Professional Documents
Culture Documents
609 (1984) chapters that are designed to enhance individual development, community
Roberts v. United States Jaycees development, and members' management skills. These materials include courses in
No. 83-724 public speaking and personal finances as well as community programs related to
Argued April 18, 1984 charity, sports, and public health. The national office also makes available to
Decided July 3, 1984 members a range of personal products, including travel accessories, casual wear,
468 U.S. 609 pins, awards, and other gifts. The programs, products, and other activities of the
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR organization are all regularly featured in publications made available to the
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT membership, including a magazine entitled "Future."
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. B
This case requires us to address a conflict between a State's efforts to eliminate In 1974 and 1975, respectively, the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters of the Jaycees
gender-based discrimination against its citizens and the constitutional freedom of began admitting women as regular members. Currently, the memberships and
association asserted by members of a private organization. In the decision under boards of directors of both chapters include a substantial proportion of women. As a
review, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that, by requiring the result, the two chapters have been in violation of the national organization's bylaws
United States Jaycees to admit women as full voting members, the Minnesota for about 10 years. The national organization has imposed a number of sanctions on
Human Rights Act violates the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters for violating the bylaws, including denying
organization's members. We noted probable jurisdiction, Gomez-Bethke v. United their members eligibility for state or national office or awards programs, and
States Jaycees, 464 U.S. 1037 (1984), and now reverse. refusing to count their membership in computing votes at national conventions.
I In December, 1978, the president of the national organization advised both chapters
A that a motion to revoke their charters would be considered at a forthcoming meeting
The United States Jaycees (Jaycees), founded in 1920 as the Junior Chamber of of the national board of directors in Tulsa. Shortly after receiving this notification,
Commerce, is a nonprofit membership corporation, incorporated in Missouri with members of both chapters filed charges of discrimination with the Minnesota
national headquarters in Tulsa, Okla. The objective of the Jaycees, as set out in its Department of Human Rights. The complaints alleged that the exclusion of women
bylaws, is to pursue from full membership required by the national organization's bylaws violated the
"such educational and charitable purposes as will promote and foster the growth and Minnesota Human Rights Act (Act), which provides in part:
development of young men's civic organizations in the United States, designed to Page 468 U. S. 615
inculcate in the individual membership of such organization a spirit of genuine "It is an unfair discriminatory practice:"
Americanism and civic interest, "To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
Page 468 U. S. 613 privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation
and as a supplementary education institution to provide them with opportunity for because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex.."
personal development and achievement and an avenue for intelligent participation Minn.Stat. 363.03, subd. 3 (1982). The term "place of public accommodation" is
by young men in the affairs of their community, state and nation, and to develop defined in the Act as
true friendship and understanding among young men of all nations." "a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or
Quoted in Brief for Appellee 2. The organization's bylaws establish seven classes of transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services,
membership, including individual or regular members, associate individual facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or
members, and local chapters. Regular membership is limited to young men between otherwise made available to the public."
the ages of 18 and 35, while associate membership is available to individuals or 363.01, subd. 18.
groups ineligible for regular membership, principally women and older men. An After an investigation, the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human
associate member, whose dues are somewhat lower than those charged regular Rights found probable cause to believe that the sanctions imposed on the local
members, may not vote, hold local or national office, or participate in certain chapters by the national organization violated the statute, and ordered that an
leadership training and awards programs. The bylaws define a local chapter as evidentiary hearing be held before a state hearing examiner. Before that hearing
"[a]ny young men's organization of good repute existing in any community within took place, however, the national organization brought suit against various state
the United States, organized for purposes similar to and consistent with those" officials, appellants here, in the United States District Court for the District of
of the national organization. App. to Juris. Statement A98. The ultimate policymaking Minnesota, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of the
authority of the Jaycees rests with an annual national convention, consisting of Act. The complaint alleged that, by requiring the organization to accept women as
delegates from each local chapter, with a national president and board of directors. regular members, application of the Act would violate the male members'
At the time of trial in August, 1981, the Jaycees had approximately 295,000 constitutional rights of free speech and association. With the agreement of the
members in 7,400 local chapters affiliated with 51 state organizations. There were at parties, the District Court dismissed the suit without prejudice, stating that it could
that time about 11,915 associate members. The national organization's executive be renewed in the event the state administrative proceeding resulted in a ruling
vice-president estimated at trial that women associate members make up about two adverse to the Jaycees.
percent of the Jaycees' total membership. Tr. 56. The proceeding before the Minnesota Human Rights Department hearing examiner
New members are recruited to the Jaycees through the local chapters, although the then went forward and, upon its completion, the examiner filed findings of fact and
state and national organizations are also actively involved in recruitment through a conclusions of law. The examiner concluded that the Jaycees organization is a "place
variety of promotional activities. A new regular member pays an initial fee followed of public accommodation" within the Act, and that it had engaged in an unfair
by annual dues; in exchange, he is entitled discriminatory practice
Page 468 U. S. 614 Page 468 U. S. 616
to participate in all of the activities of the local, state, and national organizations. by excluding women from regular membership. He ordered the national organization
The national headquarters employs a staff to develop "program kits" for use by local to cease and desist from discriminating against any member or applicant for
membership on the basis of sex and from imposing sanctions on any Minnesota recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities
affiliate for admitting women. Minnesota v. United States Jaycees, No. HR-79-014-GB protected by the First Amendment -- speech, assembly, petition for the redress of
(Minn. Office of Hearing Examiners for the Dept. of Human Rights, Oct. 9, 1979) grievances, and the exercise of religion. The Constitution guarantees freedom of
(hereinafter Report), App. to Juris. Statement A107-A109. The Jaycees then filed a association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving other individual
renewed complaint in the District Court, which, in turn, certified to the Minnesota liberties. The intrinsic and instrumental features of constitutionally protected
Supreme Court the question whether the Jaycees organization is a "place of public association may, of course, coincide. In particular, when the State interferes with
accommodation" within the meaning of the State's Human Rights Act. See App. 32. individuals' selection of those with whom they wish to join in a common endeavor,
With the record of the administrative hearing before it, the Minnesota Supreme freedom of association in both of its forms may be implicated. The Jaycees contend
Court answered that question in the affirmative. United States Jaycees v. that this is such a case. Still, the nature and degree of constitutional protection
McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (1981). Based on the Act's legislative history, the court afforded freedom of association may vary depending on the extent to which one or
determined that the statute is applicable to any "public business facility." Id. at 768. the other aspect of the constitutionally protected liberty is at stake in a given case.
It then concluded that the Jaycees organization (a) is a "business" in that it sells We therefore find it useful to consider separately the effect of applying the
goods and extends privileges in exchange for annual membership dues; (b) is a Minnesota statute to the Jaycees on what could be called its members' freedom of
"public" business in that it solicits and recruits dues-paying members based on intimate association and their freedom of expressive association.
unselective criteria; and (c) is a public business "facility" in that it conducts its A
activities at fixed and mobile sites within the State of Minnesota. Id. at 768-774. The Court has long recognized that, because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure
Subsequently, the Jaycees amended its complaint in the District Court to add a claim individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of
that the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act rendered it highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The federal suit then proceeded to trial, interference by the State. E.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 268 U. S.
after which the District Court entered judgment in favor of the state officials. United 534-535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 262 U. S. 399 (1923). Without
States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F.Supp. 766 (1982). On appeal, a divided Court of precisely identifying every consideration that may underlie this type of constitutional
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. United States Jaycees v. McClure,709 F.2d protection, we have noted that certain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical
1560 (1983). The Court of Appeals determined that, because "the advocacy of role in the culture
political Page 468 U. S. 619
Page 468 U. S. 617 and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs;
and public causes, selected by the membership, is a not insubstantial part of what they thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual and
[the Jaycees] does," the organization's right to select its members is protected by the power of the State. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 434 U. S. 383-
the freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment. Id. at 1570. It 386 (1978); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 431 U. S. 503-504 (1977)
further decided that application of the Minnesota statute to the Jaycees' (plurality opinion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 406 U. S. 232 (1972); Griswold
membership policies would produce a "direct and substantial" interference with that v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 381 U. S. 482-485 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
freedom, id. at 1572, because it would necessarily result in "some change in the supra, at 268 U. S. 535. See also Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U. S. 556, 417
Jaycees' philosophical cast," id. at 1571, and would attach penal sanctions to those U. S. 575 (1974); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 357 U. S. 460-
responsible for maintaining the policy, id. at 1572. The court concluded that the 462 (1958); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 367 U. S. 542-545 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
State's interest in eradicating discrimination is not sufficiently compelling to dissenting). Moreover, the constitutional shelter afforded such relationships reflects
outweigh this interference with the Jaycees' constitutional rights, because the the realization that individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close
organization is not wholly "public," id. at 1571-1572, 1573, the state interest had ties with others. Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference
been asserted selectively, id. at 1573, and the antidiscrimination policy could be therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity that is central
served in a number of ways less intrusive of First Amendment freedoms, id. at 1573- to any concept of liberty. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246, 434 U. S.
1574. 255 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U. S. 816, 431 U. S.
Finally, the court held, in the alternative, that the Minnesota statute is vague as 844 (1977); Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 431 U. S. 684-
construed and applied, and therefore unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause 686 (1977); Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 414 U. S. 639-
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this conclusion, the court relied on a 640 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 405 U. S. 651-652 (1972); Stanley v.
statement in the opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court suggesting that, unlike the Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 394 U. S. 564 (1969); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S.
Jaycees, the Kiwanis Club is "private," and therefore not subject to the Act. By failing 438, 277 U. S. 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
to provide any criteria that distinguish such "private" organizations from the "public The personal affiliations that exemplify these considerations, and that therefore
accommodations" covered by the statute, the Court of Appeals reasoned, the suggest some relevant limitations on the relationships that might be entitled to this
Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation rendered the Act unconstitutionally sort of constitutional protection, are those that attend the creation and sustenance
vague. Id. at 1576-1578. of a family -- marriage, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, supra; childbirth, e.g., Carey v.
II Population Services International, supra; the raising and education of children, e.g.,
Our decisions have referred to constitutionally protected "freedom of association" in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, supra; and cohabitation with one's
two distinct senses. In one line of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to relatives, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, supra. Family relationships, by their nature,
enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must involve
Page 468 U. S. 618 Page 468 U. S. 620
be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with
relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and
constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of association receives protection as beliefs, but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life. Among other things,
a fundamental element of personal liberty. In another set of decisions, the Court has therefore, they are distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high
degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the
from others in critical aspects of the relationship. As a general matter, only redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the
relationships with these sorts of qualities are likely to reflect the considerations that State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were
have led to an understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic element of not also guaranteed. See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair
personal liberty. Conversely, an association lacking these qualities -- such as a large Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290, 454 U. S. 294 (1981). According protection to
business enterprise -- seems remote from the concerns giving rise to this collective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially important in preserving
constitutional protection. Accordingly, the Constitution undoubtedly imposes political and cultural diversity, and in shielding dissident expression from
constraints on the State's power to control the selection of one's spouse that would suppression by the majority. See, e.g., Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S.
not apply to regulations affecting the choice of one's fellow employees. Compare at 417 U. S. 575; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 381 U. S. 482-485; NAACP v.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 388 U. S. 12 (1967), with Railway Mail Assn. v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 371 U. S. 431 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, 326 U. S. 93-94 (1945). Patterson, 357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 462. Consequently, we have long understood as
Between these poles, of course, lies a broad range of human relationships that may implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a
make greater or lesser claims to constitutional protection from particular incursions corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political,
by the State. Determining the limits of state authority over an individual's freedom social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.See, e.g., NAACP v.
to enter into a particular association therefore unavoidably entails a careful Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 458 U. S. 907-909, 458 U. S. 932-933
assessment of where that relationship's objective characteristics locate it on a (1982); Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 456 U. S. 244-246 (1982); In re Primus, 436
spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal U. S. 412, 436 U. S. 426 (1978); Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U. S.
attachments. See generally Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 427 U. S. 187-189 209, 431 U. S. 231 (1977). In view of the various protected activities in which the
(1976) (POWELL, J., concurring). We need not mark the potentially significant points Jaycees engages, see infra at 468 U. S. 626-627, that right is plainly implicated in
on this terrain with any precision. We note only that factors that may be relevant this case.
include size, purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics Government actions that may unconstitutionally infringe upon this freedom can take
that, in a particular case, may be pertinent. In this case, however, several features a number of forms. Among other things, government may seek to impose penalties
of the Jaycees clearly place the organization outside of the category of relationships or withhold benefits from individuals because of their membership in a disfavored
worthy of this kind of constitutional protection. group, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 408 U. S. 180-184 (1972); it may attempt
Page 468 U. S. 621 to require disclosure of
The undisputed facts reveal that the local chapters of the Jaycees are large and Page 468 U. S. 623
basically unselective groups. At the time of the state administrative hearing, the the fact of membership in a group seeking anonymity, e.g., Brown v. Socialist
Minneapolis chapter had approximately 430 members, while the St. Paul chapter Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 U. S. 87,459 U. S. 91-92 (1982); and it may
had about 400. Report, App. to Juris.Statement A-99, A-100. Apart from age and sex, try to interfere with the internal organization or affairs of the group, e.g., Cousins v.
neither the national organization nor the local chapters employ any criteria for Wigoda, 419 U. S. 477, 419 U. S. 487-488 (1975). By requiring the Jaycees to admit
judging applicants for membership, and new members are routinely recruited and women as full voting members, the Minnesota Act works an infringement of the last
admitted with no inquiry into their backgrounds. See 1 Tr. of State Administrative type. There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or
Hearing 124-132, 135-136, 174-176. In fact, a local officer testified that he could affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept members it
recall no instance in which an applicant had been denied membership on any basis does not desire. Such a regulation may impair the ability of the original members to
other than age or sex. Id. at 135. Cf. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., express only those views that brought them together. Freedom of association
Inc., 410 U. S. 431,410 U. S. 438 (1973) (organization whose only selection criterion therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate. See Abood v. Detroit
is race has "no plan or purpose of exclusiveness" that might make it a private club Board of Education, supra, at 431 U. S. 234-235.
exempt from federal civil rights statute); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute.
S. 229, 396 U. S. 236 (1969) (same); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U. S. 298, 395 U. S. Infringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve
302 (1969) (same). Furthermore, despite their inability to vote, hold office, or compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be
receive certain awards, women affiliated with the Jaycees attend various meetings, achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms. E.g.,
participate in selected projects, and engage in many of the organization's social Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, supra, at 459 U. S. 91-
functions. See Tr. 58. Indeed, numerous nonmembers of both genders regularly 92; Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U. S. 107, 450 U. S.
participate in a substantial portion of activities central to the decision of many 124 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 424 U. S. 25 (1976) (per curiam); Cousins
members to associate with one another, including many of the organization's v. Wigoda, supra, at 419 U. S. 489; American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U. S.
various community programs, awards ceremonies, and recruitment meetings. See, 767, 415 U. S. 780-781 (1974); NAACP v. Button, supra, at 371 U. S. 438; Shelton v.
e.g., 305 N.W.2d at 772; Report, App. to Juris.Statement A102, A103. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 364 U. S. 486, 488 (1960). We are persuaded that Minnesota's
In short, the local chapters of the Jaycees are neither small nor selective. Moreover, compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens justifies
much of the activity central to the formation and maintenance of the association the impact that application of the statute to the Jaycees may have on the male
involves the participation of strangers to that relationship. Accordingly, we conclude members' associational freedoms.
that the Jaycees chapters lack the distinctive characteristics that might afford On its face, the Minnesota Act does not aim at the suppression of speech, does not
constitutional protection to the decision of its members to exclude women. We turn distinguish between prohibited and permitted activity on the basis of viewpoint, and
Page 468 U. S. 622 does not license enforcement authorities to administer the statute on the basis of
therefore to consider the extent to which application of the Minnesota statute to such constitutionally impermissible criteria. See
compel the Jaycees to accept women infringes the group's freedom of expressive Page 468 U. S. 624
association. also infra at 468 U. S. 629-631. Nor does the Jaycees contend that the Act has been
B applied in this case for the purpose of hampering the organization's ability to
express its views. Instead, as the Minnesota Supreme Court explained, the Act American economy and of the importance, both to the individual and to society, of
reflects the State's strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and removing the barriers to economic advancement and political and social integration
assuring its citizens equal access to publicly available goods and services. See 305 that have historically plagued certain disadvantaged groups, including women. See
N.W.2d at 766-768. That goal, which is unrelated to the suppression of expression, Califano v. Webster, 430 U. S. 313, 430 U. S. 317 (1977) (per curiam); Frontiero v.
plainly serves compelling state interests of the highest order. Richardson, supra, at 411 U. S. 684-686. Thus, in explaining its conclusion that the
The Minnesota Human Rights Act at issue here is an example of public Jaycees local chapters are "place[s] of public accommodations" within the meaning
accommodations laws that were adopted by some States beginning a decade before of the Act, the Minnesota court noted the various commercial programs and benefits
enactment of their federal counterpart, the Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. offered to members, and stated that "[l]eadership skills are goods,' [and] business
335. See Discrimination in Access to Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal contacts and employment promotions are `privileges' and `advantages'. . . ." 305
Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. Rev.L. & Soc.Change 215, 238 (1978) (hereinafter N.W.2d at 772. Assuring women equal access to such goods, privileges, and
NYU Survey). Indeed, when this Court invalidated that federal statute in the Civil advantages clearly furthers compelling state interests.
Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883), it emphasized the fact that state laws imposed a In applying the Act to the Jaycees, the State has advanced those interests through
variety of equal access obligations on public accommodations. Id. at 109 U. S. the least restrictive means of achieving its ends. Indeed, the Jaycees has failed to
19, 109 U. S. 25. In response to that decision, many more States, including demonstrate that the Act imposes any serious burdens on the male members'
Minnesota, adopted statutes prohibiting racial discrimination in public freedom of expressive association. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U. S. 69, 467
accommodations. These laws provided the primary means for protecting the civil U. S. 78 (1984) (law firm "has not shown how its ability to fulfill [protected]
rights of historically disadvantaged groups until the Federal Government reentered function[s] would be inhibited by a requirement that it consider [a woman lawyer]
the field in 1957. See NYU Survey 239; Brief for State of New York et al. as Amici for partnership on her merits"); id. at 467 U. S. 81 (POWELL, J., concurring); see also
Curiae 1. Like many other States, Minnesota has progressively broadened the scope Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 71-74; American Party of Texas v. White, 415
of its public accommodations law in the years since it was first enacted, both with U.S. at 415 U. S. 790. To be sure, as the Court of Appeals noted, a "not insubstantial
respect to the number and type of covered facilities and with respect to the groups part" of the Jaycees' activities constitutes protected expression on political,
against whom discrimination is forbidden. See 305 N.W.2d at 766-768. In 1973, the economic, cultural, and social affairs. 709 F.2d at 1570. Over the years, the national
Minnesota Legislature added discrimination on the basis of sex to the types of and local levels of the organization have taken public positions on a number of
conduct prohibited by the statute. Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 729, 3, 1973 Minn. diverse issues, see id. at 1569-1570; Brief for Appellee 4-5, and members of the
Laws 2164. Jaycees regularly engage in a variety of
Page 468 U. S. 625 Page 468 U. S. 627
By prohibiting gender discrimination in places of public accommodation, the civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other activities worthy of constitutional
Minnesota Act protects the State's citizenry from a number of serious social and protection under the First Amendment, ibid., see, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v.
personal harms. In the context of reviewing state actions under the Equal Protection Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 444 U. S. 632 (1980). There is,
Clause, this Court has frequently noted that discrimination based on archaic and however, no basis in the record for concluding that admission of women as full
overbroad assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes forces voting members will impede the organization's ability to engage in these protected
individuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship to activities or to disseminate its preferred views. The Act requires no change in the
their actual abilities. It thereby both deprives persons of their individual dignity and Jaycees' creed of promoting the interests of young men, and it imposes no
denies society the benefits of wide participation in political, economic, and cultural restrictions on the organization's ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or
life. See, e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 728,465 U. S. 744-745 philosophies different from those of its existing members.Cf. Democratic Party of
(1984); Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 458 U. S. 723-726 United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. at 450 U. S. 122 (recognizing the right of
(1982); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 411 U. S. 684-687 (1973) (plurality political parties to "protect themselves from intrusion by those with adverse political
opinion). These concerns are strongly implicated with respect to gender principles'"). Moreover, the Jaycees already invites women to share the group's
discrimination in the allocation of publicly available goods and services. Thus, in views and philosophy and to participate in much of its training and community
upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. 2000a, activities. Accordingly, any claim that admission of women as full voting members
which forbids race discrimination in public accommodations, we emphasized that its will impair a symbolic message conveyed by the very fact that women are not
"fundamental object . . . was to vindicate 'the deprivation of personal dignity that permitted to vote is attenuated, at best. Cf. Spence v. Washington, 418 U. S.
surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments.'" 405 (1974); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 381 U. S. 483.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 379 U. S. 250 (1964). While acknowledging that "the specific content of most of the resolutions adopted
That stigmatizing injury, and the denial of equal opportunities that accompanies it, is over the years by the Jaycees has nothing to do with sex," 709 F.2d at 1571, the
surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimination on the basis of their sex as Court of Appeals nonetheless entertained the hypothesis that women members
by those treated differently because of their race. might have a different view or agenda with respect to these matters so that, if they
Nor is the state interest in assuring equal access limited to the provision of purely are allowed to vote, "some change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast can reasonably
tangible goods and services. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. be expected," ibid. It is similarly arguable that, insofar as the Jaycees is organized to
Barez, 458 U. S. 592, 458 U. S. 609 (1982). A State enjoys broad authority to create promote the views of young men whatever those views happen to be, admission of
rights of public access on behalf of its citizens. PruneYard Shopping Center v. women as voting members will change the message communicated by the group's
Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 447 U. S. 81-88 (1980). Like many States and municipalities, speech because of the gender-based assumptions of the audience. Neither
Minnesota has adopted a functional definition of public accommodations that supposition, however, is supported by the record. In claiming that women might
reaches various forms of public, quasi-commercial conduct. have a different
Page 468 U. S. 626 Page 468 U. S. 628
See 305 N.W.2d at 768; Brief for National League of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae 15- attitude about such issues as the federal budget, school prayer, voting rights, and
16. This expansive definition reflects a recognition of the changing nature of the foreign relations, see id. at 1570, or that the organization's public positions would
have a different effect if the group were not "a purely young men's association," the generally NYU Survey 223-224, 250-252. The Court of Appeals seemingly
Jaycees relies solely on unsupported generalizations about the relative interests and acknowledged that the Minnesota court's construction of the Act by use of these
perspectives of men and women. See Brief for Appellee 20-22, and n. 3. Although familiar standards ensures that the reach of the statute is readily ascertainable. It
such generalizations may or may not have a statistical basis in fact with respect to nevertheless concluded that the Minnesota court introduced a constitutionally fatal
particular positions adopted by the Jaycees, we have repeatedly condemned legal element of uncertainty into the statute by suggesting that the Kiwanis Club might be
decisionmaking that relies uncritically on such assumptions. See, e.g., Palmore v. sufficiently "private" to be outside the scope of the Act. See 709 F.2d at 1577. Like
Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429, 466 U. S. 433-434 (1984); Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. at 465 the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals, however, we read the illustrative
U. S. 745. In the absence of a showing far more substantial than that attempted by reference to the Kiwanis Club, which the record indicates has a formal procedure for
the Jaycees, we decline to indulge in the sexual stereotyping that underlies choosing members on the basis of specific and selective criteria, as simply providing
appellee's contention that, by allowing women to vote, application of the Minnesota a further refinement of the standards used to determine whether an organization is
Act will change the content or impact of the organization's speech.Compare Wengler "public" or "private." See id. at 1582 (Lay, C.J., dissenting). By offering this counter-
v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U. S. 142, 446 U. S. 151-152 (1980), with example, the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion provided the statute with more,
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 419 U. S. 508 (1975). rather than less, definite content.
In any event, even if enforcement of the Act causes some incidental abridgment of The contrast between the Jaycees and the Kiwanis Club drawn by the Minnesota
the Jaycees' protected speech, that effect is no greater than is necessary to court also disposes of appellee's contention that the Act is unconstitutionally
accomplish the State's legitimate purposes. As we have explained, acts of invidious overbroad. The Jaycees argues that the statute is "susceptible of sweeping and
discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and other improper application," NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 371 U. S. 433, because it could
advantages cause unique evils that government has a compelling interest to prevent be used to restrict the membership decisions of wholly private groups organized for
-- wholly apart from the point of view such conduct may transmit. Accordingly, like a wide variety of political, religious, cultural, or social purposes. Without considering
violence or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce special the extent to which such groups may be entitled to constitutional protection from
harms distinct from their communicative impact, such practices are entitled to no the operation of the Minnesota Act, we need only note that the Minnesota Supreme
constitutional protection. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. at427 U. S. 175-176. Compare Court expressly rejected the contention that the Jaycees should "be viewed
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 458 U. S. 907-909 (peaceful analogously to private organizations such as the Kiwanis International Organization."
picketing), with id. at458 U. S. 916 (violence). In prohibiting such practices, the 305 N.W.2d at 771. The state court's articulated willingness to adopt
Minnesota Act Page 468 U. S. 631
Page 468 U. S. 629 limiting constructions that would exclude private groups from the statute's reach,
therefore "responds precisely to the substantive problem which legitimately together with the commonly used and sufficiently precise standards it employed to
concerns" the State, and abridges no more speech or associational freedom than is determine that the Jaycees is not such a group, establish that the Act, as currently
necessary to accomplish that purpose. See City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers construed, does not create an unacceptable risk of application to a substantial
for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 466 U. S. 810 (1984). amount of protected conduct. Cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 422
III U. S. 216-217 (1975); NAACP v. Button, supra, at 371 U. S. 434.See New York v.
We turn finally to appellee's contentions that the Minnesota Act, as interpreted by Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 458 U. S. 769, n. 24 (1982).
the State's highest court, is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The void-for- IV
vagueness doctrine reflects the principle that The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
"a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that Reversed.
[persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ ____
as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law."
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 269 U. S. 391 (1926). The JAMES OBERGEFELL, et al., PETITIONERS
requirement that government articulate its aims with a reasonable degree of clarity 14556v.
ensures that state power will be exercised only on behalf of policies reflecting an RICHARD HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al.;
authoritative choice among competing social values, reduces the danger of caprice VALERIA TANCO, et al., PETITIONERS
and discrimination in the administration of the laws, enables individuals to conform
their conduct to the requirements of law, and permits meaningful judicial Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
review. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 461 U. S. 357-358 The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes
(1983); Grayned v. City of Rockford,408 U. S. 104, 408 U. S. 108-109 (1972); Giaccio certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and
v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399, 382 U. S. 402-404 (1966). express their identity. The petitioners in these cases seek to find that liberty by
We have little trouble concluding that these concerns are not seriously implicated by marrying someone of the same sex and having their marriages deemed lawful on
the Minnesota Act, either on its face or as construed in this case. In deciding that the the same terms and conditions as marriages between persons of the opposite sex.
Act reaches the Jaycees, the Minnesota Supreme Court used a number of specific I
and objective criteria -- regarding the organization's size, selectivity, commercial These cases come from Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee, States that define
nature, and use of public facilities -- typically employed in determining the marriage as a union between one man and one woman. See, e.g., Mich. Const., Art.
applicability of state and federal antidiscrimination statutes to the membership I, 25; Ky. Const. 233A; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3101.01 (Lexis 2008); Tenn. Const.,
policies of assertedly private clubs. See, e.g., Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Art. XI, 18. The petitioners are 14 same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex
Assn., 397 F.2d 96 partners are deceased. The respondents are state officials responsible for enforcing
Page 468 U. S. 630 the laws in question. The petitioners claim the respondents violate theFourteenth
(CA4 1968); National Organization for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 127 Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have their marriages, lawfully
N.J.Super. 522, 318 A.2d 33, aff'd mem., 67 N.J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974). See performed in another State, given full recognition.
Petitioners filed these suits in United States District Courts in their home States. was diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or ALS. This debilitating disease is
Each District Court ruled in their favor. Citations to those cases are in Appendix progressive, with no known cure. Two years ago, Obergefell and Arthur decided to
A, infra. The respondents appealed the decisions against them to the United States commit to one another, resolving to marry before Arthur died. To fulfill their mutual
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. It consolidated the cases and reversed the promise, they traveled from Ohio to Maryland, where same-sex marriage was legal.
judgments of the District Courts. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F. 3d 388 (2014). The Court It was difficult for Arthur to move, and so the couple were wed inside a medical
of Appeals held that a State has no constitutional obligation to license same-sex transport plane as it remained on the tarmac in Baltimore. Three months later,
marriages or to recognize same-sex marriages performed out of State. Arthur died. Ohio law does not permit Obergefell to be listed as the surviving spouse
The petitioners sought certiorari. This Court granted review, limited to two on Arthurs death certificate. By statute, they must remain strangers even in death,
questions. 574 U. S. ___ (2015). The first, presented by the cases from Michigan and a state-imposed separation Obergefell deems hurtful for the rest of time. App. in
Kentucky, is whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a No. 14556 etc., p. 38. He brought suit to be shown as the surviving spouse on
marriage between two people of the same sex. The second, presented by the cases Arthurs death certificate.
from Ohio, Tennessee, and, again, Kentucky, is whether the Fourteenth April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse are co-plaintiffs in the case from Michigan. They
Amendment requires a State to recognize a same-sex marriage licensed and celebrated a commitment ceremony to honor their permanent relation in 2007. They
performed in a State which does grant that right. both work as nurses, DeBoer in a neonatal unit and Rowse in an emergency unit. In
II 2009, DeBoer and Rowse fostered and then adopted a baby boy. Later that same
Before addressing the principles and precedents that govern these cases, it is year, they welcomed another son into their family. The new baby, born prematurely
appropriate to note the history of the subject now before the Court. and abandoned by his biological mother, required around-the-clock care. The next
A year, a baby girl with special needs joined their family. Michigan, however, permits
From their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of human history reveal only opposite-sex married couples or single individuals to adopt, so each child can
the transcendent importance of marriage. The lifelong union of a man and a woman have only one woman as his or her legal parent. If an emergency were to arise,
always has promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to their schools and hospitals may treat the three children as if they had only one parent.
station in life. Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religions and offers And, were tragedy to befall either DeBoer or Rowse, the other would have no legal
unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secular realm. Its dynamic allows rights over the children she had not been permitted to adopt. This couple seeks
two people to find a life that could not be found alone, for a marriage becomes relief from the continuing uncertainty their unmarried status creates in their lives.
greater than just the two persons. Rising from the most basic human needs, Army Reserve Sergeant First Class Ijpe DeKoe and his partner Thomas Kostura, co-
marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations. plaintiffs in the Tennessee case, fell in love. In 2011, DeKoe received orders to
The centrality of marriage to the human condition makes it unsurprising that the deploy to Afghanistan. Before leaving, he and Kostura married in New York. A week
institution has existed for millennia and across civilizations. Since the dawn of later, DeKoe began his deployment, which lasted for almost a year. When he
history, marriage has transformed strangers into relatives, binding families and returned, the two settled in Tennessee, where DeKoe works full-time for the Army
societies together. Confucius taught that marriage lies at the foundation of Reserve. Their lawful marriage is stripped from them whenever they reside in
government. 2 Li Chi: Book of Rites 266 (C. Chai & W. Chai eds., J. Legge transl. Tennessee, returning and disappearing as they travel across state lines. DeKoe, who
1967). This wisdom was echoed centuries later and half a world away by Cicero, who served this Nation to preserve the freedom the Constitution protects, must endure a
wrote, The first bond of society is marriage; next, children; and then the family. substantial burden.
See De Officiis 57 (W. Miller transl. 1913). There are untold references to the beauty The cases now before the Court involve other petitioners as well, each with their
of marriage in religious and philosophical texts spanning time, cultures, and faiths, own experiences. Their stories reveal that they seek not to denigrate marriage but
as well as in art and literature in all their forms. It is fair and necessary to say these rather to live their lives, or honor their spouses memory, joined by its bond.
references were based on the understanding that marriage is a union between two B
persons of the opposite sex. The ancient origins of marriage confirm its centrality, but it has not stood in isolation
That history is the beginning of these cases. The respondents say it should be the from developments in law and society. The history of marriage is one of both
end as well. To them, it would demean a timeless institution if the concept and continuity and change. That institutioneven as confined to opposite-sex relations
lawful status of marriage were extended to two persons of the same sex. Marriage, has evolved over time.
in their view, is by its nature a gender-differentiated union of man and woman. This For example, marriage was once viewed as an arrangement by the couples parents
view long has been heldand continues to be heldin good faith by reasonable and based on political, religious, and financial concerns; but by the time of the Nations
sincere people here and throughout the world. founding it was understood to be a voluntary contract between a man and a woman.
The petitioners acknowledge this history but contend that these cases cannot end See N. Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation 917 (2000); S.
there. Were their intent to demean the revered idea and reality of marriage, the Coontz, Marriage, A History 1516 (2005). As the role and status of women changed,
petitioners claims would be of a different order. But that is neither their purpose nor the institution further evolved. Under the centuries-old doctrine of coverture, a
their submission. To the contrary, it is the enduring importance of marriage that married man and woman were treated by the State as a single, male-dominated
underlies the petitioners contentions. This, they say, is their whole point. Far from legal entity. See 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 430 (1765).
seeking to devalue marriage, the petitioners seek it for themselves because of their As women gained legal, political, and property rights, and as society began to
respectand needfor its privileges and responsibilities. And their immutable understand that women have their own equal dignity, the law of coverture was
nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path to this profound abandoned. See Brief for Historians of Marriage et al. as Amici Curiae 1619. These
commitment. and other developments in the institution of marriage over the past centuries were
Recounting the circumstances of three of these cases illustrates the urgency of the not mere superficial changes. Rather, they worked deep transformations in its
petitioners cause from their perspective. Petitioner James Obergefell, a plaintiff in structure, affecting aspects of marriage long viewed by many as essential. See
the Ohio case, met John Arthur over two decades ago. They fell in love and started a generally N. Cott, Public Vows; S. Coontz, Marriage; H. Hartog, Man & Wife in
life together, establishing a lasting, committed relation. In 2011, however, Arthur America: A History (2000).
These new insights have strengthened, not weakened, the institution of marriage. couples, either through judicial or legislative processes. These decisions and
Indeed, changed understandings of marriage are characteristic of a Nation where statutes are cited in Appendix B, infra. Two Terms ago, in United States v. Windsor,
new dimensions of freedom become apparent to new generations, often through 570 U. S. ___ (2013), this Court invalidated DOMA to the extent it barred the Federal
perspectives that begin in pleas or protests and then are considered in the political Government from treating same-sex marriages as valid even when they were lawful
sphere and the judicial process. in the State where they were licensed. DOMA, the Court held, impermissibly
This dynamic can be seen in the Nations experiences with the rights of gays and disparaged those same-sex couples who wanted to affirm their commitment to one
lesbians. Until the mid-20th century, same-sex intimacy long had been condemned another before their children, their family, their friends, and their community. Id., at
as immoral by the state itself in most Western nations, a belief often embodied in ___ (slip op., at 14).
the criminal law. For this reason, among others, many persons did not deem Numerous cases about same-sex marriage have reached the United States Courts of
homosexuals to have dignity in their own distinct identity. A truthful declaration by Appeals in recent years. In accordance with the judicial duty to base their decisions
same-sex couples of what was in their hearts had to remain unspoken. Even when a on principled reasons and neutral discussions, without scornful or disparaging
greater awareness of the humanity and integrity of homosexual persons came in the commentary, courts have written a substantial body of law considering all sides of
period after World War II, the argument that gays and lesbians had a just claim to these issues. That case law helps to explain and formulate the underlying principles
dignity was in conflict with both law and widespread social conventions. Same-sex this Court now must consider. With the exception of the opinion here under review
intimacy remained a crime in many States. Gays and lesbians were prohibited from and one other, see Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F. 3d 859, 864868
most government employment, barred from military service, excluded under (CA8 2006), the Courts of Appeals have held that excluding same-sex couples from
immigration laws, targeted by police, and burdened in their rights to associate. See marriage violates the Constitution. There also have been many thoughtful District
Brief for Organization of American Historians as Amicus Curiae 528. Court decisions addressing same-sex marriageand most of them, too, have
For much of the 20th century, moreover, homosexuality was treated as an illness. concluded same-sex couples must be allowed to marry. In addition the highest
When the American Psychiatric Association published the first Diagnostic and courts of many States have contributed to this ongoing dialogue in decisions
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1952, homosexuality was classified as a interpreting their own State Constitutions. These state and federal judicial opinions
mental disorder, a position adhered to until 1973. See Position Statement on are cited in Appendix A, infra.
Homosexuality and Civil Rights, 1973, in 131 Am. J. Psychiatry 497 (1974).Only in After years of litigation, legislation, referenda, and the discussions that attended
more recent years have psychiatrists and others recognized that sexual orientation these public acts, the States are now divided on the issue of same-sex marriage. See
is both a normal expression of human sexuality and immutable. See Brief for Office of the Atty. Gen. of Maryland, The State of Marriage Equality in America,
American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae 717. State-by-State Supp. (2015).
In the late 20th century, following substantial cultural and political developments, III
same-sex couples began to lead more open and public lives and to establish Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no State shall deprive
families. This development was followed by a quite extensive discussion of the issue any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. The fundamental
in both governmental and private sectors and by a shift in public attitudes toward liberties protected by this Clause include most of the rights enumerated in the Bill of
greater tolerance. As a result, questions about the rights of gays and lesbians soon Rights. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145149 (1968). In addition these
reached the courts, where the issue could be discussed in the formal discourse of liberties extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and
the law. autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.
This Court first gave detailed consideration to the legal status of homosexuals See, e.g.,Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S.
in Bowers v. Hardwick,478 U. S. 186 (1986) . There it upheld the constitutionality of 438, 453 (1972) ; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479486 (1965).
a Georgia law deemed to criminalize certain homosexual acts. Ten years later, The identification and protection of fundamental rights is an enduring part of the
in Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620 (1996) , the Court invalidated an amendment to judicial duty to interpret the Constitution. That responsibility, however, has not
Colorados Constitution that sought to foreclose any branch or political subdivision of been reduced to any formula. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
the State from protecting persons against discrimination based on sexual dissenting). Rather, it requires courts to exercise reasoned judgment in identifying
orientation. Then, in 2003, the Court overruled Bowers, holding that laws making interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect.
same-sex intimacy a crime demea[n] the lives of homosexual See ibid. That process is guided by many of the same considerations relevant to
persons. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558. analysis of other constitutional provisions that set forth broad principles rather than
Against this background, the legal question of same-sex marriage arose. In 1993, specific requirements. History and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do
the Hawaii Supreme Court held Hawaiis law restricting marriage to opposite-sex not set its outer boundaries. See Lawrence, supra, at 572. That method respects our
couples constituted a classification on the basis of sex and was therefore subject to history and learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the present.
strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution. Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P. 2d The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times. The
44. Although this decision did not mandate that same-sex marriage be allowed, generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
some States were concerned by its implications and reaffirmed in their laws that Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions,
marriage is defined as a union between opposite-sex partners. So too in 1996, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all
Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 110Stat. 2419, defining persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord
marriage for all federal-law purposes as only a legal union between one man and between the Constitutions central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim
one woman as husband and wife. 1 U. S. C. 7. to liberty must be addressed.
The new and widespread discussion of the subject led other States to a different Applying these established tenets, the Court has long held the right to marry is
conclusion. In 2003, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held the States protected by the Constitution. In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967) , which
Constitution guaranteed same-sex couples the right to marry. invalidated bans on interracial unions, a unanimous Court held marriage is one of
See Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N. E. 2d 941 the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
(2003). After that ruling, some additional States granted marriage rights to same-sex The Court reaffirmed that holding in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 384 (1978) ,
which held the right to marry was burdened by a law prohibiting fathers who were couples to use contraception. 381 U. S., at 485. Suggesting that marriage is a right
behind on child support from marrying. The Court again applied this principle older than the Bill of Rights, Griswold described marriage this way:
in Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 95 (1987) , which held the right to marry was Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
abridged by regulations limiting the privilege of prison inmates to marry. Over time intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of
and in other contexts, the Court has reiterated that the right to marry is life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
fundamental under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any
102, 116(1996) ; Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632640 involved in our prior decisions. Id., at 486.
(1974); Griswold, supra, at 486; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. And in Turner, the Court again acknowledged the intimate association protected by
535, 541 (1942) ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399(1923) . this right, holding prisoners could not be denied the right to marry because their
It cannot be denied that this Courts cases describing the right to marry presumed a committed relationships satisfied the basic reasons why marriage is a fundamental
relationship involving opposite-sex partners. The Court, like many institutions, has right. See 482 U. S., at 9596. The right to marry thus dignifies couples who wish to
made assumptions defined by the world and time of which it is a part. This was define themselves by their commitment to each other. Windsor, supra, at ___ (slip
evident in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810, a one-line summary decision issued in op., at 14). Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might call
1972, holding the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage did not present a out only to find no one there. It offers the hope of companionship and understanding
substantial federal question. and assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care for the other.
Still, there are other, more instructive precedents. This Courts cases have expressed As this Court held in Lawrence, same-sex couples have the same right as opposite-
constitutional principles of broader reach. In defining the right to marry these cases sex couples to enjoy intimate association. Lawrence invalidated laws that made
have identified essential attributes of that right based in history, tradition, and other same-sex intimacy a criminal act. And it acknowledged that [w]hen sexuality finds
constitutional liberties inherent in this intimate bond. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U. S., overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but
at 574; Turner, supra, at 95; Zablocki, supra, at 384; Loving, supra, at one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. 539 U. S., at 567. But
12; Griswold, supra, at 486. And in assessing whether the force and rationale of its while Lawrence confirmed a dimension of freedom that allows individuals to engage
cases apply to same-sex couples, the Court must respect the basic reasons why the in intimate association without criminal liability, it does not follow that freedom
right to marry has been long protected. See, e.g., Eisenstadt, supra, at 453 stops there. Outlaw to outcast may be a step forward, but it does not achieve the full
454; Poe, supra, at 542553 (Harlan, J., dissenting). promise of liberty.
This analysis compels the conclusion that same-sex couples may exercise the right A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and
to marry. The four principles and traditions to be discussed demonstrate that the families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and
reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to education. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925) ; Meyer, 262 U. S.,
same-sex couples. at 399. The Court has recognized these connections by describing the varied rights
A first premise of the Courts relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice as a unified whole: [T]he right to marry, establish a home and bring up children is
regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy. This abiding a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. Zablocki, 434
connection between marriage and liberty is why Loving invalidated interracial U. S., at 384 (quoting Meyer, supra, at 399). Under the laws of the several States,
marriage bans under the Due Process Clause. See 388 U. S., at 12; see some of marriages protections for children and families are material. But marriage
also Zablocki, supra, at 384 (observing Loving held the right to marry is of also confers more profound benefits. By giving recognition and legal structure to
fundamental importance for all individuals). Like choices concerning contraception, their parents relationship, marriage allows children to understand the integrity and
family relationships, procreation, and childrearing, all of which are protected by the closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their community
Constitution, decisions concerning marriage are among the most intimate that an and in their daily lives. Windsor, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 23). Marriage also affords
individual can make. See Lawrence, supra, at 574. Indeed, the Court has noted it the permanency and stability important to childrens best interests. See Brief for
would be contradictory to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children as Amici Curiae 2227.
of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the As all parties agree, many same-sex couples provide loving and nurturing homes to
foundation of the family in our society. Zablocki, supra, at 386. their children, whether biological or adopted. And hundreds of thousands of children
Choices about marriage shape an individuals destiny. As the Supreme Judicial Court are presently being raised by such couples. See Brief for Gary J. Gates as Amicus
of Massachusetts has explained, because it fulfils yearnings for security, safe Curiae 4. Most States have allowed gays and lesbians to adopt, either as individuals
haven, and connection that express our common human ity, civil marriage is an or as couples, and many adopted and foster children have same-sex parents,
esteemed institution, and the decision whether and whom to marry is among lifes see id., at 5. This provides powerful confirmation from the law itself that gays and
momentous acts of self-definition. Goodridge, 440 Mass., at 322, 798 N. E. 2d, at lesbians can create loving, supportive families.
955. Excluding same-sex couples from marriage thus conflicts with a central premise of
The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons together can the right to marry. Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage
find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality. This is true for all offers, their children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser.
persons, whatever their sexual orientation. See Windsor, 570 U. S., at ___ ___ (slip They also suffer the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents,
op., at 2223). There is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who relegated through no fault of their own to a more difficult and uncertain family life.
seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such profound choices. The marriage laws at issue here thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex
Cf. Loving, supra, at 12 ([T]he freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another couples. See Windsor, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 23).
race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State). That is not to say the right to marry is less meaningful for those who do not or
A second principle in this Courts jurisprudence is that the right to marry is cannot have children. An ability, desire, or promise to procreate is not and has not
fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its been a prerequisite for a valid marriage in any State. In light of precedent protecting
importance to the committed individuals. This point was central the right of a married couple not to procreate, it cannot be said the Court or the
to Griswold v. Connecticut, which held the Constitution protects the right of married States have conditioned the right to marry on the capacity or commitment to
procreate. The constitutional marriage right has many aspects, of which childbearing Yet while that approach may have been appropriate for the asserted right there
is only one. involved (physician-assisted suicide), it is inconsistent with the approach this Court
Fourth and finally, this Courts cases and the Nations traditions make clear that has used in discussing other fundamental rights, including marriage and
marriage is a keystone of our social order. Alexis de Tocqueville recognized this truth intimacy. Loving did not ask about a right to interracial marriage; Turner did not
on his travels through the United States almost two centuries ago: ask about a right of inmates to marry; and Zablocki did not ask about a right of
There is certainly no country in the world where the tie of marriage is so much fathers with unpaid child support duties to marry. Rather, each case inquired about
respected as in America . . . [W]hen the American retires from the turmoil of public the right to marry in its comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient
life to the bosom of his family, he finds in it the image of order and of peace . . . . justification for excluding the relevant class from the right. See also Glucksberg, 521
[H]e afterwards carries [that image] with him into public affairs. 1 Democracy in U. S., at 752773 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 789792 (Breyer, J.,
America 309 (H. Reeve transl., rev. ed. 1990). concurring in judgments).
In Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 211 (1888) , the Court echoed de Tocqueville, That principle applies here. If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past,
explaining that marriage is the foundation of the family and of society, without then received practices could serve as their own continued justification and new
which there would be neither civilization nor progress. Marriage, the Maynard Court groups could not invoke rights once denied. This Court has rejected that approach,
said, has long been a great public institution, giving character to our whole civil both with respect to the right to marry and the rights of gays and lesbians.
polity. Id., at 213. This idea has been reiterated even as the institution has evolved See Loving 388 U. S., at 12; Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 566567.
in substantial ways over time, superseding rules related to parental consent, gender, The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but rights
and race once thought by many to be essential. See generally N. Cott, Public Vows. come not from ancient sources alone. They rise, too, from a better informed
Marriage remains a building block of our national community. understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent
For that reason, just as a couple vows to support each other, so does society pledge in our own era. Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that
to support the couple, offering symbolic recognition and material benefits to protect conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises, and
and nourish the union. Indeed, while the States are in general free to vary the neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here. But when that sincere, personal
benefits they confer on all married couples, they have throughout our history made opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the necessary consequence is to
marriage the basis for an expanding list of governmental rights, benefits, and put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or
responsibilities. These aspects of marital status include: taxation; inheritance and stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied. Under the Constitution, same-
property rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal privilege in the law of sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and
evidence; hospital access; medical decisionmaking authority; adoption rights; the it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this
rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death certificates; professional ethics right.
rules; campaign finance restrictions; workers compensation benefits; health The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by
insurance; and child custody, support, and visitation rules. See Brief for United the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendments guarantee of the
States as Amicus Curiae 69; Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae 8 equal protection of the laws. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
29. Valid marriage under state law is also a significant status for over a thousand Clause are connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent
provisions of federal law. See Windsor, 570 U. S., at ___ ___ (slip op., at 1516). The principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest
States have contributed to the fundamental character of the marriage right by on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet in some instances each
placing that institution at the center of so many facets of the legal and social order. may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other. In any particular case
There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate
principle. Yet by virtue of their exclusion from that institution, same-sex couples are and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge in the identification
denied the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage. This and definition of the right. See M. L. B., 519 U. S., at 120121; id., at 128129
harm results in more than just material burdens. Same-sex couples are consigned to (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U. S.
an instability many opposite-sex couples would deem intolerable in their own lives. 660,665 (1983) . This interrelation of the two principles furthers our understanding
As the State itself makes marriage all the more precious by the significance it of what freedom is and must become.
attaches to it, exclusion from that status has the effect of teaching that gays and The Courts cases touching upon the right to marry reflect this dynamic.
lesbians are unequal in important respects. It demeans gays and lesbians for the In Loving the Court invalidated a prohibition on interracial marriage under both the
State to lock them out of a central institution of the Nations society. Same-sex Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. The Court first declared the
couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage and seek prohibition invalid because of its un-equal treatment of interracial couples. It stated:
fulfillment in its highest meaning. There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of
The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.
and just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to 388 U. S., at 12. With this link to equal protection the Court proceeded to hold the
marry is now manifest. With that knowledge must come the recognition that laws prohibition offended central precepts of liberty: To deny this fundamental freedom
excluding same-sex couples from the marriage right impose stigma and injury of the on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes,
kind prohibited by our basic charter. classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of
Objecting that this does not reflect an appropriate framing of the issue, the the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the States citizens of liberty
respondents refer to Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997) , which without due process of law. Ibid. The reasons why marriage is a fundamental right
called for a careful description of fundamental rights. They assert the became more clear and compelling from a full awareness and understanding of the
petitioners do not seek to exercise the right to marry but rather a new and hurt that resulted from laws barring interracial unions.
nonexistent right to same-sex marriage. Brief for Respondent in No. 14556, p. The synergy between the two protections is illustrated further in Zablocki. There the
8.Glucksberg did insist that liberty under the Due Process Clause must be defined in Court invoked the Equal Protection Clause as its basis for invalidating the challenged
a most circumscribed manner, with central reference to specific historical practices. law, which, as already noted, barred fathers who were behind on child-support
payments from marrying without judicial approval. The equal protection analysis Process Clause, prohibits this unjustified infringement of the fundamental right to
depended in central part on the Courts holding that the law burdened a right of marry. See, e.g., Zablocki, supra, at 383388; Skinner, 316 U. S., at 541.
fundamental importance. 434 U. S., at 383. It was the essential nature of the These considerations lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a fundamental
marriage right, discussed at length in Zablocki, see id., at 383387, that made right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal
apparent the laws incompatibility with requirements of equality. Each concept Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not
liberty and equal protectionleads to a stronger understanding of the other. be deprived of that right and that liberty. The Court now holds that same-sex
Indeed, in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has recognized that couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. No longer may this liberty be
new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our denied to them. Baker v. Nelson must be and now is overruled, and the State laws
most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged. To take challenged by Petitioners in these cases are now held invalid to the extent they
but one period, this occurred with respect to marriage in the 1970s and 1980s. exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as
Notwithstanding the gradual erosion of the doctrine of coverture, see supra, at 6, opposite-sex couples.
invidious sex-based classifications in marriage remained common through the mid- IV
20th century. See App. to Brief for Appellant in Reed v. Reed, O. T. 1971, No. 704, There may be an initial inclination in these cases to proceed with cautionto await
pp. 6988 (an extensive reference to laws extant as of 1971 treating women as further legislation, litigation, and debate. The respondents warn there has been
unequal to men in marriage). These classifications denied the equal dignity of men insufficient democratic discourse before deciding an issue so basic as the definition
and women. One States law, for example, provided in 1971 that the husband is the of marriage. In its ruling on the cases now before this Court, the majority opinion for
head of the family and the wife is subject to him; her legal civil existence is merged the Court of Appeals made a cogent argument that it would be appropriate for the
in the husband, except so far as the law recognizes her separately, either for her respondents States to await further public discussion and political measures before
own protection, or for her benefit. Ga. Code Ann. 53501 (1935). Responding to a licensing same-sex marriages. See DeBoer, 772 F. 3d, at 409.
new awareness, the Court invoked equal protection principles to invalidate laws Yet there has been far more deliberation than this argument acknowledges. There
imposing sex-based inequality on marriage. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 have been referenda, legislative debates, and grassroots campaigns, as well as
U. S. 455 (1981) ; Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co.,446 U. S. countless studies, papers, books, and other popular and scholarly writings. There
142 (1980) ; Califano v. Westcott, 443 U. S. 76 (1979) ; Orr v. Orr, 440 U. S. has been extensive litigation in state and federal courts. See Appendix A, infra.
268 (1979) ; Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199 (1977) (plurality Judicial opinions addressing the issue have been informed by the contentions of
opinion); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636(1975) parties and counsel, which, in turn, reflect the more general, societal discussion of
; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973) . Like Loving and Zablocki, these same-sex marriage and its meaning that has occurred over the past decades. As
precedents show the Equal Protection Clause can help to identify and correct more than 100 amici make clear in their filings, many of the central institutions in
inequalities in the institution of marriage, vindicating precepts of liberty and equality American lifestate and local governments, the military, large and small
under the Constitution. businesses, labor unions, religious organizations, law enforcement, civic groups,
Other cases confirm this relation between liberty and equality. In M. L. B. v. S. L. J., professional organizations, and universitieshave devoted substantial attention to
the Court invalidated under due process and equal protection principles a statute the question. This has led to an enhanced understanding of the issuean
requiring indigent mothers to pay a fee in order to appeal the termination of their understanding reflected in the arguments now presented for resolution as a matter
parental rights. See 519 U. S., at 119124. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court invoked of constitutional law.
both principles to invalidate a prohibition on the distribution of contraceptives to Of course, the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process
unmarried persons but not married persons. See 405 U. S., at 446454. And for change, so long as that process does not abridge fundamental rights. Last Term,
in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, the Court invalidated under both a plurality of this Court reaffirmed the importance of the democratic principle
principles a law that allowed sterilization of habitual criminals. See 316 U. S., at 538 in Schuette v. BAMN, 572 U. S. ___ (2014), noting the right of citizens to debate so
543. they can learn and decide and then, through the political process, act in concert to
In Lawrence the Court acknowledged the interlocking nature of these constitutional try to shape the course of their own times. Id., at ___ ___ (slip op., at 1516).
safeguards in the context of the legal treatment of gays and lesbians. See 539 U. S., Indeed, it is most often through democracy that liberty is preserved and protected in
at 575. Although Lawrence elaborated its holding under the Due Process Clause, it our lives. But as Schuette also said, [t]he freedom secured by the Constitution
acknowledged, and sought to remedy, the continuing inequality that resulted from consists, in one of its essential dimensions, of the right of the individual not to be
laws making intimacy in the lives of gays and lesbians a crime against the State. injured by the unlawful exercise of governmental power. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 15).
See ibid. Lawrence therefore drew upon principles of liberty and equality to define Thus, when the rights of persons are violated, the Constitution requires redress by
and protect the rights of gays and lesbians, holding the State cannot demean their the courts, notwithstanding the more general value of democratic
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a decisionmaking. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 17). This holds true even when protecting
crime. Id., at 578. individual rights affects issues of the utmost importance and sensitivity.
This dynamic also applies to same-sex marriage. It is now clear that the challenged The dynamic of our constitutional system is that individuals need not await
laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and it must be further acknowledged legislative action before asserting a fundamental right. The Nations courts are open
that they abridge central precepts of equality. Here the marriage laws enforced by to injured individuals who come to them to vindicate their own direct, personal stake
the respondents are in essence unequal: same-sex couples are denied all the in our basic charter. An individual can invoke a right to constitutional protection
benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a when he or she is harmed, even if the broader public disagrees and even if the
fundamental right. Especially against a long history of disapproval of their legislature refuses to act. The idea of the Constitution was to withdraw certain
relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
and continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians serves to reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
disrespect and subordinate them. And the Equal Protection Clause, like the Due applied by the courts. West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette,319 U. S. 624, 638 (1943)
. This is why fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on
the outcome of no elections. Ibid. It is of no moment whether advocates of same- they describe. Indeed, with respect to this asserted basis for excluding same-sex
sex marriage now enjoy or lack momentum in the democratic process. The issue couples from the right to marry, it is appropriate to observe these cases involve only
before the Court here is the legal question whether the Constitution protects the the rights of two consenting adults whose marriages would pose no risk of harm to
right of same-sex couples to marry. themselves or third parties.
This is not the first time the Court has been asked to adopt a cautious approach to Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious
recognizing and protecting fundamental rights. In Bowers, a bare majority upheld a doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine
law criminalizing same-sex intimacy. See 478 U. S., at 186, 190195. That approach precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned. The First Amendment ensures
might have been viewed as a cautious endorsement of the democratic process, that religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to
which had only just begun to consider the rights of gays and lesbians. Yet, in teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and
effect, Bowers upheld state action that denied gays and lesbians a fundamental to their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure they have long
right and caused them pain and humiliation. As evidenced by the dissents in that revered. The same is true of those who oppose same-sex marriage for other reasons.
case, the facts and principles necessary to a correct holding were known to In turn, those who believe allowing same-sex marriage is proper or indeed essential,
the Bowers Court. See id., at 199 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and whether as a matter of religious conviction or secular belief, may engage those who
Stevens, JJ., dissenting); id., at 214 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., disagree with their view in an open and searching debate. The Constitution,
dissenting). That is why Lawrence held Bowers was not correct when it was however, does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the
decided. 539 U. S., at 578. Although Bowers was eventually repudiated same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex.
in Lawrence, men and women were harmed in the interim, and the substantial V
effects of these injuries no doubt lingered long after Bowers was overruled. Dignitary These cases also present the question whether the Constitution requires States to
wounds cannot always be healed with the stroke of a pen. recognize same-sex marriages validly performed out of State. As made clear by the
A ruling against same-sex couples would have the same effectand, like Bowers, case of Obergefell and Arthur, and by that of DeKoe and Kostura, the recognition
would be unjustified under the Fourteenth Amendment. The petitioners stories bans inflict substantial and continuing harm on same-sex couples.
make clear the urgency of the issue they present to the Court. James Obergefell now Being married in one State but having that valid marriage denied in another is one
asks whether Ohio can erase his marriage to John Arthur for all time. April DeBoer of the most perplexing and distressing complication[s] in the law of domestic
and Jayne Rowse now ask whether Michigan may continue to deny them the relations. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 299 (1942) (internal quotation
certainty and stability all mothers desire to protect their children, and for them and marks omitted). Leaving the current state of affairs in place would maintain and
their children the childhood years will pass all too soon. Ijpe DeKoe and Thomas promote instability and uncertainty. For some couples, even an ordinary drive into a
Kostura now ask whether Tennessee can deny to one who has served this Nation the neighboring State to visit family or friends risks causing severe hardship in the event
basic dignity of recognizing his New York marriage. Properly presented with the of a spouses hospitalization while across state lines. In light of the fact that many
petitioners cases, the Court has a duty to address these claims and answer these States already allow same-sex marriageand hundreds of thousands of these
questions. marriages already have occurredthe disruption caused by the recognition bans is
Indeed, faced with a disagreement among the Courts of Appealsa disagreement significant and ever-growing.
that caused impermissible geographic variation in the meaning of federal lawthe As counsel for the respondents acknowledged at argument, if States are required by
Court granted review to determine whether same-sex couples may exercise the right the Constitution to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, the justifications for
to marry. Were the Court to uphold the challenged laws as constitutional, it would refusing to recognize those marriages performed elsewhere are undermined. See Tr.
teach the Nation that these laws are in accord with our societys most basic of Oral Arg. on Question 2, p. 44. The Court, in this decision, holds same-sex couples
compact. Were the Court to stay its hand to allow slower, case-by-case may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States. It follows that the Court
determination of the required availability of specific public benefits to same-sex also must holdand it now does holdthat there is no lawful basis for a State to
couples, it still would deny gays and lesbians many rights and responsibilities refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the
intertwined with marriage. ground of its same-sex character.
The respondents also argue allowing same-sex couples to wed will harm marriage as ***
an institution by leading to fewer opposite-sex marriages. This may occur, the No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love,
respondents contend, because licensing same-sex marriage severs the connection fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two people
between natural procreation and marriage. That argument, however, rests on a become something greater than once they were. As some of the petitioners in these
counterintuitive view of opposite-sex couples decisionmaking processes regarding cases demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may endure even past death. It
marriage and parenthood. Decisions about whether to marry and raise children are would misunderstand these men and women to say they disrespect the idea of
based on many personal, romantic, and practical considerations; and it is unrealistic marriage. Their plea is that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to
to conclude that an opposite-sex couple would choose not to marry simply because find its fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned to live in
same-sex couples may do so. See Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F. 3d 1193, 1223 (CA10 loneliness, excluded from one of civilizations oldest institutions. They ask for equal
2014) ([I]t is wholly illogical to believe that state recognition of the love and dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.
commitment between same-sex couples will alter the most intimate and personal The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed.
decisions of opposite-sex couples). The respondents have not shown a foundation It is so ordered.
for the conclusion that allowing same-sex marriage will cause the harmful outcomes