G.R. No. L-4656 November 18, 1912 losses and damages in the sum of P8,000.
losses and damages in the sum of P8,000. Said counsel for the plaintifs therefore asked that
PARDELL vs. BARTOLOME
This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, from the judgment of October 5, 1907, whereby the
Honorable Dionisio Chanco, judge, absolved the defendants from the complaint, and the plaintif
from a counterclaim, without special finding as to costs.
Counsel for the spouses Ricardo y Cruz and Vicente Ortiz y Felin de Pardell, the first of whom,
absent in Spain by reason of his employment, conferred upon the second sufficient and ample
powers to appear before the courts of justice, on June 8, 1905, in his written complaint, alleged
that the plaintif, Vicente Ortiz, and the defendant, Matilde Ortiz, are the duly recognized natural
daughters of the spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin y Paula who died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in
1875 and 1882, respectively; that Calixta Felin, prior to her death, executed on August 17, 1876, a
nuncupative will in Vigan whereby she made her four children, named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta,
and Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal heirs of all her property; that, of the
persons enumerated, Manuel died before his mother and Francisca a few years after her death,
leaving no heirs by force of law, and therefore the only existing heirs of the said testatrix are the
plaintif Vicenta Ortiz and the defendant Matilde Ortiz; that, aside from some personal property and
jewelry already divided among the heirs, the testatrix possessed, at the time of the execution of
her will, and left at her death the real properties which, with their respective cash values, are as
follows:
1. A house of strong material, with the lot on which it is built, situated on Escolta P6,000.0
Street, Vigan, and valued at 0
2. A house of mixed material, with the lot on which it stands, at No. 88 Washington
1,500.00
Street, Vigan; valued at
3. A lot on Magallanes Street, Vigan; valued at 100.00
4. A parcel of rice land, situated in the barrio of San Julian, Vigan; valued at 60.00
5. A parcel of rice land in the pueblo of Santa Lucia; valued at 86.00
6. Three parcels of land in the pueblo of Candon; valued at 150.00
Total 7,896.00
That, on or about the first months of the year 1888, the defendants, without judicial authorization,
nor friendly or extrajudicial agreement, took upon themselves the administration and enjoyment of
the said properties and collected the rents, fruits, and products thereof, to the serious detriment of
the plaintifs' interest; that, notwithstanding the diferent and repeated demands extrajudicially
made upon Matilde Ortiz to divide the aforementioned properties with the plaintif Vicente and to
deliver to the latter the one-half thereof, together with one-half of the fruits and rents collected
therefrom, the said defendant and her husband, the self-styled administrator of the properties
mentioned, had been delaying the partition and delivery of the said properties by means of unkept
promises and other excuses; and that the plaintifs, on account of the extraordinary delay in the
delivery of one-half of said properties, or their value in cash, as the case might be, had sufered
judgment be rendered by sentencing the defendants, Gaspar de Bartolome, and Matilde Ortiz Felin
de Bartolome, to restore and deliver to the plaintifs one-half of the total value in cash, according
to appraisal, of the undivided property specified, which one-half amounted approximately to
P3,948, or if deemed proper, to recognize the plaintif Vicenta Ortiz to be vested with the full and
absolute right of ownership to the said undivided one-half of the properties in question, as
universal testamentary heir thereof together with the defendant Matilde Ortiz, to indemnify the
plaintifs in the sum of P8,000, for losses and damages, and to pay the costs.
Counsel for the defendants, in his answer denied the facts alleged in paragraphs 1, 4, 6, 7, and 8
thereof, inasmuch as, upon the death of the litigating sister's brother Manuel, their mother, who
was still living, was his heir by force of law, and the defendants had never refused to give to the
plaintif Vicente Ortiz her share of the said properties; and stated that he admitted the facts
alleged in paragraph 2, provided it be understood, however, that the surname of the defendant's
mother was Felin, and not Feliu, and that Miguel Ortiz died in Spain, and not in Vigan; that he also
admitted paragraph 3 of the complaint, with the diference that the said surname should be Felin,
and likewise paragraph 5, except the part thereof relating to the personal property and the jewelry,
since the latter had not yet been divided; that the said jewelry was in the possession of the
plaintifs and consisted of: one Lozada gold chronometer watch with a chain in the form of a bridle
curb and a watch charm consisting of the engraving of a postage stamp on a stone mounted in
gold and bearing the initials M. O., a pair of cuf buttons made of gold coins, four small gold
buttons, two finger rings, another with the initials M. O., and a gold bracelet; and that the
defendants were willing to deliver to the plaintifs, in conformity with their petitions, one-half of the
total value in cash, according to appraisement, of the undivided real properties specified in
paragraph 5, which half amounted to P3,948.
In a special defense said counsel alleged that the defendants had never refused to divide the said
property and had in fact several years before solicited the partition of the same; that, from 1886 to
1901, inclusive, there was collected from the property on Calle Escolta the sum of 288 pesos,
besides a few other small amounts derived from other sources, which were delivered to the
plaintifs with other larger amounts, in 1891, and from the property on Calle Washington, called La
Quinta, 990.95 pesos, which proceeds, added together, made a total of 1,278.95 pesos, saving
error or omission; that, between the years abovementioned, Escolta, and that on Calle
Washington, La Quinta, 376.33, which made a total of 1,141.71, saving error or omission; that, in
1897, the work of reconstruction was begun of the house on Calle Escolta, which been destroyed
by an earthquake, which work was not finished until 1903 and required an expenditure on the part
of the defendant Matilde Ortiz, of 5,091.52 pesos; that all the collections made up to August 1,
1905, including the rent from the stores, amounted to only P3,654.15, and the expenses, to
P6,252.32, there being, consequently, a balance of P2,598.17, which divided between the sisters,
the plaintif and the defendant, would make the latter's share P1,299.08; that, as shown by the
papers kept by the plaintifs, in the year 1891 the defendant Bartolome presented to the plaintifs
a statement in settlements of accounts, and delivered to the person duly authorized by the latter
for the purpose, the sum of P2,606.29, which the said settlement showed was owing his principals,
from various sources; that, the defendant Bartolome having been the administrator of the
undivided property claimed by the plaintifs, the latter were owing the former legal remuneration
of the percentage allowed by law for administration; and that the defendants were willing to pay
the sum of P3,948, one-half of the total value of the said properties, deducting therefrom the
amount found to be owing them by the plaintifs, and asked that judgment be rendered in their
favor to enable them to recover from the latter that amount, together with the costs and expenses
of the suit.
The defendants, in their counter claim, repeated each and all of the allegations contained in each
of the paragraphs of section 10 of their answer; that the plaintifs were obliged to pay to the
administrator of the said property the remuneration allowed him by law; that, as the revenues
collected by the defendants amounted to no more than P3,654.15 and the expenditures incurred
by them, to P6,252.32, it followed that the plaintifs owed the defendants P1,299.08, that is one-
half of the diference between the amount collected from and that extended on the properties, and
asked that judgment be therefore rendered in their behalf to enable them to collect this sum from
the plaintifs, Ricardo Pardell and Vicenta Ortiz, with legal interest thereon from December 7, 1904,
the date when the accounts were rendered, together with the sums to which the defendant
Bartolome was entitled for the administration of the undivided properties in question.
By a written motion of August 21, 1905, counsel for the plaintifs requested permission to amend
the complaint by inserting immediately after the words "or respective appraisal," fifth line of
paragraph 5, the phrase "in cash in accordance with the assessed value," and likewise further to
amend the same, in paragraph 6 thereof, by substituting the following word in lieu of the petition
for the remedy sought: "By reason of all the foregoing, I beg the court to be pleased to render the
judgment by sentencing the defendants, Gaspar de Bartolome and Matilde Ortiz Felin de
Bartolome, to restore and deliver to the plaintifs an exact one-half of the total vale of the
undivided properties described in the complaint, such value to be ascertained by the expert
appraisal of two competent persons, one of whom shall be appointed by the plaintifs and the other
by the defendants, and, in case of disagreement between these two appointees such value shall be
determined by a third expert appraiser appointed by the court, or, in a proper case, by the price
ofered at public auction; or, in lieu thereof, it is requested that the court recognize the plaintif,
Vicenta Ortiz, to be vested with a full and absolute right to an undivided one-half of the said
properties; furthermore, it is prayed that the plaintifs be awarded an indemnity of P8,000 for
losses and damages, and the costs." Notwithstanding the opposition of the defendants, the said
amendment was admitted by the court and counsel for the defendants were allowed to a period of
three days within which to present a new answer. An exception was taken to this ruling.
The proper proceedings were had with reference to the valuation of the properties concerned in
the division sought and incidental issues were raised relative to the partition of some of them and
their award to one or the other of the parties. Due consideration was taken of the averments and
statements of both parties who agreed between themselves, before the court, that any of them
might at any time acquire, at the valuation fixed by the expert judicial appraiser, any of the
properties in question, there being none in existence excluded by the litigants. The court,
therefore, by order of December 28, 1905, ruled that the plaintifs were entitled to acquire, at the
valuation determined by the said expert appraiser, the building known as La Quinta, the lot on
which it stands and the warehouses and other improvements comprised within the inclosed land,
and the seeds lands situated in the pueblos of Vigan and Santa Lucia; and that the defendants
were likewise entitled to acquire the house on Calle Escolta, the lot on Calle Magallanes, and the
three parcels of land situated in the pueblo of Candon.
After this partition had been made counsel for the defendants, by a writing of March 8, 1906, set
forth: That, having petitioned for the appraisement of the properties in question for the purpose of
their partition, it was not to be understood that he desired from the exception duly entered to the
ruling made in the matter of the amendment to the complaint; that the properties retained by the
defendants were valued at P9,310, and those retained by the plaintifs, at P2,885, one-half of
which amounts each party had to deliver to the other, as they were pro indivisoproperties; that,
therefore, the defendants had to pay the plaintifs the sum of P3,212.50, after deducting the
amount which the plaintifs were obliged to deliver to the defendants, as one-half of the price of
the properties retained by the former; that, notwithstanding that the amount of the counterclaim
for the expenses incurred in the reconstruction of the pro indiviso property should be deducted
from the sum which the defendants had to pay the plaintifs, the former, for the purpose of
bringing the matter of the partition to a close, would deliver to the latter, immediately upon the
signing of the instrument of purchase and sale, the sum of P3,212.50, which was one-half of the
value of the properties alloted to the defendants; such delivery, however, was not to be
understood as a renouncement of the said counterclaim, but only as a means for the final
termination of the pro indiviso status of the property.
The case having been heard, the court on October 5, 1907, rendered judgment holding that the
revenues and the expenses were compensated by the residence enjoyed by the defendant party,
that no losses or damages were either caused or sufered, nor likewise any other expense besides
those aforementioned, and absolved the defendants from the complaint and the plaintifs from the
counterclaim, with no special finding as to costs. An exception was taken to this judgment by
counsel for the defendants who moved for a new trial on the grounds that the evidence presented
did not warrant the judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. This motion was
denied, exception whereto was taken by said counsel, who filed the proper bill of exceptions, and
the same was approved and forwarded to the clerk of this court, with a transcript of the evidence.
Both of the litigating sisters assented to a partition by halves of the property left in her will by their
mother at her death; in fact, during the course of this suit, proceedings were had, in accordance
with the agreement made, for the division between them of the said hereditary property of
common ownership, which division was recognized and approved in the findings of the trial court,
as shown by the judgment appealed from.
The issues raised by the parties, aside from said division made during the trial, and which have
been submitted to this court for decision, concern: (1) The indemnity claimed for losses and
damages, which the plaintifs allege amount to P8,000, in addition to the rents which should have
been derived from the house on Calle Escolta, Vigan; (2) the payment by the plaintifs to the
defendants of the sum of P1,299.08, demanded by way of counterclaim, together with legal
interest thereon from December 7, 1904; (3) the payment to the husband of the defendant Matilde
Ortiz, of a percentage claimed to be due him as the administrator of the property of common
ownership; (4) the division of certain jewelry in the possession of the plaintif Vicenta Ortiz; and (5)
the petition that the amendment be held to have been improperly admitted, which was made by
the plaintifs in their written motion of August 21, 1905, against the opposition of the defendants,
through which admission the latter were obliged to pay the former P910.50.lawphil.net
Before entering upon an explanation of the propriety or impropriety of the claims made by both
parties, it is indispensable to state that the trial judge, in absolving the defendants from the
complaint, held that they had not caused losses and damages to the plaintifs, and that the
revenues and the expenses were compensated, in view of the fact that the defendants had been
living for several years in the Calle Escolta house, which was pro indivisoproperty of joint
ownership.
By this finding absolving the defendants from the complaint, and which was acquiesced in by the
plaintifs who made no appeal therefrom, the first issue has been decided which was raised by the
plaintifs, concerning the indemnity for losses and damages, wherein are comprised the rents
which should have been obtained from the upper story of the said house during the time it was
occupied by the defendants, Matilde Ortiz and her husband, Gaspar de Bartolome.
Notwithstanding the acquiescence on the part of the plaintifs, assenting to the said finding
whereby the defendants were absolved from the complaint, yet, as such absolution is based on the
compensation established in the judgment of the trial court, between the amounts which each
party is entitled to claim from the other, it is imperative to determine whether the defendant
Matilde Ortiz, as coowner of the house on Calle Escolta, was entitled, with her husband, to reside
therein, without paying to her coowner, Vicenta Ortiz, who, during the greater part of the time,
lived with her husband abroad, one-half of the rents which the upper story would have produced,
had it been rented to a stranger.
Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes:
Each coowner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance
with their object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor
prevent the coowners from utilizing them according to their rights.
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in the
house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde
occasioned any detriment to the interest of the community property, nor that she prevented her
sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to her rights. It is to be noted that the
stores of the lower floor were rented and accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintifs.
Each coowner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use
and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his
coowners, for the reason that, until a division be made, the respective part of each holder can not
be determined and every one of the coowners exercises, together with his other coparticipants,
joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz, plaintif, and
Matilde Ortiz, defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, and were in the care of the
last named, assisted by her husband, while the plaintif Vicenta with her husband was residing
outside of the said province the greater part of the time between 1885 and 1905, when she left
these Islands for Spain, it is not at all strange that delays and difficulties should have attended the
eforts made to collect the rents and proceeds from the property held in common and to obtain a
partition of the latter, especially during several years when, owing to the insurrection, the country
was in a turmoil; and for this reason, aside from that founded on the right of coownership of the
defendants, who took upon themselves the administration and care of the properties of joint
tenancy for purposes of their preservation and improvement, these latter are not obliged to pay to
the plaintif Vicenta one-half of the rents which might have been derived from the upper of the
story of the said house on Calle Escolta, and, much less, because one of the living rooms and the
storeroom thereof were used for the storage of some belongings and efects of common ownership
between the litigants. The defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband the upper
floor of the said house, did not injure the interests of her coowner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she
prevent the latter from living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining to her as
coowner of the property.
Notwithstanding the above statements relative to the joint-ownership rights which entitled the
defendants to live in the upper story of the said house, yet in view of the fact that the record
shows it to have been proved that the defendant Matilde's husband, Gaspar de Bartolome,
occupied for four years a room or a part of the lower floor of the same house on Calle Escolta,
using it as an office for the justice of the peace, a position which he held in the capital of that
province, strict justice, requires that he pay his sister-in-law, the plaintif, one half of the monthly
rent which the said quarters could have produced, had they been leased to another person. The
amount of such monthly rental is fixed at P16 in accordance with the evidence shown in the record.
This conclusion as to Bartolome's liability results from the fact that, even as the husband of the
defendant coowner of the property, he had no right to occupy and use gratuitously the said part of
the lower floor of the house in question, where he lived with his wife, to the detriment of the
plaintif Vicenta who did not receive one-half of the rent which those quarters could and should
have produced, had they been occupied by a stranger, in the same manner that rent was obtained
from the rooms on the lower floor that were used as stores. Therefore, the defendant Bartolome
must pay to the plaintif Vicenta P384, that is, one-half of P768, the total amount of the rents which
should have been obtained during four years from the quarters occupied as an office by the justice
of the peace of Vigan.
With respect to the second question submitted for decision to this court, relative to the payment of
the sum demanded as a counterclaim, it was admitted and proved in the present case that, as a
result of a serious earthquake on August 15, 1897, the said house on Calle Escolta was left in ruins
and uninhabitable, and that, for its reconstruction or repair, the defendants had to expend the sum
of P6,252.32. This expenditure, notwithstanding that it was impugned, during the trial, by the
plaintifs, was duly proved by the evidence presented by the defendants. Evidence, unsuccessfully
rebutted, was also introduced which proved that the rents produced by all the rural and urban
properties of common ownership amounted, up to August 1, 1905, to the sum of P3,654.15 which,
being applied toward the cost of the repair work on the said house, leaves a balance of P2,598.17,
the amount actually advanced by the defendants, for the rents collected by them were not
sufficient for the termination of all the work undertaken on the said building, necessary for its
complete repair and to replace it in a habitable condition. It is therefore lawful and just that the
plaintif Vicenta Ortiz, who was willing to sell to her sister Matilde for P1,500, her share in the
house in question, when it was in a ruinous state, should pay the defendants one-half of the
amount expanded in the said repair work, since the building after reconstruction was worth P9,000,
according to expert appraisal. Consequently, the counterclaim made by the defendants for the
payment to them of the sum of P1,299.08, is a proper demand, though from this sum a reduction
must be made of P384, the amount of one-half of the rents which should have been collected for
the use of the quarters occupied by the justice of the peace, the payment of which is incumbent
upon the husband of the defendant Matilde, as aforesaid, and the balance remaining, P915.08, is
the amount which the plaintif Vicenta must pay to the defendants.
The defendants claim to be entitled to the collection of legal interest on the amount of the
counterclaim, from December 7, 1904. This contention can not be sustained, inasmuch as, until
this suit is finally decided, it could not be known whether the plaintifs would or would not be
obliged to pay the sum whatever in reimbursement of expenses incurred by the plaintifs in the
repair work on the said house on Calle Escolta, whether or not the defendants, in turn, were
entitled to collect any such amount, and, finally, what the net sum would be which the plaintif's
might have to pay as reimbursement for one-half of the expenditure made by the defendants. Until
final disposal of the case, no such net sum can be determined, nor until then can the debtor be
deemed to be in arrears. In order that there be an obligation to pay legal interest in connection
with a matter at issue between the parties, it must be declared in a judicial decision from what
date the interest will be due on the principal concerned in the suit. This rule has been established
by the decisions of the supreme court of Spain, in reference to articles 1108, 1109, and 1110 of the
Civil Code, reference on April 24, 1867, November 19, 1869, and February 22, 1901.
With regard to the percentage, as remuneration claimed by the husband of the defendant Matilde
for his administration of the property of common ownership, inasmuch as no stipulation whatever
was made in the matter by and between him and his sister-in-law, the said defendant, the claimant
is not entitled to the payment of any remuneration whatsoever. Of his own accord and as an
officious manager, he administered the said pro indiviso property, one-half of which belonged to
his wife who held it in joint tenancy, with his sister-in-law, and the law does not allow him any
compensation as such voluntary administrator. He is merely entitled to a reimbursement for such
actual and necessary expenditures as he may have made on the undivided properties and an
indemnity for the damages he may have sufered while acting in that capacity, since at all events
it was his duty to care for and preserve the said property, half of which belonged to his wife; and in
exchange for the trouble occasioned him by the administration of his sister-in-law's half of the said
property, he with his wife resided in the upper story of the house aforementioned, without
payment of one-half of the rents said quarters might have produced had they been leased to
another person.
With respect to the division of certain jewelry, petitioned for by the defendants and appellants only
in their brief in this appeal, the record of the proceedings in the lower court does not show that the
allegation made by the plaintif Vicenta is not true, to the efect that the deceased mother of the
litigant sisters disposed of this jewelry during her lifetime, because, had she not done so, the will
made by the said deceased would have been exhibited in which the said jewelry would have been
mentioned, at least it would have been proved that the articles in question came into the
possession of the plaintif Vicenta without the expressed desire and the consent of the deceased
mother of the said sisters, for the gift of this jewelry was previously assailed in the courts, without
success; therefore, and in view of its inconsiderable value, there is no reason for holding that the
said gift was not made.
As regards the collection of the sum of P910.50, which is the diference between the assessed
value of the undivided real properties and the price of the same as determined by the judicial
expert appraiser, it is shown by the record that the ruling of the trial judge admitting the
amendment to the original complaint, is in accord with the law and principles of justice, for the
reason that any of the coowners of a pro indiviso property, subject to division or sale, is entitled to
petition for its valuation by competent expert appraisers. Such valuation is not prejudicial to any of
the joint owners, but is beneficial to their interests, considering that, as a general rule, the
assessed value of a building or a parcel of realty is less than the actual real value of the property,
and this being appraiser to determine, in conjunction with the one selected by the plaintifs, the
value of the properties of joint ownership. These two experts took part in the latter proceedings of
the suit until finally, and during the course of the latter, the litigating parties agreed to an amicable
division of the pro indiviso hereditary property, in accordance with the price fixed by the judicial
expert appraiser appointed as a third party, in view of the disagreement between and
nonconformity of the appraisers chosen by the litigants. Therefore it is improper now to claim a
right to the collection of the said sum, the diference between the assessed value and that fixed by
the judicial expert appraiser, for the reason that the increase in price, as determined by this latter
appraisal, redounded to the benefit of both parties.
In consideration of the foregoing, whereby the errors assigned to the lower court have been duly
refuted, it is our opinion that, with a partial reversal of the judgment appealed from, in so far as it
absolves the plaintifs from the counterclaim presented by the defendants, we should and hereby
do sentence the plaintifs to the payment of the sum of P915.08, the balance of the sum claimed
by the defendants as a balance of the one-half of the amount which the defendants advanced for
the reconstruction or repair of the Calle Escolta house, after deducting from the total of such sum
claimed by the latter the amount of P384 which Gaspar de Bartolome, the husband of the
defendant Matilde, should have paid as one-half of the rents due for his occupation of the quarters
on the lower floor of the said house as an office for the justice of the peace court of Vigan; and we
further find: (1) That the defendants are not obliged to pay one-half of the rents which could have
been obtained from the upper story of the said house; (2) that the plaintifs can not be compelled
to pay the legal interest from December 7, 1904, on the sum expanded in the reconstruction of the
aforementioned house, but only the interest fixed by law, at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, from
the date of the judgment to be rendered in accordance with this decision; (3) that the husband of
the defendant Matilde Ortiz is not entitled to any remuneration for the administration of thepro
indiviso property belonging to both parties; (4) that, neither is he entitled to collect from the
plaintifs the sum of P910.50, the diference between the assessed valuation and the price set by
the expert appraisal solicited by the plaintifs in their amendment to the complaint; and, (5) that
no participation shall be made of jewelry aforementioned now in the possession of the plaintif
Vicenta Ortiz. The said judgment, as relates to the points appealed, is affirmed, in so far as its
findings agree with those of this decision, and is reversed, in so far as they do not. No special
finding is made regarding the costs of both instances. So ordered.
--- xx END OF RIGHTS OF EACH CO-OWNERS xx ---
G.R. No. L-32047 November 1, 1930
MELENCIO vs. DY TIAO LAY
On August 1,1927, the plaintifs, Manuel, Mariano, Pura and Caridad Melencio, brought the present
action against the defendant-appellee, Dy Tiao Lay for the recovery of the possession of a parcel of
land situated in the town of Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and containing an area of 4,628.25 square
meters. The plaintifs further demand a monthly rental of P300 for the use and occupation of the
parcel from May, 1926, until the date of the surrender to them of the possession thereof; and that
if it is found that the said appellee was occupying the said parcel of land by virtue of a contract of
lease, such contract should be declared null and void for lack of consent, concurrence, and
ratification by the owners thereof.
In his answer, the defendant pleaded the general issue, and as special defenses, he alleged in
substance that he was occupying the said tract of land by virtue of a contract of lease executed on
July 24,1905, in favor of his predecessor in interest, by Ruperta Garcia, Pedro Melencio, Juliana
Melencio, and Ruperta Melencio under the terms specified therein, and which contract is still in
force; that Liberata Macapagal, the mother of the plaintifs, in her capacity as judicial
administratrix of the estate of Ramon Melencio, one of the original coowners of the parcel of land
in question, actually recognized and ratified the existence and validity of the contract aforesaid by
virtue of the execution of a public document by her on or about November 27,1920, and by
collecting from the assignees of the original lessee the monthly rent for the premises until April 30,
1926; and that said defendant deposits with the clerk of court the sum of P20.20 every month as
rent thereof and that as a counterclaim, he seeks the recovery of P272 for goods and money
delivered by him to the plaintifs.
The plaintifs filed a reply to the answer alleging, among other things, that Ruperta Garcia was not
one of the coowners of the land in question; that the person who signed the alleged contract of
lease never represented themselves as being the sole and exclusive owners of the land subject to
the lease as alleged by the defendant in his answer; that the said contract of lease of July 24,1905,
is null and void for being executed without the intervention and consent of two coowners, Ramon
Melencio and Jose P. Melencio, and without the marital consent of the husbands of Juliana and
Ruperta Melencio; that the lessee has repeatedly violated the terms and conditions of the said
contract; and that Liberata Macapagal, in her capacity as administratrix of the property of her
deceased husband, could not lawfully and legally execute a contract of lease with the conditions
and terms similar to that of the one under consideration, and that from this it follows that she
could not ratify the said lease as claimed by the defendant.
On January 21,1928, Liberata Macapagal Viuda de Melencio, duly appointed and qualified as
administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Ramon Melencio, filed a petition praying to
be allowed to join the plaintifs as party to the present case, which petition was granted in open
court on January 31,1928. Her amended complaint of intervention of February 14,1928, contains
allegations similar to those alleged in the complaint of the original plaintifs, and she further
alleges that the defendant-appellee has occupied the land in question ever since November, 1920,
under and by virtue of a verbal contract of lease for a term from month to month. To this complaint
of intervention, the defendant-appellee filed an answer reproducing the allegations contained in his
answer reproducing the allegations contained in his answer to the complaint of the original
plaintifs and setting up prescription as a further special defense.
It appears from the evidence that the land in question was originally owned by one Julian Melencio.
He died prior to the year 1905 leaving his widow, Ruperta Garcia, and his five children, Juliana,
Ramon, Ruperta, Pedro R., and Emilio Melencio. Emilio Melencio also died before 1905, his son Jose
P. Melencio, then a minor, succeeding to his interest in the said parcel of land by representation. A
question has been raised as to whether the land was community property of the marriage of Julian
Melencio and Ruperta Garcia, but the evidence is practically undisputed that Ruperta Garcia in
reality held nothing but a widow's usufruct in the land.
On July 24,1905, Ruperta Garcia, Pedro R. Melencio, Juliana Melencio, and Ruperta Melencio
executed a contract of lease of the land in favor of one Yap Kui Chin, but neither Jose P. Melencio
nor Ramon Melencio were mentioned in the lease. The term of the lease was for twenty years,
extendible for a like period at the option of the lessee. The purpose of the lessee was to establish a
rice mill on the land, with the necessary buildings for warehouses and for quarters for the
employees, and it was further stipulated that at the termination of the original period of the lease,
or the extension therof, the lessors might purchase all the buildings and improvements on the land
at a price to be fixed by experts appointed by the parties, but that if the lessors should fail to take
advantage of that privilege, the lease would continue for another and further period of twenty
years. The document was duly acknowledged but was never recorded with the register of deeds.
The original rent agreed upon was P25 per month, but by reason of the construction of a street
through the land, the monthly rent was reduced of P20.20.
Shortly after the execution of the lease, the lessee took possession of the parcel in question and
erected the mill as well as the necessary buildings, and it appears that in matters pertaining to the
lease, he dealt with Pedro R. Melencio, who from 1905 until his death in 1920, acted as manager of
the property held in common by the heirs of Julian Melencio and Ruperta Garcia. The original
lessee, Yap Kui Chin, died in 1912, and the lease, as well as the other property, was transferred to
Uy Eng Jui who again transferred it to Uy Eng Jui & Co., an unregistered partnership. Finally the
lease came into the hands of Dy Tiao Lay, the herein defendant-appellee.
Ramon Melencio died in 1914, and his widow, Liberata Macapagal, was appointed administratrix of
his estate. In 1913 the land which includes the parcel in question was registered under the Torrens
system. The lease was not mentioned in the certificate of title, but it was stated that one house
and three warehouses on the land were the property of Yap Kui Chin.
In 1920 the heirs of Julian Melencio made an extrajudicial partition of parts of the inheritance, and
among other things, the land here in question fell to the share of the children of Ramon Melencio,
who are the original plaintifs in the present case. Their mother, Liberata Macapagal, as
administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Ramon, collected the rent for the lease at
the rate of P20.20 per month until the month of May,1926, when she demanded of the lessee that
the rent should be increased to P300 per month, and she was then informed by the defendant that
a written lease existed and that according to the terms thereof, the defendant was entitled to an
extension of the lease at the original rental. The plaintifs insisted that they never had any
knowledge of the existence of such a contract of lease and maintained that in such case the lease
was executed without their consent and was void. It may be noted that upon careful search, a copy
of the contract of lease was found among the papers of the deceased Pedro R, Melencio. Thereafter
the present action was brought to set aside the lease and to recover possession of the land. Upon
trial, the court below rendered judgment in favor of the defendant declaring the lease valid and
ordering the plaintifs to pay the P272 demanded by the defendant in his counterclaim. From this
judgment the plaintifs appealed.
The contention of the appellants is that the aforesaid contract of lease (Exhibit C) is null and void
for the following reasons:
1. That Exhibit C calls for an alteration of the property in question and therefore ought to
have been signed by all the coowners as by law required in the premises.
2. That the validity and fulfillment of the said agreement of lease were made to depend
upon the will of the lessee exclusively.
3. That the said contract of lease being for a term of over six years, the same is null and
void pursuant to the provision of article 1548 of the Civil Code.
4. That the duration of the same is unreasonably long, thus being against public policy.
5. That the defendant-appellee and his predecessors in interest repeatedly violated the
provisions of the agreement.
The first proposition is based on article 397 of the Civil Code which provides that "none of the
owners shall, without the consent of the others, make any alterations in the common property
even though such alterations might be advantageous to all." We do not think that the alterations
are of sufficient importance to nullify the lease, especially so since none of the coowners objected
to such alterations until over twenty years after the execution of the contract of lease. The decision
of this court in the case of Enriquez vs. A. S. Watson and Co. (22 Phil., 623), contains a full
discussion of the efect of alterations of leased community property, and no further discussion
upon the point need here be considered.
The second proposition is likewise of little merit. Under the circumstances, the provision in the
contract that the lessee, at any time before he erected any building on the land, might rescind the
lease, can hardly be regarded as a violation of article 1256 of the Civil Code.
The third and fourth proposition are, in our opinion, determinative of the controversy. The court
below based its decision principally on the case of Enriquez vs. A.S. Watson & Co. (22 Phil., 623),
and on the resolution of theDireccion General de los Registros dated April 26,1907. (Jurisprudencia
Civil, vol.107, p. 222.) An examination of the Enriquez case will show that it difers materially from
the present. In that case all of the coowners of a lot and building executed a contract of lease of
the property for the term of eighteen years in favor of A. S. Watson & Co.; one of the owners was
minor, but he was represented by his legally appointed guardian, and the action of the latter in
signing the lease on behalf of the minor was formally approved by the Court of First Instance. In
the present case only a small majority of the coowners executed the lease here in question, and
according to the terms of the contract the lease might be given a duration of sixty years; that is
widely diferent from a lease granted by all of the coowners for a term of only eighteen years.
The resolution of April 26,1907, is more in point. It relates to the inscription or registration of a
contract of lease of some pasture grounds. The majority of the coowners of the property executed
the lease for the term of twelve years but when the lessees presented the lease for inscription in
the registry of property, the registrar denied the inscription on the ground that the term of the
lease exceeded six years and that therefore the majority of the coowners lacked authority to grant
the lease. The Direccion General de los Registros held that the contract of lease for a period
exceeding six years, constitutes a real right subject to registry and that the lease in question was
valid.
The conclusions reached by the Direccion General led to considerable criticism and have been
overruled by a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated June 1,1909. In that decision the court
made the following statement of the case (translation):
The joint owners of 511 out of 1,000 parts of the realty denominated El Mortero, leased out
the whole property for twelve years to Doa Josefa de la Rosa; whereupon the Count and
Countess Trespalacios together with other coowners brought this suit to annul the lease
and, in view of the fact that the land was indivisible, prayed for its sale by public auction
and the distribution of the price so obtained; they alleged that they neither took part nor
consented to the lease; that the decision of the majority of part owners referred to in
article 398 of the Code, implies a common deliberation on the step to be taken , for to do
without it, would, even more than to do without the minority, be nothing less than plunder;
and that, even if this deliberation were not absolutely necessary, the power of the majority
would still be confined to decisions touching the management and enjoyment of the
common property, and would not include acts of ownership, such as a lease for twelve
years, which according to the Mortgage Law gives rise to a real right, which must be
recorded, and which can be performed only by the owners of the property leased.
The part owners who had executed the contract prayed in reconvention that it held valid
for all the owners in common, and if this could not be, then for all those who had signed it,
and for the rest, for the period of six years; and the Audiencia of Caceres having rendered
judgment holding the contract null and void, and ordering the sale of the realty and the
distribution of the price, the defendants appealed alleging under the third and fourth
assignments of error, that the judgment was a violation of article 398 of the Civil Code,
which is absolute and sets no limit of time for the efficacy of the decisions arrived at by the
majority of the part owners for the enjoyment of the common property, citing the decisions
of June 30th, 1897, of July 8th,1902, and of October 30th, 1907; under the fifth
assignments of error the appellants contended that in including joint owners among those
referred to in said article, which sets certain limits to the power of leasing, in the course of
the management of another's property, the court applied article 1548 unduly; and by the
seventh assignments of error, they maintained the judgment appealed from also violated
article 1727, providing that the principal is not bound where his agent has acted beyond
his authority; whence it may be inferred that if in order to hold the contract null and void,
the majority of the part owners are looked upon as managers or agents exercising limited
powers, it must at least be conceded that in so far as the act in question lies within the
scope of their powers, it is valid; the contract cannot be annulled in toto.
The Supreme Court held that the appeal from the decision of the Audiencia of Caceres was not well
taken and expressed the following consideranda:
Considering that, although as a rule the contract of lease constitutes an act of
management, as this court has several times held, cases may yet arise, either owing to the
nature of the subject matter, or to the period of duration, which may render it imperative
to record the contract in the registry of property, in pursuance of the Mortgage Law, where
the contract of lease may give rise to a real right in favor of the lessee, and it would then
constitute such a sundering of the ownership as transcends mere management; in such
cases it must of necessity be recognized that the part owners representing the greater
portion of the property held in common have no power to lease said property for a longer
period than six years without the consent of all the coowners, whose propriety rights,
expressly recognized by the law, would by contracts of long duration be restricted or
annulled; and as under article 1548 of the Civil Code such contracts cannot be entered into
by the husband with respect to his wife's property, by the parent or guardian with respect
to that of the child or ward, and by the manager in default of special power, since the
contract of lease only produces personal obligations, and cannot without the consent of all
 persons interested or express authority from the owner, be extended to include
stipulations which may alter its character, changing it into a contract of partial alienation of
the property leased;
Considering that, applying this doctrine to the case before us, one of the grounds upon
which the judgment appealed from, denying the validity of the lease made by the majority
of the part owners of the pasture landEl Mortero is based, must be upheld; to wit, that the
period of duration is twelve years and the consent of all the coowners has not been
obtained; hence, the third, fourth. and fifth assignments of error are without merit; firstly,
because article 398 of the Civil Code, alleged to have been violated, refers to acts decided
upon by the majority of the part owners, touching the management and enjoyment of the
common property, and does not contradict what we have stated in the foregoing
paragraph; secondly because although the cases cited were such as arose upon leases for
more than six years, yet this point was not raised on appeal, and could not therefore be
passed upon; and thirdly, because it cannot be denied that there is an analogy between a
manager without special authority, who is forbidden by article 1548 of the Code to give a
lease for a period of over six years, and the joint owners constituting a legal majority, who
may decide to lease out the indivisible property, with respect to the shares of the other
coowners; and having come to the conclusion that the contract is null and void, there is no
need to discuss the first two assignments of error which refer to another of the bases
adopted, however erroneously, by the trial court;
Considering that the sixth assignment of error is without merit, inasmuch as the joint
ownership of property is not a sort of agency and cannot be governed by the provisions
relating to the latter contract; whence, article 1727 of the Code alleged to have been
violated, can no more be applied, than, the question of the validity or nullity of the lease
being raise, upon the contract as celebrated, it would be allowable to modify
aposteriori some one or other of the main conditions stipulated, like that regarding the
duration of the lease, for this would amount to a novation; still less allowable would it be to
authorize diverse periods for the diferent persons unequally interested in the fulfillment.
Taking into consideration articles 398,1548, and 1713 of the Civil Code and following the aforesaid
decision of June 1,1909, we hold that the contract of lease here in question is null and void.
It has been suggested that by reason of prescription and by acceptance of benefits under the
lease, the plaintifs are estopped to question the authority for making the lease.To this we may
answer that the burden of proof of prescription devolved upon the defendant and that as far as we
can find, there is no proof that Ramon Melencio and his successors ever had knowledge of the
existence of the lease in question prior to 1926. We cannot by mere suspicion conclude that they
were informed of the existence of the document and its terms; it must be remembered that under
a strict interpretation of the terms of the lease, the lessees could remain indefinitely in their
tenancy unless the lessors could purchase the mill and the buildings on the land. In such
circumstances, better evidence than that presented by the defendant in regard to the plaintif's
knowledge of the lease must be required.
The fact that Ramon during his lifetime received his share of the products of land owned in
common with his coheirs is not sufficient proof of knowledge of the existence of the contract of
lease when it is considered that the land in question was only a small portion of a large tract which
Pedro R. Melencio was administering in connection with other community property.
The appealed judgment as to the validity of the lease is therefore reversed, and it is ordered that
the possession of the land in controversy be delivered to the intervenor Liberata Macapagal in her
capacity as administratrix of the estate of the deceased Ramon Melencio. It is further ordered that
the defendant pay to said administratrix a monthly rent of P50 for the occupation of the land from
May 1st, 1926, until the land is delivered to the administratrix. The sum of P272 demanded by the
defendant in his counterclaim may be deducted from the total amount of the rent due and unpaid.
The building erected on the land by the defendant and his predecessors in interest may be
removed by him, or otherwise disposed of, within six months from the promulgation of this
decision. Without costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-3404 April 2, 1951
TUASON vs. TUASON
In 1941 the sisters Angela I. Tuason and Nieves Tuason de Barreto and their brother Antonio Tuason
Jr., held a parcel of land with an area of 64,928.6 sq. m. covered by Certificate of Title No. 60911 in
Sampaloc, Manila, in common, each owning an undivided 1/3 portion. Nieves wanted and asked for
a partition of the common property, but failing in this, she ofered to sell her 1/3 portion. The share
of Nieves was ofered for sale to her sister and her brother but both declined to buy it. The ofer
was later made to their mother but the old lady also declined to buy, saying that if the property
later increased in value, she might be suspected of having taken advantage of her daughter.
Finally, the share of Nieves was sold to Gregorio Araneta Inc., a domestic corporation, and a new
Certificate of Title No. 61721 was issued in lieu of the old title No. 60911 covering the same
property. The three co-owners agreed to have the whole parcel subdivided into small lots and then
sold, the proceeds of the sale to be later divided among them. This agreement is embodied in a
document (Exh. 6) entitled "Memorandum of Agreement" consisting of ten pages, dated June 30,
1941.
Before, during and after the execution of this contract (Exh. 6), Atty. J. Antonio Araneta was acting
as the attorney-in-fact and lawyer of the two co-owners, Angela I. Tuason and her brother Antonio
Tuason Jr. At the same time he was a member of the Board of Director of the third co-owner,
Araneta, Inc.
The pertinent terms of the contract (Exh. 6) may be briefly stated as follows: The three co-owners
agreed to improve the property by filling it and constructing roads and curbs on the same and then
subdivide it into small lots for sale. Araneta Inc. was to finance the whole development and
subdivision; it was prepare a schedule of prices and conditions of sale, subject to the subject to the
approval of the two other co-owners; it was invested with authority to sell the lots into which the
property was to be subdivided, and execute the corresponding contracts and deeds of sale; it was
also to pay the real estate taxes due on the property or of any portion thereof that remained
unsold, the expenses of surveying, improvements, etc., all advertising expenses, salaries of
personnel, commissions, office and legal expenses, including expenses in instituting all actions to
eject all tenants or occupants on the property; and it undertook the duty to furnish each of the two
co-owners, Angela and Antonio Tuason, copies of the subdivision plans and the monthly sales and
rents and collections made thereon. In return for all this undertaking and obligation assumed by
Araneta Inc., particularly the financial burden, it was to receive 50 per cent of the gross selling
price of the lots, and any rents that may be collected from the property, while in the process of
sale, the remaining 50 per cent to be divided in equal portions among the three co-owners so that
each will receive 16.33 per cent of the gross receipts.
Because of the importance of paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 of the contract (Exh. 6), for purposes of
reference we are reproducing them below:
(9) This contract shall remain in full force and efect during all the time that it may be
necessary for the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART to fully sell the said property in small and
subdivided lots and to fully collect the purchase prices due thereon; it being understood
and agreed that said lots may be rented while there are no purchasers thereof;
(11) The PARTY OF THE SECOND PART (meaning Araneta Inc.) is hereby given full power
and authority to sign for and in behalf of all the said co-owners of said property all
contracts of sale and deeds of sale of the lots into which this property might be subdivided;
the powers herein vested to the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART may, under its own
responsibility and risk, delegate any of its powers under this contract to any of its officers,
employees or to third persons;
(15) No co-owner of the property subject-matter of this contract shall sell, alienate or
dispose of his ownership, interest or participation therein without first giving preference to
the other co-owners to purchase and acquire the same under the same terms and
conditions as those ofered by any other prospective purchaser. Should none of the co-
owners of the property subject-matter of this contract exercise the said preference to
acquire or purchase the same, then such sale to a third party shall be made subject to all
the conditions, terms, and dispositions of this contract; provided, the PARTIES OF THE
FIRST PART (meaning Angela and Antonio) shall be bound by this contract as long as the
PARTY OF THE SECOND PART, namely, the GREGORIO ARANETA, INC. is controlled by the
members of the Araneta family, who are stockholders of the said corporation at the time of
the signing of this contract and/or their lawful heirs;
On September 16, 1944, Angela I. Tuason revoked the powers conferred on her attorney-in-fact and
lawyer, J. Antonio Araneta. Then in a letter dated October 19, 1946, Angela notified Araneta, Inc.
that because of alleged breach of the terms of the "Memorandum of Agreement" (Exh. 6) and
abuse of powers granted to it in the document, she had decided to rescind said contract and she
asked that the property held in common be partitioned. Later, on November 20, 1946, Angela filed
a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila asking the court to order the partition of the
property in question and that she be given 1/3 of the same including rents collected during the
time that the same including rents collected during the time that Araneta Inc., administered said
property.
The suit was administered principally against Araneta, Inc. Plaintif's brother, Antonio Tuason Jr.,
one of the co-owners evidently did not agree to the suit and its purpose, for he evidently did not
agree to the suit and its purpose, for he joined Araneta, Inc. as a co-defendant. After hearing and
after considering the extensive evidence introduce, oral and documentary, the trial court presided
over by Judge Emilio Pea in a long and considered decision dismissed the complaint without
pronouncement as to costs. The plaintif appealed from that decision, and because the property is
valued at more than P50,000, the appeal came directly to this Court.
Some of the reasons advanced by appellant to have the memorandum contract (Exh. 6) declared
null and void or rescinded are that she had been tricked into signing it; that she was given to
understand by Antonio Araneta acting as her attorney-in-fact and legal adviser that said contract
would be similar to another contract of subdivision of a parcel into lots and the sale thereof
entered into by Gregorio Araneta Inc., and the heirs of D. Tuason, Exhibit "L", but it turned out that
the two contracts widely difered from each other, the terms of contract Exh. "L" being relatively
much more favorable to the owners therein the less favorable to Araneta Inc.; that Atty. Antonio
Araneta was more or less disqualified to act as her legal adviser as he did because he was one of
the officials of Araneta Inc., and finally, that the defendant company has violated the terms of the
contract (Exh. 6) by not previously showing her the plans of the subdivision, the schedule of prices
and conditions of the sale, in not introducing the necessary improvements into the land and in not
delivering to her her share of the proceeds of the rents and sales.
We have examined Exh. "L" and compared the same with the contract (Exh. 6) and we agree with
the trial court that in the main the terms of both contracts are similar and practically the same.
Moreover, as correctly found by the trial court, the copies of both contracts were shown to the
plaintif Angela and her husband, a broker, and both had every opportunity to go over and
compare them and decide on the advisability of or disadvantage in entering into the contract (Exh.
6); that although Atty. Antonio Araneta was an official of the Araneta Inc.; being a member of the
Board of Directors of the Company at the time that Exhibit "6" was executed, he was not the party
with which Angela contracted, and that he committed no breach of trust. According to the evidence
Araneta, the pertinent papers, and sent to her checks covering her receive the same; and that as a
matter of fact, at the time of the trial, Araneta Inc., had spent about P117,000 in improvement and
had received as proceeds on the sale of the lots the respectable sum of P1,265,538.48. We quote
with approval that portion of the decision appealed from on these points:
The evidence in this case points to the fact that the actuations of J. Antonio Araneta in
connection with the execution of exhibit 6 by the parties, are above board. He committed
nothing that is violative of the fiduciary relationship existing between him and the plaintif.
The act of J. Antonio Araneta in giving the plaintif a copy of exhibit 6 before the same was
executed, constitutes a full disclosure of the facts, for said copy contains all that appears
now in exhibit 6.
 Plaintif charges the defendant Gregorio Araneta, Inc. with infringing the terms of the
contract in that the defendant corporation has failed (1) to make the necessary
improvements on the property as required by paragraphs 1 and 3 of the contract; (2) to
submit to the plaintif from time to time schedule of prices and conditions under which the
subdivided lots are to be sold; and to furnish the plaintif a copy of the subdivision plans, a
copy of the monthly gross collections from the sale of the property.
The Court finds from the evidence that he defendant Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated has
substantially complied with obligation imposed by the contract exhibit 6 in its paragraph 1,
and that for improvements alone, it has disbursed the amount of P117,167.09. It has
likewise paid taxes, commissions and other expenses incidental to its obligations as denied
in the agreement.
With respect to the charged that Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated has failed to submit to
plaintif a copy of the subdivision plains, list of prices and the conditions governing the sale
of subdivided lots, and monthly statement of collections form the sale of the lots, the Court
is of the opinion that it has no basis. The evidence shows that the defendant corporation
submitted to the plaintif periodically all the data relative to prices and conditions of the
sale of the subdivided lots, together with the amount corresponding to her. But without any
justifiable reason, she refused to accept them. With the indiferent attitude adopted by the
plaintif, it was thought useless for Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated to continue sending her
statement of accounts, checks and other things. She had shown on various occasions that
she did not want to have any further dealings with the said corporation. So, if the
defendant corporation proceeded with the sale of the subdivided lots without the approval
of the plaintif, it was because it was under the correct impression that under the contract
exhibit 6 the decision of the majority co-owners is binding upon all the three.
The Court feels that recission of the contract exhibit 6 is not minor violations of the terms
of the agreement, the general rule is that "recission will not be permitted for a slight or
casual breach of the contract, but only for such breaches as are so substantial and
fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the agreement" (Song Fo &
Co. vs. Hawaiian-Philippine Co., 47 Phil. 821).
As regards improvements, the evidence shows that during the Japanese occupation from 1942 and
up to 1946, the Araneta Inc. although willing to fill the land, was unable to obtain the equipment
and gasoline necessary for filling the low places within the parcel. As to sales, the evidence shows
that Araneta Inc. purposely stopped selling the lots during the Japanese occupantion, knowing that
the purchase price would be paid in Japanese military notes; and Atty. Araneta claims that for this,
plaintif should be thankfull because otherwise she would have received these notes as her share
of the receipts, which currency later became valueles.
But the main contention of the appellant is that the contract (Exh. 6) should be declared null and
void because its terms, particularly paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 which we have reproduced, violate
the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code, which for the purposes of reference we quote below:
ART. 400. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the community. Each may, at
any time, demand the partition of the thing held in common.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a specified length of time, not
exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This period may be a new agreement.
We agree with the trial court that the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code are not applicable.
The contract (Exh., 6) far from violating the legal provision that forbids a co-owner being obliged to
remain a party to the community, precisely has for its purpose and object the dissolution of the co-
ownership and of the community by selling the parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds of
the sale among the co-owners. The obligation imposed in the contract to preserve the co-
ownership until all the lots shall have been sold, is a mere incident to the main object of dissolving
the co-owners. By virtue of the document Exh. 6, the parties thereto practically and substantially
entered into a contract of partnership as the best and most expedient means of eventually
dissolving the co-ownership, the life of said partnership to end when the object of its creation shall
have been attained.
This aspect of the contract is very similar to and was perhaps based on the other agreement or
contract (Exh. "L") referred to by appellant where the parties thereto in express terms entered into
partnership, although this object is not expressed in so many words in Exh. 6. We repeat that we
see no violation of Art. 400 of the Civil Code in the parties entering into the contract (Exh. 6) for
the very reason that Art. 400 is not applicable.
Looking at the case from a practical standpoint as did the trial court, we find no valid ground for
the partition insisted upon the appellant. We find from the evidence as was done by the trial court
that of the 64,928.6 sq. m. which is the total area of the parcel held in common, only 1,600 sq. m.
or 2.5 per cent of the entire area remained unsold at the time of the trial in the year 1947, while
the great bulk of 97.5 per cent had already been sold. As well observed by the court below, the
partnership is in the process of being dissolved and is about to be dissolved, and even assuming
that Art. 400 of the Civil Code were applicable, under which the parties by agreement may agree to
keep the thing undivided for a period not exceeding 10 years, there should be no fear that the
remaining 1,600 sq. m. could not be disposed of within the four years left of the ten-years period
fixed by Art. 400.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss and pass upon the other points raised in the appeal and which
counsel for appellant has extensively and ably discussed, citing numerous authorities. As we have
already said, we have viewed the case from a practical standpoint, brushing aside technicalities
and disregarding any minor violations of the contract, and in deciding the case as we do, we are
fully convinced that the trial court and this Tribunal are carrying out in a practical and expeditious
way the intentions and the agreement of the parties contained in the contract (Exh. 6), namely, to
dissolve the community and co-ownership, in a manner most profitable to the said parties.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. There is no
pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
--- xx END OF OBLIGATIONS OF EACH CO-OWNERS xx ---
G.R. No. L-51283 June 7, 1989
MARIANO vs. CA
The proceedings at bar concern (1) an attempt by a married man to prevent execution against
conjugal property of a judgment rendered against his wife, for obligations incurred by the latter
while engaged in a business that had admittedly redounded to the benefit of the family, and (2)
the interference by a court with the proceedings on execution of a co-equal or coordinate court.
Both acts being proscribed by law, correction is called for and will hereby be efected.
The proceedings originated from a suit filed by Esther Sanchez against Lourdes Mariano in the
Court of First Instance at Caloocan City, 1 for recovery of the value of ladies' ready made dresses
allegedly purchased by and delivered to the latter. 2
A writ of preliminary attachment issued at Esther Sanchez' instance, upon a bond posted by Veritas
Insurance Company in the amount of P 11,000.00, and resulted in the seizure of Lourdes Mariano's
property worth P 15,000.00 or so. 3 Her motion for the discharge of the attachment having been
denied, 4 Lourdes Mariano went up to the Court of Appeals on certiorari. That Court ordered 5 the
Trial Court to receive evidence on whether or not the attachment had been improvidently or
irregularly issued. 6 The Trial Court did so, came to the conclusion that the attachment had indeed
been improperly issued, and consequently dissolved it. 7
Trial then ensued upon the issues arising from the complaint as well as Lourdes Mariano's answer
with counterclaim-which included a claim for damages resulting from wrongful attachment.
Thereafter judgment was rendered in favor of defendant Lourdes Mariano and against plaintif
Esther Sanchez containing the following dispositions, to wit: 8
1. On the complaint, defendant is ordered to pay unto the plaintif for the value of
the dishonored check (Exhs. G-1, H and I) in the total amount of P 1,512.00.
2. On the counterclaim, the plaintif is ordered to pay unto defendant the following,
as follows:
a) P 7,500.00 for loss of income of the defendant for 75 days;
b) P 16,000.00 for the value of attached goods;
c) P 25,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages;
d) P 5,000.00 as attorney's fees plus costs of suit.
The Veritas Insurance Company which issued the attachment bond is ordered to pay unto the
defendant the full insurance coverage of P 11,000.00 to answer for the total liability of the plaintif
thereof
Esther Sanchez sought to perfect an appeal by filing a notice of appeal, an appeal bond and a
record on appeal. 9
Pending approval of the record on appeal, Lourdes Mariano filed a motion for the immediate
execution of the judgment which the Court granted. 10 In virtue of the writ of execution which
afterwards issued in due course, the sherif garnished the sum of P 11,000.00 from Veritas
Insurance Company, and levied on real and personal property belonging to the conjugal
partnership of Esther Sanchez and her husband, Daniel Sanchez. Esther Sanchez then filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, praying for the annulment of the execution
pending appeal authorized by the Trial Court; but her petition was adjudged to be without merit
and was accordingly dismissed. 11
Daniel Sanchez, Esther's husband, now made his move. He filed a complaint for annulment of the
execution in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City in his capacity as administrator of the
conjugal partnership. 12 He alleged that the conjugal assets could not validly be made to answer
for obligations exclusively contracted by his wife, and that, moreover, some of the personal
property levied on, such as household appliances and utensils necessarily used in the conjugal
dwelling, were exempt from execution. He also applied for a preliminary injunction pending
adjudication of the case on the merits. 13
The Quezon City Court issued an order setting the matter of the injunction for hearing, and
commanding the sherif, in the meantime, to desist from proceeding with the auction sale of the
property subject of Daniel Sanchez' claim. 14 Lourdes Mariano filed a motion to dismiss the action;
this, the Court denied. 15 She then instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of
Appeals 16 where she initially enjoyed some measure of success: her petition was given due
course, and the Quezon City Court was restrained by the Appellate Court's Seventh Division 17 from
further proceeding with the case. 18 Eventually, however, the Eighth Division 19 came to the
conclusion that there was no merit in her cause and dismissed her petition. 20 It ruled that the
Quezon City Court had not interfered with the execution process of the Caloocan Court because
Daniel Sanchez's action in the former court raised an issue-the validity of the sherifs levy on the
conjugal partnership assets of the Sanchez spouses diferent from those adjudicated in the
Caloocan Court, and Sanchez was not a party to the case tried by the latter.
From this verdict Lourdes Mariano has appealed to this Court, contending that the Appellate Court
committed reversible error-
1) in ruling that the conjugal partnership of Daniel and Esther Sanchez could not be
made liable for Esther's judgment obligation arising from the spouses' joint
business with Lourdes Mariano;
2) in ruling that the Quezon City Court of First Instance had not interfered with the
execution process of the Caloocan Court of First Instance; and
 3) when its Eighth Division decided the petition of Lourdes Mariano although the
case had been raffled to the Seventh Division and the latter had in fact given due
course to the petition.
1. There is no dispute about the fact that Esther Sanchez was engaged in business
not only without objection on the part of her husband, Daniel, but in truth with his
consent and approval. 21 It is also established that, as expressly acknowledged by
Esther herself and never denied by Daniel, the profits from the business had been
used to meet, in part at least, expenses for the support of her family, i.e., the
schooling of the children, food and other household expenses. 22 Under the
circumstances, Lourdes Mariano action against Esther Sanchez was justified, the
litigation being "incidental to the ... business in which she is engaged 23 and
consequently, the conjugal partnership of Daniel and Esther Sanchez was liable for
the debts and obligations contracted by Esther in her business since the income
derived therefrom, having been used to defray some of the expenses for the
maintenance of the family and the education of the children, had redounded to the
benefit of the partnership. 24 It was therefore error for the Court of Appeals to have
ruled otherwise.
2. It was also error for the Court of Appeals to have held that there was no
interference by the Quezon City Court of First Instance with the execution process
of the Caloocan Court.
The rule, one of great importance in the administration of justice, is that a Court of First Instance
has no power to restrain by means of injunction the execution of a judgment or decree of another
judge of concurrent or coordinate jurisdictions. 25 But this is precisely what was done by the
Quezon City Court of First Instance: it enjoined the execution of a judgment authorized and
directed by a co-equal and coordinate court, the Caloocan City Court of First Instance. It did so on
the claim of Daniel Sanchez that the property being levied on belonged to the conjugal partnership
and could not be made liable for the wife's obligations.
The question that arises is whether such a claim that property levied on in execution of a judgment
is not property of the judgment debtor, Daniel Sanchez's wife, but of the conjugal partnership of
the Sanchez Spouses is properly cognizable by a Court other than that which rendered judgment
adversely to the wife.
To be sure, Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, authorizes a "third person," i.e., "any other
person than the judgment debtor or his agent," to vindicate "his claim to the property by any
proper action." The section reads as follows: 26
SEC. 17. Proceedings where property claimed by third person.-If property levied on
be claimed by any other person than the judgment debtor or his agent, and such
person make an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof,
stating the grounds of such right or title, and serve the same upon the officer
making the levy, and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, the officer shall
not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on
demand of the officer, indemnify the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum
not greater than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to
such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of
execution.
The officer is not liable for damages, for the taking or keeping of the property, to
any third-party claimant, unless a claim is made by the latter and unless an action
for damages is brought by him against the officer within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date of the filing of the bond. But nothing herein contained shall
prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the
property by any proper action.
xxx xxx xxx
The "proper action" referred to in the section "is and should be an entirely separate and distinct
action from that in which execution has issued, if instituted by a stranger to the latter suit:" 27 and
in "such separate action, the court may issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the sherif
enjoining him from proceeding with the execution sale." 28 "Upon the other hand, if the claim of
impropriety on the part of the sherif in the execution proceedings is made by a party to the action,
not a stranger thereto, any relief therefrom may be applied for with, and obtained from, only the
executing court; and this is true even if a new party has been impleaded in the suit." 29
In the case at bar, the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case
prosecuted and adjudged against his wife. A strikingly similar situation was presented in a case
decided by this Court as early as 1976, Rejuso v. Estipona. 30 There, the sherif tried to evict
petitioner Rejuso and his family from their house and lot which had been sold in execution of a
money judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Davao against Rejuso. What Rejuso did
was to institute, together with his wife, Felisa, a separate suit in the same court against the sherif
and the judgment creditor, Estipona, for the purpose of annulling the levy, execution sale, and writ
of possession issued in the first action in respect of their residential house and lot, on the theory
that that property was conjugal in character and "hence, not subject to such proceedings
considering that Felisa was not a party to the previous case." The action was however dismissed by
the court on the ground that it had "no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or the
nature of the action and of the relief sought." 31 The dismissal was had on motion of Estipona who
argued that the court had no jurisdiction to "vacate or annul and/or enjoin the enforcement of the
process issued by another branch in another case," and since Rejuso had already raised the same
issues in the first case, without success, he should not be allowed to "get from another branch ...
what he failed to get ... (from) Branch l." This Court affirmed that judgment of dismissal, 32 holding
that Rejuso's action was barred by res adjudicata; and "(a)s regards Felisa Rejuso, who is a new
party in Civil Case No. 5102" (the second action) it was ruled that-
... her remedy, if it has not yet been barred by the statute of limitations or become
stale in some other way, is within Civil Case No. 4435 (the first suit). Indeed, it is
superfluous to start a new action on a matter which can be more simply and
conveniently litigated within a former proceeding of which it is more logically and
legally an integral part. (Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc, v. CTA, 8 SCRA 59
[1963]). Actually, the court in which the former proceeding was pending has
exclusive jurisdiction thereof (De Leon vs. Salvador, 36 SCRA 567), the fact that the
two cases are in the same Branch of the same Court of First Instance and presided
over by the same Judge notwithstanding. After all, it is simpler and more
convenient to observe such practice, which insures also consistency in the
 resolutions of related questions because they are to be determined in most if not
all instances by the same judge.
In any case, whether by intervention in the court issuing the writ, or by separate action, it is
unavailing for either Esther Sanchez or her husband, Daniel, to seek preclusion of the enforcement
of the writ of possession against their conjugal assets. For it being established, as aforestated, that
Esther had engaged in business with her husband's consent, and the income derived therefrom
had been expended, in part at least, for the support of her family, the liability of the conjugal
assets to respond for the wife's obligations in the premises cannot be disputed.
The petitioner's appeal must therefore be sustained.
However, the petitioner's theory that the Eighth Division of the Appellate Court had improperly
taken cognizance of the case which had been raffled to the Seventh Division, must be rejected. It is
without foundation, and was evidently made without attempt to ascertain the relevant facts and
applicable rules. The case had originally been assigned to Mr. Justice Isidro C. Borromeo for study
and report while he was still a member of the Seventh Division. The case was brought by him to
the Eighth Division when he was subsequently transferred thereto; and he had ultimately written
the opinion for the division after due deliberation with his colleagues. All of this took place in
accordance with the Rules of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals subject of the petition is REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE, and the Regional Trial Court (formerly Court of First Instance) at Quezon City is ORDERED to
dismiss Civil Case No. 20415 entitled "Daniel P. Sanchez v. Deputy Sheriff Mariano V. Cachero, et
al.," with prejudice. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24419 July 15, 1968
ESTOQUE vs. PAJIMULA
Direct appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of La Union, in its Civil Case No. 1990,
granting a motion to dismiss the complaint for legal redemption by a co-owner (retracto legal de
comuneros) on account of failure to state a cause of action.
The basic facts and issues are stated in the decision appealed from, as follows:
Plaintif based her complaint for legal redemption on a claim that she is a co-owner of Lot
No. 802, for having purchased 1/3 portion thereof, containing an area of 640 square meters
as evidenced by a deed of sale, Annex "A", which was executed on October 28, 1951 by
Crispina Perez de Aquitania, one of the co-owners, in her favor.
On the other hand, the defendant, who on December 30, 1959 acquired the other 2/3
portion of Lot No. 802 from Crispina Aquitania and her children, claimed that the plaintif
bought the 1/3 southeastern portion, which is definitely identified and segregated, hence
there existed no co-ownership at the time and after said plaintif bought the aforesaid
portion, upon which right of legal redemption can be exercised or taken advantage of.
From the complaint, it would appear that Lot No. 802 of the Cadastral survey of Rosario,
covered by original certificate of title No. RO-2720 (N.A.) was originally owned by the late
spouses, Rosendo Perez and Fortunata Bernal, who were survived by her children, namely,
Crispina Perez, Lorenzo Perez and Ricardo Perez. Ricardo Perez is also now dead. On
October 28, 1951, Crispina P. Vda. de Aquitania sold her right and participation in Lot No.
802 consisting of 1/3 portion with an area of 640 square meters to Leonora Estoque (Annex
A of the complaint). On October 29, 1951, Lorenzo Perez, Crispina Perez and Emilia P.
Posadas, widow of her deceased husband, Ricardo Perez for herself and in behalf of her
minor children, Gumersindo, Raquel, Emilio and Ricardo, Jr., executed a deed of
extrajudicial settlement wherein Lorenzo Perez, Emilia P. Posadas and her minor children
assigned all their right, interest and participation in Lot No. 802 to Crispina Perez (Annex B
of the complaint). On December 30, 1959, Crispina Perez and her children Rosita Aquitania
Belmonte, Remedios Aquitania Misa, Manuel Aquitania, Sergio Aquitania and Aurora
Aquitania sold to Elena Pajimula, the remaining 2/3 western portion of Lot No. 802 with an
area of 958 square meters (Annex C of the complaint).
The action of the plaintif is premised on the claim of co-ownership. From the deed of sale
executed in favor of the plaintif, it can be seen that the 1/3 portion sold to plaintif is
definitely identified as the 1/3 portion located on the southeastern part of Lot No. 802 and
specifically bounded on the north by De Guzman Street, on the east by Posadas Street, on
the south by Perez Street, and on the west by remaining portion of the same lot, which
contained an area of 640 square meters. And in the deed of sale executed by Crispina
Perez and her children in favor of defendant Elena Pajimula over the remaining 2/3 portion
of Lot No. 802, said portion is identified as the western portion of Lot No. 802 which is
bounded on the north by De Guzman Street, on the east by properties of Leonarda
Estoque, on the south by the national road and on the west by Lots Nos. 799 and 801,
containing an area of 598 square meters.
The appellant's stand is that the deed in her favor was inoperative to convey the southeastern
third of Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre notwithstanding the description in the deed itself, for the
reason that the vendor, being a mere co-owner, had no right to sell any definite portion of the land
held in common but could only transmit her undivided share, since the specific portion
corresponding to the selling co-owner is not known until partition takes place (Lopez vs. Ilustre, 5
Phil. 567; Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528). From this premise, the appellant argues that the sale
in her favor, although describing a definite area, should be construed as having conveyed only the
undivided 1/3 interest in Lot 802 owned at the time by the vendor, Crispina Perez Vda. de
Aquitania. Wherefore, when the next day said vendor acquired the 2/3 interest of her two other co-
owners, Lot 802 became the common property of appellant and Crispina Perez. Therefore,
appellant argues, when Crispina sold the rest of the property to appellee Pajimula spouses, the
former was selling an undivided 2/3 that appellant, as co-owner, was entitled to redeem, pursuant
to Article 1620 of the New Civil Code.
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of
all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the
alienation is grossly excessive the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do
so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common.
The lower court, upon motion of defendant, dismissed the complaint, holding that the deeds of sale
show that the lot acquired by plaintif Estoque was diferent from that of the defendants Pajimula;
hence they never became co-owners, and the alleged right of legal redemption was not proper.
Estoque appealed.
We find no error in the order of dismissal, for the facts pleaded negate the claim that appellant
Estoque ever became a co-owner of appellees Pajimula.
(1) The deed of sale to Estoque (Annex A of the complaint) clearly specifies the object sold as the
southeastern third portion of Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre, with an area of 840 square meters,
more or less. Granting that the seller, Crispina Perez Vda. de Aquitania could not have sold this
particular portion of the lot owned in common by her and her two brothers, Lorenzo and Ricardo
Perez, by no means does it follow that she intended to sell to appellant Estoque her 1/3 undivided
interest in the lot forementioned. There is nothing in the deed of sale to justify such inference. That
the seller could have validly sold her one-third undivided interest to appellant is no proof that she
did choose to sell the same. Ab posse ad actu non valet illatio.
(2) While on the date of the sale to Estoque (Annex A) said contract may have been inefective, for
lack of power in the vendor to sell the specific portion described in the deed, the transaction was
validated and became fully efective when the next day (October 29, 1951) the vendor, Crispina
Perez, acquired the entire interest of her remaining co-owners (Annex B) and thereby became the
sole owner of Lot No. 802 of the Rosario Cadastral survey (Llacer vs. Muoz, 12 Phil. 328). Article
1434 of the Civil Code of the Philippines clearly prescribes that .
When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and later
the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the
buyer or grantee."
Pursuant to this rule, appellant Estoque became the actual owner of the southeastern third of lot
802 on October 29, 1951. Wherefore, she never acquired an undivided interest in lot 802. And
when eight years later Crispina Perez sold to the appellees Pajimula the western two-thirds of the
same lot, appellant did not acquire a right to redeem the property thus sold, since their respective
portions were distinct and separate.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of dismissal is affirmed. Costs against appellant
Estoque.1wph1.t
--- xxx END OF LIMITATIONS OF SUCH RIGHTS xxx ---
G.R. No. 75884 September 24, 1987
GO ONG vs. CA
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 21, 1986 Decision * of the Court of Appeals in
AC-G.R. CV No. 02635, "Julita Ong etc. vs. Allied Banking Corp. et al." affirming, with modification,
the January 5, 1984 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-35230.
The uncontroverted facts of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
...: Two (2) parcels of land in Quezon City Identified as Lot No. 12, Block 407, Psd
37326 with an area of 1960.6 sq. m. and Lot No. 1, Psd 15021, with an area of
3,660.8 sq. m. are covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188705 in the name
of "Alfredo Ong Bio Hong married to Julita Go Ong "(Exh. D). Alfredo Ong Bio Hong
died on January 18, 1975 and Julita Go Ong was appointed administratrix of her
husband's estate in Civil Case No. 107089. The letters of administration was
registered on TCT No. 188705 on October 23, 1979. Thereafter, Julita Go Ong sold
Lot No. 12 to Lim Che Boon, and TCT No. 188705 was partially cancelled and TCT
No. 262852 was issued in favor of Lim Che Boon covering Lot No. 12 (Exh. D-4). On
June 8, 1981 Julita Go Ong through her attorney-in-fact Jovita K. Yeo (Exh. 1)
mortgaged Lot No. 1 to the Allied Banking Corporation to secure a loan of
P900,000.00 obtained by JK Exports, Inc. The mortgage was registered on TCT No.
188705 on the same date with the following notation: "... mortgagee's consent
necessary in case of subsequent alienation or encumbrance of the property other
conditions set forth in Doc. No. 340, Page No. 69, Book No. XIX, of the Not. Public of
Felixberto Abad". On the loan there was due the sum of P828,000.00 and Allied
Banking Corporation tried to collect it from Julita Go Ong, (Exh. E). Hence, the
complaint alleging nullity of the contract for lack of judicial approval which the
bank had allegedly promised to secure from the court. In response thereto, the
bank averred that it was plaintif Julita Go Ong who promised to secure the court's
approval, adding that Julita Go Ong informed the defendant that she was processed
the sum of P300,000.00 by the JK Exports, Inc. which will also take charge of the
interest of the loan.
Concluding, the trial court ruled:
Absent (of) any evidence that the property in question is the
capital of the deceased husband brought into the marriage, said
property should be presumed as acquired during the marriage and,
therefore, conjugal property,
After the dissolution of the marriage with the death of plaintif's
husband, the plaintif acquired, by law, her conjugal share,
together with the hereditary rights thereon. (Margate vs. Rabacal,
L-14302, April 30, 1963). Consequently, the mortgage constituted
on said property, upon express authority of plaintif,
notwithstanding the lack of judicial approval, is valid, with respect
to her conjugal share thereon, together with her hereditary rights.
On appeal by petitioner, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification, the appealed
decision (Record, pp. 19-22). The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
instituted by defendant against plaintif shall be held in abeyance to await the final
 result of Civil Case No. 107089 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, 6th Judicial
District Branch XXXII, entitled "IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE
LATE ALFREDO ONG BIO: JULITA GO ONG, ADMINISTRATRIX". In pursuance with
which the restraining order of the lower court in this case restraining the sale of the
properties levied upon is hereby ordered to continue in full force and efect
coterminous with the final result of Civil Case No. 107089, the decision appealed
from is hereby affirmed. Costs against plaintif-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
On April 8, 1986, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said decision (Ibid., pp. 24-29),
but in a Resolution dated September 11, 1986, respondent court denied the motion for lack of
merit (Ibid., p. 23). Hence, the instant petition (Ibid., pp. 6-17).
The Second Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated November 19, 1986 (Rollo, p. 30), without
giving due course to the petition, resolved to require private respondent to comment thereon and
it did on February 19, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 37-42). Thereafter, in a Resolution dated April 6, 1987, the
petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their respective memoranda
(Ibid., p. 43).
Petitioner filed her Memorandum on May 13, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 45-56), while private respondent filed
its Memorandum on May 20, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 62-68).
The sole issue in this case is
WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED OVER THE PARCEL OF LAND UNDER
PETITIONER'S ADMINISTRATION IS NULL AND VOID FOR WANT OF JUDICIAL APPROVAL.
The instant petition is devoid of merit.
The well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great respect, carries
even more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in the case at bar.
In brief, the lower court found: (1) that the property under the administration of petitioner the
wife of the deceased, is a community property and not the separate property of the latter; (2) that
the mortgage was constituted in the wife's personal capacity and not in her capacity as
administratrix; and (3) that the mortgage afects the wife's share in the community property and
her inheritance in the estate of her husband.
Petitioner, asserting that the mortgage is void for want of judicial approval, quoted Section 7 of
Rule 89 of the Rules of Court and cited several cases wherein this Court ruled that the regulations
provided in the said section are mandatory.
While petitioner's assertion may have merit insofar as the rest of the estate of her husband is
concerned the same is not true as regards her conjugal share and her hereditary rights in the
estate. The records show that petitioner willingly and voluntarily mortgaged the property in
question because she was processed by JK Exports, Inc. the sum of P300,000.00 from the proceeds
of the loan; and that at the time she executed the real estate mortgage, there was no court order
authorizing the mortgage, so she took it upon herself, to secure an order.
Thus, in confirming the findings of the lower court, as supported by law and the evidence, the
Court of Appeals aptly ruled that Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, since
the mortgage was constituted in her personal capacity and not in her capacity as administratrix of
the estate of her husband.
Nevertheless, petitioner, citing the cases of Picardal, et al. vs. Lladas (21 SCRA 1483)
and Fernandez, et al. vs. Maravilla (10 SCRA 589), further argues that in the settlement
proceedings of the estate of the deceased spouse, the entire conjugal partnership property of the
marriage is under administration. While such may be in a sense true, that fact alone is not
sufficient to invalidate the whole mortgage, willingly and voluntarily entered into by the petitioner.
An opposite view would result in an injustice. Under similar circumstances, this Court applied the
provisions of Article 493 of the Civil Code, where the heirs as co-owners shall each have the full
ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even efect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership (Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 207
[1980]).
Consequently, in the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted in
ruling that the questioned mortgage constituted on the property under administration, by authority
of the petitioner, is valid, notwithstanding the lack of judicial approval, with respect to her conjugal
share and to her hereditary rights. The fact that what had been mortgaged was in custodia legis is
immaterial, insofar as her conjugal share and hereditary share in the property is concerned for
after all, she was the ABSOLUTE OWNER thereof. This ownership by hers is not disputed, nor is
there any claim that the rights of the government (with reference to taxes) nor the rights of any
heir or anybody else have been prejudiced for impaired. As stated by Associate Justice (later Chief
Justice) Manuel Moran in Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et al., 73 Phil. 618
The land in question, described in the appealed decision, originally belonged to
Juan Melgar. The latter died and the judicial administration of his estate was
commenced in 1915 and came to a close on December 2, 1924, only. During the
pendency of the said administration, that is, on July 5, 1917, Susana Melgar,
daughter of the deceased Juan Melgar, sold the land with the right of repurchase to
Pedro Cui, subject to the stipulation that during the period for the repurchase she
would continue in possession of the land as lessee of the purchase. On December
12, 1920, the partition of the estate left by the deceased Juan Melgar was made,
and the land in question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar. In 1921, she conveyed,
 in payment of professional fees, one-half of the land in favor of the defendant-
appellee Nicolas Rafols, who entered upon the portion thus conveyed and has been
in possession thereof up to the present. On July 23, 1921, Pedro Cui brought an
action to recover said half of the land from Nicolas Rafols and the other half from
the other defendants, and while that case was pending, or about August 4, 1925,
Pedro Cui donated the whole land in question to Generosa Teves, the herein
plaintif-appellant, after trial, the lower court rendered a decision absolving Nicolas
Rafols as to the one-half of the land conveyed to him by Susana Melgar, and
declaring the plaintif owner of the other half by express acknowledgment of the
other defendants. The plaintif appealed from that part of the judgment which is
favorable to Nicolas Rafols.
The lower court absolved Nicolas Rafols upon the theory that Susana Melgar could
not have sold anything to Pedro Cui because the land was then in custodia
legis, that is, under judicial administration. This is error. That the land could not
ordinary be levied upon while in custodia legis,does not mean that one of the heirs
may not sell the right, interest or participation which he has or might have in the
lands under administration. The ordinary execution of property in custodia legis is
prohibited in order to avoid interference with the possession by the court. But the
sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the
pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration.
The reference to judicial approval in Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court cannot adversely afect
the substantiverights of private respondent to dispose of her Ideal [not inchoate, for the conjugal
partnership ended with her husband's death, and her hereditary rights accrued from the moment
of the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code) share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership
formed between her and the other heirs/co-owners (See Art. 493, Civil Code, supra.). Sec. 7, Art.
89 of the Civil Code applies in a case where judicial approval has to be sought in connection with,
for instance, the sale or mortgage of property under administration for the payment, say of a
conjugal debt, and even here, the conjugal and hereditary shares of the wife are excluded from the
requisite judicial approval for the reason already adverted to hereinabove, provided of course no
prejudice is caused others, including the government.
Moreover, petitioner is already estopped from questioning the mortgage. An estoppel may arise
from the making of a promise even though without consideration, if it was intended that the
promise should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to enforce it would be
virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice (Gonzalo Sy Trading
vs. Central Bank, 70 SCRA 570).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102380 January 18, 1993
ACEBEDO vs. ABESAMIS
The lower court's jurisdiction in approving a Deed of Conditional Sale executed by respondents-
heirs and ordering herein administrator-petitioner Herodotus Acebedo to sell the remaining
portions of said properties, despite the absence of its prior approval as a probate court, is being
challenged in the case at bar.
The late Felix Acebedo left an estate consisting of several real estate properties located in Quezon
City and Caloocan City, with a conservative estimated value of about P30 million. Said estate
allegedly has only the following unsettled claims:
a. P87,937.00 representing unpaid real estate taxes due Quezon City;
b. P20,244.00 as unpaid real estate taxes due Caloocan City;
c. The unpaid salaries/allowances of former Administrator Miguel Acebedo, and the
incumbent Administrator Herodotus Acebedo; and
d. Inheritance taxes that may be due on the net estate.
The decedent was succeeded by eight heirs, two of whom are the petitioners herein, and the
others are the private respondents.
Due to the prolonged pendency of the case before the respondent Court for sixteen years,
respondents-heirs filed a "Motion for Approval of Sale", on October 4, 1989. The said sale involved
the properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 155569, 120145, 9145, and 18709, all of
which are registered in Quezon City, and form part of the estate. The consideration for said lots
was twelve (12) million pesos and by that time, they already had a buyer. It was further stated in
said Motion that respondents-heirs have already received their proportionate share of the six (6)
million pesos paid by the buyer, Yu Hwa Ping, as earnest money; that the balance of P6,000,000.00
is more than enough to pay the unsettled claims against the estate. Thus, they prayed for the
Court to direct the administrator, Herodotus Acebedo (referred to as petitioner-administrator
hereafter):
1. to sell the properties mentioned in the motion;
2. with the balance of P6 million, to pay all the claims against the Estate; and
3. to distribute the residue among the Heirs in final settlement of the Estate.
To the aforesaid Motion, herein petitioner-administrator interposed an "Opposition to Approval of
Sale", to wit:
 1. That he has learned that some of the heirs herein have sold some real estate
property of the Estate located at Balintawak, Quezon City, without the knowledge
of the herein administrator, without the approval of this Honorable Court and of
some heirs, and at a shockingly low price;
2. That he is accordingly hereby registering his vehement objection to the approval
of the sale, perpetrated in a manner which can even render the proponents of the
sale liable for punishment for contempt of this Honorable Court;
3. The herein Administrator instead herein prays this Honorable Court to authorize
the sale of the above mentioned property of the Estate to generate funds to pay
certain liabilities of the Estate and with the approval of this Honorable Court if
warranted, to give the heirs some advances chargeable against theirs (sic)
respective shares, and, for the purpose to authorize the herein Administrator, and
the other heirs to help the Administrator personally or through a broker, to look for
a buyer for the highest obtainable price, subject always to the approval of this
Honorable Court. 1
On October 30, 1989, herein petitioners moved to be given a period of forty-five (45) days within
which to look for a buyer who will be willing to buy the properties at a price higher than
P12,000,000.00.
The case was set for hearing on December 15, 1989. However, by said date, petitioners have not
found any buyer ofering better terms. Thus, they asked the Court, on February 8, 1990, for an in
extendible period of thirty days to look for a buyer.
Petitioner-administrator then filed a criminal complaint for falsification of a public document
against Yu Hwa Ping and notary public Eugenio Obon on February 26, 1990. He initiated this
complaint upon learning that it was Yu Hwa Ping who caused the notarization of the Deed of
Conditional Sale wherein allegedly petitioner-administrator's signature was made to appear. He
also learned that after he confronted the notary public of the questioned document, the latter
revoked his notarial act on the same.
On April 2, 1990, petitioner-administrator filed the civil action to secure the declaration by the
Court of the nullity of the Deed of Conditional Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale.
The period granted herein petitioners having lapsed without having found a buyer, petitioner
Demosthenes Acebedo sought to nullify the Orders granting them several periods within which to
look for a better buyer. Respondents filed a comment thereon.
Having miserably failed to find a better buyer, after seven long months, petitioner-administrator
filed another "Opposition to Approval of Sale", dated May 10, 1990, maintaining that the sale
should wait for the country to recover from the efects of the coup d'etat attempts, otherwise, the
properties should be divided among the heirs.
On June 21, 1990, petitioners filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Mortgage and Lease some of the
Properties of the Estate". To this Motion, respondents filed an Opposition on the following grounds :
that the motion is not proper because of the pending motion to approve the sale of the same
properties; that said conditional sale was initiated by petitioner-administrator who had earlier
signed a receipt for P500,000.00 as earnest money; that the approval of the sale would mean Yu
Hwa Ping's assumption of payment of the realty taxes; that the estate has no further debts and
thus, the intestate administrator may be terminated.
On August 17, 1990, respondent Court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which, stated,
among others, to wit: 2
b. the motion filed by the heirs-movants, dated October 4, 1989, praying that the
new administrator be directed to sell the properties covered by TCT Nos. 155569,
120145, 9145 and 18709, in favor of Yu Hwa Ping is hereby denied; and
c. the new administrator is hereby granted leave to mortgage some properties of
the estate at a just and reasonable amount, subject to the approval of the Court.
On December 4, 1990, the respondent Judge issued an order resolving to call the parties to a
conference on December 17, 1990. The conference was held, but still the parties were unable to
arrive at an agreement. So, on January 4, 1991, it was continued, wherein the parties actually
agreed that the heirs be allowed to sell their shares of the properties to Yu Hwa Ping for the price
already agreed upon, while herein petitioners negotiate for a higher price with Yu Hwa Ping.
Petitioners, then, instead filed a "Supplemental Opposition" to the approval of the Deed of
Conditional Sale.
On March 29, 1991, the respondent Court issued the challenged Order, the dispositive portion of
which states, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated August 7, 1990, is hereby lifted, reconsidered and
set aside, and another one is hereby issued as follows:
1. Approving the conditional sale, dated September 10, 1989, executed by the
heirs-movants, in favor of Yu Hwa Ping, pertaining to their respective shares in the
properties covered by TCT Nos. 155569, 120145, 1945 and 18709 of the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City;
 2. Ordering the administrator Herodotus Acebedo to sell the remaining portions of
the said properties also in favor of Yu Hwa Ping at the same price as the sale
executed by the herein heirs-movants;
3. Ordering Yu Hwa Ping to deposit with the Court the total remaining balance of
the purchase price for the said lots within TWENTY (20) DAYS from notice hereof;
4. The motion to cite former administrator Miguel Acebedo in contempt of court,
resulting from his failure to submit the owner's copy of TCT Nos. 155569, and
120145 is hereby denied. 3
Yu Hwa Ping, on April 4, 1991, deposited the remaining balance of the purchase price for the
properties subject of the Deed of Conditional Sale in the amount of P6,500,000.00.
Petitioners herein received the questioned Order on April 11, 1991. Twenty one (21) days
thereafter, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Court reinstate its Order of
August 17, 1990. To this, private respondents filed their Opposition. 4
Instead of making a reply, petitioners herein filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. The
motions for reconsideration of herein petitioners were denied by the respondent Court on August
23, 1991.
On September 23, 1991, herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, hoping for the
last time that they would be able to convince the Court that its Order dated March 29, 1991 in
efect approving the conditional sale is erroneous and beyond its jurisdiction.
On October 17, 1991, the respondent Court denied the Motion for Partial Reconsideration for "lack
of merit".
On November 7, 1991, private respondents filed a Motion for Execution of the Order dated March
29, 1991. This was pending resolution when the petitioners filed this Petition for Certiorari.
The controversy in the case at bar revolves around one question: Is it within the jurisdiction of the
lower court, acting as a probate court, to issue an Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale
executed by respondents-heirs without prior court approval and to order herein Administrator to
sell the remaining portion of said properties?
We answer in the positive?
In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, 5 this Court made a pronouncement that it is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his
prospective heirs before final adjudication. Hence, it is error to say that this matter should be
threshed out in a separate action.
The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale
of an immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be
made with the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a
probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the probate court in the case at bar, acted within its
jurisdiction in issuing the Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale.
We cannot countenance the position maintained by herein petitioners that said conditional sale is
null and void for lack of prior court approval. The sale precisely was made conditional, the
condition being that the same should first be approved by the probate court.
Petitioners herein anchor their claim on Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. 6 It is settled that
court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedent's estate. However,
reference to judicial approval cannot adversely afect the substantive rights of the heirs to dispose
of their ideal share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership among the heirs. 7
This Court had the occasion to rule that there is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right,
interest, or participation he may have in the property under administration. This is a matter which
comes under the jurisdiction of the probate court. 8
The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent's property, even if the same is under administration,
is based on the Civil Code provision 9 stating that the possession of hereditary property is deemed
transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in
case the inheritance is accepted. Where there are however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of
the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs. 10
The Civil Code, under the provisions on co-ownership, further qualifies this right. 11 Although it is
mandated that each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and thus may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, the efect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. 12 In other words, the law does not prohibit a co-owner from
selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in common. 13
As early as 1942, this Court has recognized said right of an heir to dispose of property under
administration. In the case of Teves de Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et al., 14 it was said that the sale made
by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the pending administration, in no
wise, stands in the way of such administration. The Court then relied on the provision of the Old
Civil Code, Article 440 and Article 339 which are still in force as Article 533 and Article 493,
respectively, in the new Civil Code. The Court also cited the words of a noted civilist, Manresa:
"Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs 'becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate
left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of
ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate which remains undivided'."
Private respondents having secured the approval of the probate court, a matter which is
unquestionably within its jurisdiction, and having established private respondents' right to alienate
the decedent's property subject of administration, this Petition should be dismissed for lack of
merit.
PREMISES considered, Petition is hereby DISMISSED. With Costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 61584 November 25, 1992
PAULMITAN vs. CA
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals, dated July 14, 1982 in CA-G.R. No. 62255-R entitled "Alicio Paulmitan, et al. v. Donato
Sagario Paulmitan, et al." which affirmed the decision 2 of the then Court of First Instance (now
RTC) of Negros Occidental, 12th Judicial District, Branch IV, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 11770.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, who died sometime in 1953, 3 left the two following parcels of land
located in the Province of Negros Occidental: (1) Lot No. 757 with an area of 1,946 square meters
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-8376; and (2) Lot No. 1091 with an area of
69,080 square meters and covered by OCT No. RO-11653. From her marriage with Ciriaco
Paulmitan, who is also now deceased, Agatona begot two legitimate children, namely: Pascual
Paulmitan, who also died in 1953, 4 apparently shortly after his mother passed away, and Donato
Paulmitan, who is one of the petitioners. Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa is Donato's daughter while the
third petitioner, Rodolfo Fanes, is Juliana's husband. Pascual Paulmitan, the other son of Agatona
Sagario, is survived by the respondents, who are his children, name: Alicio, Elena, Abelino, Adelina,
Anita, Baking and Anito, all surnamed Paulmitan.
Until 1963, the estate of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan remained unsettled and the titles to the two
lots mentioned above remained in the name of Agatona. However, on August 11, 1963, petitioner
Donato Paulmitan executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship, extrajudicially adjudicating unto
himself Lot No. 757 based on the claim that he is the only surviving heir of Agatona Sagario. The
affidavit was filed with the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental on August 20, 1963, cancelled
OCT No. RO-8376 in the name of Agatona Sagario and issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
35979 in Donato's name.
As regards Lot No. 1091, Donato executed on May 28, 1974 a Deed of Sale over the same in favor
of petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter. 5
In the meantime, sometime in 1952, for non-payment of taxes, Lot No. 1091 was forfeited and sold
at a public auction, with the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental being the buyer. A
Certificate of Sale over the land was executed by the Provincial Treasurer in favor of the Provincial
Board of Negros Occidental. 6
On May 29, 1974, Juliana P. Fanesa redeemed the property from the Provincial Government of
Negros Occidental for the amount of P2,959.09. 7
On learning of these transactions, respondents children of the late Pascual Paulmitan filed on
January 18, 1975 with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a Complaint against
petitioners to partition the properties plus damages.
Petitioners set up the defense of prescription with respect to Lot No. 757 as an affirmative defense,
contending that the Complaint was filed more than eleven years after the issuance of a transfer
certificate of title to Donato Paulmitan over the land as consequence of the registration with the
Register of Deeds, of Donato's affidavit extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757. As
regards Lot No. 1091, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claimed in her Answer to the Complaint that she
acquired exclusive ownership thereof not only by means of a deed of sale executed in her favor by
her father, petitioner Donato Paulmitan, but also by way of redemption from the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental.
Acting on the petitioners' affirmative defense of prescription with respect to Lot No. 757, the trial
court issued an order dated April 22, 1976 dismissing the complaint as to the said property upon
finding merit in petitioners' affirmative defense. This order, which is not the object of the present
petition, has become final after respondents' failure to appeal therefrom.
Trial proceeded with respect to Lot No. 1091. In a decision dated May 20, 1977, the trial court
decided in favor of respondents as to Lot No. 1091. According to the trial court, the respondents, as
descendants of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan were entitled to one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 1091, pro
indiviso. The sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan to his daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did
not prejudice their rights. And the repurchase by Juliana P. Fanesa of the land from the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental did not vest in Juliana exclusive ownership over the entire land
but only gave her the right to be reimbursed for the amount paid to redeem the property. The trial
court ordered the partition of the land and directed petitioners Donato Paulmitan and Juliana P.
Fanesa to pay private respondents certain amounts representing the latter's share in the fruits of
the land. On the other hand, respondents were directed to pay P1,479.55 to Juliana P. Fanesa as
their share in the redemption price paid by Fanesa to the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the second cause of action pleaded
in the complain as follows:
1. The deed of sale (Exh. "F") dated May 28, 1974 is valid insofar as the one-half
undivided portion of Lot 1091 is concerned as to vest ownership over said half
 portion in favor of defendant Juliana Fanesa and her husband Rodolfo Fanesa, while
the remaining half shall belong to plaintifs, pro-indiviso;
2. Lot 1091, Cadastral Survey of Pontevedra, Province of Negros Occidental, now
covered by TCT No. RO-11653 (N.A.), is ordered partitioned. The parties must
proceed to an actual partition by property instrument of partition, submitting the
corresponding subdivision within sixty (60) days from finality of this decision, and
should they fail to agree, commissioners of partition may be appointed by the
Court;
3. Pending the physical partition, the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is
ordered to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. RO-11653 (N.A.) covering Lot
1091, Pontevedra Cadastre, and to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in
the name of plaintifs and defendants, one-half portion each, pro-indiviso, as
indicated in paragraph 1 above;
4. Plaintifs are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, defendant Juliana Fanesa the
amount of P1,479.55 with interest at the legal rate from May 28, 1974 until paid;
5 Defendants Donato Sagario Paulmitan and Juliana Paulmitan Fanesa are ordered
to account to plaintifs and to pay them, jointly and severally, the value of the
produce from Lot 1091 representing plaintifs' share in the amount of P5,000.00
per year from 1966 up to the time of actual partition of the property, and to pay
them the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees as well as the costs of the suit.
xxx xxx xxx
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence this petition.
To determine the rights and obligations of the parties to the land in question, it is well to review,
initially, the relatives who survived the decedent Agatona Sagario Paulmitan. When Agatona died
in 1953, she was survived by two (2) sons, Donato and Pascual. A few months later in the same
year, Pascual died, leaving seven children, the private respondents. On the other had, Donato's
sole ofspring was petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa.
At the time of the relevant transactions over the properties of decedent Agatona Sagario
Paulmitan, her son Pascual had died, survived by respondents, his children. It is, thus, tempting to
apply the principles pertaining to the right of representation as regards respondents. It must,
however, be borne in mind that Pascual did no predecease his mother, 8 thus precluding the
operation of the provisions in the Civil Code on the right of representation 9 with respect to his
children, the respondents. When Agatona Sagario Paulmitan died intestate in 1952, her two (2)
sons Donato and Pascual were still alive. Since it is well-settled by virtue of Article 777 of the Civil
Code that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent," 10 the right of ownership, not only of Donato but also of Pascual, over their respective
shares in the inheritance was automatically and by operation of law vested in them in 1953 when
their mother died intestate. At that stage, the children of Donato and Pascual did not yet have any
right over the inheritance since "[i]n every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the
more distant
ones." 11 Donato and Pascual excluded their children as to the right to inherit from Agatona Sagario
Paulmitan, their mother.
From the time of the death of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan to the subsequent passing away of her
son Pascual in 1953, the estate remained unpartitioned. Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides:
"Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned
in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased." 12 Donato and Pascual
Paulmitan were, therefore, co-owners of the estate left by their mother as no partition was ever
made.
When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his children, the respondents, succeeded him in
the co-ownership of the disputed property. Pascual Paulmitan's right of ownership over an
undivided portion of the property passed on to his children, who, from the time of Pascual's death,
became co-owners with their uncle Donato over the disputed decedent estate.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claims ownership over Lot No. 1091 by virtue of two transactions,
namely: (a) the sale made in her favor by her father Donato Paulmitan; and (b) her redemption of
the land from the Provincial of Negros Occidental after it was forfeited for non-payment of taxes.
When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091 to his daughter Juliana P. Fanesa, he
was only a co-owner with respondents and as such, he could only sell that portion which may be
allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership. 13 The sale did not prejudice the rights of
respondents to one half (1/2) undivided share of the land which they inherited from their father. It
did not vest ownership in the entire land with the buyer but transferred only the seller's pro-
indiviso share in the property 14 and consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the land until it is
partitioned. InBailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court, through Justice Irene R. Cortes,
outlined the efects of a sale by one co-owner without the consent of all the co-owners, thus:
The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in Article 493 of
the Civil Code, Thus:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage
it and even substitute another person its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership. [Emphasis supplied.]
 As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole
property as his, the sale will afect only his own share but not those of the other co-
owners who did not consent to the sale [Punsalan v. Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320 (1923)].
This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other
disposition afects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what
would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common
[Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909)]. Consequently, by virtue of the sales
made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect to their
proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to
private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a co-owner of
the disputed parcel of land as correctly held by the lower court since the sales
produced the efect of substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof [Mainit v.
Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730 (1910)].
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent
of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-
owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
Applying this principle to the case at bar, the sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan of the land to his
daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not give to the latter ownership over the entire land but
merely transferred to her the one half (1/2) undivided share of her father, thus making her the co-
owner of the land in question with the respondents, her first cousins.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa also claims ownership of the entire property by virtue of the fact that
when the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental bought the land after it was forfeited for
non-payment of taxes, she redeemed it.
The contention is without merit.
The redemption of the land made by Fanesa did not terminate the co-ownership nor give her title
to the entire land subject of the co-ownership. Speaking on the same issue raised by petitioners,
the Court, in Adille v. Court of Appeals, 16 resolved the same with the following pronouncements:
The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive
ownership over the property held in common?
Essentially, it is the petitioners' contention that the property subject of dispute
devolved upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join him in its redemption
within the period required by law. He relies on the provisions of Article 1515 of the
old Civil Code, Article 1613 of the present Code, giving the vendee a retro the right
to demand redemption of the entire property.
There is no merit in this petition.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by co-owner with respect to his share
alone (CIVIL CODE, art. 1612, CIVIL CODE (1889), art. (1514.). While the records
show that petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the
expenses therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it
did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership (Supra, Art. 489). There is no
doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil
Code:
Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to
contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common
and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this obligation by
renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of
the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-
ownership.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While
a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to
consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the
property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of
all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property
and consolidate title thereto in his name (Supra, art. 1607). But the provision does
not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not
provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the entire lot by virtue of the
redemption she made, nevertheless, she did acquire the right to reimbursed for half of the
redemption price she paid to the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental on behalf of her co-
owners. Until reimbursed, Fanesa hold a lien upon the subject property for the amount due her. 17
Finally, petitioners dispute the order of the trial court, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, for
them to pay private respondents P5,000.00 per year from 1966 until the partition of the estate
which represents the share of private respondents in the fruits of the land. According to petitioners,
the land is being leased for P2,000.00 per year only. This assigned error, however raises a factual
question. The settled rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review. As a
general rule, findings of fact made by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and
conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33187 March 31, 1980
PAMPLONA vs. MORETO
This is a petition for certiorari by way of appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-
G.R. No. 35962-R, entitled "Vivencio Moreto, et al., Plaintif-Appellees vs. Cornelio Pamplona, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants," affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I at
Bian.
The facts, as stated in the decision appealed from, show that:
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During their marriage, they acquired
adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land Estate, situated in Calamba,
Laguna, containing 781-544 and 1,021 square meters respectively and covered by certificates of
title issued in the name of "Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega."
The spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega begot during their marriage six (6) children,
namely, Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all surnamed Moreto.
Ursulo Moreto died intestate on May 24, 1959 leaving as his heirs herein plaintifs Vivencio,
Marcelo, Rosario, Victor, Paulina, Marta and Eligio, all surnamed Moreto.
Marta Moreto died also intestate on April 30, 1938 leaving as her heir plaintif Victoria Tuiza.
La Paz Moreto died intestate on July 17, 1954 leaving the following heirs, namely, herein plaintifs
Pablo, Severina, Lazaro, and Lorenzo, all surnamed Mendoza.
Alipio Moreto died intestate on June 30, 1943 leaving as his heir herein plaintif Josefina Moreto.
Pablo Moreto died intestate on April 25, 1942 leaving no issue and as his heirs his brother plaintif
Leandro Moreto and the other plaintifs herein.
On May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega died intestate in Calamba, Laguna.
On July 30, 1952, or more than six (6) years after the death of his wife Monica Maniega, Flaviano
Moreto, without the consent of the heirs of his said deceased wife Monica, and before any
liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Monica and Flaviano could be efected, executed in favor
of Geminiano Pamplona, married to defendant Apolonia Onte, the deed of absolute sale (Exh. "1")
covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00. The deed of sale (Exh. "1") contained a description of lot No.
1495 as having an area of 781 square meters and covered by transfer certificate of title No. 14570
issued in the name of Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega, although the lot was acquired
during their marriage. As a result of the sale, the said certificate of title was cancelled and a new
transfer certificate of title No. T-5671 was issued in the name of Geminiano Pamplona married to
Apolonia Onte (Exh. "A").
After the execution of the above-mentioned deed of sale (Exh. "1"), the spouses Geminiano
Pamplona and Apolonia Onte constructed their house on the eastern part of lot 1496 as Flaviano
Moreto, at the time of the sale, pointed to it as the land which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona.
Shortly thereafter, Rafael Pamplona, son of the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte,
also built his house within lot 1496 about one meter from its boundary with the adjoining lot. The
vendor Flaviano Moreto and the vendee Geminiano Pamplona thought all the time that the portion
of 781 square meters which was the subject matter of their sale transaction was No. 1495 and so
lot No. 1495 appears to be the subject matter in the deed of sale (Exh. "1") although the fact is
that the said portion sold thought of by the parties to be lot No. 1495 is a part of lot No. 1496.
From 1956 to 1960, the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonio Onte enlarged their house and
they even constructed a piggery corral at the back of their said house about one and one-half
meters from the eastern boundary of lot 1496.
On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the plaintifs demanded on the
defendants to vacate the premises where they had their house and piggery on the ground that
Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the lot which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona as the same
belongs to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife and the latter was already
dead when the sale was executed without the consent of the plaintifs who are the heirs of Monica.
The spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte refused to vacate the premises occupied by
them and hence, this suit was instituted by the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for the declaration
of the nullity of the deed of sale of July 30, 1952 above-mentioned as regards one-half of the
property subject matter of said deed; to declare the plaintifs as the rightful owners of the other
half of said lot; to allow the plaintifs to redeem the one-half portion thereof sold to the defendants.
"After payment of the other half of the purchase price"; to order the defendants to vacate the
portions occupied by them; to order the defendants to pay actual and moral damages and
attorney's fees to the plaintifs; to order the defendants to pay plaintifs P120.00 a year from
August 1958 until they have vacated the premises occupied by them for the use and occupancy of
the same.
The defendants claim that the sale made by Flaviano Moreto in their favor is valid as the lot sold is
registered in the name of Flaviano Moreto and they are purchasers believing in good faith that the
vendor was the sole owner of the lot sold.
After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by agreement of the parties, it was found out
that there was mutual error between Flaviano Moreto and the defendants in the execution of the
deed of sale because while the said deed recited that the lot sold is lot No. 1495, the real intention
of the parties is that it was a portion consisting of 781 square meters of lot No. 1496 which was the
subject matter of their sale transaction.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive part thereof being as follows:
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintifs declaring the deed of
absolute sale dated July 30, 1952 pertaining to the eastern portion of Lot 1496
covering an area of 781 square meters null and void as regards the 390.5 square
meters of which plaintifs are hereby declared the rightful owners and entitled to
its possession.
The sale is ordered valid with respect to the eastern one-half (1/2) of 1781 square
meters of Lot 1496 measuring 390.5 square meters of which defendants are
declared lawful owners and entitled to its possession.
After proper survey segregating the eastern one-half portion with an area of 390.5
square meters of Lot 1496, the defendants shall be entitled to a certificate of title
covering said portion and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9843 of the office of the
Register of Deeds of Laguna shall be cancelled accordingly and new titles issued to
the plaintifs and to the defendants covering their respective portions.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 of the office of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna covering Lot No. 1495 and registered in the name of Cornelio Pamplona,
married to Apolonia Onte, is by virtue of this decision ordered cancelled. The
defendants are ordered to surrender to the office of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna the owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 within thirty
(30) days after this decision shall have become final for cancellation in accordance
with this decision.
Let copy of this decision be furnished the Register of Deeds for the province of
Laguna for his information and guidance.
With costs against the defendants. 2
The defendants-appellants, not being satisfied with said judgment, appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the judgment, hence they now come to this Court.
The fundamental and crucial issue in the case at bar is whether under the facts and circumstances
duly established by the evidence, petitioners are entitled to the full ownership of the property in
litigation, or only one-half of the same.
There is no question that when the petitioners purchased the property on July 30, 1952 from
Flaviano Moreto for the price of P900.00, his wife Monica Maniega had already been dead six years
before, Monica having died on May 6, 1946. Hence, the conjugal partnership of the spouses
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega had already been dissolved. (Article 175, (1) New Civil Code;
Article 1417, Old Civil Code). The records show that the conjugal estate had not been inventoried,
liquidated, settled and divided by the heirs thereto in accordance with law. The necessary
proceedings for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership were not instituted by the heirs either in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse pursuant to Act 3176 amending
Section 685 of Act 190. Neither was there an extra-judicial partition between the surviving spouse
and the heirs of the deceased spouse nor was an ordinary action for partition brought for the
purpose. Accordingly, the estate became the property of a community between the surviving
husband, Flaviano Moreto, and his children with the deceased Monica Maniega in the concept of a
co-ownership.
The community property of the marriage, at the dissolution of this bond by the
death of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to the legal partnership and
becomes the property of a community, by operation of law, between the surviving
spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse, or the exclusive property of the
widower or the widow, it he or she be the heir of the deceased spouse. Every co-
owner shall have full ownership of his part and in the fruits and benefits derived
therefrom, and he therefore may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, unless personal rights are in question.
(Marigsa vs. Macabuntoc, 17 Phil. 107)
In Borja vs. Addision, 44 Phil. 895, 906, the Supreme Court said that "(t)here is no reason in law
why the heirs of the deceased wife may not form a partnership with the surviving husband for the
management and control of the community property of the marriage and conceivably such a
partnership, or rather community of property, between the heirs and the surviving husband might
be formed without a written agreement." In Prades vs. Tecson, 49 Phil. 230, the Supreme Court
held that "(a)lthough, when the wife dies, the surviving husband, as administrator of the
community property, has authority to sell the property withut the concurrence of the children of
the marriage, nevertheless this power can be waived in favor of the children, with the result of
bringing about a conventional ownership in common between the father and children as to such
property; and any one purchasing with knowledge of the changed status of the property will
acquire only the undivided interest of those members of the family who join in the act of
conveyance.
It is also not disputed that immediately after the execution of the sale in 1952, the vendees
constructed their house on the eastern part of Lot 1496 which the vendor pointed out to them as
the area sold, and two weeks thereafter, Rafael who is a son of the vendees, also built his house
within Lot 1496. Subsequently, a cemented piggery coral was constructed by the vendees at the
back of their house about one and one-half meters from the eastern boundary of Lot 1496. Both
vendor and vendees believed all the time that the area of 781 sq. meters subject of the sale was
Lot No. 1495 which according to its title (T.C.T. No. 14570) contains an area of 781 sq. meters so
that the deed of sale between the parties Identified and described the land sold as Lot 1495. But
actually, as verified later by a surveyor upon agreement of the parties during the proceedings of
the case below, the area sold was within Lot 1496.
Again, there is no dispute that the houses of the spouses Cornelio Pamplona and Apolonia Onte as
well as that of their son Rafael Pamplona, including the concrete piggery coral adjacent thereto,
stood on the land from 1952 up to the filing of the complaint by the private respondents on July 25,
1961, or a period of over nine (9) years. And during said period, the private respondents who are
the heirs of Monica Maniega as well as of Flaviano Moreto who also died intestate on August 12,
1956, lived as neighbors to the petitioner-vendees, yet lifted no finger to question the occupation,
possession and ownership of the land purchased by the Pamplonas, so that We are persuaded and
convinced to rule that private respondents are in estoppel by laches to claim half of the property,
in dispute as null and void. Estoppel by laches is a rule of equity which bars a claimant from
presenting his claim when, by reason of abandonment and negligence, he allowed a long time to
elapse without presenting the same. (International Banking Corporation vs. Yared, 59 Phil. 92)
We have ruled that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal partnership was already dissolved
six years before and therefore, the estate became a co-ownership between Flaviano Moreto, the
surviving husband, and the heirs of his deceased wife, Monica Maniega. Article 493 of the New Civil
Code is applicable and it provides a follows:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage
it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal
rights are involve. But the efect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to
the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
We agree with the petitioner that there was a partial partition of the co-ownership when at the
time of the sale Flaviano Moreto pointed out the area and location of the 781 sq. meters sold by
him to the petitioners-vendees on which the latter built their house and also that whereon Rafael,
the son of petitioners likewise erected his house and an adjacent coral for piggery.
Petitioners point to the fact that spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega owned three parcels
of land denominated as Lot 1495 having an area of 781 sq. meters, Lot 1496 with an area of 1,021
sq. meters, and Lot 4545 with an area of 544 sq. meters. The three lots have a total area of 2,346
sq. meters. These three parcels of lots are contiguous with one another as each is bounded on one
side by the other, thus: Lot 4545 is bounded on the northeast by Lot 1495 and on the southeast by
Lot 1496. Lot 1495 is bounded on the west by Lot 4545. Lot 1496 is bounded on the west by Lot
4545. It is therefore, clear that the three lots constitute one big land. They are not separate
properties located in diferent places but they abut each other. This is not disputed by private
respondents. Hence, at the time of the sale, the co-ownership constituted or covered these three
lots adjacent to each other. And since Flaviano Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the
entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters as his share, he had a perfect legal and lawful right to dispose
of 781 sq. meters of his share to the Pamplona spouses. Indeed, there was still a remainder of
some 392 sq. meters belonging to him at the time of the sale.
We reject respondent Court's ruling that the sale was valid as to one-half and invalid as to the
other half for the very simple reason that Flaviano Moreto, the vendor, had the legal right to more
than 781 sq. meters of the communal estate, a title which he could dispose, alienate in favor of the
vendees-petitioners. The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner as
vendor pointed out its location and even indicated the boundaries over which the fences were to
be erectd without objection, protest or complaint by the other co-owners, on the contrary they
acquiesced and tolerated such alienation, occupation and possession, We rule that a factual
partition or termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was created, and barred not only the
vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private respondents herein from asserting as
against the vendees-petitioners any right or title in derogation of the deed of sale executed by said
vendor Flaiano Moreto.
Equity commands that the private respondents, the successors of both the deceased spouses,
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega be not allowed to impugn the sale executed by Flaviano
Moreto who indisputably received the consideration of P900.00 and which he, including his
children, benefitted from the same. Moreover, as the heirs of both Monica Maniega and Flaviano
Moreto, private respondents are duty-bound to comply with the provisions of Articles 1458 and
1495, Civil Code, which is the obligation of the vendor of the property of delivering and transfering
the ownership of the whole property sold, which is transmitted on his death to his heirs, the herein
private respondents. The articles cited provide, thus:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself
to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other part
to pay therefore a price certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditionial.
Art. 1495. The vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver, as well as
warrant the thing which is the object of the sale.
Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents received from their
deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the property rights and obligations
which were not extinguished by their parents' death. And under Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New Civil
Code, the contract of sale executed by the deceased Flaviano Moreto took efect between the
parties, their assigns and heirs, who are the private respondents herein. Accordingly, to the private
respondents is transmitted the obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole area of 781 sq.
meters to the petitioners (which was the original obligation of their predecessor Flaviano Moreto)
and not only one-half thereof. Private respondents must comply with said obligation.
The records reveal that the area of 781 sq. meters sold to and occupied by petitioners for more
than 9 years already as of the filing of the complaint in 1961 had been re-surveyed by private land
surveyor Daniel Aranas. Petitioners are entitled to a segregation of the area from Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-9843 covering Lot 1496 and they are also entitled to the issuance of a new
Transfer Certificate of Title in their name based on the relocation survey.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification in the sense that the sale made and executed by Flaviano Moreto in favor of the
petitioners-vendees is hereby declared legal and valid in its entirely.
Petitioners are hereby declared owners in full ownership of the 781 sq. meters at the eastern
portion of Lot 1496 now occupied by said petitioners and whereon their houses and piggery coral
stand.
The Register of Deeds of Laguna is hereby ordered to segregate the area of 781 sq. meters from
Certificate of Title No. 9843 and to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title to the petitioners
covering the segregated area of 781 sq. meters. No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25014 October 17, 1973
VDA. DE CASTRO vs. ATIENZA
The Court rejects petitioners' appeal as without merit and affirms the judgment of the appellate
court. Petitioners' predecessor-in-interest as co-owner of an undivided one-half interest in the
fishpond could validly lease his interest to a third party, respondent Atienza, independently of his
co-owner (although said co-owner had also leased his other undivided one-half interest to the
same third party) and could likewise by mutual agreement independently cancel his lease
agreement with said third party. Said predecessor-in-interest (and petitioners who have substituted
him as his heirs) therefore stands liable on his express undertaking to refund the advance rental
paid to him by the lessee on the cancelled lease and cannot invoke the non-cancellation of the co-
owner's lease to elude such liability.
The Court of Appeals, in its decision affirming in toto the judgment of the Manila court of first
instance ordering therein defendant-appellant Arsenio de Castro, Sr. (now deceased and
substituted by above-named petitioners as his heirs) "to return to the plaintif (respondent)
Gregorio Atienza the sum P2,500.00 with legal interest from the date of the filing of complaint until
fully paid plus the sum of P250.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of the suit", found the following
facts to undisputed:
On January 24, 1956 the brothers Tomas de Castro and Arsenio de Castro, Sr.
leased to plaintif a fishpond containing an area of 26 hectares situated in Polo,
Bulacan and forming part of a bigger parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 196450 of the registry of the property of Bulacan. The lessors are co-
owners in equal shares of the leased property.
According to the contract of lease (Exh. 1) the term of the lease was for five years
from January 24, 1956 at a rental of P5,000 a year, the first year's rental to be paid
on February 1, 1956, the second on February 1, 1957 and the rental for the last
three years on February 1, 1958. The first year's rental was paid on time.
In the meantime, Tomas de Castro died.
In the month of November, 1956, plaintif as lessee and defendant Arsenio de
Castro, Sr. as one of the lessors, agreed to set aside and annul the contract of
lease and for this purpose an agreement (Exh. A) was signed by them, Exhibit A as
signed by plaintif and defendant shows that Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro, widow of
Tomas de Castro, was intended to be made a party thereof in her capacity as
representative of the heirs of Tomas Castro.
Condition No. 2 of Exhibit A reads as follows:
"2. Na sa pamamagitan nito ay pinawawalang kabuluhan namin ang nasabing
kasulatan at nagkasundo kami na ang bawat isa sa amin ni Arsenio de Castro at
Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro ay isauli kay GREGORIO ATIENZA ang tig P2,500.00 o
kabuuang halagang P5,000.00 na paunang naibigay nito alinsunod sa nasabing
kasulatan; na ang nasabing tig P2,500.00 ay isasauli ng bawat isa sa amin sa o
bago dumating ang Dec. 30, 1956."
Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro refused to sign Exhibit A. Defendant did not pay the
P2,500.00 which under the above-quoted paragraph of Exhibit A, he should have
paid on December 30, 1956. Demand for payment was made by plaintif's counsel
on January 7, 1957 but to no avail, hence the present action.
On the conflicting contentions between the parties as to who between them would attend to
securing the signature of Mrs. Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro (widow of Tomas de Castro) to the
agreement of cancellation of the lease with respondent Atienza, the appellate court found that "the
testimony of the defendant (Arsenio de Castro, Sr.) ... supports the contention of the plaintif
(Atienza) "that it was the defendant Arsenio who was interested and undertook to do so, citing
Arsenio's own declaration that "I agreed to sign this document (referring to the cancellation)
because of my desire to cancel our original agreement" and that his purpose in obtaining the
cancellation of said lease agreement with plaintif Atienza was "(B)ecause I had the intention of
having said fishpond leased to other persons and I cannot lease it to third parties unless I can
secure the signature of Felisa Vda. de Castro."
The appellate court thus held in efect that as Arsenio "was the one interested in cancelling the
lease (Exh. 1), it stands to reason that he most probably undertook to obtain the signature of Mrs.
Castro [widow and successor-in-interest of his brother Tomas]" and that he could not invoke his
own failure to obtain such signature to elude his own undertaking and liability to refund respondent
(plaintif) his share of the rental paid in advance by respondent on the cancelled lease in the sum
of P2,500.00.
The appellate court furthermore correctly held that the consent or concurrence of Felisa Vda. de
Castro (as co-owner in succession of Tomas) was not an essential condition to the validity and
efectivity of the agreement of cancellation of the lease (Exhibit A) as between Arsenio and
respondent-lessee, contrary to petitioners' claim, holding that "(S)ince there is no specific provision
in Exhibit A supporting defendant's claim, we are not prepared to supply such condition unless the
same can be deduced from other evidence or unless the terms of Exhibit A cannot be performed by
plaintif and defendant without Mrs. Castro being bound as a party thereto."
The issue is simply reduced to whether Arsenio as co-owner of the fishpond owned pro-indiviso by
him with his brother Tomas (succeeded by Felisa Vda. de Castro) could validly lease his half-
interest to a third party (respondent Atienza) independently of his
co-owner, and in case his co-owner also leased his other half interest to the same third party,
whether Arsenio could cancel his own lease agreement with said third party?
The appellate court correctly resolved the issue thus: "Our view of the contract of lease Exhibit 1 is
that each of the Castro brothers, leased his undivided one-half interest in the fishpond they owned
in common to the plaintif. Could one of them have validly leased his interest without the other co-
owner leasing his own? The answer to this is given by appellant in his own brief (p. 14) when he
said that it would result in a partnership between the lessee and the owner of the other undivided
half. If the lease could be entered into partially by one of the co-owners, insofar as his interest is
concerned, then the lease, Exhibit 1, can also be cancelled partially as between plaintif and
defendant. Therefore, we conclude that the consent of Mrs. Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro is not
essential for the cancellation of the lease of defendant's one-half undivided share in the fishpond
to plaintif."
The appellate court's judgment is fully supported by the Civil Code provisions on the rights and
prerogatives of co-owners, and specifically by Article 493 which expressly provides that
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefitspertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage
it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal
rights are involved. But the efect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to
the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be alloted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership. *
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed with costs against petitioners.
G.R. No. 137152 January 29, 2001
CITY OF MANDALUYONG vs. AGUILAR
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Orders dated September 17,
1998 and December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig City 1 dismissing the
petitioner's Amended Complaint in SCA No. 1427 for expropriation of two (2) parcels of land in
Mandaluyong City. 1wphi1.nt
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On August 4, 1997, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig City a complaint
for expropriation entitled "City of Mandaluyong, plaintiff v. Antonio N., Francisco N, Thelma N,
Eusebio N, Rodolfo N., all surnamed Aguilar, defendants." Petitioner sought to expropriate three (3)
adjoining parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,847 square meters registered under Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 59780, 63766 and 63767 in the names of the defendants, herein
respondents, located at 9 de Febrero Street, Barangay Mauwag, City of Mandaluyong; on a portion
of the 3 lots, respondents constructed residential houses several decades ago which they had
since leased out to tenants until the present; on the vacant portion of the lots, other families
constructed residential structures which they likewise occupied; in 1983, the lots were classified by
Resolution No. 125 of the Board of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council as an
Area for Priority Development for urban land reform under Proclamation Nos. 1967 and 2284 of
then President Marcos; as a result of this classification, the tenants and occupants of the lots
ofered to purchase the land from respondents, but the latter refused to sell; on November 7, 1996,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of petitioner, upon petition of the Kapitbisig, an association of
tenants and occupants of the subject land, adopted Resolution No. 516, Series of 1996 authorizing
Mayor Benjamin Abalos of the City of Mandaluyong to initiate action for the expropriation of the
subject lots and construction of a medium-rise condominium for qualified occupants of the land; on
January 10, 1996, Mayor Abalos sent a letter to respondents ofering to purchase the said property
at P3,000.00 per square meter; respondents did not answer the letter. Petitioner thus prayed for
the expropriation of the said lots and the fixing of just compensation at the fair market value of
P3,000.00 per square meter.2
In their answer, respondents, except Eusebio N. Aguilar who died in 1995, denied having received
a copy of Mayor Abalos' ofer to purchase their lots. They alleged that the expropriation of their
land is arbitrary and capricious, and is not for a public purpose; the subject lots are their only real
property and are too small for expropriation, while petitioner has several properties inventoried for
socialized housing; the fair market value of P3,000.00 per square meter is arbitrary because the
zonal valuation set by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square meter. As
counterclaim, respondents prayed for damages of P21 million. 3
Respondents filed a "Motion for Preliminary Hearing" claiming that the defenses alleged in their
Answer are valid grounds for dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendants and lack of cause of action. Respondents prayed that the affirmative defenses be
set for preliminary hearing and that the complaint be dismissed. 4 Petitioner replied.
On November 5, 1997, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint and named as an additional
defendant Virginia N. Aguilar and, at the same time, substituted Eusebio Aguilar with his heirs.
Petitioner also excluded from expropriation TCT No. 59870 and thereby reduced the area sought to
be expropriated from three (3) parcels of land to two (2) parcels totalling 1,636 square meters
under TCT Nos. 63766 and 63767.5
The Amended Complaint was admitted by the trial court on December 18, 1997. Respondents,
who, with the exception of Virginia Aguilar and the Heirs of Eusebio Aguilar had yet to be served
with summons and copies of the Amended Complaint, filed a "Manifestation and Motion" adopting
their "Answer with Counterclaim" and "Motion for Preliminary Hearing" as their answer to the
Amended Complaint.6
The motion was granted. At the hearing of February 25, 1998, respondents presented Antonio
Aguilar who testified and identified several documentary evidence. Petitioner did not present any
evidence. Thereafter, both parties filed their respective memoranda. 7
On September 17, 1998, the trial court issued an order dismissing the Amended Complaint after
declaring respondents as "small property owners" whose land is exempt from expropriation under
Republic Act No. 7279. The court also found that the expropriation was not for a public purpose for
petitioner's failure to present any evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the expropriation are
landless and homeless residents of Mandaluyong. The court thus disposed of as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Amended Complaint is hereby ordered dismissed without
pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED."8
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 29, 1998, the court denied the motion. Hence
this petition.
Petitioner claims that the trial court erred
"IN UPHOLDING RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT THEY QUALIFY AS SMALL PROPERTY
OWNERS AND ARE THUS EXEMPT FROM EXPROPRIATION."9
Petitioner mainly claims that the size of the lots in litigation does not exempt the same from
expropriation in view of the fact that the said lots have been declared to be within the Area for
Priority Development (APD) No. 5 of Mandaluyong by virtue of Proclamation No. 1967, as amended
by Proclamation No. 2284 in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1517. 10 This declaration allegedly
authorizes petitioner to expropriate the property, ipso facto, regardless of the area of the land.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1517, the Urban Land Reform Act, was issued by then President
Marcos in 1978. The decree adopted as a State policy the liberation of human communities from
blight, congestion and hazard, and promotion of their development and modernization, the
optimum use of land as a national resource for public welfare. 11 Pursuant to this law, Proclamation
No. 1893 was issued in 1979 declaring the entire Metro Manila as Urban Land Reform Zone for
purposes of urban land reform. This was amended in 1980 by Proclamation No. 1967 and in 1983
by Proclamation No. 2284 which identified and specified 245 sites in Metro Manila as Areas for
Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones.
In 1992, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act No. 7279, the "Urban Development
and Housing Act of 1992." The law lays down as a policy that the state, in cooperation with the
private sector, undertake a comprehensive and continuing Urban Development and Housing
Program; uplift the conditions of the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban, areas and
resettlement areas by making available to them decent housing at afordable cost, basic services
and employment opportunities and provide for the rational use and development of urban land to
bring about, among others, equitable utilization of residential lands; encourage more efective
people's participation in the urban development process and improve the capability of local
government units in undertaking urban development and housing programs and
projects.12 Towards this end, all city and municipal governments are mandated to conduct
an inventory of all lands and improvements within their respective localities, and in coordination
with the National Housing Authority, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, the National
Mapping Resource Information Authority, and the Land Management Bureau,identify lands for
socialized housing and resettlement areas for the immediate and future needs of the
underprivileged and homeless in the urban areas, acquire the lands, and dispose of said lands to
the beneficiaries of the program.13
The acquisition of lands for socialized housing is governed by several provisions in the law. Section
9 of R.A. 7279 provides:
"Sec. 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. Lands for socialized housing shall be
acquired in the following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement
Program sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have
not yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS Sites which have
not yet been acquired;
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the
beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government
units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of government lands."
Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order: (1) government lands; (2)
alienable lands of the public domain; (3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within
the declared Areas for Priority Development (APD), Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum
Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired; (5) BLISS sites which
have not yet been acquired; and (6) privately-owned lands.
There is no dispute that the two lots in litigation are privately-owned and therefore last in the order
of priority acquisition. However, the law also provides that lands within the declared APD's which
have not yet been acquired by the government are fourth in the order of priority. According to
petitioner, since the subject lots lie within the declared APD, this fact mandates that the lots be
given priority in acquisition. 14
Section 9, however, is not a single provision that can be read separate from the other provisions of
the law. It must be read together with Section 10 of R.A. 7279 which also provides:
"Section 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of
this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly
or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture agreement,
negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be
resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided,
further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small
property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: Provided, finally, That
abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be reverted and escheated to the State in a
proceeding analogous to the procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court. 15
For the purposes of socialized housing, government-owned and foreclosed properties shall
be acquired by the local government units, or by the National Housing Authority primarily
through negotiated purchase:Provided, That qualified beneficiaries who are actual
occupants of the land shall be given the right of first refusal."
Lands for socialized housing under R.A. 7279 are to be acquired in several modes. Among these
modes are the following: (1) community mortgage; (2) land swapping, (3) land assembly or
consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation to the government; (6) joint venture agreement; (7)
negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation. The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions:
(a) it shall be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; (b)
parcels of land owned by small property owners are exempt from such acquisition.
Section 9 of R.A. 7279 speaks of priorities in the acquisition of lands. It enumerates the type of
lands to be acquired and the heirarchy in their acquisition. Section 10 deals with the modes of
land acquisition or the process of acquiring lands for socialized housing. These are two diferent
things. They mean that the type of lands that may be acquired in the order of priority in
Section 9 are to be acquired only in the modes authorized under Section 10. The
acquisition of the lands in the priority list must be made subject to the modes and conditions set
forth in the next provision. In other words, land that lies within the APD, such as in the instant case,
may be acquired only in the modes under, and subject to the conditions of, Section 10.
Petitioner claims that it had faithfully observed the diferent modes of land acquisition for
socialized housing under R.A. 7279 and adhered to the priorities in the acquisition for socialized
housing under said law. 16 It, however, did not state with particularity whether it exhausted the
other modes of acquisition in Section 9 of the law before it decided to expropriate the subject lots.
The law states "expropriation shall be resorted to when other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted." Petitioner alleged only one mode of acquisition, i.e., by negotiated purchase.
Petitioner, through the City Mayor, tried to purchase the lots from respondents but the latter
refused to sell.17 As to the other modes of acquisition, no mention has been made. Not even
Resolution No. 516, Series of 1996 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod authorizing the Mayor of
Mandaluyong to efect the expropriation of the subject property states whether the city
government tried to acquire the same by community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or
consolidation, land banking, donation to the government, or joint venture agreement under Section
9 of the law.
Section 9 also exempts from expropriation parcels of land owned by small property
owners.18 Petitioner argues that the exercise of the power of eminent domain is not anymore
conditioned on the size of the land sought to be expropriated. 19 By the expanded notion of public
use, present jurisprudence has established the concept that expropriation is not anymore confined
to the vast tracts of land and landed estates, but also covers small parcels of land. 20 That only a
few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not diminish its public use
character.21 It simply is not possible to provide, in one instance, land and shelter for all who need
them.22
While we adhere to the expanded notion of public use, the passage of R.A. No. 7279, the "Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992" introduced a limitation on the size of the land sought to be
expropriated for socialized housing. The law expressly exempted "small property owners" from
expropriation of their land for urban land reform. R.A. No. 7279 originated as Senate Bill No. 234
authored by Senator Joey Lina23 and House Bill No. 34310. Senate Bill No. 234 then provided that
one of those lands not covered by the urban land reform and housing program was "land actually
used by small property owners within the just and equitable retention limit as provided under this
Act."24 "Small property owners" were defined in Senate Bill No. 234 as:
"4. Small Property Owners are those whose rights are protected under Section 9, Article
XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines, who own small parcels of land within the fair and
 just retention limit provided under this Act and which are adequate to meet the reasonable
needs of the small property owner's family and their means of livelihood. 25
The exemption from expropriation of lands of small-property owners was never questioned on the
Senate floor.26This exemption, although with a modified definition, was actually retained in the
consolidation of Senate Bill No. 234 and House Bill No. 34310 which became R.A. No. 7279. 27
The question now is whether respondents qualify as "small property owners" as defined in Section
3 (q) of R.A. 7279. Section 3 (q) provides:
"Section 3 x x x (q). "Small property owners" refers to those whose only real property
consists of residential lands not exceeding three hundred square meters (300 sq.m.) in
highly urbanized cities and eight hundred square meters (800 sq.m.) in other urban areas."
"Small-property owners" are defined by two elements: (1) those owners of real property whose
property consists of residential lands with an area of not more than 300 square meters in highly
urbanized cities and 800 square meters in other urban areas; and (2) that they do not own real
property other than the same.
The case at bar involves two (2) residential lots in Mandaluyong City, a highly urbanized city. The
lot under TCT No. 63766 is 687 square meters in area and the second under TCT No. 63767 is 949
square meters, both totalling 1,636 square meters in area. TCT No. 63766 was issued in the names
of herein five (5) respondents, viz:
"FRANCISCO N. AGUILAR, widower; THELMA N. AGUILAR, single; EUSEBIO N. AGUILAR, JR.,
widower; RODOLFO N. AGUILAR, single and ANTONIO N. AGUILAR, married to Teresita Puig;
all of legal age, Filipinos."28
TCT No. 63767 was issued in the names of the five (5) respondents plus Virginia Aguilar, thus:
"FRANCISCO N. AGUILAR, widower; THELMA N. AGUILAR, single; EUSEBIO N. AGUILAR, JR.,
widower; RODOLFO N. AGUILAR, single and ANTONIO N. AGUILAR, married to Teresita Puig;
and VIRGINIA N. AGUILAR, single, all of legal age, Filipinos." 29
Respondent Antonio Aguilar testified that he and the other registered owners are all siblings who
inherited the subject property by intestate succession from their parents. 30 Their father died in
1945 and their mother in 1976. 31 Both TCT's were issued in the siblings' names on September 2,
1987.31 In 1986, however, the siblings agreed to extrajudicially partition the lots among
themselves, but no action was taken by them to this end. It was only eleven (11) years later, on
November 28, 1997 that a survey of the two lots was made 33 and on February 10, 1998, a
consolidation subdivision plan was approved by the Lands Management Service of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources. 34 The co-owners signed a Partition Agreement on February
24, 199835 and on May 21, 1998, TCT Nos. 63766 and 63767 were cancelled and new titles issued
in the names of the individual owners pursuant to the Partition Agreement.
Petitioner argues that the consolidation of the subject lots and their partition was made more than
six (6) months after the complaint for expropriation was filed on August 4, 1997, hence, the
partition was made in bad faith, for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of R.A. 7279. 36
At the time of filing of the complaint for expropriation, the lots subject of this case were owned in
common by respondents; Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right
belongs to diferent persons.37During the existence of the co-ownership, no individual can claim
title to any definite portion of the community property until the partition thereof; and prior to the
partition, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire
land or thing.38 Article 493 of the Civil Code however provides that:
"Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But
the efect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-
ownership.39
Before partition in a co-ownership, every co-owner has the absolute ownership of his undivided
interest in the common property. The co-owner is free to alienate, assign or mortgage his interest,
except as to purely personal rights. 40 He may also validly lease his undivided interest to a third
party independently of the other co-owners. 41The efect of any such transfer is limited to the
portion which may be awarded to him upon the partition of the property. 42
Article 493 therefore gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell
and dispose of his undivided interest. 43 The co-owner, however, has no right to sell or alienate a
concrete specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because his right over the
thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication. 44 If the co-owner
sells a concrete portion, this, nonetheless, does not render the sale void. Such a sale afects only
his own share, subject to the results of the partition but not those of the other co-owners who did
not consent to the sale.45
In the instant case, the titles to the subject lots were issued in respondents' names as co-owners in
1987ten (10) years before the expropriation case was filed in 1997. As co-owners, all that the
respondents had was an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the lots. This, however,
did not mean that they could not separately exercise any rights over the lots. Each respondent had
the full ownership of his undivided interest in the property. He could freely sell or dispose of his
interest independently of the other co-owners. And this interest could have even been attached by
his creditors.46 The partition in 1998, six (6) months after the filing of the expropriation case,
terminated the co-ownership by converting into certain and definite parts the respective undivided
shares of the co-owners.47 The subject property is not a thing essentially indivisible. The rights of
the co-owners to have the property partitioned and their share in the same delivered to them
cannot be questioned for "[n]o co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership." 48 The
partition was merely a necessary incident of the co-ownership; 49 and absent any evidence to the
contrary, this partition is presumed to have been done in good faith.
Upon partition, four (4) co-owners, namely, Francisco, Thelma, Rodolfo and Antonio Aguilar each
had a share of 300 square meters under TCT Nos. 13849, 13852, 13850, 13851. 50 Eusebio Aguilar's
share was 347 square meters under TCT No. 13853 51 while Virginia Aguilar's was 89 square meters
under TCT No. 13854.52
It is noted that Virginia Aguilar, although granted 89 square meters only of the subject lots, is, at
the same time, the sole registered owner of TCT No. 59780, one of the three (3)
titles initially sought to be expropriated in the original complaint. TCT No. 59780, with a land area
of 211 square meters, was dropped in the amended complaint. Eusebio Aguilar was granted 347
square meters, which is 47 square meters more than the maximum of 300 square meters set by
R.A. 7279 for small property owners. In TCT No. 13853, Eusebio's title, however, appears the
following annotation:
"... subject to x x x, and to the prov. of Sec. 4 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court with respect to
the inheritance left by the deceased Eusebio N. Aguilar."53
Eusebio died on March 23, 1995, 54 and, according to Antonio's testimony, the former was survived
by five (5) children.55 Where there are several co-owners, and some of them die, the heirs of those
who die, with respect to that part belonging to the deceased, become also co-owners of the
property together with those who survive. 56After Eusebio died, his five heirs became co-owners of
his 347 square-meter portion. Dividing the 347 square meters among the five entitled each heir to
69.4 square meters of the land subject of litigation.
Consequently, the share of each co-owner did not exceed the 300 square meter limit set in R.A.
7279. The second question, however, is whether the subject property is the only real property of
respondents for them to comply with the second requisite for small property owners.
Antonio Aguilar testified that he and most of the original co-owners do not reside on the subject
property but in their ancestral home in Paco, Manila. 57 Respondents therefore appear to own real
property other than the lots in litigation. Nonetheless, the records do not show that the ancestral
home in Paco, Manila and the land on which it stands are owned by respondents or anyone of
them. Petitioner did not present any title or proof of this fact despite Antonio Aguilar's testimony.
On the other hand, respondents claim that the subject lots are their only real property 58 and that
they, particularly two of the five heirs of Eusebio Aguilar, are merely renting their houses and
therefore do not own any other real property in Metro Manila. 59 To prove this, they submitted
certifications from the offices of the City and Municipal Assessors in Metro Manila attesting to the
fact that they have no registered real property declared for taxation purposes in the respective
cities. Respondents were certified by the City Assessor of Manila; 60 Quezon City;61Makati
City;62 Pasay City;63 Paranaque;64 Caloocan City;65 Pasig City;66 Muntinlupa;67 Marikina;68 and the
then municipality of Las Pias69 and the municipality of San Juan del Monte 70 as having no real
property registered for taxation in their individual names.1wphi1.nt
Finally, this court notes that the subject lots are now in the possession of respondents. Antonio
Aguilar testified that he and the other co-owners filed ejectment cases against the occupants of
the land before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Mandaluyong, Branches 59 and 60. Orders of eviction
were issued and executed on September 17, 1997 which resulted in the eviction of the tenants and
other occupants from the land in question.71
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the orders dated September 17. 1998 and
December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig City in SCA No. 1427
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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