pertain to national bureaus or offices
of the government.
Citing 50 Am. Jur. 449, petitioner contends that "the power of the investigation
committee to issue compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
undoubtedly exists since only complimentary to the power of the mayor to investigate,
suspend and remove city officers and employees, supra, is the recognized rule that
where the statute grants a right, it also confers by implication every particular power
necessary for the exercise thereof." There is no merit in the argument. In the first
place, the authority cited speaks of statutory, grant of power to a body. Here, We have
seen that whatever power may be claimed by petitioner's committee may only be
traced to the power of the Mayor to investigate as implied from his power to suspend
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN

or remove certain city employees. There is no statutory grant of power to investigate

to petitioner's committee.

In the second place, even granting that the Mayor has the implied power to require
the appearance of witnesses before him, the rule, as noted earlier, is that the Mayor
can not delegate this power to a body like the committee of the petitioner. (Francia v.
Pecson, et al., supra.)

Lastly, 50 Am. Jur. Sec. 428, p. 450 itself admits an exception to the rule invoked by
the petitioner. Thus, it is stated that "where the liberty and property of persons are
sought to be brought within the operation of a power claimed to be impliedly granted
by an act because necessary to its due execution, the case must be clearly seen to
be within those intended to be reached." Here, no less than the liberty of Armando
Ramos is involved in the claim of the committee to the right to cite witnesses.

We hold, therefore, that petitioner's committee has no power to cite witnesses to

appear before it and to ask for their punishment in case of refusal. This conclusion
makes it unnecessary for Us to pass upon the other error assigned by petitioner as
having been allegedly committed by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila is hereby affirmed,
without pronouncement as to costs.
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
12. Masangcay vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-13827 September 28, 1962
BENJAMIN MASANGCAY, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Godofredo A. Ramos and Ruby Salazar-Alberto for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General and Dominador D. Dayot for respondent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Benjamin Masangcay, with several others, was on October 14, 1957 charged before
the Commission on Election with contempt for having opened three boxes bearing
serial numbers l-8071, l-8072 and l-8073 containing official and sample ballots for the
municipalities of the province of Aklan, in violation of the instructions of said
Commission embodied in its resolution promulgated September 2, 1957, and its
unnumbered resolution date March 5, 1957, inasmuch as he opened said boxes not
the presence of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor,
and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the
Citizens' Party, as required in the aforesaid resolutions, which are punishable under
Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Masangcay
was then the provincial treasurer of Aklan designated by the Commission in its
resolution in Case CE-No. 270, part II 2 (b) thereof, to take charge of the receipt and
custody of the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their
distribution, among the different municipalities of the province.
In compliance with the summons issued to Masangcay and his co-respondents to
appear and show cause why they should not be punished for contempt on the basis
of the aforementioned charge, they all appeared before the Commission on October
21, 1957 and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereupon, evidence was presented by both
the prosecution and the defense, and on December 16, 1957 the Commission
rendered its decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty as
charged and sentencing each of them to suffer three months imprisonment and pay a
fine of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment of two months in case of insolvency, to be
served in the provincial jail of Aklan. The other respondents were exonerated for lack
of evidence.
Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue the
constitutionality of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which grants the
Commission on Elections as well as its members the power to punish acts of contempt
against said body under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided for
in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in that the portion of said section which grants to the
Commission and members the power to punish for contempt is unconstitutional for it
infringes the principle underlying the separation of powers that exists among the three
departments of our constitutional form of government. In other words, it is contended
that, even if petitioner can be held guilty of the act of contempt charged, the decision
is null and void for lack of valid power on the part of the Commission to impose such
disciplinary penalty under the principle of separation of powers. There is merit in the
contention that the Commission on Elections lacks power to impose the disciplinary
penalty meted out to petitioner in the decision subject of review. We had occasion to
stress in the case of Guevara v. The Commission on Elections 1 that under the law
and the constitution, the Commission on Elections has only the duty to enforce and
administer all laws to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try, hear and
decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. In
this sense, said, the Commission, although it cannot be classified a court of justice
within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an
administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as
controversies that by express provision law come under its jurisdiction. The difficulty
lies in drawing the demarcation line between the duty which inherently is
administrative in character and a function which calls for the exercise of the quasi-
judicial function of the Commission. In the same case, we also expressed the view
that when the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the
power to punish contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature, as can
be clearly gleaned from the following doctrine we laid down therein:
. . . In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise
any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish
for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.
As this Court has aptly said: 'The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts;
its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to
the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates courts, and, consequently, in the
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN

administration of justice (Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U.S. v.

Lee Hoc, 36 Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 O.G., 2570; In Re Kelly, Phil., 944). The
exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute
of courts (Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, Ibid.). Its exercise by administrative
bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony
(People v. Swena, 296 P., 271). And the exercise of that power by an administrative
body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid (Langenberg v.
Lecker, 31 N.E., 190; In Re Sims, 37 P., 135; Roberts v. Hacney, 58 SW.,
810).1awphl.nt

In the instant case, the resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for
whose violation the charge for contempt was filed against petitioner Masangcay
merely call for the exercise of an administrative or ministerial function for they merely
concern the procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other election
paraphernalia among the different municipalities. In fact, Masangcay, who as
provincial treasurer of Aklan was the one designated to take charge of the receipt,
custody and distribution of election supplies in that province, was charged with having
opened three boxes containing official ballots for distribution among several
municipalities in violation of the instructions of the Commission which enjoin that the
same cannot be opened except in the presence of the division superintendent of
schools, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista
Party, the Liberal Party, and the Citizens' Party, for he ordered their opening and
distribution not in accordance with the manner and procedure laid down in said
resolutions. And because of such violation he was dealt as for contempt of the
Commission and was sentenced accordingly. In this sense, the Commission has
exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt, and so its decision is null and
void.

Having reached the foregoing conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to pass on the

question of constitutionality raised by petitioner with regard to the portion of Section 5
of the Revised Election Code which confers upon the Commission on Elections the
power to punish for contempt for acts provided for in Rule 64 of our rules of court.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from insofar as petitioner Benjamin Masangcay

is concerned, as well as the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
insofar as it concerns him, are hereby reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
13. Bedol vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 179830 December 3, 2009
LINTANG BEDOL, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari are the twin Resolutions issued by the
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in the case entitled "In
the Matter of the Charge of Contempt of the Commission Against Election Supervisor
Lintang Bedol." The first Resolution1 dated August 7, 2007, held petitioner guilty of
contempt of the COMELEC and meted out to him the penalty of six (6) months
imprisonment and a fine of P1,000.00. The second Resolution2 dated August 31,
2007, denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts as stated by the COMELEC follow:
On May 14, 2007, the National and Local elections were held under the auspices of
this Commission.
As Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for the province of
Maguindanao, the respondent [petitioner] discharged his official functions and was
able to ensure the PBOCs performance of its ministerial duty to canvass the
Certificates of Canvass coming from the twenty two (22) city and municipalities in the
province.
At that time, respondent [petitioner] also was charged with the burdensome and
gargantuan duty of being the concurrent Provincial Elections Supervisor for the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan a neighboring province of Maguindanao.
Respondent [petitioner] Bedol failed to attend the scheduled canvassing of the
Provincial Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he is the
Provincial Election Supervisor which was slated on May 22, 2007.
On May 25, 2007, respondent appeared before the Commission, en banc sitting as
the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) for the election of senators to submit the
provincial certificate of canvass for Maguindanao, pursuant to his functions as
Provincial Elections Supervisor and chair of the PBOC for Maguindanao. Due to
certain observations on the provincial certificates of canvass by certain parties,
canvassing of the certificate was held in abeyance and respondent was queried on
the alleged fraud which attended the conduct of elections in his area.
He was already informed of the resetting of the canvassing for May 30, 2007, but failed
to appear despite prior knowledge.
On June 4, 2007, Celia B. Romero, Director II, ERSD & Concurrent Chief of the
Records and Statistics Division of the COMELEC issued a certification that as of even
date, the canvassing documents for all municipalities of the province of Maguindanao
in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections were not transmitted by the Provincial
Election Supervisor of said province nor the respective Board of Canvassers.
The Commission and not just the NBOC, in the exercise of its investigatory powers to
determine existing controversies created the Task Force Maguindanao, headed by
Commissioner Nicodemo Ferrer, which was tasked to conduct a fact-finding
investigation on the conduct of elections and certificates of canvass from the city and
municipalities in Maguindanao.
Respondent [petitioner] appeared before the Task Force during its June 11, 2007 fact
finding activity and responded to the queries from the chair. It was during this hearing
that respondent [petitioner] Bedol explained that, while in his custody and possession,
the election paraphernalia were stolen sometime on May 29, 2007, or some fifteen
(15) days after the elections. This was the first time such an excuse was given by the
respondent [petitioner] and no written report was ever filed with the Commission
regarding the alleged loss.1avvphi1
Respondent [petitioner] Bedol was duly informed to be present in the next scheduled
investigative proceedings set for June 14, 2007 as the Task Force wanted to delve
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
deeper into the alleged loss by propounding additional questions to Atty. Bedol during
the next scheduled proceedings, such as why he still had in his possession said
documents which should have already been turned over to the Commission, why he
did not report to the COMELEC or to the police authorities the purported theft, and
other pertinent questions. However, despite actual notice in open session, Atty. Bedol
failed to appear, giving the impression that respondent [petitioner] Bedol does not give
importance to this whole exercise and ignores the negative impact his attitude has on
this Commission.
Also respondent [petitioner] failed and refused to submit a written explanation of his
absences which he undertook to submit on June 13, 2007, but was only received by
this Commission belatedly on July 03, 2007.
On June 26, 2007, [petitioner] came out on national newspapers, in an exclusive
interview with the Inquirer and GMA-7, with a gleaming 45 caliber pistol strapped to
his side, and in clear defiance of the Commission posted the challenge by saying that
those that are saying that there was cheating in Maguindanao, file a case against me
tomorrow, the next day. They should file a case now and I will answer their
accusations.(Words in brackets ours)
On June 27, 2007, the COMELEC through Task Force Maguindanao head,
Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer, issued a Contempt Charge and Show Cause
Order3 against petitioner citing various violations of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, viz:
You are hereby formally charged of contempt of this Commission for having committed
during the period between May 14, 2007, and June 26, 2007, acts in violation of
specific paragraphs of Section 2, Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as
follows:
1. (a) Your (PES Bedols) failure to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial
Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he (sic) is (sic) the
Provincial Election Supervisor on May 22, 2007; (b) your failure to attend the reset
schedule of the canvassing on May 30, 2007, despite knowledge thereof when you
attended the previously scheduled but again reset canvassing of said PCOCs on May
25, 2007; (c) your failure to attend the continuation of hearing of the Task Force
Maguindanao on June 14, 2007, despite notice to him in open session in the hearing
held on June 11, 2007, and personal service to you of a subpoena which you duly
signed on the same date; and your failure/refusal to submit your written explanation
of your said absences which you undertook to submit on June 13, 2007 all of these
failures on your part are violations of paragraphs (b) and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
2. Your unlawful assumption of custody in your office in Maguinadanao of the
municipal certificates of canvass (MCOC) and other accountable election documents
of all the municipalities of Maguinadanao used in the last elections of 2007, but which
should have been delivered to the Commission on Elections in its main office in
Intramuros, Manila, and your admission that said accountable documents were lost
from your said custody these constitute violations of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d),
section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.
3. Your pronouncements in the media flaunting [disrespect to] the authority of the
COMELEC over you, challenging the institution to file a case against you in court as
it is only in court that you are ready to face your accuser are violations of paragraphs
(a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.
4. Your regaling the media (interviews in national television channels, newspapers
and radios) with your boast of possession of an armory of long firearms and side arms,
displaying in public for all to see in your front-page colored portrait in a national
broadsheet and during a television interview a shiny pistol tucked in a holster at your
waist in a combative mode (sic) these are clear violations of paragraphs (a) and
(d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules. (Words in brackets ours)
Through the foregoing June 27, 2007 Order, petitioner was directed to appear before
the COMELEC En Banc on July 3, 2007 at 10:00 oclock in the morning to personally
explain why he should not be held in contempt for the above-mentioned offenses.
On July 2, 2007, petitioner was arrested by members of the Philippine National Police
on the basis of an Order of Arrest4 issued on June 29, 2007 by the COMELEC after
petitioner repeatedly failed to appear during the fact-finding proceedings before Task
Force Maguindanao.
During the July 3, 2007 hearing, petitioner questioned the COMELECs legal basis for
issuing the warrant of arrest and its assumption of jurisdiction over the contempt
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charges. Upon petitioners motion, he was granted a period of ten (10) days within
which to file the necessary pleading adducing his arguments and supporting
authorities. The continuation of the hearing was set on July 17, 2007.
On July 17, 2007, which was beyond the ten-day period he requested, petitioner
submitted an Explanation Ad Cautelam with Urgent Manifestation, containing the
following averments:
1. Respondent [petitioner] urgently manifests that he is making a special appearance
as he assails the jurisdiction of the Honorable Commission and its capacity to
prosecute the present case in an impartial and fair manner.
2. Respondent [petitioner] questions the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him.
He can not be validly arrested or re-arrested as a witness who is being compelled to
testify in a hearing before the Honorable Commission.
3. Respondent [petitioner] has not committed any contemptuous acts against the
Commission. He has not committed those acts charged against him by the
Commission motu proprio. (Words in brackets ours.)
During the hearing on July 17, 2007, petitioner reiterated his objection to the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the contempt charges due to the absence of a
complaint lodged with the COMELEC by any private party. Petitioners objection was
treated as a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which was denied forthwith by
the COMELEC. Petitioner was then required to present evidence which he refused to
do. Various exhibits were then marked and presented to the COMELEC. However,
the latter allowed petitioner to file a Memorandum within a period of ten (10) days and
gave him the opportunity to attach thereto his documentary and other evidence.
On July 31, 2007, petitioner again belatedly filed his Memorandum5 maintaining his
objection to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to initiate the contempt proceedings on
ground that the COMELEC, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for
the election of senators, was performing its administrative and not its quasi-judicial
functions. Petitioner argued that the COMELEC, in that capacity, could not punish him
for contempt.
On August 7, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc rendered the first assailed Resolution,
the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, respondent Atty. Lintang Bedol is hereby
found guilty of Contempt of the Commission for the following acts and omissions:
1. (a) The failure to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of
Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he is the Provincial Election Supervisor
on May 22, 2007 (b) failure to attend the reset schedule of the canvassing on May 30,
2007, despite knowledge thereof when Respondent Bedol attended the previously
scheduled but again reset canvassing on May 25, 2007 (c) failure to attend the
continuation of hearing of the Task Force Maguindanao on June 14, 2007, despite
notice to Respondent in open session in the hearing held on June 11, 2007, and
personal service to him of the subpoena which he duly signed on the same date; the
failure/refusal to submit written explanation of respondents absences which he
undertook to submit on June 13, 2007 --- all of these failures are violations of
paragraphs (b) and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
2. The unlawful assumption of custody in the Respondents office in Maguindanao of
the Municipal Certificates of Canvass (MCOC) and other accountable election
documents of all the municipalities of Maguindanao used in the last elections of 2007,
but which should have been delivered to the Commission on Elections in its main
office in Intramuros, Manila, and Respondents plain admission that said accountable
documents were lost from his said custody --- these constitute violations of paragraphs
(a), (c) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.lavvphil
3. The respondents pronouncements in media flaunting disrespect to the authority of
the COMELEC over him, challenging the institution to file a case against him in court
as it is supposedly only in court that Respondent Bedol was ready to face his accuser
are violations of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.
4. Regaling the public through the media (interviews in national television channels,
newspapers and radios) with boast of possession of an armory of long firearms and
side arms, displaying in public, for all to see in his front-page colored portrait in a
national broadsheet and during a television interview, a shiny pistol tucked in a holster
at your waist in a combative mode (sic) --- these are clear violations of paragraphs
(a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of said Rules.
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
All the foregoing constitute an exhibition of contumacious acts showing disrespect for
the institution, of which respondent is even a ranking official, which is clearly
contemptuous of this Commission, for which Respondent Lintang Bedol is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a fine of
One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00).
The Legal Department of the Comelec is hereby directed to investigate and determine
whether or not any election offense or crime under the Revised Penal Code has been
committed by respondent Lintang Bedol and to initiate the filing of the necessary
charge/s therefor.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
COMELEC in the other assailed Resolution dated August 31, 2007.
Hence, petitioner filed before the Court the instant petition for certiorari raising the
following issues:
I Elections,6 which held:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS HAS JURISDICTION TO
INITIATE OR PROSECUTE THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE
PETITIONER.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSSION HAS ALREADY PREJUDGED THE CASE
AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN VIOLATION OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ASSUMING IT HAS JURISDICTION TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT, ARE
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, CREDIBLE AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
We dismiss the petition.
The main thrust of petitioners argument is that the COMELEC exceeded its
jurisdiction in initiating the contempt proceedings when it was performing its
administrative and not its quasi-judicial functions as the National Board of Canvassers
for the election of senators. According to petitioner, the COMELEC may only punish
contemptuous acts while exercising its quasi-judicial functions.
The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its
constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the explicit
provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx
(6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
The above-quoted provision should be construed broadly to give effect to the
COMELECs constitutional mandate as enunciated in Loong v. Commission on
xxx. Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad
power "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent
of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been niggardly in defining the parameters
of powers of COMELEC in the conduct of our elections.
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative,
quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC
embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election
laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers
to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its
administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of election laws.
In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the
Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and
regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus
Election Code.7
The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva,8 described
quasi-judicial power in the following manner, viz:
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of
the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power
to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and
to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power
when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or
reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty
entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers
or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official
action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons
are affected, it is elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due
process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings. [Emphasis ours.]
The Creation of Task Force Maguindanao was impelled by the allegations of fraud
and irregularities attending the conduct of elections in the province of Maguindanao
and the non-transmittal of the canvassing documents for all municipalities of said
province.
Task Force Maguindanaos fact-finding investigation to probe into the veracity of the
alleged fraud that marred the elections in said province; and consequently, to
determine whether the certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether
an election offense had possibly been committed could by no means be classified
as a purely ministerial or administrative function.
The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-
judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the
elections in Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted
hearings and required the attendance of the parties concerned and their counsels to
give them the opportunity to argue and support their respective positions.
The effectiveness of the quasijudicial power vested by law on a government
institution hinges on its authority to compel attendance of the parties and/or their
witnesses at the hearings or proceedings. As enunciated in Arnault v. Nazareno9
Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing,
and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so
some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who
refuse to appear during a fact-finding investigation, despite a previous notice and order
to attend, would render nugatory the COMELECs investigative power, which is an
essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the conduct of honest and
credible elections. In this case, the purpose of the investigation was however derailed
when petitioner obstinately refused to appear during said hearings and to answer
questions regarding the various election documents which, he claimed, were stolen
while they were in his possession and custody. Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could
punish petitioner for such contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force hearings.
Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a board of canvassers at
that time it required petitioner to appear before it, the Court had the occasion to rule
that the powers of the board of canvassers are not purely ministerial. The board
exercises quasi-judicial functions, such as the function and duty to determine whether
the papers transmitted to them are genuine election returns signed by the proper
officers.10 When the results of the elections in the province of Maguindanao were
being canvassed, counsels for various candidates posited numerous questions on the
certificates of canvass brought before the COMELEC. The COMELEC asked
petitioner to appear before it in order to shed light on the issue of whether the election
documents coming from Maguindanao were spurious or not. When petitioner
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
unjustifiably refused to appear, COMELEC undeniably acted within the bounds of its
jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions.
In Santiago, Jr. v. Bautista,11 the Court held:
xxx. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or
administrative duties, and the performance of and administrative or ministerial duties,
may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally
that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the
legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an
officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he
acts judicially.
On the procedure adopted by the COMELEC in proceeding with the indirect contempt
charges against petitioner, Section 52 (e), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code
pertinently provides:
Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections.
xxx
(e) Punish contempts provided for in the Rules of Court in the same procedure and
with the same penalties provided therin. Any violation of any final and executory
decision, order or ruling of the Commission shall constitute contempt thereof.
[Emphasis ours.]
The aforecited provision of law is implemented by Rule 29 of COMELECs Rules of
Procedure, Section 2 of which states:
Rule 29 Contempt
Sec. 1. xxx
Sec. 2. Indirect Contempt. After charge in writing has been filed with the Commission
or Division, as the case may be, and an opportunity given to the respondent to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of the responsible officer of the Commission in the performance of his
official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or
command of the Commission or any of its Divisions, or injunction or restraining order
granted by it;
(c) Any abuse of or any inlawful interference with the process or proceedings of the
Commission or any of its Divisions not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of
this Rules;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice by the Commission or any of its Divisions;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority; and
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served.
SEC. 3 Penalty for Indirect Contempt. If adjudged guilty, the accused may be
punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos or imprisonment
for not more than six (6) months, or both, at the discretion of the Commission or
Division.
The language of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
is broad enough to allow the initiation of indirect contempt proceedings by the
COMELEC motu proprio. Furthermore, the above-quoted provision of Section 52(e),
Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code explicitly adopts the procedure and penalties
provided by the Rules of Court. Under Section 4, Rule 71, said proceedings may be
initiated motu proprio by the COMELEC, viz:
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an
order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt.
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In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers
involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of
or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall
allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately,
unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and
the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
Hence, the COMELEC properly assumed jurisdiction over the indirect contempt
proceedings which were initiated by its Task Force Maguindanao, through a Contempt
Charge and Show Cause Order, notwithstanding the absence of any complaint filed
by a private party.
We turn now to petitioners claim that the COMELEC pre-judged the case against him,
and that its findings were not supported by evidence. His claim deserves scant
consideration.
The fact that the indirect contempt charges against petitioner were initiated motu
proprio by the COMELEC did not by itself prove that it had already prejudged the case
against him. As borne out by the records, the COMELEC gave petitioner several
opportunities to explain his side and to present evidence to defend himself. All of
petitioners belatedly filed pleadings were admitted and taken into consideration
before the COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution finding petitioner guilty of
indirect contempt.
The COMELEC complied with the aforementioned Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court and with the requirements set by Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
when it issued the Contempt Charge and Show Cause Order against petitioner
directing him to appear before it and explain why he should not be held in contempt.
Petitioner claims that the challenged Resolution finding him guilty of indirect contempt
was based merely on hearsay, surmises, speculations and conjectures, and not on
competent and substantial evidence. He contends that there is no convincing
evidence that he deliberately refused to heed the summonses of the COMELEC or
that he was sufficiently notified of the investigative hearings. He further argues that
the loss of the election documents should not even be automatically ascribed to him.
We are not persuaded.
Petitioner was found guilty of contempt on four (4) grounds. First, he repeatedly failed
to attend, despite notice of the scheduled12 canvassing of the Provincial Certificates
of Canvass, the hearing of the Task Force Maguindanao; and refused to submit his
explanation for such absences, which he had undertaken to submit, in violation of
paragraphs (b) and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Petitioner was duly notified of the scheduled hearings. It was his official responsibility
to be present during the scheduled hearing to shed light on the allegedly stolen
election documents but he failed to do so without offering any valid justification for his
non-appearance.
Second, he unlawfully assumed custody of accountable election documents, which
were lost while in his possession, and consequently failed to deliver the same, in
violation of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d) Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.
Petitioner admitted that the subject certificate of canvass and other election
documents were lost while in his custody. Petitioner himself admitted during the
hearing held on June 11, 2007 that the documents were stolen sometime on May 29,
2007. Apart from the said loss of the vital election documents, his liability stemmed
from the fact that he illegally retained custody and possession of said documents more
than two weeks after the elections. The COMELEC viewed such act as a
contemptuous interference with its normal functions.
Third and fourth, he publicly displayed disrespect for the authority of the COMELEC
through the media (interviews on national television channels, and in newspapers and
radios) by flaunting an armory of long firearms and side arms in public, and posing for
the front page of a national broadsheet, with a shiny pistol tucked in a holster, in
violation of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.
Petitioner questions the probative value of the newspaper clippings published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer on June 26, 2007 which showed a photo of him with a firearm
tucked to his side and his supposed exclusive interview. He claims that said
newspaper clippings are mere hearsay, which are of no evidentiary value.
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True, there were instances when the Court rejected newspaper articles as hearsay,
when such articles are offered to prove their contents without any other competent WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a Temporary
and credible evidence to corroborate them. However, in Estrada v. Desierto, et al.,13 Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.
the Court held that not all hearsay evidence is inadmissible and how over time,
exceptions to the hearsay rule have emerged. Hearsay evidence may be admitted by SO ORDERED.
the courts on grounds of "relevance, trustworthiness and necessity."14 When certain
facts are within judicial notice of the Court, newspaper accounts "only buttressed these
facts as facts."15

Another exception to the hearsay rule is the doctrine of independently relevant

statements, where only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the
truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply; hence, the
statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement
is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or
be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.16

Here, the newspaper clippings were introduced to prove that petitioner deliberately
defied or challenged the authority of the COMELEC. As ratiocinated by the COMELEC
in the challenged Resolution of August 7, 2007, it was not the mere content of the
articles that was in issue, but petitioners conduct when he allowed himself to be
interviewed in the manner and circumstances, adverted to in the COMELEC
Resolution, on a pending controversy which was still brewing in the COMELEC. While
petitioner claimed that he was misquoted, he denied neither the said interview nor his
picture splashed on the newspaper with a firearm holstered at his side but simply relied
on his objection to the hearsay nature of the newspaper clippings. It should be
stressed that petitioner was no ordinary witness or respondent. He was under the
administrative supervision of the COMELEC17 and it was incumbent upon him to
demonstrate to the COMELEC that he had faithfully discharged his duties as dictated
by law. His evasiveness and refusal to present his evidence as well as his reliance on
technicalities to justify such refusal in the face of the allegations of fraud or anomalies
and newspaper publication mentioned to the Contempt Charge and Show Cause
Order amounted to an implied admission of the charges leveled against him.

All told, petitioner brought this predicament upon himself when he opted to dispense
with the presentation of his evidence during the scheduled hearings and to explain his
non-appearance at the hearings of Task Force Maguindanao and the loss of the
certificates of canvass and other election documents.
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
14. Gaoiran vs. Alcala
[G.R. No. 150178. November 26, 2004]
FLORIAN R. GAOIRAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA, Retired Chairman,
Commission on Higher Education, ESTER ALBANO GARCIA, now Chairman,
Commission on Higher Education, FELIPE S. AMMUGAUAN, SR., Vocation School
Superintendent I, Angadanan Agro-Industrial College, EDMOND M. CASTILLEJO,
Administrative Officer I, Angadanan Agro-Industrial College, and DIOSDADO TELAN,
Instructor I & Head Teacher III, OIC Designate, Angadanan Agro-Industrial College,
Angadanan, Isabela, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by Florian R. Gaoiran, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61477. In the assailed decision, the appellate
court reversed the Decision dated February 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, nullifying the Resolution dated June 3, 1999 of Hon.
Angel C. Alcala, then Chairman of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED),
dismissing petitioner Gaoiran from the service for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
On October 29, 1997, a letter-complaint was filed with the CHED against petitioner
Gaoiran, Head Teacher III in the High School Department of the Angadanan Agro-
Industrial College (AAIC),[2] a state-supervised school in Angadanan, Isabela. In his
letter-complaint, respondent Edmond M. Castillejo, Administrative Officer II, also of
the same school, charged the petitioner with mauling him while he was performing his
duties therein. The incident allegedly took place on August 15, 1997 at 2:30 p.m. inside
the school premises. Appended to the letter-complaint were the verified criminal
complaint filed by respondent Castillejo against the petitioner and the sworn
statements of his witnesses. The criminal complaint for assault to a person in authority
was filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Angadanan-San Guillermo and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 97-42.
The letter-complaint was referred to the Legal Affairs Service of the CHED. Thereafter,
Atty. Felina S. Dasig, then Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Director III, Legal
Affairs Service, conducted a fact-finding investigation on the mauling incident to
determine the existence of a prima facie case against the petitioner.
During the fact-finding investigation, respondent Castillejo averred that at 2:30 p.m.
on August 15, 1997, while he was performing his usual duties as Administrative Officer
II, the petitioner suddenly barged into his (Castillejos) office and, then and there,
assaulted and boxed him. The petitioner delivered blows on respondent Castillejos
head, left eye, left eyebrow and lower lip. Not content with the injuries he inflicted on
respondent Castillejo, the petitioner tried to throw him down the stairs but was
prevented by the timely intervention of Mr. Ismael Bautista, Accountant I of the same
school. Bautista and other employees of the AAIC corroborated respondent Castillejos
statements. Moreover, the medical certificate issued by Dr. Belinda L. Miguel showed
that on August 15, 1997, she treated respondent Castillejo for the wounds he
sustained on his left eye, left eyebrow and lower lip.
For his part, the petitioner averred that at around 2:30 p.m. of August 15, 1997, he
was about to leave the school premises. Suddenly, respondent Castillejo shouted to
the security guard to punch out the petitioners attendance card. This irked the
petitioner because there were students and other teachers in the vicinity. The
petitioner confronted respondent Castillejo and asked the latter why he had to
embarrass him (petitioner) in front of the students. Respondent Castillejo just turned
his back and proceeded to his office. The petitioner followed him and later saw that
respondent Castillejo was already holding a wrench. Inside respondent Castillejos
office, the petitioner made a side step and just then, respondent Castillejo slipped and
fell flat on the floor. The petitioner noticed that respondent Castillejos left eyebrow was
bleeding and he was putting up a struggle (nagpupumiglas), so the petitioner held his
feet. While going down the stairs, the petitioner met Bautista and Henry Rupac,
Watchman I of the school.
After the fact-finding investigation was terminated, and upon finding of a prima facie
case against the petitioner for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, Atty. Dasig issued the Formal Charge and Order of Preventive
Suspension dated July 27, 1998 stating in part:
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WHEREFORE, you are hereby directed to answer in writing and under oath the above
charges against you within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, submitting therewith
sworn statements of your witnesses and other pertinent documents, if any. In your
answer, you are directed to state whether or not you elect a formal hearing of the
charges against you or you waive your rights to such hearing. You are, likewise,
advised of your right to counsel.
Considering the gravity of the instant charge against you, pursuant to the provisions
of P.D. 807, as amended, you are hereby PREVENTIVELY SUSPENDED FOR
NINETY (90) DAYS WITHOUT PAY effective upon receipt thereof.[3]
The petitioner did not submit his written counter-affidavit or answer to the charges
against him. Instead, he filed with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a petition
for certiorari and prohibition to restrain the enforcement of the said preventive
suspension order. However, considering that the petitioner had already served the
suspension, the case was dismissed for being moot and academic.
The petitioner sought reconsideration of the formal charge and preventive suspension
order, contending that the letter-complaint was not under oath and that he was not
informed nor apprised of the complaint against him before, during and after the
preliminary fact-finding investigation.
Thereafter, Joel Voltaire V. Mayo, who was later appointed Director of the Legal Affairs
Service of the CHED, issued the Resolution dated February 20, 1999, dismissing the
administrative complaint against the petitioner on the ground that the letter-complaint
of respondent Castillejo was not under oath.
However, respondent Hon. Angel C. Alcala, then Chairman of the CHED, apparently
unaware of the existence of Director Mayos resolution, issued another Resolution
dated June 3, 1999, finding the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissing him therefrom. The
dispositive portion of respondent Alcalas resolution states:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, respondent FLORIAN R. GAOIRAN is
hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE for unlawfully
attacking a person in authority while in the active performance of his duties and
responsibilities and, then and there, inflicted physical injuries on his person. This is
without prejudice to the complainants right to institute the proper criminal and civil
actions against the respondent relative thereto.
The Vocational Schools Superintendent of Angadanan Agro-Industrial College,
Angadanan, Isabela, is hereby directed to effectively implement this Order and to
submit a report thereon within three (3) days upon implementation.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The petitioner received a copy of the above resolution on July 12, 1999, which was
served on him by respondent Felipe P. Ammugauan, Sr., School Superintendent I of
AAIC.
The petitioner then filed with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction. He alleged that respondent Alcala committed
grave abuse of discretion when, in the Resolution dated June 3, 1999, he dismissed
the petitioner from the service despite the fact that the administrative complaint against
him had already been dismissed per the Resolution of February 20, 1999 of Director
Mayo of the Legal Affairs Service.
In its Decision dated February 15, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner as it declared the June 3, 1999 Resolution of respondent Alcala null and
void. The RTC found that after the formal charge was filed against the petitioner and
he chose not to file an answer thereto, a formal investigation was still required to be
conducted under the Civil Service Rules. When Director Mayo of the Legal Affairs
Service, in his February 20, 1999 Resolution, dismissed the administrative complaint
against the petitioner on the ground that the letter-complaint was not under oath, the
formal investigation had not, as yet, been terminated. Such dismissal, according to
the RTC, put an end to the litigation. Thus, respondent Alcala acted with grave abuse
of discretion in issuing his June 3, 1999 Resolution, dismissing the petitioner from the
service, for the reason that the administrative complaint against him had already been
dismissed.
On appeal by the respondents, the Court of Appeals (CA), in the assailed Decision of
September 10, 2001, reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. The CA
declared as valid respondent Alcalas June 3, 1999 Resolution, dismissing the
petitioner from the service. On the other hand, it declared as without legal effect
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
Director Mayos February 20, 1999 Resolution, dismissing the administrative complaint
against the petitioner.
In so ruling, the CA noted an apparent irregularity in Director Mayos February 20, 1999
Resolution. The CA pointed out that while the said resolution was ostensibly dated
February 20, 1999, a copy thereof was mailed to respondent Castillejo only on July 6,
1999 and received by the latter only on July 14, 1999. The petitioner, for his part,
received a copy thereof only on July 1, 1999. Prior to these dates, the existence of the
said resolution had not been established; hence, the date of its actual issuance
remained doubtful. The CA ruled that between the two conflicting resolutions, Director
Mayos February 20, 1999 Resolution and respondent Alcalas June 3, 1999
Resolution, the latter was entitled to the presumption of regularity. Moreover,
respondent Alcala, as then Chairman of the CHED, had the authority to reverse and
set aside the acts or issuances of his subordinates, including that of Director Mayo.
The CA further ratiocinated that, even granting that the February 20, 1999 Resolution
was regularly issued, Director Mayo nonetheless overstepped his authority because
Atty. Dasig, then OIC of the Legal Affairs Service, had filed the formal charge and
order of preventive suspension against the petitioner as early as July 27, 1998. The
CA also held that, contrary to Director Mayos ruling, the fact that the letter-complaint
was not under oath was not fatal. Even an anonymous complaint may be acted upon
by the authority concerned provided that the same is verifiable, since under Section
48[5] of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292,[6] administrative proceedings may be
commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the Secretary or head of
office of equivalent rank, or head of local government or chiefs of agencies, or regional
directors.
The CA, likewise, opined that in administrative proceedings, a formal or trial-type
hearing is not, at all times, necessary. In this case, the petitioner was not denied
procedural due process as he was afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain his side. On the other hand, the CA declared that respondent Ester Albano
Garcia, who replaced respondent Alcala as Chairman of the CHED, was denied
procedural due process by the RTC when it rendered its decision without awaiting her
answer to the petition. The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Resolution dated June 3, 1999 of then Chairman
of CHED, Angel C. Alcala is hereby declared valid while the Resolution dated February
20, 1999 of Director Joel Voltaire Mayo is hereby declared to be without legal effect.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Aggrieved, the petitioner now comes to this Court alleging as follows:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
OF LAW FOR NOT UPHOLDING THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL
SERVICE LAW ESPECIALLY RULE XIV, SECTION 2 OF THE OMNIBUS RULES
IMPLEMENTING BOOK 5 OF EXECUTIVE [ORDER] NO. 292 AND OTHER
PERTINENT CIVIL SERVICE LAWS, SECTION 2, SECTION 4 AND PARAGRAPH D
OF SECTION 4;
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT A VOID COMPLAINT IS DEEMED INEXISTENT;
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
OF LAW IN NOT ORDERING A FORMAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CHARGES
PROFFERED AGAINST THE PETITIONER THERE BEING NO FORMAL
INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE COMMISSION;
4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ESTER ALBANO GARCIA WAS
DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW KNOWING THAT THE LATTER, BEING A
NOMINAL PARTY, THE LOWER COURT MAY DISPENSE WITH HER ANSWER TO
THE PETITION;
5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN HOLDING THAT THE FORMAL CHARGE AND ORDER OF PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION IS LEGAL.[8]
As the petitioner himself submits, the foregoing issues are interrelated; hence, they
shall be resolved jointly.
The petitioner vigorously contends that the letter-complaint of respondent Castillejo
should be deemed inexistent as it was not made under oath. Consequently, the formal
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
charge and order of preventive suspension filed against him, which stemmed from the
said letter-complaint, was, likewise, null and void. The petitioner cites Section 2,[9]
Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, which requires
that an administrative complaint against a civil service official or employee be in writing
and under oath. Moreover, the letter-complaint did not allegedly comply with Section
4(d)[10] of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 94-0521,[11] also known
as the Uniform Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative Investigation, and
the law then in force at the time, because it did not contain a certification of non-forum
shopping.
Since respondent Castillejos letter-complaint failed to comply with the formal
requirements of the law, the petitioner maintains that Director Mayo rightfully
dismissed the same and that respondent Alcala abused his discretion when he
dismissed the petitioner from the service.
The Court is not persuaded.
The pertinent provisions governing the initiation of administrative complaints against
civil service officials or employees are provided in Book V of E.O. No. 292. Sections
46(c) and 48(1) and (2), Chapter 6, Subtitle A thereof read:
Sec. 46. Discipline: General provisions.
(c) Except when initiated by the disciplining authority, no complaint against a civil
service official or employee shall be given due course unless the same is in writing
and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant.
...
Sec. 48. Procedures in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees.
(1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or
employee by the Secretary or head of office of equivalent rank, or head of local
government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written
complaint of any other persons.
(2) In the case of a complaint filed by any other persons, the complainant shall submit
sworn statements covering his testimony and those of his witnesses together with his
documentary evidence. If on the basis of such papers a prima facie case is found not
to exist, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case. If a prima facie case exists,
he shall notify the respondent in writing, of the charges against the latter, to which
shall be attached copies of the complaint, sworn statements and other documents
submitted, and the respondent shall be allowed not less than seventy-two hours after
receipt of the complaint to answer the charges in writing under oath together with
supporting sworn statements and documents, in which he shall indicate whether or
not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory. If the
answer is found satisfactory, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case.
On the other hand, Section 2, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V
of E.O. No. 292, cited by the petitioner, reads:
Sec. 2. Any person may file an administrative complaint with the Commission or any
of its proper office. Said complaint shall be in writing and under oath, otherwise, the
same shall not be given due course.
Further, Section 4(d) of CSC Resolution No. 94-0521, likewise, invoked by the
petitioner, states:
Sec. 4. Complaint in Writing and Under Oath. No complaint against a civil servant shall
be given due course, unless the same is in writing and under oath.
The complaint should be written in a clear manner, simple and concise language and
in a systematic manner as to apprise the civil servant concerned of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him and to enable him to intelligently prepare his
defense or answer.
The complaint shall also contain the following:
...
(d) a statement that no other administrative action or complaint against the same party
involving the same acts or omissions and issues has been filed before another agency
or administrative tribunal.
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
In the absence of any one of the above-mentioned requirements, the complaints shall
be dismissed.
It must be pointed out that, while the letter-complaint of respondent Castillejo was not
concededly verified, appended thereto were the verified criminal complaint that he
filed against the petitioner, as well as the sworn statements of his witnesses. These
documents could very well be considered as constituting the complaint against the
petitioner. In fact, this Court, through the Court Administrator, investigates and takes
cognizance of, not only unverified, but also even anonymous complaints filed against
court employees or officials for violations of the Code of Ethical Conduct.[12] Indeed,
it is not totally uncommon that a government agency is given a wide latitude in the
scope and exercise of its investigative powers.[13] After all, in administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.[14]
In any case, contrary to the petitioners assertion, the letter-complaint of respondent
Castillejo is not a complaint within the purview of the provisions mentioned above. In
the fairly recent case of Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals,[15] this Court
held that the complaint under E.O. No. 292 and CSC rules on administrative cases
both refer to the actual charge to which the person complained of is required to answer
and indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation should his answer be
deemed not satisfactory.
In this case, respondent Castillejos letter-complaint contained the following
averments:
The undersigned wish to file his complaint against Mr. Florian R. Gaoiran, Head
Teacher III of Angadanan Agro-Industrial College for mauling him last August 15, 1997
at around 2:30 in the afternoon for the accused to be disciplined. The case is now filed
in the Court of Justice docketed under Criminal Case No. 97-42 for Assault to Person
in Authority.
I am Mr. Edmond M. Castillejo, Administrative Officer II of Angadanan Agro-Industrial
College, Angadanan, Isabela, furnishing you a copy of my complaint filed in court, all
under oath, for you to determine the gravity of the case administratively. Mr. Florian
R. Gaoiran is now intimidating two of the witnesses against him thats why may I
request for an immediate investigation of the case, by the commission, for him to be
suspended or probably removed from the service to avoid him from threatening the
witnesses.
Your preferential attention and favorable action in this request are earnestly requested
and will be highly appreciated.[16]
Acting thereon, the CHED referred the matter to its Office of Legal Affairs Service and
Atty. Dasig, as OIC Director thereof, conducted a fact-finding investigation on the
incident. The said letter-complaint did not, by itself, commence the administrative
proceedings against the petitioner, requiring an answer from him, but, as already
mentioned, merely triggered a fact-finding investigation by the CHED.
The Court cannot, therefore, uphold the petitioners contention that respondent
Castillejos letter-complaint was inexistent and could not be acted upon by the CHED
for to do so, would result in an absurd and restrictive interpretation of E.O. No. 292
and effectively deprive the Government of its disciplining power over people who hold
a public trust.[17]
In this case, it was the formal charge and order of preventive suspension filed by Atty.
Dasig against the petitioner charging him with grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and directing him to submit his answer in
writing and under oath that constituted the complaint.[18] Notably, Atty. Dasig signed
the formal charge and order of preventive suspension for the Commission in her
capacity as then OIC of the CHEDs Legal Affairs Service. As the complaint against
the petitioner was initiated by the appropriate disciplining authority, under Sections
46(c)[19] and 48(1),[20] Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No. 292, the same need
not be subscribed and sworn to. Neither is it required that the same contain a
verification of non-forum shopping.
Section 47(2), Chapter 7 of E.O. No. 292 provides, in part, that the Secretaries and
heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall
have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against
officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Since it was the CHED,[21] as the
disciplining authority, through Atty. Dasig, which filed the formal charge or complaint
against the petitioner, jurisdiction was properly acquired over the case.
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
Anent the issue on which of the two conflicting resolutions is valid, the Court agrees
with the CA that respondent Alcalas June 3, 1999 Resolution dismissing the petitioner
from the service prevails over that of Director Mayos February 20, 1999 Resolution
dismissing the administrative complaint.
First, the basis for the dismissal of the administrative complaint stated in Director
Mayos resolution, i.e., that the letter-complaint was not verified, is, as earlier
discussed, patently erroneous. Second, it was issued by Director Mayo in excess of
his authority. It is borne by the records that Atty. Dasig already filed the formal charge
against the petitioner after a fact-finding investigation had been conducted on the
mauling incident and a prima facie case had been established against him. The formal
charge was filed as early as July 27, 1998 and, on September 21, 1998, Atty. Dasig
submitted her memorandum to respondent Alcala recommending the petitioners
dismissal. It was, thus, highly irregular for Director Mayo to dismiss the administrative
complaint against the petitioner long after the formal charge had already been filed
against him and the matter was already for respondent Alcalas resolution. Third,
respondent Alcala, by reason of his position as then Chairman of the CHED, had the
authority to reverse and set aside the acts or issuances of his subordinates. His June
3, 1999 Resolution dismissing the petitioner from the service, in effect, reversed and
set aside the Resolution dated February 20, 1999 of Director Mayo, his subordinate.
Finally, the petitioner insists that no formal investigation was conducted after the
formal charge had been filed against him in violation of Section 22 of CSC Resolution
No. 94-0521 which reads:
Section 22. Conduct of Formal Investigation. A formal investigation shall be held after
the respondent has filed his answer or after the period for filing an answer has expired.
It shall be completed within thirty (30) days from the date of the service of the formal
charge, unless the period is extended by the Commission in meritorious cases.
Although the respondent did not elect a formal investigation, one shall nevertheless
be conducted if upon evaluation of the complaint, the answer, and the documents in
support thereof, the merits of the case cannot be judiciously resolved without
conducting such formal investigation.
The petitioners allegation is, however, belied by respondent Alcalas statement in his
resolution, to wit:
Nevertheless, during the formal investigation of the case, respondent [referring to the
petitioner] failed to submit his written counter-affidavit/answer to the charges filed
against him by the complainant so he was declared in default. This notwithstanding,
the oral testimony given during the fact-finding investigation was considered in his
(respondents) favor to enable this office to determine the veracity of the allegations
imputed against the respondent.
After weighing all the evidences [sic] submitted and the testimonies given by the
witnesses for both complainant and the respondent, this office finds substantial
evidence to hold the respondent administratively liable for violation of subparagraphs
(2) and (27) of Section 46(b), Chapter 7, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No. 292
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987.[22]
Significantly, the petitioner cannot rightfully claim that he was denied procedural due
process. What is repugnant to due process is the denial of the opportunity to be
heard.[23] The petitioner was undoubtedly afforded the opportunity to present his side
as he was directed to file his written answer to the formal charge against him. He opted
not to do so. He cannot now feign denial of due process.
Under Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No.
292, grave misconduct on first offense is punishable by dismissal. On the other hand,
conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service on first offense is
punishable by suspension for six months and one day to one year.
In fine, the appellate court committed no reversible error in upholding respondent
Alcalas Resolution of June 3, 1999 finding the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissing him
therefrom.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
September 10, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61477 is AFFIRMED
in toto.
SO ORDERED.
CHAPTER 4 ADMIN
15. Ang Tibay vs. CIR
G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC.,
respondents.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court
of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the
above-entitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the
reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the
majority opinion of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de
duracion o que no sea para una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de
cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago de los
salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual
ya colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus
tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan
de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con
sus osbreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que
se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro
forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo
5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a
que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales
ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation
of the judgement rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case
to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of
leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the
members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the
records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in
leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a
scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his
CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re
supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically
prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer
union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal.
(281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority
rule and elective representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2
and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source
of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made
applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor
legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule.
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7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the
National Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even
with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them
and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and
effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of
the judgment rendered herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to
the motion for a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the
opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the
Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the
respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the
interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in
cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of the powers
of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which
should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the
entire record of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this
case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers
here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains
what transpired during the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and
conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit
their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of
counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically
stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice
which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding
only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of
Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far
more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to
consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute
arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate
the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of
prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards
wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or
employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the
number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty,
and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary
of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the
Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing
and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4,
ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor
to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement.
(Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it
shall investigate and study all industries established in a designated locality, with a
view to determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such
industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum
"canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners.
(Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of
industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to
the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order
to determine specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in
agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which
is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673,
promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out that the Court of
Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had
occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained
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by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms
and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by
any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may
deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be
restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial
or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or
determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of
settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section
13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been
especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently
promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The
fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable
cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999,
82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider
the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S.
Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22
Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part
of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or
persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or
consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.)
This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of
unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of
Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G.
1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland
Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650,
81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor
Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v.
Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The
obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the
compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be
deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative
order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563,
568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville
R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene
and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a
desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated
hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co.
v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate
Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed.
431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the
parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against
them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is
enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing
evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards
of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts
in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial
or agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local
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board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public official in any
part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate
to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of
Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the
exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the
volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies
coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of
statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final
decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no
such statutory authority.
petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We
have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By and
large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest
of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the
hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be
relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of
Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the
fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected
by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby
granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may
be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth
hereinabove. So ordered.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that,
except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's
Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a
factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.

This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for
the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of
material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically
discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this
avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of
Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National
Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated
by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further
alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial
avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the