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INTRODUCTION 3
THE PLATES 59
Tank dl'sl r11ct ion h<1dg< s
INDEX 64
OSPREY
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l
WORLD WAR II INFANTRY I
ANTI-TANK TACTICS
INTRODUCTION
:'\FA;\.'TRY \IU l:\SFl'.\R.\111 L IRO\I l.\'.\:K..... both in the assaul! and i11 <Ill
integrate d anti-L~lllk dcltntT. This cu11ccpl was understood ;tl111ust
immediatel y 11pon tlw first llcl<ling of ranks, and h<crnH a basic
pnnpt nl tank and anti-tank warfan-:
'Tanks unacn1111pa11it'd I>\ i11fantrv can11ul achicn dccisi\'t' ... 11tcess:
The first dedicated anti-tank
thl'y must be supported by infantn. who alo11(' c;u1 cll'ar and hold
weapon: the massive German
13.2mm single-shot, bolt-action ground gaincd . . . II I l'IH'lll\' I tanks s11ccecd in penetrating tht' lint'. the
Mauser Tank Abwehr Gewehr I friendhI infantry 11111st hold 11111 and co11ce11lralc all their dfons on
(TGewehr) of 1918, held here stopping the advance of the crnm\\ infantry. while the hostile tanks arc
by an American officer, weighed
dealt with In our artillcrv. ..
The ddcat of the e11c111\''s infantn. must
16kg (35.271b). It was normally
therefore be the Ii rst cunsiderat iun in al I pb11s 1'111 a11 ti-La11 k dcfC.nlT.
supported on a blpod attached
to the barrel band at the end These statements arc firnnd in the LS :\rmy's /11strnflio11s fol' ,,\nti-tr111li
of the forearm. l>1'/i'llr'1' l/'rnui1i1111(1/ - fdn11t1r)' I 1)/ 8), fiu111 tllt O/liri11/ /Jriti1h J>on11111'11/.
OLl1n tha11 lhc fieldi11g ol dedicated anti-tank weapons, tht'st' c01H qil.'i
remained 1111d1~mgcd througlw111 \\'orld War 11.
At the beginning of \Vorld \\'ar II most countries had a basically
sound a11Li-La11k d11ctri11e. Tht' fatal flaw was that the effect oft111ploying
the tank i11 large combined arms formations was not fully understood.
France had placed compk1t faith in its 11nckrpnwcre d a nti-tank g1111s.
deployed in depth . 111 spring 19-10 the Cenna11s massed se,e n Panzer
d i\isinns on th<' weak :\rckmws frnn t. attacking through an 11 ncx peeled
sec tor and m tTWhl'h11i11g FrnH h cldi:11ns. 0111T t hn hrokt tl11011gh
they thrust deep inlo the rear, co111pleLely dislocatit1g French attempts to
rcspon<l . The French still Yicwcd tanks as infantn support weapons: theY
ne,cr m a <;scd their arn1our. s11p111>rtl'd b y other arms , to m;mntu\H'
against breakthroughs.
The I ~HO Blil:-..kri1g S('lll other armil's into 1H'ar panic, and a rush to
find a means or countl'ri11g it t11s1wd Oil both sides of the :\1la111ic. The
fear was of'tc11 exaggnated , con\illci11g some that i11fa111ry u11its were
helpless against ranks. Often the pL111ni11g- co1111ni1t(Ts looked only at
the lank itsdL and did not consider tht n>111hined arms aspects 11t
(~erman doctrine; but cflcclin_ ;ulli-Lank deklllT would also have to be
a cnm hi ncd arms effort.
A11ti-La11k tact ics and weapons wen in a co11stanl stall' of' n olution
thro11ghou1 the war. lmprnn:d models of tanks . e\olvi11g ar111uur
tart ics, new field i nnnvation s an cl the overall de\'dopmcn t of corn bincd
an11s tactics all contrib11ted to Lhis process. A11ti-ta11k wea po11s changnl
drastically: there was a constant st'arch fo r 111ore lethal, more accuratt:'.
l011ger-rang:d. mon compact and lighter weapons. \\11ilc imprml'ci tank
designs and increased armour protection greatly i11Jlm11ccd the denl-
opmcnt of anti-tank weapons, those oLher factors we re equally important. 3
THE TANK THREAT
From their first use by the British A.nm on the \Vestern Front in
September 1916, infantry has perceiwd tanks as a 'tenor' weapon
ea pa hie of routing troops. piercing dcf'cnsi\'e lines and driving deep into
rear areas. Considering the limitations of' period anti-Lank weapons.
there was considerable justification for this frar.
To understand the capabilities and limitations of anti-tank wPapnns
and tactics. 011e must be fomiliar with the capabilities a11d limitations of
1anks. Tank design evnl\'ed so rapidly during Wnrld War II. and the char-
acteristics of iwlividual models <liffrred so markedly. tha1 generalizations
are diflicult. In am discussio11 of ge11eral sLrengLhs and weaknesses it must
be borne in mind that the.lie do not rwccssarily apply. in specifics or in
comparable degree, lo all tanks.
Tank design and capabilities
At the beginning of \Vorld \Var II the light tank was the most
varied greatly during World War cmnmon class. (The use of small two-man 'tankettes' -weighing from 2
II; this German pzKw IV Aust F to 6 terns. armed with machine guns. and vulnerable to AP small arms
of 1941 may be considered a ammunition and grenades - had all buL ceased. although Japan and
typical medium tank of Its day.
Italy retained them.) Light tanks weighed some 6 to l?l Lons. with
The thickest armour (50mm - 21n)
Is on the hull and tul'T'et fronts
comparatively thin armour usually nllnerable to the nwdest anti-Lank
and the gun mantlet; turret guns of 19:~9-1 l. Thev had a new of two to f(ntr llll'll. and were generally
sides and rear are 30mm, upper armed with a ~7mm main gun. though often onlv with machine g1111s. 1
glacls 25mm, hull sides and rear Their principal role was scoutini.;. and aning as "light unalry outriders
20mm, hull roof 15mm, turret
for he<l\'ier tanks; howewr. in less aflluent armies the lighl model
roof 1Omm. Early in the war
the main gun was optimized for
was somctinws the principal combat t;ink. As the \Var progressed light
infantry support - here a short- tanks It-II from favour because of their vulnerability; lightly annoured
barrelled 7 .5cm for knocking out sco111 cars, with a high degree of mobility and speed. better serYed the
field fortifications. By 1943 the reconnaissance role. Some light tanks were 1etaine<l in sccondarv rnlcs.
role of the tank had evolved;
and some new 'light' 111odcls \\rrc fielded wi1h almost the capabilities of
long-barrelled high velocity guns
were being mounted, to fight a
earlv-war medium tanks.
new generation of enemy tanks l\frrlium ranks were more hea,ily armoured; thev were usually capable
led by the Soviet T-34. of wi1hstandi11g light AT g1111fire, a11d to some extent medium calibre AT
guns, al least from the front.
Th('y were generally in
the weight range I!"> to '.\0-
plus tons. had crews of
fn11r nr five. anrl mounted
main armament of ben\.'cen
17mm and 76mm calibre.
l\k<li11ms were often
viewed as supponing tanks,
providing heavier calibre.
longcr-ran1.~Td guns to
support their light cuun-
teq1arts. Initially their speed
was comparatively slow.
As it was realized that
medium tanks provided
the best overall capabilities
1 Note that 1n German documents calibres
of weapons larger than small arms are
always given 1n centimetres. e.g. 37mm "
4 3 7cm
to withstand improving AT weapons. 111
manoeuvre, provide fire support, and fight
other lanks, so their capabilities were steadily
upgraded. Armour and speed were improved,
and \vhile the gun calibre was seldom increased
beyond i6mrn. weapons were upgraded to offer
longer range and mon: penetration. 111 the
second half of the war mediums, in the character
of 'general purpose' tanks, appeared in over-
SIDE VIEW
whelmingly greater numbers than other classes. .--~.
PLAN VIEW
122mm, capable of killing any tank at long
range. under armour suffi<:ient to defeat Pz. Kw. 3
medium tank guns and infantry AT weapons.
They were generally slow and very heavy (55-70 tons), whkh limited Tanks had other vulnerabilities
cross-nmmry and even road mobility. as many bridges could not suppon apart from penetration of the
armour. Thi diagram, from a US
them. They were present on the hattlefield in only small m1mbers, but
Intelligence report, lndlcet.. air
whe n skilfully t'.mployed they might have a definite, and occasionally a Intakes for both the crew and
decisive effecl. engine, and engine exhausts, of
While other types of armoured fighting vehicles (AFV) were a German PzKw Ill. Such vents
encountered by the infanlr')', most were relatively vulnerable to light AT were vulnerable to fire bombs,
smoke and gas.
weapons. These included scout cars, reconnaissance vchides, halftrack
personnel carritrs, and self-propelled assault and anti-tank guns. Only
two of these types presented a threat comparable lo thaL of tanks: the
assault gun and Lhe tllllk destroyer. Both were built on Lank chassis,
giving them the same mobility as tanks. Assault guns lacked a revolving
turret, having the main gun mounted with limited traverse in a heavily
armoured hull superstructure. These were mainly infantry support
weapons, hut some mounted longer guns capable of anti-tank
fire (though the lack of a rotating turret greatly limited this ability ).
Tank destroyers - self-propelled AT guns - sometimes had a rotating
turret, but this often had an open tnp, and the vehicles' armour was
lighter than that of the tanks they fought; they relied on speed or
concealment for survival. 5
Any tank that could be seen
could be hit and knocked out
with the appropriate weapon.
This German PzKw V Aust A
Panther was holed through the
45mm hull side armour by an AP
round from a 75mm gun, which
probably kllled the entire turret
crew. Note the track links on
the turret side, and skirt plates
hung along a rail on the hull
side, Intended to detonate
bazooka rounds before they
struck the hull.
Limitations to
moblllty
While la n ks posscssc<l
a high <Legree of cross-
ro11ntrv mobilirv,, on..-
rough tttTain and nhstadcs.
thev were limited to some
degree. Among a tank's
weakest points was exactly
what made it a tank: its
tracks, fonncd of separate
plates linked and pi1med
LogcLllLT in a flexible belt.
i\Iincs. h'l.mtin or obstacles
could break tracks; and
exccedinglv rough terrain
and ,iolcnt manocmns
could 'Lhnm:' a track off its
8 b'lli<ling sprocket.
rvtany tanks \\'(' rt' rdati\'ely u11<.lerpo\\'ered.
which aff('ctcd 1hcir "lwed, manoeuvrability, anrl
ability to 11egotiall' obstacles and rough terrain.
The maximum speed obrained by most tanks
was 12 to 2:> miles per hour. \.Imi11g surh a
hea\'V nhicle often caused the engilll' tn
o\'crheal, whether it was air- or walcr-cooled. The
ravages of abrasi\'l'. clogging <l 11st were a ro11s1a11 t
problem; engine lik was short, requiring frccpwnt
maintenance and replace111tnl. Fuel consumption
limited operating range, and was measured in
gallons per mile rather than miles per gallon.
Tanks might be powered by petrol/gasoline or
diesel; petrol e11gi11l's required more frequent
refuelling and were more prone Lo catch fire. hut required less A tank destroyer was not a tank;
maintenance. Diesel engines were more expensi\'e to produce, hut while built on tank chassis, their
armour was generally llghter
provided hcttn power-to-weight rarios; the file! was less combusribl(',
and they often had open-topped
gave greater range for its volimw, and was cheaper. turrets. They were designed
Rough rerrain and obstacles caused more difficulty than is often to klll tanks and not to support
appreciated. Sinking into deep nm<l, swampv ground or sofr sand coulrl Infantry, although they often
'belly' a tank; running the nose over tree stumps or boulders could had to per1onn that task - a
role in which they were made
break tracrion because of the low ground dcaratH.T. Tanks could easily
vulnerable (like this US M10)
lose their grip on ice, mud, gravel and srccp inclines. '.\lost early tanks by the lack of a tank's co-axlal
had comparatively 11arruw ll"<Kks. limiting their ability to cross soft and bow machine guns. In
grounrl clue to the rdativcly high grounrl pressure per square inch . urban fighting all AFVa suffered
Wider tracks, or 'gnn1sns . added ro the outside edge, \\'t.Tl' often from the limited elevation of
their guns, which restricted
provided tu reclucc ground pressure; hut wider, he<l\"ier tracks h1nlter
their ablllty to engage targets
reduced speed, increased fuel consumption and caused more wear 011 on the higher floora and roofs
the ru1111i11g gea1-. of bulldlngs.
The height of the mau-made or nat 11ral obstacles that a tall k could
ne~ot iatc ckpended on the design and angle of" t h(' front of' i ls tracks
and hull; most. tanks could 11ot mount a wall much over :l, feel high.
Trenches and ditches whose width was 111ore than one-third the length
of the track's 'grounrl footprint' could halt a tank; so could closely
spared trees of <nn morkratc diameter. Extcnsi\c tangled harhcd wire
and other debris could jam ru1111ing ge ar. Long-barrelled guns were
restricted in woodland and built-up areas, where their tranrsc was
sometimes hloc ked.
Armament
The main gun was mounted in a turret with a '.W10" tra\'crsc; ckYatio11
and depression were 1ypically limited. Ideally the gun would be a 1011g-
barrdkd high n(ncity \\'Capon Capable or defe ating othe r tanks. but
short-barrelled low nlocity guns were often provided for the infann1
support rok ; this was a mistake. as tanks so armed were mostly incapable
of engaging enemy ranks. There was much resistance in many armies LO
providing imprmtd nr larger calibre gtms. All sorts of tactical rationales
were argued, but the real reason for using lmv velocity guns W<Ls tn
reduce costs or ronsene materials. In a very few instances tanks also
mounted a smaller calihrt' secondary gun , hut the complications
outweighed the advantages. Cyrn-stabilization was not always provided
for the gun, and this greatly reducerl the ability to engage targets while 9
moving: a lank would han' 10 halt to aim and
fire. during which time it was vulnerable . Other
'"eaknesses affrcling weapon perf(1rma11ce Wt' rt:'.
hand-operated as opposed to powned turret
trawrsc, and relatively indticicnt sighting systems.
A tank's machine guns are often disro11nted.
hut in fact they proved to be extremely valuable
for engaging enemy positions, troops and soft-
skin vehicles. They wert even 111111e important for
protecting their own and other tanks from
attacking infantt")'. !\lost tanks ntntmtcrl a co-axial
machine gu11 in tilt: main gu11 111a11tlet. Frt>quemly
a how machine ~111 was moumed in the right front
hull , and another exte rnally on the commanrlcr's
cupola for air defence and g-round targets.
Occasionally a machine 1-,run \Vas mounted in the
back of the turret or other llllltsual positions.
mainly in some R11ssian ;md.Japant'St' types.
The Hritish and (~ennans employed smoke
grt-'nadc dischargers on son1t AFVs. These were
small tubes fitted outside the tul'l'et, capable of
throwing phosphorus smoke grenades 20 to l 00
yards. rapidly creating a dense smoke scrcf'n to
co11nal the tank while it withdrt'w ur changed
The sergeant commander of a course. (The hursting phosphorns threw Olli burning particles dangerous
British M3 Grant of 5 Royal Tank lo both attacking and supporting infantt")'. )
Regt slgnalllng by flag In the
North African desert, February
1942. Conditions were not so
The crew environment
suitable for visual signalling on The greatest tactical weak11t'ss of a tank is the crew's n-rv limited field
most other wartime fronts, and of visio11, and their complete inability to hear anything outside.
It obviously could not be used Communications hetwctn tanks was critical in order to to-o rdinate
at night or in other conditions
effective tactics. In the early days hand and flag signals were used. hut
of limited visibility. (IWM)
these could not lw t-'mployed once tanks Cllllt-' under fire. in forest. or
in poor \'isihilit; due to night, rain, snnw. fog. smoke or dust. Visual
signals also required tank commanders to constantly obsen'e unit
commanders tanks for orckrs. Only radios prodded dlcctive intra-tank
r<>mmunications. :\.1o st countries prmidcd nnly s11h-11nit comma11ders
tanks with two-way radios, and line tanks with receivers. Commm1ication
with infantry was C.'\'en mon difficult. In most armies infantry below
company level lackcrl portahk radios, and cwn if t lwy were so equipped
infanlrv ;111d t<tuk radios used rliffcrenl frequen c ies. lnl'antn-taHk
co-ordination was accomplish ed hy hand signals, coloured smoke
grenades. signal tlares, tracer fire, and limitcrl \Trhal cnrnrn1111ication .
The problem was compounded by the cliflicuh)' ul simply attracting the
tank comma11dcr's atttntion. I.ate in tlw wa1- the \Vcslern Allies fittt>d
some tanks v.ith an external tdephonc set for communication between
tank and infantry co111ma11ders. hut this was never a complete solution.
The tank crew had to endure great heat . deafening 11oise from the
engine and runnin g gca1. dizzying htmcs from the engine and gun,
cramped space hampned by awkward interior fittings, violent pitching
and lurching during rross-countt")' movement, poor visibility, and the
10 cvcr-presc11t f-irc hazard. Driving with the 111rniddy steering and dutch
systems of the perio<l was physically exhausting,
Tank recognition cards
and sometirnes drivers and co-dri\'crs had to be The Germans first used recognition leaflets in 1917 to
rotated at i11tervals. The loader had lo cope with depict silhouettes of enemy tanks and indicate points
insufficient space. heavy ammuuition, and the vulnerable to attack. Similar sheets or booklets were used
dangerous recoil of the gun. The gunner was busy by most armies in World War II to provide a means of
identifying different types of AFVs by line drawings: effective
acquiring targets and operating the main gun
aiming points might be indicated , and sometimes other
and co-axial machine gun, and in smaller tanks vulnerable areas such as the engine, fuel tank and ammu-
he sometimes had to load for himself. The nition storage. The Germans issued four-page leaflets for
commander was the busiest, having to guide the each type of enemy tank, specifically for each calibre of
tank. determine routes, search fur targets and AT/tank gun (2. 3.7, 5, 7.5 & 8.Scm), indicating the type
of ammunition effective at different ranges. The leaflets
threats, \\"atch his comman<ler's tank, mailllain
were stowed in the gun's sight box: sometimes a sheet
formation, and co-ordinate the crew. In some for the main type of tank the crew was fighting was taped
light tanks he additionally served as gunner to the gun shield beside the sight. This translated example
and / or loader. Either the commander, loader or is for the US M3 Grant tank. for a 2cm gun mounted on the
co-driver/ hull machim. gunner also had to man PzKw II light tank. Black areas= lethal effect; crosshatched
the radio.
= deterrent or damaging effect: white = no effect.
The Germans often painted reminders on the inside of
For self protection if they were forced to AT gun shields, e.g. 'Observe Carefully' or 'Be Certain'
abandon the tank (and wen quick and lucky (to reduce fratricide). 'Remember Camouflage', or simply
enough to do so, before exploding ammunition Kaltblutig ('cold blooded' - i.e. 'be calm and serious').
turned it into an oven), most crewmen were
armed with pistols. and one or two su~machine
guns wcrt' oftf'n stowed i11 the tank: a supply of
hand grenades was also carried to fcn<l off
infantry atlacks. Baled out' aews were a
lrgitimatt' targf't who routinely dre\.v fire from
enemy tanks and infantry. F!IDNT
* * *
f\1ines, other ranks. AT guns. infantry AT weapons,
artillery. ground-attack aircraft and direct infantry
attack were the main causes of tank losses. '.\Jatural
obstacles halted more tanks than man-made, and
banal mechanical breakdowns took a high toll.
Su~1d Shlll
Regardless of all their limitations, however, tanks 1,1,'l, .~o a:.
SU:E
were formidable weapons: they could be decisive
;:.
if handled and supported effectively, and were a
serious thrL'at to infantry. A brid note on tank ,fU- .111 .. lt CC rt.. -..
~ ------- Soll I "l: Lt c:tl : 0 rr.
unit organization is necessary. (1 r..i.;.r N".1-1n tnt
r
tir~ t~ ~.
~ ~ta.nlt
-=~ - ~d not
1t .. 1
&.t lb'' m
Germany and the USSR employed tank
regimenLo; with two or three battalions. The US
replaced its thrcc-hactalion regiments with HE ;._:h .... ll h.;
m;;;-Lb.e l
~lUlaust fir~.
separate battalions attached to 1-egime11tal-si1.ed
REAR
'combat commands'. although two divisions
retained regiments. British Commonwealth and
Japanese tank 'rq~iments' were of single battalion
size. Most tank batt<tlions had three or four companies, either of the
same type. or occasionally with three light or medium companies and
one of the opposite type. A tank company l)Vically had three or four
platoons. A platoon consisted of between three and six tanks, but four
or five were common : and one to three tanks were assigned to each
company headquarters. Commonwealth armies referred to their
company-size units as 'squadrons' and platoon-size units as 'troops', in
the cavalry tradition: their squadrons each had four three-tank troops. 11
Regardless of the number of tanks assigned to a company/ sriuadron.
a company in combat would soon be reduced by combat losses and
mechanical failure. Tankers preferred to operate in company
formations for mutual support, firepower and shock clfrcL. Platoons
were considered the smallest practical clenwnt for combat; ;md the
absolute minimum , ..as for tanks to operate in pairs.
Equally important was for tanks to he accnmpa11it"d by infantry - tn
reconnoitre and clear routes, warn of AT Wt'apons 1111d auacking-
This diagram translated from infantry. direct tanks to bypass mines anci obstacles, co-ordinate
a Soviet manual depicts the manocmTes, irlrntif\ targets and rli1"ect the tanks' fire. Accompanying
four most common types of AT infantry were essential to protect tanks from close-in attacks. especially
projectiles used In 1943, and in dose terrain or built-up areas. Tanks committed without infantry.
their capabilities when fired
separate<l from infantry hy enemy action, or leaving their infantry
at 300 yards' range.
(Top to bottom:) behind. were extrc-mely vuhu:i-able.
Armour-piercing high explosive
(AP-HE)
Armour-piercing capped, with ANTI-TANK WEAPONS - AN OVERVIEW
a penetrating core (APC)
Shaped or hollow charge -
high explosive anti-tank (HEAT} At the beginning of the \Var most countries foll<>wtd fairly similar
High explosive plastic or 'squash anti-tank doctrines, V<ffying according to the terrain of their expected
head' (HEP or HESH). areas of operation, the m1mhcrs all<l t}ves of allotted AT weapons, an<l
the expectcrl cnemv's tank capahililies. The
main precepts of AT warfare included
separating tanks from their supporting
infantry: channelling arm11ur into ' kill zones';
iiii%1Q positioning AT weapons in depth; causing
Armour - piercing
shell
tanks to 'button up' (close all hatches), thus
Shell penelrlu Shell 1>lode1
.,mour by fore ln1id lnlc increasing their vulnc1ahility and hamp{ring
of !tie lmfHcl beyond .,mour command and control: massing AT lires;
exploiting tank-restrictive terrain. 111;111-rnade
and natural obstacles and 111i11elields; and
1~H.,d-core
blinding and scree11i11g by means uf smoke.
This discussion of AT weapons is limiter! to
1hell
those found at battalion and lower levels of
Bo ltom plI nd blll1tlc Fregmenl1 of shell core
cp d1f1oyed, the nd ermour hil crew' infantry units. Laq.{e calibre towed and sdf-
tort ol shell penelrl1 end lenli equipment propellcd AT guns operated by specialist units
ermour
generally fall outside the remit of this book.
though with isolated exceptions.
A wick \;uicty of AT weapons cxisterl in
5heped-chrg I ~n~J. and during the war the search for more
shtll
efltxtive \\'capons arguably saw more ,ariations
Armour h pierced by
c11mulellv. 1tr.. m of of design and rlcwlopmcntal effort than those
Hplo1lon produch
for any other categor\' of weapon, ranging
from the mundane, tu the innovative. to the
frankly bizarre. Regardless of the weapnn 's
design - be it a high velocity gun, <lll advanced
rocket launcher. or a bomb slapped 011 to
Shell wllh pla1tic a ta11k's surfrtce by a desperate infantryman -
.. plosive
Vibrflon nd fr119menh the aim of' any AT weapon was to deliver a
produced by Hplo1lon
of pltslic Hplo1lv1 Fr19menh Ind air blt u111ed by pn~jcctile or explosive charge capable of
trmour vlbrellon end reflect d pc11ctrating Cl tank's annour or othenvise
wavu insl.de link
12 disabling it.
Armour-piercing shot
Kinetic energy is the basic means of penetrating a hard mat('rial. and
Scm Pigr.-M.
It:;t;l1ffU'7!J ~ /3[ l/,/J
this must be delivered bv a high velociLy gun. The simplest example is
lfusfiiltrun!! .If~
tlw armour-piercing (AP) shot: a solid pn~jectilc made of hardened steel
with a cnmpara1in-ly hl11nt nose, though usually providt'd with a
streamlined 'windshkld' (the tip of a shaq.>-nosed projectik, like an
arrow. will break off on impact and the mass \\i ll he cldlcctcd) . AP shot
rdi t>s on its speed and hardness to penetrate. All armies issued AP
cartridges for their rifles a11d machine guns: these pre-dated ta11ks.
having hee11 dc\'clopcd in \\'orld \Var I to dcft'at snipers using steel plate
shields for cover. They were indfrctivc against all hut the lightest AFVs.
since they typically penetrated only 6mm to IOmm (Y, Lo ~in) of annuur
wht'll striking at right angles (i .e. ~HY') and \\oithin 100 varcls' range.
Variations on the brger AP ro11nds include a small high explosive
(HE) or incendiary charge ill the pn~tctile's base; such AP-IIE a11d
AP-1 roun<ls, fittcrl with base-detonating fuses. <'Xplode or ignite after I I
penelrati11g. to cause fragmentation or scaucr burning particles to
I
ignite ruel 01' allllllllllition slored inside the tank. 1\nnour-picrcing
capped (APC) is AP shot with a soft metal nose cap that ' turns' the
pn~jectile to ro11ghlv 90' when it strikes armour. Another variation is a
smaller calibrt' hardened penetrator sheathed ill a larger soh metal Germany Introduced the
projectile; wlwn it strikes armour the softer material is stripped off and Panzergranatpatrone 40 anti-
armour round (Pzgr 40, or to the
the penetrator punches through. Enhancements aside, the AP round
AHies 'AP40') In all AT and tank
itself causes little damage to the tank other than making a lwle. \1ost gun calibres; this is the head
crew c1s11allies and interna l <lamag-c arc caused by fragmentation from of a 5cm shell. They achieved
the penetratt~d armour and the projectile, brt'aking up and 1icoclwting a higher veloclty than standard
around the cramped interior with lethal effect. The least desired effect AP shot, with a softer steel
sabot ('shoe') around a small
is for the projectile to pass entirely through the tank and out the other
penetrator core of hard tungsten,
side. causing 111i11i111al damage. and an easily crushable 'wlnd-
shleld' pointed nose. Like many
'Squash head' munitions AP rounds they had a tracer
The high explosi\'e plastic or 'squash head (I IEP or HESll) round is a element In the base; by tracking
the tracer In fllght the gunner
plastic explosive charge contained in a thin-walled pn~jectile with a base-
can sense' If the round Is a hit
dctunating fuse. It relics on bnttc force to smack into the tank. with the or miss before It strikes, and
pliable explosive 'squashing' out and detonating, so that the explosion can then either correct his aim
sheers off fragnwnts from the inside of the armour. ff the armour is for the neat shot or acquire
s111liciently thin the HEP round may hlow a hole through it or severely another target. Fractions of a
second can mean life or death
blKkle it. This round has the advantage of low cost, and is also ust'htl
when engaging tanks.
against soft-ski11 vehicles. and light fortifications and buildings, since it
has the same dkct nn concrete anrl masonq as on steel.
shells used in World War I. Extensive rlevclopmcnt banum sulphate. 25 per cent polyvinyl acetate, 15 per cent
of purpose-made AT mines was pursued in the dark yellow pigment, 10 per cent zinc sulphate and 10
late 1920s/ early 19'.~0s and continued throughout per cent sawdust. It was applied by hand in a first 5mm
the war. During \\'orld War II all armies lairl layer, and four hours later a textured 3mm coat was added
with a spatula, and dried with a blowtorch. The ridged
millions of mines on all fronts. All combatants in patterns made it more difficult to attach magnetic and
:-.Jorth Africa created \'<Lst minefields because of 'sticky' grenades. It was not supposed to be applied to
the lack of naturnl rlefcnces and obstacles; anrl the turret, engine deck or track skirts where it would be
the .Japanese made increasing use of mines as the worn off by crew traffic, but in fact it was commonly seen
on these areas.
Pacific \Var progressed.
Zimmerit was ordered discontinued on 9 September
Typically, AT mines were prcssure-activaterl by 1944 because it was rumoured that gunfire could set it
a tank's crushing weight; if stepped on by a soldier alight; this was found to be untrue, and the plaster was
thev, would not normallv, detonate. \lost mines not removed, but its factory application was not restarted.
would blow off a track, hut the heavier models
could cause substalllial damage. The layout, density.
and location of minefields varied greatly. Anti-
personnel mines were routinely intermixed with
anti-Lank mines lo hamper i11fa11try and engi11t'ers
attempting to clear lanes for the tanks. and booby-
trapping mines to hinder clearance was common.
l\f inefields were tied into natural obstacles, laid
on likely avenues of approach and often in
patterns that would lead tanks into the sights of
AT guns; the use of dummy minefields alongside
real ones multiplied these effccts. 2
Like any obstacle. a minefield - whether a re,..,.
mines buried al a road intersection, or multiple
belts of thousands of mines - was worthless unless
covered by observation and fire . If effectively
sited, camouflaged and covered by Ii.re, they could
halt or at least slow a tank advance. Once the
defenders l\'CIT driven away it was a relatively
straightforward matter (though seldom without
bloody cost) to dear routes through minefields
which had taken much time and effort to lav. ,. The
harassing and delaying dkc:t of a small number of mines laid at Vt'isely
chosen poinL'i could be more effective than large minefields.
A wide and imaginative variety of expedient anti-tank weapons were
employed. Regardless of how ingenious or effective these last-resort
weapons may have appeared, and huw thoroughly troops were trained
in their use, any army forced to employ them was in desperate straits.
2 See also Elite 122. World War 11 /n,antry Tactics: Company & Battalion 19
Most required direct attack by a soldier or at
least an attack cklivered al very close range.
demanding a high rlcgrcc of cxposun. and a slim
chance of escape. In order to succeed the attacker
required great courage. a well-chosen position. a
stealthy approach, effective' covc:Ting fire, absence
of enemy infantry. and no small measure of luck;
in the 'invasion srare' summer of 1940 a British
Army manual on such tactics frankly compared
the risks with 'tiger shooting on foot'. Never-
theless, training was widt'spread and serious: in
I !140-41 such methods were often all that the
Hritish or Soviet infantryman had. Examples of
expedient weapons included:
Satrhd d1rlff!J'S I Olh-20lh explosive charges
packed in a haversack \'l/ilh a short Lime fuse,
thrown on the engine deck. into the tracks. or
jammed under a 1111Tct overhang. A variation
In North Africa, a British was the pole charge. a demolition charge on a 4ft-{ilt pole. allowing
ordnance disposal engineer poses it to be placed on a vuhwrablc spot.
with a German Teller AT mine
ConrPnfmtnl rlw11!;rs l\undle of about six hand grenades or small
attached (for the photographer's
benefit, unconvincingly, with
demolition charges wired Logether with a central detonator, and usually
a long white string from the a hanrlle. Employed in the same way as satchel charges. A single grt'nacle
handle) to an anti-personnel might also he shovccl down a gun hancl.
SMlne ('Bouncing Betty') rigged /)ouhh-- rhmg11s Two demolition charges linked by wire and thrown to
to klll mine clearers. In reallty
cangle around a gun harrcl. Smoke grenades were used similarly. in the
they would be coupled by a short
wire to a well In the underside
hope of blinding gunners.
of the AT mine. The TMI 35 held AT 111i11r.1 I land-delivered mines laced directly in front of a track, or
11 lb of TNT, and was set off by thrown into tlw tracks.
pressures of 4201b on the centre fin' bomb.\ Large petrol/gasoline cans (:lgal / 201) with incendiary or smoke
but only 1751b at the edges.
grenades attached for detonation. and thrown ur dropped on to a tank's
engine <leek.
'Alo/otm mrktni/.\ Class hntt les filled with petrol/ gasoline and often
enhanced with oil. rubber, 1.ar, phosphorus etc. to make it burn longer
and bolter ;md adhere to the tank. or to crnst> more smoke lo blind the
crew. A rag stuffed in the bottle neck was lit and the bottle thrown at the
tank, prderably at vision ports, hatches. or engine companme11ls; some
were provided with self-ignition dc\iccs. Results were often disappointing
because of the small a111ou11t of fuel. and later tanks were better sealc<I.
/\nother method W<lS breaking 11umt:~rous fuel-tilled bottles on a tank
and igniting ii with tlares. tracers or smoke grenades.
Expedient anti-tank weapons -
I.e. those fabricated in the field
by soldiers adapting available Blasting cap', Fu.ze ,
munitions and materials - took \'.'ire faster..tng '
many forms. This Is a German
double charge, comprising two
demolition charges with a short
delay fuse and Igniter, connected
by a short length of wire; thrown
over a tank gun barrel, it will
disable the weapon. Most
expedient weapons required
Sxpksiv.:! cha:ge
20 a dangerously close-In attack. -------
'/Jui.\y rhain.~ 'AT mines fastened together along a rope or plank. conccakcl
beside a road and pulkd across in front ol a lank by a hidden soldier.
Various mechanical means of attacking tanks were suggested; some of
these may have \.vorkcd on cady war light tanks, hut 01gainq larger tvpcs
they had liule efkn. lL was recommended that a steel bar, pipe, wooden
hcam or C'\'en a rifle he \\oeclgcd into the running gear tojam the tracks .
Battering machine gun barrels with a bar. hammering on glass \ision
ports and periscopes. dri\'ing wtdges into lllJTel rings. forcing open
hatches with crowbars. cmciing vision puns and periscopes with mud.
burning blankeL'i or o\'ercoats, and similar acts of physical mavlwm were
measures of desperation. These. like some of the improvised munitions.
were horn of real experience in such nmflicts as the Spanish Ci\'il
\Var (l~'.~f)-:m): but against the heavier tanks of later years they usually
accomplished little. and were often fatal to those who tried them.
Field artillery and mortars arc often said to be i11dlecti\'c against
armour. \Vhile it is trne that long range indirect tire had little dhct
011 tanks (a direct hit being rart). it did have the bend it ul separating
the infantry from tanks an<l forcing the unit to deploy into dispersed
formations early in an action. r\car misses only caused '\upcrficial
damage. (These limitations did not apply in some exceptional cases
such as the \cry heavy n;l\'al gunfire c:otHTJllrations occasionally
a\'ailable lo the Allied annies in Sicilv and '.'Jorman<ly.) Concentrated
artille1y could destroy light tanks. however. and this was accomplished
in se\'eral instances against Japanese and Italian armour. Artillery
and mol'lars could lay smoke on tank lormations, though this had the
disadvantage of obscuring targets f{Jr friendly AT guns: often smoke was
Soldiers of the 'Grossdeutsc:hland'
dropped only on the rear two-thirds of a tank forma1ion. still allowing
Division prepare a concentrated
gunners to target the lead tanks. charge with seven stick
111 an enlt'rgency. light field artillery of up to I O:>mm could engage grenades. Such a charge might
tanks with di1-c<t tire. and AP or HEAT rounds \Vert often a\'ailahlc for break a track, damage an engine
field pieces. f\l osl were marginal in this rolt. hecause ol' inadequate If thrown on the raar deck, or
penetrate lighter annour over
sights and slow tra\'erse. I11fa11try guns - i.e. light, simplified artillery
a hatch or if Jammed under a
pieces manned hy infantryml'n - werl' uscd by some armies as firt' turret overhang. The concussion
support \Veapo11s. and some were provided with 1IEAT rounds, hut they was reportedly enough to
were ill suited as AT weapons for the same reasons. temporarily stun a tank crew.
\fost anti-aircraft guns
were provided with AP
ammunition, and possessed
a high rate of fire and rapid
traverse. Thev took time
to emplace. though most
coukl be tired at grn11n<l
targets while still 11Hn111ted
on their travelling carriage.
Most AA guns were large
and their high prolile made
them ditlicult to conceal
- essential for a wc01pon en-
gaging tanks. Some ~Omm
and '.~7 / 40mm ;\A cannon
could be effective against
light tanks . The L~erman 21
This Soviet 76.2mm ZiS-3 was
the standard dlvlslonal llght field
artillery piece from 1942. The
Red Army required field artlllery
to be capable of engaging tanks
effectively, and the ZIS-3 proved
well adapted to this role; It Is
often considered as more an
AT weapon than a field gun.
use of 8.8cm Flak ~uns in the AT role.: is well known. The round was
devastali11g Lu La11ks and the weapon was exlremely accurale and long-
rangcd. hut its large size and the time and labour it took tn emplace was
an impediment. Few other counlries employed theit latge calibre AA
guns iu a similar mau11er. allhough the Smicls used their 8[>mm gun
against annour at least as 11111ch as the (;crmans.
r- ~
\ I
~m
u
25
1943-45
By 1942/ 43 the nature of anti-tank warfare had changed in many
respects. Armour was employed in smaller scale as well as mass
operations, and more frequently to support infantry, both in the attack
and defence. Self~propcllecl assault guns were also more common on
the hattlefield.
Conventional AT guns were being upgraded to medium and large
calibres, but improvements in tank design, armour, firepuwt"r and
mobility ontpaced the appearance on the field of adequate AT guns.
'Quick fixes ' were common , \Vith existinp; tank and AA hTlms mounted on
AT gun carriages. Anti-tank rifles were falling from use. and in the LS ancl
later the German annics they began to he replaced by shoulder-I-ired
rocket launchers. The British Commonwealth armies went dcl\\11 their
mv11 cul-de-sac (sec below); and the USSR and Japan lidded nothing
comparahk. These hi~hly portable weapons providcrl the infantry with
the protection they needed. and led lo new small unit AT tactics. Thc-y did
not replace come1nional AT gu11s, being considered supplementary
weapons of opportunity; yet although their range an<l lethality \\'ere
limited, they went a lung way to transfo1111 the tank/ infantry balance in
the latter's favour. particularly i11 the West i11 194-J/-l-[>. The impnrlance of
dose-attack , ..capons such as hand mines and AT rifle grenaclcs did not
diminish, \\ith some countrie:s lidding new designs.
It W<Ls realized that effective AT tactics required mobility equal to that
of tanks, and more- AT guns were mounted on full -tracked ('ha..,sis; in a
logical conclusion. it \Vas also realized that the best tank-killers were
other tanks. The necessity of making AT defences as deep as possible,
maintaining mobile AT reserves, and utilizing tanks and dedicated tank
destroyers was appreciated. \Vhile warfare had ben>me 11101-e mobile,
when time permitted an army in the defence prepared strong AT
positions protected by extensive- obstacle systems and minefields. The
Red Army made extensivt' usc;- of AT strongpoints, as did the \Vehrmacht
after the tide of suffess turned. !\fore anille1-y was provided with AT
ammu11ition, as were light AA guns.
AJter J 943 large German tank ulknsives were seldom seen, all(l only
occasionally possible after lll<~jor efforts lo m<L'is forces: the.Japanese never
employed armour on a large scale. The Allies' ahility to produce lanks
and field large armour for111atio11.s i11neased. Because Axis tank allack.s
largely ceased apart from small scale operations and counter-attacks, the
importance of small unit AT weapons and tactics increased. Because of
the ability of tanks to pt"11etrnte deeply. even in local counter-attacks.
the need to prm;de artillery unils and other rear eleme1w; with AT
protection was realized.
Tank-hunter teams
\lost armies c-mployed tank-hunter teams, and their use incrc-ased as the
war progressed and more lethal portable AT weapons bc.: rame aYailable.
Their organization was usually left up to indh;dual units. though sonw
experiments had bc-c-n undertaken and recommendations were- made.
Units often developed their own tactics. and the terrain remained a
governing factor. A hunter team might consist of anything between four
and 12 men, with six to eight !wing typical, lc-d by a junior NCO . A two
26 tu four-man attack element were armed with a sta11d-off weapon such as
an AT rille or shuulder-lircd rocket launcher, or
dose-attack weapons such as AT hand mine s and
grcnad('s . Cnveri ng c lcnwn r.11, of two t n Iour
riflemen armed with hand, rille aml smoke
grenades backed up the attack element, protefling
them againsl accompanying enemy infan1ry. Often
a two-man automatic rille 111 light machine gun
team was in cl ude d for support.
Hunter learns were deployed forward of the
main line of resistance, especially i11 dose terrain,
lo ambush advancing tanks. Other teams were
held in readiness bv front line and immc<liate
reserve sub-uniLs to attack penetrating tanks,
and others could be held deeper in the rear to
ambush or intercept tanks. They were cspeciallv
useful i11 forests and built-up are<L"i where good
cover anrl concealment were available. and where
tanks were rcstrinc<l to predictable routes and
forced to 1110\'e slowlv. ldeallv teams would he
co-ordinated with other friendly elcnwnts, hut the
nature of combat anrl the scarcitv of tactical
radius often precluded this. 1 Iunter teams might
The ultimate mobility for an also be used offensively, by infthrating enemy lines and attacking tank
Infantry AT weapon was to be 'laagers' and assc111hly areas.
portable by an Infantryman over Ideallv a hunte r team would ambush a tank - let it come to them -
any terrain. In this staged shot
h111 often they had 10 intercept or pursue their quarry. Poor visibility
a US bazooka crew 'engage'
a Panther PzKw V Ausf A with (night, fog. rain) was preferred, hul cn11di1io11s could not he waited
the 2.361n M1A1 rocket upon. Smoke grenades might be used to blind the crew and/ or screen
launcher, whose light weight the attack clclll('Tlt's approach . The c<wcring element might deliver the
and handy size made it easy smuke, distract the tank with s111;1ll arms lirt". and tn);{age enemy
to manoeuvre into a favourable
infantry. a s would the machine gun new. If using a stand-off \\L'apon the
firing position - unlike that
chosen by this photographer for attack clement would mmc in as close as pr;Ktical. to I 00 yards or less:
his reconstructed drama: facing ii using clusc-attack weapons they would have to attack the tank directly,
the Panther's massive, sloped at zero range.
frontal armour, and inviting fire Tanks were attackc<l from th<' rear qua<lrant if possible. Even ,.,;th the
from Its co-axial and bow
more pm,Trful portable AT weapons flank and rear shots were usually
machine guns.
Hecessary to kill a tank. The use of hullter teams was hampered by
normal tank ladies nf seldom operating alone or without infantry
support. Such a11 ambush was often a11 immediate action without
specific organization or pla1ming; small groups of i11fa11trv simply
attackc<l ranks with whatever was available when the oppornmity
presented itself. This \\'as partintlarly true utjapanese and Soviet troops.
who might 'swarm' tanks, accepting het\} losses in the hope of
<lcstrming this high \'al11e target.
United States
Bef(ire tlw war America was lean 011 infantry AT weapons, though its
doctrine wa" hasirallv snllnd. Besidf's infantrv AT elements. the Field
Anillery was responsible for a11ti-ta11k ddetu e; they put little effort into
Spigot-type grenade launchers, it. however. taking the view that their fr'w AT guns \Vere Lo protect the
over which the hollow shaft of artillery and 11ot thl' di\'ision as a whole. Aht'r testing in pre-war
a grenade fitted, were adopted
m~moell\Tes the fa11k Destruver Force was established in November
by the US, Germany and Japan;
this is the US M7 for use on a
l ~H l. and all existing di\'isional AT baualions were re-designated TD
Garand M1 rifle. It required the ha1talin11s. In a period of exaggerated tlar of Cennan armour. 220
standard gas valve screw plug to baLtal ions were ordered tu be established. A more realistic j udgeme11L of
be replaced, and was secured to the actual threat, and Germany's forced shift to a defensive posture, saw
the bayonet lug (llke many other
only I Of) bat1alio11s organizt'd, and '.~!) nf thts< W('n lll'\'C'I" deplnvect
launchers). The further down the
launcher the grenade's finned,
overst'as: some Wl'rl' convened into other tYpes ol' unit. About half ol
tube-like tall boom was pushed, the hallalions used halftrack-mmmtcd (later fully tracked) guns, and the
the greater the range. An oddity others halhrack-towcd guns .
of the M7 launcher was that The basic i11fa11tn AT weapon was the :l7m111 ~UAl AT gun first lidded
the rifle could not be fired semi-
in I~lclO: this was a copy of llw Ccrman '.~. 7cm Pal\. '.~:\/ :~6. A good weapon
automatic while It was attached;
at the end of the war this
when adopted, hy 19-l l it ,.,as outdated: prn<luction ceased in mid-I ~14'.)
drawback was ellmlnated by r,
when the 7111111 w;L'i adupted, though the :nmm often remained in use by
the issue of the M7A1 battalion AT platoons, <'specially in the Pacific. It w;t'i prmidcd with AP,
AP< :. I IE. and canistcr ammunition, and fired I !1 to
~() rounds per minute: AP shot could penetrate
only '.~llmm at ;,oo yards with a right-angled
impart, though APC achieved !II mm under the
sa111e comlitirnts. It required a crew ul' six, a11d wa.s
tnwcd bv a Y:-tnn or 1-ton truck.
Tht' !J7mm I\[ I was a copy ol the British h-pdr
\> \lk II modified for Arnt'rica11 pruductiu11; the
later l\.llAI and \l!A~ had i111prnved trawrse
gear. It could I ire AP and APC rounds at I~ 10
Enprn. had a te11-ma11 crew. and was lowed by a
I-ton or I !0-ton truck. Even with AP penetration
of 7~~mm at I ,OOO vards and '.ltr. it Lou \:as soo11
;
The ftrs1 haznokas were shipped to thl' Rritish i11 !\orth Africa, and tn
the Sovit't U11io11. Tht' tiOO delive1ed to the British in September HH~
were tested and deemed unsuitl'd for desert \'>'arfarc: it was reasoned
that attacking infontrynw11 could not approach (~cnnan armour due to
the lark ol co11ceal111e11t i11 the desert. The bazooka's value as a defensive
weapon was apparc11tly ig-11orecl, and the British place<l 1hcm in storag-c.
}-\\-contrast. the Red Army saw their value immedi a tely. an<l the first of
thein,; lo be lost in combat p10\'ided the model for the (~ennan 8.8cm
Raketen panzerbl'tchse or 'Pattzcrschrcck ( 'armour ttTror' ).
The \f I bazooka sa\\" its first American use in No\'cmbcr 1942 in
'.'\orth Africa a11d on Tarawa; weighing 13.1 lh, it is recognizable by its
wooden shoulder stock and two pistol grips. The tvl I A 1 was standardized
in .J11lv 19-B, though it was not fielded for some months; it eliminated
The 2.36in M9 and M9A 1 the forward hanclgrip and had an improved electrical ignition svstem.
bazookas, Introduced in late Both nH><lels had a 2:-10-yar<l maxim11m range. rate nf tire of 4 tn :irpm.
1943, could be broken down and were :l-L'Jin (I .'.~:-1111) long. The :'vl~l was sta11dardi1e d in September
into two sections for transport,
l ~1-l~ at tlw rnp1es1 of the Airborne Command. and began to be fielded
or stowed In a canvas bag for
parachute jumping. The fact
in micl-10+1. This had a longer lilin (l.:i:lm) t11bc . increasing its
that It could be disassembled accuracy and ra nge to :mo yards, and 111on reliabk rockets. The tube
allowed It a longer tube to could be bn1ke11 down into Lwo sections for ease of transport. The \19A l
increase its range over the diffrred only in an improved barrd-coupling latch ; both models
M1A1. The M18 was Identical,
wcighc<l E>.X71h (7.1 ~l kilog rammes). Total production was 476.(i~H. of
but had an aluminium rather
than a steel tube, to reduce
which ~i7.81 ~)were the \.19Al model.
weight and prevent rust; few T he l\.ffi HEAT roc ket had a pointed nosl', six lo ng black-like tailfins,
saw service in World War II. and could pemtrate :)in (71imm) of armour at :~o ' impact angle and
-1. 7i11 (JI Omm ) al 90".
l lowcvcr, malfunctions wcn:
so frequent Lhat its use was
suspended in .\fay 194~ .
The impro\'cd \16A I / A2
quickly arrived. and the
l\.II Al and l\lfl laimdwrs
could not fin \f() rockets.
30 I I 11 A11g11sl I ~l4:) the rvttiA;~
How the bazooka got Its name
The 2.36in AT rocket launcher is universally known as the 'bazooka', a nickname
which has become generic. In 1941 the US Army developed a large shaped charge
AT rifle grenade. the M10; unfortunately, it was too heavy to fire from a rifle without
damage, or even from a launcher on a .50cal machine gun. That same year the Army
purchased a number of British 2in AA rockets for testing. In 1942, 2nd Lt Edward
G.Uhl fitted M10 warheads to modified copies of the rocket motors. A 60mm steel
tube was fitted with two handgrips, a shoulder stock, rudimentary sights. and a
simple electrical firing system. The result was the 2.36in T1 AT rocket launcher. Major
Zeb Hastings noted the weapon's similarity to an amusing musical instrument called
the 'bazooka' used in his act by radio comedian and musician Bob Bums, the
Arkansas Traveler', and the nickname stuck. While under development the bazooka
was code-named 'the Whip'; it was also called the 'stovepipe', for obvious reasons.
rocket was adopted; this had a round nose to lower the angk of efkctin.
impact. a short cylindrical tin assembly with four vanes for improved
stability, and <Ill improved cone-liner in the shaped charge warhead,
which inneased penetration by ~{() per cent. In I Y44 the t'vl 10 \VP rocket
was approved.
* * *
US a11ti-ta11k doctrine emphasized combat outposts with some battalion
AT guns temporally attached. \lost baualio11 guns were placed near the
main Jim of resistanc(' with frw if any provided co the reserve, and thus
there was little depth of dt'l(~ nce. Regimental AT guns were positioned
to the rear of lhe forward banalions. or held in readiness to occupy
alternate positions covering the main line or to support counter-attacks.
If non-regimental AT guns were attached, usually in the form of tank The halftrack-mounted 75mm
destroyer companies. they rould be positioned to the rear to provide Gun Motor Carriage M3, as used
more depth, as well as being attached to the screening force. by the earty US Tank Destroyer
The main tasks of illl AT defe11re were the organization or the defence Fon:e battallons. This example
Is in British service In Italy, ftring
of the main line of resistance and the formation of counter-attack units
in a supplementary fteld artillery
held in reserve . The latter was the primary function of tank destroyer role - It proved only marginally
units. Anti-tank weapons were not equally distributed across the effective for Its Intended minion.
front: reconnaissance was
con<luctcd to <letcrmine
their deployment based 011
the following criteria of
1ising p1i01ity: (I) routes of
advance that man-made
and natural obstacles made
impractical for tanks; (2)
areas that could be inter-
dicted hy passnc AT
defencf'; and (:~) zones that
had to be covered by AT
weapons ancl mines to
block am1our. Efforts \.HT('
made to channel tanks into
the third zone in order to
engage them.
The m~~jo1 flaw in
thr employment of' rank 31
dcslroycr units was that
more often than not no
(~crma11 tank thre<'\1 was
immediately present. To
cmplov tank destroyers
gainfully they were there-
fore alloued Lo support
infantrv units as assault
guns, ot'tcn with a company
to each regiment, a
platoon to each hattalion.
and a two-gun section 10
each rifle company. If a
m;~jor C~<'rman tank attack
did de\'elop, the division's
attached TD battalion was
1h11s too widely dispersed
lo co11entrat.f" and conduct
a counter-attack. Lack of
US 57mm M1 AT gun partly time, and often inadc<ptatc roads usually choked with support vehicle
protected by a building corner - colum11s. prcvc11tccl the unit from cu11centrating rapidlv in the
a common means of hastily
ncnssan area. Tanks were found to he more effeelin tank-killers; and
positioning a gun in a builtup
area. Often rubble and debris
tht' last tank rlcstrnvcr unit was inactivated in :'\nvcmlwr 1~146.
would be piled around the In the Pacific the Japanese tank threat was minimal. and relatively
exposed parts of the gun, more light AT guns wer<' a<lt'qnate for dealing with Lhe small numher
for concealment than cover. c11c0t11ll<'l't'd. The .Japanese frequently employerl dug-i11 Lanks as st;itic
pillboxes. or committed them pitnmcal in s111all 11u111bt'rs. \Vhen large
numhers were cmplnyerl in countcr-auack.o; they were often accompanied
by inadequate 1wmlwrs of infantry. and were frequently committed to
COlllllt'r-attack a landing force too late, by which time AT guns.
halftrac k-mn11nted guns anrl tanks were alrt'ady ashore. The US units
11s11all\' made short work of the ohsnlcsccnt .Japanese tanks with barrages
from bazookas, AT guns and artillery; often few CS tanks were even
present 011 these occasions. The first .Japanese tank allack on
(;uadakanal was dekated by a frw :~innn AT g11ns (eight tanb knc)('kt'd
uul). a 75111111 halftrack-mou1ned gun (one Lank). and 75mm hmvilzers
(three tanks); \farinc light tanks nnlv showed up in time to mop up the
ern:my i11fa11Ln. The largt'st tank ha11k in the Pacilic saw a few \1a1ine
tank.'i, AT guns. bazookas and artillery destrnv '..!4 ol' '.~7 allacking
.Japanese tanks 011 Saipa11.
There were instances when l'S troops were ove1n111 hy ( ;crman tanks,
in Tunisia in ,,;nter 1942 / 4'.~ and early in the Bault of the Bulge in
lkccmhcr I ~H L hut for the most part t :s forces possessed overwhelming
numbers of' hazooLL'\, AT guns. tanks, Lank destroyers. artillery. and air
support, dt:'feating most armour ~L'isaulL" easily.
British Commonwealth
Britain entered the war with the 2-pdr ( 40mm) T\lk I quick-firing gun
adopted in 1~l'.)8 . Its design was 11n11s11al in that when it went into action
its wheels were removed and three legs spread to prmide a stable mount
wilh a '.\fiff' traverse. IL weighed twice as much as its German 37mm
32 f11111ti11 1ml 0 11 pag1' 4/J
colllllerpan. The British emisioned it engaging tanks from well-
concealc<l prepared positions. an<l mobility was not an issue. This soon
prove<l an error; speed of emplacement and displacement wa<> essenlial,
and its high prolile was dillicult to conceal, especially in the North
Afiican desert. Its maximum effective range \.Vas 600 yards and it could
penetrate r,omm of an11our, which soon proved inadequate; its five-man
crew could crack off 20 lo 22rpm, but it was provided only with AP-tracer
ammunition. thus limiting its rnlc. It was normally transported on rhe
back of a I Y:>-ton l\.f orris truck or 'portce'. Ramps allowed it to bC' oil~
loaded for ground tirini.;. the preferred method. but it could be llred
from I he truck bed. It could also he towed by a Y.-ton trnck or full-tracked
Uninrsal Caffie!'.
Large numbers of 2-pdrs were lost in France in 1940: and while the
6-pdr (E'>7mm) gun existed in prototype. production of tlw 2-pdr had to
continue as a stopgap in view of the desperate need for AT weapons. A
number of Swedish-made :~7mm m/'.H Bofurs guns were intercepted en
route to Sudan i11 1940 an<l impressed into service in Africa as rhe \lk I.
Provided \Vith AP-trace1 and l IE ammunition, they were only effective
up to 400 yards, but weighed less than half a~ much as the '.!-pounder.
Cerman mountain units, Poland. Denmark and Finland also 1tse<l the
same gun.
The fi-pdr ivtk I was delivert:d in late 1941. lo be quickly followed by
the shorter harrcllc<l ~Ik TI, anrl by rhc \fk IV \\ith a I fiin-longer barrel.
They could be ponccd on a I Y.-ton lorry or. more commonly, lowed hy
Moblllty was essentlal for AT a tracked carrier. The fi..pdr (see above under the basically identical LS
guns. The British made wide 57mm) was a wcll-<lcsigncd, low profile weapon .
use of the 'portee' concept,
In !\lay 1942 a much larger 17-pdr nin) AT gun was approved for
transporting 2-pdr and 6-pdr guns
aboard a truck. While the gun senicc, the first reaching the Tunisian from ('.jury rigged' on 2[>-pdr
could be tired from the truck gun-howitzer carriag-cs) late in 1942,just in time to greet the first PzKw
bed, steel ramps were provided VI Tiger t;mks deployed lhne. \Veighing l ,8~~1b and with a I 65.4!1i11
to dismount the gun for ground harrcl, it tired an APC round which could pe1wtrate I 09mm ( 4.36i11) of
tire. This la a 6-pdr Mk II on a
1 '/1-ton lorry; the side shields
armour at I .OOO yards at ~W. an<l an HE ro11nrl with a rang<' of I 0,000
could also be used when in a yards. A.n APDS ('disposable sabot') round with a tungsten carbide
ground position, but seldom were. penetrator, which could pierce 231mm (9.24in) of armour at l.000
yards and :\O", reached the front in August 1944. (This
excellent gun was also 111odified for mounting in the
British 'Firefly' Sherman tank variant. eventually
J.,ri,ing each tank troop in Nonh-\\:'est
Europe one lank that had a chance
against the Pamher and Tiger.)
The Boys 0.55in ~lk J bolt
action AT rifle was fed hv
a five-round magazine: it
weighed ;~6lh and was 64in
long. Adopted in 19'.\6, by
1940 it was obsolete, being
able 10 pcnt'trate nnly
20mm of armour at ~WO
yards. Unpopular for its
savage recoil, weight and
awhvardness, it was repla<:ed
as the rifle platoon AT 41
France, 1939-40: a British crew
man a French 25mm Mle 1934,
which the Tommies called the
'Hotchkiss'. Besides helping to
meet the BEF's shortage of AT
guns, this was a llmlted effort
at weapons standardization with
the French. Assigned to brigade
AT companies, the 25mm was
found to be a very poor weapon,
only barely able to defeat
the German PzKw I light tank;
penetration and range were little
better than those of an AT rifle,
and It was too flimsy for truck
towing (thus necessitating the Wt'apon in 19-t~ by the PIA"I: hut it remained in senicc on va1ious light
British Army's 'portee' concept). AFVs. A few hundred were employed by Finland. and they were also
These weapons were gratefully prnvickd to China by the LISA.
abandoned In France before
The l'vlk I Projector, Infantry. Anti-Tank (PIAT- pronounced 'pee-at')
Dunkirk.
saw its first combat with Canadian troops in Sicily in .July 194'.t The PIAT
was a spigot-type clisd1arger; and \Vhile iL;; rnund was effective, the
launcher had some unique drawbacks. At ~I. ilb it was heavy. but it was
only :~9in long. Its range against tanks was 100 yards: the '.~.:"1in HEAT
bomb could penetrate 4in ( lOOmm) of' annour. but it could hit building-
size targets at 3~>0 yards and became prized as a 'hunker-buster'. The
projcnilc was launched by a powerful spring driving a rod into its tail
and igniting a propcllam cartridge. Unlike bazuoka-L\-pe weapons, the
PJAT itself had no hack-httst: it could he fired from inside a building,
and threv. up 110 signature of smoke and dust. l\.Iountcd on a monopod.
it was shoulder-fired. but there was a difficult knack to using it. Like the
Boys. one PIAT was issued to each rifle platoon headquarters; some
11 !i,000 were produced. 3
The ~o . 68 AT rifle grenade was the first British wcao11 tu emluy the
shaped-charge principle. Fielded in the summer of 1940, at just und<:r
2lh this was the heaviest rifle grenade employed in \Vorld \Var II. It was
!ired from a 2.:-lin cup discharger. and was fin-stabilized. The warhead
had a poorly designed ca\'il}', lacking any fonn of stand-off. and ito; flat
nose degraded it."i accuracy. Regardless of its poor d esign. its abilitv to
)Jt'lle trate armour was considered remarkable in 1940. It ''"~L"i withdrawn
from scnice when the PIAT was issued.
Early in the wat' an anti-tank school was established and operated bv ex-
International Brigade membt'rs \\~th combat experience from the Spanish
Ci\il \Var. A pamphlet, Tank Huntin!{tmd Drstrurtirm, gave ad\ice which wa.'i
relevant to a desperate last-ditch gucrrilla campaign. but hardly for more
conventional scenarios. 111 the true summer 1940 spirit of 'You can ah"ays
take one with you ... '. it <lescdhed tank-hunting a.'i a sport akin to big game
hunting. and recommended it for 'men who have bravery. rt'suurce and
determination. \Vhile a few expedie nt weapons were recommended, the
main tank-hunting weapons presnihed were hand grenades, of which the
British e-mployed a \\ide varie ty. 111 the abse11ce of anything like enough AT
guns, they had lilllc else with which to face the expe cted (~cnnan i1w,L-;io11.
All re lied on blast dfeC"t, an<l none possessed a shaped cha1-g-c; they were
ineHectin against all hut the lightest tanks aftt'r 1940, but were rt'Lained to
blow off tank tracks or for demolition and wall-breaching:
42 3 See Elite 122, World Wat 11 lnfantty Tactics. Company & Battalion
The 0.551n Mk 1 Boys AT rifle
saw widespread use In British
Mogat1ne cat.eh Commonwealth armies; this
Ej'-'Ctor !!loo round muzzle brake Is found
i 5"ret.y catch on British-made rlftes. The
/
Canadian-made Mk 1 had a flat
rectangular muzzle brake with
vent holes In the edges; it also
had a carrying handle, which
the British model lacked. The
Bova also saw llmlted use by
US Marine Raiders and Army
p,5t_,;;l grip Rangers, as well as by the
( troggrrguorci) Chinese.
;Vo. 71 or 'lhnmo.\ jlmh /(l}'llfld1" ~Y.lh, I 0-1 !1 yarrls range; impact fuse
armed by 'Allways' system - safety pin withdrawn in flight by umeeling
of weighted tape. Used in 1940-41, withdrawn, then reissued in 194'.\
for demo Ii t inns.
No. 74 .~T or \lil'k1, h1J111h ~ Ydh, glass sphert' with handle, lilied with
nitrogelatin (often mistakenly called nitroglycerin) and thickly covered
\\.'ith adhesive-soaked cloth. carrit'd in discardahle metal cover. After
sakty pin removed, grenade thrown or placed by hand; release of hand
grip initiated 5-second time fuse. \ery unpopular, but saw limited use
19!0-43; after 194-0 most were passed on 10 1lw French Resistann.
No. 75 'Hawkin!> KH'nwldmi111' 2 Y. lb, tin canister; initiated by various
fuses, it could he used as grenade or (more commo11ly) lanchnine.
as well as for wall-bn-aching. Reliable dt\;ce, also used by US fm-ces; in
use l ~H2-55 .
.Vo.82 '(;amnum grnwd1' Elasticated cloth hag in which varied amounts
of plastic explosive were placed as appropriate fort he target; i11itiated by
'Allways' fuse (~cc ;\u.7'.~ abu\e). 111 use 1Y4~-54.
\\l1ile a few AT hand grenades saw limited use, the principal German
hand a11ti-ta11k weapn11 was the magnetic hollow charge :~kg Haft-
Hohlladu11gen (Halt-HI~)). This 'armour-cracker' (Panzerkna<ker) was
a<loptcd in :\'mtmht'r 1942. It \vas of truncated cone shape. with a
The 3kg Haft-Hohl/adungen was handle holding the fuse. and three pairs nf magnets around the base
a hollow charge fitted with three which allowed it to be allached to a tank, fortress gun cupola, and
pairs of magnets (Hatten means
pillhox doors or sh111tcrs. Early models had a friction-ignited 4.5 second
to cllng'). This hand-placed
'armour-cracker' actually
delay f'use, which so111eti111cs did not allow time for tlw attacker to seek
weighed 3.8kg, being fllled with cmer; a 7.!l st'Cond fuse was introduced in ~lay 1943. The charge could
3kg (8.81b) of pentollte. The penetrate up to 1-Hlmrn of annour or 20 inches of concrete. Some
magnets were termed 'Alnico', !'i :"i'.~.900 'armour crackers' \VtTe made in 1942-44; the llaft-Hohlladung
which Is often assumed to be a
was declared obsolete in ~lay I ~M4. to be replaced by the Panzerfaust.
maker or designer name, but Is
actually a contraction: 'AINICo'
although existing stocks rcmaincrl in use.
for aluminium-nlckel-cobalt, an The 'anti-armour thnw,'11 mine type I' (Pa11zenvurti11ine J) was a 31b
alloy used for making magnets. ( l .:3!lkg) hand-thrown hollow charge mine issued in H>44. It consisted
of a hemispherical-nosed warhead with a long tailboorn and four folding
cloth vanes. \.\"hen it '"'as thrown the igniter was armed and vanes
opened like an t1mbrdla LO stabilize the mine. Its range was 20 or ~()
yards and it ,..as considered to he quite effective - penetrating 80 to
I OOmm - bnt somewhat unsaft to handle.
The 8.8cm Racketenwcrfer 4'.3 ('rocket launcher model I 94~r) or
Piij>j>f'hnt ('Dolly') looked like a small artillery piece, a brcech-loarling-
tube 011 t\VO wheels. Its I IEAT rocket was effective to ~rno yarrls against
moving targets and up to :JOO for statio11ary targets. to pc1wtrate 160
millimetres. The \\"capon was not recoilless and there was no hack-hlasc.
It was expensive to make, and insufficiently portable for infantrymen,
its 325lb (149kg) weight being broken down into seven sections for
man-packing.
Captured American ~36in rvl l bazookas led to a new design. the
8.8cm Raketenpanzerbtkhst (RPzB) 43. also known as the Pa11.u nrhrrrk 51
('armour tetTor') or (~/i>nmhr ('stovepipe'). This electrically fired One of several AT rifles used by
the Germans, the 7.92mm PzB
shoul<ler weapon was 65in (I fi'.~8111111) long anrl weighed ~09lb (9.5kg);
39 was single shot with semi-
it used the same 8.8cm warhead as the Pitppchen, but with a redesigned automatic ejection. To load, the
motor, and had a range of I .~O yards. The Panzerschreck was highly pistol grip Is pulled forward and
portable, low cost, and could be produced rapidly in large numbers. downward and the breechblock
The almost identkal RPzB !">4 was proclrn:cd in 1944; this weighed 24.2lb opens. After firing this action
Is repeated, and the opening
( 11 kg) because an added shield protected the gunner from muzzle
breechblock ejects the spent
hlow-h;wk. 011ly a small number were produced before the RPzB :"i4 / 1 cartridge. The PzB 39 has a
appeared, with a shorter 52.5in (1 '.333111111) tube and its weight reduced folding buttstock and the bipod
to the former 9.?lkg-; this could fire an improved rocket to 180 yards. Is adjustable for height.
This \Vas the mmt common model of the almost 290,000 nf all modds Detachable ammunition
boxes are fitted to each
produced. (The RPzB 43 could not fire the lle\\' rocket. and was
side of the receiver,
reissued to second li11c unit-;.) Regimcntal :\I' gun companies were each holding ten
replaced by 'armour destroyer' (Panzer1.ersti'>rer) co111pa11ies wilh up tu rounds.
:,4 Pa11zersd1rcck!i in thn.e platoons, each with lH launchers in three
squads. Some companies retained a platoon with three 7.:lnn g-1ms.
The Pa11u-rfnu.1t ('armour fist') is the best known of the 11ew (~ennan
anti-armour weapons, and was genuinely revolutionary. The 'Faust' was
artually a single-shot recoilless gun launching a fin-stabilized shaped
\ ~
charge warhead with a propellant cartridge. It consisted (for the ldein.
small' model) of a '.3:Ji11-long sLeel tube of Hmm bore. An ovcr-
calihre shaped chargc warhead was fitted to the muzzle. It was hdd
under the arm or over the shoulder, and lired by a percussion
igniter, which \\>'as exposed to the rncki11g- t1iggcr when the
gunner flipped 11p a folding sight 1m top of the tube. Looking'1 ~ ;;
through one of three apertures i11 the lallcr, he lined up a Ll ";'
barleycorn sight 011 the top ed.ge of the w~.uhcad with the
target. One<' fircd, the non-rclnadahle luhe was discankd. ..-.._ _ /
The first Panzerfaust k!Pi11 model. issued in July The 8.Bcm Racketenwerler 43 or
194'.~ (aka Pa111erl;tust 1. or Gntdwn - Pcgh~'). 'POppchen' was a non-recoilless
rocket launcher. While Its RPzBGr
had a I OOmm diameter warlwad, weig-hcd :~31h
4312 HEAT rocket (foreground)
(I .!">kg), and penetrated l 40111111 of annmff al :~o
looked the same as the APz:BGr
yards. The PanzerfausL :~o (aka Panzerfa11st 2 or 4322 and APzBGr 4992 fired
f;'HH, 'large') followed immcdiatelv; it had the same from the Panzerschreck RPzB 43
range. but it and subsequent models emploved a tl.Glh (3kg) 1SOmm & APzB 54, and RPzB 54/1
respectively, they were not
warhead capable of penetrating 200mm at an impact angl<~ of '.~0 degrtes.
interchangeable. Most R-Werfer
The 1-.11m.1 weighed I I 51h (:1 .22kg) in total. This and suhscqucnt models 43s were sent to North Africa
were designated by their dkclive range in me11es, and had progressiveh' and Italy, though a few
larger propellant charges. The 1!"ilh (6.llkg) Panzcrfa11st 60 was were seen in
introd11(ed i11 the summc1 of I 944; "'ith the same warhead and twice the Normandy.
range. it saw the widest use. 111 September 1944 the l'a11Lerfaust 100
appeared, weig-hing- the same as the 60. \tore adYanccd modds were
under dcnlopmcnt '"'hen the war emkd.
\lore than 8 million Panzerfausts of all models were
produced. \'\'hile short-ranged. they were effective weapons,
mainlv because of the she< r
11u111bers available. Thev had
no specialist crews, but were
issued to inrli\iduals just like
grenades; indeed. in the
closing month'\ of the \Var
52 ( ;e1111an prnpag;mda mack
Copied from US bazookas
GERMAN ANTITANK Projectile captured in Russia, the much
ROCKET LAUNCHER _1__~...
;
larger B.Bcm RPzB 43
Panzerschreck was quickly
adopted by the Wehrmacht.
It was soon replaced by the
RPzB 54, which appeared almost
identical apart from an added
face shield (sometimes removed
In combat). Both fired the
RPzBGr 4322 rocket. The shorter
RPzGr 54/1 model fired the
l
Improved RPzBGr 4992 rocket
as well as the 4322, but the
Cocking handle Induction coU 43 and 54 could not fire the
new 4992.
much of the fan that Hitler Youth teenagers. old Volksttmn home
guardsmen, and cn 11 houscwin:s could be trained to use them. Allocation
to infantry di,isions was '.)() per rifle and pionet"r company. 18 per AT
company and other nm1pa11y-sizc 11nits, and 12 per arrilh1") hatter\'.
* * * A US soldier examines 8.Bcm
Cennan anti-armour doctriue called for all units i11dudi11g rear services RPzB 54 Panzerschreck rocket
to prepare f<w tank rlefrnn hy emplacing AT weapo11s to cover likely launchers. Late in the war the
Wehrmacht regimental 'armour
avenues ol approach, to tie tank-proof terrain into the dcknsivc plan.
destroyer company' possessed
and to provide for early warning - a fu11ction of reconnaissame uniL-; and 54 of these, which were typically
infantry n11tpns1s. 'krrain was dassitil'd as armo11r-prool (Panzcrschicr) employed In groups of six
- impassable tu AFVs; 'armour-risk' (Pa111ergefahrdet) - dillirult for covering the same area.
AFVs; or ;armour-kasihle' (Pa11zcrn1i~1glich) -
passable to an11011r. This determination was mack
by map and ground renmnaissancc. Armorn'"pro11f
1e1Tai11 induclcd dense friresl, swampland. deep
mud, lllllll<-Tous large rocks anci gulli<'s. sl<'ep
slopes. railrnad c111ba11k111e11ls or cuttings.
Anti-tank guns were wdl dug in and co11ccakd.
pnsi1ioncrl in twos and threes, anrl emplaccd in
depth throughout the regimental ckfrnsi\'c sector.
Select<>d single guns might begin picking off ta11ks
at maximum ra11g<. hut most lwl<l their fire until
the target was withi11 ;mo to 1:-,0 yards. Close
combat teams allackcd tanks which reached the
Ccrman battle positions. Once a tank attack ,.,as
repulsed the gu11s 1110\ed Lo alternative positions.
The Ccnnans learned that 1he massive effort
expended in la)ing va.st minctickls was wa.'ltcd, since
they were so casilv breached. They mainly laid sm<tll
delaying minefields 011 mutes and within their
posi1inns to knock out marauding tanks. Anti-tank
ditches were:~ no longer dug wdl fonvard of' the fronl
line because they provided enemy infantry ''ith
_jump-off cover; th('y were now <lug immediately in
front of llghling positions. The 'annuur deie11ce
centre of rcsisranre' (PanzeF-abwehr-geschutz) was
establishC:'d on the suspected tank approach route,
where weapons were cu1u.:entrated. 53
This Panzertaust 60 waa the
moat common of several models
produc:ed. The sight waa folded
down untll the weapon was
readied for firing. When using
a Panzertaust from a trench the
firer had to be careful that the
back-blast was not deflected
Into his confined position by a
rear parapet. Most Panzertausts
were painted dark ochre yellow,
but some field-grey. They were
marked In red on the tube:
Vorslcht! Starker Feuerstrahll
('Danger! Intense fire flash!'),
with an arrowhead pointing to
the rear. Operating lnstruc:tlons
were printed on the lower
portion of the projectile.
Japan
.Japan '"''as dismally ill prepared for anti-tank warfare (taismsha sn1toJ, and
suitable weapons were almost non-existent. Although they had bt'ell out-
manoeuvred when thev,. faced Soviet armour in l'vlanchuria in 19~\9, the\' ,
FURTHER READING
Biryukov. C .. & \klnikov. c;., /\11tila11k llrn/arr, Prognss Publishers.
\1oscow ( 197~)
Chambnlain, Pett'r. & Gander. Terry J. A nti-Tanl< Hiajmn.\, World \Var II
Fact File.<;, Arco Publishing Co, !\'cw York (I !17~)
Eng-lish.John A., 011 lnff111f1J. l'racgn Publishers, l\'ew York ( 1984)
Forty, George, British Army Jlmulbook 1939- 19./ _5, Alan Sulton Publishing.
Stroud. Clos (1998)
Forty, (~eorge.Ja/H1ms1'An11y ll1111tll}()ol< 1939-19-15, Alan Sutton
Publishing. Stroud, Clos ( 19~)9)
(~ahcl, Chri ..;;tnphcr R., S1'l'k, .\.frik1', and J),>stmy: US ,\nuy 'f'ank /Jpstmyr
/Jortri11e i11 \forld \\(n II. Combat Studies Institute . Ft I .ea\'enworth,
KS (1985)
Cander. Ten-y .J., Th1' Brrwolw: l/r111d-I frld lloflmu-C'/1<11gr A 11li-"/'m1k
\Vea/1011s, Classic Weapons Series, PRC Publishing. L<111do11 ( 1998)
Gudgin. Peter. Armmrml Finj1011wr: 'flu' l>rudo/Illlf'lll of '/(111/i A rmamcnt
/9"39-45_. Ala11 Sutto11 Publishing. Stroud, (;los (l~lq7)
Hufhchmidt, E.J., I-:11ow }(J111 A11tila11k Hijlf's. Blacksmith Gruup ( l 97i)
\Veeks,John. Afrn Against Tank1: A Histo1y of.-\nti-Ta11k H(11/m111,
l\.fason/ Charter Publishers. ~cw 'York (I 9i!"1)
Zaluga, Stt'\'l'n .J. & Ness, Leland S., Red Ann.\' Ha11dhook 1939-1945,
58 Ala11 Sutton Publishing, Stroud, Clos ( 1998)
PLATES TEXT turret and hull sides of late model Panzer Ills and IVs). The GI
carries a 20lb M1 satchel charge containing eight 2'/lb
A: TANK VULNERABILITIES tetrytol blocks - more than enough to halt the tank if thrown
Except to the tank's immediate front and the direction in on the engine grating or in the tracks; once it is immobilized
which the turret was oriented, the crew were for all practical it will be easy prey for bazookas. The most favourable
purposes blind. Many of the means of vision were mounted direction from which to attack was the quarter behind
high to maximize their fields, and stealthy and courageous whichever direction the turret was oriented (diagram, C),
infantry could easily move into the tank's blind zone or 'dead unless it was facing to the tank's rear. Very few tank
space' (Toter-Raum). This might extend out as far as 20 yards designers considered this and mounted a machine gun in
(diagram, B), within which a prone or crouching infantryman the turret rear, but they were provided in most Japanese
was invulnerable to the main gun (1) and co-axial machine medium tanks and the Soviet BT-8, KV-1, and IS-1 and -2.
gun (2). Within perhaps a 10-yard inner zone (diagram, A) he The major threat to attacking infantry in this rear quadrant
could not be seen or engaged from pistol/sub-machine gun was machine-gunning by accompanying tanks, which the
ports (3) or by hand grenades tossed from a hatch such as Americans called 'back-scratching'; they might even fire HE
the turret side escape hatch (4). (The Germans developed an rounds at or near friendly tanks to rid their comrades of
HE-fragmentation cartridge for the 2.6cm flare pistol; fired clinging infantry.
out of a pistol port, it detonated after a one-second delay.)
Of course, the width and configuration of these zones varied B: GENERIC COMPANY ANTI-TANK
from tank to tank and changed as the turret rotated. DEFENCE
The driver (5) and bow machine gunner (6) could only see Regardless of nationality, a rifle company established in a
directly ahead and a few degrees to either side. The turret defensive position followed a fairly common pattern: the
gunner had a very narrow field of vision through the gun primary differences were due to the numbers and types of AT
sight. and only in the direction the main gun was pointing. weapons. This basic deployment of two platoons forward
The commander had the best field of vision through vision and one in support was employed in most defensive
blocks or slits in the low cupola (7), and possibly a periscope situations, differing according to specific strengths and local
set in or beside the hatch. Tank commanders preferred to conditions.
operate with their hatches open to maximize observation, Security outposts (1) are established well forward to warn of
but even in the absence of artillery or mortar opposition they the enemy's approach and hamper enemy patrols. Beyond
could be forced to 'button up' by small arms fire. This tank the company outposts are screening forces from battalion.
is fitted with three-tube smoke grenade projectors (8) on regiment, and division. Most available AT weapons (2)
either cheek of the turret; triggers inside the turret projected covered armour-favourable terrain, while machine guns
smoke bombs out to about 25 yards, providing a smoke (3) covered terrain restrictive to tanks, as this was the
screen to conceal the tank if engaged. primary infantry approach. Anti-tank obstacles (4) were
Here, in North-West Europe, an American infantryman created across the front - here, 1Oin driven posts - if time
rushes a PzKw IV Ausf H tank (for clarity. we have omitted and resources allowed, and tied into natural obstacles (5).
the extra 'stand-off' armour plates normally fixed outside the Bridges were blown (6), point minefields laid at chokepoints
(7), and roadblocks established (8) - here, an abatis of felled
trees. Infantry AT weapons - AT rifles, bazookas or PIATs -
were usually allocated on the basis of one per platoon; they
VULNERABILITY OF TIGER TANKS might be assigned to each platoon or employed in a single
grouping. One. two or more light AT guns (9) might be
attached from battalion or higher to augment the defence,
!G -- especially on terrain favourable to tanks. The 'tankable'
approaches would also be targeted by artillery and mortar
concentrations to separate the infantry from the tanks. Some
infantry AT weapons might be employed in the company rear
to provide depth to the defence or secure a flank, or be
attached to a tank-hunter team. One or more tank-hunter
teams (10) might be established by the support platoon
and possibly the forward platoons to engage tanks which
penetrated the front line defences. Anti-tank mines were
sometimes laid around platoon positions or on flank
approaches (11).
60
The Japanese 1\lpe 99 (1939) AT
Pl unger _..-----:W oodt.n pl ug charge (99 hako-bakural) was
J {ral.lloved bdore small (about 43/4 in x 1 %in
Locltlng nut lnsertlng- !uze )
(secures rn:ue)
without the four magnets), but If
Safety pin
/ ;string attac hed) two or more could be fastened
together they cauaed a great
deal of concern to tankers
(see Plate H). It was Issued In
............---- Fuze a canvas carrying pouch, with
the fuse packed In a two-piece
metal tube under the pouch flap.
D: US ARMY ANTI-TANK AMBUSH, 1944-45 leader (7) would give the signal to spring the ambush by
American tank-hunter teams preferred the ambush - long an opening fire himself and shouting 'Fire!' The 50-ton PzKw V
American tradition - over direct close-in attacks with hand- Panther was a tough nut to crack; its upper glacis was
delivered weapons (not that they would hesitate to climb 80mm thick, the lower glacis 60mm, the turret front 110mm,
aboard a halted Panzer and grenade the crew). Close-attack gun mantlet 120mm, hull sides 50mm, and turret sides and
weapons often resulted in needless casualties; stand-off back 45mm - all enhanced by its well-sloped armour design.
weapons such as the bazooka and rifle grenade were more
effective. and also allowed the hunter team to be more E: BRITISH ANTI-TANK ROADBLOCK,
widely dispersed instead of concentrating around a tank 1943-44
(for illustrative reasons this scene in the Ardennes shows the Mountainous Italy was a challenge to tank troops. Villages
team more closely grouped than they would actually be). The were typically built on dominating mountainside ridges.
dense woodlands of North-West Europe were ideal for this approachable only by narrow exposed roads easily
style of combat; Gls. many of whom had trained in the vast obstructed by mines and roadblocks. A physical roadblock
pine forests of the southern United States, often excelled in was seldom used . since this forewarned advancing
such tactics. armour; instead, well-concealed positions were prepared
Tank-hunter teams were built around a 12-man rifle squad, covering a section where tanks were exposed. If the lead
though these were typically understrength - as here. The vehicle could be disabled it trapped those following. which
weapon of choice was the 2.36in M9A 1 bazooka with M6A3 were vulnerable to intense artillery fire - as will soon be
HEAT rocket (1 ); manned by a two-man crew, it had a experienced by this StuG Ill 7.5cm assault gun and SdKfz
practical range of less than 100 yards, and in woodland the 251 /1 halftrack.
tank might be engaged at only about 20 yards. The bazooka It was virtually impossible to dig in on the rocky terrain, so
was operated by a pair of the team's riflemen, all of whom positions were built with the most available material - loose
were trained in its use. A grenadier armed with an M9A 1 AT rocks, stacked in low circular walls. From the British Army's
rifle grenade propelled from an M7 launcher on an Ml rifle long experience of the Indian North-West Frontier, such a
(2) provides back-up: it was only effective for side or rear position was called a sangar; it had to appear like a natural
shots. An M 19 WP smoke rifle grenade (3) lies in readiness rock pile if it was not to be detected. The PIAT (1) replaced
to blind the tank or accompanying infantry as the team the Boys AT rifle and No.68 AT rifle grenade in mid-1943.
withdraws. Once it was cocked the bomb was inserted in the open-
A rifleman crouches ready with a Mk llA 1 fragmentation topped semi-cylindrical tray, and launched by a trigger pull.
grenade, and an M15 WP hand grenade (4); this was a The discharge was supposed to re-cock the 2001b spring,
bursting-type grenade that instantly created a large, dense but sometimes failed to do so; it was almost impossible to
cloud to blind and distract. It also scattered burning gobs of re-cock manually under exposed combat conditions .
white phosphorus for anything between 18 and 30 yards - Another problem with the PIAT was that when aimed
dangerous for an incautious thrower. The squad's .30cal downhill the bomb could slide out of the muzzle. The 3.5in
M 1918A2 Browning Automatic Rifle (5) would engage Mk IA HEAT bomb (2) weighed 31b and could penetrate 4in
accompanying infantry to drive them away from the tank; (100mm) of armour. but the point-detonating, base-initiating
sometimes a .30cal M1919A4 light machine gun crew was fuse reduced its potential effectiveness.
attached to the team for more firepower. One or two riflemen The No.75 or 'Hawkins' AT grenade (3) was actually a small
would always be deployed for rear security (6). The squad mine that could be buried or thrown depending on the type 61
of detonator fitted. Five or six would be placed across a buried mines. These TM-38 mines {7) are emplaced to catch
road; here, strung together in a 'necklace' or 'daisy-chain' at a tank by surprise when it turns a corner. Between 440 and
2ft intervals, they are being pulled across the approaching 660lb weight was required to detonate the 61b (3.6kg) charge
vehicle's path. Heavier conventional AT mines could be of TNT.
linked in the same manner. One rifleman lies in wait with a
No.77 WP smoke grenade {4), and a No.73 'thermos flask' G: GERMAN PANZERKAMPFGRUPPE
AT grenade (5). The latter contained 3Yilb of poweriul polar IN COVERING POSITION, 1944-45
ammonal gelatin dynamite or nitrogelatin; it could penetrate As the tide turned against them on all fronts, and they faced
up to 2in of armour. but was more effective when aimed at overwhelming enemy armour with little of their own, the
the tracks. Weighing 41'lb, and measuring 11 in x 3'/.in, this Wehrmacht excelled in small scale delaying actions. By 1944
grenade could only be thrown 10 to 15 yards. It was fitted the German Army was well equipped with a variety of potent
with an impact-detonating fuse, armed (like the No.77 WP) man-portable AT weapons; just as importantly, they knew
when the weighted tape of the 'Allways' system unwound how to use terrain , natural and man-made obstacles
in flight and pulled out the safety pin. A Bren light machine (the stream here is fordable), and how to integrate other
gun team (6) is placing suppressive fire on the weapons into the defence. The mission of this small armour
personnel carrier. battle group, in an armour defence centre of resistance
(Panzerabwehrgeschutz) or covering position (vorge-
F: SOVIET ANTI-TANK DEFENCE schobene Stelfung), is to delay the approach of British tanks
IN BUILT-UP AREA, 1944 (1) on a secondary route into a defended village (off the edge
Despite the weight and bulk of the bolt-action PTRD-41 and of the picture). Such a group would fight stubbornly until
semi-automatic PTRS-41 AT rifles (PTA = protivotankovoe ordered to withdraw, or would disengage at a specified time.
ruzhe), the Red Army retained them throughout the war, long This sometimes mystified their opponents, who might be
after AT rifles had been withdrawn by other countries. engaged in a desperate fight when, without apparent reason,
Although the shorter of the two models, the PTRD-41 was the Germans melted away. Pre-planned artillery barrages
over six feet in length (1). The rifles had extremely good would then strike the recently abandoned position.
penetration for their class, but side and rear shots at close Point AT minefields were laid at chokepoints (2), inter-
range were necessary when taking on later German tanks. mingled with anti-personnel mines. The latter not only
The AT rifleman's dream shot was to be in the right place at hampered sappers clearing them, but might also prevent
the right time to take a belly shot as a tank mounted an recovery crews from reaching disabled tanks, and thwart
obstacle. The forward portion of the belly of a PzKw V infantrymen and forward observers from using the hull as
Panther was 26mm thick, but because of the angle of incline cover. The few AT guns available at this date were often
as the tank climbs, the 14.5mm (.57cal) bullet, even with an employed singly, like this 5cm PaK 38 (3), rather than in
incendiary load, does not guarantee a kill. Another weapon larger groups: 2cm FlaK guns were positioned on flanks (4)
the Soviets retained and even continued to develop was the to help make up for the lack of AT guns. A single squad with
AT hand grenade. The RPG-43 was the second Soviet six 8.8cm RP54 Panzerschrecks have taken up positions in
design, and the first with a shaped charge (2). If it struck at a typical pattern (5); each 'bazooka' crew has dug a narrow
right angles it could penetrate 75mm, so attack from above V-shaped slit trench, clustered in threes with two forward
a tank was the optimum method - a Panther's turret roof and and one to the rear. These were dug in open areas to
engine deck were only 15mm thick. Pulling the pin allowed provide wide fields of fire, and spoil was removed to make
the rear cone of the thrown grenade to slide off the handle them hard to spot. This arrangement allowed the
and act as a drogue at the end of the deploying streamers Panzerschrecks to engage tanks approaching from any
(3). Another weapon the Soviets used long after it fell from direction, and provided an in-depth defence; at least two of
all but emergency use in other armies was the 'Molotov the launchers could engage any tank. The top of the 'V' was
cocktail' (4) - what the Russians called a 'bottle with oriented toward the enemy; the gunner would move into the
flammable mixture' (butylkas goryuchej smes'yu), since it arm of the 'V' offering the best angle to the target, his
was thought disrespectful to use the name of the USSR's assistant loading and taking shelter from the back-blast in
Foreign Minister as slang. They provided 'incendiary liquid the other arm. While there are farm buildings in the area,
kits', consisting of two long glass tubes filled with sulphuric only a few snipers occupy them (6); buildings attracted
acid, to be attached to gasoline-filled vodka or cognac suppressive fire and allowed the enemy to pinpoint German
bottles by rubber bands: when the bottle shattered upon positions quickly. Scattered pairs of grenadiers hide on
impact the acid reacted with and ignited the gasoline. tank routes armed with a few Panzerfausts, ready to
Molotovs were widely used; in fact, some 100 men of ad hoe engage tanks that might slip through {7). With rifle strength
675-man 'worker's battalions,' manned by untrained factory reduced in many grenadier units, higher allocations of
workers. were armed only with these expedient weapons. MG34 and MG42 machine guns {8) were made to increase
Sub-machine gunners (5) were deployed for close protection firepower. These were put to good use separating infantry
of AT rifle crews. and to shoot Panzergrenadiers (6) off tanks. from the tanks they escorted. British tankers speak of
It was not possible to bury AT mines in paved streets, hearing MG bullets striking their hulls and accompanying
although they could be hidden under a light layer of debris infantrymen 'squealing like rabbits'.
or concealed in a barricade to await tanks attempting to The different weapons were frequently assigned fire sectors
crash it. Often they were simply laid openly on a street: so covering other positions. anticipating that they would
long as they were covered by fire to prevent them from being eventually be abandoned and occupied by the enemy. As
62 removed by escorting infantrymen, they were as effective as the enemy approached the position Bern and 12cm mortars
was bestowed. Both the German and Finnish badges,
worn on the upper right sleeve, were awarded to men
destroying tanks with Panzerfausts, Panzerschrecks, hand
and rifle grenades, satchel charges, hand mines, etc.
Germany instituted the Sonderabzeichen fUr das
niederk~mpfen von Panzerkampfwagen durch
Einzelkiimpfer on 9 March 1942, but eligibility was
backdated to 22 June 1941, the first day of Operation
'Barbarossa'. The 8.Scm x 3cm silver-coloured braid
stripe with black edges bore a bronze PzKw IV tank.
When a fifth award was earned a single gold braid
badge replaced preceding badges. Oberstleutnant
Gunter Viezenz, Grenadier Regt 7, received the highest
number of awards: 21 - four gold and one silver badge.
Finland instituted a Panssarintuhoojamerkkion on 28
June 1944, backdated to 1 June; AT and tank gunners
were also eligible for this. A ?cm x 3cm white backing
was printed with a light brown T-34 tank. White ?cm x
1cm bars were sewn above the badge when three, five,
ten, and 15 tanks were destroyed. The highest number
destroyed with hand-held weapons was eight, by UCpl
Villi Vaisanen, 2nd Border Jiiger Bn, with Panzerfausts.
The US 505th Parachute Infantry Regt established an
unofficial award for bazooka gunners knocking out a
tank during the 10 July-17 August 1943 Sicily campaign.
The 3in x 2in olive drab patch depicted a brown bazooka
with a yellow lightning bolt, and was worn on the left
Tank destruction badges breast pocket.
Soldiers who successfully attacked a tank with a hand-
held or hand-placed weapon sometimes received German Unterofflz/er squad leader, armed wHh an MP40
standard awards for valour, or at least a posthumous sub-machine gun and displaying two Tank Destruction
wound decoration. In some instances a special award Badges and the Close Combat Clasp.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - -
from the main battle position would fire on pre-registered weapon which was moderately effective against hull side
barrage areas (9). Assault guns (10) might be positioned to and top armour (1). The Marines fitted 2in thick planks to
the rear, usually dug-in or hidden in buildings to further deter the sides of many Shermans: they protected hatches by
the advance. The US Army judged that extensive permanent welding festoons of nails on top, points upwards, or
fortifications such as the Westwall ('Siegfried Line') only covering them with welded rod cages giving Sin of stand-
enhanced the German defence by 15 per cent over off. Like tankers on all fronts, they fastened spare track
defences comprising field works only. Dug-in German sections to turret sides and hull fronts. and placed
tanks and assault guns were given an efficiency rating of 40 sandbags on the engine deck around intake/exhaust
per cent and were considered much more troublesome gratings. Most units removed turret top machine guns, to
than bunkers. prevent Japanese who clambered aboard from turning
them against Marine infantry.
H: JAPANESE SELF-SACRIFICE, 1945: Sometimes two Type 99 mines were wired together to
'TEN MEN FOR ONE TANK' improve penetration. In other instances two pairs of mines
Most Marine tanks on two Jima were lost to mines, followed were fastened together with small demolition charges
by AT guns: this battle saw the widest use of mines, sandwiched between them, and the four mines were wired
including buried aerial bombs and torpedoes. which between split logs (2). Though little used, the Type 2 (1942)
obliterated tanks and amtracs. However, a number were rifle grenade launcher could fire 30mm and 40mm HEAT
destroyed by desperate close-in infantry attacks. In one grenades, penetrating 30mm and SOmm respectively; the
action involving 12 tanks, one bogged down in sand 1Oft 40mm is illustrated at (3). One fallen soldier has attempted
from a cave, and was swarmed by 30 to 40 Japanese. to throw a bar or 'yardstick' mine (4) with 61b of explosive
(After disabling the guns and radio. the entire tank crew in front of the Sherman's tracks. As a last resort Japanese
managed to fight their way out.) The Japanese commander troops were encouraged to force tank hatches open and
on the island was much concerned by the USMC's attack the crew with grenades - (5) is a Type 99 fragmen-
M4A3 Shermans. fearing that his 4 ?mm Type 1 (1941) AT tation - and even bayonets (6). In Burma one officer
guns could not defeat them (an exaggerated fear. as it boarded an M3 Lee of the British 3rd Carabiniers and killed
turned out.) He ordered preparations to use the Type 99 the commander and turret gunner with his sword, before
(1939) magnetic AT hand mine (99 hako bakurai). a simple being riddled with revolver bullets by the loader. 83
INDEX
ReJ<'r-t~tu-c-'
to illunration!I arr. ithown in bold. Coloul' S.m.iet Union, weapon" and 1.a1rti4-:~ 4!)-itol t'Xf>"dirnt 19-:!1, 20
platr are hown with pag<' and caption lrna10" in "lll~d lt'adrr>C6(3!"i. 60~. 07(311, Iii), 6! d1rgr. concrnuatrd 20. lll
brad<eL. Uh-rnarhinr gunnrn, So\'i<"t Ann)' F5(:!~. t;2) chugcs. double 20, Cll(~~. 60)
chat')("" " "chcl 20. A(:l3. 5Y)
omti-tank. ddent:c ~~-25 tank rl~~Lrnyrr~ r, 'Molocov cocktails W. f4(38. 62>. 17
llriush Amn H Cun Motor C'.arrij!e, M:\ 7'mun 31 l(TC-llade dicharJl<:f, S<hvu/,.,.h,...,.3(1mm CU!Hl'P<' 25
t.~omp;1nv, gcn('ric BC"H. 59) MI0:9 grenade launrhtr, Mi: 28. D2(:i6. 61 i
(;("m1an 5~\-fJI lank-hm11r1 lra1m 21i-2i, BIOCH. :'i!I) , D(.%, Iii) i;i1e1101tlt-., h;md Ill, 11:1
[ap;u1~sc 'iii-~ i. 58 tAnk 1r, ug11i1ion ranb II. 11 llrimh E3-ES1:17. til-62), 4:.!-4'1, 44
SOl-i<-1 f(:IH, l)~l. -17-18 Japanese 'hpc 911 fr.tgmcntation H5(40. 63)
I'S Amir :IJ-'.I:! '"""' lllw armnurrcl fighl in!{
~" nhiclt"~ Ml~WP 04('16.611
anti-tank tat tic11, ~vnlutlon ~2-~~; dt111ou11r11r 4-!'L 9-10 mnkc Ncht-lhandgr-.111a1< (Nhllgr) 3'1 C2('.!:J. 601
;umour(,d lighting 1'd1idc> 5 armour 7-A S.."iet '21.'.l ll, Ii:!), Ii
sr.r alm tank dcstnnt'.1~; 1.-ui k' llri1ih Gl(:m. ti2J ti<k (Slldhanclgranat<") C4(35. 601
a-.ault gum :., G 10(3!1, li:I) d1anu 1rri,.1k~. rs.~e111ial h-7 gnn;uk1. ritklaunched 17. 17-IH. 24, .-12
Gun Motor t:.."lni.lgt, ~t4 7~m111 SI rr("W ( ' 11\frontnt'lll I 11-12 1;(;/l"to: cs1:1:i. 6111. ;,o
hallmck. SdKf/. ~r,1 i I E('.ii. lll-112) hah h.-.</ n1w11ing R, A(:l:J. oYl Jap;uuS< .fllmm 'h-pc 2 H3( 10, ti'.l). 56. 5h
S(()lll Cal"'.\ 1 ht";tH' ;, M!l.-\1: 29. 2ll. Dl!(::lti. !ii l
'infa,JUI'\'' ;, M PI WI' muke D31:16. til)
badge. tank rll'tmLLion ti!J. f.i'.I J;1pa1lt'st' ~2 No.bi!: 44
llriti~h :\rm\ li11ht .t Scwi<'c VP<~S-11: Ii
{~' t1fJu South Afri1:.1n AlmouJ"r.cl lli\i., iun, t1h M~ I.ram 10. 11 .\t.,/1rmnnrr Ii: l!I. 50
llnn li~hl machinr gun cram E61~7. li2l M4 i f\H.-\:l Sht1ma11 6. !I, H 1.-IO. ti:~J. :,:,, :,;, Sii jlllllS l~>-lli,21
Rn\al fank Rq~imcnt. oi: 10 ,,., 1Jl\rr lanl:o-.: Shtnnan 'f'irrfh' 17-pclr ('\in) .JI
f\ritJ.<sih l..-<1mmot1\\'('alth, weapon~ nul ;.ntit-\ :i2. -t l-H f\-l'IAI StuMI light 7 :l7mm I!'>, I Ii, 2!1, 211-2~
Rl'11\(;r Hl:!i H2~ llEAT 52. 53 "'" dfo, 4'r11u>1Jl't-1l li~htlng \'l'hlf:les rifle lt.:.--17. :!I
nook<' 11-l!'J. ~7 Vir1.t.1~1.. <lhrr,llf'lJIU~tnt (~l1111er h :i Bo\'' Mk I 055in 11 ~1~. 4'.'I
'>qua. h hracl" I ~ c.;rm1an l'zli :.o. 52
W'OJMUl~ c;m11t1lbii.,.rlv .l~ (( ;.11 :1!11 wcnadc-laund1m,:: ll-4, ~o
olnlMk" anti-t..111k 2~. 24. 84, B!l(~4. f1'l> -' " rtlH1 muni~iott)ri.; t;u1k,, 01nnameu1 J1panrM :.!'Omm T''JX' 97: 55
irr <li.><1 rnarlhlod.,, ha1rn1<is. J;1p;m" ' H6(40, li:ll Panz<"rbuscla Cl'lll) :111: l!4 , Cl(.%, 1;c)I, "O. S2
Uk..iua"a ~j gum. ><anll '1. EL~i. tll--62~. GIO ('.t~, ti3) ' rrcoillc"'\ 17
orcluann: rlispo~I tug111nr 20 gum. ~lK :!c 111 C'.4CW. 6:.!l Solothum '.!Omm ll'.lllOO: 15
111dd1i11r gun<. Ml;'.'lI arHI \IC-12 Gll('.N, li2 :1 Smict FI! :18, 6~), 46. lti, 47
riflcnwn, (;,.m1an c1:1:,, ~~,, mirw, ;1111i-p<"nu1111rl ~Minr %0 rork<'t launchcr, l'rrn:rnrhrYf"i< (Rpz8 43/ !i41 8.&m
ruarlhlo.-k. 88c:H. oi~!i. E(~7. f>l-62l 1in.-, K.11lHk CS( :~~. 6CI') GS!:l!I. ti:! l . ,; 1 --5~. Sl
~t'I' dl.io oh!11L.1dr~. anti-t;tnk rin1-. MI D2t:~h. 61 :1 nKkct 1;1.UJlc her. Rack.etcn"''c rfrr ti H.8rm
Rini. M 141XA~ 8row11i1111; A111nm,uic D5(31i, Iii 1 l./'upprl1m -- "Dulh') ;,1, 52
.\c1~l'ant n1111matulcr. ;, l<TR 10 .uhm<11'11inr 1:1111. \IP-lfl: 63 rod.et la11mlwn (b>zookJ.) 17, 26. 29-31
.~nipC"rs, l;.~;nndn G6(:'\9. G2> v.'t"apon"', ;1111i-1;.mk 12-~~ Ml i MIAI ~.36111 15, 27. 30, :10, lf:i
.'>olllh :\frit:<111 :\rmou11d lli\iion, lith 8 .111i111n. li..t<I 21. H W .1/ M\.IAI :! ..11ii11 30 ..10. Dl<:lti. til L 60
84 Stwil~I r1nli-ta11k ddl1u.T in huihup illt'I fCiH, f-2'1 S<"1.-1 /.i~:1 7li.2mm 22 orii;..'lu of name jl