SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Cases:

30. Ocampo vs. Ocampo, G.R. No. 187879, July 5, 2010

31. De Gala vs. Gonzales, 53 Phil 104

32. Roxas vs. Pecson, 82 Phil 407

33. Silverio, Jr. vs. CA, 600 SCRA 1

34. Sanchez vs. CA, 279 SCRA 647

35. Estate of Hilario Ruiz vs. CA, 252 SCRA 252

 Ocampo vs. Ocampo
G.R. No. 187879 July 5, 2010

Facts:

Leonardo initially administered the estate. Initially, he received

1/3 of the income of the estate. After his death, the wife and kids did
not receive 1/3 of the income of the estate. So they filed intestate
estate of both the proceedings. A counter petition was filed opposing
the appointment of the wife since she did not take care of her
husband, what more of his estate?

Issue: Whether the removal of the special administrator was proper.

Ruling:

Removal of special administrator is discretionary. It is not limited

to the grounds of removing the regular administrator.

As to the appointment as regular administrator, although

appointment was mentioned in the motion for termination of special
administration, and respondents filed comment, no full-blown hearing
where her competence and capacity has been threshed out.
Theoretically, it is enough to revoke her appointment. But here,
already protracted proceeding and there is already a posting of bond,
the appointment should just be converted to one of special
administrator.

Regarding the bond, RTC's denial was valid, but never exempted
from filing a bond unless the testator says so (but if circumstances
change, could still be required to post a bond). Application of grounds
for revocation to special administrator is discretionary upon the court.
On a two (2) estates being settled, it is not possible to do that.

De Gala v. Gonzales
53 Phil 104

Facts:

Testatrix signed using a thumb mark. In the attestation clause, it

was not mentioned that the testatrix signed by thumb mark. But, in
the last paragraph of the will, she mentioned that she signed it using
her thumb mark.

Issue: Is the will valid?

Ruling:

Yes. The will is valid. It appeared in the attestation clause that

the signature was affixed in the presence of the witnesses, and the
form of the signature is sufficiently described and explained in the last
clause of the body of the will. It may be conceded that the attestation
clause does not, standing alone, quite meet the requirements of the
statute, but taken in connection with the last clause of the body of the
will, it is fairly clear and sufficiently carries out the legislative intent.

SILVERIO JR. vs. CA

600 SCRA 1

Facts:

Beatriz Silverio died and her husband Ricardo Sr. filed an

intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate. Ricardo Sr. was
appointed as administrator. On January 3, 2005, Ricardo Jr. filed an
opposition, he is then appointed as new administrator. On December
12, 2005, Ricardo Sr. was reinstated as administrator. On May 31,
2005, the trial court issued an order directing Nelia (daughter) to
vacate the Forbes Park property. It also allowed the sale of various
properties of the intestate estate of Beatriz to partially settle the
estate taxes, penalties, interests and other charges due. Among the
properties authorized to be sold was one located in Forbes Park. Nelia
filed a notice of appeal from the decision of the trial court authorizing
the sale of the Forbes Park property. Meanwhile, Ricardo Jr. filed a
motion to dismiss appeal and for the issuance of a writ of execution
against the appeal of Nelia.

Issue: Whether the filing of Notice of Appeal is the proper remedy.

Ruling:

No. The purported authority of Nelia, which she allegedly

secured from Ricardo Sr., was never approved by the probate court.
Therefore, she never had any real interest in the specific property
located in Forbes Park. As such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC
must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an
appeal.

An interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case

completely but leaves something to be decided upon. It is only after a
judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the
appeal of the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the
judgment itself. The interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed
separately from the judgment. It is only when such interlocutory order
was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to.

Thus, Nelia employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a

Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for employing the improper
mode of appeal, the case should have been dismissed. The implication
of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the
reglementary period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, the proper remedy in the instant case. This means that Nelia has
now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the
RTC.

Estate of Hilario Ruiz vs. CA

G.R. No. 118671. January 29, 1996

Facts:

Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs

his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent
Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters. On April 12,
1988, Hilario Ruiz died. On June 29, 1992, four years after the
testators death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who
filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for
the probate and approval of Hilario Ruizs will and for the issuance of
letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz.

Issue: whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate
but before payment of the estates debts and obligations, has the
authority:

(1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support
of the testators grandchildren;

(2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and

(3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor

of the will.

Ruling:

1. No. Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional

support from the funds of the decedents estate. The law clearly limits
the allowance to widow and children and does not extend it to the
deceaseds grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.

2. No. No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the

obligations above-mentioned has been made or provided for, unless
the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by
the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such
time as the court directs.

3. No. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and

management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not
absolute and can only be exercised so long as it is necessary for the
payment of the debts and expenses of administration, He cannot
unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents properties
and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and
appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering
a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration,
the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject
to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and
justness.
 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Cases:

184. Torrijos vs. CA, 67 SCRA 394

185. Vda. De Manguera vs. Risos, 563 SCRA 499

186. Aquino vs. Sison, 179 SCRA 648

187. Godoy vs. CA, 165 SCRA 149

188. People vs. City Court of Silay, 74 SCRA 247

189. Barcena vs. Gingoyan, 474 SCRA 72

190. Abay vs. Garcia, 162 SCRA 665

 Torrijos vs. CA
67 SCRA 394

Facts:

Wakat Diamnuan and his wife were the registered owners of

one-fourth share of a parcel of land. Wakat Diamnuan and his wife sold
their one-fourth share in favor of petitioner Torrijos. The deed of sale,
however, was refused registration because Torrijos, who produced did
not have the copies thereof held by the other co-owners, Kangi
Erangyas and heirs of Komising Tagle.

In 1969, the entire property, together with the share of Wakat

Diamnuan and his wife, was sold. Hence, Torrijos prosecuted Wakat
Diamnuan for estafa. After trial, the trial Judge convicted the
accused.On August 5, 1973, the accused died, for which reason his
counsel moved to dismiss the appeal under paragraph 1 of Article 89
of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that the death of a convict
extinguishes, not only the personal penalties, but also the "pecuniary
penalties" as long as the death occurs before final judgment.

Complainant Torrijos opposed the said motion to dismiss appeal

on the ground that the term "pecuniary penalty" should not include
civil liability in favor of the offended party, which was decreed by the
trial court in this case, as the civil action therefor was not reserved,
much less filed separately from the criminal action.

Issue: Whether the civil liability was extinguished.

Ruling:

Despite the acquittal based on death for the crime of homicide or

physical injuries or damage to property through reckless imprudence,
notwithstanding the absence of any reservation to file a civil action,
such acquittal does not preclude the offended party from pursuing a
civil action for damages based on tort or culpa aquiliana. And the civil
action based on tort or contract need not be reserved.

Vda. De Manguera vs. Risos

563 SCRA 499

Facts:

Respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of

Public Document before the RTC as Criminal Case that arose from the
falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly committed by
respondents where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of
the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed her
signature to the document.
 Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation
in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical Center due
to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila
for further treatment. The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take
the latters deposition. He explained the need to
perpetuate Concepcions testimony due to her weak physical condition
and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility.

The motion was granted by the RTC. Aggrieved, respondent filed

a special civil action for certiorari before the CA. At the outset, the CA
observed that there was a defect in the respondents petition by not
impleading the People of the Philippines, an indispensable party. This
notwithstanding, the appellate court resolved the matter on its merit,
declaring that the examination of prosecution witnesses, as in the
present case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The latter
provision, said the appellate court, only applies to civil cases. Pursuant
to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcions
deposition should have been taken before the judge or the court where
the case is pending and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati City;
and thus, in issuing the assailed order, the RTC clearly committed
grave abuse of discretion.

The CA added that the rationale of the Rules in requiring the

taking of deposition before the same court is the constitutional right of
the accused to meet the witnesses face to face. The appellate court
likewise concluded that Rule 23 could not be applied suppletorily
because the situation was adequately addressed by a specific provision
of the rules of criminal procedure.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Rule 23 of Civil Procedure applies to the deposition

of the petitioner?

2. Whether or not failure to implead the People of the Philippines in a

petition for certiorari arising from a criminal case a quo constitutes a
waivable defect in the petition for certiorari?

Ruling:

1. It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial
of the case in the presence of the judge. This is especially true in
criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his
constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives
the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such questions
as they deem material and necessary to support their position or to
test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge
to observe the witnesses demeanor.
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of
the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery that
may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted
either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of
discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect
on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the
defense and prosecution witnesses.

In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution

witness, who, according to the petitioners, was too sick to travel and
appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus comes into
play, and it provides:

Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it

satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or
infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave
the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is
pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his
absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been
served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an
examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the
examination

The procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is
thus required that the conditional examination be made before the
court where the case is pending. It is also necessary that the accused
be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right
to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of
examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same
manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question and
answer.

To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for

the purpose of taking his deposition should be made before the court,
or at least before the judge, where the case is pending. Such is the
clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules. We find no
necessity to depart from, or to relax, this rule. As correctly held by the
CA, if the deposition is made elsewhere, the accused may not be able
to attend, as when he is under detention. More importantly, this
requirement ensures that the judge would be able to observe the
witness deportment to enable him to properly assess his
credibility. This is especially true when the witness testimony is crucial
to the prosecutions case.

2. It is undisputed that in their petition for certiorari before the CA,

respondents failed to implead the People of the Philippines as a party
thereto. Because of this, the petition was obviously defective. As
provided in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor. Therefore, it behooved the petitioners
(respondents herein) to implead the People of the Philippines as
respondent in the CA case to enable the Solicitor General to comment
on the petition. However, this Court has repeatedly declared that the
failure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. In such a case, the remedy is to implead the
non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order
of the court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any
stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the
petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite
the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition
for the petitioners/plaintiffs failure to comply.

Instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Commissioner

Domingo v. Scheer in this wise:

There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their

forms or contents. Their sole purpose is to facilitate the application of
justice to the rival claims of contending parties. They were created, not
to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the administration
of justice. They do not constitute the thing itself, which courts are
always striving to secure to litigants. They are designed as the means
best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, they are a means to
an end. When they lose the character of the one and become the
other, the administration of justice is at fault and courts are
correspondingly remiss in the performance of their obvious duty.

Aquino vs. Sison

179 SCRA 648

Facts:

Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court, charging

private respondent Rodolfo Mejia, alias "Ruding" with the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearm. In said information, nine (9) persons
appear as witnesses for the prosecution.
Upon being arraigned, private respondent entered a plea of "not
guilty", after which the prosecution began the presentation of its
evidence. Complainant Virgilio Quinto was the prosecutions first
witness. In the course of Quintos cross-examination, he admitted that
he and private respondent were subjected to paraffin tests.
After the cross-examination of Virgilio Quinto, the defense verbally
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. Acting on said motion, and despite the vigorous objection of
the prosecution, the respondent Judge, granted the motion.

Issue: Whether the judge committed grave abuse of discretion in

dismissing the case.

Ruling:

Under Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1980 Rules on Criminal

Procedure, it is only after the prosecution has rested its case that the
accused may file a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. It is therefore clear that private respondents
motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence suffers
from prematurity, having been interposed at the time when the
prosecution was still presenting its evidence.

The order issued by the respondent judge dismissing the case

was capricious and tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction. Double jeopardy would therefore not attach in
such a case.

Godoy vs. CA
165 SCRA 149

Facts:
Petitioner, Cornelio Godoy, is one of the six (6) persons accused
of Homicide in Regional Trial Court. Upon arraignment, all six (6)
accused pleaded "not guilty." Trial proceeded until the prosecution
concluded the presentation of its evidence after which, the prosecution
formally offered its documentary exhibits.

Before the defense submitted its objections to said formal offer,

petitioner-accused filed a "Motion to Acquit," on the ground of lack of
evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, to which the
prosecution filed an Opposition. Thereafter, petitioner, as well as the
other accused, submitted their objections to the prosecution's formal
offer of exhibits. The Trial Court issued an Order denying petitioner-
accused's Motion to Acquit "for lack of merit" and admitting the
"Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits for the Prosecution subject to
the opposition/comments thereto.'

Premised on the aforesaid denial, at the hearing the prosecution

moved in open Court for the disqualification of petitioner-accused from
presenting evidence as well as his exclusion from further participating
in the proceedings, either personally or through counsel, on the
ground that the Motion to Acquit is equivalent to a demurrer to the
evidence so that petitioner-accused had already waived his right to
present evidence. This was orally opposed by petitioner- accused.

On 13 November 1987, respondent Appellate Court promulgated

a Decision nullifying the assailed Orders of the Trial court dated 8 April
1987 and 1 June 1987. It held that petitioner's Motion to Acquit was,
in reality, a demurrer to evidence as defined in Section 15, Rule 119 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, all the elements thereof being
present; and that the filing thereof and the denial by the Trial Court
resulted in an automatic waiver by petitioner of his right to present
evidence on his behalf.

Issue: Whether or not the motion to acquit filed by petitioner Cornelio

Godoy is the same/identical/equivalent to the motion to dismiss on
demurrer to evidence.

Ruling:

In this case, however, we find the rule on demurrer to evidence

inapplicable.

For one, technically speaking, the prosecution had not yet rested
its case at the time the Motion to Acquit was presented. The
prosecution's formal offer of documentary exhibits had not yet been
acted on by the Court, nor had the defense submitted its objections
thereto.

For another, the Trial Court lost no time in denying the Motion to
Acquit and petitioner-accused was ready to present his evidence but
the prosecution moved to disqualify him.

There was no intended delay in the proceedings, therefore, and

the practice sought to be avoided by the rule is inexistent.
Consequently, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the
Trial Court for having allowed the defense to present its evidence and
to participate further in the proceedings "in the interest of justice."

People vs. City Court of Silay

74 SCRA 247

Facts:

That sometime on January 4,1974, accused Pacifico Sensio,

Romeo Millan and Wilfredo Jochico who were then scalers at the
Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane cars No.1743,1686 and
1022 loaded with sugar canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight
report cards), Apparently, it was proven and shown that there was
padding of the weight of the sugar canes and that the information on
the tarjetas were to be false making it appear to be heavier than its
actual weight.

The three accused then were charged with Falsification by

private individuals and use of falsified document. After the
prosecution had presented, the respondent moved to dismiss the
charge against them on the ground that the evidences presented were
not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting
on the motion, respondent court issued its order dismissing the case
on the ground that the acts committed by the accused do not
constituted the crime of falsification as strictly enumerated in the
revised penal code defining the crime of falsification which was
charged earlier and that their case be dismissed.

People asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable

even if the case at bar was dismissed because according to them, it
was done with the consent of the accused therefore waiving there
defense of double jeopardy. The accused on the other hand, reiterated
the fact that the dismissal was due to lack of merits of the prosecution
which would have the same effect as an acquittal which will bar the
prosecution from prosecuting the accused for it will be unjust and
unconstitutional for the accused due to double jeopardy rule thus the
appeal of the plaintiff.

Issue: Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court would place
the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico in double jeopardy.

Ruling:

Yes. The revival of the case will put the accused in double
jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been dismissed earlier
due to lack of merits. It is true that the criminal case of falsification
was dismissed on a motion of the accused however this was a motion
filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for the evidence
beyond reasonable ground which the prosecution had not been able to
do which would be tantamount to acquittal therefore will bar the
prosecution of another case.

As it was stated on the requirements of a valid defense of double

jeopardy it says: That there should be a valid complaint, second would
be that such complaint be filed before a competent court and to which
the accused has pleaded and that
defendant was previously acquitted, convicted or dismissed or
otherwise terminated without express consent of the accused in which
were all present in the case at bar.

There was indeed a valid, legitimate complaint and concern

against the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico which was filed at a
competent court with jurisdiction on the said case. It was also
mentioned that the accused pleaded not guilty and during the time of
trial, it was proven that the case used against the accused were not
sufficient to prove them guilty beyond reasonable doubt therefore
dismissing the case which translates to acquittal.

It explained further that there are two instances when we can

conclude that there is jeopardy when first is that the ground for the
dismissal of the case was due to insufficiency of evidence and second,
when the proceedings have been reasonably prolonged as to violate
the right of the accused to a speedy trial. In the 2 requisites given, it
was the first on that is very much applicable to our case at bar where
there was dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of evidence which
will bar the approval of the petition in the case at bar for it will
constitute double jeopardy on the part of the accused which the law
despises.

Abay vs. Garcia

162 SCRA 665

Facts:

A criminal case for direct assault upon an agent of a person in

authority was filed against Felix Abay, Sr., Felix Abay, Jr., and two other
accused. Accused Felix Abay, Sr. and Felix Abay, Jr. were duly
arraigned and both pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced with Ramiro
Garque testifying on direct examination and partly on cross-
examination. The trial was transferred but again the cross-examination
was not terminated so the case was reset.

At the continuation of the trial, both accused appeared without

their counsel. The trial fiscal, was present, but the complainant,
Garque who was still to be cross-examined, failed to appear despite
due notice. The private prosecutor also failed to appear. Whereupon,
City Judge Felino Garcia verbally ordered, motu proprio, the dismissal
of the case. Fiscal Lobaton did not object to the dismissal. Both
accused remained silent and later left the courtroom after the judge
dictated the order of dismissal.

At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of the same day, Atty.

Trocino, together with Garque arrived in court and upon learning that
Criminal Case was ordered dismissed, verbally moved to have the
order of dismissal set aside. In the presence of special counsel
Navarro, Atty. Trocino was allowed to present evidence in support of
the verbal motion for reconsideration and to explain the failure of
Garque to appear on time. In his written order Judge Garcia granted
the verbal motion for reconsideration and set aside the verbal order of
dismissal. He further ordered the resetting of the case for hearing on
another date.

Subsequently, the accused, through counsel, filed a motion for

reconsideration of the order invoking double jeopardy, claiming that
the verbal order of dismissal, even if provisional, was rendered without
the express consent of the accused. The motion for reconsideration
was denied, after which the accused filed a petition for certiorari,
which sought to annul and set aside the order of the City Court. The
judge dismissed the petition. The CA affirmed the decision.

Issue: Whether there was a valid dismissal.

Ruling:

We fully agree with the findings of the respondent court. Where

there is valid information and the accused has been arraigned, an
order of dismissal issued by the court, motu proprio, in the course of a
trial of a criminal case, whether based on the merits or for failure of
prosecution witnesses to appear, has the effect of a judgment of
acquittal and double jeopardy attaches.

The order is also immediately executory. However, this order of

dismissal must be written in the official language, personally and
directly prepared by the judge and signed by him conformably with the
provisions of Rule 120, section 2 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 120,
section 2 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).

In the instant case, it is very clear that the order was merely
dictated in open court by the trial judge. There is now? showing that
this verbal order of dismissal was ever reduced to writing and duly
signed by him. Thus, it did not yet attain the effect of a judgment of
acquittal, so that it was still within the powers of the judge to set it
aside and enter another order, now in writing and duly signed by him,
reinstating the case.
 EVIDENCE

Cases:

26. People vs. Toledo, 357 SCRA 649

27. Hrs. of Sabanpan vs. Comorposa, 408 SCRA 692

28. People vs. Napat A, 179 SCRA 403

29. Tabuena vs. CA, 179 SCRA 403

 People vs. Toledo
357 SCRA 649

Facts:

Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes about the

occupation of certain land situated in the municipality of Pinamalayan,
Province of Mindoro. On the morning of June 15, 1927, the two men
happened to meet. The argument was renewed, and they agreed to
fight. They did engage in a bolo duel with a fatal result for Filomeno
Morales, who was killed almost instantly. Sisenando Holgado was also
seriously wounded but was able to proceed to a neighboring house.
From there Sisenando Holgado was taken to the municipal building
where he made a sworn authenticated statement before the municipal
president, in which he declared that only he and Filomeno Morales
fought and that there was nobody else around.

About one month later, Sisenando Holgado died from the wounds
received in the fight. The disputable point is whether the accused
Eugenio Toledo intervened in the quarrel and dealt a mortal blow to
Filomeno Morales. For the prosecution was presented the witness
Justina Villanueva, the querida of Filomeno Morales, who testified to
the presence and participation of Eugenio Toledo. Her testimony was
partially corroborated by that of the witness Justina Llave.

On the other hand, the theory for the defense was that Toledo
was in another place when the fight between Morales and Holgado
occurred and that his only participation was on meeting Holgado, who
was his landlord or master, in helping him to a nearby house. To this
effect is the testimony of the accused and of Conrado Holgado, the son
of Sisenando Holgado. The defense also relied upon the affidavit of
Sisenando Holgado, Exhibit 1, which was identified by the municipal
president of Pinamalayan.

Issue: Is the exhibit (exhibit 1) considered hearsay? Is it admissible

as evidence?
Ruling:

Yes. The affidavit is considered hearsay because the one who

made it was not presented in court under oath to testify on his written
statement. This is the general rule. But regarding the supporting
question, the answer is also yes. The exhibit is admissible as evidence
the reason being that it is one of the accepted exceptions of the
hearsay rule. This is called the Declaration Against interest or in the
book of Agpalo, the dead mans statute. Sec. 38 of the Rules of Court
exemplifies this rule.

Sec.38 Declaration against interest.- The declaration made by a

person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the
declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was
made so far contrary to declarants own interest, that a reasonable
man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or
his successors in interest and against third persons.
In order for a statement to be admissible (in this case made as
an exhibit) it must comply the following requisites:

1) That the declarant is dead or unable to testify;

2) That it relates to a fact against the interest of the
declarant;
3) That at the time he maid said declaration the declarant
was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid
interest; and
4) That the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed
such declaration to be true.

In the case it bar, it is clear as day that the declarant made the
statement before the municipal president before he died and that it
was clearly against his interest because it had the effect of exonerating
Eugenio Toledo from liability. Declarant was also aware of this fact and
knows this to be true because otherwise, he wouldnt have made such
a statement. Here the declarant is deceased and his statements were
made under oath.

They also read in such a way as to ring with the truth. When
Sisenando Holgado declared "When we fought, there was nobody
present," it was at the end of just such a rambling statement as a
wounded man would be expected to make. When Sisenando Holgado
declared "I met one of my workers named Eugenio Toledo, who
accompanied me to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic," he did so in
response to a question by the municipal president. Exhibit 1 should
have been received not as conclusive evidence of innocence, but as
evidence to be taken into consideration in connection with the other
proven facts.

Hrs. of Sabanpan vs. Comorposa

408 SCRA 692
Facts:
A complaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by
petitioners against respondents. The complaint alleged that Marcos
Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of Lot No. 845, Land 275
located at Darong, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur with an area of 1.2
hectares. In 1960, he died leaving all his heirs, his children and
grandchildren.

In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of

Oboza was terminated from his job. The termination of his
employment caused a problem in relocating his house. Being a close
family friend of [Marcos] Saez, Francisco Comorposa approached the
late Marcos Saezs son, [Adolfo] Saez, the husband of Gloria Leano
Saez, about his problem. Out of pity and for humanitarian
consideration, Adolfo allowed Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land
of Marcos Saez. Hence, his nipa hut was carried by his neighbors and
transferred to a portion of the land subject matter of this case. Such
transfer was witnessed by several people, among them, Gloria Leano
and Noel Oboza. Francisco Comorposa occupied a portion of Marcos
Saez property without paying any rental. Francisco Comorposa left for
Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his possession by the respondents
who likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises
through petitioners tolerance.

A formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the

premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that
they [were] the legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful
possessor[s] of the premises. A [C]omplaint was filed with the
barangay office of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, but the parties failed to
arrive at an amicable settlement. Thus, the corresponding Certificate
to File Action was issued by the said barangay and an action for
unlawful detainer was filed by petitioners against respondents.

Issue: Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion, and err in
declaring that, neither is there error on the part of the Regional Trial
Court, when it did not give importance to the affidavits by Gloria Leano
Saez, Noel [Oboza], and Paulina Paran for allegedly being self serving?

Ruling:

The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its

probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain
pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value
refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an
issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines
provided by the rules of evidence.
 While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the
witnesses respective testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to
reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly
proven. Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their cause of
action, because they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief.

People vs. Napat A

179 SCRA 403

Facts:
The Narcotics Regional Unit in Baguio City received information
that a certain Susana Napat-a was looking for a buyer of marijuana
leaves. Acting on this report, Captain Emmanuel Manzano formed a
group composed of CIC Leo Quevedo, A2C Serafin Artizona and Pat.
Maximiano Peralta, to conduct a buy-bust operation. The group
proceeded to the public market on Magsaysay Avenue. There, the
informer introduced to the appellant his companion, CIC Leo Quevedo,
as an interested buyer of marijuana. Pat. Peralta, who was then posted
at a strategic distance, heard Quevedo order three (3) kilos of dried
marijuana leaves for the price of P800 per kilo set by Napat-a.

Having closed the deal, the appellant, accompanied by Quevedo

and the informer, rode on a jeep to Brookside, Baguio City, Artizona
and Peralta took a taxi and followed them. Upon reaching Brookside,
Peralta and Artizona posted themselves near a store. They observed
Quevedo and the informer standing at the junction of lower and upper
Brookside waiting for Susana Napat-a. The latter soon reappeared
carrying a brown carton box which she handed to Quevedo who
thereupon made the pre-arranged signal. On seeing Quevedo's signal,
Peralta and Artizona rushed to the scene. CIC Quevedo held Susana by
the arm and placed her under arrest. The three narcotics agents
brought her to their office for investigation. Quevedo, Artizona and
Peralta, executed a joint affidavit (Exh. H) narrating the circumstances
leading to the arrest of the appellant.

The contents of the brown carton box were referred to Lt. Carlos
Figueroa, a forensic chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory in Camp Bado
Dangwa, for examination. In his Chemistry Report, Lt. Figueroa
affirmed that a qualitative examination of the specimens taken from
the brown carton box showed them to be marijuana.

Issue: Whether Exhibits are admissible.

Ruling:
 The subsequent loss of these exhibits did not affect the case for
the trial court had described the evidence in the records. In People vs.
Mate, 103 SCRA 484, we ruled that "(e)ven without the exhibits which
have been incorporated into the records of the case, the prosecution
can still establish the case because the witnesses properly Identified
those exhibits and their testimonies are recorded." Furthermore, in
this case, appellant's counsel had cross- examined the prosecution
witnesses who testified on those exhibits.

Tabuena vs. CA
179 SCRA 403

Facts:
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land
consisting of about 440 square meters and situated in Poblacion,
Makato, Aklan. An action for recovery of ownership thereof was filed in
the Regional Trial Court by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose
Tabuena, the herein petitioner. After trial, judgment was rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was required to vacate the
disputed lot. 1

As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr.
sometime in 1926 to Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the
United States. Tabernilla returned to the Philippines in 1934, and
Damasa Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan's instruction, conveyed
the subject land to Tabernilla. At the same time, she requested that
she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her life.
Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property,
which she promised to do, and did. She remained on the said land
until her death, following which the petitioner, her son and half-brother
of Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof. The complaint was filed
when demand was made upon Tabuena to surrender the property and
he refused, claiming it as his own.

Issue: Whether the Exhibits were formally offered.

Ruling:

The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit

does not mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the
evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were
marked at the pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for the
purpose of identifying them at that time. They were not by such
marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said in Interpacific Transit,
Inc. vs. Aviles, 3 "At the trial on the merits, the party may decide to
formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will advance its cause,
and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event,
such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given
any evidentiary value."

Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:

. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to

rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon
the evidence offered by the patties at the trial. 4

We did say in People vs. Napat-a that even if there be no formal

offer of an exhibit, it may still be admitted against the adverse party if,
first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and,
second, it has itself been incorporated in the records of the case. But
we do not find that these requirements have been satisfied in the case
before us. The trial court said the said exhibits could be validly
considered because, even if they had not been formally offered, one of
the plaintiffs witnesses, Cunegunda Hernandez, testified on them at
the trial and was even cross-examined by the defendant's counsel. We
do not agree. Although she did testify, all she did was identify the
documents. Nowhere in her testimony can we find a recital of the
contents of the exhibits.