Armando Santiago Jr

Jurisdoctor

Section Number Section title Extend Coverage

1 Due process / Equal
Protection of laws clause
2 Search and Seizures Arrest
3 Right to privacy of RPC
correspondence
4 Freedom of Expression
5 Freedom of religion
6 Right to liberty of abode and
travel
7 Right to information
8 Right to association
9 Right to Expropriate Power of Eminent domain
10 Contract Clause / Non- Oblicon
Impairment laws clause
11
12
13
14
15

PONENCIA:
TOPIC:
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS:
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE:
TRIGGER OF THE RULING:
VERDICT:
END POINT:
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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Bill of Rights ....................................................................................................................................................4

Significance of the Bill of Rights .....................................................................................................................4
Classification of Rights ...................................................................................................................................4
THE INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE
Similarities, Distinctions, and Limitation..........................................................................................................4
Fundamental powers of the State (police power, eminent domain, taxation) .................................................5
Tests for Validity of Exercise of Police Power .................................................................................................5
Requisites .......................................................................................................................................................5
TO WHAT AREAS OF LIEE POLICE POWER HAS PERVASIVE REACH? ..................................................5
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS CLAUSE
Requisites for valid exercise of Inherent Powers ............................................................................................7
GIVE THE TWO ASPECTS OF DUE PROCESS AND DISCUSS EACH.......................................................7
DO LIFE AND PROPERTY ENJOY IDENTICAL PROTECTION FROM THE CONSTITUTION? ..................7
DOES EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW PROHIBIT CLASSIFICATION? .......................................................7
GIVE THE MEANING/RELATIVITY OF DUE PROCESS ACCORDING TO THE CASE OF US v. LING SU
FAN .................................................................................................................................................................7
GIVE THE ESSENTIALS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
ACCORDING TO THE CASE OF BANCO ESPANOL v. PALANCA ...............................................................8
GIVE THE CARDINAL PRIMARY REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS .............................................................................................................................................8
GIVE THE MINIMUM STANDARS WHICH MUST BE MET BY THE SCHOOLS TO SATISFY THE
DEMANDS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ...........................................................................................8
Constitutional and statutory due process ........................................................................................................8
EXPLAIN VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE ...........................................................................................8
Concept of Equal protection ..........................................................................................................................9
Rational Basis Test .........................................................................................................................................9
Strict scrutiny test ...........................................................................................................................................9
Search and seizures
Section 2. DIGESTED PROVISION ...............................................................................................................9
Requisites of a valid warrant: ........................................................................................................................10
Warrantless searches
IS EVERY WARRANTLESS SEARCH AN ILLEGAL SEARCH? ..................................................................10
Examination of Application (Rule 126, Section 4 of the Rules of Court) .......................................................11
Particularity of Prescription ...........................................................................................................................12
Properties subject to seizure (Rule 126, section 2 of the rules of court) ......................................................12
Admissibility of illegally seized evidence (EXCLUSIONARY RULE) Art. III, Section 3 Paragraph 2 ............12
DO THE ORDINARY RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES APPLY TO
SEARCHES CONDUCTED AT THE AIRPORT PURSUANT TO ROUTINE AIRPORT SECURITY
PROCEDURES? ..........................................................................................................................................13
Warrantless arrest
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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

RULE 113 Arrest ...........................................................................................................................................13

BOND (Pyansador) .......................................................................................................................................15
WHO MAY ISSUE WARRANT OF ARREST ................................................................................................15
ADMINISTRATIVE ARRESTS .....................................................................................................................15
Subject of the offense; ..................................................................................................................................16
Right of Association
Related Provisions ........................................................................................................................................17
1. Labor Unionism ........................................................................................................................................17
2. Communist and Similar Organizations ....................................................................................................17
3. Integrated Bar of the Philippines ..............................................................................................................18
CASES
People vs. Ferrer ............................................................................................................................19
BANGALISAN vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS ............................................................................21
United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) vs Hon. Bienvenido E. Laguesma ........................23
Contract Clause / Non-Impairment clause
REQUISITES of valid impairment .................................................................................................................26
WHEN DOES, A LAW IMPAIR THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS? ........................................................26
WHEN NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE PREVAILS .........................................................................................26
1. Application of the Contract Clause ...........................................................................................................26
2. Contemporary Application of the Contract Clause ...................................................................................27
3. Limitations ................................................................................................................................................28
Nature of protection ......................................................................................................................................28
Contracts affected .........................................................................................................................................28
Limitations.....................................................................................................................................................28
Effect of emergency legislation on contracts ................................................................................................28
Currency legislation and contracts ................................................................................................................28
Impairment ....................................................................................................................................................29
CASES
Ortigas & Company vs Court of Appeals ........................................................................................31
Mariveles vs. CA ............................................................................................................................33
Clemons vs. Nolting .......................................................................................................................35
PHILRECA vs DILG ........................................................................................................................35
Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority ............................................................................................... 37

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

BILL OF RIGHTS
set of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the individual, and imposing
limitations on the powers of the government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS

Government is powerful. When unlimited, it becomes tyrannical. The Bill of Rights is a guarantee that there are
certain areas of a person's life, liberty, and property which governmental power may not touch.

Bill of Rights are generally self-implementing.

CLASSIFICATION OF RIGHTS
Political Rights granted by law to members of community in relation to their direct or indirect participation in the
establishment or administration of the government;

Civil Rights rights which municipal law will enforce at the instance of private individuals for the purpose of
securing them the enjoyment of their means of happiness;

Social and Economic Rights; and, Human Rights.

THE INHERENT POWERS OF THE

STATE
1. Police Power
2. Power of Eminent Domain
3. Power of Taxation

They are inherent powers because they belong to the very essence of government and without them no
government can exist.

SIMILARITIES, DISTINCTIONS, AND LIMITATION

Similarities:

they are inherent in the State

they are necessary and indispensable
they are methods by which the State interferes with private rights
they presuppose an equivalent compensation
they are exercised primarily by the legislature

Differences:
Police Power Eminent Domain Taxation

As to regulation regulates both liberty and regulates property rights regulates property rights
property only only
As to who may exercise only the government government and some only the government
private entities
As to the property taken destroyed because it is -wholesome -wholesome
noxious or intended for -taken for a public use or -taken for a public use or
noxious purpose purpose purpose
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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

As to Compensation intangible altruistic full and fair equivalent of protection and public
feeling that the person the property expropriated improvements for the
has contributed to the taxes paid
general welfare

Limitations:

Bill of Rights

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE (POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN,

TAXATION)
POLICE POWER is the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the
great public needs. It is the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subject of the same.

SCOPE: Police power rests upon public necessity and upon the right of the state and of the public to self-
protection.

TESTS FOR VALIDITY OF EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER

(1) Lawful Subject: Interest of the general public (as distinguished from a particular class required exercise).
This means that the activity or property sought to be regulated affects the general welfare. [Taxicab Operators V.
Board of Transportation (1982)]

(2) Lawful Means: Means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and are
not unduly oppressive. [Tablarin v. Gutierrez (1987)]

(3) Least Restrictions of Individual Rights: It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. [White Light Corporation, et al v. City of
Manila (2009)]

POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN is the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public
but private property of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty to public purpose.

REQUISITES
(1) Private property

(2) Genuine necessity - inherent/presumed in legislation, but when the power is delegated (e.g. local
government units), necessity must be proven.

(3) For public use - Court has adopted a broad definition of public use, following the U.S. trend

(4) Payment of just compensation

(5) Due process [Manapat v. CA (2007)]

POWER OF TAXATION is the power to raise revenue for governmental purposes.

TO WHAT AREAS OF LIEE POLICE POWER HAS PERVASIVE REACH?

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Police power has been used to justify enactments in the fields of:

Public health measures like make house repairs; compulsory connection to sewerage system; license to practice
medicine; regulation of cattle imports; sale of meat.

Public safety measures like building regulations; regulation of carrying deadly weapons; participation in rotational
patrol duty; regulation of gasoline stations and movie theaters; use of city roads.

Public moral like regulating the operation of public dance halls; prohibiting gambling; licensing of cock-pits;
prohibiting the operation of pinball machines; regulating the operation of motels and hotel; regulating
establishment of massage parlors.

General (public) welfare like regulating slaughter of carabaos; provisions for the suppression of agricultural
pests; regulating nuisances; rules for the deportation of aliens; regulating building construction; prescribing
registration of land under the Torrens System; zoning regulations; anti-graft laws designed to curb activities of
public officials

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL

PROTECTION OF LAWS CLAUSE
Section 1: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.

REQUISITES FOR VALID EXERCISE OF INHERENT POWERS

The yardsticks for the exercise of the inherent powers of the government are:
1. Due Process Clause
2. Equal Protection Clause

GIVE THE TWO ASPECTS OF DUE PROCESS AND DISCUSS EACH

The two aspects of due process are:

Substantive due process simply means that the law be reasonable and not arbitrary.
Procedural due process meant a law that hears before it condemns; that proceeds upon inquiry, and renders
judgment only after trial.

DO LIFE AND PROPERTY ENJOY IDENTICAL PROTECTION FROM THE

CONSTITUTION?
NO. The primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Property rights can be lost through
prescription while human rights are imprescriptible.

DOES EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW PROHIBIT CLASSIFICATION?

NO, but the classification must be reasonable. To be reasonable, it;

1. Must rest on substantial distinction;

2. Must be germane to the purpose of law;
3. Must not be limited to existing conditions only;
4. Must apply equally to all members of the same class.

GIVE THE MEANING/RELATIVITY OF DUE PROCESS ACCORDING TO THE CASE

OF US V. LING SU FAN
In the case of U.S. v. Ling Su Fan due process simply means:
That there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of
the Government;
That this law shall be reasonable in its operation;
That it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and
It shall be applicable alike to all citizens of a state or to all of a class.

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

GIVE THE ESSENTIALS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN JUDICIAL

PROCEEDINGS ACCORDING TO THE CASE OF BANCO ESPANOL V. PALANCA
In the case of Banco Espanol Filipino v. Palanca, the essentials of procedural due process in JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS are:
1. There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the
subject of the proceedings;
3. The defendant must be given opportunity to be heard; and
4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

GIVE THE CARDINAL PRIMARY REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS IN

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
In the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, the Cardinal primary requirements in
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS were summarized as follows:

The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence thereof;
The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
The decision must have something to support itself;
The evidence must be substantial (such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion).
The decision must be based on evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected;
The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its independent consideration of the law and facts
of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; and
The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

GIVE THE MINIMUM STANDARS WHICH MUST BE MET BY THE SCHOOLS TO

SATISFY THE DEMANDS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
In Guzman v. National University, the Supreme Court provided the guidelines for the handling of disciplinary
cases in schools:

The students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of an accusation against them;
They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
They shall be informed of the evidence against them;
They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY DUE PROCESS

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws (Section 1, Art. III).

Statutory due process: Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided (Art. 2 Civil
Code of the Philippines).

EXPLAIN VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE

In People v. Nazario 186, 195-196 (1088) the Supreme Court said:

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.

It is repugnant to the Constitution in two aspects:

it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and
it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle.

CONCEPT OF EQUAL PROTECTION

In Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy), the Supreme Court said: The guarantee of equal protection means that
no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other
persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.

Standards of judicial review on equal protection:

RATIONAL BASIS TEST

A law that touches on a constitutionally protected interest must be rationally related to furthering a legitimate
government interest. In applying the rational basis test, courts begin with a strong presumption that the law or
policy under review is valid.

STRICT SCRUTINY TEST

To pass strict scrutiny, the law or policy must satisfy three (3) tests:
It must be justified by a compelling governmental interest;
The law or policy must be narrowly tailored to achieve the goal or interest; and
The law or policy must be the least restrictive means for achieving that interest, that is, there cannot be a
less restrictive way to effectively achieve the compelling government interest.

In Ormoc Sugar Central v. Ormoc City, Ormoc City imposes a tax on Ormoc Sugar Central by name. Ormos
Sugar Central is the only sugar central in Ormoc City. The Court held that such ordinance is not valid for it would
be discriminatory against the Ormoc Sugar Central which alone comes under the ordinance.

Search and seizures

Section 2. Art. III.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the Judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

SECTION 2. DIGESTED PROVISION

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

GENERAL RULE: WHAT

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and

EXCEPTION: HOW

no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge

REQUIREMENT FOR EXCEPTION: HOW COME

after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and

ASCERTAINMENT:

particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Concept: It protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself. It is a guarantee of the right of the people to
be secure in their persons against unreasonable search and seizures. It is a guarantee against unlawful arrest
and other forms of restraint on the physical liberty of the person.
Warrant Requirement

REQUISITES OF A VALID WARRANT:

1. It must be issued upon probable cause;
2. probable cause must be determined personally by a judge;
3. such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce;
4. the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and person to be seized.

Probable cause meant such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, as will warrant a cautious man in
the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it, are legally just and proper.

Probable cause for an arrest or for the issuance of a warrant of arrest mean such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested.

Personally, examine the complainant and his witnesses meant the exclusive and personal responsibility of
the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause

Probable cause for a search meant such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.

Particularity of description meant description that expresses a conclusion of fact not law by which the
warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure, or when the things described are limited to
those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued

John Doe satisfies the requirement of particularity of description provided it contains a descriptio personae
such as will enable the officer to identify the accused

Warrantless searches
IS EVERY WARRANTLESS SEARCH AN ILLEGAL SEARCH?
NO. Not every warrantless search is illegal search. As a general rule searches and seizures must be
accompanied with a valid warrant except:

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

1. When the right is voluntarily waived;

2. When there is valid reason to stop and frisk;
3. When the search is incidental to a lawful arrest;
4. Search of vessels and aircraft;
5. Search of moving vehicle;
6. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of sanitary and building regulations;
7. When prohibited articles are in plain view;
8. Search and seizure under exigent and emergency;
9. Areal target zoning or saturation drive (valid exercise of military powers of the President; Searches of
passengers at airport. R.A. 6235 provides that every airline ticket shall contain a condition that hand-carried
luggage, etc., shall be subject to search and this condition shall form part of the contract between the passenger
and the air carrier.

Search incident of a lawful Arrest Arresting officer is authorized to search the arresting as long as the arrest
is valid

Search of a moving motor vehicle it must be based on probable cause (ex. There is a place where there is a
person who are known to habitually deliver drug, the police officer has a probable cause, he may search the car)

Search in violation of custom laws Pertains to Bureau of Customs (Ex. kapag naviolate mo yung laws ng
bureau customs)

Seizure of the evidence in plain view Seen without touching (ex. Robin padilla Case pagbaba nya ng kotse,
may nakatak na baril sa bewang nya, kahit hindi sya kapkapan kitang may baril sya.)

When the accused, himself waives his right against unreasonable search and seizures Gave consent to search
even if its illegally search

Stop and frisk it is a doctrine, it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop and
frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in the light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. (Ex. Malacat vs. CA nung time na
naganap yung Miranda bombing there is certain people na parang hindi sila mapakali na parang may
kahinahinalang gagawin, the police officer approached them, with the probable cause they made a search on
these people and found out that there is a bomb inside their belongings.)

Exigent and emergency circumstances

Additional Exceptions (Not in the Rules):

(1) Estoppel: When the right is voluntarily waived
(2) Violent insanity.

EXAMINATION OF APPLICATION (RULE 126, SECTION 4 OF THE RULES OF

COURT)
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (3a)

The judge, before issuing the search warrant, must personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any writers he may produce on facts personally known
to then, and attach to
the record their sworn statement together with any affidavit submitted.

The evidence offered by the complainant and his witness should be based on their own personal knowledge and
not on mere information or belief.
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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Affiant could be charged with perjury if the allegations contained therein are found to be untrue.

PARTICULARITY OF PRESCRIPTION
Constitution requires that the place to be searched on the persons or things to be seized be described
with such particularity as to enable the person serving the warrant to identify them.
The person sought to be seized should be identified by name if the warrant is issued without a name or
with the name in blank such that it can be enforced against any person, it is unquestionably void.
Where by the nature of the articles to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not
required that a technical description be given.
Only the articles particularly described in the warrant can be seized and no other property can be taken
thereunder unless it is prohibited law.

PROPERTIES SUBJECT TO SEIZURE (RULE 126, SECTION 2 OF THE RULES OF

COURT)
SEC. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application for search warrant shall be
filed with the following:

(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was
committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the
criminal action is pending, (n)

Property subject of the offense

Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense

Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense where the search and seizures is
made only
for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used against the accused the warrant is unlawful as it would violate
the constitutional rights against self-incrimination

ADMISSIBILITY OF ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE (EXCLUSIONARY RULE) ART.

III, SECTION 3 PARAGRAPH 2

Purpose of EXCLUSIONARY RULE: Kung ang gusto talaga ng authority ay makulong ang isang tao, pwedeng
nakawin nalang nya yung evidence, because of this exclusionary rule, hindi na nila pwedeng gawin yun dahil
lahat ng illegally seized evidence is inadmissible as an evidence of the case (for it is considered, fruit from the
poisonous tree)
Articles illegally seized are not admissible as evidence (EXCLUSIONARY RULE), pursuant to the doctrine
originally announced in the case of Stonehill vs. Diokno

Properties may have been seized in violation of the said provision, it does not follow that its owner shall be
entitled to recover it immediately. If the said property is the subject of litigation, like will remain incustodia legis
until the case is terminated

May nonetheless be used in the judicial or administrative action that may be filed against the officer responsible
for it illegal seizure

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

where the accused did not raise the issue of the admissibility of the evidence against him on ground that it had
been illegally seized, such omission constituted a waiver of the protection granted by this section

Warrantless searches and seizures (RULE 113) instance when a search or seizures may be validly made
notwithstanding noncompliance with the requisites disused above.

Peace officer or even a private person may without a warrant a person

when such person has in fact just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his
presence.
When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it.

When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal establishment or a place where he is
serving his final judgement

DO THE ORDINARY RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND

SEIZURES APPLY TO SEARCHES CONDUCTED AT THE AIRPORT PURSUANT
TO ROUTINE AIRPORT SECURITY PROCEDURES?
NO. Searches of passengers at airport. R.A. 6235 provides that every airline ticket shall contain a condition that
hand-carried luggage, etc., shall be subject to search and this condition shall form part of the contract between
the passenger and the air carrier.

Warrant must refer to only one specific offense

Warrantless arrest
A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
When, in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or attempting to
commit an offense;
When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving a final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

Warrantless Arrest a writ issued by a judge after finding of judicial probable cause, that there is necessity in
placing the accused in custody

RULE 113 ARREST

Section 1. Definition of arrest. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. (1) purpose is to bind the person to answer an accusation of a crime;
referring to a criminal warrant of arrest.

Other instances of arrest:

Arrest or contempt by administrative and legislative bodies Ronnie dayan: he was arrested in La Union,
Pangasinan not on the basis of warrant arrest issued by the court and not on the basis of criminal court, but
issued warrant for he was cited in contempt by congress: house of representatives for not showing up.

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Deportation arrest - executive branch is authorized arrest securing a warrant any alien who has illegally entered
into the country or proven unfit to stay. executive department need not to apply or secure a judicial warrant to
arrest an individual
Both are subject to due process-must be exercise with the recognition of arrest

Section 2. Arrest;how made. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.

No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person arrested shall not be subject to
a greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. (2a)

Section 3. Duty of arresting officer. It shall be the duty of the officer executing the warrant to arrest the
accused and to deliver him to the nearest police station or jail without unnecessary delay. (3a)

Section 4. Execution of warrant. The head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was delivered for
execution shall cause the warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10) days after
the expiration of the period, the officer to whom it was assigned for execution shall make a report to the judge
who issued the warrant. In case of his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state the reasons therefor. (4a)

Section 5. Arrest without warrant;when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; Reason for allowing POLICE warrantless arrest: because there was no time to for filing such
warrant (baka kapag nagapply pa ng warrant of arrest pagbalik nya wala na yung aarestohin nakatakas na!)

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112. (5a)

Section 6. Time of making arrest. An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night. (6)

Section 7. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant, the
officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and of the fact that a warrant has been
issued for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to so inform him,
or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his
possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be
shown to him as soon as practicable. (7a)

Section 8. Method of arrest by officer without warrant. When making an arrest without a warrant, the officer
shall inform the person to be arrested of his authority and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either
engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, has escaped, flees or
forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity so to inform him, or when the giving of such information will
imperil the arrest. (8a)

Section 9. Method of arrest by private person. When making an arrest, a private person shall inform the
person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him and cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in
the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, or has escaped, flees, or forcibly

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Jurisdoctor

resists before the person making the arrest has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such
information will imperil the arrest. (9a)

Section 10. Officer may summon assistance. An officer making a lawful arrest may orally summon as many
persons as he deems necessary to assist him in effecting the arrest. Every person so summoned by an officer
shall assist him in effecting the arrest when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself. (10a)

Section 11. Right of officer to break into building or enclosure. An officer, in order to make an arrest either by
virtue of a warrant, or without a warrant as provided in section 5, may break into any building or enclosure where
the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance thereto, after announcing
his authority and purpose. (11a)

Section 12. Right to break out from building or enclosure.Whenever an officer has entered the building or
enclosure in accordance with the preceding section, he may break out therefrom when necessary to liberate
himself. (12a)

Section 13. Arrest after escape or rescue. If a person lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued, any person
may immediately pursue or retake him without a warrant at any time and in any place within the Philippines. (13)

Section 14. Right of attorney or relative to visit person arrested. Any member of the Philippine Bar shall, at
the request of the person arrested or of another acting in his behalf, have the right to visit and confer privately
with such person in the jail or any other place of custody at any hour of the day or night. Subject to reasonable
regulations, a relative of the person arrested can also exercise the same right. (14a)

BOND (PYANSADOR)
Section 23. Arrest of accused out on bail. For the purpose of surrendering the accused, the bondsmen may
arrest him or, upon written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking, cause him to be arrested by
a police officer or any other person of suitable age and discretion.

An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from
the Philippines without permission of the court where the case is pending. (23a)

Ex. Accused He may maintain a premium to a surety company to assures the court that I will appear when so
requires,
failure to appear, the court will confiscate the bond. The bondsman may arrest the accused without obtaining a
warrant of arrest in court. (This bond serve a guarantor)

SEARCH WARRANT- An order signed by a judge directed to a peace officer to search seize and to bring to
court

2 kinds of search:
1. Searches with warrant
2. Searches Without any warrant (but only under certain circumstances)

Section 1. Search warrant defined. A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of
the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property described therein and bring it before the court. (1)

WHO MAY ISSUE WARRANT OF ARREST

1987 Constitution - Only the JUDGE may issue warrant of arrest (exclusive prerogative of Judge)
1973 (Martial Law Constitution) - A warrant of arrest may be issued by the JUDGE AND SUCH OTHER
OFFICER AS MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW Secretary of Defense may issue warrant without obtaining from

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRESTS
General Rule: Only the judge has the power to issue a warrant after the proper procedure has been duly taken.

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Jurisdoctor

Exceptions:
(1) In cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of
Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation. [Salazar v.
Achacoso (1990)]

(2) Warrant of arrest may be issued by administrative authorities only for the purpose of carrying out a final
finding of a violation of law and not for the sole purpose of investigation or prosecution. It may be issued only
after the proceeding has taken place as when there is already a final decision of the administrative authorities.

Peace officer Police, NBI or PDEA

The warrant cannot be a "general warrant" meaning, it cannot be a fishing expedition. It must state the
suspected offense and only be limited to:

SUBJECT OF THE OFFENSE;

Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; o
Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
(Section 2, Rule 126, Rules of Criminal Procedure)

It cannot be issued if there is no suspected offense, like "I have not heard from him in over a month now."
Stone hill Case: Applies the use of general warrant which is not allowed by the law, as provides by our
constitution that it must be specific, otherwise considered fishing expedition which requires ascertainment of the
offense committed.

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Jurisdoctor

Right of Association
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged
(Section 8, Article III)
RELATED PROVISIONS

Sec 2(5), Art. IX-B

The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government
employees.

Sec. 3, Art. XIII.

x x x. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They
shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work,
and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law.

1. LABOR UNIONISM
The right to form associations does not necessarily include the right to be given legal personality. However, if the
law itself should make possession of legal personality a pre-condition for effective associational action, involved
would be not just the right to have legal personality but also the right to be an association.Philippine Association
of Free Labor Unions vs Secretary of Labor (1969)

The right of association of managerial employees is denied because of Article 245 of the Labor Code which
provides that managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. This is
because Art III Sec 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise is for the purposes not contrary to law. [United
Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) vs Laguesma (1998)]

2. COMMUNIST AND SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS

This is a question of the constitutionality of the Anti- Subversion Act which declares the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and similar organizations illegal and outlawed. Although the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the statute, we cannot overemphasize the need for prudence and circumspection in its enforcement,
operating as it does in the sensitive area of freedom of expression and belief. The basic guidelines for
prosecution under the Act, are the following elements for the crime to be established:

(1) In case of subversive organizations other than the CPP, (a) that the purpose of the
organization is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and to establish in
this country a totalitarian regime under the domination of a foreign power; (b) that the

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Jurisdoctor

accused joined such organization; and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully and by overt
acts; and
(1) In the case of the CPP, (a) that the CPP continues to pursue the objectives which led
Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government by illegal means for the purpose of placing the country under the control of
a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined the CPP; (c) that he did so willfully,
knowingly and by overt acts. [People vs Ferrer (1972)]

3. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

Compulsory membership of a lawyer in the integrated bar of the Philippines does not violate the constitutional
guarantee. In Re: Edillon, 84 SCRA 554

Right to Form associationsshall not be impaired without due process of law; guarantees the right not to join
an association. Sta. Clara Homeowners Association vs. Gaston1

This right is especially meaningful in a free society because a man is by nature gregarious. His disposition to mix
with others of the same persuasions, interests or objectives is guaranteed by this provision. It also expressly
guarantees to those employed in the public and private sectors the right to form unions.

This right is available also to those in the government sectors. It is a settled in jurisprudence that, in general,
workers in the public sectors do not enjoy the right to strike. The general rule in the past and up to present is that
the terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof are governed by law. x x x. Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law,
government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by the workers in the private sector to secure
concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace
cannot be secured through compulsion by law.

Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. x x x In
government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the
administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected
through statutes or administrative circulars, rules and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements.
Alliance of Concerned Government Workers vs. Ministry of Labor and Employment2

In the case of Jacinto vs. CA3, the SC held that petitioners were not penalized for the exercise of their right to
assemble peacefully and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Rather, the Civil Service
Commission found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having absented
themselves without proper authority, from their school during regular school days, in order to participate in the
mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the non holding of classes and in the deprivation of students
of education, for which they were responsible. Had petitioners availed themselves of their free timerecess,
after classes, weekends or holidaysto dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities
within the bounds of law, no onenot the DECS, the CSC or even the SCcould have held them liable for the
valid exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary stoppage of classes resulting
from their activity necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition
against strikes by government workers. Their act by their nature was enjoined by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations, for which they must, therefore, be made answerable.

GSIS vs. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS,4 it was against the backdrop of the provisions of the
Constitution that the Court resolved that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in
concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government employees to organize is limited to

1G.R. No. 141961, January 23, 2002

2 124 SCRA 1

3 281 SCRA 657

4 G. R. No. 170132, December 6, 2006,

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Jurisdoctor

the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike. It may be, as the appellate court
urged, that the freedom of expression and assembly and the right to petition the government for a redress of
grievances stand on a level higher than economic and other liberties. The right to form associations shall not be
impaired without due process of law and is thus an aspect of the right of liberty. It is also an aspect of the
freedom of contract. In addition, insofar as the associations may have for their object the advancement of beliefs
and ideas, the freedom of association is an aspect of the freedom of speech and expression, subject to the
same limitation.

- The right also covers the right not to join an association.

- Government employees have the right to form unions. They also have the right to strike, unless there is a
statutory ban on them (i.e. ban on public school teachers).

The right to form associations shall not be impaired without due process of law.
The instinct to organize is a very basic human drive.
The right to form an association does not include the right to compel others to form an association. But there
may be situations in which, by entering into a contract, one may also be agreeing to join an association.

A land buyer who buys a lot with an annotated lien that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of a
homeowners association thereby voluntarily joins the association.

One who becomes an employee of an establishment that has a closed shop agreement with the union
thereby becomes a member of the union.

The right to form associations includes the right to unionize.

The right of civil servants to unionize is also recognized in Article IX, B, Section 2(5) which says: The right to
self-organization shall not be denied to government employees. The right is recognized whether such
employees perform governmental or proprietary functions.
The right of labor in general to unionize is also recognized in Article XIII, Section 3: The State shall guarantee
the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.
Employees of the SSS and public school teachers do not have a constitutional right to strike. But the current
ban on them against strikes is statutory and may be lifted by statute.

Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Secretary of Labor: Sec. 23 of RA 875 requiring the
registration of labor unions was challenged as violative of the Bill of Rights. The SC held that this contention was
untenable. The registration is not a limitation to the right of assembly or association, which may be exercised
with or without said registration. It is merely a condition sine qua non to for the acquisition of legal personality by
labor organizations, associations, or unions and the possession of the rights and privileges granted by law to
legitimate labor organizations.

Mere membership in the Communist Party and similar organizations may not be punished as a criminal
offense. Membership does not render the members either of rebellion or of conspiracy to commit rebellion,
because mere membership and nothing more implies advocacy of abstract theory or principle without any
action being induced thereby; and that such advocacy becomes criminal only if it if coupled with action or
advocacy of action. (People v. Hernandez)

(Note: The Anti-Subversion Act has been repealed.)

CASES

PEOPLE VS. FERRER5

PONENCIA: CASTRO
TOPIC: Right to association

5 GR L-32613-14, 27 December 1972 First Division, Castro (J): 5 concur, 12 took no part, 1 dissented in a separate opinion
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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

TRIGGER OF THE FACTS:

TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE:
TRIGGER OF THE RULING:
VERDICT: the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set aside, and these two cases are hereby remanded to
the court a quo for trial on the merits.
END POINT:

FACTS
a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Feliciano Co in the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac.
Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co,
directed the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information.
The twice-amended information recites
"That an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal
organization aimed to takeover the Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit,
subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian
regime and placing the government under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an
instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University
the training school of recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of the said Communist
Party of the Philippines. That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating
circumstances are present, to wit:

B. That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities;
C. That the crime was committed by a band; and
D. With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity." Co moved to quash on
the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. Meanwhile, on 25 May 1970,
another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, charging Nilo Tayag and five others
with subversion. After preliminary investigation was had, an information was filed. On 21 July
1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that
(1) Republic Act 1700 is a bill of attainder;
(2) it is vague;
(3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and
(4) it denies him the equal protection of the laws. Resolving the constitutional
issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of 15 September 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds
that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad, and dismissed the informations against the two
accused.
The Government appealed. The Supreme Court resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for
certiorari.

ISSUE
Whether the Anti-Subversion Law partakes of the nature of a Bill of Attainder.

HELD
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be enacted."
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a
legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to
implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling
legislative usurpation of the judicial function. History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress
unpopular causes and political minorities, and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed.
The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize
a statute as a bill of attainder. Herein, when the Anti-Subversion Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be
seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of

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Jurisdoctor

BANGALISAN VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS6

PONENCIA: REGALADO
TOPIC: Right to association
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS: 800 public school teachers had a mass action for their benefits, they were dismissed by
DECS for the neglect of their duty as a teacher.
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE: WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion and petitioners exonerated that they are
deprived of their constitutional right.
TRIGGER OF THE RULING: No. CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Public employees are not allowed to
engage in a strike.
VERDICT: the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that petitioner
Rodolfo Mariano shall be given back wages without deduction or qualification from the time he was suspended until
his actual reinstatement which, under prevailing jurisprudence, should not exceed five years.
END POINT: The right of government employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or
associations, without including the right to strike.

FACTS
Petitioners were among the 800 public school teachers who staged mass actions
to dramatize their protests concerning the alleged failure of the public authorities to implement in a just and
correct manner certain laws and measures intended for their material benefit.
the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) issued a Return-to-Work Order.
Petitioners failed to comply with said order, hence they were charged by the Secretary with grave
misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation of Civil Service law, rules and regulations and reasonable
office regulations; refusal to perform official duty; gross insubordination; conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service; and absence without official leave in violation of PD 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service
Decree of the Philippines.
They were simultaneously placed under preventive suspension.
Thereafter, the DECS Secretary rendered a decision finding petitioners guilty as charged and dismissing them
from the service effective immediately.
Acting on the motions for reconsideration filed by some of the petitioners the Secretary subsequently modified
the penalty of dismissal to suspension for nine months without pay.
The other petitioners also filed individual appeals to the MSPB, but all of their appeals were dismissed for lack
of merit.
Petitioners then appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) where it ruled that respondents were guilty
of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
It, however, modified the penalty of nine months suspension previously meted to them to six months
suspension with automatic reinstatement in the service but without payment of back wages.
All the petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CSC resolutions but these were all denied,
except that of petitioner Rodolfo Mariano who was found guilty only of a violation of reasonable office rules
and regulations because of his failure to inform the school of his intended absence and to file an application
for leave therefor.
This petitioner was accordingly given only a reprimand.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit

ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the resolutions of the
CSC that penalized petitioners whose only offense was to exercise their constitutional right to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances

HELD
6 G.R. No. 124678. July 31, 1997
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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

No, the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes. While the
Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, they are prohibited from performing
strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary
work stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of government employees to organize is limited only to
the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.

It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners purpose was to realize their
demands by withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term strike was not used by the striking
employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation,
and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.

The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. To grant employees of the public sector the right to
strike, there must be a clear and direct legislative authority therefor. In the absence of any express legislation
allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right,
employees in the public service may not engage in strikes, walkouts and temporary work stoppages like workers
in the private sector

It is not the exercise by the petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was punished, but
the manner in which they exercised such right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public
service and classes in various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there are efficient but non-disruptive
avenues, other than the mass actions in question, whereby petitioners could petition the government for redress
of grievances.

It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail services to the
public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government employees. It may be conceded
that the petitioners had valid grievances and noble intentions in staging the mass actions, but that will not
justify their absences to the prejudice of innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize
an illegal work stoppage. The right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages by public employees
was clearly recognized at common law.

SYLLABI
Civil Service; Administrative Law; Strikes; The right of government employees to organize is limited only to the
formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction
that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the right of
government employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-
outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The
right of government employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or associations, without
including the right to strike.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The fact that the conventional term strike was not used by the striking employees
to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its
appearance, will be deemed to be controlling. It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that
petitioners purpose was to realize their demands by withholding their services. The fact that the conventional
term strike was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is
inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.
The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute, public employees do not
have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose.

Same; Same; Same; Right of Assembly; The public school teachers who went on strike are penalized not
because they exercised their right of peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances but because
their successive unauthorized and unilateral absences produced adverse effects upon their students for whose
education they are responsible.Further, herein petitioners, except Mariano, are being penalized not because
Page 22 of 42
 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

they exercised their right of peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances but because of their
successive unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon their students for whose
education they are responsible. The actuations of petitioners definitely constituted conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, punishable under the Civil Service law, rules and regulations.

Same; Same; Same; Suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail services to the
public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government employees. It bears stressing
that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail services to the public, which is one
of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government employees. It may be conceded that the petitioners
had valid grievances and noble intentions in staging the mass actions, but that will not justify their absences to
the prejudice of innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal work stoppage.

Same; Same; Same; Even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like Memorandum Circular No. 6,
public employees are denied the right to strike or engage in a work stoppage against a public employer. As a
general rule, even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like Memorandum Circular No. 6, public
employees are denied the right to strike or engage in a work stoppage against a public employer. The right of the
sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages by public employees was clearly recognized at common law.
Indeed, it is frequently declared that modern rules which prohibit such strikes, either by statute or by judicial
decision, simply incorporate or reassert the common-law rule.
Same; Same; Same; To grant employees of the public sector the right to strike, there must be a clear and direct
legislative authority therefor. To grant employees of the public sector the right to strike, there must be a clear
and direct legislative authority therefor. In the absence of any express legislation allowing government
employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, employees in the
public service may not engage in strikes, walkouts and temporary work stoppages like workers in the private
sector.

Same; Same; Preventive Suspension; Under Section 51 of Executive Order No. 292, it is the nature of the
charge against an officer or employee which determines whether he may be placed under preventive
suspension.Section 51 of Executive Order No. 292 provides that (t)he proper disciplining authority may
preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the
charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the
performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would
warrant his removal from the service. Under the aforesaid provision, it is the nature of the charge against an
officer or employee which determines whether he may be placed under preventive suspension. In the instant
case, herein petitioners were charged by the Secretary of the DECS with grave misconduct, gross neglect of
duty, gross violation of Civil Service law, rules and regulations, and reasonable office regulations, refusal to
perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence
without official leave (AWOL), for joining the teachers mass actions held at Liwasang Bonifacio on September
17 to 21, 1990. Hence, on the basis of the charges against them, it was within the competence of the Secretary
to place herein petitioners under preventive suspension.

UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION (UPSU) VS HON.

BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA7
PONENCIA: Mendoza
TOPIC: Non-Impairment clause
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS:
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE:
TRIGGER OF THE RULING:
VERDICT:
END POINT:

7 G.R. No. 122226, March 25, 1998

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

FACTS
The petitioner is a union of supervisory employees.
Sometime of march, the union filed a petition for certification on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola
Products Philippines, Inc.
However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for
union membership under the first sentence of Art 245 of the Labor Code, which provides:

Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory Employees-
Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory
employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file
employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, pressing for resolution its contention that the first sentence of Art.
245 of the Labor Code, so far declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form, assit or join unions,
contravenes Article III, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

ISSUE
Whether or not Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from forming, joining or assisting labor
unions, violates Article III, Section 8 of the Constitution.

RULING
Art. 245 do not violate Article III, Section 8 of the Constitution.
The real intent of Article III, section 8 is evident in Lerums proposal.
The Commission intended the absolute right to organize of government workers, supervisory employees and
security guards to be constitutionally guaranteed.
By implication, no similar absolute constitutional rights to organize for labor purposes should be deemed to
have been granted to top-level and middle managers.
Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, Section 8 of the Constitution encroach on by a ban
against managerial employees forming a union.
The guaranteed right in Art. III, Section 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for the
purposes not contrary to law.
In the case of Art 245, there is rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining
labor organization.
For the reason that these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might
not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interest. The union also becomes
company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership.

SYLLABI
Same; Same; The guarantee of organizational right in Art. 111, 8 not infringed by a ban against managerial
employees forming a union; There is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or
joining labor organizations. Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, 8 infringed by a ban against
managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, 8 is subject to the condition that its
exercise should be for purposes not contrary to law. In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for
prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor organizations. As Justice Davide, Jr., himself a
constitutional commissioner, said in his ponencia in Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v. NLRC: In the first
place, all these employees, with the exception of the service engineers and the sales force personnel, are
confidential employees. Their classification as such is not seriously disputed by PEO-FFW; the five (5) previous
CBAs between PIDI and PEO-FFW explicitly considered them as confidential employees. By the very nature of

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

their functions, they assist and act in a confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of,
persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations. As such, the rationale behind the
ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist or joint a labor union equally applies to them.

Supreme Court; Judgments; Prospective Application of Judgments; Natural Resources; Reliance on De

Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 (1971) and Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 515 (1992), is misplaced,
as these cases would apply if the prevailing law or doctrine at the time of the signing of the Amended Joint
Venture Agreement (JVA) was that a private corporation could acquire alienable lands of the public domain, and
the Decision annulled the law or reversed this doctrinethe prevailing law before, during and after the signing of
the Amended JVA is that private corporations cannot hold, except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain.
Amaris reliance on De Agbayani and Spouses Benzonan is misplaced. These cases would apply if the
prevailing law or doctrine at the time of the signing of the Amended JVA was that a private corporation could
acquire alienable lands of the public domain, and the Decision annulled the law or reversed this doctrine.
Obviously, this is not the case here. Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations were allowed to acquire
alienable lands of the public domain. But since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, private corporations were
banned from holding, except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution continued this
constitutional prohibition. The prevailing law before, during and after the signing of the Amended JVA is that
private corporations cannot hold, except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain. The Decision has not
annulled or in any way changed the law on this matter. The Decision, whether made retroactive or not, does not
change the law since the Decision merely reiterates the law that prevailed since the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution. Thus, De Agbayani, which refers to a law that is invalidated by a decision of the Court, has no
application to the instant case.

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Contract Clause / Non-Impairment

clause
No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed
(Section 10, Article III)
REQUISITES OF VALID IMPAIRMENT
1. Substantial impairment
A. change the terms of legal contract either in time or mode of performance
B. impose new conditions
C. dispenses with expressed conditions
D. authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in the terms
2. Affects rights of parties with reference to each other, and not with respect to non-parties. 8

WHEN DOES, A LAW IMPAIR THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS?

1. If it changes the terms and conditions of a legal contract either as to the time or mode of performance
2. If it imposes new conditions or dispenses with those expressed
3. If it authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms.

WHEN NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE PREVAILS

(1) against power of taxation
(2) regulation on loans

New regulations on loans making redemption of property sold on foreclosure stricter are not allowed to apply
retroactively. Co v. Philippine National Bank9

Civil Code, Art. 1306.

The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.

1. APPLICATION OF THE CONTRACT CLAUSE

Impairment is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract. There is substantial impairment when the law
changes the terms of a legal contact between the parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes
new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that
provided in its terms. [Clements v. Nolting10]

8 [Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association v. Secretary, DILG (2003)]

9 [Co v. Philippine National Bank (1982)]

10 42 Phil. 702
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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

2. CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF THE CONTRACT CLAUSE

As to Tax:

GENERAL RULE: Power of taxation may not be used to violate the constitutional right of every person to be
secured against any statute that impairs the obligation of contracts.

EXCEPTION: But if the statute exempts a party from any one class of taxes, the imposition of a different tax is
not an impairment of the obligation of contracts.

A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be
given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is
applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Non-impairment of contracts or
vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of the police power.
[Ortigas & Co. v. CA11]

New regulations on loans making redemption of property sold on foreclosure more strict are not allowed to apply
retroactively. [Co v. Philippine National Bank (1982)]

Limitations on the use of land imposed by a contract to yield to a reasonable exercise of police power are
affirmed. Thus, zoning regulations are superior to contractual restrictions on the use of property. [Presley v. Bel-
Air Village Association (1991)]

A separation pa law can be given retroactive effect to apply to existing contracts. [Abella v. National Labor
Regulations Commission (1987)]

The charter of a bank, even if a contract, is no obstacle to liquidation done under police power. [Philippine
Veterans Bank Employees Union v. Philippine Veterans Bank (1990)]

Contracts also yield to the requirements of the freedom of religion. [Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers (1974)]
Timber licenses, permits, and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced, or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they
are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause. [Oposa v. Factoran (1993)]

A rehabilitation plan approved by statute which merely suspends the actions for claims does not violate the
contract clause. [GSIS v. Kapisanan (2006)]

The SECs approval of the Rehabilitation Plan did not impair BPIs right to contract. The impairment clause is a
limit on the exercise of legislative power and not of judicial or quasi-judicial power. The SEC...was acting as a
quasi-judicial body, and its order approving the plan cannot constitute an impairment of the right and the freedom
to contract.

Besides, the mere fact that the Rehabilitation Plan proposes a dacion en pago approach does not render it
defective on the ground of impairment of the right to contract. The undertaking really partakes in a sense of the
nature of sale. As such, the essential elements of a contract of sale must be present. Being a form of contract,
the dacion en pago agreement cannot be perfected without the consent of the parties involved. [China Banking
Corporation v. ADB Holdings (2008)]

The amount of rental is an essential condition of any lease contract. The change of its rate in the Rehabilitation
Plan is not justified as it impairs the stipulation between the parties. [Leca Realty v. Manuela Corporation (2007)]
The non-impairment clause is a limit on legislative power, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial power. The
approval of the Rehabilitation Plan by the Securities and Exchange Commission is an exercise of adjudicatory
power by an administrative agency and thus the non-impairment clause does not apply. Neither does it impair
the power to contract. [BPI v. SEC (2007)]

11 G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Laws prohibiting premature campaigning are intended to level the playing field for candidates to public office, to
equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser- known or poorer candidates,
on the other, by preventing undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and
popularity. Such laws might affect advertising contracts, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield
to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. [Chavez v. COMELEC (2004)]

The Court has imposed 2 essential requisites in order that RA 7641 (Retirement Law) may be given retroactive
effect. First, the claimant for retirement benefits must still be in the employ of the employer at the time the statute
took effect. Second, the claimant must have complied with the requirements for eligibility for such retirement
benefits under the statute. [Universal Robina Sugar v. Cabaleda (2008)]

3. LIMITATIONS
It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition does not prohibit every change in existing laws.
To fall within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but the
impairment must be substantial. Moreover, the law must effect a change in the rights of the parties with
reference to each other, and not with respect to non-parties. [Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives
Association v. Secretary, DILG12]

NATURE OF PROTECTION
Purpose: Safeguard the integrity of valid contractual agreements against unwarranted
interference by the State.
General Rule: Contracts should be respected by the legislature and not tampered with by subsequent
laws that will change the intention of the parties or modify their rights and obligations. The will of the parties to
the contract must prevail.

CONTRACTS AFFECTED
Affects legal, executed and executory contracts, which must be valid.

LIMITATIONS
1. A contract valid at the time of its execution may be legally modified or even completely invalidated by a
subsequent law.
2. Strict construction. Charters, franchises and licenses granted by the Government are strictly construed
against the grantees.
3. If a law is a proper exercise of the police power, it will prevail over the contract. This is because public
welfare is superior to private rights (PNB v. Remigio, G.R. 78508, March 21, 1995). Into each contract
are read the provisions of existing law and, always, a reservation of the police power as long as the
agreement deals with a matter affecting the public welfare.
4. Eminent domain and taxation may also validly limit the impairment clause.

EFFECT OF EMERGENCY LEGISLATION ON CONTRACTS

In a national emergency, such as a protracted economic depression, the police power may be exercised to the
extent of impairing some of the rights of parties arising from contracts. However, such emergency laws are to
remain in effect only during the continuance of the emergency.

CURRENCY LEGISLATION AND CONTRACTS

1. The legislative department has complete authority to determine the currency of the state and to prescribe
what articles shall be used and accepted as legal tender in the payment of lawful obligations.
2. Private parties are bound to observe this governmental authority over the nation's currency in the
execution of their contracts.

12 G.R. No. 143076, June 10, 2003

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

IMPAIRMENT
In order to come within the meaning of the constitutional provision, the obligation of contract must be
impaired by some legislative act (statute, ordinance, etc.). The act need not be by a legislative office; but it
should be legislative in nature. Furthermore, the impairment must be substantial (Philippine Rural Electric
Cooperatives Assoc. v. DILG Secretary, G.R. 143076, June 10, 2003).

A mere administrative order, not legislative in nature, may not be considered a cause of impairment within
the scope of the constitutional guarantee. The guarantee is also not violated by court decisions.

The act of impairment is anything which diminishes the value of the contract. The legislature may, however,
change the remedy or may prescribe new modes of procedure. The change does not impair the obligation
of contracts so long as another remedy, just as efficacious, is provided for the adequate enforcement of the
rights under the contract. (Manila Trading Co v. Reyes, 1935)

NOTE:
A mere change in PROCEDURAL REMEDIES which does not change the substance of the contract, and
which still leaves an efficacious remedy for enforcement does NOT impair the obligation of contracts.
A valid exercise of police power is superior to obligation of contracts.
The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the
State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations
must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or
the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.
The purpose of the impairment clause is to safeguard the integrity of valid contractual agreements against
unwarranted interference by the State. As a rule, they should be respected by the legislature and not
tampered with by subsequent laws that will change the intention of the parties or modify their rights and
obligations. The will of the obligor and the obligee must be observed; the obligation of their contract must
not be impaired. However, the protection of the impairment clause is not absolute. There are instances
when contracts valid at the time of their conclusion may become invalid, or some of their provisions may be
rendered inoperative or illegal, by virtue of supervening legislation.

Limitations:
1. Police powerprevails over contracts;
2. Eminent domainmay weaken obligation of contracts; and
3. Taxationcannot weaken obligation of contracts.

Impairmentanything that diminishes the efficacy of a contract There is impairment when there is change in the
terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions,
or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its
terms. (Clemons vs. Nolting, No. 17959, January 24, 1922)

Hon. Heherson Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 162243, November 29, 2006, in unequivocal
terms, the SC have consistently held that such licenses concerning the harvesting of timber in the countrys
forests cannot be considered contracts that would bind the Government regardless of changes in policy and the
demands of public interest and welfare. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause
cannot be invoked.

The law relating to the obligation of contracts does not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within the
prohibition the change must impair the obligation of the existing contract, and the impairment must be
substantial.

A law which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance,
or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something
different from that provided in its terms, is law which impairs the obligation of a contract and is therefore null
and void. (Clemons v. Nolting)

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intention of the parties, necessarily impairs
the contract itself. (U.S. v. Diaz Conde)

Government of the Philippine Islands v. Frank: The terms of a statute had been made a part of the contract
between Frank and the Government. The Court said that a subsequent amendment of the statute could not have
the effect of amending the terms of the contract.

To come under the prohibition, the law must effect a change on the rights of the parties with reference to each
other and not with reference to non-parties. Moreover, what the prohibition envisions are enactments passed
by a governmental law-making body.

An additional tax imposed upon goods already contracted to be sold does not impair the contract between
the buyer and seller.
A change in the Catholic Churchs canon law which affects the contractual relation between parties with
reference to internal affairs of the church is not covered by the prohibition.

During the period of transition, a statute was passed providing that money judgments rendered in court should
be stated in terms of the new Philippine currency in an amount equivalent to the value of the old. The law,
when applied to contractual debts, was challenged as an impairment of the obligation of contracts. In Gaspar
v. Molina, the Court upheld the statute since it did not require the debtor to pay more nor the creditor to
receive less than they were required to pay or receive under the former law.

Clemons v. Nolting: An attempt by the government to satisfy an obligation to pay in U.S. dollars by the payment
of Philippine pesos at the rate of P2 = $1 when the commercial value of the U.S. dollar was much more, was
deemed an impairment of the contractual obligation.

The non-impairment clause is a limit on the exercise of legislative power and not of judicial or quasi-judicial
power.

Police power is superior over the sanctity of contracts.

Statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the state of police power, are
applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those
already established and in operation. (Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Public Service Commission)

In Abe v. Foster Wheeler Corporation, in upholding a statute granting to workers rights which they did not
have under existing contracts, the Court said that the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment is limited by
the exercise of police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare.

The contract clause did not preclude remedial legislation in the interest of the general welfare.
Primero v. Court of Agrarian Relations: The security of tenure guaranteed to an agricultural tenant by a
statute was challenged as impairing existing tenancy relations. The Court ruled that the law was unquestionably
a remedial legislation promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution and in the exercise
of the police power of the State to promote the common weal.

New regulations on loans making redemption of property sold on foreclosure stricter were not allowed to apply
retroactively. (Co v. Philippine National Bank)

Limitations on the use of land imposed by contract yield to a reasonable exercise of police power and, hence,
zoning regulations are superior to contractual restrictions on the use of property. (Ortigas & Co. v. FEATI
Bank)

Contracts also yield to the requirements of freedom of worship.

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Jurisdoctor

A license or permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or permittee, and is not a property
in the constitutional sense, as to which the constitutional prescription against the impairment of contracts may
extend. (Gonzalo Sy Trading v. Central Bank)

CASES

ORTIGAS & COMPANY VS COURT OF APPEALS13

PONENCIA: QUISUMBING, J.:
TOPIC: Non-Impairment clause
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS:
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE:
TRIGGER OF THE RULING:
VERDICT: the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals
as well as the assailed resolution of August 13, 1996, in CAG.R. SP No. 39193 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
END POINT:

FACTS
Ortigas & Company sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of land located in Greenhills Subdivision with conditions
duly annotated on the certificate of title issued to Emilia
the Metropolitan Manila Commission (now MMDA) enacted MMC Ordinance 81-01 (Comprehensive Zoning
Area for the National Capital Region),
which reclassified as a commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue where the lot is located.
Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp.
The lease contract did not specify the purposes of the lease.
Thereupon, Mathay constructed a single story commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales
company.
Ortigas filed a complaint against Emilia Hermoso with the RTC Pasig
seeking the demolition of the said commercial structure for having violated the terms and conditions of
the Deed of Sale.
The complaint was later amended to implead Ismael G. Mathay III and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp.,
which have 10% interest in the lot.
In his answer, Mathay III denied any knowledge of the restrictions on the use of the lot and filed a cross-claim
against the Hermosos.
the trial court issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
Mathay III moved to set aside the injunctive order,
but the trial court denied the motion.
Mathay III then filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari
ascribing to the trial court grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.
He claimed that MMC Ordinance 81-01 classified the area where the lot was located as
commercial area and said ordinance must be read into the Deed of Sale as a concrete exercise
of police power.
Ortigas & Company averred that restrictions duly annotated on the title must prevail over the ordinance.
the appellate court granted the petition, nullified and set aside the assailed orders.
The appellate court held that the MMC Ordinance effectively nullified the restrictions allowing only residential
use of the property in question.
Ortigas seasonably moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied it.
Ortigas filed the petition for review.

13 GR 126102 04 December2000
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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

ISSUE
Whether or notMMC 81-01 be given retroactive effect and impair vested rights and contracts?

HELD
Yes,in general, laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation.
Lex prospicit, non respicit.
Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later
statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect.
A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract
necessarily impairs the contract itself and cannot be given retroactive effect without violating the constitutional
prohibition against impairment of contracts.
One exception involves police power.
A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be
given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts.
Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence.
Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise
by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general
welfare of the people.
Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract. MMC Ordinance 81-01
is a legitimate police power measure as previously held in Sangalang vs. IAC. Thus, following the ruling in
Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533 (1979), the contractual stipulations annotated on
the Torrens Title must yield to the ordinance.
When that stretch was reclassified, the restrictions in the contract of sale were deemed extinguished by the
retroactive operation of the zoning ordinance and could no longer be enforced.
While Philippine legal system upholds the sanctity of contract so that a contract is deemed law between the
contracting parties, nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot contravene law, morals, good customs

SYLLABI
Contracts; Contract Clause; Police Power; Statutes; A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner
changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily impairs the contract itself and cannot be given
retroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts. We agree that
laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation. Lex prospicit, non respicit. Equally settled, only
laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the
latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner
changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily im pairs the contract itself and cannot be given
retroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities
or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contractspolice
power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. The
foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power. A law enacted in the exercise of
police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may
reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts,
but equally to those already in existence. Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield
to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police
power must be read into every contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, we already
upheld MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 as a legitimate police power measure.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Restrictions in a contract of sale limiting all constructions on the subject lot to single-
family residential buildings deemed extinguished by the retroactive operation of a zoning ordinance reclassifying
the area as a commercial zone. Following our ruling in Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co., 94
SCRA 533 (1979), the contractual stipulations annotated on the Torrens Title, on which Ortigas relies, must yield
to the ordinance. When that stretch of Ortigas Avenue from Roosevelt Street to Madison Street was reclassified
Page 32 of 42
 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

as a commercial zone by the Metropolitan Manila Commission in March 1981, the restrictions in the contract of
sale between Ortigas and Hermoso, limiting all construction on the disputed lot to single-family residential
buildings, were deemed extinguished by the retroactive operation of the zoning ordinance and could no longer
be enforced. While our legal system upholds the sanctity of contract so that a contract is deemed law between
the contracting parties, nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot contravene law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy. Otherwise such stipulations would be deemed null and void.

MARIVELES VS. CA
PONENCIA: QUISUMBING, J.:
TOPIC: Non-Impairment clause
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS:
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE:
TRIGGER OF THE RULING:
VERDICT:he Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.
R. SP No. 55416 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner and Longest Force are held liable jointly and severally
for underpayment of wages and overtime pay of the security guards, without prejudice to petitioners right of
reimbursement from Longest Force Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. The amounts payable to complaining
security guards, herein private respondents, by way of total back wages and attorneys fees are hereby set at
P3,926,100.40 and P392,610.04, respectively. Costs against petitioner.
END POINT:

FACTS
Sometime on October 1993, Mariveles Shipyard Corporation engaged the services of Longest Force
Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. to render security services at its premises. Pursuant to their agreement,
Longest Force deployed its security guards, the private respondents herein, at the petitioners shipyard in
Mariveles, Bataan.
According to petitioner, it religiously complied with the terms of the security contract with Longest Force,
promptly paying its bills and the contract rates of the latter. However, it found the services being rendered by the
assigned guards unsatisfactory and inadequate, causing it to terminate its contract with Longest Force on April
1995. Longest Force, in turn, terminated the employment of the security guards it had deployed at petitioners
shipyard.

On September 1996, private respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages pursuant to
the PNPSOSIA-PADPAO rates, non-payment of overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service
incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and attorneys fees, against both Longest Force and petitioner, before the
Labor Arbiter. The case sought the guards reinstatement with full back wages and without loss of seniority
rights.

Longest Force admitted that it employed private respondents and assigned them as security guards at the
premises of petitioner rendering a 12 hours duty per shift for the said period. It likewise admitted its liability as to
the non-payment of the alleged wage differential in the total amount of P2,618,025 but passed on the liability to
petitioner

The petitioner denied any liability on account of the alleged illegal dismissal, stressing that no employer-
employee relationship existed between it and the security guards. It further pointed out that it would be the
height of injustice to make it liable again for monetary claims which it had already paid. Anent the cross-claim
filed by Longest Force against it, petitioner prayed that it be dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner averred that
Longest Force had benefited from the contract; it was now estopped from questioning said agreement on the
ground that it had made a bad deal.

The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment that Longest Force and Mariveles Shipping be jointly and severally liable to
pay the money claims of the complainants. Petitioner appealed the foregoing to the NLRC. The labor tribunal,
affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the
NLRC.

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 Armando Santiago Jr
Jurisdoctor

The petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari assailing the NLRC judgment for having been rendered
with grave abuse of discretion with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition
and dismissed it outright.

ISSUE
WON Longest Force should be held solely and ultimately liable.

HELD
Petitioners liability is joint and several with that of Longest Force, pursuant to Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the
Labor Code which provide as follows:

ART. 106. CONTRACTOR OR SUBCONTRACTOR. Whenever an employer enters into a contract with
another person for the performance of the formers work, the employees of the contractor and of the latters
subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with this
Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to
the extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to
employees directly employed by him.

ART. 107. INDIRECT EMPLOYER. The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to
any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an independent
contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project.

ART. 109. SOLIDARY LIABILITY. The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, every
employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with his contractor or subcontractor for any violation of
any provision of this Code. For purposes of determining the extent of their civil liability under this Chapter, they
shall be considered as direct employers.

In this case, when petitioner contracted for security services with Longest Force as the security agency that hired
private respondents to work as guards for the shipyard corporation, petitioner became an indirect employer of
private respondents pursuant to Article 107 above cited. Following Article 106, when the agency as contractor
failed to pay the guards, the corporation as principal becomes jointly and severally liable for the guards wages.
This is mandated by the Labor Code to ensure compliance with its provisions, including payment of statutory
minimum wage.

The security agency is held liable by virtue of its status as direct employer, while the corporation is deemed the
indirect employer of the guards for the purpose of paying their wages in the event of failure of the agency to pay
them. This statutory scheme gives the workers the ample protection consonant with labor and social justice
provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner cannot evade its liability by claiming that it had religiously paid the
compensation of guards as stipulated under the contract with the security agency. Labor standards are enacted
by the legislature to alleviate the plight of workers whose wages barely meet the spiraling costs of their basic
needs. Labor laws are considered written in every contract. Stipulations in violation thereof are considered null.
Similarly, legislated wage increases are deemed amendments to the contract. Thus, employers cannot hide
behind their contracts in order to evade their (or their contractors or subcontractors) liability for noncompliance
with the statutory minimum wage.

However, the court emphasizes that the solidary liability of petitioner with that of Longest Force does not
preclude the application of the Civil Code provision on the right of reimbursement from his co-debtor by the one
who paid. As held in Del Rosario & Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC, the joint and several liabilities
imposed on petitioner is without prejudice to a claim for reimbursement by petitioner against the security agency
for such amounts as petitioner may have to pay to complainants, the private respondents herein. The security
agency may not seek exculpation by claiming that the principals payments to it were inadequate for the guards
lawful compensation. As an employer, the security agency is charged with knowledge of labor laws; and the

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adequacy of the compensation that it demands for contractual services is its principal concern and not any
others.

SYLLABI
Same; Indirect Employers; Security Guards; Joint and Several Obligations; When the security agency fails to pay
its guards, the corporation serviced, as principal, becomes jointly and severally liable for the guards wages.In
this case, when petitioner contracted for security services with Longest Force as the security agency that hired
private respondents to work as guards for the shipyard corporation, petitioner became an indirect employer of
private respondents pursuant to Article 107 above cited. Following Article 106, when the agency as contractor
failed to pay the guards, the corporation as principal becomes jointly and severally liable for the guards wages.
This is mandated by the Labor Code to ensure compliance with its provisions, including payment of statutory
minimum wage. The security agency is held liable by virtue of its status as direct employer, while the corporation
is deemed the indirect employer of the guards for the purpose of paying their wages in the event of failure of the
agency to pay them. This statutory scheme gives the workers the ample protection consonant with labor and
social justice provisions of the 1987 Constitution.

CLEMONS VS. NOLTING

PONENCIA: JOHNSON, J.:
TOPIC: Non-Impairment clause
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS:
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE:
TRIGGER OF THE RULING:
VERDICT:For all of the foregoing facts and the law, we are fully persuaded that the remedy prayed for should be, and
is hereby, granted. And it is hereby ordered and decreed that the writ of mandamus be issued to the defendant
herein, commanding him to countersign, or cause to the countersigned the original of the warrant set forth in
paragraph 9 of the complaint, and to deliver the same to the plaintiff so that he may present it to the Treasurer of the
Philippine Islands and receive payment of said sum of P73.33 due him as averred in the complaint and without any
finding as to costs. So ordered.
END POINT:

SYLLABI
Contracts; Use of Dollar Sign ($), Significance of; A Contract Payable in Dollars Must Be Paid in Dollars or Their
Equivalent. When the dollar sign ($) is used in a written contract made in the United States, it signifies dollars
in the money of the United States, and the contract can be discharged only by the payment of the required
amount in United States money or in Philippine pesos of an equivalent commercial value, unless otherwise
specifically provided in the contract. It would be ruinous to the commercial interests of the Philippine Islands to
declare that the payment of debts of money could be made in other specie than that stipulated in the contract.

PHILRECA VS DILG
PONENCIA: PUNO, J.:
TOPIC: Non-Impairment clause
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS:
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE:
TRIGGER OF THE RULING:
VERDICT:the instant petition is DENIED and the temporary restraining order heretofore issued is LIFTED.
End point of the case:
END POINT:

FACTS
Under Presidential Decree (PD) 269, as amended, or the National Electrification Administration Decree, it is the
declared policy of the State to provide the total electrification of the Philippines on an area coverage basis the
same being vital to the people and the sound development of the nation.
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Pursuant to this policy, PD 269 aims to promote, encourage and assist all public service entities engaged in
supplying electric service, particularly electric cooperatives by giving every tenable support and assistance to
the electric cooperatives coming within the purview of the law.

From 1971 to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by PD 269, as amended, the
Philippine Government, acting through the National Economic Council (now National Economic Development
Authority) and the NEA (National Electrification Administration), entered into 6 loan agreements with the
government of the United States of America through the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) with electric cooperatives, including Agusan Del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ANECO); Iloilo I
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ILECO I); and Isabela I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ISELCO I), as beneficiaries.

The 6 loan agreements involved a total amount of approximately US$86,000,000.00. These loan agreements are
existing until today.

The loan agreements contain similarly worded provisions on the tax application of the loan and any property or
commodity acquired through the proceeds of the loan.

On 23 May 2000, a class suit was filed by the Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc.
(PHILRECA); ANECO, ILECO I and ISELCO I; in their own behalf and in behalf of other electric cooperatives
organized and existing under PD 269, against the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG) and the Secretary of the Department of Finance, through a petition for prohibition, contending that
pursuant to the provisions of PD 269, as amended, and the provision in the loan agreements, they are exempt
from payment of local taxes, including payment of real property tax.

With the passage of the Local Government Code, however, they allege that their tax exemptions have been
invalidly withdrawn, in violation of the equal protection clause and impairing the obligation of contracts between
the Philippine Government and the United States Government.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Local Government Code unduly discriminated against electric cooperatives organized and
existing under PD 269 on the ground that it violated the equal protection clause.

HELD
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived
of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances. Thus, the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a law based on
reasonable classification.

Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purposes of the
law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.

There is reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax treatment
between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269, as amended, and electric cooperatives under RA 6938
(Cooperative Code of the Philippines).

First, nowhere in PD 269, as amended, does it require cooperatives to make equitable contributions to capital.
Under the Cooperative Code, the articles of cooperation of a cooperative applying for registration must be
accompanied with the bonds of the accountable officers and a sworn statement of the treasurer elected by the
subscribers showing that at least 25% of the authorized share capital has been subscribed and at least 25% of
the total subscription has been paid and in no case shall the paid-up share capital be less than P2,000.00.

Second, another principle adhered to by the Cooperative Code is the principle of subsidiarity. Pursuant to this
principle, the government may only engage in development activities where cooperatives do not possess the

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Jurisdoctor

capability nor the resources to do so and only upon the request of such cooperatives. In contrast, PD 269, as
amended by PD 1645, is replete with provisions which grant the NEA, upon the happening of certain events, the
power to control and take over the management and operations of cooperatives registered under it. The extent
of government control over electric cooperatives covered by PD 269, as amended, is largely a function of the
role of the NEA as a primary source of funds of these electric cooperatives. It is crystal clear that NEA incurred
loans from various sources to finance the development and operations of the electric cooperatives.

Consequently, amendments to PD 269 were primarily geared to expand the powers of the NEA over the electric
cooperatives to ensure that loans granted to them would be repaid to the government. In contrast, cooperatives
under RA 6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient and independent organizations with minimal government
intervention or regulation.

Lastly, the transitory provisions of RA 6938 are indicative of the recognition by Congress of the fundamental
distinctions between electric cooperatives organized under PD 269, as amended, and cooperatives under the
new Cooperative Code.

Article 128 of the Cooperative Code provides that all cooperatives registered under previous laws shall be
deemed registered with the CDA upon submission of certain requirements within one year. However,
cooperatives created under PD 269, as amended, are given three years within which to qualify and register with
the CDA, after which, provisions of PD 1645 which expand the powers of the NEA over electric cooperatives,
would no longer apply.

SYLLABI
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Non-Impairment Clause; It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional
prohibition on the impairment of the obligation of contracts does not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall
within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but the impairment
must be substantial. It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the impairment of the
obligation of contracts does not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within the prohibition, the change
must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial. What
constitutes substantial impairment was explained by this Court in Clemons v. Nolting: A law which changes the
terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions,
or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its
terms, is law which impairs the obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void. Moreover, to constitute
impairment, the law must affect a change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not with
respect to non-parties.

CHAVEZ VS. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY14

PONENCIA: CARPIO, J.:
TOPIC: Non-Impairment clause
TRIGGER OF THE FACTS:
TRIGGER OF THE ISSUE:
TRIGGER OF THE RULING:
VERDICT:WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is
hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.End point of the case:
END POINT:

FACTS

14 403 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 133250 May 6, 2003

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Jurisdoctor

The President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA15.
tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire,
lease and sell any and all kinds of lands."
On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands
reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the MCCRRP16
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517,
granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP containing a total area
of 1,915,894 square meters.
Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title in
the name of PEA
covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the
MCCRP
PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA17 through negotiation without public bidding.
the Board of Directors of PEA confirmed the JVA, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the JVA.

INTERACTION
The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report
Among the conclusions of their report are:
(1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain
which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these
lands;
(2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and
(3) the JVA itself is illegal.
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a
study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report
The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate
Committees.
petitioner Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition18 .
Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed
lands to AMARI.
Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28,
Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on
"constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void.

ISSUE
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA and AMARI are as follows:
1. Whether the reliefs prayed for are moot and academic because of subsequent events;
2. Whether the petition should be dismissed for failing to observe the principle of governing the heirarchy of
courts;
3. Whether the petition should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies;
4. Whether petitioner has locus standi;
5. Whether the constitutional right to information includes information on on-going neogtiations BEFORE a
final agreement;
6. Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to AMARI of
certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed violate the 1987 Constitution; and

15 Public Estate Authority

16 Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project

17 Joint Venture Agreement

18 Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
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Jurisdoctor

7. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the issue whether the amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous
to the government

HELD

ISSUE 1
We rule that the signing and of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the President cannot
operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction.

PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended
JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and
AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation
of the JVA is its violation of the Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from
alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial
contract but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and
submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation.

Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression being a wholly government owned corporation
performing public as well as proprietary functions. All previous decisions of the Court involving Section 3, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution, covered agricultural lands sold
to private corporations which acquired the lands from private parties.

Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition because of the
possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under
the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate share in the
reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses, The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time
the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation project.

ISSUE 2
The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. The Court can
resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for
mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.

ISSUE 3
PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands.
The law obligated PEA make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA
failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a
negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the
public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial
intervention.

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely
legal or constitutional question. The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands
held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private
corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant
case.

The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply
with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to
information on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to

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Jurisdoctor

insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino Citizens.
The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the
public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.

ISSUE 4
Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of
government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they
'immediately affect the social, economic and moral well-being of the people.'

We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights
to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources matters of transcendental public
importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.

ISSUE 5
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's right to
information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the
Constitution, thus: Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."

Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that
the right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction."
Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise,
the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too
late for the public to expose its defects.

Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly
disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli.

However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like
relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The right only affords access to records, documents and papers,
which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records,
documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to
protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules
specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying.

ISSUE 6
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is employed in some
public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the
defense of the territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals.

Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast, property devoted
to public service referred to property used for some specific public service and open only to those authorized to
use the property.Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to
property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property constituted property of
public dominion although employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the national wealth.

"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the defense of the
territory, shall become a part of the private property of the State." This provision, however, was not self-
executing. The legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer

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Jurisdoctor

needed for public use or territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate the property to private
parties.

Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature

Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, shall be
classified as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other
than agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the
provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.

The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands
for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the
government prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always
reserved these lands for some future public service.

However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to classification as disposable public
agricultural lands, could only be leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.

The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution
allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.

Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the
public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as
many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation
by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to
circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.

PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom
Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands
of the public domain. Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands
necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution,
agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified
private parties. All other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters . . . owned by the State"
forming part of the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is
vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water whether directly or through
private contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable
lands subject to the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.

Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the
reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the
lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.

There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD
No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while
EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." PEA's charter,
however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and
sell any and all kinds of lands . . . owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government." 87
(Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial
or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance
with the PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from

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Jurisdoctor

acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.

Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code, the
government is required to sell valuable government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445
mandates that:... "In the event that the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such
price as may be fixed by the same committee or body concerned and approved by the Commission."

However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250
hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original
JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares. The failure of public bidding on
December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750
hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned.

Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land
of the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA.

The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not
automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands
of the public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to
dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the
constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or
patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands.

To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will
sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain. This scheme can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain
since PEA can "acquire . . . any and all kinds of lands."

The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title
in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations
but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.

ISSUE 7
Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last issue.
Besides, the Court is not the trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.

SYLLABI
Right to Information; Nothing can be more empowering than to compel access to all information relevant to the
negotiation of government contracts including but not limited to the negotiation of government contracts including
but not limited to evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of
reference and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to any proposed undertaking.
First, my concurrence. I am happy that this Court has stuck to a civil libertarians honesty and transparency in
government service when interpreting the ambit of the peoples right to information on matters of public concern.
Nothing can be more empowering on this aspect than to compel access to all information relevant to the
negotiation of government contracts including but not limited to evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and
expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other documents attached to such reports or
minutes, all relating to any proposed undertaking. This to me encourages our people to watch closely the
proprietary acts of State functionaries which more often than not, because they have been cloaked in technical
jargon and speculation due to the absence of verifiable resource materials, have been left unaccounted for
public debate and searching inquiry.

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