You are on page 1of 67

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 3

THE TANK THREAT 4


Tank classilic1tions
Essential charaelcristics of tanks

GORDON L ROTTMAN PROTECTION & VULNERABILITIES 7


entered the US Army in 1967,
volunteered for Special Forces
Arn1<111r - limitations to rnohilit\' - armanH'llt -
and completed training as a the crew cn\ironment
weapons specialist. He was
Tank recognition cards
assigned to the 7th Special
Forces Group until reassigned
to the Sth Special Forces ANTI-TANK WEAPONS: AN OVERVIEW 12
Group in Vietnam in 1969-70.
A highly respected and
Ar111our-picrci11g shot - c11ha11nd .\l-1 ro1111ds - 'squash laad'
established author, Gordon prnjenilcs - 'sli~q1td hollow charge' rnu11itio11s - fi11--.;t;1hili1t'd
is now a civilian contract
mu11iti1111s - srnoke-pr()(luti11g rnu11itl1111s
Special Operations Forces
Intelligence Specialist at Anti-tank guns
the Army's Joint Readiness British 'pot111d' gu11 designation S\stc111
Center, Ft Polk.
Oth e r i11fa111n weapons & 1111111iliom: AT rif1('s -AT rrn k(t
bu11chns - 'recoilless rifles' - rillc-la1111clwd ,\T gnn;idcs -
AT hand g-rcnadcs - hand mines - 'illlokc gnnadcs - AT mines -
cxpcdil'nt AT weapons S..: 1;1ctic.-.; - field anilkn & 111nrta1s -
<111ti-aircri1h g1111s
limmrrit

EVOLUTION OF ANTI-TANK TACTICS 22


I ~1:~~1-..j.'.!
I ~q:~--l-!"1
Tan k-h u 11 tcr tt'ams
STEVE NOON was born In
Kent, UK, and attended art
college In Cornwall. He has
SPECIFIC WEAPONS & TACTICS 27
had a life-long passion for l! 11 i Led Sta Les
lllustratlon, and since 1985
has worked as a professional
British Cunrn1oll\Vt'alt h
artist. Steve has provided Smicl L'. 11io11
award-winning Illustrations
Gcnnarn
for publishers Dorllng
Klndersley, where his interest .Japan
in historical Illustration began.
FURTHER READING 58

THE PLATES 59
Tank dl'sl r11ct ion h<1dg< s

INDEX 64
OSPREY
Elite 124 ~'UB L IS r---1 1 ,.Jc;

World War II Infantry


Anti-Tank Tactics

Gordon L Rottman Illustrated by Steve Noon


O::-: o r .~ul:.int ed1r_o' IJ _ ~ r - 1 1 1 ' \/'/ .-1d1 c /,;
First published in 2005 by Osprey Pubhsh1ng. Midland House.
Artist's Note
West Way, Botley. Oxford OX2 OPH, UK
443 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016. USA
Readers may care to note that the original paintings from which
Email: info@ospreypublishing.com
the colour plates in this book were prepared are available for
private sale. All reproduction copyright whatsoever is retained
e 2005 Osprey Publishing Ltd.
by the Publishers. All enquiries should be addressed to:

All rights reserved. Apart from any fair deahng for the purpose or private study. Steve Noon
research. criticism or review. as permitted under the Copyright, DHigns and
50 Colchester Avenue. Penylan, Cardiff, Wales CF23 98P
Patents Act. 1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced. stored in
a retrieval system. or transmitted in any fonn or by any means, electronic.
The Publishers regret that they can enter into no correspondence
electrical. chemical. mechanical. optical. photocopying, recording or otherwise.
upon this matter.
without the prior wrrtten permission of the copyright owner. Enquiries should
be addressed to the Publishers.

ISBN 1 84176 842 1

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

05 06 07 08 09 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Editor: Martin Windrow


Design: Alan Hamp
Index by Alan Thatcher
Originated by The Electronic Page Company. Cwmbran. UK
Printed 1n China through World Print Ltd.

FOR A CATALOGUE OF ALL BOOKS PUBLISHED BY


OSPREY MILITARY AND AVIATION PLEASE CONTACT:

NORTH AMERICA
Osprey Direct US, 2427 Bond Street, Unlv8f'9ity Park, IL 60466, USA
Email : infoOospreydlrectuu.com

ALL OTHER REGIONS


Osprey Direct UK, P.O. Box 140, Wellingborough,
Nor1hants, NN8 2FA, UK
Email : infoOoapreydlrect.eo.uk

Abbreviations used In this text:


www.ospreypubllshlng.com
AA anti-aircraft
AFV armoured fighting vehicle
AP armour-piercing
APC armour-piercing capped
AT anti-tank
HE high explosive
HEAT high explosive anti-tank (shaped charge)
HEP high explosive plastic (squash head)
-pdr pounder (British gun designation)
PzKw Panzerl<ampfwagen (German, 'tank')
rpm rounds per minute
TO tank destroyer
WP white phosphorus

Other abbreviations for weapon designations are


explained in the text.

Linear measurements:
Both US/British and metric measurements are generally
given in this text. but metres in continental range
estimates have been given simply as yards.
For exact conversion, note:
feet to metres = multiply feet x 0.3058
yards to metres =multiply yards x 0.9n4
miles to kilometres = multiply miles x 1.6093
l
WORLD WAR II INFANTRY I
ANTI-TANK TACTICS

INTRODUCTION
:'\FA;\.'TRY \IU l:\SFl'.\R.\111 L IRO\I l.\'.\:K..... both in the assaul! and i11 <Ill
integrate d anti-L~lllk dcltntT. This cu11ccpl was understood ;tl111ust
immediatel y 11pon tlw first llcl<ling of ranks, and h<crnH a basic
pnnpt nl tank and anti-tank warfan-:
'Tanks unacn1111pa11it'd I>\ i11fantrv can11ul achicn dccisi\'t' ... 11tcess:
The first dedicated anti-tank
thl'y must be supported by infantn. who alo11(' c;u1 cll'ar and hold
weapon: the massive German
13.2mm single-shot, bolt-action ground gaincd . . . II I l'IH'lll\' I tanks s11ccecd in penetrating tht' lint'. the
Mauser Tank Abwehr Gewehr I friendhI infantry 11111st hold 11111 and co11ce11lralc all their dfons on
(TGewehr) of 1918, held here stopping the advance of the crnm\\ infantry. while the hostile tanks arc
by an American officer, weighed
dealt with In our artillcrv. ..
The ddcat of the e11c111\''s infantn. must
16kg (35.271b). It was normally
therefore be the Ii rst cunsiderat iun in al I pb11s 1'111 a11 ti-La11 k dcfC.nlT.
supported on a blpod attached
to the barrel band at the end These statements arc firnnd in the LS :\rmy's /11strnflio11s fol' ,,\nti-tr111li
of the forearm. l>1'/i'llr'1' l/'rnui1i1111(1/ - fdn11t1r)' I 1)/ 8), fiu111 tllt O/liri11/ /Jriti1h J>on11111'11/.
OLl1n tha11 lhc fieldi11g ol dedicated anti-tank weapons, tht'st' c01H qil.'i
remained 1111d1~mgcd througlw111 \\'orld War 11.
At the beginning of \Vorld \\'ar II most countries had a basically
sound a11Li-La11k d11ctri11e. Tht' fatal flaw was that the effect oft111ploying
the tank i11 large combined arms formations was not fully understood.
France had placed compk1t faith in its 11nckrpnwcre d a nti-tank g1111s.
deployed in depth . 111 spring 19-10 the Cenna11s massed se,e n Panzer
d i\isinns on th<' weak :\rckmws frnn t. attacking through an 11 ncx peeled
sec tor and m tTWhl'h11i11g FrnH h cldi:11ns. 0111T t hn hrokt tl11011gh
they thrust deep inlo the rear, co111pleLely dislocatit1g French attempts to
rcspon<l . The French still Yicwcd tanks as infantn support weapons: theY
ne,cr m a <;scd their arn1our. s11p111>rtl'd b y other arms , to m;mntu\H'
against breakthroughs.
The I ~HO Blil:-..kri1g S('lll other armil's into 1H'ar panic, and a rush to
find a means or countl'ri11g it t11s1wd Oil both sides of the :\1la111ic. The
fear was of'tc11 exaggnated , con\illci11g some that i11fa111ry u11its were
helpless against ranks. Often the pL111ni11g- co1111ni1t(Ts looked only at
the lank itsdL and did not consider tht n>111hined arms aspects 11t
(~erman doctrine; but cflcclin_ ;ulli-Lank deklllT would also have to be
a cnm hi ncd arms effort.
A11ti-La11k tact ics and weapons wen in a co11stanl stall' of' n olution
thro11ghou1 the war. lmprnn:d models of tanks . e\olvi11g ar111uur
tart ics, new field i nnnvation s an cl the overall de\'dopmcn t of corn bincd
an11s tactics all contrib11ted to Lhis process. A11ti-ta11k wea po11s changnl
drastically: there was a constant st'arch fo r 111ore lethal, more accuratt:'.
l011ger-rang:d. mon compact and lighter weapons. \\11ilc imprml'ci tank
designs and increased armour protection greatly i11Jlm11ccd the denl-
opmcnt of anti-tank weapons, those oLher factors we re equally important. 3
THE TANK THREAT
From their first use by the British A.nm on the \Vestern Front in
September 1916, infantry has perceiwd tanks as a 'tenor' weapon
ea pa hie of routing troops. piercing dcf'cnsi\'e lines and driving deep into
rear areas. Considering the limitations of' period anti-Lank weapons.
there was considerable justification for this frar.
To understand the capabilities and limitations of anti-tank wPapnns
and tactics. 011e must be fomiliar with the capabilities a11d limitations of
1anks. Tank design evnl\'ed so rapidly during Wnrld War II. and the char-
acteristics of iwlividual models <liffrred so markedly. tha1 generalizations
are diflicult. In am discussio11 of ge11eral sLrengLhs and weaknesses it must
be borne in mind that the.lie do not rwccssarily apply. in specifics or in
comparable degree, lo all tanks.
Tank design and capabilities
At the beginning of \Vorld \Var II the light tank was the most
varied greatly during World War cmnmon class. (The use of small two-man 'tankettes' -weighing from 2
II; this German pzKw IV Aust F to 6 terns. armed with machine guns. and vulnerable to AP small arms
of 1941 may be considered a ammunition and grenades - had all buL ceased. although Japan and
typical medium tank of Its day.
Italy retained them.) Light tanks weighed some 6 to l?l Lons. with
The thickest armour (50mm - 21n)
Is on the hull and tul'T'et fronts
comparatively thin armour usually nllnerable to the nwdest anti-Lank
and the gun mantlet; turret guns of 19:~9-1 l. Thev had a new of two to f(ntr llll'll. and were generally
sides and rear are 30mm, upper armed with a ~7mm main gun. though often onlv with machine g1111s. 1
glacls 25mm, hull sides and rear Their principal role was scoutini.;. and aning as "light unalry outriders
20mm, hull roof 15mm, turret
for he<l\'ier tanks; howewr. in less aflluent armies the lighl model
roof 1Omm. Early in the war
the main gun was optimized for
was somctinws the principal combat t;ink. As the \Var progressed light
infantry support - here a short- tanks It-II from favour because of their vulnerability; lightly annoured
barrelled 7 .5cm for knocking out sco111 cars, with a high degree of mobility and speed. better serYed the
field fortifications. By 1943 the reconnaissance role. Some light tanks were 1etaine<l in sccondarv rnlcs.
role of the tank had evolved;
and some new 'light' 111odcls \\rrc fielded wi1h almost the capabilities of
long-barrelled high velocity guns
were being mounted, to fight a
earlv-war medium tanks.
new generation of enemy tanks l\frrlium ranks were more hea,ily armoured; thev were usually capable
led by the Soviet T-34. of wi1hstandi11g light AT g1111fire, a11d to some extent medium calibre AT
guns, al least from the front.
Th('y were generally in
the weight range I!"> to '.\0-
plus tons. had crews of
fn11r nr five. anrl mounted
main armament of ben\.'cen
17mm and 76mm calibre.
l\k<li11ms were often
viewed as supponing tanks,
providing heavier calibre.
longcr-ran1.~Td guns to
support their light cuun-
teq1arts. Initially their speed
was comparatively slow.
As it was realized that
medium tanks provided
the best overall capabilities
1 Note that 1n German documents calibres
of weapons larger than small arms are
always given 1n centimetres. e.g. 37mm "
4 3 7cm
to withstand improving AT weapons. 111
manoeuvre, provide fire support, and fight
other lanks, so their capabilities were steadily
upgraded. Armour and speed were improved,
and \vhile the gun calibre was seldom increased
beyond i6mrn. weapons were upgraded to offer
longer range and mon: penetration. 111 the
second half of the war mediums, in the character
of 'general purpose' tanks, appeared in over-
SIDE VIEW
whelmingly greater numbers than other classes. .--~.

A sub-category of mediums was the 'infantry


tank', a product of two opposing schools of
thought. Some planners believed that two
separate tank types should be provided, one to
tighl other tanks (in the British term, 'cruiser
tanks'). and Lhc other Lu suppun the advance
of infantry. The latter were generally more
heavily armoured, and mou11ted a gun intended FRONT VIEW -
to knock out enemy positions: they could he
slow, since they had only to keep pace \\ith
the in fan try.
\Vhile some examples of what could be
termed heavy tanks existed at the beginning of
the war, their tactical purpose was not rard11lly
I~
thought through: they were multi-gun, heavily
armoured, and \Try slow. [\lore dl(:-rtive heavy
tanks began to appear midway through the war. I~
L_~~~~~~~~~~==~==-~11,1_
1 1 . , .
1 t~~11
Designers strove to provide a mount for a heavy
high velocity gun, of between 88mm and I

PLAN VIEW
122mm, capable of killing any tank at long
range. under armour suffi<:ient to defeat Pz. Kw. 3
medium tank guns and infantry AT weapons.
They were generally slow and very heavy (55-70 tons), whkh limited Tanks had other vulnerabilities
cross-nmmry and even road mobility. as many bridges could not suppon apart from penetration of the
armour. Thi diagram, from a US
them. They were present on the hattlefield in only small m1mbers, but
Intelligence report, lndlcet.. air
whe n skilfully t'.mployed they might have a definite, and occasionally a Intakes for both the crew and
decisive effecl. engine, and engine exhausts, of
While other types of armoured fighting vehicles (AFV) were a German PzKw Ill. Such vents
encountered by the infanlr')', most were relatively vulnerable to light AT were vulnerable to fire bombs,
smoke and gas.
weapons. These included scout cars, reconnaissance vchides, halftrack
personnel carritrs, and self-propelled assault and anti-tank guns. Only
two of these types presented a threat comparable lo thaL of tanks: the
assault gun and Lhe tllllk destroyer. Both were built on Lank chassis,
giving them the same mobility as tanks. Assault guns lacked a revolving
turret, having the main gun mounted with limited traverse in a heavily
armoured hull superstructure. These were mainly infantry support
weapons, hut some mounted longer guns capable of anti-tank
fire (though the lack of a rotating turret greatly limited this ability ).
Tank destroyers - self-propelled AT guns - sometimes had a rotating
turret, but this often had an open tnp, and the vehicles' armour was
lighter than that of the tanks they fought; they relied on speed or
concealment for survival. 5
Any tank that could be seen
could be hit and knocked out
with the appropriate weapon.
This German PzKw V Aust A
Panther was holed through the
45mm hull side armour by an AP
round from a 75mm gun, which
probably kllled the entire turret
crew. Note the track links on
the turret side, and skirt plates
hung along a rail on the hull
side, Intended to detonate
bazooka rounds before they
struck the hull.

Tracks and suspension - road


wheels - were easily disabled by
mines and other weapons which
could not penetrate the hull. Essential characteristics of tanks
Replacement usually had to Tanks \\'t'l't' shock weapons. inlcntkd lo be used 1'11 11u1.1 .1 t, capilalizi11g 011
be done by the crew (If they their armour prntcction. tirq>O\\'(T and mobility. At the n-ry ka."it a tank
aurvlved the action, and did not
was intended In pn1ttc1 its crew from machine gun and small arms fire,
have to abandon the tank}; it
was obviously Impossible while
shell fragments, and a11ti-perso111u_l rni11cs. Thn also offncd \'arying
under fire. Here a British crew degrees of protect inn from AT tire. other t~111 ks g1111s. rnortars and
replace a bogle wh-1 on a artillery. Thev could tranl cross-cou11lr\' o\'er 1u1c\cn ground and
Sherman in Normandy; when lhrnugh dense vcgelalio11, and surmount anti-person11d and lighL anti-
they have finished, replacing
,chiclc obstacles, as wdl as n1hhlc in h11ilt-np areas. All these acfrantages
the cut track link and tensioning
the track will take more hours
had their li111ilatio11s, hm,c\Tr, depending 011 tht' specific tank model.
of back-breaking labour. Despitt- their psychological impact 1111 infantnmtn in the open,
(Imperial War Museum} ranks were far fro111 being the 11ndcfc;Hahlc, nnstnpp;1hlc. firc-
hreathing monste rs so often
port raytd . Vt ii nerabi Ii ties
;1 hnnndcd - i r cnnrli rions
wen lan111rahle to those
lighting against them; if
leaders made the righr
stTies ol assess111e11 ls a11cl
decisions; ii' the troops
possessed thc ncnssan
cu1111111g a11d deten11i-
11atio11: and if the situation
permitted them 10 take
ad\'a11tagc of ,aried terrain
and o f the consta11tlv..
c hanging tactical situation.
Ta11ks arc large and
extrcmclv noisy. and thus
rlifficult to conceal. No
matter how effective a
camo11flage patte rn a tank
may he painted \\ith, or how
thoroughly it is covered
with vq.~c tat ion, its every
6 lll<Wt'lllt'llt (and on rlrv
ground, the dust it raises) signals its presence. It is dillintlt to conceal from
the air in all hut the densest woodland, an<l the tracks gouged out by its
p<1ssi11g art' easily detected.
It is difficult to conce111rate or relocate: tanks in a combat 1011e,
lwca11se of the con.sidcrahle effort required to transport them long
distances by hc:~ny road transporter or rail wagons . Long distance travel
on their own tracks u\'er even improved roads renders a significant
percentage mcd1anically <lisahle<l heforc they see combat. Tanks
rtquirc a co11siderahle support 'tail' in the form of speciali1ed
maintenance perso11nel. spare parL"i, field repair facilities , recovery
Yeh ides. and fuel and ammunition transport.
Regardless of the armour,
tankers were quick to add
additional protection from AT
fire. Here a US Stuart M5A1
PROTECTION & VULNERABILITIES
light tank has track llnks, a road
wheel and sandbags fastened Tanks originated to provide a means uf conveying prutectecl weapons
on the hull front; even filled 5gal and their crews over ohstacles and while under firt' , so tht'ir armour is
water cans gave a little extra one of their defining advantages .
protection, and more track links
The armour on a tank was not cunsiste11tlv thick: typically. the thickest
are fastened to the turret sides.
The toothed attachment on the was found nn the gun mantkt (the shield protecting the opening \\'here
bow was a locally fabricated the gun emerges from the turret) and other frontal parts of the turret,
blade to cut through Normandy and 011 the ln>nt of the hull. This too varied: the upper glacis - the down-
hedgerow banks. Note too the sloping portion oft he hull front - was thicker than the lower glacis on tlw
grousers' added to the outer
bottom or the nose. Next in thickness were the turret sides, follnwc<l hv
edge of the tracks, to increase
track width and reduce ground the fonvard and Ct'n tral portions of the It ull sides, especially above the
pressure. tracks. The lower hull inside' or 'he hind' the tracks was thinner: hei ng
lower, it was ditlicult to hit. and \\'as also protected
to some exlc11t by the tracks. road wheels and
return rollers. The rear portions of the hull sides,
the hack ol' the hull, and the top smfaces nl' both
hull and turret were relatively thin; so was the
tutTet rear, though this was thicker than much of
the hull side armour. The belly, except for the
most fon-.ard portion, was rdathdy thin. Heavy
arninurc' d gratings protected the top of the cn~m
compartment, but \'>Tr<:' vulnerable to clemnlitinn
charges and incendiaries.
The construction of a tank's annnur was also
a factor. l lomogcneous armour mai11tai1tt"<I a
constant degree of hardness through its entire
thickness, while hard-faced armour had a harder
exterior than interior. I lulls and turrets might be
manufactured by riveting or welding armour
plates together, or might he cast in singk picc<'s.
Bolting and riveting was the least cfkctivc, as a hit
could buckle the plates and break them loose,
'"hilc simultaneously turning 'popped" rivets into
pn~ectilcs . \Vdded armour was more dTcctivc,
but cast armour was even better. The use of sloped
armour increased during the war in order to
deflect the strikes of AT pn~ectiles: this greatly
increased armour effectiveness, allowing thinner 7
armour and thus reducing \\.'eight. l\lorc attention was given to external
design to reduce the number of 'shot traps' - i.e. lUtTet m crhangs and
right angles in armour that allowed prc~jectiles a purchase.
Besides a tank's integral armour, tankns often took measures to
provide additional protection. Spare 1rack sections and road w!lt'ds
were attadwd to turret and hull, sandbags were wired to the hull,
wire mesh screen or sheet metal skirt.'i were fastened to the hull sides
to ksscn the effect of shaped charge ordnance - or wooden planks. to
ward off magnetic hand mines.
Regardless of the thickness, type and slope of anno11r, a tank requires
openings for new entry. weapons. sights, \ision, ventilation, external
fittings, and access to the engine and other <Httmnotive rnmponents. At
Lhc very lcasl there was a hatch over the driver's position and one or two
hatches for the 1111nL crew. Thert might also be esc1e hatches, in the
A Sherman of 6th South African
tt1rrcr sidC' or rear. hull side above or behind the tracks. and sometimes
Armd Div crossing an Italian in the hell\'; late i11 the war this latLer \Vas often deleted, as it made tanks
river. A tank's fording depth was more vulnerable to mines. (Contrary to popular perception, hatches
limited, and seldom exceeded could he locked from inside.) Sometimes a small hatch was provided in
3 feet. This could be extended
the turret rear or .,ide through which tu load a111111u11ilio11 ur eject spt.'nt
by waterproofing and fording
kits, as here, but these required shell cases. Smaller pistol / sub-machine gun pons were sometimes
time-consuming preparations; provided in tlltTC't sides. and flare pistol ports in the tlll'l'C't roof. Early
once prepared for deep fording tanks had vision slits aro1111cl the n1mmander's cupola, i11 the turret sides
the turret often could not be and other positions. and a shullcrcd driver's view port: all these were
turned, the guns elevated, or
'1ilncrahlc tn \onnntrated small arms tire. Flare pistols cot1ld also he
certain hatches and ports opened
without breaking waterproof
fired at ,isiun purls to blind crews at nig-ht. Periscopts aud bulletprnof
seals. Water obstacles provided glass vision blocks Glint into \vidcr use with time. Intl these too could be
more of a barrier than just their damaged hy g11nfin'.
depth; steep banks on either Early tanks pos:-sessed enough small ope11i11gs Lltat air could t'tller.
side, muddy or rocky bottoms,
rhese were ve1~ susceptible to flanws. smoke and tear gas - all commonly
and marshland on adjacent banks
could easlly prevent a tank from
rc\nmme11<kd as carlv, i11fa11trv,. anti-tank measures. Later tanks were
crossing even a shallow water betler protected from these dkcL'i; protected vc11Lilation pons were
barrier. providtd. often with forced air ventilation, hoth inrakc a11d exhaust.

Limitations to
moblllty
While la n ks posscssc<l
a high <Legree of cross-
ro11ntrv mobilirv,, on..-
rough tttTain and nhstadcs.
thev were limited to some
degree. Among a tank's
weakest points was exactly
what made it a tank: its
tracks, fonncd of separate
plates linked and pi1med
LogcLllLT in a flexible belt.
i\Iincs. h'l.mtin or obstacles
could break tracks; and
exccedinglv rough terrain
and ,iolcnt manocmns
could 'Lhnm:' a track off its
8 b'lli<ling sprocket.
rvtany tanks \\'(' rt' rdati\'ely u11<.lerpo\\'ered.
which aff('ctcd 1hcir "lwed, manoeuvrability, anrl
ability to 11egotiall' obstacles and rough terrain.
The maximum speed obrained by most tanks
was 12 to 2:> miles per hour. \.Imi11g surh a
hea\'V nhicle often caused the engilll' tn
o\'crheal, whether it was air- or walcr-cooled. The
ravages of abrasi\'l'. clogging <l 11st were a ro11s1a11 t
problem; engine lik was short, requiring frccpwnt
maintenance and replace111tnl. Fuel consumption
limited operating range, and was measured in
gallons per mile rather than miles per gallon.
Tanks might be powered by petrol/gasoline or
diesel; petrol e11gi11l's required more frequent
refuelling and were more prone Lo catch fire. hut required less A tank destroyer was not a tank;
maintenance. Diesel engines were more expensi\'e to produce, hut while built on tank chassis, their
armour was generally llghter
provided hcttn power-to-weight rarios; the file! was less combusribl(',
and they often had open-topped
gave greater range for its volimw, and was cheaper. turrets. They were designed
Rough rerrain and obstacles caused more difficulty than is often to klll tanks and not to support
appreciated. Sinking into deep nm<l, swampv ground or sofr sand coulrl Infantry, although they often
'belly' a tank; running the nose over tree stumps or boulders could had to per1onn that task - a
role in which they were made
break tracrion because of the low ground dcaratH.T. Tanks could easily
vulnerable (like this US M10)
lose their grip on ice, mud, gravel and srccp inclines. '.\lost early tanks by the lack of a tank's co-axlal
had comparatively 11arruw ll"<Kks. limiting their ability to cross soft and bow machine guns. In
grounrl clue to the rdativcly high grounrl pressure per square inch . urban fighting all AFVa suffered
Wider tracks, or 'gnn1sns . added ro the outside edge, \\'t.Tl' often from the limited elevation of
their guns, which restricted
provided tu reclucc ground pressure; hut wider, he<l\"ier tracks h1nlter
their ablllty to engage targets
reduced speed, increased fuel consumption and caused more wear 011 on the higher floora and roofs
the ru1111i11g gea1-. of bulldlngs.
The height of the mau-made or nat 11ral obstacles that a tall k could
ne~ot iatc ckpended on the design and angle of" t h(' front of' i ls tracks
and hull; most. tanks could 11ot mount a wall much over :l, feel high.
Trenches and ditches whose width was 111ore than one-third the length
of the track's 'grounrl footprint' could halt a tank; so could closely
spared trees of <nn morkratc diameter. Extcnsi\c tangled harhcd wire
and other debris could jam ru1111ing ge ar. Long-barrelled guns were
restricted in woodland and built-up areas, where their tranrsc was
sometimes hloc ked.

Armament
The main gun was mounted in a turret with a '.W10" tra\'crsc; ckYatio11
and depression were 1ypically limited. Ideally the gun would be a 1011g-
barrdkd high n(ncity \\'Capon Capable or defe ating othe r tanks. but
short-barrelled low nlocity guns were often provided for the infann1
support rok ; this was a mistake. as tanks so armed were mostly incapable
of engaging enemy ranks. There was much resistance in many armies LO
providing imprmtd nr larger calibre gtms. All sorts of tactical rationales
were argued, but the real reason for using lmv velocity guns W<Ls tn
reduce costs or ronsene materials. In a very few instances tanks also
mounted a smaller calihrt' secondary gun , hut the complications
outweighed the advantages. Cyrn-stabilization was not always provided
for the gun, and this greatly reducerl the ability to engage targets while 9
moving: a lank would han' 10 halt to aim and
fire. during which time it was vulnerable . Other
'"eaknesses affrcling weapon perf(1rma11ce Wt' rt:'.
hand-operated as opposed to powned turret
trawrsc, and relatively indticicnt sighting systems.
A tank's machine guns are often disro11nted.
hut in fact they proved to be extremely valuable
for engaging enemy positions, troops and soft-
skin vehicles. They wert even 111111e important for
protecting their own and other tanks from
attacking infantt")'. !\lost tanks ntntmtcrl a co-axial
machine gu11 in tilt: main gu11 111a11tlet. Frt>quemly
a how machine ~111 was moumed in the right front
hull , and another exte rnally on the commanrlcr's
cupola for air defence and g-round targets.
Occasionally a machine 1-,run \Vas mounted in the
back of the turret or other llllltsual positions.
mainly in some R11ssian ;md.Japant'St' types.
The Hritish and (~ennans employed smoke
grt-'nadc dischargers on son1t AFVs. These were
small tubes fitted outside the tul'l'et, capable of
throwing phosphorus smoke grenades 20 to l 00
yards. rapidly creating a dense smoke scrcf'n to
co11nal the tank while it withdrt'w ur changed
The sergeant commander of a course. (The hursting phosphorns threw Olli burning particles dangerous
British M3 Grant of 5 Royal Tank lo both attacking and supporting infantt")'. )
Regt slgnalllng by flag In the
North African desert, February
1942. Conditions were not so
The crew environment
suitable for visual signalling on The greatest tactical weak11t'ss of a tank is the crew's n-rv limited field
most other wartime fronts, and of visio11, and their complete inability to hear anything outside.
It obviously could not be used Communications hetwctn tanks was critical in order to to-o rdinate
at night or in other conditions
effective tactics. In the early days hand and flag signals were used. hut
of limited visibility. (IWM)
these could not lw t-'mployed once tanks Cllllt-' under fire. in forest. or
in poor \'isihilit; due to night, rain, snnw. fog. smoke or dust. Visual
signals also required tank commanders to constantly obsen'e unit
commanders tanks for orckrs. Only radios prodded dlcctive intra-tank
r<>mmunications. :\.1o st countries prmidcd nnly s11h-11nit comma11ders
tanks with two-way radios, and line tanks with receivers. Commm1ication
with infantry was C.'\'en mon difficult. In most armies infantry below
company level lackcrl portahk radios, and cwn if t lwy were so equipped
infanlrv ;111d t<tuk radios used rliffcrenl frequen c ies. lnl'antn-taHk
co-ordination was accomplish ed hy hand signals, coloured smoke
grenades. signal tlares, tracer fire, and limitcrl \Trhal cnrnrn1111ication .
The problem was compounded by the cliflicuh)' ul simply attracting the
tank comma11dcr's atttntion. I.ate in tlw wa1- the \Vcslern Allies fittt>d
some tanks v.ith an external tdephonc set for communication between
tank and infantry co111ma11ders. hut this was never a complete solution.
The tank crew had to endure great heat . deafening 11oise from the
engine and runnin g gca1. dizzying htmcs from the engine and gun,
cramped space hampned by awkward interior fittings, violent pitching
and lurching during rross-countt")' movement, poor visibility, and the
10 cvcr-presc11t f-irc hazard. Driving with the 111rniddy steering and dutch
systems of the perio<l was physically exhausting,
Tank recognition cards
and sometirnes drivers and co-dri\'crs had to be The Germans first used recognition leaflets in 1917 to
rotated at i11tervals. The loader had lo cope with depict silhouettes of enemy tanks and indicate points
insufficient space. heavy ammuuition, and the vulnerable to attack. Similar sheets or booklets were used
dangerous recoil of the gun. The gunner was busy by most armies in World War II to provide a means of
identifying different types of AFVs by line drawings: effective
acquiring targets and operating the main gun
aiming points might be indicated , and sometimes other
and co-axial machine gun, and in smaller tanks vulnerable areas such as the engine, fuel tank and ammu-
he sometimes had to load for himself. The nition storage. The Germans issued four-page leaflets for
commander was the busiest, having to guide the each type of enemy tank, specifically for each calibre of
tank. determine routes, search fur targets and AT/tank gun (2. 3.7, 5, 7.5 & 8.Scm), indicating the type
of ammunition effective at different ranges. The leaflets
threats, \\"atch his comman<ler's tank, mailllain
were stowed in the gun's sight box: sometimes a sheet
formation, and co-ordinate the crew. In some for the main type of tank the crew was fighting was taped
light tanks he additionally served as gunner to the gun shield beside the sight. This translated example
and / or loader. Either the commander, loader or is for the US M3 Grant tank. for a 2cm gun mounted on the
co-driver/ hull machim. gunner also had to man PzKw II light tank. Black areas= lethal effect; crosshatched

the radio.
= deterrent or damaging effect: white = no effect.
The Germans often painted reminders on the inside of
For self protection if they were forced to AT gun shields, e.g. 'Observe Carefully' or 'Be Certain'
abandon the tank (and wen quick and lucky (to reduce fratricide). 'Remember Camouflage', or simply
enough to do so, before exploding ammunition Kaltblutig ('cold blooded' - i.e. 'be calm and serious').
turned it into an oven), most crewmen were
armed with pistols. and one or two su~machine
guns wcrt' oftf'n stowed i11 the tank: a supply of
hand grenades was also carried to fcn<l off
infantry atlacks. Baled out' aews were a
lrgitimatt' targf't who routinely dre\.v fire from
enemy tanks and infantry. F!IDNT

* * *
f\1ines, other ranks. AT guns. infantry AT weapons,
artillery. ground-attack aircraft and direct infantry
attack were the main causes of tank losses. '.\Jatural
obstacles halted more tanks than man-made, and
banal mechanical breakdowns took a high toll.
Su~1d Shlll
Regardless of all their limitations, however, tanks 1,1,'l, .~o a:.
SU:E
were formidable weapons: they could be decisive

;:.
if handled and supported effectively, and were a
serious thrL'at to infantry. A brid note on tank ,fU- .111 .. lt CC rt.. -..
~ ------- Soll I "l: Lt c:tl : 0 rr.
unit organization is necessary. (1 r..i.;.r N".1-1n tnt
r
tir~ t~ ~.
~ ~ta.nlt

-=~ - ~d not
1t .. 1
&.t lb'' m
Germany and the USSR employed tank
regimenLo; with two or three battalions. The US
replaced its thrcc-hactalion regiments with HE ;._:h .... ll h.;
m;;;-Lb.e l
~lUlaust fir~.
separate battalions attached to 1-egime11tal-si1.ed
REAR
'combat commands'. although two divisions
retained regiments. British Commonwealth and
Japanese tank 'rq~iments' were of single battalion
size. Most tank batt<tlions had three or four companies, either of the
same type. or occasionally with three light or medium companies and
one of the opposite type. A tank company l)Vically had three or four
platoons. A platoon consisted of between three and six tanks, but four
or five were common : and one to three tanks were assigned to each
company headquarters. Commonwealth armies referred to their
company-size units as 'squadrons' and platoon-size units as 'troops', in
the cavalry tradition: their squadrons each had four three-tank troops. 11
Regardless of the number of tanks assigned to a company/ sriuadron.
a company in combat would soon be reduced by combat losses and
mechanical failure. Tankers preferred to operate in company
formations for mutual support, firepower and shock clfrcL. Platoons
were considered the smallest practical clenwnt for combat; ;md the
absolute minimum , ..as for tanks to operate in pairs.
Equally important was for tanks to he accnmpa11it"d by infantry - tn
reconnoitre and clear routes, warn of AT Wt'apons 1111d auacking-
This diagram translated from infantry. direct tanks to bypass mines anci obstacles, co-ordinate
a Soviet manual depicts the manocmTes, irlrntif\ targets and rli1"ect the tanks' fire. Accompanying
four most common types of AT infantry were essential to protect tanks from close-in attacks. especially
projectiles used In 1943, and in dose terrain or built-up areas. Tanks committed without infantry.
their capabilities when fired
separate<l from infantry hy enemy action, or leaving their infantry
at 300 yards' range.
(Top to bottom:) behind. were extrc-mely vuhu:i-able.
Armour-piercing high explosive
(AP-HE)
Armour-piercing capped, with ANTI-TANK WEAPONS - AN OVERVIEW
a penetrating core (APC)
Shaped or hollow charge -
high explosive anti-tank (HEAT} At the beginning of the \Var most countries foll<>wtd fairly similar
High explosive plastic or 'squash anti-tank doctrines, V<ffying according to the terrain of their expected
head' (HEP or HESH). areas of operation, the m1mhcrs all<l t}ves of allotted AT weapons, an<l
the expectcrl cnemv's tank capahililies. The
main precepts of AT warfare included
separating tanks from their supporting
infantry: channelling arm11ur into ' kill zones';
iiii%1Q positioning AT weapons in depth; causing
Armour - piercing
shell
tanks to 'button up' (close all hatches), thus
Shell penelrlu Shell 1>lode1
.,mour by fore ln1id lnlc increasing their vulnc1ahility and hamp{ring
of !tie lmfHcl beyond .,mour command and control: massing AT lires;
exploiting tank-restrictive terrain. 111;111-rnade
and natural obstacles and 111i11elields; and

1~H.,d-core
blinding and scree11i11g by means uf smoke.
This discussion of AT weapons is limiter! to
1hell
those found at battalion and lower levels of
Bo ltom plI nd blll1tlc Fregmenl1 of shell core
cp d1f1oyed, the nd ermour hil crew' infantry units. Laq.{e calibre towed and sdf-
tort ol shell penelrl1 end lenli equipment propellcd AT guns operated by specialist units
ermour
generally fall outside the remit of this book.
though with isolated exceptions.
A wick \;uicty of AT weapons cxisterl in
5heped-chrg I ~n~J. and during the war the search for more
shtll
efltxtive \\'capons arguably saw more ,ariations
Armour h pierced by
c11mulellv. 1tr.. m of of design and rlcwlopmcntal effort than those
Hplo1lon produch
for any other categor\' of weapon, ranging
from the mundane, tu the innovative. to the
frankly bizarre. Regardless of the weapnn 's
design - be it a high velocity gun, <lll advanced
rocket launcher. or a bomb slapped 011 to
Shell wllh pla1tic a ta11k's surfrtce by a desperate infantryman -
.. plosive
Vibrflon nd fr119menh the aim of' any AT weapon was to deliver a
produced by Hplo1lon
of pltslic Hplo1lv1 Fr19menh Ind air blt u111ed by pn~jcctile or explosive charge capable of
trmour vlbrellon end reflect d pc11ctrating Cl tank's annour or othenvise
wavu insl.de link
12 disabling it.
Armour-piercing shot
Kinetic energy is the basic means of penetrating a hard mat('rial. and
Scm Pigr.-M.
It:;t;l1ffU'7!J ~ /3[ l/,/J
this must be delivered bv a high velociLy gun. The simplest example is
lfusfiiltrun!! .If~
tlw armour-piercing (AP) shot: a solid pn~jectilc made of hardened steel
with a cnmpara1in-ly hl11nt nose, though usually providt'd with a
streamlined 'windshkld' (the tip of a shaq.>-nosed projectik, like an
arrow. will break off on impact and the mass \\i ll he cldlcctcd) . AP shot
rdi t>s on its speed and hardness to penetrate. All armies issued AP
cartridges for their rifles a11d machine guns: these pre-dated ta11ks.
having hee11 dc\'clopcd in \\'orld \Var I to dcft'at snipers using steel plate
shields for cover. They were indfrctivc against all hut the lightest AFVs.
since they typically penetrated only 6mm to IOmm (Y, Lo ~in) of annuur
wht'll striking at right angles (i .e. ~HY') and \\oithin 100 varcls' range.
Variations on the brger AP ro11nds include a small high explosive
(HE) or incendiary charge ill the pn~tctile's base; such AP-IIE a11d
AP-1 roun<ls, fittcrl with base-detonating fuses. <'Xplode or ignite after I I
penelrati11g. to cause fragmentation or scaucr burning particles to
I
ignite ruel 01' allllllllllition slored inside the tank. 1\nnour-picrcing
capped (APC) is AP shot with a soft metal nose cap that ' turns' the
pn~jectile to ro11ghlv 90' when it strikes armour. Another variation is a
smaller calibrt' hardened penetrator sheathed ill a larger soh metal Germany Introduced the
projectile; wlwn it strikes armour the softer material is stripped off and Panzergranatpatrone 40 anti-
armour round (Pzgr 40, or to the
the penetrator punches through. Enhancements aside, the AP round
AHies 'AP40') In all AT and tank
itself causes little damage to the tank other than making a lwle. \1ost gun calibres; this is the head
crew c1s11allies and interna l <lamag-c arc caused by fragmentation from of a 5cm shell. They achieved
the penetratt~d armour and the projectile, brt'aking up and 1icoclwting a higher veloclty than standard
around the cramped interior with lethal effect. The least desired effect AP shot, with a softer steel
sabot ('shoe') around a small
is for the projectile to pass entirely through the tank and out the other
penetrator core of hard tungsten,
side. causing 111i11i111al damage. and an easily crushable 'wlnd-
shleld' pointed nose. Like many
'Squash head' munitions AP rounds they had a tracer
The high explosi\'e plastic or 'squash head (I IEP or HESll) round is a element In the base; by tracking
the tracer In fllght the gunner
plastic explosive charge contained in a thin-walled pn~jectile with a base-
can sense' If the round Is a hit
dctunating fuse. It relics on bnttc force to smack into the tank. with the or miss before It strikes, and
pliable explosive 'squashing' out and detonating, so that the explosion can then either correct his aim
sheers off fragnwnts from the inside of the armour. ff the armour is for the neat shot or acquire
s111liciently thin the HEP round may hlow a hole through it or severely another target. Fractions of a
second can mean life or death
blKkle it. This round has the advantage of low cost, and is also ust'htl
when engaging tanks.
against soft-ski11 vehicles. and light fortifications and buildings, since it
has the same dkct nn concrete anrl masonq as on steel.

'Shaped charge' munitions


'Shaper! chargt" or "hollow charge' munttlons rely on the rvtonroe
effect', employing an explosive d1arge with a cone-shaped ca\'ity. \Vhen
tlw open end of the cavity is placed against the r~uget it focuses the blast
on a single small point. cutting a hole . Early shaped chargcs had shallow
cavities. During- \Vodd \Var I a <;t'rman d esignrr improved the concept
by lining the cavity with thin metal, and detonating the charge not
directly against the surface but a short distance from it (a 'stanrl-otr of
twn to three times the diameter of the chargt') lo further focus the blast.
111 19~8 two Swiss <'ll!{inccrs perfected the principle and demonstrated
its use in demolition charges. A B1;tish ordnance enh>inecr employed 13
the concept in his design for the 1-irst shaped
charge AT rifle grenade; and the first use of the
shapc<l chargC' by most countries was for such
munitions.
Dwing the war an en lire range ohveapons were
provi<lcd with shaped charge ,..arheads; these
'high explosive anti-tank' (HEAT) munitions
incluckd hand and rif lc grenades, AT and tank
guns, AT rocket launchers. light field artillery
shells, and hand-placed ckmulition charges and
mines. \Vhik widely used by the CS, B1itai11 and
Ccnnany, "haped charge rounds saw limited use
by the LISSR. Japa11 and Italy. One of the main
bendiL'> of shaped charge pn~jectiles is rh;H they
do not rdv on velocity en- mass to penetrate armour; such a round will A US 57mm M1 AT gun In 'full
ad1ien. the same penetration at !)00 yards as at f>O yards. It makes no battery'. The M1 had an artillery
type hand-cranked traverse
difti.:rencc if tlw pn~jtctile is hand-thrown or fired from a high velocity g-im :
rather than the shoulder traverse
while the t\\'O entirely <lilkrent types nl projectiles will by 1wct>ssitv he of of the British 6pdr from which
dilkrent designs. if they are of the same size and imt rnal al'l'angtme11t It was copied. The M1A2 was
the pc11ctration will be the same. The.: prr!jectile is comparatively light and provided with the shoulder
inexpensive to make. traverse, however - a panel
beside the breech allowed the
L:pon impact, the projectile is detonated by a base-detonating fuse.
gun to be swung freely by the
and the metal cavity lining is transformed into a molten 'hot solid slug'. gun layer's weight. The wavy
which punclws through arn1011r plate a1 <tpprnximatt'ly :U,OOOft pc.r shield edge, retained from the
second. This process is usually described as the liner being 'vaporized British design, helped distort
into a plasma jet that instant!\ burns through annour. This molten the shield's appearance for
concealment; and note the
metal slug carries with it fragments from both the pn~jtctile and the
gun's low profile.
armour itl\elL The hot slug and fragme11ts ignite a111mu11itio11 and fuel
and kill or seriously injure anyone in their path. The entry hnle is
surprisingly small, it.~ 0111t: r diame:tn lwi11g lar.~n tha11 the hole:- 011 llu:
inside. Besides armour, shaped charges penetrate any resistallt surface
such ~L" concrc:>te, masonry. timber or even sandbags.
Fin-stabilit.t>d shaped d1arge rounds have more effective penetration
than spin-stabilized prl!jecLiles; the former do not rotate, or do so at a
very low rate. Tiu: high ratl' of spin imparted to spin-stabilizccl
prnjcctiles (ad1ievt'd hy ritling) dissipatt.s up to three-quarters ol thc
pcm~trating effect thrnugh centrifugal force. This is why rocket and ritk
grenade HEAT rounds arc more effective than one fired frorn a rifled
AT gun.
The effects of shaped charge warheads Gill be reduced by placing
heavy wire mesh or thin steel plates a short distance rnttsi<lc the armour OPPOSITE Bazookas - here an
plate. This causes the shaped charge to detonate short of the target M1A1, still In service In August
and dissipates the effects of the phLsma jet. resulting in little or 1944 - were not used by
specialist crews; riflemen were
no penetration.
trained to operate them, and
Individuals within a US rifle
Smoke munitions platoon were designated to
Va1ious chemical munitions were also used against tanks. Smokt- use them In combat. More often
producing projectiles and grenades arc a double-edged sword. \Vhite than not tank destroyers were
assigned to support infantry
phosphorus (\VP) is tht' most effective of several smokt'-generating
units, a role far different from
agents; apart from creating a dense white smoke doud, irs hurning their mlBBlon as originally
particles, scattnt>d by a small bursting drnngc, burn on stubbornly at envisioned - note the M 10
14 :l.OOO'' F ('.!.i60'C). They rain down 011 troops in open positions. to in the background.
burn 1hro11gh flesh, and
tht'v stick to anv surface
i .

they touch. Chhcr types of


smoke only burn upnn
impact and do not pn,duce
casualties. \\11ile WP does
not inflict appreciable
damage 011 tanks, smoke
Anti-tank rifles were too heavy is a useful anti-tank aid; dense smoke scrtTllS blind tanks, causing
and awkward for Infantrymen, di .~oricntaticm and breaking up fonnations, and conceal the approach
but at the beginning of the war
of dose-i11 i11f;111t1y allacks. Equallv, smoke also su-ecns the 11wnme11t
there were few other weapons
available to them for AT defence.
of tanks. conceals them. and prevents cncrnv gunners from effectively
This la a Swedish-made Solothum engaging them. I land-placed smoke pots, smoke candles and smoke
20mm s18-1100; It weighed gre11adcs were also used by wartime armies.
54.7kg (1031b), and was 2.16m
l7ft) long. It had semi-automatic
Anti-tank guns
feed from a 5-round magazine,
and could penetrate 1Smm of
Among all the many wcapo11s de\'eloped, these remai 11ed the most
annour at 300 yards. This weapon widely used means of attacking tanks. At the beginning of the war most
w.. used by Italy, Hungary, countries fielded a :~imrn AT g1111 with fairlv common chanKterislics. ,-\
Romania, the Netherlands, and great deal of clcvclop111cnt had taken place in tht I ~nos as improvements
to some extent by Germany.
i11 tanks were noted. These guns were monntcd on two-wheel carriages
an<l capahlc of towing hy a light truck: most cotmlries had recognized
the.- nect'ssity ol pro,iding AT guns with motorized mobility in order to
get tlwm int.o position, withdraw them. and reposition them rapidly.
Ncvcrthckss, since most weighed nnlv several huJl(lrcd pounds they
could be manhandkd tor shun distances. T~:pically they had a protective
shield. a split trail mounting. and could he tranrsed rapidly.
These small guns were basically nhsnlcsce11t in 19'.\9, and obsolete by
l~l41. Thev somelimes remained in use until the war's end out of
necessiry. though mostly in supplementary roles: all were provided
with 1IE rounds ll>r use againsl nlher 1argets. l11troclucing impn>\'t'd
am mu 11i Lio 11 sometimes
<.'Xll'nckd their lifr. hut
the small calibre g1111s
WtTe silllplv incapable of
p1111ching through thf'
i ncreasi nglv he;n tank
arllluur e11cuu11te1Tcl from
lhe mid-war vears.
The ck,elopment of
larger calibre AT guns had
begun in most cn11ntric.~
before Lhe war, but few
had heen fielded. ~..tedium
calibre weapons m the
4:-lmm In :>7mm 1mge
soon bega11 lo appear.
aml largely replaced the
;~7111111 class, of which mosl
were simply scaled-up
versions. (Calibre alone
c111 be Ill isleadi11g: e.g. the 15
performance of un<lcrpowcrcd Japanese and
British pounder' designation system
During World War II some British weapons were
Italian 47mm guns rlid not compare with that of
designated by a 'pound' system rather than by calibre. their contemporaries.) Although they too soon
This was a traditional system based on projectile weight, became obsolesct3nt, medium calihrc guns
dating back to the days of black powder and solid generally remained in use by infantry units. The
cannonballs; applied to modern artillery, these designations shortagc of AT guns was so <liH' that many armies
bore only an approximate relationship to the actual weight employed anything tlwy could get their hands
of the projectile. The metric and inch calibres of various
on. including captured weapons and obsolete
British weapons designated in the 'pounder' series were
as follows:
light artille1y pieces mo<lifie<l for the AT rule.
Still larger calibre ,..,eapnns in the if>mm range
2-pdr AT gun 40mm 1.57in
were developed; these ,,:ere usually assigned lo
6-pdr AT gun 57mm 2.24in
17-pdr AT gun 76.2mm 3in <lhisinnal and higher level AT units, hut some
18-pdr field gun 84mm 3.33in found thtir way into i11fantry AT units.
25-pdr gun-howitzer 87.6mm 3.45in Anti-lank guns had tht'ir limitations. E\'en the
light pien.'s were heavy. and while the crew could
manhandle them into and 0111 of position. this
was by no means rapid. The :nmm guns were small enough and
possessed a sufficiently low profile that they could be concealed easily,
and existing cover was uftt'll t'mploycd. As tht guns hccamc larger they
recp1ircd a \'Chicle for positioning, and were mon~ ditlicult to conceal -
crucial to the effectiveness and survivability of an AT gun. Considerable
effort was required to <lig in these larger pieces. an<l thev were difficult
to 'vithdraw and reposition rapidly. The late-war behemoths fielded by
Gennam (H.8cm) and the l 1SSR ( IOOmm) '"TH' wrging on impractical
in the role: their size and weight had become a liability rn_gating their
destructiveness. On the plus sick, AT guns used well-pro,en anillcq
terh110)0~1Y, they were reliable, and th<'y were accurate at comparati\'cly
long ranges.
Anti-tank g1ms organic to infantry unit-; were manned by speciallv
trained info.ntrymc11 rather than artillerymen or specialist AT troops.
1ypically an early infantry battalion had a platoon ol three to six :~7mm
guns. while the multi-battalion infantry regimc11t/ brigade had an AT
company with six to I~ g1111s. Later in the war the battalion AT platoo11
was often deleted, having been replaced hy other weapons al company
Jen-I. In some armies it was retained with :~7mm guns mainly in the
infantry support role. The regimental / brigade AT company usually
recci\'ed largtr calibrt guns.

Other infantry weapons and munitions


The anti-tank rifle was in widespread use but essentially obsolete in I !);~9.
The (~ennans ha<l fielded a 1:~.2mm AT rifle l<ltt' in \Vorld \Var I. all([
devdopme111 had been rapid in the mid-19'.rns. !\lost countries
employed an AT rifle when the war began, with the exception of
America, whid1 relic<l on its .!'>Oral heavy machine gun. The calibre
range of AT rilles varied between 7.~nmm an<l 20mm. These weapons
were heavy. weighing from 30-plus to over 100 pounds, and were very
awkward to handle. requiring two or even three men to transport the
weapon and its ammunition. They measured from ?>ft to 7ft in length.
and were supported by a bipod; the longer ones sometimes had
removahlc barrels. They were actually more awkward to move than
many ma('hinc guns. and their weight and h11lki11css was a frequent
16 cause of complaint.
For their weight and size their annour pe11etraLio11 was marginal.
usually only about half an inch ( 1~~mm) at 200 to 300 yards. Some
performed better, such as the 145111111 and 20mm. but were still far from
effective even against 19'.~9 tanks. Because of their weight most did not
have cxccssiv<' recoil. hut the m11zzk blast could he uncomfortable.
Their designs varied greatly. including magazine-fed or single-shot,
semi-automatic or bolt-action. By 1941/42 they were largely \\ithcfrawn;
only the Smiet Red :\nny k<pt them in widespread use, hm most
countries replaced then1 with some mon- man-portable weapon.
The dcvclopmenl of bazooka-type anti-tank rocket launchers began
in 1941. These 111a11-porta hie, shoulder-Ii red weapons pr~jecte<l a llEAT
warhead; most \Vere reloadable, but the revolutionary (;ennan
Prmznfrwstwas a single-shot disposable weapon. Their light weight made
them easily portable by infantrymen 011 the ha1tl<fi(')d, and they were
quick and inexpensive Lo produn i11 large 11u1nbers. Since the l IEAT
In the early 1940s most countries
warhead was more effective as a ti11-stahilized pn~jcctile. this provided an
adopted a shaped charge rifle-
idt'al match between launcher and v.arhead. They ,..en also effective in launched AT grenade of some
smashing through light fonitications. type; cup dischargers were
The shoulder-fired AT rocket lau11cher was an answer to the adopted by Germany, Britain and
infa11tqrna11 's prayt'rs, hut early weapons did have their problems. Their Japan. Flg.1 Is the rined German
30mm Schlessbecher adopted
range was shon - less than '.!00 yards, and ohcn under half that; the
In 1942, capable of firing 30mm
reliability of tht' rockets. both in launch ignition and clcto11atio11 011 AT (Flg.2), over-callbre 40mm AT
the target, was somt'timcs \van ting: and the design of early-warheads was (Flg.3), and 30mm high explosive
for from optimum. This class of weapons suffered (and still does) from grenades (Flg.4).
tactical limitations. Rocket launchers nee<l an
unobslructed area Le 1 the rear for their considcrahlc
hack-blast; they generate a noticeable firing
signature of smoke and dust (partly countered hy
their ease of relocating); and they cannot he 111-e<l
from \\ithin cndostd spaces - such as a room of
a conventional ho11s< - hecausc nf the back-blast
overpressure.
'Recoilless rifles saw only limitt'd use. The
Gcnnans pioneered the dcvclopmen t of these
light guns, which exploited the same principal nf
F'IO_I FllF'LE OISCHARGEFI (CUP TYPE)
equalizing the recoil by means uf a simult~meous
back-blast, hut employed a brecch-lnadcd shell
with a perf<ffatcd propellant case rather than a
self~propelled rnckct. The US fielded a small
number of recoilless rifles at the end of the war.
\Vhilc both nations prm'iclcd HE.AT rounds,
because they wei-t spin-stabilized these were unly
marginal AT weapons; the German design was
slighlly more efkcti\'c as it used standard artillery
HEAT pn~ectiles with a slower spin.
..-

Most co\tntrics rlcvclope<l rifle-launched anti-


tank grenades to give any infanlly111<m at least a i
half\vay effective means of combating tanks. Being
in-stabilized I hey were somewhat effective for
delivering a shaped charge. hut the 1940 cone
<lcsigns, light explosive charges, and often
FIG 2. FIG. 3 FIG. 4
inferior fusing gave them poor penetration and 17
reliability. Effective range was seldom over I 00 yards. and that only
against light armour. Tht' use of riflt' grenades required a special
launching dc,icc fitte<l to the muzzle and special launching cartridges.
011e or more launchers were provided to rifle scp1arls/ sertions; these
could also launch anti-personnel, smoke a11d signal grenades.
There were three types of rifle grcnack systems. Th<' discharger ru
l)pe required a cup-like dnice attached to the ritlc's muzzle in which
the gn. nade was inserted. Their disadvantage was that the cup blocked
the use of rifle sights for rq.{11lar tiring while it was f-ittf'<l. The spigot type
featured a tube attached to the muzzle; the grenade had a hollow
tailhoorn which slid o\'cr the tube. The rnd type grenade, dating from
before \\ 'orld \\'ar I. was soon ahandoned. The grenade was fitted to a
long metal rod inserted into the 111u1.1.lc; it requirt'd no special launcher.
hut would cnntually damage the bore. \tost grenades had to be fired
with the rifle's h11tt on the ground and the hand angled at the necessary
range elevation. The grenades' heavy weight caused tremendous recoil
that would damag;e a rifle afler repeated use - to say nothing of
Anti-tank hand grenades were the shoulder of any grcnadin unwise enough to try firing it \Vith the
heavy, due to the necessarily convelllional grip. For the direct fire recp1ircd hy some AT grenades
large explosive charge, and this
the rifle stock was placed under the arm and damped tightlv to the side
gave them a short range. These
are the flat-nosed Soviet RPG-42
of the torso with the dhow.
(left) and domed RPG-6 (right) Anti-tank hand grenades were developed before the war, hut were
of 1944, with shaped charges essentially '"'Capons or last resort. \lust relied 011 a simple I IE charge to
penetrating 75mm and 1OOmm of penetrate light armour nr break a track. Ikca11sc of their necessarily
armour respectlvely. To ensure
small size t lwy were 11u11e too dfcctive. especially against all hut the
that they struck the target at the
necessary angle, stablllzlng tall
lightest tanks after 1941 . They Wt:Tl' most effectin agaimt tracks, and
streamers deployed when they upper surfaces such as turret tops ami engine <lcC"ks. Britain and the
were thrown (aee Plate F). USSR were Lhc main producers of AT hand grenades; dw l IS rlid not
bother with their developme11L. and Japan only
hdclecl some indficient designs late in the war. To
be effective some stabili1.ing svstem was necessary
to ensure tht' grenade struck the target in the
right attitude to maximize the hlast. Thev were
larger and heavier than standard grenades, and so
could he thrown only about 20 to 30 yards.
A larger version of tlH AT hand grenade W<ls
the hand mine. These were larg-er explosive
charges hand-placed by very bold i11fa11trymen -
in reality, virtual suicide weapons . Most had
shaped charges and were attached to the tank hy
magnets; the mine was sb pped on to the tank.
with a delay l11se that kft hardy sufficient time
for the attacker to dive for cover. Others were
han<l-thrown and impact-detonated. but because
ol thcir wcigln tlair range was as shon as 10 to
15 yards. 111 the hands of determined men in
close terrain thev nlTe1Trl a c:onsiclerahk threat.
however, forcing tank crew.-; tn take drastic
protective measures.
Among chemical munitions. snwke grenades.
smokt candles and smoke pots wcn employed
18 by infantry i11 close-in attacks. Early in the war
some storc was also placed in tear gas grenades; Zlmmerlt
the idea was lo bombard a tank \Vith irritant gas The Soviets occasionally plastered a thin layer of textured
grenades so that the fumes suckerl into the tank's concrete over their tanks to hamper the attachment of
\'entilation syste111 \vould blind or drive out the German magnetic hand mines. In case the Red Army
developed a magnetic AT hand mine similar to their own,
crew. The Japanese developed a toxic gas grenade
in December 1 943 the Germans began applying Zimmerit
to he employed in the same manner. In reality 'anti-magnetic plaster' on the production lines of new
smoke and gas grenades were relatively ineflenive, PzKw V and VI tanks, heavy assault guns, and some
as the tank merely drove out of the small area PzKw IV tanks and lighter assault guns. (The Red Army
affected, often before a trouhlesome amount of never did field such a weapon, although they did use
gas entered tht' tank. captured German examples.) Zimmerit was a magnetic-
insulating putty, not truly anti-magnetic', developed by
The first anti-tank mines lverc buried anillen Chemische Werke Zimmer GmbH and made of 40 per cent
i

shells used in World War I. Extensive rlevclopmcnt banum sulphate. 25 per cent polyvinyl acetate, 15 per cent
of purpose-made AT mines was pursued in the dark yellow pigment, 10 per cent zinc sulphate and 10
late 1920s/ early 19'.~0s and continued throughout per cent sawdust. It was applied by hand in a first 5mm
the war. During \\'orld War II all armies lairl layer, and four hours later a textured 3mm coat was added
with a spatula, and dried with a blowtorch. The ridged
millions of mines on all fronts. All combatants in patterns made it more difficult to attach magnetic and
:-.Jorth Africa created \'<Lst minefields because of 'sticky' grenades. It was not supposed to be applied to
the lack of naturnl rlefcnces and obstacles; anrl the turret, engine deck or track skirts where it would be
the .Japanese made increasing use of mines as the worn off by crew traffic, but in fact it was commonly seen
on these areas.
Pacific \Var progressed.
Zimmerit was ordered discontinued on 9 September
Typically, AT mines were prcssure-activaterl by 1944 because it was rumoured that gunfire could set it
a tank's crushing weight; if stepped on by a soldier alight; this was found to be untrue, and the plaster was
thev, would not normallv, detonate. \lost mines not removed, but its factory application was not restarted.
would blow off a track, hut the heavier models
could cause substalllial damage. The layout, density.
and location of minefields varied greatly. Anti-
personnel mines were routinely intermixed with
anti-Lank mines lo hamper i11fa11try and engi11t'ers
attempting to clear lanes for the tanks. and booby-
trapping mines to hinder clearance was common.
l\f inefields were tied into natural obstacles, laid
on likely avenues of approach and often in
patterns that would lead tanks into the sights of
AT guns; the use of dummy minefields alongside
real ones multiplied these effccts. 2
Like any obstacle. a minefield - whether a re,..,.
mines buried al a road intersection, or multiple
belts of thousands of mines - was worthless unless
covered by observation and fire . If effectively
sited, camouflaged and covered by Ii.re, they could
halt or at least slow a tank advance. Once the
defenders l\'CIT driven away it was a relatively
straightforward matter (though seldom without
bloody cost) to dear routes through minefields
which had taken much time and effort to lav. ,. The
harassing and delaying dkc:t of a small number of mines laid at Vt'isely
chosen poinL'i could be more effective than large minefields.
A wide and imaginative variety of expedient anti-tank weapons were
employed. Regardless of how ingenious or effective these last-resort
weapons may have appeared, and huw thoroughly troops were trained
in their use, any army forced to employ them was in desperate straits.
2 See also Elite 122. World War 11 /n,antry Tactics: Company & Battalion 19
Most required direct attack by a soldier or at
least an attack cklivered al very close range.
demanding a high rlcgrcc of cxposun. and a slim
chance of escape. In order to succeed the attacker
required great courage. a well-chosen position. a
stealthy approach, effective' covc:Ting fire, absence
of enemy infantry. and no small measure of luck;
in the 'invasion srare' summer of 1940 a British
Army manual on such tactics frankly compared
the risks with 'tiger shooting on foot'. Never-
theless, training was widt'spread and serious: in
I !140-41 such methods were often all that the
Hritish or Soviet infantryman had. Examples of
expedient weapons included:
Satrhd d1rlff!J'S I Olh-20lh explosive charges
packed in a haversack \'l/ilh a short Lime fuse,
thrown on the engine deck. into the tracks. or
jammed under a 1111Tct overhang. A variation
In North Africa, a British was the pole charge. a demolition charge on a 4ft-{ilt pole. allowing
ordnance disposal engineer poses it to be placed on a vuhwrablc spot.
with a German Teller AT mine
ConrPnfmtnl rlw11!;rs l\undle of about six hand grenades or small
attached (for the photographer's
benefit, unconvincingly, with
demolition charges wired Logether with a central detonator, and usually
a long white string from the a hanrlle. Employed in the same way as satchel charges. A single grt'nacle
handle) to an anti-personnel might also he shovccl down a gun hancl.
SMlne ('Bouncing Betty') rigged /)ouhh-- rhmg11s Two demolition charges linked by wire and thrown to
to klll mine clearers. In reallty
cangle around a gun harrcl. Smoke grenades were used similarly. in the
they would be coupled by a short
wire to a well In the underside
hope of blinding gunners.
of the AT mine. The TMI 35 held AT 111i11r.1 I land-delivered mines laced directly in front of a track, or
11 lb of TNT, and was set off by thrown into tlw tracks.
pressures of 4201b on the centre fin' bomb.\ Large petrol/gasoline cans (:lgal / 201) with incendiary or smoke
but only 1751b at the edges.
grenades attached for detonation. and thrown ur dropped on to a tank's
engine <leek.
'Alo/otm mrktni/.\ Class hntt les filled with petrol/ gasoline and often
enhanced with oil. rubber, 1.ar, phosphorus etc. to make it burn longer
and bolter ;md adhere to the tank. or to crnst> more smoke lo blind the
crew. A rag stuffed in the bottle neck was lit and the bottle thrown at the
tank, prderably at vision ports, hatches. or engine companme11ls; some
were provided with self-ignition dc\iccs. Results were often disappointing
because of the small a111ou11t of fuel. and later tanks were better sealc<I.
/\nother method W<lS breaking 11umt:~rous fuel-tilled bottles on a tank
and igniting ii with tlares. tracers or smoke grenades.
Expedient anti-tank weapons -
I.e. those fabricated in the field
by soldiers adapting available Blasting cap', Fu.ze ,
munitions and materials - took \'.'ire faster..tng '
many forms. This Is a German
double charge, comprising two
demolition charges with a short
delay fuse and Igniter, connected
by a short length of wire; thrown
over a tank gun barrel, it will
disable the weapon. Most
expedient weapons required
Sxpksiv.:! cha:ge
20 a dangerously close-In attack. -------
'/Jui.\y rhain.~ 'AT mines fastened together along a rope or plank. conccakcl
beside a road and pulkd across in front ol a lank by a hidden soldier.
Various mechanical means of attacking tanks were suggested; some of
these may have \.vorkcd on cady war light tanks, hut 01gainq larger tvpcs
they had liule efkn. lL was recommended that a steel bar, pipe, wooden
hcam or C'\'en a rifle he \\oeclgcd into the running gear tojam the tracks .
Battering machine gun barrels with a bar. hammering on glass \ision
ports and periscopes. dri\'ing wtdges into lllJTel rings. forcing open
hatches with crowbars. cmciing vision puns and periscopes with mud.
burning blankeL'i or o\'ercoats, and similar acts of physical mavlwm were
measures of desperation. These. like some of the improvised munitions.
were horn of real experience in such nmflicts as the Spanish Ci\'il
\Var (l~'.~f)-:m): but against the heavier tanks of later years they usually
accomplished little. and were often fatal to those who tried them.
Field artillery and mortars arc often said to be i11dlecti\'c against
armour. \Vhile it is trne that long range indirect tire had little dhct
011 tanks (a direct hit being rart). it did have the bend it ul separating
the infantry from tanks an<l forcing the unit to deploy into dispersed
formations early in an action. r\car misses only caused '\upcrficial
damage. (These limitations did not apply in some exceptional cases
such as the \cry heavy n;l\'al gunfire c:otHTJllrations occasionally
a\'ailable lo the Allied annies in Sicilv and '.'Jorman<ly.) Concentrated
artille1y could destroy light tanks. however. and this was accomplished
in se\'eral instances against Japanese and Italian armour. Artillery
and mol'lars could lay smoke on tank lormations, though this had the
disadvantage of obscuring targets f{Jr friendly AT guns: often smoke was
Soldiers of the 'Grossdeutsc:hland'
dropped only on the rear two-thirds of a tank forma1ion. still allowing
Division prepare a concentrated
gunners to target the lead tanks. charge with seven stick
111 an enlt'rgency. light field artillery of up to I O:>mm could engage grenades. Such a charge might
tanks with di1-c<t tire. and AP or HEAT rounds \Vert often a\'ailahlc for break a track, damage an engine
field pieces. f\l osl were marginal in this rolt. hecause ol' inadequate If thrown on the raar deck, or
penetrate lighter annour over
sights and slow tra\'erse. I11fa11try guns - i.e. light, simplified artillery
a hatch or if Jammed under a
pieces manned hy infantryml'n - werl' uscd by some armies as firt' turret overhang. The concussion
support \Veapo11s. and some were provided with 1IEAT rounds, hut they was reportedly enough to
were ill suited as AT weapons for the same reasons. temporarily stun a tank crew.
\fost anti-aircraft guns
were provided with AP
ammunition, and possessed
a high rate of fire and rapid
traverse. Thev took time
to emplace. though most
coukl be tired at grn11n<l
targets while still 11Hn111ted
on their travelling carriage.
Most AA guns were large
and their high prolile made
them ditlicult to conceal
- essential for a wc01pon en-
gaging tanks. Some ~Omm
and '.~7 / 40mm ;\A cannon
could be effective against
light tanks . The L~erman 21
This Soviet 76.2mm ZiS-3 was
the standard dlvlslonal llght field
artillery piece from 1942. The
Red Army required field artlllery
to be capable of engaging tanks
effectively, and the ZIS-3 proved
well adapted to this role; It Is
often considered as more an
AT weapon than a field gun.

use of 8.8cm Flak ~uns in the AT role.: is well known. The round was
devastali11g Lu La11ks and the weapon was exlremely accurale and long-
rangcd. hut its large size and the time and labour it took tn emplace was
an impediment. Few other counlries employed theit latge calibre AA
guns iu a similar mau11er. allhough the Smicls used their 8[>mm gun
against annour at least as 11111ch as the (;crmans.

EVOLUTION OF ANTI-TANK TACTICS


1939-42
The hrna<llv similar anti-tank doctrines followed hv all armies in 19~~)
were based 011 very little practical experience. The kw pre-war conflicts
in \vhich tanks were employed (Spanish Civil War, Italia11 cu11quest of
Ethiopia) prmickd few \iahlc lessons~ only small m1mhcrs of light tanks
\\TIT used. in relativdv low level conflicts against forces with fe\v if any

AT weapons. Thtse episodes gave liule warning of the imminenl large


scale op<'ratinns by mass formations of cnmhincd arms. Peacetime
manoell\Tes often failed either to validate or challenge doctrine. as they
seldom atcuratC'ly portrayed the actions of opposing armour forces.
As alr<'ady mC'ntinncd, there were two schools of thought on the likdy
employment of armour: one foresaw massed anm1111 plunging through
the fron1 lines and deep into the enemy's rear. the othe1- the parcclli11g
nut of the a\'ailahle tanks tn support 1he advance of the infantry. In f~l<"t
both concepts were valid. but n11>11ey-strapped atmics tried to skimp
and tended lo restrict themselves. The Cermans. for example. while
p roponents of' the de('p armoured thrust by massed tanks supportcci by
mobile infantry and aircraft. also specified that PzKw IV tanks were
to adva11n no more than 100 vards,
bevond
. the infamrv' and were to
support the foot lroops \\ith machine gun fire.
The infantry a11ti-ta11k tactics taught in the dilkrelll armies varied
in cktail because of local facto rs, hut tht'rc wcrt' two broad forms of
A.T def<.'ncc:
Pw~iVl' tlt'/ena included patrols and outposts lo warn of approaching
armour, AT obstacles and minefields, incorporation of natural obstacles
into the defence. selection of dclcnsivc sectors that hindered annour
22 a11d rci11forcccl tht' dd(nn. and GllJH>ttflage.
:\f'tivr 1!1fn1rr comhinc<l Lhc skilful selection of AT weapon positions and
fire zones, deployment of AT Wl'apuns. tank-hunter teams, and the us<:
or AT resen(s and CO\llllCr-attack forces.
Because of tlte 111ohilitv of tanks and the comparatively static 11atur(
of infanlt)' AT tactics. tht'st' arc t1or111ally th11ught of as clde11sin -
Tanks c011<1ucr. infantry holds' (J.F.C.Fuller). This is largely true;
however, some <kgnc of offrnsin measures could he conducted against
armoured forces by en11 the early sell~prnpdled AT guns. typically
mmmted 011 nbsnlcscent tank d1assis or trucks. The infantry itself.
especially if' li111i1t~d In movement 011 font, had very limited otl(nsiw
capabilities againsL armour. Annoured or 111otori1.ed infantry were not
much better as their transport had little or 1111 armour. possessed less
cross-countt)' mobility than tanks. and had f(\v weapons capable of
engaging tanks at long range:-;. Tank-hunter teams nmld not tnilv he
considered offensive hl'causc thcv' ha<l limitcd mohilitv. . could cowr onlv'
short dista11ces, and th('ir small-scale operations were usually cnnductf'd
in a unit's dele11sivl' scclur; they were tlms basically defensive.
The following <lisn1ssio11 is generic; th(' reader should ktep in mind
that each country's tactics \'<ll'itd tn some extent, and these differences
Anti-tank obstacles took many
are addressed in thl' llL'XL chapter.
forms, and to be effective It
Anti-tank defensive nwasurcs were incorporated into the routine was necessary to keep them
establishment of a defence. Tht extt'nt nl armour employed by the under observation and fire. This
enemy. known enemy armour tac:tics, the number and types of' available Soviet roadblock Is excellently
AT wcapcms, and terrain \Vl'!T the determining factors. An infantry designed, being tied into the
tank-proof terrain of dense
regiment (or British ( :omnH1mvealth brigadt'). regardless of nationality.
forest. Raising it to turret height
typically deployed derensivdy with two bau;1lions forward and one in prevents the tank from climbing
reserve. Each battalion had t\\' O ritk companies in the line and one It or breaking through with the
in resenc: the sa111t applied to each company's rif k platoons. This force of Its hull. It prevents the
meant that one-third of any echdun 's sub-units were in reserve tank from firing down the road,
since It masks the main gun;
positions. and this depth of ckfrnre was essential to AT dcfc.nce . The
allows the defenders to fire
dt>ployment of AT weapons depended \'l't)' much upon the actions and at the weaker lower hull; and
disposition of thl' infantry uniL'i they supportt:d, and a high degree of denies cover to accompanying
n)-()rdination and co-operation were required. Infantry.
\Vhen a divisio11 established
a dcfrnr<' tht> di,isional recon-
naissance unit and denwnt.s
detached from the reserve
regiment were deployed
ftH"'\:ard as a scrt'en to prol<'ct
the unit-; prcaring defences.
The screen i 11g force kept
enemy patrols at a distance ,
observed enemy activity. pre-
\'ented surp1isc attacks. warned
of the enemy's approach. and
engaged the cIJellly if' he
advanced. To prevent surprise
auacks by armour. AT guns
from the regimental ur divi-
sional AT unit might rci11forcc
the scrt>ening force. Once
the mam defences wt:'l't' 23
established part of the
screening force ,..a.s with-
NOT~ : hll '""' "' - - drawn. but some remained.
along with some AT
\\rapons depending on the
tank threat. Each regiment
and battalion in the main
line of resistance placed
its own screen forward in
the form of outposts, obser-
vation and listening posts,
and sccu1;t). patrols. Anti-
trnk b11.111s might be deployed
with these elemcnlo.; if there
was a hi~h armour threat,
hut eadv in the war thert'
l'R"T SIGHT llUll SIGHT were lew weapons availabk
even to arm the main
positions.
German PzB 39 AT rlftes were Ideally au 'anti-tank ohstadt'' fronted the main positions. This could
modified In 1943 into the be a minctield, tank ditch. natural obstacle (river, swamp, g-ully) or other
GranatbDchse 39 AT grenade-
tank-n.strictjve terrain, or simply point obstacles such as AT barricades or
launchlng rlfte. Using a speclal
propellant cartridge, it could fire clustffs of mines e.g. at intersections and chokepoints, or blown bddgcs.
the 46mm and 81mm AT rifle Shortag-e of time and rcsn\lrccs ohen prevcntcci the preparation of
grenades up to 150 yards. The extensive obstacle svstems.
Qr9 39 was issued three to lnfanu1 battalions typically had two to six AT guns: these would
a rlfte company, llke previous
he attached to rifle compani('s dc1wnding on tank avenues of
AT rifles. Its distribution was
not wide, since the superior approach, and 1101 necessarily equally distributed between companies.
Panzerschreck and Panzarfaust As depth was important to AT defence - il was accepted that at least
rocket launchers were Issued som(' tanks would invariably penetrate the main lint' - some of the
soon afterwards. guns might be attached lo the reserve cumpanr Anti-tank rifles.
organic lo battalions or companies. were usually allocated to rifle
platoons. These were most effectively employed with multiple ritles
engaging a single tank. Great store \Vas placed in hand and rille
grenades. hand mines, and expedient weapons. since littll' else was
then available to rifle platoons.
Defensive positions were placed well inside any woods rather th<lll
on the edges, since this prevented direct tire from tank guns and
artille11 being brought to bear on positions; it also restricted tank
movemt'rtt. and provided concealment for AT weapons and lank-huntn
teams. Fighting positions were dug deep to allow soldiers to crouch
in the bottom with 2ft of overhead clearance to prntl'ct against a
tank's crushing anion. The same applied lo crew-served weapon
positions, with narrow slif crenches dug to the sides as crew refuges from
overrunning- tanks.
A key lo a successful defence - or al least to preventing a rout - was
for infantrvmen to be trained in the vulnerabilities and limitations of
I

tanks. Confidence-building training was essential: soldiers might he


made to lie on the ground between its tracks. or squat in foxholes. as a
tank was driven over them. They were instructed that vvhen tanks
approached they had to remain hidden until the last monH:"tll; the doser
24 the tau k was, the safer thev were. and if they waited tu move out uf the
way until they were inside the ta11k's blind wnc thn ran little risk or
being machinl-gu1111nl. Thev could then attack. if' dose-alt;tck weapons
were availahlc. or rcmai11 co11LTalcd unril the tank passed and t'nga).;c
the accompanyin~ infantrv.
Some of the regime11tal AT co111panv's guns might rl'inforcc the forward
companies; more ohc11 they were held in ITscnc. cithn pusi1ioncd l.o
cover likely tank annues into tht' rear, nr ready In mmc into position
to block a breakthrough .
Early doctrine often called for tanks to be cng;1gcd at the wcap011s
maximum range . Artillery would takt the enemy fnrmalinn under
fire at maximum range to inflict casualtie .~ un the accompanying
infantry, and force tanks to assuna a balllc formation early, thus
slowing their ach~rnn'. Early in the war it was learned that it was more BELOW LEFT The 30mm
elfrctin to wait until tanks were within a frv hundred yards - in Schiessbecher cup-type grenade
discharger Introduced In 1942
effect, springing an ;imbush - and this proved to he effcctin C\'Cn in
for the Kar9Bk rifle could launch
the r\orth AJrica11 desert. Rather than forewarning the: ;11lva11cing 30mm, 40mm, 46mm and
tanks with missed shots. which allowed lhe111 lo lake e\'asi\e 61 mm AT rlfte grenades (Gewehr
111CmocmTcs. it was h('ttcr to ensure hits at relatively close range. Panzergranate), as well as anti-
~-lortars a11d machine g1111s would target the infantry and attempt tn personnel and various pyrotechnic
and special purpose rounds.
separate them from the ta11ks .
Though generally superseded by
The AT guns pnsitinncd furrht'r hack would engage tanks pl'11e- the Panzerlaust, these grenades
trating the forward posi lions. and if 11eccssar-v the regimen ta I rese1Ye remained In use until the end of
AT guns would go irno action . lnfantrymtn in small teams were to the war.
take on scattered tanks with close-attack weapons. especially in
BELOW The 46mm GPzgr 46
forested. built-up and other dose lerrai11 . Some of the divisional AT
and 61mm GPzgr 61, for use
hattalinn 's guns might be attached lo forward rcgi111e11ls, but most with the Schiessbecher cup
were held in reserve to block penetrations. Earlv in the war few if any discharger. Their special
tank units \Ven_ available fur attachment to divisions to serve as a propellant cartridges are
counter-attack force. pictured with them. Unlike
most armies, which used a
In the attack, AT sub-units would accompany attacking units. 11s11ally
common launcher cartridge
fol!m...ing somewhat to the rear. They were 111 go i11111 action ii cncmv irrespective of the projectile,
tanks atlacke<l the column; they might be called forward for dircn lire the Germans had a special
on pillboxes, and to cover tank approaclas nn the flanks. cartridge for each model.

r- ~
\ I
~m
u
25
1943-45
By 1942/ 43 the nature of anti-tank warfare had changed in many
respects. Armour was employed in smaller scale as well as mass
operations, and more frequently to support infantry, both in the attack
and defence. Self~propcllecl assault guns were also more common on
the hattlefield.
Conventional AT guns were being upgraded to medium and large
calibres, but improvements in tank design, armour, firepuwt"r and
mobility ontpaced the appearance on the field of adequate AT guns.
'Quick fixes ' were common , \Vith existinp; tank and AA hTlms mounted on
AT gun carriages. Anti-tank rifles were falling from use. and in the LS ancl
later the German annics they began to he replaced by shoulder-I-ired
rocket launchers. The British Commonwealth armies went dcl\\11 their
mv11 cul-de-sac (sec below); and the USSR and Japan lidded nothing
comparahk. These hi~hly portable weapons providcrl the infantry with
the protection they needed. and led lo new small unit AT tactics. Thc-y did
not replace come1nional AT gu11s, being considered supplementary
weapons of opportunity; yet although their range an<l lethality \\'ere
limited, they went a lung way to transfo1111 the tank/ infantry balance in
the latter's favour. particularly i11 the West i11 194-J/-l-[>. The impnrlance of
dose-attack , ..capons such as hand mines and AT rifle grenaclcs did not
diminish, \\ith some countrie:s lidding new designs.
It W<Ls realized that effective AT tactics required mobility equal to that
of tanks, and more- AT guns were mounted on full -tracked ('ha..,sis; in a
logical conclusion. it \Vas also realized that the best tank-killers were
other tanks. The necessity of making AT defences as deep as possible,
maintaining mobile AT reserves, and utilizing tanks and dedicated tank
destroyers was appreciated. \Vhile warfare had ben>me 11101-e mobile,
when time permitted an army in the defence prepared strong AT
positions protected by extensive- obstacle systems and minefields. The
Red Army made extensivt' usc;- of AT strongpoints, as did the \Vehrmacht
after the tide of suffess turned. !\fore anille1-y was provided with AT
ammu11ition, as were light AA guns.
AJter J 943 large German tank ulknsives were seldom seen, all(l only
occasionally possible after lll<~jor efforts lo m<L'is forces: the.Japanese never
employed armour on a large scale. The Allies' ahility to produce lanks
and field large armour for111atio11.s i11neased. Because Axis tank allack.s
largely ceased apart from small scale operations and counter-attacks, the
importance of small unit AT weapons and tactics increased. Because of
the ability of tanks to pt"11etrnte deeply. even in local counter-attacks.
the need to prm;de artillery unils and other rear eleme1w; with AT
protection was realized.

Tank-hunter teams
\lost armies c-mployed tank-hunter teams, and their use incrc-ased as the
war progressed and more lethal portable AT weapons bc.: rame aYailable.
Their organization was usually left up to indh;dual units. though sonw
experiments had bc-c-n undertaken and recommendations were- made.
Units often developed their own tactics. and the terrain remained a
governing factor. A hunter team might consist of anything between four
and 12 men, with six to eight !wing typical, lc-d by a junior NCO . A two
26 tu four-man attack element were armed with a sta11d-off weapon such as
an AT rille or shuulder-lircd rocket launcher, or
dose-attack weapons such as AT hand mine s and
grcnad('s . Cnveri ng c lcnwn r.11, of two t n Iour
riflemen armed with hand, rille aml smoke
grenades backed up the attack element, protefling
them againsl accompanying enemy infan1ry. Often
a two-man automatic rille 111 light machine gun
team was in cl ude d for support.
Hunter learns were deployed forward of the
main line of resistance, especially i11 dose terrain,
lo ambush advancing tanks. Other teams were
held in readiness bv front line and immc<liate
reserve sub-uniLs to attack penetrating tanks,
and others could be held deeper in the rear to
ambush or intercept tanks. They were cspeciallv
useful i11 forests and built-up are<L"i where good
cover anrl concealment were available. and where
tanks were rcstrinc<l to predictable routes and
forced to 1110\'e slowlv. ldeallv teams would he
co-ordinated with other friendly elcnwnts, hut the
nature of combat anrl the scarcitv of tactical
radius often precluded this. 1 Iunter teams might
The ultimate mobility for an also be used offensively, by infthrating enemy lines and attacking tank
Infantry AT weapon was to be 'laagers' and assc111hly areas.
portable by an Infantryman over Ideallv a hunte r team would ambush a tank - let it come to them -
any terrain. In this staged shot
h111 often they had 10 intercept or pursue their quarry. Poor visibility
a US bazooka crew 'engage'
a Panther PzKw V Ausf A with (night, fog. rain) was preferred, hul cn11di1io11s could not he waited
the 2.361n M1A1 rocket upon. Smoke grenades might be used to blind the crew and/ or screen
launcher, whose light weight the attack clclll('Tlt's approach . The c<wcring element might deliver the
and handy size made it easy smuke, distract the tank with s111;1ll arms lirt". and tn);{age enemy
to manoeuvre into a favourable
infantry. a s would the machine gun new. If using a stand-off \\L'apon the
firing position - unlike that
chosen by this photographer for attack clement would mmc in as close as pr;Ktical. to I 00 yards or less:
his reconstructed drama: facing ii using clusc-attack weapons they would have to attack the tank directly,
the Panther's massive, sloped at zero range.
frontal armour, and inviting fire Tanks were attackc<l from th<' rear qua<lrant if possible. Even ,.,;th the
from Its co-axial and bow
more pm,Trful portable AT weapons flank and rear shots were usually
machine guns.
Hecessary to kill a tank. The use of hullter teams was hampered by
normal tank ladies nf seldom operating alone or without infantry
support. Such a11 ambush was often a11 immediate action without
specific organization or pla1ming; small groups of i11fa11trv simply
attackc<l ranks with whatever was available when the oppornmity
presented itself. This \\'as partintlarly true utjapanese and Soviet troops.
who might 'swarm' tanks, accepting het\} losses in the hope of
<lcstrming this high \'al11e target.

SPECIFIC WEAPONS & TACTICS


Where AT guns are discussed mHler the national sections below, their
theoretical maximum range is omitted. l :ndcr combat conditions the
greatest effective range, regardless of calibre. was seldom beyond I.OOO
to 1,400 yards. and oflen mu c h less. 27
The US 37mm M3A 1 gun was
the mainstay of American AT
defence untll 1943, when It
began to be replaced by the
57mm M1. The 37mm often
remained In use In Infantry
battalion AT platoons, especially
In the Pacific; It was easily
manhandled over rough terrain
Into positions allowing it to
engage pillboxes and caves.
This gun In Tunisia is protected
by a rock sangar.

United States
Bef(ire tlw war America was lean 011 infantry AT weapons, though its
doctrine wa" hasirallv snllnd. Besidf's infantrv AT elements. the Field
Anillery was responsible for a11ti-ta11k ddetu e; they put little effort into
Spigot-type grenade launchers, it. however. taking the view that their fr'w AT guns \Vere Lo protect the
over which the hollow shaft of artillery and 11ot thl' di\'ision as a whole. Aht'r testing in pre-war
a grenade fitted, were adopted
m~moell\Tes the fa11k Destruver Force was established in November
by the US, Germany and Japan;
this is the US M7 for use on a
l ~H l. and all existing di\'isional AT baualions were re-designated TD
Garand M1 rifle. It required the ha1talin11s. In a period of exaggerated tlar of Cennan armour. 220
standard gas valve screw plug to baLtal ions were ordered tu be established. A more realistic j udgeme11L of
be replaced, and was secured to the actual threat, and Germany's forced shift to a defensive posture, saw
the bayonet lug (llke many other
only I Of) bat1alio11s organizt'd, and '.~!) nf thts< W('n lll'\'C'I" deplnvect
launchers). The further down the
launcher the grenade's finned,
overst'as: some Wl'rl' convened into other tYpes ol' unit. About half ol
tube-like tall boom was pushed, the hallalions used halftrack-mmmtcd (later fully tracked) guns, and the
the greater the range. An oddity others halhrack-towcd guns .
of the M7 launcher was that The basic i11fa11tn AT weapon was the :l7m111 ~UAl AT gun first lidded
the rifle could not be fired semi-
in I~lclO: this was a copy of llw Ccrman '.~. 7cm Pal\. '.~:\/ :~6. A good weapon
automatic while It was attached;
at the end of the war this
when adopted, hy 19-l l it ,.,as outdated: prn<luction ceased in mid-I ~14'.)
drawback was ellmlnated by r,
when the 7111111 w;L'i adupted, though the :nmm often remained in use by
the issue of the M7A1 battalion AT platoons, <'specially in the Pacific. It w;t'i prmidcd with AP,
AP< :. I IE. and canistcr ammunition, and fired I !1 to
~() rounds per minute: AP shot could penetrate
only '.~llmm at ;,oo yards with a right-angled
impart, though APC achieved !II mm under the
sa111e comlitirnts. It required a crew ul' six, a11d wa.s
tnwcd bv a Y:-tnn or 1-ton truck.
Tht' !J7mm I\[ I was a copy ol the British h-pdr
\> \lk II modified for Arnt'rica11 pruductiu11; the
later l\.llAI and \l!A~ had i111prnved trawrse
gear. It could I ire AP and APC rounds at I~ 10
Enprn. had a te11-ma11 crew. and was lowed by a
I-ton or I !0-ton truck. Even with AP penetration
of 7~~mm at I ,OOO vards and '.ltr. it Lou \:as soo11
;

28 inadequate for European sen'icc: a replau..me11t


was sought, h111 none was lid<lcd because of
the abu11thu1cc. ol tanks and tank clestroytrs. Tlw
'.~in tv15 Ar gun. issued to some towed TD
battalions, was a modifi('d AA gun on a l O!">mm
howitzer carriage.
In the Army an AT platoon with three :nm111 or
57mm J.,'llllS was organic to the infant17 battalion's
HQ company. The 1eginwntal AT company had
three three-gun platoons, usually 57mm. L11lik.e
those of most contemporary armies, the US
division did not possess an organic- AT unit; but
a tank d(stroycr battalion \\as habitually attached
at this level (except in tht' Pacific). with ~6 x :~in
or 76mm gun self~prupelled tank destroyt'. rs,
organized in three companies each with three
four-gun platoons.
The only other AT ,..eapo11 in use was 1he
tvl9A I rifle grenade, a spigot type. The 1941 M~>
had been copied from the Gt'rman ( ;( ;; p40 and
lacked a nose cone providing stand-off delo11atio11;
to make mallcrs worse, the fuse was fitted to the
nose rather than the base, further hampering the
shaped-charge effect. It was withdrawn in fan>tir
of the I ~H2 l\19A 1 with a nose cone a11d has('-
detonating fuse. which penetrated :1 to 4in
(75-lOOmm) uf ar111uur. Fired from lhe \11 rifle
it had a range of about 28!> yar<ls. and from the
~H carbine, 18!> yards. R."lngc could he increased
hy '.\0-:)0 per n .11t bv the use of a booster cartridge
('vitamin pill') inserte d in tlw muzzle- of Lhl' launcher tube: this was not The M9A1, and other rlfte-
used wilh the carbine, tn avoid damage from the greater concussion. launched AT grenades, could be
launched from the M1 rifte with
Until a grenade lau11cher became available for the semi-autrnnatic \11
an M7 launcher, the M1903 rlfte
ritlc in late 194:~ squads used a bolt-action Springfidd J\J 1903 rifle with an M1 launcher, the M1917
for grenade lau11chi11g. Initially there was one l;1unchcr per squad, rifle with an M2 launcher, and
hut by 1944 Lhc Army was issuing two or Lhrcc, and the \farines one to from an M1 carbine with an MB
even rifleman . launcher. More often than not
this HEAT grenade was used
The mainstay inlantry AT weapon was the 2.'.\11in rocket launcher
against field fortifications,
or 'bazooka'. Tht ba1.ooka was lighl, simple to operate, and quick an<l buildings or even personnel.
inexpensive to produce. Most importantly, it was effC<:tivc: and just as
significant as its main role was its ability to knock out pillboxes.
The Army allt>LLcd 112 bazookas to an i11fa11t17 n.:giment, 558 Lo a
cli\isinn; infantry battalions Wl'r<' iss11e<l 29. hut only five to each of their
three rille companies. The remainder \Vere assigne<l to hcadq11aners,
artillery, and support units throughout the division. to provide AT
<lcfencc. Adrlitional ha1ookas could he borrowed from the haualiou HQ
and )wavy weapons compauies.
The L:S l\farincs added l 3~ bazookas to their divisional establish111e11t
in .July 1942, w ith H per regiment. In April 194:~ the nurnhcrs were
increased to 24~~ in a division and f>3 per regiment. Like the Army, the
rvlari11es at first provided bazookas to service units; however, i11 !\lay l Y44
this policy was reversed an<l bazookas were reduced to 172 per <li\ision,
with-! ~{ per regiment, owing to the limited.Japanese armour threat. 29
The 2.361n M1A1 bazooka and
eartler M1 (note the charactertstlc
wooden shoulder stock) required
the gunner to wear face and
hand protection to prevent Injury
fTom the unconsumed propellant
as the rocket left the muzzle.
Rather than a gas mask, as
here, gunners normally wore
11 pair of goggles with a small
facemask, though protection
was often dispensed with In
combat. The later M9 bazooka
did not require such protection
because of Its longer tube and
improved propellant.

The ftrs1 haznokas were shipped to thl' Rritish i11 !\orth Africa, and tn
the Sovit't U11io11. Tht' tiOO delive1ed to the British in September HH~
were tested and deemed unsuitl'd for desert \'>'arfarc: it was reasoned
that attacking infontrynw11 could not approach (~cnnan armour due to
the lark ol co11ceal111e11t i11 the desert. The bazooka's value as a defensive
weapon was apparc11tly ig-11orecl, and the British place<l 1hcm in storag-c.
}-\\-contrast. the Red Army saw their value immedi a tely. an<l the first of
thein,; lo be lost in combat p10\'ided the model for the (~ennan 8.8cm
Raketen panzerbl'tchse or 'Pattzcrschrcck ( 'armour ttTror' ).
The \f I bazooka sa\\" its first American use in No\'cmbcr 1942 in
'.'\orth Africa a11d on Tarawa; weighing 13.1 lh, it is recognizable by its
wooden shoulder stock and two pistol grips. The tvl I A 1 was standardized
in .J11lv 19-B, though it was not fielded for some months; it eliminated
The 2.36in M9 and M9A 1 the forward hanclgrip and had an improved electrical ignition svstem.
bazookas, Introduced in late Both nH><lels had a 2:-10-yar<l maxim11m range. rate nf tire of 4 tn :irpm.
1943, could be broken down and were :l-L'Jin (I .'.~:-1111) long. The :'vl~l was sta11dardi1e d in September
into two sections for transport,
l ~1-l~ at tlw rnp1es1 of the Airborne Command. and began to be fielded
or stowed In a canvas bag for
parachute jumping. The fact
in micl-10+1. This had a longer lilin (l.:i:lm) t11bc . increasing its
that It could be disassembled accuracy and ra nge to :mo yards, and 111on reliabk rockets. The tube
allowed It a longer tube to could be bn1ke11 down into Lwo sections for ease of transport. The \19A l
increase its range over the diffrred only in an improved barrd-coupling latch ; both models
M1A1. The M18 was Identical,
wcighc<l E>.X71h (7.1 ~l kilog rammes). Total production was 476.(i~H. of
but had an aluminium rather
than a steel tube, to reduce
which ~i7.81 ~)were the \.19Al model.
weight and prevent rust; few T he l\.ffi HEAT roc ket had a pointed nosl', six lo ng black-like tailfins,
saw service in World War II. and could pemtrate :)in (71imm) of armour at :~o ' impact angle and
-1. 7i11 (JI Omm ) al 90".
l lowcvcr, malfunctions wcn:
so frequent Lhat its use was
suspended in .\fay 194~ .
The impro\'cd \16A I / A2
quickly arrived. and the
l\.II Al and l\lfl laimdwrs
could not fin \f() rockets.
30 I I 11 A11g11sl I ~l4:) the rvttiA;~
How the bazooka got Its name
The 2.36in AT rocket launcher is universally known as the 'bazooka', a nickname
which has become generic. In 1941 the US Army developed a large shaped charge
AT rifle grenade. the M10; unfortunately, it was too heavy to fire from a rifle without
damage, or even from a launcher on a .50cal machine gun. That same year the Army
purchased a number of British 2in AA rockets for testing. In 1942, 2nd Lt Edward
G.Uhl fitted M10 warheads to modified copies of the rocket motors. A 60mm steel
tube was fitted with two handgrips, a shoulder stock, rudimentary sights. and a
simple electrical firing system. The result was the 2.36in T1 AT rocket launcher. Major
Zeb Hastings noted the weapon's similarity to an amusing musical instrument called
the 'bazooka' used in his act by radio comedian and musician Bob Bums, the
Arkansas Traveler', and the nickname stuck. While under development the bazooka
was code-named 'the Whip'; it was also called the 'stovepipe', for obvious reasons.

rocket was adopted; this had a round nose to lower the angk of efkctin.
impact. a short cylindrical tin assembly with four vanes for improved
stability, and <Ill improved cone-liner in the shaped charge warhead,
which inneased penetration by ~{() per cent. In I Y44 the t'vl 10 \VP rocket
was approved.
* * *
US a11ti-ta11k doctrine emphasized combat outposts with some battalion
AT guns temporally attached. \lost baualio11 guns were placed near the
main Jim of resistanc(' with frw if any provided co the reserve, and thus
there was little depth of dt'l(~ nce. Regimental AT guns were positioned
to the rear of lhe forward banalions. or held in readiness to occupy
alternate positions covering the main line or to support counter-attacks.
If non-regimental AT guns were attached, usually in the form of tank The halftrack-mounted 75mm
destroyer companies. they rould be positioned to the rear to provide Gun Motor Carriage M3, as used
more depth, as well as being attached to the screening force. by the earty US Tank Destroyer
The main tasks of illl AT defe11re were the organization or the defence Fon:e battallons. This example
Is in British service In Italy, ftring
of the main line of resistance and the formation of counter-attack units
in a supplementary fteld artillery
held in reserve . The latter was the primary function of tank destroyer role - It proved only marginally
units. Anti-tank weapons were not equally distributed across the effective for Its Intended minion.
front: reconnaissance was
con<luctcd to <letcrmine
their deployment based 011
the following criteria of
1ising p1i01ity: (I) routes of
advance that man-made
and natural obstacles made
impractical for tanks; (2)
areas that could be inter-
dicted hy passnc AT
defencf'; and (:~) zones that
had to be covered by AT
weapons ancl mines to
block am1our. Efforts \.HT('
made to channel tanks into
the third zone in order to
engage them.
The m~~jo1 flaw in
thr employment of' rank 31
dcslroycr units was that
more often than not no
(~crma11 tank thre<'\1 was
immediately present. To
cmplov tank destroyers
gainfully they were there-
fore alloued Lo support
infantrv units as assault
guns, ot'tcn with a company
to each regiment, a
platoon to each hattalion.
and a two-gun section 10
each rifle company. If a
m;~jor C~<'rman tank attack
did de\'elop, the division's
attached TD battalion was
1h11s too widely dispersed
lo co11entrat.f" and conduct
a counter-attack. Lack of
US 57mm M1 AT gun partly time, and often inadc<ptatc roads usually choked with support vehicle
protected by a building corner - colum11s. prcvc11tccl the unit from cu11centrating rapidlv in the
a common means of hastily
ncnssan area. Tanks were found to he more effeelin tank-killers; and
positioning a gun in a builtup
area. Often rubble and debris
tht' last tank rlcstrnvcr unit was inactivated in :'\nvcmlwr 1~146.
would be piled around the In the Pacific the Japanese tank threat was minimal. and relatively
exposed parts of the gun, more light AT guns wer<' a<lt'qnate for dealing with Lhe small numher
for concealment than cover. c11c0t11ll<'l't'd. The .Japanese frequently employerl dug-i11 Lanks as st;itic
pillboxes. or committed them pitnmcal in s111all 11u111bt'rs. \Vhen large
numhers were cmplnyerl in countcr-auack.o; they were often accompanied
by inadequate 1wmlwrs of infantry. and were frequently committed to
COlllllt'r-attack a landing force too late, by which time AT guns.
halftrac k-mn11nted guns anrl tanks were alrt'ady ashore. The US units
11s11all\' made short work of the ohsnlcsccnt .Japanese tanks with barrages
from bazookas, AT guns and artillery; often few CS tanks were even
present 011 these occasions. The first .Japanese tank allack on
(;uadakanal was dekated by a frw :~innn AT g11ns (eight tanb knc)('kt'd
uul). a 75111111 halftrack-mou1ned gun (one Lank). and 75mm hmvilzers
(three tanks); \farinc light tanks nnlv showed up in time to mop up the
ern:my i11fa11Ln. The largt'st tank ha11k in the Pacilic saw a few \1a1ine
tank.'i, AT guns. bazookas and artillery destrnv '..!4 ol' '.~7 allacking
.Japanese tanks 011 Saipa11.
There were instances when l'S troops were ove1n111 hy ( ;crman tanks,
in Tunisia in ,,;nter 1942 / 4'.~ and early in the Bault of the Bulge in
lkccmhcr I ~H L hut for the most part t :s forces possessed overwhelming
numbers of' hazooLL'\, AT guns. tanks, Lank destroyers. artillery. and air
support, dt:'feating most armour ~L'isaulL" easily.

British Commonwealth
Britain entered the war with the 2-pdr ( 40mm) T\lk I quick-firing gun
adopted in 1~l'.)8 . Its design was 11n11s11al in that when it went into action
its wheels were removed and three legs spread to prmide a stable mount
wilh a '.\fiff' traverse. IL weighed twice as much as its German 37mm
32 f11111ti11 1ml 0 11 pag1' 4/J
colllllerpan. The British emisioned it engaging tanks from well-
concealc<l prepared positions. an<l mobility was not an issue. This soon
prove<l an error; speed of emplacement and displacement wa<> essenlial,
and its high prolile was dillicult to conceal, especially in the North
Afiican desert. Its maximum effective range \.Vas 600 yards and it could
penetrate r,omm of an11our, which soon proved inadequate; its five-man
crew could crack off 20 lo 22rpm, but it was provided only with AP-tracer
ammunition. thus limiting its rnlc. It was normally transported on rhe
back of a I Y:>-ton l\.f orris truck or 'portce'. Ramps allowed it to bC' oil~
loaded for ground tirini.;. the preferred method. but it could be llred
from I he truck bed. It could also he towed by a Y.-ton trnck or full-tracked
Uninrsal Caffie!'.
Large numbers of 2-pdrs were lost in France in 1940: and while the
6-pdr (E'>7mm) gun existed in prototype. production of tlw 2-pdr had to
continue as a stopgap in view of the desperate need for AT weapons. A
number of Swedish-made :~7mm m/'.H Bofurs guns were intercepted en
route to Sudan i11 1940 an<l impressed into service in Africa as rhe \lk I.
Provided \Vith AP-trace1 and l IE ammunition, they were only effective
up to 400 yards, but weighed less than half a~ much as the '.!-pounder.
Cerman mountain units, Poland. Denmark and Finland also 1tse<l the
same gun.
The fi-pdr ivtk I was delivert:d in late 1941. lo be quickly followed by
the shorter harrcllc<l ~Ik TI, anrl by rhc \fk IV \\ith a I fiin-longer barrel.
They could be ponccd on a I Y.-ton lorry or. more commonly, lowed hy
Moblllty was essentlal for AT a tracked carrier. The fi..pdr (see above under the basically identical LS
guns. The British made wide 57mm) was a wcll-<lcsigncd, low profile weapon .
use of the 'portee' concept,
In !\lay 1942 a much larger 17-pdr nin) AT gun was approved for
transporting 2-pdr and 6-pdr guns
aboard a truck. While the gun senicc, the first reaching the Tunisian from ('.jury rigged' on 2[>-pdr
could be tired from the truck gun-howitzer carriag-cs) late in 1942,just in time to greet the first PzKw
bed, steel ramps were provided VI Tiger t;mks deployed lhne. \Veighing l ,8~~1b and with a I 65.4!1i11
to dismount the gun for ground harrcl, it tired an APC round which could pe1wtrate I 09mm ( 4.36i11) of
tire. This la a 6-pdr Mk II on a
1 '/1-ton lorry; the side shields
armour at I .OOO yards at ~W. an<l an HE ro11nrl with a rang<' of I 0,000
could also be used when in a yards. A.n APDS ('disposable sabot') round with a tungsten carbide
ground position, but seldom were. penetrator, which could pierce 231mm (9.24in) of armour at l.000
yards and :\O", reached the front in August 1944. (This
excellent gun was also 111odified for mounting in the
British 'Firefly' Sherman tank variant. eventually
J.,ri,ing each tank troop in Nonh-\\:'est
Europe one lank that had a chance
against the Pamher and Tiger.)
The Boys 0.55in ~lk J bolt
action AT rifle was fed hv
a five-round magazine: it
weighed ;~6lh and was 64in
long. Adopted in 19'.\6, by
1940 it was obsolete, being
able 10 pcnt'trate nnly
20mm of armour at ~WO
yards. Unpopular for its
savage recoil, weight and
awhvardness, it was repla<:ed
as the rifle platoon AT 41
France, 1939-40: a British crew
man a French 25mm Mle 1934,
which the Tommies called the
'Hotchkiss'. Besides helping to
meet the BEF's shortage of AT
guns, this was a llmlted effort
at weapons standardization with
the French. Assigned to brigade
AT companies, the 25mm was
found to be a very poor weapon,
only barely able to defeat
the German PzKw I light tank;
penetration and range were little
better than those of an AT rifle,
and It was too flimsy for truck
towing (thus necessitating the Wt'apon in 19-t~ by the PIA"I: hut it remained in senicc on va1ious light
British Army's 'portee' concept). AFVs. A few hundred were employed by Finland. and they were also
These weapons were gratefully prnvickd to China by the LISA.
abandoned In France before
The l'vlk I Projector, Infantry. Anti-Tank (PIAT- pronounced 'pee-at')
Dunkirk.
saw its first combat with Canadian troops in Sicily in .July 194'.t The PIAT
was a spigot-type clisd1arger; and \Vhile iL;; rnund was effective, the
launcher had some unique drawbacks. At ~I. ilb it was heavy. but it was
only :~9in long. Its range against tanks was 100 yards: the '.~.:"1in HEAT
bomb could penetrate 4in ( lOOmm) of' annour. but it could hit building-
size targets at 3~>0 yards and became prized as a 'hunker-buster'. The
projcnilc was launched by a powerful spring driving a rod into its tail
and igniting a propcllam cartridge. Unlike bazuoka-L\-pe weapons, the
PJAT itself had no hack-httst: it could he fired from inside a building,
and threv. up 110 signature of smoke and dust. l\.Iountcd on a monopod.
it was shoulder-fired. but there was a difficult knack to using it. Like the
Boys. one PIAT was issued to each rifle platoon headquarters; some
11 !i,000 were produced. 3
The ~o . 68 AT rifle grenade was the first British wcao11 tu emluy the
shaped-charge principle. Fielded in the summer of 1940, at just und<:r
2lh this was the heaviest rifle grenade employed in \Vorld \Var II. It was
!ired from a 2.:-lin cup discharger. and was fin-stabilized. The warhead
had a poorly designed ca\'il}', lacking any fonn of stand-off. and ito; flat
nose degraded it."i accuracy. Regardless of its poor d esign. its abilitv to
)Jt'lle trate armour was considered remarkable in 1940. It ''"~L"i withdrawn
from scnice when the PIAT was issued.
Early in the wat' an anti-tank school was established and operated bv ex-
International Brigade membt'rs \\~th combat experience from the Spanish
Ci\il \Var. A pamphlet, Tank Huntin!{tmd Drstrurtirm, gave ad\ice which wa.'i
relevant to a desperate last-ditch gucrrilla campaign. but hardly for more
conventional scenarios. 111 the true summer 1940 spirit of 'You can ah"ays
take one with you ... '. it <lescdhed tank-hunting a.'i a sport akin to big game
hunting. and recommended it for 'men who have bravery. rt'suurce and
determination. \Vhile a few expedie nt weapons were recommended, the
main tank-hunting weapons presnihed were hand grenades, of which the
British e-mployed a \\ide varie ty. 111 the abse11ce of anything like enough AT
guns, they had lilllc else with which to face the expe cted (~cnnan i1w,L-;io11.
All re lied on blast dfeC"t, an<l none possessed a shaped cha1-g-c; they were
ineHectin against all hut the lightest tanks aftt'r 1940, but were rt'Lained to
blow off tank tracks or for demolition and wall-breaching:
42 3 See Elite 122, World Wat 11 lnfantty Tactics. Company & Battalion
The 0.551n Mk 1 Boys AT rifle
saw widespread use In British
Mogat1ne cat.eh Commonwealth armies; this
Ej'-'Ctor !!loo round muzzle brake Is found
i 5"ret.y catch on British-made rlftes. The
/
Canadian-made Mk 1 had a flat
rectangular muzzle brake with
vent holes In the edges; it also
had a carrying handle, which
the British model lacked. The
Bova also saw llmlted use by
US Marine Raiders and Army
p,5t_,;;l grip Rangers, as well as by the
( troggrrguorci) Chinese.

;Vo. 71 or 'lhnmo.\ jlmh /(l}'llfld1" ~Y.lh, I 0-1 !1 yarrls range; impact fuse
armed by 'Allways' system - safety pin withdrawn in flight by umeeling
of weighted tape. Used in 1940-41, withdrawn, then reissued in 194'.\
for demo Ii t inns.
No. 74 .~T or \lil'k1, h1J111h ~ Ydh, glass sphert' with handle, lilied with
nitrogelatin (often mistakenly called nitroglycerin) and thickly covered
\\.'ith adhesive-soaked cloth. carrit'd in discardahle metal cover. After
sakty pin removed, grenade thrown or placed by hand; release of hand
grip initiated 5-second time fuse. \ery unpopular, but saw limited use
19!0-43; after 194-0 most were passed on 10 1lw French Resistann.
No. 75 'Hawkin!> KH'nwldmi111' 2 Y. lb, tin canister; initiated by various
fuses, it could he used as grenade or (more commo11ly) lanchnine.
as well as for wall-bn-aching. Reliable dt\;ce, also used by US fm-ces; in
use l ~H2-55 .
.Vo.82 '(;amnum grnwd1' Elasticated cloth hag in which varied amounts
of plastic explosive were placed as appropriate fort he target; i11itiated by
'Allways' fuse (~cc ;\u.7'.~ abu\e). 111 use 1Y4~-54.

To load the PIAT, the No.2


Inserted the bomb Into the open
top of the firing tray. It needed
a heavy four-finger trigger pull;
there was a noticeable 'hang
fire' as the massive spring
driving the firing rod caused the
PIAT to Jerk forward, and then
the propellant blast caused a
recoil. This combination could
loosen the flrer'a grip, and If he
released the trigger too soon the
discharge would fall to re-cock
the 2001b spring. In such caus
it took a man's whole body
strength to twist the housing
while forcing the spring back
with his feet braced on the
butt; trying to perform this trick
In battle while staying under
cover was quite challenging.
(Reconstruction; photo Simon
Pugh-Jones) 43
The 2-pdr anti-tank g-tm was first assigned to the di,isinnal AT regiment.
a battalion-size Royal Artillery uuiL; these had four batteries of 12 guns
each. A battery was attached to each divisional brigade , consis1ing of
three four-gun troops, one attached to each i11fa11try battaliuu. The
~-pdrs were replaced with ~pdrs in 1942, and during 1944-45 batteries
gradually achieved one troop with 6-pdr~ and rwo \\ith the much
superior 17-pclr gun. The number of AT guns a\ailabk to a di\'isio11
was inadequate. and in 1942 each infantry baualim1 's HQ company
additionally received a platoon of six 2-pdrs, later 6-pmmdcrs.
All loo often the four '.!-pdrs supporting a11 i11fa11t11 battalion were
employed in a straight line across the defensi\'e front. allov<ing them only
fromal shots at tanks they could not defeat. This made them easier to
detect - \\'hen one was spotted the others were tu be found immediately
The No.68 rlfte-launched AT lo il'i flanks. Whether in desert or woo<llan<l, it was frnm<l that tlwy had
grenade, and the 2.51n cup lo he employed in staggered linC's \\ith one or morC' positioned to achieve
discharger fitted to the muzzle
side shots.
of an SMLE; the tin label
reminds the firer to pull the The British began the war with a doctrine specifying a continuous
safety pin before Inserting It. front line protected by an anti-tank obstacle. and the dictate 'Troops
The grenade's original paint allotted to the deft~ nre of a localitv must deknd it to the e nd without a
finish Is dark buff, with a red thought of,.,.ithdrawal...' Positions were to ht' pland in depth. In North
'fllllng stripe' overlapping the
Afiica this docrrinc was largelv rt'placed by a much more realistic 'box
threads of the screw-on cap,
above green/black/green concept ol in-depth stro11gpoi11ts on tank-proof terrain protected by
stripes identifying the filling minefields and screened bv outposts and patrols.
as pentollte, the preferred lkcause of the inadequacies and insufficie nt number of '.l-pdr guns,
shaped-charge explosive.
field a rtillery was heavily employed in '.\Jonh Africa lo supplemelll them.
(Photo Richard Hook)
The 2-pdrs were directed not to engage tanks until within 800 vards, and
closer in wooded terrain . Opening lire at liOO yards was fou11d to be ton
close, since tank machine guns were then within eflective range. At 800
yards AT guns were as an:urate as at 600 , while machine g-uns were less
accurate and unable to penetrate gun shields. Th e liekl artillerys '.!5-pdr
gun-howitzer had the advantage of 3G0 tra\'erse and a 20rpm rate of fire
with AP rounds; 25-pdrs opened fire within I .OOO yards. hut were
marginal tank-killers except at short range .
The 2-pdr gLms were also positioned behind the front line to protect
artillery reginwnt.<>, and their AT tires were integrared. The 2-pdrs might
he positioned 100 to '.WO yards to the tlank of the artilkrv, or if all-round
protection was necessary, as much as 500 to 1,000 ya rds to the front and
flanks. The use of 25-pdrs as AT guns also provided depth to the anti-
tank defence . As more 6-pdr a11d he<l\ier g-tms became available, along
with sdl~prope lled AT guns. the reliance 011 artillery faded. Guns were
The No.74 ST ('sticky type') AT positioned to conce ntrate tires, as Cennan tanks usually attacked in a
grenade. On this example, dated mass which could not be engage d effectively by single guns.
December 1942, the adhesive
In Burma and o ther jungle areas Japa nese tanks we re largely
coating has dried out to a
rc~trine<l to roads and Commonwealth force s concentrated AT g1111s
consistency llke dark brown
wood; the handgrlp and safety along the roads in great depth. A ddinite forward line of the AT
release are of black bakelite and defence was specified, as was a rear line beyond which tanks wert: not
bare metal respectively. This allmved to pass.
was one of a box full of 'sticky Rifle platoons relied on their single Boys AT rifle ur PL\T and various
bombs' recovered recently in
AT hand grenades. Expedient m eans of attackin!o{ tanks were \\idely
Normandy, where they were
presumably burled by the encouraged early in the war, hut these proved to be only marginally
Maquis before D-Day. effective. Camouflage and dispersed deployment were considered a key
44 (Photo Richard Hook) factor in AT defence.
Soviet Union
The USSR hegan the war
with the cl!)mm l'vl J 9:W an<l
rvllY'.~7 AT guns fur protivo-
ta nk011a)'a ohormw ('anti-
tank comhat'). These were
rt'lxtrrdled 37mm rvt 19'.\0
an<l ~119:~2 guns, almost
exact copies of the German
PaK 3!">/;~6. the identifying
difference hcing- w1rc-
spoked wheels. In 1Y4 I the
short-barrelled 37mm was
also still i11 use, though it
penetrated only 40tnm ul
armour at 500 yards. Both
calibres fired AP and HE
amrn1111ition. The 4~1111111
rvt 1942 was essentially an
M 1937 with a one-third
longer barrel, increasing its
The British 2-pdr Mk I AT gun velocity and thus pe11etralio11 to 60mm at 500 yards; this was still
weighed 1,8581b, about twice inadequate. but the tvll 942 remained the primary hallalion and
as much as Its US and German
regimental AT gun. A high-velocity round. based on a Cerman design.
37mm counterparts. It could
be fired from Its wheels, but
was introduced in April I !H2: this could penetrate 80mm at 500 yards.
they were normally removed for Apart from improved perwtration the 45mm offered a mon cflcrtive
action and the gun set up on Its HE round than the '.Hmm.
Integral three-legged mounting. Theoretically a platoon with two guns, either '.~7rnm or 45mm, was
Side shields were available, but
allocated to each Iifk battalion, and four 1u- six h'1111S to a regimental AT
seldom used.
halteJ)' In the event insuJJicicnt guns were availahlc to continue equipping
battalion platoons, and they were dropped het1veenjuly 1941 aml.Januarv
194:3. The 15mm also armed divisional AT battalions, each with three
fo11r-g1111 batte1ies. The AT battalion was deleted from the divisio11al
establishment in July 1941, but restored in Januaq 1942. Dming that
period the only AT guns were those assignc<l to regimental batteries.

The Soviet 45mm M1942 AT


gun partly replaced the 45mm
M1932 as well as 37mm guns.
The 45mm began to be replaced
by the 57mm ZiS-2 in late 1943,
but earlier models remained in
use. Its long barrel coupled with
a new high velocity round made
the 45mm a reasonably effective
weapon for Its calibre. The USSR
was the only country to use
46mm guns. 45
Production of the :Jimm
ZiS-2 beK<lll in 1941, but
it was halted when Soviet
intelli!{ence assessed Germ<m
tank armour as thinner
than had been believed.
Production \Vas resumed
in .June 194:~. with an
improved carriage. \\/ith a
rate of firl' of 20-25 rprn.
i l could penetrate I 4!"unm
at SOO vards: it fired both
high velocity AP and HE
rounds. and had the
The Soviet 14.5mm Degtyarov longest barrel of any gun in this calibre range. The S7mm was lo re pi are
PTRD-41 AT rifle (see also Plate the 4!'unm at divisional lcvd, hut often the 1wcessary prime movers were
F), with a length of 6'hft, was
unavailable, and divisions retained manhandled 4!'Jmm guns. From 194~
actually reasonably light for Its
size at 17.44kg (381b). The barrel
independent AT battalions and brigades were raised.
could be separated from the The standard di\isional artillery piece was the 76.2mm F-22 of 19%
action at the point where the and the improved l 9~~y FS-~nusv gun: the 7G.2mm ZiS-:~ was
assistant gunner's hand rests introch1nd in early 1942. The 76.2mm guns were long-barrelled
In this photo; on the march the
'"capons suited for AT use, and the Cennans employed many captured
No.2 carried the barrel and
the No.1 the action.
F-22s in that role. Tht' Soviets also adopted a massive IOOmm BS-3 AT
gun in 1944.
The Red Army were the war's largest users of anti-tank rifles,
producing some 400,000. Two models were employcd, both of 14.!'>mm
calibre, bipod-mounted. long and heavy. but capable of being broken
dnwn into two sections. The Dcgtyanw PTRD-41 \\'as .<>ingk-shot, holt-
action, 78.74in ( 1966mm) long, and weighed 38lb (I 7.44kg). The
Simonov PTRS-41 was semi-automatic: v~ith a live-round magazine;
its 84.2:-Jill (~OOfonm) length and 46lb (21 kg) weight, coupled with its
complexity and cost, resulte<l in iL-; seeing much less service. The
14.:Jmrn B<12 AP-inccndiary round penetrated '.)5mm of armour at I 00
yards aml 2'.'l111m at SOO, vllhile the tungsten carhi<le-cored BS-41 AP-1
punched through 40mm al 100 yards and '.)Smm at 300.
Both weapons were adopted in August 1~H1, and a platoon of six was
added to the rifle regiment establishment. They saw their first romhat
use only in November 1941, and the regimental scale was increased to a
company of three platoons, each with three squads. each with three
rifles - a total of '27 weapons. An AT rifle company was a<lded to the rifle
battalion in .July 1~M2. with two platoons of four squads (I 6 rifles). as
wdl as a four-platoon company in the divisional AT battalion (~(-) ritks).
In .January l Y4'.1 the hatralion company was reduced to a nine-ritk
platoon. AT rifks wert also distributed to many other types of units.
Although they were soon obsolete, AT titles remained in Soviet use
throughout the war. Ta<.:tics emphasized sick ;mcl n:M attack, as well as
use against the many light AFVs encountered on the battlefield.
With the acquisition of R,EJOO US 2.:36in ~11 bazookas through Lend-
Lease in l 942. the capture of various ( ~crman rocket launchers in 194:~.
and their own vigorous Katyusha artillery rocket programme, it is
surprising that the Soviet.;; <lid not develop ;m effective shoulder-fired
46 AT r<Kket launcher to replace the obsolete, heavy, awkwarcl and costly
AT rifles. They did rnakl' l'Xlt'nsive use of captured Panzerl'austs: a11d
B1~tai11 prmi<led :'.~WO Boys AT rifles and J ,OOO PlAT'i.
111 194 l the Soviets ticlded an unusual weapon known as the
am/mlmru'I ('ampoule pn~jector'), \Vith six assigned to the rille regiment's
'anti-tank morLar platoon. This was a short l 25mm tuhe on a four-
legge<l mount firing a glass sphere filled with.jellied petrnl./gasnlirw to a
range of 2!>0 yards: it had a new of three men. Inaccurate and largely
ineffective against tanks. it was withdrawn in late l~H2. The use of
man-portable llamethrowers against tanks \Vas common. however.
The VPCS-41 r\T rifle grenade was a heavy, fin-stabilized rod-type
grenade, requiring nu separate launcher allad1ment for the rifle. Its
poorly designed shaped charge lacked sufficient stand-nff and had an
almost flat Hose, ckgra<ling its accuracy. It \\'as phased out in about l 943
due to its short !">0 to /f, yard range. limited armour penetration, and
damaging cffrct on rifles.
The Smict" employed three AT stick hand grenades. These were
heavy, about 2Ytlb, limiting throwing range to about 15 or 20 yards. All
were stabilizt<l hy deployable ribbon <lrogucs . The RPG-40 (rudrnaya
/nvtihotankml)'i p:mnalo, 'hand anti-tank grenade') was a blast grenade
penetrating 20 to 2fm11n of' stet'!; it \vas more effective against pillboxes
than armour. The RPC-42 used a shaped charge to penetrate 7!'mm; A staged photo of Red Army
AT rifle crew taking on a PzKw
an<l the RPC-fi was a nn1ch improved design introduced in 1944, with Ill. Note that both men carry the
lOOmm penetration. Apart from these grenades, 't\folotov cocktails' haversacks containing 20 rounds
were produced in their millions, and sclf~igni1ing kits were provided to of 14.!Smm AP-1 cartridges.
attach to bottles in the field.
* * *
Soviet AT ddC:nces cmphasizc<l depth: ~-:~km in
1941 ( l Y1-l Yi 111 iks), and four times that depth by
the time of the battle of Kursk in mid-1913.
Co-ordination between units, and a strong
mobile AT reserve, were also m;~jor factors. Anti-
tank units were called 'anti-tank artillery' , and
field artillcrv units were also trained to con<luct
I

direct lire 011 armour. Light AT guns were


positioned well forward, hut not beyond tlw
infantry front line, with progressively larger
calibre guns in subsequent lines. Large calibre
guns could be posilione<l forward to cover key
avenues. Anti-tank guns Wf're covered hy infantry
and AT rifles, and \Vere positioned in pairs wilhin
50 yards of each other. Sometimes guns were
positimw<l 100 to 1:10 yards apart along the front.
Camouflage and alternative positions were
heavily cmph<L~ized, and fire was held until tanks
were within 1100 yar<ls at mnst to avoid revealing
positions prematurely. Four guns were often posi-
tioned in a diamond pattern to provide
all-round fire.
Anti-tank guns and artillery were expected to
fire until overrun; lhe <lestruction of large
numbers of tanks \Vas considered a successful
defence even if the guns were lost. The Soviets 47
calculated that 12 x 45mm rounds were necessary to knock out a
tank, whether fired from one gun or several; this allowed for misses
and ddkctcd hits. Typically, one 45mm gun was lost for eve!)'
tank destroyed. The 76.2mm required half the number of rounds to
destroy a tank, and typically knocked out two or three before being
destroyed iL'ielf.
The 'fire sack' was a pre-planned zone into v.hich minefields.
obstacles, and fire would channel armour - a large scale ambush.
Several AT units would be positioned 011 both sides of the kill zone, to
engage the tanks from different directions and ranges. Massed artillery
tires were conct'nlratcd on the zone. and mobile AT guns would attack
it. An AT reserve would be held. lo manoeuvre illlo position to block
escaping tanks even if the enemy changed direction .
Divisional and higher commanders established an AT reserve (j>mlilm-
tankov_v)' rt'Zt>ni}; at division level this was co11stitut<:'d from pan of the AT
battalion and one platoon from each rewmcntal AT hattcry. Tanks and
mobile nhstade dctachrn<:'nts might be included - the latter laid hasty
minefields on enemy tank routes.
The use of AT strongpoints was customary in the summer 194~~
defensive battles. A typical strongpoint engaged in the battle of Kursk
was built '"'ithin a riJle company position : it might co11sist of three or
four 4!lmm AT guns, two or three AT rifle squa<ls, a sapper squad with
demolition charges, a sub-machine gun squad, ancl tank-hunter
The German 3.7cm PaK 35/38
teams with Molotov cocktails and other close-attack weapons . Up to
AT gun was extensively copied
1,iOO mines were lai<l per kilometre ('Vi mi le) of fr on tagc, along by other countries Including
with AT ditches and other obstacles, all covered by pre-planned the US, USSR and Italy, as
artillery cuncen trations. well as being exported to the
At least ten AT rifles were to he committed against a tank platoon. Nether1ands and China. The
shield was usually high, but the
and instructions provide an idea or their t'mployment: ' In all cases
upper portion WH hinged (level
establish secondary firing positions; fire five to ten rounds from one with the loader's helmet top In
position, then move to another. If the e nemy tank is moving in a this photo) and could be dropped
direction unfavourable to you, quickly and inconspiniously occupy forward to lower its profile.
another position to fire
into the sick or rear from
t>O lo I 00 yards.
'Manoeuvring on the
hattlcllcld. force tlw lank
into the lire of another AT
rifle: in those cases when
you arc operating with
other AT rilles, and in a
combat formation v.ith our
own infantry. co-ordinate
your own mission \\ilh that
of your neighbour. \Vhen
supported by grcna<lc and
7vlolotov cocktail throv.ers,
determine their positions
and do not fire in their
direc:tion. If an enemv tank
I

has halted. disable its


48 wt>apons first.'
Germany
Despile all their emphasis on rnohik annourc<l warfare, the \Vehrmacht
entered the \\!ar with marginal anti-tank capabilities. The army was so
oriented toward aggressiveness that anything smacking of cleknce was
\icwc<l \\ith disfavour. 'Arn1011r defence' (Panzcrahwehr) units were
re<lcsignated armour hunter ( Panzerj~:iger) 011 1 April 1940, to play
down their ddensive nature. Anti-tank guns were increasingly mounted
on tracked chassis to improve mobility. This 7 .Scm PaK 40 Is typical
The principal AT gun was the Rheinmetall-Borsig '.). 7un PaK '.~:-, / ~Hi of World War II anti-tank guns:
(Panzerabwehr Kanone. 'armour defence gun', model l~B;) / '.~6). Nine it has a long barrel for high
velocity and range, a muzzle
guns were allotted to the three-platoon regimental AT company and '27
brake to reduce recoil (since
to the di\isional AT baltalion. Copied by many countries, the PaK 3!:"> / 36 the guns were kept as light as
was an excellelll weapon in the mid-1930s, but by 1940 it was obsolescent possible), a shield to protect the
- as acknowkrlgcrl hy its army nickname of '<loorknocker' (/'i"irklo/>/n). crew from tank machine gun fire
Operated by a six-man crew, it originally lired an AP round thal could and fragmentation, rubber tyres
for high-speed towing when
penelrate 40mm al 400 yards: in 1940 Lhe AP . 10 round was introduced,
repositioning, split tralls,
penetrating ;")0111111 at 400 yards. In I !H 1 a massive mun.lc-loaded shaped direct fire optical sights, and
charge 'rod grenade' was de\'eloped to extend tlw gun\ life; this a means of rapid traverse. To
Steilgnmate 4 l had a 1!19111111 (6.36in) warhead which rested outside the be successful and to have any
muzzle. capahle of penetrating l .~Onun of armour \\'ith an effective chance of surviving, AT guns
also needed camouflage and
range of' 200 yards, although much longer ranges could be achieved.
protection. This gun appears
The 5cm PaK '.~8. a scaled-up version of tlw '.t7nn, wa.s fielded in late to have been well camouflaged,
1940 to replace the' 'dnork11orker.' hut supply was slow. \ViLh a good shot though most has been pulled
it could knock 0111 a 1~:H with the AP40 round. which penetrated 8!)mm away to allow the position to be
at :100 yards. while the standard AP penetrated fiOmm at that range . The photographed. The low-profile
gun has been dug into a pit, and
Cennan<> were so badly in need of AT guns that they t'mpluycdjust about
a slit trench dug for the gunner
all captured ordnance in this rnlc, but rn1111bt>rs were still i11suHkient. and loader Immediately beneath
They also huilt several hybrid desii.,'11s mating AT guns tn artillery carriages. the breech. This view illustrates
A further scaling 11p of the PaK '.'H resulted i11 the 7.5cm PaK -l-0, als11 the double, spaced shield typical
lielded in late 1940. This became Lhe main divisional AT gun, hut some of many German AT guns; it
required the use of less steel
were assigned to regimental AT companies as well. Heavy to manhandle.
and reduced weight, while
it nonetheless proved to he an effective weapon. It could knock out must equating to the protective effect
tanks. penetrating lO"m11n at 500 yards vdth standard AP. and 115mm of a solid shield approximately
with AP40. l\fany captured Smiet 76.2mm FS-22 guns were rcrhamlwred one-third thicker.
for Cerman 7 ..~cm and
further modified lor AT
use as the 7.6'1.cm PaK
'.\tl(r). The :~.7ctn , !inn. and
7.5cm were all provided
with HE rounds.
From 1941 the Ccrmans
made limited use of two
Gerlich-type tapered or
'squeeze' bore guns, the
2.8cm (tapering Lo 2nn)
and 4.2cm (actually 4.:'>cm,
tapering to 2.94cm). The
2.8cm sPzB 41 was a small.
wheeled weapon meant to
replace 7.92111111 AT rilles,
and the 4.2cm lePaK 41
was mounted on a '.t7cm 49
carriage. These guns used a special pn1ectilc that
was 'squeezed' down co a smaller calibre when
fired in orrler to achieve a higher velocity. (~uns
and ammunition were expensive to produce - the
rounds required scarce tungsten carbide cores -
and production ceased in 1942. Penetration was Air Bursting charge
good: the 2.8cm achieved 60mm at 400 yards. and
the l.2cm, i!)mm at !100 yards. Their usefulness
was limited hv tlwir lack of HE rounds.
/

The 2cm FlaK 38 single and quad AA cannon Sleeve, to rif


Bose fuze
were integrated into anti-armour defences and over the barrel
provided with AP and AP40 ammunition, as were
the :t 7cm FlaK guns.
The Cnmans hact small numbers of AT rifles
Rod, to fit
in senice in 19~~9. the Panzerbi'tchse (Pi.I\) :~8 and inside the borrel
Fins (six. in n1,1mber)
39. Only l ,600 examples of the complex and
expensive PzB :~R were produced, hut ;m,2'.~2 of
tht' PzB :~9. Both models were 7.92n1111 calibre.
taking a necked-down 94mm-long \\'orld War I
13.2mm AT rifle cartridge. capable of penetrating
30mm at 100 var<ls. The bullet was too small Lu
do much interior damage; a larger round would
ticochct armm<l and hi1 difft'tTnt crewmen. but the little .'.\I ml bullet To extend the life of the 3. 7cm
would usually stop whe11 it hit the first ma11. The early rounds had a tiny PaK 35/36 this Ste/lgranafe 41
round was produced In 1941. It
tear ga.-; pellet, but this '"''as too small to he effective. Later ammunition
was essentially a rod-type 'rifle
had a carhicte core - something learned from the Poks. Roth rifles were grenade' loaded In the bore of
single-shot and hipod-mounted. The PzB 38 weighed '.~Sib ( 15.99kg) the gun, with the finned sleeve
and the PzB '.~9. 27.2!">lb (12.43kg). Several other 7.92mm AT 1-ifks sa\'\' sliding down outside the barrel.
limitc<l use, along with nmnerous captured weapons including Soviet It could penetrate 150mm (61n)
of armour at Its effective range
types, and various Swedish-made 20rnm rifles such as the Solothurn
of 200 yards at 5 degrees
sl8-l 100. ;\ rifle company had a seven-man AT section \\ith thrl'{' elevation.
\\eapons: onf' miglll be attached to each platoon, but it was preferred to
keep them grouped flH" concentrated fire.
Recognizing that they were outdatf:-'d, in 194:~ the Germans modified
the PzB ~9 into the Granathikhse (GrU) !NAT grenade rifle. shortening
the barrel by 2fl and attaching a grenade discharger cup. Capable of
firing any German AT grena<le. it '"'as still heavy at 2'.3.1 !llh ( 10.;)kg) . and
its range of I !'10 yards was not much further than the same grenades
could be Iired from a standard rifle.
The 'rifle grenade for anti-armour combat model 1940'
(Cewchrgranate zur Panzcrhckampf11ng 40 - <;(; / P40) used a spigo1-
typt' launcher. The grenade, copied by the US. was ineffective e\e11
though the Germans used a base-detonating fuse: it lacked stand-off. It
was withd1awn in 1942 and replaced by a :mmm cup discharger system.
The first 'rifle armour grenade' ((~ewehr Panzergra11ate) was a 30mm
shaped charge ''ith 20 to '.30mm of penetration and an effective rang<' of
!>O to I 00 yards. By 1942 a 40mm m er-calibre grenade was introduced.
capable of penetrating !'>Omm at up to 150 yards. Almost 24 million
30mm and 40111111 grenades were produced . The 4omrn an<l 61 mm
versions wrre introduced in late 1942 and late 194:{ respectively, with an
effective range of 80 tu 100 yards. The 46mm penetrated 70 to 90mm.
50 an<l the 6 I mm pierced 100 to I 20mm.
The 2.8cm schwere
PanzerbDchse 41 (sPzB 41)
employed the Gerllch tapered
bore prlnclple, 'squeezing' the
projectile to 2cm. Intended to
replace 7 .92mm AT rifles In
Infantry companies, it saw only
llmlted iaaue because of high
production costs and the
scarcity of the tungsten
necessary for Its AP rounds.
There was no traversing or
elevating mechanism: it was
freely traversed and elevated
using handgrips near the breech.

\\l1ile a few AT hand grenades saw limited use, the principal German
hand a11ti-ta11k weapn11 was the magnetic hollow charge :~kg Haft-
Hohlladu11gen (Halt-HI~)). This 'armour-cracker' (Panzerkna<ker) was
a<loptcd in :\'mtmht'r 1942. It \vas of truncated cone shape. with a
The 3kg Haft-Hohl/adungen was handle holding the fuse. and three pairs nf magnets around the base
a hollow charge fitted with three which allowed it to be allached to a tank, fortress gun cupola, and
pairs of magnets (Hatten means
pillhox doors or sh111tcrs. Early models had a friction-ignited 4.5 second
to cllng'). This hand-placed
'armour-cracker' actually
delay f'use, which so111eti111cs did not allow time for tlw attacker to seek
weighed 3.8kg, being fllled with cmer; a 7.!l st'Cond fuse was introduced in ~lay 1943. The charge could
3kg (8.81b) of pentollte. The penetrate up to 1-Hlmrn of annour or 20 inches of concrete. Some
magnets were termed 'Alnico', !'i :"i'.~.900 'armour crackers' \VtTe made in 1942-44; the llaft-Hohlladung
which Is often assumed to be a
was declared obsolete in ~lay I ~M4. to be replaced by the Panzerfaust.
maker or designer name, but Is
actually a contraction: 'AINICo'
although existing stocks rcmaincrl in use.
for aluminium-nlckel-cobalt, an The 'anti-armour thnw,'11 mine type I' (Pa11zenvurti11ine J) was a 31b
alloy used for making magnets. ( l .:3!lkg) hand-thrown hollow charge mine issued in H>44. It consisted
of a hemispherical-nosed warhead with a long tailboorn and four folding
cloth vanes. \.\"hen it '"'as thrown the igniter was armed and vanes
opened like an t1mbrdla LO stabilize the mine. Its range was 20 or ~()
yards and it ,..as considered to he quite effective - penetrating 80 to
I OOmm - bnt somewhat unsaft to handle.
The 8.8cm Racketenwcrfer 4'.3 ('rocket launcher model I 94~r) or
Piij>j>f'hnt ('Dolly') looked like a small artillery piece, a brcech-loarling-
tube 011 t\VO wheels. Its I IEAT rocket was effective to ~rno yarrls against
moving targets and up to :JOO for statio11ary targets. to pc1wtrate 160
millimetres. The \\"capon was not recoilless and there was no hack-hlasc.
It was expensive to make, and insufficiently portable for infantrymen,
its 325lb (149kg) weight being broken down into seven sections for
man-packing.
Captured American ~36in rvl l bazookas led to a new design. the
8.8cm Raketenpanzerbtkhst (RPzB) 43. also known as the Pa11.u nrhrrrk 51
('armour tetTor') or (~/i>nmhr ('stovepipe'). This electrically fired One of several AT rifles used by
the Germans, the 7.92mm PzB
shoul<ler weapon was 65in (I fi'.~8111111) long anrl weighed ~09lb (9.5kg);
39 was single shot with semi-
it used the same 8.8cm warhead as the Pitppchen, but with a redesigned automatic ejection. To load, the
motor, and had a range of I .~O yards. The Panzerschreck was highly pistol grip Is pulled forward and
portable, low cost, and could be produced rapidly in large numbers. downward and the breechblock
The almost identkal RPzB !">4 was proclrn:cd in 1944; this weighed 24.2lb opens. After firing this action
Is repeated, and the opening
( 11 kg) because an added shield protected the gunner from muzzle
breechblock ejects the spent
hlow-h;wk. 011ly a small number were produced before the RPzB :"i4 / 1 cartridge. The PzB 39 has a
appeared, with a shorter 52.5in (1 '.333111111) tube and its weight reduced folding buttstock and the bipod
to the former 9.?lkg-; this could fire an improved rocket to 180 yards. Is adjustable for height.
This \Vas the mmt common model of the almost 290,000 nf all modds Detachable ammunition
boxes are fitted to each
produced. (The RPzB 43 could not fire the lle\\' rocket. and was
side of the receiver,
reissued to second li11c unit-;.) Regimcntal :\I' gun companies were each holding ten
replaced by 'armour destroyer' (Panzer1.ersti'>rer) co111pa11ies wilh up tu rounds.
:,4 Pa11zersd1rcck!i in thn.e platoons, each with lH launchers in three
squads. Some companies retained a platoon with three 7.:lnn g-1ms.
The Pa11u-rfnu.1t ('armour fist') is the best known of the 11ew (~ennan
anti-armour weapons, and was genuinely revolutionary. The 'Faust' was
artually a single-shot recoilless gun launching a fin-stabilized shaped
\ ~
charge warhead with a propellant cartridge. It consisted (for the ldein.
small' model) of a '.3:Ji11-long sLeel tube of Hmm bore. An ovcr-
calihre shaped chargc warhead was fitted to the muzzle. It was hdd
under the arm or over the shoulder, and lired by a percussion
igniter, which \\>'as exposed to the rncki11g- t1iggcr when the
gunner flipped 11p a folding sight 1m top of the tube. Looking'1 ~ ;;
through one of three apertures i11 the lallcr, he lined up a Ll ";'
barleycorn sight 011 the top ed.ge of the w~.uhcad with the
target. One<' fircd, the non-rclnadahle luhe was discankd. ..-.._ _ /
The first Panzerfaust k!Pi11 model. issued in July The 8.Bcm Racketenwerler 43 or
194'.~ (aka Pa111erl;tust 1. or Gntdwn - Pcgh~'). 'POppchen' was a non-recoilless
rocket launcher. While Its RPzBGr
had a I OOmm diameter warlwad, weig-hcd :~31h
4312 HEAT rocket (foreground)
(I .!">kg), and penetrated l 40111111 of annmff al :~o
looked the same as the APz:BGr
yards. The PanzerfausL :~o (aka Panzerfa11st 2 or 4322 and APzBGr 4992 fired
f;'HH, 'large') followed immcdiatelv; it had the same from the Panzerschreck RPzB 43
range. but it and subsequent models emploved a tl.Glh (3kg) 1SOmm & APzB 54, and RPzB 54/1
respectively, they were not
warhead capable of penetrating 200mm at an impact angl<~ of '.~0 degrtes.
interchangeable. Most R-Werfer
The 1-.11m.1 weighed I I 51h (:1 .22kg) in total. This and suhscqucnt models 43s were sent to North Africa
were designated by their dkclive range in me11es, and had progressiveh' and Italy, though a few
larger propellant charges. The 1!"ilh (6.llkg) Panzcrfa11st 60 was were seen in
introd11(ed i11 the summc1 of I 944; "'ith the same warhead and twice the Normandy.

range. it saw the widest use. 111 September 1944 the l'a11Lerfaust 100
appeared, weig-hing- the same as the 60. \tore adYanccd modds were
under dcnlopmcnt '"'hen the war emkd.
\lore than 8 million Panzerfausts of all models were
produced. \'\'hile short-ranged. they were effective weapons,
mainlv because of the she< r
11u111bers available. Thev had
no specialist crews, but were
issued to inrli\iduals just like
grenades; indeed. in the
closing month'\ of the \Var
52 ( ;e1111an prnpag;mda mack
Copied from US bazookas
GERMAN ANTITANK Projectile captured in Russia, the much
ROCKET LAUNCHER _1__~...
;
larger B.Bcm RPzB 43
Panzerschreck was quickly
adopted by the Wehrmacht.
It was soon replaced by the
RPzB 54, which appeared almost
identical apart from an added
face shield (sometimes removed
In combat). Both fired the
RPzBGr 4322 rocket. The shorter
RPzGr 54/1 model fired the

l
Improved RPzBGr 4992 rocket
as well as the 4322, but the
Cocking handle Induction coU 43 and 54 could not fire the
new 4992.

much of the fan that Hitler Youth teenagers. old Volksttmn home
guardsmen, and cn 11 houscwin:s could be trained to use them. Allocation
to infantry di,isions was '.)() per rifle and pionet"r company. 18 per AT
company and other nm1pa11y-sizc 11nits, and 12 per arrilh1") hatter\'.
* * * A US soldier examines 8.Bcm
Cennan anti-armour doctriue called for all units i11dudi11g rear services RPzB 54 Panzerschreck rocket
to prepare f<w tank rlefrnn hy emplacing AT weapo11s to cover likely launchers. Late in the war the
Wehrmacht regimental 'armour
avenues ol approach, to tie tank-proof terrain into the dcknsivc plan.
destroyer company' possessed
and to provide for early warning - a fu11ction of reconnaissame uniL-; and 54 of these, which were typically
infantry n11tpns1s. 'krrain was dassitil'd as armo11r-prool (Panzcrschicr) employed In groups of six
- impassable tu AFVs; 'armour-risk' (Pa111ergefahrdet) - dillirult for covering the same area.
AFVs; or ;armour-kasihle' (Pa11zcrn1i~1glich) -
passable to an11011r. This determination was mack
by map and ground renmnaissancc. Armorn'"pro11f
1e1Tai11 induclcd dense friresl, swampland. deep
mud, lllllll<-Tous large rocks anci gulli<'s. sl<'ep
slopes. railrnad c111ba11k111e11ls or cuttings.
Anti-tank guns were wdl dug in and co11ccakd.
pnsi1ioncrl in twos and threes, anrl emplaccd in
depth throughout the regimental ckfrnsi\'c sector.
Select<>d single guns might begin picking off ta11ks
at maximum ra11g<. hut most lwl<l their fire until
the target was withi11 ;mo to 1:-,0 yards. Close
combat teams allackcd tanks which reached the
Ccrman battle positions. Once a tank attack ,.,as
repulsed the gu11s 1110\ed Lo alternative positions.
The Ccnnans learned that 1he massive effort
expended in la)ing va.st minctickls was wa.'ltcd, since
they were so casilv breached. They mainly laid sm<tll
delaying minefields 011 mutes and within their
posi1inns to knock out marauding tanks. Anti-tank
ditches were:~ no longer dug wdl fonvard of' the fronl
line because they provided enemy infantry ''ith
_jump-off cover; th('y were now <lug immediately in
front of llghling positions. The 'annuur deie11ce
centre of rcsisranre' (PanzeF-abwehr-geschutz) was
establishC:'d on the suspected tank approach route,
where weapons were cu1u.:entrated. 53
This Panzertaust 60 waa the
moat common of several models
produc:ed. The sight waa folded
down untll the weapon was
readied for firing. When using
a Panzertaust from a trench the
firer had to be careful that the
back-blast was not deflected
Into his confined position by a
rear parapet. Most Panzertausts
were painted dark ochre yellow,
but some field-grey. They were
marked In red on the tube:
Vorslcht! Starker Feuerstrahll
('Danger! Intense fire flash!'),
with an arrowhead pointing to
the rear. Operating lnstruc:tlons
were printed on the lower
portion of the projectile.

Ta11k-ht111trr teams (Pamer:jagdgrnppt) consistt'd of an NCO and at


least three men well trained in xr close comhat rcdmiqucs and
equipped with weapons to ' blind, halt , and destroy'. Sud1 teams were
employed only as a last resort, wlwn there were no AT guns operational
or a position had been nverrnn. l'vlarhirw gims an<l morrars concc11tratcd
on separating t~11e111y infantry from their tanks. Small arms were directed
against tank vision ports. and the team moved under cover of smoke
grenades. II possible they would lie in wait for the tank tn come within
~O yards hef(1re attacking with dose-cornhat and txpt'dient '"'capons.
After Pa111erfaus1s became available tlwv were rlw preferred method of
attack. fired in barrages from m11ltipk directions. 1;111k-l11111tcr teams
would move in dose and allack fru111 the rear or sides. Close-range
ambushes ,.,,en set up in woodland and built-up areas. Riflt>men
cow1i11g the dose-in all<Kkcr would cease fire if it hampered him. hut
be prepared to lire if the crew opened a hatch to ddend the tank. Once
a tank was disabled and captured. its gun brccchhlocks would bt>
The Panzertaut 30 Is depicted removed and the tank set nn fire .
here with lta warhead removed. 111 194~~ the Germans in Russia dt,eluped tire J->al'.fionl ('armour
The thin sheet metal fins defence gun front'). This was an extension of the idea of emplacing AT
unwrapped' when the warhead
guns behind the forward positions to engage tank.'i after thev broke
was launched. Whlle It Is similar
In appearance to the Panzertaust
through. when their fighting formations were kss org<mized and they
60, the folding sights are of might he separated fron1 their supporting infantn; Soviet tanks often
dlatlnctly different design. broke through in large numbers. The concept was for the cih;sio11al AT
ba11alio11 (corps and army
level battalions were also
cmplnvcd) to position six
to ten or more well du~
in and ronrealerl 75cm
guns under a single com-
ma11dt>r. on favourable
tcJTain blocking the main
tank n1t1tcs. Their towing
vehidt's were hidden dose
54 hv. reach tn relocate nr
withdraw the guns quickly. In effect. the Pakfrnnt amhushed tanks at
shrfft range, with all guns opening lire simultaneously. Artillery and
rocket pn~ectors supported the Pakfrolll while available reserves and
armour mmcd into a count<T-attack.

Japan
.Japan '"''as dismally ill prepared for anti-tank warfare (taismsha sn1toJ, and
suitable weapons were almost non-existent. Although they had bt'ell out-
manoeuvred when thev,. faced Soviet armour in l'vlanchuria in 19~\9, the\' ,

downplay("d the decisiveness of armour, persisting in the view that tanks


were infantry support weapons. There was 110 doctrine fr>r massing
armour or engaging in battles with enemy tanks. They expected their
enemies to follow suit, and made the mistake ofjudhring that only light
US tanks would be co111111ittecl to Pacifi(" islands. In the cnnt, from the
l"\memhcr 1943 Tarawa assault onwards the US habitually employed ~14
Sherman medium tanks, and later some tank <lcstroycrs.
The prindpal .Jaanese 'AT gun was the :nmm 'l)'pe 94 ( l~tM)
infant1y rapid-fire g-un. Originally intended to deliver direct fire to
knock out machine gun nests, it was prmidc<l v.ith I IE ammunition.
Although an AP-HE round was issued, it performed dismally as an AT
gun owing to it" low \'clocity and poor penetration - just 24mm at !'>00
yards. The l\1JC 94 ,.,as light and could!){" broken down into six sections
!"or animal or man-pack transport by its eight-man new. Some units
deploying from China were armed with more effective '.~7mm Type 97
( 19:~7) :\I' guns; these were German-made PaK ~E>/'.~f>s captureci from
China, but were ve11 few in numbtr.
From late 1942 the 47mm Type l (1941) AT gun began to appear.
\Vhilc nnl as efkctivc as similar cont<'mporary '""'capons, it cnuld
knock out a Slwrman, hut seldom with a frontal shot. Its AP round
could penetrate !lOmm at ;)()() yards. and it was also provided with HE
The Japanese 37mm ~pe 94
am111u11itiu11. Infantry regimental AT cmnpanies had thr('e two-gun
(1934) was originally adopted as platoons with either '.Hmm or 47111111 guns. Even late in the war they
an Infantry rapid-fire gun. While W('fl" often still armed with '.Hmm pieces. and mosl 4 7mm guns were
provided with an AP-HE round, found in independent AT battalions, which might possess a mix nt the
It was an extremely poor AT
two calibres. There \vere no divisional AT ballalions.
weapon. It was capable of a
high rate of fire because of Its
\.t achim cannon units \Wrt' armed \\i th 20mm Type 98 (1938)
breechblock design, but It had automatic cannon and I '.t2mm 'I)vc 9'.~ ( 1933) heavy machine guns.
a slow traverse. Both were capable of AA Vire, but ' '' l'lT especially valuable as anti-boal
and anti-amphibian tractor guns when provided
with AP ammunition.
The 20mm Type 97 ( 1937) AT rifle was issued
lo some infantry battalions, with up to eight in
the battalion gun company. This was an
expensive weapon and frw units actually received
it: at 1!>Olb (68kg) it was cumbersome, requiring
a thr(e to four-man crew. It was capable of scmi-
and fully-automatic fire, an unusual feature
fora weapon fed by a seven-round magazine.
\:tounte:>d on a bipod and a hutl monopod, it
had a violent recoil. AJ>-tracer and HE-tracer
ammunition was provided, the former penetrating
l ~111111 at 200 yards. 55
The Japanese 47mm 'fype 1 Little use was made of AT rifle grenades. The Ccrmans provided
(1941) AT gun. The Japanese plans for their cup-discharged :30mm and 40mm grenades, and
were extremely proficient In
modified copies were produced as the Type 2 ( 1942) grenades - one of
positioning these and other
weapons in well camouflaged
the kw uses made of llw shaped charge concept by the .lapancse.
positions to achieve flank and Antllhcr shaped ('harge weapo11 was the lunge mine. basically a hand-
rear shots at the US Shermans delivered AT mine atcached lo a pole. First used in the Philippines in
during the late war island I !J+I, it consisted of an 11 .Hlb (!'>.'.\kg) truncated cone-shaped warhead
battles, and under such
fitted with stand-off 'prongs' and mounted 011 a ()ft pole. The attacker
circumstances they did
achieve 'kills' despite their
rushed a tank. slamming the charge into it'i side; lw did not sun.in. hut
mediocre performance. the mine could penetrate I !">Omm of armour.
The Type 99 ( 19~~9) magnetic anti-armour c harge was a ca11vas-
covered 2lb 11 oz charge formed as a flat disc I .!'Jin thick x 4. 75in
<liamcter. and titted with four magnets around the outside edge. Relying
011 blast. it was dkctive only against the thinner side and top armour.
being able to penetrate 25n1m of plate. The fuse was struck on a solid
One of the few Japanese object to ignitt' it. Se\'eral t}1ws of expedient Al' f\H~ nades and h a nd
weapons employing shaped mines uf' 111arginal dl<-ctiveness were mass-produced in the Philippines
charges was the 30mm Type 2
in I ~H '.~-+l.
(1942) grenade based on the
German Schlessbecher cup * * *
discharger system. It could be .Japanese AT tactics were characterized by thdr emphasis on uffensi\'e
fitted on Arlsaka 6.5mm and spiril. on efforts to offs<'t their inadequate weapons, and on the close
7. 7mm rifles, and fired both 1crrai11 i11 which muc h of the fighting <><:nund. The value of strength of
30mm and over-calibre 40mm
will. to the point of selt:-sacrillce, in overcoming the materiel superio1ity
(shown here) AT grenades. Their
penetration was approximately
ofJapan 's enemies was a powerful and pre\'ailing belief. \\11ile Westerners
30mm and 50mm respectively, tend to dismiss such intangible aspects. this suicidal aggression \\'as
with a range of about 100 yards. 11evtnhekss a ,iahlt'. factor, though ,,.ith ob\'ious limitations; 'one soldier
for one tank' was a common crc<lo, hut the
mathematics were usually costlit'r than that.
Rugged, dose terrain - either covered with dense
vegetation, or broken groun<l with gorges, ridges,
hillocks and sinkholes - provided AT weapons with
cmer and concealment. as well as allowing the
Japanese to concC'ntratc on close attacks an<l to
maximize the e flecl of' their short-ranged weapons.
While organic divisional AT assets ,..,ere
limited, one ro three independent AT battalions
and machine cannon units 111ight be auached
56 to a division. Anti-tank guns were dug in well
forward, though some would be positioned i11
depth. and others comnwnly protected flank and
rear approaches. Secondary posirions were
prepared in the position's depth and 011 the
llanks. Camouflage was excellent; anci-armour
engagements were basically ambushes, as they
would open lire at very shon ranges with guns
positioned for side and rear shots. Guns were
often dug into ridges and rocky slopes inac-
cessible to ta11ks. 111 rough terrain numerous guns
were concentrated un the few routes available
to tanks. SHEARWIRE

Tank-hunter teams of six lo eight men under


an NCO \'\'t'tT formed by each infantry platoon.
The men sometimes worked in pairs: one with a
- - - METAL SL EEVE
Tvpe 99 hand 111im. a grenade and a smoke
' " - - -- - - BOOSTC.R
candle, the seconrl with two each ~v1olot<w
cocktails, grenades and smoke candles. Other
tank-hunters organized into a diversionary team
with smoke can<lles: a track teant with hand-laid
'vardstick' AT mines or pole charges; a turret
teant with Type 9~1 hand mines or satchel
charges; and a covering group of rincmcn with
hand grenades. The covering rifle platoon
forced the tank tu 'button up', while machine
guns and ;iOmm grenade dischargers ('knee
mortars') strove to separate the infantry as the I
tanks approached.
The fewer AT guns available. the more tank-hunter units would he The 2.9kg (6.41b) of explosives
formed . Each was gi\'en a sector in which to deliver its 'shock att<u:k', as in the warhead of the lunge mine
(shltotsu b11kur11/J was pushed
the tank entered an area \'lhere the unit was concealed. Attack sites were
back with its detonator onto a
selected at points wht'rc the tank would have lo slow down, such as when firing pin when slammed into the
crossing a stream or gully. 011e Japanese don11nent stated that attackers side of a tank. Three 5.25in rods
should 'vulu11ta1ilyjump 011 the tank and throw a gre11ade i11side ur stab protruding from the base of the
the crew \\ith a bayonet'. Neverthckss, in A.pril-.\fay 194:1 on Okinawa cone ensured optimum stand
off' for the hollow charge.
the causes uf L:S t;mk losses were mines, AT guns. artillery. and attacks
US troops called this suicide
with magnetic hand mines and satchel charges - in that order. weapon an 'idiot stick', but It
On lwo Jima in February-March 1945, USMC tanks were hampered did knock out tanks. Circular
almost as muth by the thaotic terrain as by Japanese AT defences. The Type 93 (1933) AT mines ('tape
soh volcanic sa11<l caused many tanks to throw tracks or bog down. The measure mines') were also
fastened to the ends of poles
.Japanese ried tank ditches and minefields into terrain features, ro
for the same purpose.
channel tanks into the fields of fire of 47111111 AT guns, whidt proved
effective at short range; in one such action three Shermans Wf'rc
immohilizerl within minutes by turret hits. Losses were high; hy the
operation's fourth day the 4th Tank Bn listed l l of their tanks
destroyed. eight damaged, and 28 operational; the 5th Tank 811 hacl
lost I :1, with four rlamaged and :H operational.
Losses continued to mount, and the baualions were hard pressed to
field enough tanks. In some instances the Japanese use of non-AT
weapons actually prevented th~ commitment of tanks. When tanks
advanced with accompanying infantI)' the Japanese would harrage the:-
area with mortars and gn~nadc dischargers. causing infantry casualties; 57
The goal of all Infantry AT
weapon I to halt, dleable and
destroy tanks. Thi US Marine
M4A3 Sherman on lwo Jlma
shows a range of protective
additions: track plates around
the turret, sandbags and road
wheels on the engine deck, and
thick wooden planks along the
hull sides.

in snnw clearing operations tilt' :\fari11e i11fa11trv declined the use of


armour in order lo avoid the hea\'ier fire t hev all racted, a11d
painstakingly cleared pillboxes and caves with ha1ookas. demolitions
and Ilamethruwers instead . The Japa11ese ofte11 sitl'd pillboxes on
terrain inaccessible Lu ta11ks to pre\'Clll flamcthrowcr tanks from moving
within range; these \V('JT particularly feared and hated, and often
suflt>red dose-in attacks.

FURTHER READING
Biryukov. C .. & \klnikov. c;., /\11tila11k llrn/arr, Prognss Publishers.
\1oscow ( 197~)
Chambnlain, Pett'r. & Gander. Terry J. A nti-Tanl< Hiajmn.\, World \Var II
Fact File.<;, Arco Publishing Co, !\'cw York (I !17~)
Eng-lish.John A., 011 lnff111f1J. l'racgn Publishers, l\'ew York ( 1984)
Forty, George, British Army Jlmulbook 1939- 19./ _5, Alan Sulton Publishing.
Stroud. Clos (1998)
Forty, (~eorge.Ja/H1ms1'An11y ll1111tll}()ol< 1939-19-15, Alan Sutton
Publishing. Stroud, Clos ( 19~)9)
(~ahcl, Chri ..;;tnphcr R., S1'l'k, .\.frik1', and J),>stmy: US ,\nuy 'f'ank /Jpstmyr
/Jortri11e i11 \forld \\(n II. Combat Studies Institute . Ft I .ea\'enworth,
KS (1985)
Cander. Ten-y .J., Th1' Brrwolw: l/r111d-I frld lloflmu-C'/1<11gr A 11li-"/'m1k
\Vea/1011s, Classic Weapons Series, PRC Publishing. L<111do11 ( 1998)
Gudgin. Peter. Armmrml Finj1011wr: 'flu' l>rudo/Illlf'lll of '/(111/i A rmamcnt
/9"39-45_. Ala11 Sutto11 Publishing. Stroud, (;los (l~lq7)
Hufhchmidt, E.J., I-:11ow }(J111 A11tila11k Hijlf's. Blacksmith Gruup ( l 97i)
\Veeks,John. Afrn Against Tank1: A Histo1y of.-\nti-Ta11k H(11/m111,
l\.fason/ Charter Publishers. ~cw 'York (I 9i!"1)
Zaluga, Stt'\'l'n .J. & Ness, Leland S., Red Ann.\' Ha11dhook 1939-1945,
58 Ala11 Sutton Publishing, Stroud, Clos ( 1998)
PLATES TEXT turret and hull sides of late model Panzer Ills and IVs). The GI
carries a 20lb M1 satchel charge containing eight 2'/lb
A: TANK VULNERABILITIES tetrytol blocks - more than enough to halt the tank if thrown
Except to the tank's immediate front and the direction in on the engine grating or in the tracks; once it is immobilized
which the turret was oriented, the crew were for all practical it will be easy prey for bazookas. The most favourable
purposes blind. Many of the means of vision were mounted direction from which to attack was the quarter behind
high to maximize their fields, and stealthy and courageous whichever direction the turret was oriented (diagram, C),
infantry could easily move into the tank's blind zone or 'dead unless it was facing to the tank's rear. Very few tank
space' (Toter-Raum). This might extend out as far as 20 yards designers considered this and mounted a machine gun in
(diagram, B), within which a prone or crouching infantryman the turret rear, but they were provided in most Japanese
was invulnerable to the main gun (1) and co-axial machine medium tanks and the Soviet BT-8, KV-1, and IS-1 and -2.
gun (2). Within perhaps a 10-yard inner zone (diagram, A) he The major threat to attacking infantry in this rear quadrant
could not be seen or engaged from pistol/sub-machine gun was machine-gunning by accompanying tanks, which the
ports (3) or by hand grenades tossed from a hatch such as Americans called 'back-scratching'; they might even fire HE
the turret side escape hatch (4). (The Germans developed an rounds at or near friendly tanks to rid their comrades of
HE-fragmentation cartridge for the 2.6cm flare pistol; fired clinging infantry.
out of a pistol port, it detonated after a one-second delay.)
Of course, the width and configuration of these zones varied B: GENERIC COMPANY ANTI-TANK
from tank to tank and changed as the turret rotated. DEFENCE
The driver (5) and bow machine gunner (6) could only see Regardless of nationality, a rifle company established in a
directly ahead and a few degrees to either side. The turret defensive position followed a fairly common pattern: the
gunner had a very narrow field of vision through the gun primary differences were due to the numbers and types of AT
sight. and only in the direction the main gun was pointing. weapons. This basic deployment of two platoons forward
The commander had the best field of vision through vision and one in support was employed in most defensive
blocks or slits in the low cupola (7), and possibly a periscope situations, differing according to specific strengths and local
set in or beside the hatch. Tank commanders preferred to conditions.
operate with their hatches open to maximize observation, Security outposts (1) are established well forward to warn of
but even in the absence of artillery or mortar opposition they the enemy's approach and hamper enemy patrols. Beyond
could be forced to 'button up' by small arms fire. This tank the company outposts are screening forces from battalion.
is fitted with three-tube smoke grenade projectors (8) on regiment, and division. Most available AT weapons (2)
either cheek of the turret; triggers inside the turret projected covered armour-favourable terrain, while machine guns
smoke bombs out to about 25 yards, providing a smoke (3) covered terrain restrictive to tanks, as this was the
screen to conceal the tank if engaged. primary infantry approach. Anti-tank obstacles (4) were
Here, in North-West Europe, an American infantryman created across the front - here, 1Oin driven posts - if time
rushes a PzKw IV Ausf H tank (for clarity. we have omitted and resources allowed, and tied into natural obstacles (5).
the extra 'stand-off' armour plates normally fixed outside the Bridges were blown (6), point minefields laid at chokepoints
(7), and roadblocks established (8) - here, an abatis of felled
trees. Infantry AT weapons - AT rifles, bazookas or PIATs -
were usually allocated on the basis of one per platoon; they
VULNERABILITY OF TIGER TANKS might be assigned to each platoon or employed in a single
grouping. One. two or more light AT guns (9) might be
attached from battalion or higher to augment the defence,
!G -- especially on terrain favourable to tanks. The 'tankable'
approaches would also be targeted by artillery and mortar
concentrations to separate the infantry from the tanks. Some
infantry AT weapons might be employed in the company rear
to provide depth to the defence or secure a flank, or be
attached to a tank-hunter team. One or more tank-hunter
teams (10) might be established by the support platoon
and possibly the forward platoons to engage tanks which
penetrated the front line defences. Anti-tank mines were
sometimes laid around platoon positions or on flank
approaches (11).

Thi translated diagram from a Soviet manual shows the


vulnerabilities of a PzKw VI Tiger I - a 'TVI' in Red Army
parlance. Standard symbols Indicate the most effective
weapons for use against various points. The 'gun sight'
symbol means 'use all weapons'; the shell and cronwires,
'use guns of all calibres'; the arrow, 'throw Incendiary
bottles'; and the explosion, use AT grenades'. Note the
position of the Internal fuel tank Is also Indicated. 59
C: INFANTRY ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, out of it, or might foil infantry attacks by spraying machine
1939-40 gun fire through it. One rifleman (2) has Nebelhandgranate
The first campaigns of the war found most countries' infantry (NbHgr) 39 smoke hand grenades and smoke cylinders
relying on a variety of comparatively simple weapons for AT (Rauchrohr 39). Another (3) carries a double charge
defence. and those carried by this German tank-hunter team (Doppel-Ladung), a pair of 1kg TNT blocks fastened to the
typify the range available. ends of a short length of wire, to destroy main gun or
The AT rifle, here a 7.92mm PzB 39 Panzerbusche (1) with machine gun barrels by throwing them over the barrel like
the butt folded, was often the main platoon AT weapon . saddlebags. Another (4) has a concentrated charge
While range and accuracy were adequate, even in 1939 (Geballte-Ladung) of six Stielhandgranate (Stg) 24 stick
they were often ineffective against the tanks of the day; the grenade heads, with detonators and handles removed,
small AP bullets held no HE or incendiary charge to enhance wired around a complete central grenade. Thrown into tank
behind-the-armour effects. Chemical smoke was used to tracks or on top of the turret or engine deck, it might break
blind tanks and screen attacking infantry, but it took time a track or penetrate up to 60mm of armour. Another
for a sufficient cloud to develop; the tank could simply drive rifleman (5) is armed with a GG/P40 rifle grenade with a
spigot-type discharger on his Kar98k rifle. Like all other
rifle-launched AT grenades of this period, it was of poor
A bazooka man peen through the sights of his M9A1 (note
locking collar of two-part tube just ahead of the handgrlp),
ballistic design and had a less than effective shaped charge
while his assistant pulls an M6A 1 or A2 rocket from its
cavity; most armies replaced their first generation AT rifle
packing tube - three of these were carried In a slung grenades by 1942/43.
canvas bag. A connector wire has to be unwound from the This combination of weapons provided tank-hunters with
rocket tall; holding on to the free end of this, the loader will stand-off engagement (AT rifle. rifle-launched AT grenade),
press the latch which allows the round to be sllpped Into close-in attack weapons to immobilize. disable or destroy
the end of the tube, and which then holds it secure. He (double and concentrated charges), and smoke devices to
must then wind the free end of the wire around one of the blind the quarry and screen the attackers. Regardless of
two connector bosses on the shoulders of the tube, before weapon. planning and rehearsals were critical to success.
giving the gunner the 'Ready!' signal, while getting well out Here the squad leader (Gruppenfl.ihrer) (6) briefs his men
of the way of the back-blast. (Reconstruction by 29th Dlv before deploying for an exercise, even though they are in
Historical Assoc, photo courtesy Tim Hawkins) a combat zone.

60
The Japanese 1\lpe 99 (1939) AT
Pl unger _..-----:W oodt.n pl ug charge (99 hako-bakural) was
J {ral.lloved bdore small (about 43/4 in x 1 %in
Locltlng nut lnsertlng- !uze )
(secures rn:ue)
without the four magnets), but If
Safety pin
/ ;string attac hed) two or more could be fastened
together they cauaed a great
deal of concern to tankers
(see Plate H). It was Issued In
............---- Fuze a canvas carrying pouch, with
the fuse packed In a two-piece
metal tube under the pouch flap.

D: US ARMY ANTI-TANK AMBUSH, 1944-45 leader (7) would give the signal to spring the ambush by
American tank-hunter teams preferred the ambush - long an opening fire himself and shouting 'Fire!' The 50-ton PzKw V
American tradition - over direct close-in attacks with hand- Panther was a tough nut to crack; its upper glacis was
delivered weapons (not that they would hesitate to climb 80mm thick, the lower glacis 60mm, the turret front 110mm,
aboard a halted Panzer and grenade the crew). Close-attack gun mantlet 120mm, hull sides 50mm, and turret sides and
weapons often resulted in needless casualties; stand-off back 45mm - all enhanced by its well-sloped armour design.
weapons such as the bazooka and rifle grenade were more
effective. and also allowed the hunter team to be more E: BRITISH ANTI-TANK ROADBLOCK,
widely dispersed instead of concentrating around a tank 1943-44
(for illustrative reasons this scene in the Ardennes shows the Mountainous Italy was a challenge to tank troops. Villages
team more closely grouped than they would actually be). The were typically built on dominating mountainside ridges.
dense woodlands of North-West Europe were ideal for this approachable only by narrow exposed roads easily
style of combat; Gls. many of whom had trained in the vast obstructed by mines and roadblocks. A physical roadblock
pine forests of the southern United States, often excelled in was seldom used . since this forewarned advancing
such tactics. armour; instead, well-concealed positions were prepared
Tank-hunter teams were built around a 12-man rifle squad, covering a section where tanks were exposed. If the lead
though these were typically understrength - as here. The vehicle could be disabled it trapped those following. which
weapon of choice was the 2.36in M9A 1 bazooka with M6A3 were vulnerable to intense artillery fire - as will soon be
HEAT rocket (1 ); manned by a two-man crew, it had a experienced by this StuG Ill 7.5cm assault gun and SdKfz
practical range of less than 100 yards, and in woodland the 251 /1 halftrack.
tank might be engaged at only about 20 yards. The bazooka It was virtually impossible to dig in on the rocky terrain, so
was operated by a pair of the team's riflemen, all of whom positions were built with the most available material - loose
were trained in its use. A grenadier armed with an M9A 1 AT rocks, stacked in low circular walls. From the British Army's
rifle grenade propelled from an M7 launcher on an Ml rifle long experience of the Indian North-West Frontier, such a
(2) provides back-up: it was only effective for side or rear position was called a sangar; it had to appear like a natural
shots. An M 19 WP smoke rifle grenade (3) lies in readiness rock pile if it was not to be detected. The PIAT (1) replaced
to blind the tank or accompanying infantry as the team the Boys AT rifle and No.68 AT rifle grenade in mid-1943.
withdraws. Once it was cocked the bomb was inserted in the open-
A rifleman crouches ready with a Mk llA 1 fragmentation topped semi-cylindrical tray, and launched by a trigger pull.
grenade, and an M15 WP hand grenade (4); this was a The discharge was supposed to re-cock the 2001b spring,
bursting-type grenade that instantly created a large, dense but sometimes failed to do so; it was almost impossible to
cloud to blind and distract. It also scattered burning gobs of re-cock manually under exposed combat conditions .
white phosphorus for anything between 18 and 30 yards - Another problem with the PIAT was that when aimed
dangerous for an incautious thrower. The squad's .30cal downhill the bomb could slide out of the muzzle. The 3.5in
M 1918A2 Browning Automatic Rifle (5) would engage Mk IA HEAT bomb (2) weighed 31b and could penetrate 4in
accompanying infantry to drive them away from the tank; (100mm) of armour. but the point-detonating, base-initiating
sometimes a .30cal M1919A4 light machine gun crew was fuse reduced its potential effectiveness.
attached to the team for more firepower. One or two riflemen The No.75 or 'Hawkins' AT grenade (3) was actually a small
would always be deployed for rear security (6). The squad mine that could be buried or thrown depending on the type 61
of detonator fitted. Five or six would be placed across a buried mines. These TM-38 mines {7) are emplaced to catch
road; here, strung together in a 'necklace' or 'daisy-chain' at a tank by surprise when it turns a corner. Between 440 and
2ft intervals, they are being pulled across the approaching 660lb weight was required to detonate the 61b (3.6kg) charge
vehicle's path. Heavier conventional AT mines could be of TNT.
linked in the same manner. One rifleman lies in wait with a
No.77 WP smoke grenade {4), and a No.73 'thermos flask' G: GERMAN PANZERKAMPFGRUPPE
AT grenade (5). The latter contained 3Yilb of poweriul polar IN COVERING POSITION, 1944-45
ammonal gelatin dynamite or nitrogelatin; it could penetrate As the tide turned against them on all fronts, and they faced
up to 2in of armour. but was more effective when aimed at overwhelming enemy armour with little of their own, the
the tracks. Weighing 41'lb, and measuring 11 in x 3'/.in, this Wehrmacht excelled in small scale delaying actions. By 1944
grenade could only be thrown 10 to 15 yards. It was fitted the German Army was well equipped with a variety of potent
with an impact-detonating fuse, armed (like the No.77 WP) man-portable AT weapons; just as importantly, they knew
when the weighted tape of the 'Allways' system unwound how to use terrain , natural and man-made obstacles
in flight and pulled out the safety pin. A Bren light machine (the stream here is fordable), and how to integrate other
gun team (6) is placing suppressive fire on the weapons into the defence. The mission of this small armour
personnel carrier. battle group, in an armour defence centre of resistance
(Panzerabwehrgeschutz) or covering position (vorge-
F: SOVIET ANTI-TANK DEFENCE schobene Stelfung), is to delay the approach of British tanks
IN BUILT-UP AREA, 1944 (1) on a secondary route into a defended village (off the edge
Despite the weight and bulk of the bolt-action PTRD-41 and of the picture). Such a group would fight stubbornly until
semi-automatic PTRS-41 AT rifles (PTA = protivotankovoe ordered to withdraw, or would disengage at a specified time.
ruzhe), the Red Army retained them throughout the war, long This sometimes mystified their opponents, who might be
after AT rifles had been withdrawn by other countries. engaged in a desperate fight when, without apparent reason,
Although the shorter of the two models, the PTRD-41 was the Germans melted away. Pre-planned artillery barrages
over six feet in length (1). The rifles had extremely good would then strike the recently abandoned position.
penetration for their class, but side and rear shots at close Point AT minefields were laid at chokepoints (2), inter-
range were necessary when taking on later German tanks. mingled with anti-personnel mines. The latter not only
The AT rifleman's dream shot was to be in the right place at hampered sappers clearing them, but might also prevent
the right time to take a belly shot as a tank mounted an recovery crews from reaching disabled tanks, and thwart
obstacle. The forward portion of the belly of a PzKw V infantrymen and forward observers from using the hull as
Panther was 26mm thick, but because of the angle of incline cover. The few AT guns available at this date were often
as the tank climbs, the 14.5mm (.57cal) bullet, even with an employed singly, like this 5cm PaK 38 (3), rather than in
incendiary load, does not guarantee a kill. Another weapon larger groups: 2cm FlaK guns were positioned on flanks (4)
the Soviets retained and even continued to develop was the to help make up for the lack of AT guns. A single squad with
AT hand grenade. The RPG-43 was the second Soviet six 8.8cm RP54 Panzerschrecks have taken up positions in
design, and the first with a shaped charge (2). If it struck at a typical pattern (5); each 'bazooka' crew has dug a narrow
right angles it could penetrate 75mm, so attack from above V-shaped slit trench, clustered in threes with two forward
a tank was the optimum method - a Panther's turret roof and and one to the rear. These were dug in open areas to
engine deck were only 15mm thick. Pulling the pin allowed provide wide fields of fire, and spoil was removed to make
the rear cone of the thrown grenade to slide off the handle them hard to spot. This arrangement allowed the
and act as a drogue at the end of the deploying streamers Panzerschrecks to engage tanks approaching from any
(3). Another weapon the Soviets used long after it fell from direction, and provided an in-depth defence; at least two of
all but emergency use in other armies was the 'Molotov the launchers could engage any tank. The top of the 'V' was
cocktail' (4) - what the Russians called a 'bottle with oriented toward the enemy; the gunner would move into the
flammable mixture' (butylkas goryuchej smes'yu), since it arm of the 'V' offering the best angle to the target, his
was thought disrespectful to use the name of the USSR's assistant loading and taking shelter from the back-blast in
Foreign Minister as slang. They provided 'incendiary liquid the other arm. While there are farm buildings in the area,
kits', consisting of two long glass tubes filled with sulphuric only a few snipers occupy them (6); buildings attracted
acid, to be attached to gasoline-filled vodka or cognac suppressive fire and allowed the enemy to pinpoint German
bottles by rubber bands: when the bottle shattered upon positions quickly. Scattered pairs of grenadiers hide on
impact the acid reacted with and ignited the gasoline. tank routes armed with a few Panzerfausts, ready to
Molotovs were widely used; in fact, some 100 men of ad hoe engage tanks that might slip through {7). With rifle strength
675-man 'worker's battalions,' manned by untrained factory reduced in many grenadier units, higher allocations of
workers. were armed only with these expedient weapons. MG34 and MG42 machine guns {8) were made to increase
Sub-machine gunners (5) were deployed for close protection firepower. These were put to good use separating infantry
of AT rifle crews. and to shoot Panzergrenadiers (6) off tanks. from the tanks they escorted. British tankers speak of
It was not possible to bury AT mines in paved streets, hearing MG bullets striking their hulls and accompanying
although they could be hidden under a light layer of debris infantrymen 'squealing like rabbits'.
or concealed in a barricade to await tanks attempting to The different weapons were frequently assigned fire sectors
crash it. Often they were simply laid openly on a street: so covering other positions. anticipating that they would
long as they were covered by fire to prevent them from being eventually be abandoned and occupied by the enemy. As
62 removed by escorting infantrymen, they were as effective as the enemy approached the position Bern and 12cm mortars
was bestowed. Both the German and Finnish badges,
worn on the upper right sleeve, were awarded to men
destroying tanks with Panzerfausts, Panzerschrecks, hand
and rifle grenades, satchel charges, hand mines, etc.
Germany instituted the Sonderabzeichen fUr das
niederk~mpfen von Panzerkampfwagen durch
Einzelkiimpfer on 9 March 1942, but eligibility was
backdated to 22 June 1941, the first day of Operation
'Barbarossa'. The 8.Scm x 3cm silver-coloured braid
stripe with black edges bore a bronze PzKw IV tank.
When a fifth award was earned a single gold braid
badge replaced preceding badges. Oberstleutnant
Gunter Viezenz, Grenadier Regt 7, received the highest
number of awards: 21 - four gold and one silver badge.
Finland instituted a Panssarintuhoojamerkkion on 28
June 1944, backdated to 1 June; AT and tank gunners
were also eligible for this. A ?cm x 3cm white backing
was printed with a light brown T-34 tank. White ?cm x
1cm bars were sewn above the badge when three, five,
ten, and 15 tanks were destroyed. The highest number
destroyed with hand-held weapons was eight, by UCpl
Villi Vaisanen, 2nd Border Jiiger Bn, with Panzerfausts.
The US 505th Parachute Infantry Regt established an
unofficial award for bazooka gunners knocking out a
tank during the 10 July-17 August 1943 Sicily campaign.
The 3in x 2in olive drab patch depicted a brown bazooka
with a yellow lightning bolt, and was worn on the left
Tank destruction badges breast pocket.
Soldiers who successfully attacked a tank with a hand-
held or hand-placed weapon sometimes received German Unterofflz/er squad leader, armed wHh an MP40
standard awards for valour, or at least a posthumous sub-machine gun and displaying two Tank Destruction
wound decoration. In some instances a special award Badges and the Close Combat Clasp.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - -

from the main battle position would fire on pre-registered weapon which was moderately effective against hull side
barrage areas (9). Assault guns (10) might be positioned to and top armour (1). The Marines fitted 2in thick planks to
the rear, usually dug-in or hidden in buildings to further deter the sides of many Shermans: they protected hatches by
the advance. The US Army judged that extensive permanent welding festoons of nails on top, points upwards, or
fortifications such as the Westwall ('Siegfried Line') only covering them with welded rod cages giving Sin of stand-
enhanced the German defence by 15 per cent over off. Like tankers on all fronts, they fastened spare track
defences comprising field works only. Dug-in German sections to turret sides and hull fronts. and placed
tanks and assault guns were given an efficiency rating of 40 sandbags on the engine deck around intake/exhaust
per cent and were considered much more troublesome gratings. Most units removed turret top machine guns, to
than bunkers. prevent Japanese who clambered aboard from turning
them against Marine infantry.
H: JAPANESE SELF-SACRIFICE, 1945: Sometimes two Type 99 mines were wired together to
'TEN MEN FOR ONE TANK' improve penetration. In other instances two pairs of mines
Most Marine tanks on two Jima were lost to mines, followed were fastened together with small demolition charges
by AT guns: this battle saw the widest use of mines, sandwiched between them, and the four mines were wired
including buried aerial bombs and torpedoes. which between split logs (2). Though little used, the Type 2 (1942)
obliterated tanks and amtracs. However, a number were rifle grenade launcher could fire 30mm and 40mm HEAT
destroyed by desperate close-in infantry attacks. In one grenades, penetrating 30mm and SOmm respectively; the
action involving 12 tanks, one bogged down in sand 1Oft 40mm is illustrated at (3). One fallen soldier has attempted
from a cave, and was swarmed by 30 to 40 Japanese. to throw a bar or 'yardstick' mine (4) with 61b of explosive
(After disabling the guns and radio. the entire tank crew in front of the Sherman's tracks. As a last resort Japanese
managed to fight their way out.) The Japanese commander troops were encouraged to force tank hatches open and
on the island was much concerned by the USMC's attack the crew with grenades - (5) is a Type 99 fragmen-
M4A3 Shermans. fearing that his 4 ?mm Type 1 (1941) AT tation - and even bayonets (6). In Burma one officer
guns could not defeat them (an exaggerated fear. as it boarded an M3 Lee of the British 3rd Carabiniers and killed
turned out.) He ordered preparations to use the Type 99 the commander and turret gunner with his sword, before
(1939) magnetic AT hand mine (99 hako bakurai). a simple being riddled with revolver bullets by the loader. 83
INDEX

ReJ<'r-t~tu-c-'
to illunration!I arr. ithown in bold. Coloul' S.m.iet Union, weapon" and 1.a1rti4-:~ 4!)-itol t'Xf>"dirnt 19-:!1, 20
platr are hown with pag<' and caption lrna10" in "lll~d lt'adrr>C6(3!"i. 60~. 07(311, Iii), 6! d1rgr. concrnuatrd 20. lll
brad<eL. Uh-rnarhinr gunnrn, So\'i<"t Ann)' F5(:!~. t;2) chugcs. double 20, Cll(~~. 60)
chat')("" " "chcl 20. A(:l3. 5Y)
omti-tank. ddent:c ~~-25 tank rl~~Lrnyrr~ r, 'Molocov cocktails W. f4(38. 62>. 17
llriush Amn H Cun Motor C'.arrij!e, M:\ 7'mun 31 l(TC-llade dicharJl<:f, S<hvu/,.,.h,...,.3(1mm CU!Hl'P<' 25
t.~omp;1nv, gcn('ric BC"H. 59) MI0:9 grenade launrhtr, Mi: 28. D2(:i6. 61 i
(;("m1an 5~\-fJI lank-hm11r1 lra1m 21i-2i, BIOCH. :'i!I) , D(.%, Iii) i;i1e1101tlt-., h;md Ill, 11:1
[ap;u1~sc 'iii-~ i. 58 tAnk 1r, ug11i1ion ranb II. 11 llrimh E3-ES1:17. til-62), 4:.!-4'1, 44
SOl-i<-1 f(:IH, l)~l. -17-18 Japanese 'hpc 911 fr.tgmcntation H5(40. 63)
I'S Amir :IJ-'.I:! '"""' lllw armnurrcl fighl in!{
~" nhiclt"~ Ml~WP 04('16.611
anti-tank tat tic11, ~vnlutlon ~2-~~; dt111ou11r11r 4-!'L 9-10 mnkc Ncht-lhandgr-.111a1< (Nhllgr) 3'1 C2('.!:J. 601
;umour(,d lighting 1'd1idc> 5 armour 7-A S.."iet '21.'.l ll, Ii:!), Ii
sr.r alm tank dcstnnt'.1~; 1.-ui k' llri1ih Gl(:m. ti2J ti<k (Slldhanclgranat<") C4(35. 601
a-.ault gum :., G 10(3!1, li:I) d1anu 1rri,.1k~. rs.~e111ial h-7 gnn;uk1. ritklaunched 17. 17-IH. 24, .-12
Gun Motor t:.."lni.lgt, ~t4 7~m111 SI rr("W ( ' 11\frontnt'lll I 11-12 1;(;/l"to: cs1:1:i. 6111. ;,o
hallmck. SdKf/. ~r,1 i I E('.ii. lll-112) hah h.-.</ n1w11ing R, A(:l:J. oYl Jap;uuS< .fllmm 'h-pc 2 H3( 10, ti'.l). 56. 5h
S(()lll Cal"'.\ 1 ht";tH' ;, M!l.-\1: 29. 2ll. Dl!(::lti. !ii l
'infa,JUI'\'' ;, M PI WI' muke D31:16. til)
badge. tank rll'tmLLion ti!J. f.i'.I J;1pa1lt'st' ~2 No.bi!: 44
llriti~h :\rm\ li11ht .t Scwi<'c VP<~S-11: Ii
{~' t1fJu South Afri1:.1n AlmouJ"r.cl lli\i., iun, t1h M~ I.ram 10. 11 .\t.,/1rmnnrr Ii: l!I. 50
llnn li~hl machinr gun cram E61~7. li2l M4 i f\H.-\:l Sht1ma11 6. !I, H 1.-IO. ti:~J. :,:,, :,;, Sii jlllllS l~>-lli,21
Rn\al fank Rq~imcnt. oi: 10 ,,., 1Jl\rr lanl:o-.: Shtnnan 'f'irrfh' 17-pclr ('\in) .JI
f\ritJ.<sih l..-<1mmot1\\'('alth, weapon~ nul ;.ntit-\ :i2. -t l-H f\-l'IAI StuMI light 7 :l7mm I!'>, I Ii, 2!1, 211-2~

llmm. Bo h 31 111t41i11m -1-;1 anu~ain:l'aJI ~1-:!2

mohilil\' limil;Hinn"i 8-~ 1l<"ignatmn "~lrm, llriti>h pounckr' Iii


t;rnnan Am" C{:I'>. fiOI, 6!J pl;i..lilrr. 7.im,,vrJ' :.tntim~nrril
19, l ft Frc-nrh :>. 42
'l;ro,.rlrut.chl.uul' lli,hinn 21 pro1t11i1111, ;ul1li1io11;el 7. ~. HHO. h'.1l. 58 [aani,_,. ll( lO, li1). 55. 5.;, 56
Potn7("rgn:naclu:r'.\ F6(.18, H2) protrl"lion ;11111 rnlnrrahiliti~s 51. 7-12. 11. \I I ~7111111 14. 32
f'111i.!"'lw,,1/'/irn/1f~ ir co\'(1i1J4 l"1:-.i1j(111 Gl~~t. f,2~l:l 1 A(:I'.\. :19). 59 \l:'A I :17mm 28. 211-29
c..:.c-rm;,,111't', \H'apon~ ouul 1..ou1in; l~J..-.r.:, p,Kw Ill ~. 47 M0tl!<'I 'fank Abwchr ( riwrhr 1' 'J'.(;n,."f/it)
1'1.Kw IV 22 13.~mm 3
.-\nsf F 4 Mk I :!-pdr quKk-liring :l~. II. H. 45
..\mf II A(~:~. ''I) Mk 11 l~pdr 41. 11
lnfa..1u'\, auark.lnJt 1anL~ :!~>. 26-!!7 P1Kw \' 1';1111ht1 D(%. Iii), rn11. h:.!) l'aK '.~i:"1 / ~U; '.t7nn 4M. Hl
infomtr). deknf c; tlgain:t;t tanks 2:'.\-:!:1 A1"1' ..\ 6, 27 l'JK :IH '"'m G3('.19, t.i:!.1. .-1~1
lwo [ima HlIO. li:l>. :,7_;,11 P1Kw VI Ti~n I 59 Pali. IU i. '.1t' lll 49. l!l
Slwrni.ul ' firrfh' 41 "" n/.w lnk<: Ml / MIAc~ />111>:erfmul 1ec:o1lle" G7(3!1, 62). 5::!- 5$. 114
faf>an, weapon.\ a.111l t#t.ntn1. !l!......;"'18 SIH'l'l1Ml1 1ehu...,,, l'nm.,.,fm.<r/u 41 (sPzll 411 51
Japanc5e ~dr~an-ifin 2i. H( IO, ~i:'il. !lfi 'ta11krll"' I Smicl 45. lo. Iii, IM
thna1 from ~7 'squeat' IMJl'r 4!1-~11), SI
munitions Ill. 1:~1r, uuit 1u-~;mi1.,;t.tio11 11-1 ~ i11fanlrT Ci'.\!'>, till)
~tY fll.,o WC."ill)JOll!i minr< I~. :!U, 811 (:1-1, 5'1)
t.annour-picrdng s.hol I~ I "hi. l.1 Erlwanl I;, ~I hand 18
chemical 111--l~l \ ' nilf'tl S1a1r:o-, wr;tpnn" .111<l 1ani<-s 2~:i2 .fapanc<" HI, H2, H4! 10, IHl. :,6, 57. ;,;, 61
l'"rJ:.rrj'au.tt 5:!. S4 I :s i \ntl\' ~1-~2. Di:lti. Cil .1 l'anzl'nntrfmint I Lhrow11 :11
"h.ap.-cl/ hollow ch.ugc ' I :1-14 P.11-.1d1111r lnfancn R1g1. ~ffllh ti:l So\'iel 1111-'.U! "'71. ~K. ti:!l
:1.5in HEAT El!Cl7, t>l 1. 12 lank llrslfo\'('I Forn 2M, 31 Tell<"1 lllli '.I!'>: 20
Ll'Ll(f Iii and fil: 25 I IS \la>inr Corp' !'>7-'>~. !18 rnnrta,.... :!I, G9i'.1\I, t;:!--ti'.I )
llr1ft-ll0Jil/111/1111grrr .~kg 111,,n-111 :ll !II. ~I PL\I' il'rn111or, lnla111r;-. Anti-'l:mkl. fl.lk I El 13i. til I.
'.'>16Al.: ,\2/ .-\ :1 lll::AT 30-'.ll. DI 1.:11;. Iii), 60 V;iiallrll, I./ Cpl Villi Ii.~ no
l'lJll IO/ 'Al'IO' Ill \'t"hiclt". lc>n! l_-1011 41, -11 'prnjc:nor. mpoulc' lampulumn ), ~wire .-17

Rl'11\(;r Hl:!i H2~ llEAT 52. 53 "'" dfo, 4'r11u>1Jl't-1l li~htlng \'l'hlf:les rifle lt.:.--17. :!I
nook<' 11-l!'J. ~7 Vir1.t.1~1.. <lhrr,llf'lJIU~tnt (~l1111er h :i Bo\'' Mk I 055in 11 ~1~. 4'.'I
'>qua. h hracl" I ~ c.;rm1an l'zli :.o. 52
W'OJMUl~ c;m11t1lbii.,.rlv .l~ (( ;.11 :1!11 wcnadc-laund1m,:: ll-4, ~o

olnlMk" anti-t..111k 2~. 24. 84, B!l(~4. f1'l> -' " rtlH1 muni~iott)ri.; t;u1k,, 01nnameu1 J1panrM :.!'Omm T''JX' 97: 55
irr <li.><1 rnarlhlod.,, ha1rn1<is. J;1p;m" ' H6(40, li:ll Panz<"rbuscla Cl'lll) :111: l!4 , Cl(.%, 1;c)I, "O. S2
Uk..iua"a ~j gum. ><anll '1. EL~i. tll--62~. GIO ('.t~, ti3) ' rrcoillc"'\ 17
orcluann: rlispo~I tug111nr 20 gum. ~lK :!c 111 C'.4CW. 6:.!l Solothum '.!Omm ll'.lllOO: 15
111dd1i11r gun<. Ml;'.'lI arHI \IC-12 Gll('.N, li2 :1 Smict FI! :18, 6~), 46. lti, 47
riflcnwn, (;,.m1an c1:1:,, ~~,, mirw, ;1111i-p<"nu1111rl ~Minr %0 rork<'t launchcr, l'rrn:rnrhrYf"i< (Rpz8 43/ !i41 8.&m
ruarlhlo.-k. 88c:H. oi~!i. E(~7. f>l-62l 1in.-, K.11lHk CS( :~~. 6CI') GS!:l!I. ti:! l . ,; 1 --5~. Sl
~t'I' dl.io oh!11L.1dr~. anti-t;tnk rin1-. MI D2t:~h. 61 :1 nKkct 1;1.UJlc her. Rack.etcn"''c rfrr ti H.8rm
Rini. M 141XA~ 8row11i1111; A111nm,uic D5(31i, Iii 1 l./'upprl1m -- "Dulh') ;,1, 52
.\c1~l'ant n1111matulcr. ;, l<TR 10 .uhm<11'11inr 1:1111. \IP-lfl: 63 rod.et la11mlwn (b>zookJ.) 17, 26. 29-31
.~nipC"rs, l;.~;nndn G6(:'\9. G2> v.'t"apon"', ;1111i-1;.mk 12-~~ Ml i MIAI ~.36111 15, 27. 30, :10, lf:i
.'>olllh :\frit:<111 :\rmou11d lli\iion, lith 8 .111i111n. li..t<I 21. H W .1/ M\.IAI :! ..11ii11 30 ..10. Dl<:lti. til L 60
84 Stwil~I r1nli-ta11k ddl1u.T in huihup illt'I fCiH, f-2'1 S<"1.-1 /.i~:1 7li.2mm 22 orii;..'lu of name jl

You might also like