Corsican Constitution

The Corsican Constitution of Pasquale Paoli (1755-1769)
Author(s): Dorothy Carrington

Source: The English Historical Review, Vol. 88, No. 348 (Jul., 1973), pp. 481-503
Published by: Oxford University Press
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The English Historical Review
No. CCCXLVIII - July I973
The Corsican constitution of Pasquale Pao
17,Y YI769)
WHEN the Corsicans, in the twenty-ffth year of their rebellion
against Genoese colonial rule, elected Pasquale Paoli General of the
nation, they found a leader well qualified to consolidate their
independence. From I S, until France annexed the island in I 769,
he governed the greater part of Corsica as an autonomous state. It
was a very small state; yet his achievement earned him an inter-
national reputation. His admirers regarded his system as democratic;
for Boswell it was 'the best model that hath ever existed in the demo-
cratical form'. Voltaire expressed a more measured appreciation:
Paoli, he writes, did not claim the title of king, but he acted as such
in several respects, by 'placing himself at the head of a democratic
government'.'
What, exactly, was the character of Paoli's constitutional experi-
ment? The answer is to be found in the rich collection of contem-
porary documents in the Corsican archives, until now little exploited
by historians.2 The evidence there accumulated abundantly shows
that Paoli did in fact establish a form of representative government
very much in advance of its time. Indeed it incorporated a concept of
democracy that was not admitted in either of the constitutions
produced, in I787 and I789, by the American and French Revolu-
tions, more than three decades later: the election of members to the
i. James Boswell, An Account of Corsica. . . (London, I768), p. i6i (page references

are given from 2nd edition, I768). Voltaire, Prdcis du siecle de Louis XV, in chapter LX,
added to 2nd edition, 1769; see Oeuvres Compltes (Paris, 878), XV. 4I3.
2. A[rchives] D[epartementales de la] C[orse], Fonds Paoli and Serie F. Neglect of these
essential sources renders accounts of the constitution hitherto published incomplete.
The most detailed, Mathieu Fontana, La constitution du gdndralat de Pascal Paoli ...
(Paris, I907), uses only printed material; Peter Adam Thrasher's biography, Pasquale
Paoli ... (London, I970), oversimplifies the constitution; Fernand Ettori, author of 'La
Revolution de la Corse' in Histoire de la Corse, edited by Paul Arrighi (Toulouse, I97I),
pp. 307-68, is chiefly concerned with the salutary task of deflating exaggerated estimates
of the constitution made by earlier historians. Important secondary sources, hitherto
only partially exploited, are Paoli's letters, published in B[ulletin de la] S[ocitli des]
S[ciences] H[istoriques et] N[aturelles de la] C[orse], I88i-i93I, and by N. Tommaseo,
Lettere diPaoli (Florence, i 846); the chronicle of Ambrogio Rossi, a Corsican churchman
writing in the late eighteenth century, who reproduces many original documents in
extenso, 'Osservazioni storiche sopra la Corsica', I7 vols., of which I 3 are published in
BSSHNC between I 895 and I 906, and F. R. J. de Pommereul, Histoire de l'isle de Corse
(2 vols., Berne, I779), written with a critical sense which makes it a valuable complement
to Boswell's enthusiastic Account.... For the factual history of the rebellion see Ettori,
ubi supra, and for the period of the War of the Austrian Succession, Andre Le Glay,
Histoire de la conqu6te de la Corse par les Franfais ... (Paris, I 9I2).
Longman Group Ltd. and Contributors, I973

VOL. LXXXVIII-NO. CCCXLVIII R
482 THE CORSICAN CONSTITUTION OF July
Corsican legislature, during the greater part of Paoli's regime, was

by manhood suffrage. Study of the Corsican archives has been so
neglected that the recent discovery of the original constitutional
document came as a surprise. This document appears to be the earliest
of its kind. Written in good Italian, it runs to ten and a half manu-
script pages and is signed 'Pasquale Paoli'. The full text has remained
unpublished to this day. The preamble would surely have become
historic had it ever been known outside Corsica: 'The General Diet
of the People of Corsica, legitimately Master of itself, convoked
according to the form [established by] the General [Paoli] in the city
of Corte, the I6, 17, I8 November 1755. Having reconquered its
Liberty, wishing to give durable and constant form to its govern-
ment, reducing it to a constitution from which the Felicity of the
Nation will derive. [The Diet] has decreed and decrees. . . ." Here
we see a concentrated statement of some major doctrines of the
Enlightenment which must astonish in view of its early date. The
sovereignty of the people, 'legitimately master of itself', is un-
ambiguously declared seven years before the publication of
Rousseau's Du contrat social. The sovereign people creates a consti-
tution for its own well-being, a role which historians have hitherto
supposed was assumed for the first time by the people of the United
States.2 The concepts of liberty as a natural right (implicit in the
word 'reconquered'), of the happiness of the nation as the proper
aim of government, of the nation as the aggregate of the sovereign
people,3 are in line with the celebrated texts of the American and
French Revolutions: the American Declaration of Independence,
La D6claration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen.
How did it happen that the Corsicans, a notoriously poor, back-
ward people, were the first to proclaim and act upon these ideas? It
should be borne in mind that they were near enough to the Italy of
the Illuminismo to be in touch with contemporary developments of
European thought. Pasquale Paoli, for one, had been educated in
Naples, where his father, leader of the early phases of the rebellion,
i. 'La Dieta Generale del Populo di Corsica, Lecitimamente Patrone di se medesimo.

... Volendo, riaquistata la sua Liberta, dar forma durevole, e costante al suo governo
riducendoli a costituzione tale, che da essa ne derivi la felicita della Nazione . . .', ADC
Se'rie F; referred to in text as 'constitutional document' or 'document of Nov. 175 5'; the
source of all information on 'the constitution of Nov. I75 5' unless otherwise stated. The
main clauses of the constitution are given by Rossi, x, BSSHNC (nos. 237-40, 1900),
I36-4I, followed by Fontana, pp. I63-4, with a slightly different wording of the
preamble: 'La Dieta generale rappresentante il popolo di Corsica, unico patrone di se
medesimo. ...'
2. R. R. Palmer, in The Age of Democratic Revolution (2 vols., Princeton and Lo
I959), ii. 224, points to the promulgation of the constitution of the state of M
chusetts, I780, as the first occasion when a people acted as a 'constituent powe
3. The word 'nation' is here charged with its revolutionary significance, which d
the French Revolution became the rule; see J. Godechot, 'Nation, Patrie, et Patrio
en France au XVIIIe siecle', Annales Historiques de la Revolution Franfaise (Oct.-D
197I), pp. 48I-50I.
1973 PASQUALE PAOLI (I75 5-I769) 483
was living in exile. There he became a disciple of the Enlightenment,

so that when he returned to Corsica in I 7 5 5 in the hope of command-
ing the rebel movement he took with him the works of Montesquieu,
observing, in a letter to his father: 'These books are very necessary
in Corsica.'" The influence of De l'esprit des lois is certainly apparent
in his constitution, in the extent of the powers he reserved for him-
self as head of state, and in the separation of legislative and executive
into two distinct but interdependent bodies, operating in equilibrium.
Paoli however owed as much and more to Corsican political tradi-
tion. From this source were derived the principle features of his
constitution: A general (himself) with what might be described as a
presidential position; a national assembly (the Diet) partly elected by
manhood suffrage; an executive council nominated by the assembly.
Paoli's role was to reshape and co-ordinate institutions already tried
or existing in Corsica, 'reducing' them (to borrow the expression
used in the constitutional document) to a coherent and workable
system. His constitution issued from a convergence of the En-
lightenment, as represented by Montesquieu, and of Corsican
political traditions, rooted in the distant past, and significantly
developed during the national struggle of the preceding twenty-five
years.
Elective institutions had been known in the Corsican villages at
least since the Middle Ages. From the eleventh century there is
evidence of free rural communities, existing alongside the feudal
domains, which administered themselves according to what a
Corsican chronicler calls 'popular government', that is by elected
chiefs who acted as protectors and magistrates in return for a salary.
Numerous families in fact succeeded in joining the ranks of the feudal
nobility by making hereditary the privileges acquired by this means.2
In the conflict between the feudal and 'popular' systems the nobles
were however defeated. As early as I 3 5 8 they were deposed in the
northern half of the island by a popular revolution. To consolidate
this victory, the insurgents appealed to the Genoese Republic, which
was thus ennabled to take possession of Corsica. The Genoese
completed the task for which they had been summoned before the
end of the sixteenth century, by progressively dispossessing the
remaining seigneurial families, or depriving them of their preroga-
tives.3 The Corsicans had in fact exchanged feudal for colonial
i. Letter from Paoli written on Nov. I754, before he left Italy, in which he asks his
father to send him Montesquieu's Considdrations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains ...
and De 1'esprit des lois, quoted in Abbe Letteron, 'Pascal Paoli avant son elevation au
Generalat', BSSHNC (nos. 35 8-60, I9I3), p. 36.
2. See A. Casanova, 'Essai d'etude sur la seigneurie banale en Corse', E[iudes] C[orses]
(nos. I7, i8, 2I-24, I958-9), no. i8, pp. 5-23, and his principal source, 'Chronique de
Giovanni della Grossa', BSSHNC (nos. 85-90, I888), in particular pp. I25-33.
3. For the factual history of Corsica during the Genoese regime see Histoire ... ed.
Arrighi, loc. cit. and P. P. R. Colonna de Cesari Rocca, Histoire de la Corse. . . (Paris,
I 907).
domination. But while the Genoese regime was despotic, and ex-
cluded Corsicans from any significant role in the central administra-
tion, it did however leave local government in Corsican hands. The
300 or so rural communes, practically autonomous units, cotermin-
ous with the parishes, administered themselves through their
Podestats and 'Fathers of the Commune', elected every year in plenary
village assemblies. In continuance of very ancient usages, these
assemblies also organized the exploitation of the extensive common
lands, and various communal services, including a form of health
insurance. Every second year they elected representatives - procura-
tori - empowered to choose, in secondary elections, the councillors
known as the 'Noble Twelve' who assisted the Genoese govern-
ment in an advisory capacity.'
The decolonization movement of the eighteenth century was
favoured by the particular character of Corsican society. The people,
as a whole, had a long familiarity, on a local level, with the principles
of representative government and collective responsibility. Feudal
privileges had been virtually abolished; the nobility was impoverished
and powerless.2 Not that Corsican society was without inequalities,
even if they were considerably less marked than in mainland
Europe. During the past hundred years of peaceful Genoese rule a
new class of notables had emerged, in the rural districts as well as in
the towns. They owed their relative prosperity in a large measure to
the real encouragement given by the Genoese government to
Corsican agriculture; but they were among those who most resented
the colonial regime, for Genoa had also imposed trade monopolies
that severely restricted their profits on the sale and export of cereals.
In general the notables were not ill-educated; many had attended the
Italian universities, to qualify for careers in medicine, the Church,
the law. This intellectual elite provided the leaders of the national
rebellion; like the French Revolution it was directed by an ambitious,
frustrated middle class.3 Evidence of class conflict, such as caused
rifts within the French revolutionary movement, is however lacking.
i. For the organization of the rural communes see P. Lamotte, studies in EC (no. 9,
1956, pp. 33-62; no. I0, 1956, pp. 54-58); P. Emanuelli, Recherches sur la Terra di
Comune ... (Aix-en-Provence, I962). The best study of the Genoese administration is
still Andre Touranjon's introduction to Inventaire sommaires des archives departementales ...
(3 vols., Ajaccio, I906-3 5), vol. i. The 'Noble Twelve'-Nobili Dodeci-was a body of
eighteen members, twelve elected in the north-eastern area of the island, containing
about two-thirds of the population, known as Diqua dai monti, and six in the south-
western area, known as Dila dai monti, separated from the former by a mountain range,
and less populated and developed, although not inferior in size. The members of the
council held office in rotation. They were not necessarily of noble origin, but were
ennobled by their office. At intervals they chose an oratore to present requests to the
Senate in Genoa.
2. Only four families retained vestiges of feudal privileges, of which only one, the
Istria in Dila dai monti, possessed a domain of any importance. The three other small
domains were in Cap Corse.
3. See F. Pomponi, Essai sur les notables ruraux au XVIIe siecle, (Aix-en-Provence,
1962).
I973 PASQUALE PAOLI (I75 5-I769) 483
Though the Corsican rebellion was often split by family feuds and
disagreements as to policy, while certain areas gave it little support,
or none,1 it drew strength from the solidarity of the different cate-
gories of the population engaged in it. Priest and peasant, ruined
noble and rural notable, were united in their common hostility to the
colonial regime. The clergy, though numerous in proportion to the
population, were neither rich nor powerful enough to excite anti-
clerical feeling among a people little given to questioning the tenets
of its religion. From the beginning monks and priests backed the
rebellion, in which they distinguished themselves, through the years,
as ambassadors, publicists, parliamentarians, recruiting agents and
guerrilla commanders.
The rebellion erupted spontaneously in December I729, during
the collection of taxes following two bad harvests in succession. It
was initiated by the peasants; but they lost no time in choosing men
of influence, respected notables, as their leaders, designated as
Generals. Military success was rapid; in the first campaign the
Genoese lost control of the interior. They remained, thenceforth,
entrenched in six coastal cities, fortresses which they had built in
previous centuries and peopled, mainly, with their own nationals.
Fighting was none the less to drag on through the next forty years,
during which the Genoese failed to reassert an effective domination
over the rural areas, while the Corsicans failed to capture the coastal
towns. Both sides were assisted, at different times, by foreign
powers: the Genoese were aided by the Hapsburgs, I73I-2, and
then by France, intermittently, from I738 until in I768 they sold
their rights on Corsica to Louis XV; the Corsicans had the confusing
support of British, Sardinian and Hapsburg forces during the War of
the Austrian Succession. At intervals settlements between Genoese
and Corsicans were proposed, discussed, attempted, but without
ever resolving the conflict, in accordance with the now familiar
pattern of colonial wars.
At first the rebels were divided in their aims. While one group
boldly advocated the proclamation of an independent Corsican
republic, another merely hoped to extort concessions from the
Genoese. A third was in favour of securing foreign protection, even
at the cost of accepting some measure of domination from the pro-
tecting power.2 National consciousness developed under the shock
of repeated disappointments in regard to the foreign states: the
papacy and Spain refused the overlordship of the island offered by the
rebels in I73I-2, as did France in I738 and again ten years later;
i. The rebellion broke out, and was always best supported, in Diqua dai motmi, except
in Cap Corse, a small but prosperous peninsula in the north-east, which was freed from
Genoese control by Pasquale Paoli as late as 1762. Support of the rebellion in Dila dai
momti was intermittent and partial until 1763.
2. See Rossi, writing of the year 1731, vi, BSSHNC (nos. 202-5, I897), 84.
France was not prepared to supplant the Genoese until they them-
selves offered to cede their title to Corsica. As for Britain and
Sardinia, their interventions during the War of the Austrian Success-
ion were ineffectual; fortunately for the Corsicans, since their inten-
tion was to partition the island. In the meantime Genoa turned a
deaf ear to Corsican complaints. These were not inspired by any
revolutionary ideology: the rebels simply wanted reforms, in parti-
cular reform of the corrupt judicial system which actually encouraged
violence among a people much given to private feuds. Particular
grievances were also voiced: the nobles demanded restitution of
their ancient privileges, the notables, liberty of commerce, the clergy,
the right to accede to the five Corsican bishoprics, hitherto reserved
for Genoese citizens; the peasants clamoured for a reduction in
taxation.' Had these requests been granted in full, Corsican society
would have perhaps become more orderly and prosperous, and also,
certainly, more stratified. But Genoese intractability forced the rebels
to look for their salvation in the formation of an autonomous
republic. In the process, sectional ambitions were temporarily laid
aside, while the rebels collaborated in numerous attempts to establish
a national political organization, always primarily concerned with the
administration of justice. Paoli's constitution, egalitarian in style,
represents the culmination of this long series of experiments.
In spite of early divergences of opinion, the Generals of the
rebellion were already influential enough, by 30 January I 73I, tO
summon a national assembly, a consulta, and proclaim a 'provisional
system of government'. Composed of representatives of the parishes,
the assembly met at Corte, a small town in the mountainous centre
of the island. On 30 January I73 5 the system was re-enacted, without
significant changes. Three Generals were appointed Primates; one
was Giacinto Paoli, father of Pasquale. The system, of which they
were no doubt the authors, while making a show of associating the
people with the government, was in fact skilfully designed to leave
the Primates in unchallenged authority. They were to govern through
a Junta exercising both executive and legislative functions; its six
members, so it is stated, were to be elected; but elsewhere in the
relevant document it is said that the Primates had the right to
nominate them. The same anomaly applies to the General Diet,
which was to meet every third month, alternatively with the Junta.
It was to be composed of a procuratore elected in every parish; yet the
Primates were authorized to nominate its members. Subordinate to
the Junta were numerous executive officials, separated into special-
ized departments: they too were to be elected, but could also be
nominated by the Junta. Presumably elections took place, but could
i. See Rossi, vi. 43-48, 'Dimande in generale della Nazione. . .' presented 1730. The
demands of the different classes were invariably presented together. Attempts to reach
agreement with Genoa continued till 1750.
I973 PASQUALE PAOLI (I755-1769) 487
always be overruled by the Primates, or by the Junta, which they

controlled. The avowed purpose of this political organization was to
keep order in a country torn by private feuds; it was accordingly
accompanied by criminal legislation of an extreme severity.' Most of
the Corsican systems of government were to incorporate clauses of
this nature, including Paoli's constitution of I 7 5 5 .2
Undemocratic as was this first experiment in national self-govern-
ment, it was approved by consulte representing the Corsican people.
Such assemblies were not without precedent in Corsican history;
indeed they formed part of the indigenous political tradition which
no foreign ruler had been able to suppress. The earliest known took
place in I264, when a noble, temporarily master of the island, im-
posed what amounted to a rudimentary national constitution.3
Many were subsequently held, on a national or regional scale, in
times of rebellion or civil war, before the Genoese consolidated their
rule in the sixteenth century. Occasionally such assemblies were
summoned by the Genoese themselves. The leaders of the eighteenth-
century rebellion thus found to hand a traditional institution,
appropriate to the circumstances, which they revived and made full
use of. The consulte enabled them to secure indispensable confirma-
tion of the authority with which they had been invested by the
people, and to sound public opinion on national policy. Consulte
were summoned whenever decisions of importance had to be taken;
sometimes as often as three or four times in a year. As many as
seventy are recorded between the outbreak of the rebellion and the
accession of Pasquale Paoli, forty-four of them on a national scale.
Their membership was determined by custom, as interpreted in the
invitations of the war leaders who summoned them. The 'Fathers of
the Commune' were invariably invited, the Podestats on important
occasions, besides unspecified numbers of 'chiefs' and 'good
patriots'. Nor were these all. Often procuratori were called for, to
represent either each parish, or each of the pievi (the sixty-eight
ancient administrative units, each grouping several parishes).4 In the
parishes the procuratori were chosen, like the Podestats and 'Fathers
of the Commune', by the vote of the assembled adult males; in this
i. For the consulta of Jan. I73I see Rossi, vi. 83-90. This evidence is not admitted by
Ettori, ubi supra. The record of the consulta of I735 is published from a contemporary
document in Lamotte, 'La declaration de l'independence de la Corse', EC (no. 2, I954),
pp. 35-43.
2. Only about a quarter of the document recording Paoli's constitution (see n. i,
p. 482), concerns institutions; the rest is devoted to legal procedure and penal law.
3. Grossa, ubi supra, pp. i8i-2. Giudice della Rocca, author of this 'constitution',
decreed that chiefs and nobles should render him homage in a yearly assembly; that
appeals against judgments could be made to him personally, and that a yearly tax,
proportionate to revenue, should be paid, in the feudal domains half to him and half to
the seigneur, and in the free communities to him alone.
4. See Rossi, vi-x, BSSHNC (nos. 209-I3, I898; nos. 2I4-I7, I899; nos. 229-33,
237-40, I 900),passim. Thepievi, unequal in size, varied in number from c. 68 to 6o.
way the practice of selecting members for a national assembly by

manhood suffrage quite naturally found a place in Corsican political
life. Seeing that the territory controlled by the rebels contained some
305 patishes, each of which had its Podestat and two 'Fathers of the
Commune', a consulta might number well over a thousand members,
representing a population that can barely have exceeded 96,ooo.1
The consulte were responsible for the succession of constitutional
experiments that give so original and creative a character to the
Corsican rebellion. New forms of government were devised in rapid
succession to meet the changing military or political situation. Thus
in April I736, when the German adventurer Theodor von Neuhof
persuaded the rebels to crown him king in consideration of the
supplies he brought them, with the promise of more to come, he was
made to swear fidelity to a constitution that left him little real power.
Though he had a free hand in appointing his ministers, his govern-
ment was supervised by a Diet of twenty-four members elected to
represent the different areas of the country. Three of them were to be
constantly in attendance on the king, who could take no decisions
regarding war or taxation without their consent.2
Theodor's reign ended when he left the island in November of
that same year. It was followed by an intervention of French
troops allied with Genoa. In I739 the Corsicans were defeated and
their leaders sent into exile, including Giacinto Paoli, who retired to
Naples, taking with him his fourteen-year-old son, Pasquale. The
consulte, interrupted in I739, were nevertheless resumed after French
troops withdrew in I74I. From I743 a series of provisional govern-
ments was proclaimed, in which were incorporated institutions that
had already proved their workability in the rebel state. At a consulta
of I7-I9 March I 743, a regency was formed, designed to direct the
rebellion pending Theodor's return. Two Generals were appointed
joint heads of state, assisted by seven lieutenants and three judges for
civil cases. New criminal legislation was simultaneously enacted;
presumably it was enforced by the Generals, the judicial power
being assimilated, as in the past, with the military and executive
authority.3 On 29-30 August I745, Theodor being still absent, and
by now discredited, another collegiate type of government was
established, consisting of a President and two 'Protectors'.4 The
following year the two 'Protectors' and the President joined Count
Rivarola, then collaborating with the Anglo-Sardinian forces, as
i. Statistics derived from census made in I 740 during French occupation of Corsica,
Archives nationales (Paris), K I225. Out of a total population of I20,389, c. I3,000 were in
the six Genoese towns, and I0,366 in Cap Corse. Eight of the 333 parishes were in the
Genoese towns, and twenty in Cap Corse. After liberating Cap Corse Paoli controlled a
population of c. I07,000, in 325 parishes.
2. Consulta I5 Apr. I736; see Rossi, vii, BSSHNC (nos. 209-I 3, I898), I7I. Sixteen
members of the Diet represented Diqua dai monti, eight Dila ...
3. Rossi, viii. 247-8. 4. Rossi, viii. 309.
I973 PASQUALE PAOLI (I755-I769) 489
heads of state with the title of General. To relieve the Generals of

judicial duties, a Supreme Magistrature of twelve members was
appointed; they were to reside at Corte, four at a time, turn by turn,
together with one or other of the Generals.' This tribunal was not
without precedent; a Supreme Magistrature had been created as
early as I734,2 but apparently had a short life, like so many Corsican
institutions in this troubled period. It reappears after I746, under
different names and in varying forms, as a constant feature of
Corsican systems of government, including that of Paoli. Meanwhile
in April I747, another attempt was made to organize the nation by
the appointment of two Generals and two presidents, all of whom
had already held office as heads of state. They were to assume the
business of government turn by turn for periods of a month, and
were to be assisted by a council of twenty-four members, three at a
time, turn by turn, for periods of thirteen days. The councillors,
representing the different provinces, were nominated then and there
by the consulta that adopted this new system.3
Such governments tended to have less authority than the consulte
that brought them into being and usually designated their members.
During the I740S these national assemblies, which in the past had
served essentially as consultative bodies, increasingly asserted their
will. In I 746, shortly after the creation of the Supreme Magistrature,
another consulta, displeased with the Generals, decreed that they
should be subordinate to the magistrates.4 Most decisions imple-
mented by the heads of state emanated from the consulte: the consulte
of I746 fixed the amount of a hearth tax, decreed that Genoese
property should be confiscated for the benefit of the nation, that an
embassy be sent to the king of Sardinia, and that the magistrates
appoint two controllers of public revenue.5 The consulte had actually
come to fulfil the role of a national parliament more efficiently, and
much more continuously, than any of the timidly-designed diets and
councils included in the various systems of government. The arrange-
ment inevitably weighed against stability. There was no regular
machinery for renewing the membership of the governments
established by the consulte, nor for summoning the consulte themselves,
which remained outside the political structure of the nation while at
the same time creating it. Governments were short-lived, institutions
constantly modified, discarded, replaced; the rebel state operated by
improvisation. Yet no one, before Paoli, perceived the flaws in what
had become the customary mode of government: the confusion of
executive and judicial powers; the absence of an instituted legisla-
ture; the exclusion, from the regular government, of the most
I. Rossi, ix, BSSHNC (nos. 229-33, I900), 58.
2. Rossi, vii, BSSHNC (nos. 209-I 3, I 898), 95 -96.
3. Rossi, ix, 77-79. 4. Rossi, ix, 66-69.
5. Rossi, ix: hearth tax, 62; Genoese property, 58; embassy, 62, control of revenue,
66-67.
powerful and representative body in the country. When the system
known in Corsican history as 'Gaffori's constitution' was adopted in
October I752, no real break was made with the past; the 'con-
stitution' merely reproduced features of the preceding systems on a
more ambitious scale. It had been carefully prepared the year before,
being designed to take effect when French troops, occupying Corsica
since the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, were withdrawn, following
the Corsican rejection of a settlement with Genoa proposed by
France.
Gian' Pietro Gaffori, who had been at the head of the rebel
governments since I 745, was probably the author of the new system,
though he had no defined functions in it. The ruling authority was a
Supreme Council, a tribunal analogous to the Supreme Magistrature,
but much larger, for it was composed of seven presidents and no less
than 104 councillors. They were to hold office, in accordance with
the rotative system now familiar in Corsica, the presidents for periods
of a month, the councillors for periods of fifteen days. Their conduct
was to be scrutinized by a Junta of five sindicatori, a court of in-
quisition and appeal such as had existed under the Genoese regime.
A Council of State and a Council of Justice and War were instituted,
each of twelve members, both of which possessed executive as well
as judicial powers. The public revenue was entrusted to a Junta of
Finance of seven members. All the members of these various bodies
were elected by the consuilta that adopted the 'constitution'. For the
first time in a Corsican national government functionaries were
appointed to link the central administration with that of the
parishes.' The system collapsed after the assassination of Gaffori the
following year. A regency was promptly appointed of four members,
one of whom was Clemente Paoli, elder brother of Pasquale. It
was on his advice that Pasquale, then an officer in a Neapolitan
regiment, decided to present his candidature for the generalship of
the rebel state. But before he left Italy he proposed to the patriots
a provisional form of government. The system, adopted at a
consulta held on 2I-22 April, just after his return, has a certain
originality, and shows some appreciation of the principle of repre-
sentative government. Yet the preponderance of the judiciary,
characteristic of previous Corsican governments, is carried to an
extreme, for the nation was to be ruled by a magistrature that
accumulated all powers. The seventy-two members of this body
were to be elected in the different provinces, in numbers roughly
proportionate to the size and population of these areas, to form, in
each, a Provincial Magistrature. Twice a year they were all to
assemble at Corte to form the Supreme Magistrature, empowered to
deal with every aspect of government. Its resolutions, including
i. Published from a contemporary document in Lamotte, 'La formation du premier
gouvernement corse autonome', Corse Historique (no. 2, I95 3), pp. I2-23.
1973 PASQUALE PAOLI (I755-I769) 49I
legal judgments, would be decided by secret ballot. Resolutions

having the character of statutory laws required a two-thirds majority.
Only in negotiations with foreign powers could the authority of this
body be questioned: no decisions in such 'matters pertaining to the
state' could be taken without the consent of twelve assistants, styled
statisti, and the representatives of the pievi. The tribunal of the
sindicatori was maintained, with four members.'
Such was the government in force when Pasquale Paoli won a
difficult election as General of the Nation at a consulta held on 15
July I755. Only sixteen of the sixty-eight pievi were represented;
moreover a rival candidate was present, Emmanuele Matra, a
wealthy notable who after his disappointment lost no time in having
himself proclaimed General of the Nation, on I I August, at a consulta
composed of his own partisans.2 Paoli nevertheless went ahead to
summon a consulta at Corte in November of that same year; the
record of its proceedings forms the constitutional document already
quoted. To this consulta Paoli gave the title of General Diet, and by
this master-stroke transformed the structure and character of the
national government. According to the constitution the General
(that is, Paoli), had to summon the Diet once a year; in this way he
institutionalized the traditional consulta and promoted it to the status
of a national parliament. He also, in so doing, astutely protected
himself against Matra and other possible rivals; for since the Diet,
which had confirmed him in his office, was a body of state, any
consulta summoned by a private individual became irregular and
subversive. Only Paoli could lawfully summon any such assembly,
for the constitution not only imposed on him the duty of summoning
the Diet, but accorded him, as head of state, the right to summon
other assemblies - 'particular congresses' - on his sole initiative. The
creation of the Diet gave the Corsicans what can properly be termed
a constitution, as distinct from the precarious executive governments
of preceding years. The Diet was the most enlightened institution of
Paoli's regime. Inheriting the functions formerly exercised by the
consulte, it enacted laws, regulated taxation, and determined national
policy.3 But unlike the traditional consulte the Diet was independent
I. Dom. Ph. Marini, 'La Consulte de Caccia et l'Election de Pascal Paoli', BSSHNC
(nos. 352-4, I9I3), pp. 65-112. The consulta is ignored by Rossi. The system was
apparently that mentioned by Paoli in a letter to his father, 27 Oct. I754; see Letteron,
'Pascal Paoli...', ubi supra p. 32.
2. Rossi, x, BSSHNC (nos. 237-40, I900), Paoli's election, I23-6; Matra's consulta,
p. I28.
3. These essential functions are not mentioned in the constitutional document of
Nov. I755 (presumably because the Diet was automatically identified with the
traditional consulta) but are fully attested by contemporary evidence,including the records
of many sessions of the Diet, which are to be found in ADC, Rossi, and Tommaseo. The
constitutional document only specifies the powers of the Diet to censure Paoli after his
opening speech, and the other members of the executive through the Sindicato. The term
'Diet' is not used in subsequent contemporary documents; the assembly is referred to
as the Consul/a Generale.
of the executive power. Paoli had no seat in the assembly; he was

merely president of an executive council which the Diet appointed.
The Diet moreover, being the national legislature, had power to
modify the constitution of which, in theory, it was the author.
Paoli's role in shaping the constitution of November I755 is un-
questionable; yet in the relevant document the constitution is pre-
sented as emanating from the Diet, representing the sovereign
people. The Diet 'decreed' the establishment of the executive council,
the Council of State, 'conferred' on it supreme authority in political,
military and economic affairs. The Diet appointed Paoli 'chief and
director' of the Council and elected all its members. At first the
membership of this Council, following the lines of Gaffori's Supreme
Council was extremely large. Tbirty-six presidents and no fewer than
io8 councillors were divided in equal numbers between three
chambers, of finance, justice and war. The Council was required to
meet in full only twice a year; during the rest of the time it was
represented by Paoli and by one president and one councillor for
each chamber. The presidents held office, in rotation, for periods of a
month, the councillors for periods of ten days.
The underlying principle was presumably to give authority to a
large number of people, yet at the same time, by restricting their
terms of office, prevent any one of them from acquiring much
influence. On the other hand, according to the constitution of I75 5,
the members of the Council of State were elected for life. The
arrangement may have been designed to ensure the government's
stability, but had it continued it might well have created a ruling
group within the nation, likely to impose itself on the Diet as well as
on Paoli. The Diet was no doubt aware of this danger when it made
the Council of State the object of the first of numerous modifications
to the original constitution of I75 5. In I75 8 it reduced the Council to
eighteen members, elected for only six months, who had to reside in
Corte. According to Pommereul, a French officer who knew
Corsica during Paoli's regime, the Council was thereafter completely
dominated by Paoli. In I764 it was finally reduced to nine members,
elected for a year. They had to be over thirty-five years of age.'
Paoli's appointment was for life, but subject, always, to the
approval of the nation. His responsibility to the Diet was incorpor-
ated in the constitution of I75 5: every session was to be opened by a
speech from Paoli in which he would render account of his govern-
ment and 'await with submission the judgment of the people'. After
which he retired, and the executive was suspended for the duration
of the session.2 An unfavourable judgment could evidently lead to
i. See records of sessions of Diet, I4-I6 Sept. I75 8, Rossi, x. 248, and zz May-c. io
June I764, Tommaseo, p. 52.
2. From 1764 the suspension of the executive was marked by a ceremony: the
chancellor of the Council of State (a permanent official) gave the seal of the realm into
1973 PASQUALE PAOLI (I 7 5 5-I 769) 493
his deposition; although this is not stated in the constitutional

document it must have been understood, for in I764 the Diet made
provision for electing a new general if his post fell vacant by his
death or abdication or, significantly, 'in any other way'.' The con-
stitution was thus designed to ensure Paoli's dependence on the Diet.
On the other hand, as General of the Nation and permanent presi-
dent of the Council of State, he possessed a defined area of authority.
He had a double vote in the deliberations of the Council; in military
matters his voice was decisive.2 He was also personally entrusted
with conducting Corsica's relations with foreign states. This import-
ant function is not mentioned in the constitutional document of
November I 7 5 5. It had evidently been assumed when he was electe
general in July of that year, and at the same time delimited, for it was
decreed by the consulta of I 5 July that he could take no decisions i
foreign affairs - 'matters of state' - without the consent of the
representatives of the nation.3
In appropriating these particular powers Paoli may well have
envisaged himself as a constitutional regent, by analogy with the
monarch described by Montesquieu in his chapter on the English
constitution in De l'esprit des lois. According to Montesquieu the
executive ought to be in the hands of a monarch, and the control of
the army, and of foreign affairs ('things dependent on the law of
nations') belonged to the executive.4 But Montesquieu offered no
sanction whatever for Paoli's control of the judiciary through the
Chamber of Justice in the Council of State. The Chamber of Justice
was the supreme court in the nation, and alone could sentence to
death or banishment. But it was more than a tribunal, for according
to the constitutional document of I755 it also managed political
government. In admitting this clause Paoli was simply adhering to
the Corsican tradition which maintained that the administration of
justice was the predominant function of government. None the less
his failure to sever the judiciary from the executive must appear,
today, as a serious flaw in his constitution. In practice the Chamber
of Justice judged only the most serious crimes, and left other business
to various tribunals instituted between I 7 5 5 and I 763. The chief civil
court, which from I763 was also entrusted with criminal cases, was
the keeping of a chancellor elected by the Diet for the duration of the session;
Pommereul, ii. 2I0.
i. Tommaseo, p. 5 3.
2. Constitutional document, ADC Serie F.
3. The consulta of July I755 decreed that Paoli should be 'economic and political
chief' but could take no decisions in 'matter of state'-materia di stato-without the con-
sent of the representatives of the people; Rossi, x. I24. The meaning of materia di stato
would be obscure were it not that the record of the consulta of 2I-22 Apr. I75 5 leaves no
doubt whatever that the expression materie appartenenti allo stato meant relations with
foreign powers; Marini, ubi supra, p. 8 i.
4. Montesquieu, De l 'esprit des lois (2 vols., Paris, I96I), i. i68, I73, 163.
the Rota Civile, composed of three doctors in law nominated for life
by the Council.' Provincial Magistratures were progressively estab-
lished, able to judge minor criminal as well as cvil offences; they
also exercised certain executive functions in their districts.2 Minor
civil cases, throughout Paoli's regime, were handled by judges
elected one in each pieve; the Podestats continued, as always, as
justices of the peace in their parishes. The heads of the remaining
seigneurial families were allowed the privilege of acting as unpaid
magistrates in their domains,3 without supervision from the pro-
vincial magistrates, but subject to the authority of the Chamber of
Justice and of the Sindicato, a tribunal of sindicatori such as had
existed in the two preceding systems of government.
The function of the Sindicato, according to the constitution of
I 7 S, was to enable the Diet to scrutinize the conduct of all magis-
trates and officials. It was composed of Paoli and four members,
which the Diet elected. Contemporary records show that the
Sindicato was brought into being at irregular intervals, and that it
travelled all over the country to investigate irregularities and redress
abuses.4 Its decisions were irrevocable. Only the Junta of War
escaped its control; this was another occasional, travelling tribunal,
created by the Diet in times of emergency to hunt down bandits and
traitors. While the Sindicato, by all accounts, was conciliatory and
humane, the Junta was ruthless. Authorized to condemn to prison
and corporal punishment, and to confiscate or destroy property, it
could mobilize the local militia to enforce its sentences. When Paoli
was appointed its president, it could also impose the death penalty,
Paoli simply handing over the culprits to the Chamber of Justice.5
Such a tribunal could no doubt be justified in time of war. Yet
Pommereul maintains that Paoli systematically used the Junta to
annihilate his political enemies.6 These, during the first eight years of
his regime, were certainly active and dangerous. In the north of the
I. The Rota Civile, established for judging civil cases by the constitution of I75 5, was
later suppressed and then reinstated in I763; see record of Diet, 26-29 Dec. I763,
ADC Serie F.
2. The constitution of 1755 established Provincial Magistratures in two outlyin
provinces. Nine others were subsequently created, covering the rest of the rebe
territory. They had authority to enforce orders of the executive in their jurisdict
and from I 763 each had the right to designate two or three of its members to atten
Diet; see record of Diet, Dec. I763, ADC Se'rie F.
3. This privilege, which presumably affected only four families (see n. 2, p. 484), is
not mentioned in the constitutional document or in any record of the Diet, but is
reliably attested by Boswell, who visited Paoli when he was presiding over the Sindicato
in the jurisdiction of the Istria family; Boswell, pp. I57-8, 3I3-I4.
4. In practice the members of the Sindicalo were sometimes nominated by the Diet, as
in 1758, see Rossi, x. 248, and sometimes by the Council of State at the Diet's request;
see record of Diet, 28 May 1767, ADC Serie F.
5. This tribunal was also known as the 'Junta of Observation'. In May I762 the Diet
decreed the establishment of such a Junta of ten members with Paoli as president, with
'power to proceed as far as the blood penalty'; Rossi, xi, BSSHNC (nos. 260-5, I902),
42. 6. Pommereul, ii. 200-I.
1973 PASQUALE PAOLI (I 7S 5-I769) 495
island the Matra family, aided by Genoa, opposed him in a series of

armed revolts. In the south he had to combat the organized hostility
both of Antonio Colonna, a nobleman backed by the French, and of
a powerful pro-Genoese party led by the local notables. Resistance
in the two areas was not overcome until I763.
Having defeated rival factions, and at the same time imposed his
authority on the executive, Paoli, so it appears in the available
evidence, from I763 turned his attention to mastering the Diet. The
Corsican Diet was then an unusual and very powerful institution. It
was remarkable, in its period, by its mere existence: most of the great
European nations were governed without a representative legisla-
ture: such was the case in France, Russia, Prussia, Spain. The Diet
made laws and regulated taxation; these prerogatives, of course,
were also exercised by the English parliament. But the Corsican Diet
also nominated the heads of the executive, whereas in England the
appointment of ministers belonged to the sovereign. Moreover by
the terms of the Corsican constitution the Diet could censure and
depose any member of the executive, Paoli not excepted. And as the
body representing the people, the Diet, in theory at least, had a
control over foreign policy. It is hardly surprising that Pommereul,
a Frenchman of the Enlightenment, though sharply critical of Paoli,
was unstinting in his approval of the Diet: 'in it alone', he observes,
'resided fully and without division the sovereign power', in contrast
to the English parliament, and the Estates General of the United
Netherlands, which in his opinion were no more than 'barriers
against absolutism'.' Pommereul had evidently not realized the extent
to which the English parliament had come to influence the executive
through cabinet ministers. And he was no doubt uninformed of the
constitution of contemporary Sweden, where the Rikstag had the
same powers as the Corsican Diet, including that of nominating the
executive council, in which the king, like Paoli, merely acted as
president, with a double vote in its deliberations.2
The most original aspect of the Corsican Diet was the system by
which its members were elected. During the greater part of Paoli's
regime every adult male had the right to vote in elections to the Diet,
or to stand for election. Nothing is said of the composition of the
Diet in the constitutional document; the assembly, so it was under-
stood, would be formed in the same way as the customary consulte.
Contemporary evidence indicates that the parishes habitually sent
i. Pommereul, ii. 206-7.
2. See Ragnar Svanstrom and Carl Fredrik Palmstierna, A short History of Sweden, t
Joan Bulman (Oxford, I934); pp. I89-253; B. J. Hovde, The Scandinavian Countries .
(Ithaca, I948), pp. I77-90. The constitution of the 'Era of Liberty', I7I9-72, was an
experiment in parliamentary government which reduced the power of the king to that
permanent president of the Council of the Realm, elected by the Riksdag (or Estates,
body of four chambers dating from I43 5). The nobles virtually monopolized the Counc
and predominated in the 'Secret Committee', a powerful organ of government with
the Riksdag from which the peasants were excluded.
their elected procuratori; in th

elected members; in the early sessions they were probably a
majority. Voting, until I766, was by acclamation; there were
no qualifications for candidates or electors except that they should
be over twenty-five.' Such an arrangement was unknown outside
Corsica. Elsewhere in Europe diets and parliaments, where they
existed, were chosen by and from a limited, privileged sector of
society.2 The English parliament was elected by a sufftage restricted
by property qualifications, which placed power in the hands of the
landed gentry and aristocracy. The Swedish Rikstag was divided into
four chambers, of the clergy, nobles, burghers and peasants. Nobles
were not elected, but attended by right, and they monopolized the
executive posts, from which peasants were exduded. The complex
system of the United Netherlands resulted in the rule of an oligarchy;
in the diets of Poland, Bohemia and Hungary the nobles predom-
inated while the peasants were not even represented; the councils of
the old city republics, Genoa, Venice, Geneva, were exdusively
patrician. Nowhere but in Corsica did the people, as a whole, have
equal rights of representation and participation in public affairs,
except in the Swiss cantons still administered by a system of 'pure',
direct democracy. Paoli's constitution, with all its flaws, prefigured
modern representative government.
But the democratic structure of the Diet was not to continue
unchallenged, and paradoxically, the challenge came from Paoli. He
had created the Diet from the customary consulta, institutionalized its
powers and used them to secure his own. Contemporary evidence
from various sources goes to show that having done so, he thereafter
aimed at subjugating the assembly. His policy was not, at first, to
make any spectacular changes in the constitution, but rather to use
loopholes in it to increase his sphere of power. Although he had no
seat in the Diet, and could not be present during its deliberations, he
could influence its legislation in his speech preceding each session.
Nearly all the major legislation of the Diet can be traced to Paoli: the
modifications to the constitution, the resolutions concerning his
major constructive undertakings, such as the establishment of a mint,
a navy, a university. He could also take advantage of the customary
prerogative of the Corsican Generals to invite non-elected persons to
the Diet, and so secure seats for his supporters. The relevant docu-
ments show that from I762 he habitually summond members, or
ex-members, of the judiciary and executive.3 From I 763 he mobilized
i. See Boswell, p. I46; Pommereul, ii. 208-9; electoral law of I766, infra, p. 499.
Voting in the Diet was secret; see record of session, Dec. I763, ADC Setie F.
2. For a general survey of this subject see Palmer, vol. i.
3. Each session was summoned by a circular letter from Paoli and the Council of
State which specified the categories of people to be elected, or who were invited to, the
Diet. Letters of i6 May I762, and 7 Jan. I763, BSSHNC (nos. 75-77, I887), pp. 364,
432; summon procuratori from the pievi, not the parishes. Presumably Paoli was already
his allies, the clergy.' Paoli had inaugurated his regime by confiscat-
ing the revenues of the absentee Genoese bishops. Later he judic-
iously came to terms with Pope Clement XIII, and even persuaded
him, in I760, to send an Apostolic Visitor to the rebel state. Both
these acts had earned him the regard of the clergy. From I763 they
were allowed a separate system of representation by which they sent
about I 37 members to the Diet, and so had a much higher repre-
sentation per head than the ordinary citizens.2 Priests and monks
debated and voted together with the other members. They soon made
themselves felt; from I764 the elected speaker of the Diet was
always a churchman.3 The relative wealth of the clergy proved
invaluable to Paoli in the implementation of his policies. The Church
supplied money in exceptional levies and voluntary gifts; it melted
down ecclesiastical ornaments to provide metals for the mint; it
largely financed (as well as staffed) the university opened at Corte in
January I765 .4 Paoli was apparently at heart a deist,5 and he went as
far as he dared to subordinate Church to State. Before the clergy
were admitted in numbers to the Diet, legislation had been passed to
deprive them of their privilege of being judged by canon law,6 while
Paoli had no scruple in disregarding their traditional right of giving
asylum to criminals.7
In November I763 Paoli summoned an extraordinary session of
the Diet to which he invited, besides members of the provincial
seeking to limit the numbers of elected members; but apparently without success;
Rossi, xi. 85, states that every village sent a procuratore to the Diet, as do Pommereul
and Boswell (see n. 4, p. 498). In May I762 Paoli also invited presidents and council-
lors of the Provincial Magistratures and commissarii of the pievi (military commanders
nominated by the Council of State; see constitutional document, ADC Se'rie F), besides
an unspecified number of 'the most zealous and enlightened patriots'. His convocation
to the Diet of I767 includes an invitation to ex-Councillors of State; BSSHNC (nos.
I07-8, I889). p. I77; Rossi, xi. 85, asserts that they attended by right.
I. Circular letter, Jan. I763, BSSHNC (nos. 75-77, I887), p. 432, in which are
invited the vicariiforanei and the head priest of each pieve.
2. By correlating information on the composition of the Diet given by Rossi, xi. 85,
with information concerning the clergy, principally provided by S.-B. Casanova,
Histoire del'Eglise Corse (4 vols., Ajaccio-Bastia, I93I-9), it can be inferred that the clergy
sent to the Diet: five members representing the five dioceses; the five Provincials of the
five monastic orders; the fifty-five Superiors of the monasteries in the rebel territory;
four elected members from the four collegiate churches; sixty-eight members to re-
present the pievi. The clergy in the rebel territory cannot have numbered more than
about I,300; a census of I770 gives I,550 clergy for the whole island; Archives
nationales, Q i 298. See Rene Le Mee, 'Un denombrement des Corses en I 770', Problemes
d'histoire de la Corse, Societe des Etudes Robespierristes, Societe d'Histoire Moderne,
(Paris, I97I), pp. 23-44. 3. Pommereul, ii. I 55.
4. Rossi observes that Paoli gave the clergy favoured representation in the Diet to
make them 'docile' in accepting the 'sacrifices' demanded of them; xi. 7I. For the
donation of metals to the mint, see record of Diet, 2 Feb. I763, Rossi, xi. 7I-72; for the
gift to the university, letter from Paoli to the vicariiforanei, I763, ADC Fonds Paoli i; for
the exceptional levy, record of Diet, 22 May I768, Tommaseo, pp. I35-6.
S. See Pommereul, ii. 240.
6. Record of Diet, Sept. I758, Rossi, x. 248; see also Pommereul, ii. 82.
7. See letter from Paoli to Lucia of Cap Corse, I764, ADC Fonds Paoli 4.
judiciary and executive, the Podestats and 'Fathers of the Commune'

of the parishes.' The electedprocuratori were thus in a minority. The
Diet must surely have been acting on Paoli's instructions when it
thereupon passed legislation designed to keep them in a minority for
good. According to the new law, the procuratori were to be chosen
by indirect elections, one for each pieve.2 Had it been respected, the
elected representatives of the people would have been reduced to
sixty-eight; an insignificant number compared with that of the clergy
and of the other categories of people who might attend the Diet.3
The evidence however shows, unquestionably, that this law was not
respected; the parishes, as is noted by contemporaries, stoutly
defended their traditional right of sending their directly elected
procuratori to the national assembly.4 In fact not a single record of a
secondary election of a procuratore for a pieve has come to light,
whereas records of elections of procuratori in the parishes are numer-
ous in the Corsican archives.
That the new law was resented can be judged by the manner, tact-
ful to the point of deceit, in which Paoli brought it to the attention of
the electorate in his convocation to the Diet of I764. His circular
letter says nothing of secondary elections, but instructs every
procuratore elected in the parishes to be equipped with a notarial
affidavit made out according to an official printed form.5 The form,
of which an example exists in the Corsican archives, runs to over
I,OOO words.6 It authorizes the procuratore elected in a parish to attend
the Diet, and there to 'suggest, insinuate, propose, ask, reply, assert
or contradict' whatever he esteems to be 'good and useful' for his
community and for the nation. Only towards the end of the docu-
ment is it stated that the procuratore invested with all these powers
and responsibilities has also authority to assemble with other
procuratori of his pieve to elect one or several of their number to
represent the pieve as a whole. The new regulation was thus formu-
lated, not as a command, but as an invitation to exercise yet another
right, and it was already modified to allow for the election of more
than one procuratore to represent a single pieve.
When the Diet met in May I 764 Paoli openly attacked its authority
by proposing that it should give the Council of State a negative veto
on its legislation. This amounted to a fundamental change in the
constitution which, if accepted, in the words of Pommereul, would
have made Paoli 'sovereign'.7 But it was energetically opposed, and
i. Circular letter, 29 Nov. I763, ADC Fonds Paoli 76.
2. Record of Diet, Dec. I763, ADC Serie F.
3. At this session legislation was also passed to give the Provincial Magistrates
representation in the Diet.
4. Boswell, p. I47; Pommereul, ii. 208-9.
5. Circular letter, 29 Nov. I763, ADC Fonds Paoli 76.
6. ADC Fonds Paoli i8.
7. Pommereul, ii. 62. According to Boswell, pp. I49-50, the Diet also opposed
the suspensive veto.
1973 PASQUALE PAOLI (I75 5-I769) 499
Paoli had to content himself with a suspensive veto, resembling that

accorded to Louis XVI by the French revolutionary constitution of
I79I. A resolution voted by the Diet could be suspended by the
Council of State until it gave its motives for refusal, at the next
session of the Diet, or 'at some other opportune time'.' After which
the resolution could be reconsidered, and if voted again by the Diet
was passed into law. In this struggle with the Diet Paoli was covered
by the authority of his master, Montesquieu: the executive power, so
he states in De l'esprit des lois, ought to have a share in the legislature
by the 'power of rejecting'.2 At this same session it was also decreed
that a resolution, to be passed, required a two-thirds majority. Those
that gained half the votes could be brought forward a second or
third time in the same session. Those that won less were dismissed,
but could be re-presented at a future session; provided, that is, the
Council of State gave its consent.3 To this degree Paoli succeeded in
imposing his authority on the Diet.
In I766 a new attempt to curtail the traditional freedom of parish
elections was made by the Diet, acting, we may suppose, on Paoli's
instructions. The procuratore of each parish was to be elected from a
choice of three candidates proposed by the Podestats and 'Fathers of
the Commune'; he had to win a two-thirds majority. Only heads of
families bad the right to vote. If none of the three won the requited
majority another election was to take place. In this case candidates
were to be proposed by the heads of families. Three were to be
selected by majority vote in a primary election; one of the three was
to be elected in a secondary election by a two-thirds majority. If none
of them won this majority, the parish forfeited its representation in
that session of the Diet.4 This electoral legislation does not seem to
have been much better observed than that of I763. Documentary
evidence, provided by 263 records of parish elections for the Diet of
May I768, suggests that the complicated voting system was seldom
followed or even understood. Only four affidavits note the per-
formance of elections exactly as prescribed.5 The Diet met eighteen
times between November I 75 5 and its last session in March I 769.
The available data is insufficient to show whether it ever made a
stand against Paoli, except to resist his demand for an absolute veto
in I 764. But he must have feared its interference with his policies, for
by a skilful manipulation of the constitution he excluded it from
participation in foreign affairs. When in I764, and again in I767, it
became necessary to take decisions with regard to critical negotia-
tions with France (then occupying the coastal towns), Paoli excer-
cised his right to summon 'particular congresses' rather than the Diet.
i. Tommaseo, pp. 5 I-5 2. 2. Montesquieu, De 1'esprit des lois, i. I 72.
3. Tommaseo, pp. 5 I-5 2.
4. Record of Diet, May I766, ADC Serie F. The law is inaccurately reported by
Rossi, xi. 243.
5. ADC Fonds Paoli i. The records show that secret voting was imposed.
To these assemblies he invited people predisposed to accept his

views: ex-Councillors of State, who had come under the sway of his
forceful personality during their terms of office; military commanders
of the pievi, who owed their appointment to the Council of State, or
in other words to himself. It was from them (united in I767 to form
a 'Grand Council of the Nation') that he obtained approval of his
foreign policy; the Diet was only informed of results afterwards.'
Pommereul contends that Paoli thereby changed the government
from a democratic to an aristocratic form.2
His regime can be usefully evaluated only within the context of its
day. Its defects, as a democracy, are now obvious. The judiciary was
incompletely separated from the executive. The Diet was only partly
elected by manhood suffrage, and after I766 in theory not at all; it
was always invaded by members of the executive and judiciary, and
from I 763 was overweighted by the clergy. On the other hand Paoli,
who according to the original constitution of I755 possessed less
power than any monarch of his time (with the exceptions, perhaps,
of the king of Sweden and the elected king of Poland), by contriving
to govern as far as possible through the executive succeeded in so
increasing his personal authority that some historians have not
hesitated to describe him as an enlightened despot. All the same, his
constitution had a liberal character rare in a period when the rule of
absolute monarchs, aristocracies and oligarchies, was general
throughout Europe. The principle of egality inherent in the system
is what makes it most remarkable. The law, emanating from the Diet,
applied equally to all citizens, nobles and dergy included; taxation
was moderate and equitable, consisting of a uniform hearth-tax and
exceptional levies, proportional to property; restrictions on franchise
and accession to office were always based on age, not on birth or on
wealth, while almost every position of authority, from 'Father of the
Commune' to Councillor of State, was to be won by some form of
election. In fact egality was Paoli's ideal, his definition of democracy,
which he believed to be the best form of government. There is no
reason to doubt the sincerity of his views as expressed in I764 in a
letter to a friend: 'perfect egality is the most desirable thing in a
democratic government, and it is that which has ensured the happi-
ness of the Swiss and Dutch ... the steps by which tyrants rise to
thrones are nothing other than inequalities in fortune'.3 How, then,
i. In I764, when French troops occupied the coastal towns, Paoli summoned a
congress, on 22-25 Oct. composed of Provincial Magistrates, commissarii of the pievi and
ex-Councillors of State (Rossi, xi. i60-3) which authorized him to address a protest to
Louis XV. He did not inform the Diet of this decision, nor of its results, until the next
session, on 20 May I765; see Rossi, xi. I89-9I). In I767, when the last chance of an
agreement with Genoa, guaranteed by France, had to be considered, Paoli summoned a
congress known as the 'Grand Council of the Nation', partly composed of ex-Councillors
of State. Since they had seats in the Diet Paoli had not, technically, violated the con-
stitution; see Rossi, xi. 338-43. 2. Pommereul, ii. 96.
3. I5 July I764,BSSHNC(nos. 95-96, i888), pp. 672-3. Quoted by Eltor
I973 PASQUALE PAOLI (I75 5-I769) 50I
did it happen that Paoli's actions were so often contrary to his

principles? So contrary, indeed, that according to the Corsican
chronicler Rossi he was suspected of aspiring to kingship, and was
'terribly accused' of seeking to 'debase the nation' while ruling it
like an 'absolute prince'.'
A growing taste for personal power is not the only motive for his
conduct that can be suggested, although it undoubtedly played a
role. Had Paoli not manoeuvred to increase his powers, it seems
likely that he would have lost those he originally possessed. At no
time was he secure in his position. His egalitarian system left vital
ambitions unfulfilled, among the notables, greedy for political
prestige, and among the ruined nobles who had hoped, by the rebel-
lion, to recover their privileges, and had received so little satis-
faction from Paoli. These were the categories of people which had
openly opposed him until I763, and which also were continuously
elected to the Diet. Already in the seventeenth century the notables,
fused with the remnants of the nobility, had come to dominate in the
village assemblies; they continued to dominate in elections to the
Diet. The records rarely indicate that the full electorate went to the
polls; usually they describe the voters as 'the most and major part of
the community', or 'the best and major part', or as composed of
'chiefs', notables - princzpali - or nobles.2 In spite of the democratic
rights available to the people, the Diet was in reality controlled by
local leaders; men who envied or resented Paoli. By his own admis-
sion after the collapse of his regime, he was always threatened by
jealous rivals; he was never 'master in Corsica'.3 His support came
from the mass of the peasants, who even if they made limited use of
their political rights looked to him as their protector. Rossi concedes
that he had a 'popular talent'; Boswell, describing how he was
idolized by the simple country people, is entirely convincing.4 But
the peasants, for the most part illiterate, could be of little use to
Paoli in conducting public affairs. They could however fight for him.
The French, when they invaded the island in I768, found many
collaborators among the Corsican notables and nobles.5 But the
i. Rossi, ix. 87-88.

2. See records of elections in ADCFondsPaoli i. At Calenzana, on 3 May I768, allthe
men who had attended a religious ceremony went to the poll, although only heads of
families then had the right to do so; but at Zicavo, a village of some 800 inhabitants,
only fourteen men, apparently notables, took part in an election to this same session of
the Diet. Elsewhere the electorate is described as composed of capi popoli, or principali.
The term lapiu e maggior parte del omini della comunita, frequently used, already appears in
records of village assemblies of the sixteenth century; see numerous examples quoted by
Emmanuelli. The increasing domination of the village assemblies by the notables in the
seventeenth century is studied by Pomponi, pp. I64-5.
3. See Paoli's interesting confidences to the Jesuit man of letters, Bettinelli, whom he
met in Tuscany after his defeat in I769, in 'Observations sur M. de Paoli ecrites A Mme.
de l'Hopital . . .', BSSHNC (no. i i, i 88i), p. 302.
4. Rossi, ix. 88; Boswell, pp. I62, 3I3-I6.
5. See Rossi, xi. 338; 'Observations sur M. de Paoli. . .', ubi supra, p. 302.
common people, rallying to the mass levy of Paoli's militia, fiercely

resisted the French army for the best part of a year, although hope-
lessly inferior in numbers and in arms.
Defeated in May I769, Paoli retired to England. But during the
twenty-one years of his exile he never abandoned hope of restoring
an independent government in Corsica. He refused a pardon offered
to him in I776, with the reply that he was unable to accept the
despotic administration imposed on Corsica by the French monarchy.
While he was prepared to see Corsica politically attached to France,
he believed that only an autonomous regime, which would limit
French interference to military protection, could procure the happi-
ness of his countrymen.' His ideas were unchanged at the beginning
of the French Revolution: Corsica, so he wrote to a friend in the
autumn of I789, should be given an autonomous status, with an
independent government suited to the 'genius and customs' of its
people.2 When he was at last recalled to his country, following an
amnesty for Corsican political exiles decreed on 30 November I789,
his triumph was undermined by disappointment, for on that same
day the Constituent Assembly, on the proposition of the Corsican
deputy Saliceti, had also decreed that Corsica should thenceforth be
an integral part of France and governed by the same constitution.
Paoli duly swore fidelity to the new French constitution, when he
was welcomed in Paris as a 'martyr of liberty', on io April I790. In
Corsica, where he was elected head of the administration, on I
October, he seems at first to have collaborated loyally enough with
the new order. Yet he was out of tune with a system of government
that implied subordination to Paris, and that owed nothing to his
own constitutional experiment, while he had little in common with
the young generation of hard-line revolutionists, such as Saliceti
(who was to vote for the death of Louis XVI). In this predicament
Paoli fell back on the power tactics of which he was master; until
I 792 he contrived to control Corsican elections, and so maintained his
supremacy, though at the cost of making some serious enemies. The
election of Corsican deputies to the Convention however escaped
his influence, and brought his opponents, the Jacobins, to power. In
February I 793 the failure of a military expedition against Sardinia (in
which a Corsican contingent took part), gave them their chance to
discredit him. Accused of complicity with England, on 2 April he
was indicted by the Convention. Inevitably his old hope of re-
establishing Corsican autonomy was resuscitated, when he was
proclaimed 'Father of the Nation' in a massive vote of confidence at a
consulta he summoned at Corte, on 27-29 May.3 But this victory was
i. On this occasion Paoli recorded his views in a memoire, dated Oct. I776, repro-
duced by Rossi, xiii, BSSHNC (nos. i8I-5, I896), 39-42.
2. Letters to Abbe Andrei, 6 Oct. and io Nov. I789, Tommaseo, pp. 320, 322-3.
3. See Letteron, 'Pieces et documents pour servir 'a 'histoire de la Corse pendant la
Revolution Francaise', BSSHNC (nos. I I 5-i 8, I890), pp. 366-98.
a dangerous illusion. Outlawed by the Convention, on I7 June, he

had no choice but to appeal for British protection. The sequel, as
related in contemporary documents, makes sad reading. The con-
stitution of the Anglo-Corsican kingdom, proclaimed in June I 794,
was hardly less liberal than Paoli's own constitution of I75 5, except
that the viceroy, head of the executive, had a right to veto the legisla-
tion of the elected parliament; precisely what Paoli had sought and
failed to obtain from the Corsican Diet in I764.1 Had he been
viceroy he might well have cooperated to ensure the success of the
regime. But the British government, wary of a man who had twice
led the Corsicans to rebel against their rulers, appointed Sir Gilbert
Elliot. Paoli became a pole of subversive activities and in October
I795 was obliged to return to England. His career was finished. The
mistakes and misfortunes of its latter phases have obscured his
earlier achievements, so that his Corsican constitution of I755-69
has remained little known, studied or appreciated to this day.
Ajaccio, Corsica DOROTHY CARRINGTON

i. The constitution, created with Corsican collaboration, was proclaimed at a
consulta at Corte, on i O-2I June I 794; see record in Letteron, 'Pieces et documents pour
servir a l'histoire de la Corse pendant la Revolution Fran?aise', BSSHNC (nos. I2I-5,
I89I), pp. 349-98.
I wish to thank M. Pierre Lamotte, Archiviste en Chef de la Corse, for facilitating my

researches, and in particular for providing me with a copy of the constitutional docu-
ment of I755. Translations from French and Italian are by the author.

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The Corsican Constitution of Pasquale Paoli (1755-1769)

Author(s): Dorothy Carrington

The Corsican constitution of Pasquale Pao

i. James Boswell, An Account of Corsica. . . (London, I768), p. i6i (page references

Longman Group Ltd. and Contributors, I973

Corsican legislature, during the greater part of Paoli's regime, was

i. 'La Dieta Generale del Populo di Corsica, Lecitimamente Patrone di se medesimo.

was living in exile. There he became a disciple of the Enlightenment,

always be overruled by the Primates, or by the Junta, which they

way the practice of selecting members for a national assembly by

heads of state with the title of General. To relieve the Generals of

legal judgments, would be decided by secret ballot. Resolutions

of the executive power. Paoli had no seat in the assembly; he was

his deposition; although this is not stated in the constitutional

island the Matra family, aided by Genoa, opposed him in a series of

their elected procuratori; in th

judiciary and executive, the Podestats and 'Fathers of the Commune'

Paoli had to content himself with a suspensive veto, resembling that

To these assemblies he invited people predisposed to accept his

did it happen that Paoli's actions were so often contrary to his

i. Rossi, ix. 87-88.

common people, rallying to the mass levy of Paoli's militia, fiercely

a dangerous illusion. Outlawed by the Convention, on I7 June, he

Ajaccio, Corsica DOROTHY CARRINGTON

I wish to thank M. Pierre Lamotte, Archiviste en Chef de la Corse, for facilitating my

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