POST-EMPLOYMENT CASES
cause for termination of employment by
AGABON v NLRC, RIVIERA HOMES,
INC.
FACTS:
Private respondent Riviera Home
Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the
business of selling and installing
ornamental and construction materials. It
employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and
Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and
cornice installers on January
1992[2] until February 23, 1999 when they
were dismissed for abandonment of work.
COMPLAINT. Petitioner then filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and
payment of money claims
LA: dismissals illegal and ordered private
respondent to pay the monetary claims;
ordered to pay them their backwages and
SPIR
NLRC: reversed; they abandoned their
work
CA: affirmed but ordered ER to pay holiday
pay and SIL
ISSUE: W/N their termination was for just
cause
HELD:
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, after a
careful review of the facts, ruled that
petitioners dismissal was for a just cause.
They had abandoned their employment
and were already working for another
employer.
DUE PROCESS. To dismiss an employee,
the law requires not only the existence of
a just and valid cause but also enjoins the
employer to give the employee the
opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself.[13]
ABANDONMENT. Abandonment is the
deliberate and unjustified refusal of an
employee to resume his employment. [14] It
is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just
the employer.[15]
2 FACTORS FOR A VALID FINDING OF
ABANDONMENT:
(1) the failure to report for work or
absence without valid or justifiable reason;
2, and (2) a clear intention to sever
employer-employee relationship, with the
second as the more determinative factor
which is manifested by overt acts from
which it may be deduced that the
employees has no more intention to work.
The intent to discontinue the employment
must be shown by clear proof that it was
deliberate and unjustified.[16]
IN THE CASE AT BAR: In February 1999,
petitioners were frequently absent having
subcontracted for an installation work for
another company. Subcontracting for
another company clearly showed the
intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship with private respondent. This
was not the first time they did this. In
January 1996, they did not report for work
because they were working for another
company. Private respondent at that time
warned petitioners that they would be
dismissed if this happened again.
Petitioners disregarded the warning and
exhibited a clear intention to sever their
employer-employee relationship.
In Sandoval Shipyard v. Clave,[18] we held
that an employee who deliberately
absented from work without leave or
permission from his employer, for the
purpose of looking for a job elsewhere, is
considered to have abandoned his job. We
should apply that rule with more reason
here where petitioners were absent
because they were already working in
another company.
PROCEDURE FOR DISMISAL. After
establishing that the terminations were for
a just and valid cause, we now determine
if the procedures for dismissal were
observed. The procedure for terminating
an employee is found in Book VI, Rule I,
Section 2(d) of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code:
Standards of due process: requirements of
notice. In all cases of termination of
employment, the following standards of
due process shall be substantially
observed:
I. For termination of employment based on
just causes as defined in Article 282 of the
Code:
the charge, present his evidence or rebut
the evidence presented against him; and
(c) A written notice of termination served
on the employee indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstances,
grounds have been established to justify
his termination.
In case of termination, the foregoing
notices shall be served on the employees
last known address.
Dismissals based on just causes
contemplate acts or omissions attributable
to the employee while dismissals based on
authorized causes involve grounds under
the Labor Code which allow the employer
to terminate employees. A termination for
an authorized cause requires payment of
separation pay. When the termination of
employment is declared illegal,
reinstatement and full backwages are
mandated under Article 279. If
reinstatement is no longer possible where
the dismissal was unjust, separation pay
may be granted.

(a) A written notice served on the 4 POSSIBLE SITUATIONS:

employee specifying the ground or
grounds for termination, and giving to said
employee reasonable opportunity within
which to explain his side;
SCENARIOS LIABILITY
the dismissal is for
a just cause under VALID
(b) A hearing or conference during which Article 282 of the DISMISSAL / NO
Labor Code, for an LIABILITY
the employee concerned, with the
authorized cause
assistance of counsel if the employee so
under Article 283,
desires, is given opportunity to respond to or for health
reasons under an indemnity to the employee. This
Article 284, and due became known as the Wenphil or Belated
process was Due Process Rule.
observed
the dismissal is
without just or ILLEGAL DISMISSAL/
authorized cause LIABLE
but due process CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS v
was observed; STATUTORY DUE PROCESS
the dismissal is
without just or ILLEGAL DISMISSAL/
authorized cause LIABLE
and there was no
due process
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTORY DUE
the dismissal is for
just or authorized DUE PROCESS PROCESS
VALID DISMISSAL/ ER
cause but due LIABLE FOR NON-
process was not protects the protects
COMPLIANCE W/ DUE
observed individual from employees from
PROCESS
the government being unjustly
and assures him terminated
of his rights in without just cause
criminal, civil or after notice and
IN THE CASE AT BAR : The present case
administrative hearing.
squarely falls under the fourth situation.
proceedings;
The dismissal should be upheld because it
was established that the petitioners
abandoned their jobs to work for another
company. Private respondent, however,
WENPHIL DOCTRINE CONTROLLING. After
did not follow the notice requirements
carefully analyzing the consequences of
and instead argued that sending notices
the divergent doctrines in the law on
to the last known addresses would have
employment termination, we believe that
been useless because they did not reside
in cases involving dismissals for cause
there anymore. Unfortunately for the
but without observance of the twin
private respondent, this is not a valid
requirements of notice and hearing, the
excuse because the law mandates the
better rule is to abandon
twin notice requirements to the
the Serrano doctrine and to
employees last known address it
follow Wenphil by holding that the
should be held liable for non-compliance
dismissal was for just cause but
w/ the procedural reqtsm of due process.
imposing sanctions on the employer.
Such sanctions, however, must be stiffer
than that imposed in Wenphil. By doing
so, this Court would be able to achieve a
BELATED DUE PROCESS RULE. The rule
fair result by dispensing justice not just to
thus evolved: where the employer had a
employees, but to employers as well.
valid reason to dismiss an employee but
did not follow the due process
requirement, the dismissal may be upheld
but the employer will be penalized to pay
The unfairness of declaring illegal or
ineffectual dismissals for valid or
authorized causes but not complying with
statutory due process may have far-
reaching consequences.
This would encourage frivolous suits,
where even the most notorious violators of
company policy are rewarded by invoking
due process. This also creates absurd
situations where there is a just or
authorized cause for dismissal but a
procedural infirmity invalidates the
termination. Let us take for example a
case where the employee is caught
stealing or threatens the lives of his co-
employees or has become a criminal, who
has fled and cannot be found, or where
serious business losses demand that
operations be ceased in less than a
month. Invalidating the dismissal would
not serve public interest. It could also
discourage investments that can generate
employment in the local economy.
SOCIAL JUSTICE. An employee who is
clearly guilty of conduct violative of Article
282 should not be protected by the Social
Justice Clause of the Constitution. Social
justice, as the term suggests, should be
used only to correct an injustice. As the
eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel observed,
social justice must be founded on
the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among diverse units
of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined
force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and
paramount objective of the state of
promoting the health, comfort, and quiet
of all persons, and of bringing about the
greatest good to the greatest number.[34]
This is not to say that the Court was
wrong when it ruled the way it did
in Wenphil, Serrano and related
cases. Social justice is not based on
rigid formulas set in stone. It has to
allow for changing times and
circumstances.
DAMAGES. Where the dismissal is for a
just cause, as in the instant case, the lack
of statutory due process should not nullify
the dismissal, or render it illegal, or
ineffectual. However, the employer should
indemnify the employee for the violation
of his statutory rights, as ruled in Reta v.
National Labor Relations Commission.
[36]
The indemnity to be imposed should be
stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice
of dismiss now, pay later, which we sought
to deter in the Serrano ruling. The
sanction should be in the nature of
indemnification or penalty and should
depend on the facts of each case, taking
into special consideration the gravity of
the due process violation of the employer.
NOMINAL DAMAGES IS PROPER TO
VINDICATE RIGHTS OF A PLAINTIFF
THAT WERE VIOLATED OR INVADED
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES. The violation of
the petitioners right to statutory due
process by the private respondent
warrants the payment of indemnity in the
form of nominal damages. The amount of
such damages is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, taking into account
the relevant circumstances.
[40]
Considering the prevailing
circumstances in the case at bar, we
deem it proper to fix it at
P30,000.00. We believe this form of
damages would serve to deter employers
from future violations of the statutory due
process rights of employees. At the very
least, it provides a vindication or
recognition of this fundamental right
granted to the latter under the Labor Code
and its Implementing Rules.
ON MONEY CLAIMS. The Court affirm the
ruling of the appellate court on petitioners
money claims. Private respondent is liable
for petitioners holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay and 13th month pay
without deductions.
RULING: PETITION DENIED BUT OREDER
TO PAY PETITIONERS HOLIDAY PAY AND SIL
AND NOMINAL DAMAGES.
JAKA FOOD PROCESSING CORP. v
PACOT
FACT:
 present case, respondents were dismissed
Respondents Darwin Pacot, Robert due to retrenchment, which is one of the
Parohinog, David Bisnar, Marlon Domingo, authorized causes under Article 283 of the
Rhoel Lescano and Jonathan Cagabcab same Code.
were earlier hired by petitioner JAKA Foods
Processing Corporation (JAKA, for short)
until the latter terminated their JUST CAUSE v AUTHORIZED CAUSE. A
employment on August 29, 1997 because dismissal for just cause under Article 282
the corporation was in dire financial implies that the employee concerned has
straits. It is not disputed, however, that committed, or is guilty of, some violation
the termination was effected without JAKA
against the employer, i.e. the employee
complying with the requirement under
has committed some serious misconduct,
Article 283 of the Labor Code regarding
the service of a written notice upon the is guilty of some fraud against the
employees and the Department of Labor employer, or, as in Agabon, he has
and Employment at least one (1) month neglected his duties. Thus, it can be said
before the intended date of termination. that the employee himself initiated the
dismissal process.
COMPLAINT. In time, respondents
separately filed with the regional On another breath, a dismissal for
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor an authorized cause under Article 283
Relations Commission (NLRC) complaints does not necessarily imply delinquency or
for illegal dismissal, underpayment of culpability on the part of the employee.
wages and nonpayment of service Instead, the dismissal process is initiated
incentive leave and 13th month pay
by the employers exercise of his
against JAKA and its HRD Manager, Rosana
management prerogative, i.e. when the
Castelo.
employer opts to install labor saving
LA: termination illegal; pay full backwages devices, when he decides to cease
and separation pay in lieu of business operations or when, as in this
reinstatement. case, he undertakes to implement a
retrenchment program.
NLRC: affirmed
The clear-cut distinction between a
MR: granted; pay separation pay and dismissal for just cause under Article 282
P2,000 each to indemnify the and a dismissal for authorized cause under
complainants for non-observance of due Article 283 is further reinforced by the fact
process.
that in the first, payment of separation
pay, as a rule, is not required, while in the
CA: reversed and set aside the NLRC
decision second, the law requires payment of
separation pay.[9]
ISSUE: What are the legal implications of a
situation where an employee is dismissed Accordingly, it is wise to hold that: (1) if
for cause but such dismissal was effected the dismissal is based on a just cause
without the employers compliance with under Article 282 but the employer failed
the notice requirement under the Labor to comply with the notice requirement, the
Code sanction to be imposed upon him should
be tempered because the dismissal
HELD: process was, in effect, initiated by an act
imputable to the employee; and (2) if the
The difference between Agabon and the
dismissal is based on an authorized cause
instant case is that in the former, the
under Article 283 but the employer failed
dismissal was based on a just cause under
Article 282 of the Labor Code while in the to comply with the notice requirement, the
sanction should be stiffer because the
dismissal process was initiated by the
employers exercise of his management
prerogative.
The records before us reveal that, indeed,
JAKA was suffering from serious business
losses at the time it terminated
respondents employment (more than
P188M deficit)
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES. It is, therefore,
established that there was ground for
respondents dismissal, i.e., retrenchment,
which is one of the authorized causes
enumerated under Article 283 of the Labor
Code. Likewise, it is established that JAKA
failed to comply with the notice
requirement under the same Article.
Considering the factual circumstances in
the instant case and the above
ratiocination, we, therefore, deem it
proper to fix the indemnity at P50,000.00.
RULING: PETITION GRANTED; PAY
RESPONDENTS P50K FOR NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH DUE PROCESS
MARIWASA v LEOGARDO
FACTS:
Private respondent Joaquin A. Dequila (or
Dequilla) was hired on probation by
petitioner Mariwasa Manufacturing, Inc.
(hereafter, Mariwasa only) as a general
utility worker on January 10, 1979. Upon
the expiration of the probationary period
of six months, Dequila was informed by his
employer that his work had proved
unsatisfactory and had failed to meet the
required standards. To give him a chance
to improve his performance and qualify for
regular employment, instead of dispensing
with his service then and there, with his
written consent Mariwasa extended his
probation period for another three months
from July 10 to October 9, 1979. His
performance, however, did not improve
and on that account Mariwasa terminated
his employment at the end of the
extended period. 1
COMPLAINT. Dequila thereupon filed with
the Ministry of Labor against Mariwasa and
its Vice-President for Administration, Angel
T. Dazo, a complaint for illegal dismissal
and violation of Presidential Decrees Nos.
928 and 1389. 2
REGIONAL DIRECTOR:
NLRC: reversed; he was already a regular
employee at the time of his dismissal,
therefore, could not have been lawfully
dismissed for failure to meet company
standards as a probationary worker. He
was ordered reinstated to his former
position without loss of seniority and with
full back wages from the date of his
dismissal until actually reinstated.
ISSUE: W/N the ER and EE may validly
extend the probationary period by
agreement
HELD:
YES. Agreement stipulating longer
probationary periods as constituting as
lawful exception to the statutory
proscription limiting the period to 6
months.
VALID EXTENSION OF PROBATIONARY
PERIOD. The single difference
between Buiser and the present case: that
in the former involved an eighteen-month
probationary period stipulated in the
original contract of employment, whereas
the latter refers to an extension agreed
upon at or prior to the expiration of the
statutory six-month period, is hardly such
as to warrant or even suggest a different
ruling here. In both cases the parties'
agreements in fact resulted in extensions
of the period prescribed by law. That in
this case the inability of the probationer to
make the grade became apparent only at
or about the end of the six-month period,
hence an extension could not have been
pre-arranged as was done
in Buiser assumes no adverse significance,
given the lack, as pointed out by the
Solicitor General, of any indication that the
extension to which Dequila gave his
agreement was a mere stratagem of
petitioners to avoid the legal
consequences of a probationary period
satisfactorily completed.
For aught that appears of record, the
extension of Dequila's probation
was ex gratia, an act of liberality on the
part of his employer affording him a
second chance to make good after having
initially failed to prove his worth as an
employee. Such an act cannot now
unjustly be turned against said employer's
account to compel it to keep on its payroll
one who could not perform according to its
work standards. The law, surely, was
never meant to produce such an
inequitable result.
WAIVER. By voluntarily agreeing to an
extension of the probationary period,
Dequila in effect waived any benefit
attaching to the completion of said period
if he still failed to make the grade during
the period of extension. The Court finds
nothing in the law which by any fair
interpretation prohibits such a waiver. And
no public policy protecting the employee
and the security of his tenure is served by
prescribing voluntary agreements which,
by reasonably extending the period of
probation, actually improve and further a
probationary employee's prospects of
demonstrating his fitness for regular
employment.
Having reached the foregoing conclusions,
the Court finds it unnecessary to consider
and pass upon the additional issue raised
in the Supplemental Petition 8 that the
back wages adjudged in favor of private
respondent Dequila were erroneously
computed.
RULING: PETITION GRANTED.
BUISER v LEOGARDO
FACTS:
The records show that petitioners
Iluminada Ver Buiser and Ma. Mercedes P.
Intengan entered into an "Employment
Contract (on Probationary Status)" on May
26, 1980 with private respondent, a
corporation engaged in the business of
publication and circulation of the directory
of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company. Petitioner Ma. Cecilia Rillo-
Acuna entered into the same employment
contract on June 11, 1980 with the private
respondent.
Among others, the "Employment Contract
(On Probationary Status)" included the
following common provisions:
l. The company hereby employs the
employee as telephone representative on
a probationary status for a period of
eighteen (18) months, i.e. from May 1980
to October 1981, inclusive. It is
understood that darung the probationary
period of employment, the Employee may
be terminated at the pleasure of the
company without the necessity of giving
notice of termination or the payment of
termination pay.
The Employee recognizes the fact that the
nature of the telephone sales
representative's job is such that the
company would be able to determine his
true character, conduct and selling
capabilities only after the publication of
the directory, and that it takes about
eighteen (18) months before his worth as
a telephone saw representative can be
fully evaluated inasmuch as the
advertisement solicited by him for a
particular year are published in the
directory only the following year.
Corollary to this, the private respondent
prescribed sales quotas to be
accomplished or met by the petitioners.
Failing to meet their respective sales
quotas, the petitioners were dismissed
from the service by the private
respondent. The records show that the
private respondent terminated the
services of petitioners Iluminada Ver
Buiser and Cecilia Rillo-Acuna on May 14,
1981 and petitioner Ma. Mercedes P.
Intengan on May 18, 1981 for their failure
to meet their sales quotas.
COMPLAINT. Petitioners filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal
RD: dismissed
NLRC: affirmed
ISSUE: W/N the EEs have become
automatically regular EEs on the ground of
more than 1 year service notwithstanding
their agreement
HELD:
GR: the probationary period of
employment is limited to six (6) months.
EXCEPTIONS: When the parties to an
employment contract may agree
otherwise, such as when the same is
established by company policy or when
the same is required by the nature of work
to be performed by the employee. In the
latter case, there is recognition of the
exercise of managerial prerogatives in
requiring a longer period of probationary
employment, such as in the present case
where the probationary period was set for
eighteen (18) months, i.e. from May, 1980
to October, 1981 inclusive, especially
where the employee must learn a
particular kind of work such as selling, or
when the job requires certain
qualifications, skills, experience or
training.
IN THE CASE AT BAR: In the case at bar, it
is shown that private respondent
Company needs at least eighteen (18)
months to determine the character and
selling capabilities of the petitioners as
sales representatives. The Company is
engaged in advertisement and publication
in the Yellow Pages of the PLDT Telephone
Directories. Publication of solicited ads are
only made a year after the sale has been
made and only then win the company be
able to evaluate the efficiency, conduct,
and selling ability of its sales
representatives, the evaluation being
based on the published ads. Moreover, an
eighteen month probationary period is
recognized by the Labor Union in the
private respondent company, which is
Article V of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, ... thus:
Probationary Period New employees
hired for regular or permanent shall
undergo a probationary or trial period of
six (6) months, except in the cases of
telephone or sales representatives where
the probationary period shall be eighteen
(I 8) months.
the stipulation is NOT contrary to law,
morals and public policy.
SC: We, therefore, hold and rule that the
probationary employment of petitioners
set to eighteen (18) months is legal and
valid and that the Regional Director and
the Deputy Minister of Labor and
Employment committed no abuse of
discretion in ruling accordingly.
ALSO, petitioners failure to meet sales
quota is a just cause for dismissal,
regardless of permanent or probationary
status.
RULING: PETITION IS DIMISSED
LEUS v ST SCHOLASTICA COLLEGE
FACTS:
SSCW (St. Scholastica College Westgrove)
is a catholic and sectarian educational
institution in Silang, Cavite. In May 2001,
SSCW hired the petitioner as an Assistant
to SSCWs Director of the Lay Apostolate
and Community Outreach Directorate.
Sometime in 2003, the petitioner and her
boyfriend conceived a child out of
wedlock. When SSCW learned of the
petitioners pregnancy, Sr. Edna Quiambao
(Sr. Quiambao), SSCWs Directress,
advised her to file a resignation letter
effective June 1, 2003. In response, the
petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao that she
would not resign from her employment
just because she got pregnant without the
benefit of marriage.5
Sr. Quiambao formally directed the
petitioner to explain in writing why she
should not be dismissed for engaging in
pre-marital sexual relations and getting
pregnant as a result thereof, which
amounts to serious misconduct and
conduct unbecoming of an employee of a
Catholic school.
LETTER. Her pregnancy out of wedlock
does NOT amount to serious misconduct
or unbecoming of an EE. She averred that
she was unaware of the school policy
REPLY. Accdg to petitioner, pre-marital
sexual relations even bet. 2 consenting
adults w/o legal impediment to marry is
considered disgraceful and immoral
conduct or a serious misconduct which are
grounds for termination of employment.
TERMINATION. Through a letter sent to
respondent, she was informed that her
employment was terminated on the
ground of serious misconduct.
COMPLAINT. Petitioner filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal
CONTENTION: Her pregnancy out of
wedlock cannot be considered as serious
misconduct since the same is a purely
private affair and NOT connected in any
way in her duties as an EE of SSCW.
LA: dismissed; Petitioner is expected to
live up to the Catholic values taught to
their students.
NLRC: affirmed
CA: denied; the 1992 MRPS and the LC
governs the termination of employment of
teaching personnel of private schools
ISSUE: W/N pregnancy out of wedlock by
an EE of catholic educational institution is
a cause for the termination of her
employment
HELD:
NO. In resolving the foregoing
question,the Court will assess the matter
from a strictly neutral and secular point of
view the relationship between SSCW as
employer and the petitioner as an
employee, the causes provided for by law
in the termination of suchrelationship, and
the evidence on record. The ground cited
for the petitioners dismissal, i.e., pre-
marital sexual relations and,
consequently, pregnancy outof wedlock,
will be assessed as to whether the same
constitutes a valid ground for dismissal
pursuant to Section 94(e) of the 1992
MRPS.
In resolving the foregoing question,the
Court will assess the matter from a strictly
neutral and secular point of view the
relationship between SSCW as employer
and the petitioner as an employee, the
causes provided for by law in the
termination of suchrelationship, and the
evidence on record. The ground cited for
the petitioners dismissal, i.e., pre-marital
sexual relations and, consequently,
pregnancy outof wedlock, will be assessed
as to whether the same constitutes a valid
ground for dismissal pursuant to Section
94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.
TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES MUST
BE ASSESSED AGAINST THE
PREVAILING NORMS OF CONDUCT. In
CHUA-QUA v CLAVE, the circumstances
MUST be HOLISTICALLY considered in light
of the prevailing norms of conduct and
applicable laws.
 Otherwise stated, it is NOT the
totality of circumstances
surrounding the conduct per se
that determines whether the same
is disgraceful or immoral, but THE
CONDUCT THAT IS GENERALLY
ACCEPTED BY SOCIETY AS
RESPECTABLE OR MORAL.
If the conduct does not conform to
what society generally views as
respectable or moral, then the
conduct is considered as
disgraceful or immoral. Tersely put,
substantial evidence must be
presented, which would establish
Thus, the determination of whether a
conduct is disgraceful or immoral involves
a two-step process:
1. a consideration of the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the
conduct; and
2. an assessment of the said
circumstances vis--visthe
prevailing norms of conduct, i.e.,
what the society generally
considers moral and respectable.
That the petitioner was employed by a
Catholic educational institution per se
does not absolutely determine whether
her pregnancy out of wedlock is
disgraceful or immoral. There is still a
necessity to determine whether the
petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock is
considered disgraceful or immoral in
accordance with the prevailing norms of
conduct.
PUBLIC AND SECULAR MORALITY SHOULD
DETERMINE THE PREVAILING NORMS OF
CONDUCT, NOT RELIGIOUS MORALITY
However, determining what the prevailing
norms of conduct are considered
disgraceful or immoral is not an easy task.
An individuals perception of what is moral
or respectable is a confluence of a myriad
of influences, such as religion, family,
social status, and a cacophony of others.
Why? Because the jurisdiction of the Court
extends only to public and secular
morality (ESTRADA v ESCRITOR).
Both Estrada and Radamare
administrative cases against employees in
the civil service. The Court, however, sees
no reason not to apply the doctrines
enunciated in Estrada and Radamin the
instant case. Estrada and Radamalso
required the Court to delineate what
conducts are considered disgraceful
and/or immoral as would constitute a
ground for dismissal. More importantly, as
in the said administrative cases, the
instant case involves an employees
security of tenure; this case likewise
concerns employment, which is not merely
a specie of property right, but also the
means by which the employee and those
who depend on him live.45
It bears stressing that the right of an
employee to security of tenure is
protected by the Constitution.
Perfunctorily, a regular employee may not
be dismissed unless for cause provided
under the Labor Code and other relevant
laws, in this case, the 1992 MRPS. As
stated above, when the law refers to
morality, it necessarily pertains to public
and secular morality and not religious
morality. Thus, the proscription against
"disgraceful or immoral conduct" under
Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which is
made as a cause for dismissal, must
necessarily refer to public and secular
morality. Accordingly, in order for a
conduct tobe considered as
disgraceful or immoral, it must be
"detrimental (or dangerous) to those
conditions upon which depend the
existence and progress of human
society and not because the conduct
is proscribed by the beliefs of one
religion or the other."
Thus, in Santos v. NLRC,46 the Court
upheld the dismissal of a teacher who had
an extra-marital affair with his co-teacher,
who is likewise married, on the ground of
disgraceful and immoral conduct under
Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS. The Court
pointed out that extra-marital affair is
considered as a disgraceful and immoral
conduct is an afront to the sanctity of
marriage, which is a basic institution of
society.
THE PETITIONERS PREGNANCY OUT
OF WEDLOCK IS NOT A DISGRACEFUL
OR IMMORAL CONDUCT SINCE SHE
AND THE FATHER OF HER CHILD HAVE
NO IMPEDIMENT TO MARRY. In stark
contrast to Santos, the Court does not find
any circumstance in this case which would
lead the Court to conclude that the
petitioner committed a disgraceful or
immoral conduct. It bears stressing that
the petitioner and her boyfriend, at the
time they conceived a child, had no legal
impediment to marry. Indeed, even prior
to her dismissal, the petitioner married her
boyfriend, the father of her child. As the
Court held in Radam, there is no law which
penalizes an unmarried mother by reason
of her sexual conduct or proscribes the
consensual sexual activity between two
unmarried persons; that neither does such
situation contravene any fundamental
state policy enshrined in the Constitution.
Admittedly, the petitioner is employed in
an educational institution where the
teachings and doctrines of the Catholic
Church, including that on pre-marital
sexual relations, is strictly upheld and
taught to the students. That her
indiscretion, which resulted in her
pregnancy out of wedlock, is anathema to
the doctrines of the Catholic Church.
However, viewed against the prevailing
norms of conduct, the petitioners conduct
cannot be considered as disgraceful or
immoral; such conduct is not denounced
by public and secular morality. It may be
an unusual arrangement, but it certainly is
not disgraceful or immoral within the
contemplation of the law.
To stress, pre-marital sexual relations
between two consenting adults who have
no impediment to marry each other, and,
consequently, conceiving a child out of
wedlock, gauged from a purely public and
secular view of morality, does not amount
to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under
Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.
PETITIONERS DISMISSAL NOT A VALID
EXERCISE OF SSWCS MANAGEMENT
PREROGATIVE. The Court has held that
"management is free to regulate,
according to its own discretion and
judgment, all aspects of employment,
including hiring, work assignments,
working methods, time, place and manner
of work, processes to be followed,
supervision of workers, working
regulations, transfer of employees, work
supervision, lay off of workers and
discipline, dismissal and recall of workers.
The exercise of management prerogative,
however, is not absolute as it must
beexercised in good faith and with due
regard to the rights of labor." Management
cannot exercise its prerogative in a cruel,
repressive, or despotic manner.53
ILEGAL DISMISSAL. In sum, the Court finds
that the petitioner was illegally dismissed
as there was no just cause for the
termination of her employment. SSCW
failed to adduce substantial evidence to
establish that the petitioners conduct,
i.e., engaging in pre-marital sexual
relations and conceiving a child out of
wedlock, assessed in light of the prevailing
norms of conduct, is considered
disgraceful or immoral. The labor tribunals
gravely abused their discretion in
upholding the validity of the petitioners
dismissal as the charge against the
petitioner lay not on substantial evidence,
but on the bare allegations of SSCW. In
turn, the CA committed reversible error in
upholding the validity of the petitioners
dismissal, failing torecognize that the
labor tribunals gravely abused their
discretion in ruling for the respondents.
Petitioner is entitled to SPIR
RULING: PETITION GRANTED; PAY SPIR
AND FULL BACKWAGES