The Lawyers Philosophical Map and The Disputants Perceptual Map Impediments To

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WILLIAM GOLDMAN
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10/3/2011
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THE LAWYER\rquote S PHILOSOPHICAL MAP AND THE..., 6 Harv. Negotiation L....
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6 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 145
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Harvard Negotiation Law Review
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Spring 2001
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Article
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THE LAWYER\rquote S PHILOSOPHICAL MAP AND THE DISPUTANT\rquote S PERCEPTUAL MAP:
IMPEDIMENTS TO FACILITATIVE MEDIATION AND LAWYERING
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Chris Guthrie
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Copyright (c) 2001 Harvard Negotiation Law Review; Chris Guthrie
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INTRODUCTION
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I.
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THE PURIST VIEW OF MEDIATION
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150
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II.
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LAWYER-MEDIATOR FACILITATION
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A. The Lawyer\rquote s Standard Philosophical Map
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1. Analytical Acumen
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2. Emotional Unintelligence
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3. Adversarial Orientation
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4. Summary
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B. The Disputant\rquote s Standard Perceptual Map
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1. Lawyers as Legal Experts
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2. Lawyers as Gladiators
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3. Lawyers as Deceivers
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4. Summary
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C. Mediation Hypothetical
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1. Introduction
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4. Assisted Negotiation
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D. The Lawyer-Mediator\rquote s Role
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III.
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A. Should Lawyers Adopt a Different Philosophical Map?
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C. What Role Should Law Schools Play?
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}
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CONCLUSION
{\ri50 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li50 \qr \b0
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187
}\i0 \ri50 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li50 \qr \b0 \intbl \cell \row }}
}
}
}
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}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_111958_146_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_111958_146_1}
*146
}
}
Introduction
\par
}
}
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{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E5VAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E5VAE_1}
Professor Leonard Riskin developed his controversial grid to \u8220\'3fcategoriz
e the various approaches to mediation.\u8221\'3f
}
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}
Consistent with his pluralistic view, Riskin argues that mediation includes bot
h facilitation and evaluation.
}
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2
}}}
}
Facilitative mediation occurs where the mediator strives to help the parties co
mmunicate with one another so they can resolve their dispute on their own terms.
Mediators who use a facilitative approach \u8220\'3fassume that [their] princip
al mission is to clarify and to enhance communications between the parties in or
der to help them decide what to do.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F3284591023_ID0EFXA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
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3
}}}
}
Evaluative mediation, by contrast, occurs where the mediator tries not only to
help the parties communicate with one another but also to provide the parties wi
th information and opinions on the substance of their dispute. Evaluative mediat
ors, thus, \u8220\'3fassume that the participants want and need the mediator to
provide some direction as to the appropriate grounds for settlement--based on la
w, industry practice or technology.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F4284591023_ID0EVXA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
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4
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E3XAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E3XAE_1}
Riskin\rquote s categorization of mediation has engendered much debate among aca
demics and practitioners.
}
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{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F5284591023_ID0EEYA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
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5
}}}
}
Although most in the mediation community accept Riskin\rquote s positive assert
ion that mediation
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*147
}
}
as currently practiced includes both facilitation and evaluation,
}
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{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F6284591023_ID0EMYA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F6284591023_ID0EMYA}
6
}}}
}
a vocal group of purist critics rejects Riskin\rquote s pluralist view of media
tion on normative grounds. These purist critics--including such prominent mediat
or-scholars as Professors Kim Kovach,
}
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{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F7284591023_ID0ESYA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
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7
}}}
}
Lela Love,
}
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{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F8284591023_ID0EVYA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F8284591023_ID0EVYA}
8
}}}
}
and
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*148
}
}
Josh Stulberg
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F9284591023_ID0E4YA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
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9
}}}
}
--argue that mediation is in fact, and should be, solely a facilitative process
\u8220\'3fdesigned to capture the parties\rquote insights, imagination, and ide
as that help them to participate in identifying and shaping their preferred outc
omes.\u8221\'3f
}
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{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F10284591023_ID0ELZ}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
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10
}}}
}
For the purists, evaluation has no place in mediation.
}
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{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F11284591023_ID0EPZ}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
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11
}}}
\par
}
}
}
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{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EWZAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EWZAE_1}
I do not seek in this article to add my voice to the chorus debating the relativ
e merits of the pluralist and purist approaches to mediation.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F12284591023_ID0E5Z}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
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12
}}}
}
Instead, despite my belief that the pluralists win this debate as both a positi
ve and normative matter, I intend to imagine for purposes of this article that t
he purists actually prevail upon state legislatures, regulators, mediation train
ers, and members of the mediation community at large to mandate a purely facilit
ative approach to mediation. Having successfully conjured up an image of
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*149
}
}
this purely facilitative mediation world, I then seek to make the impertinent c
laim that mediation is highly unlikely to be a purely facilitative process as lo
ng as lawyers serve as mediators.
\par
}
}
}
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{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EP1AE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EP1AE_1}
This claim rests on two intuitions, one about lawyers and the other about non-la
wyers\rquote perceptions of lawyers. My first intuition is that lawyers are unl
ikely to possess the personalities, predispositions, skills, and training necess
ary to mediate in a purely facilitative, non-evaluative way. The facilitative me
diator, according to the purists, aims to reorient parties toward one another, t
o listen carefully, to help the parties communicate, to attend to emotions and r
elationship issues, and to avoid opining based on law.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F13284591023_ID0E41}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
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13
}}}
}
The professionals who seem best-suited to mediate according to the purist model
are psychotherapists, social workers, school counselors, clergy, and others who
are inclined toward, and thoroughly trained in, the use of such skills. In cont
rast, lawyers--who tend to be better speakers than listeners, better thinkers th
an feelers, and better advisors than counselors--operate according to a \u8220\'
3fstandard philosophical map\u8221\'3f
}
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14
}}}
}
that compromises their ability to function successfully as purely facilitative
mediators.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EM2AE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EM2AE_1}
My second intuition is that disputants perceive lawyers and non-lawyers differen
tly. They imagine that lawyers possess greater knowledge of the law and legal sy
stem, less emotional and interpersonal sensitivity, and lower ethical standards
than other professionals who might serve as mediators. This means, in turn, that
disputants are likely to perceive facilitative behavior on the part of lawyer-m
ediators differently than identical behavior on the part of non-lawyer-mediators
. Suppose, for instance, that a mediator asks a plaintiff in a personal injury c
ase the following facilitative question: \u8220\'3fCan you describe what your li
fe has been like since the accident?\u8221\'3f Disputants are likely to ascribe
different connotations to this question--even if it is phrased the same way, spo
ken in the same tone, and accompanied by identical body language--depending upon
the professional background of the mediator. If the mediator is a psychotherapi
st, for instance, disputants are likely to perceive that the mediator is asking
the question out of genuine interest in the plaintiff\rquote s feelings. If the
mediator is a lawyer, the disputants are more likely to suspect that the mediato
r is asking primarily to get a sense of the money damages appropriate to the cas
e. Disputants, in short, are likely to share a \u8220\'3fstandard perceptual map
\u8221\'3f that predisposes them to
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*150
}
}
view lawyer-mediators as evaluative rather than facilitative dispute resolvers.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E23AE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E23AE_1}
There is a growing body of empirical evidence on the lawyer\rquote s philosophic
al map and the non-lawyer\rquote s perceptual map. Drawing from that evidence, a
nd from what can reasonably be inferred from it, I argue in this article that me
diation is unlikely to be purely facilitative as long as lawyers serve as mediat
ors. I begin in Part I by describing the purist approach to mediation. In Part I
I, I use available empirical evidence as well as a mediation hypothetical to dev
elop my argument that lawyer-mediators compromise purely facilitative mediation.
Finally, I conclude in Part III by briefly considering some of the implications
of this argument for lawyering. Specifically, I explore whether lawyers can--an
d whether they should--behave differently.
\par
}
}
}
}
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{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EW4AE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EW4AE_1}
I. The Purist View of Mediation
\par
}
}
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Mediation is a process in which an impartial third party helps others resolve a
dispute.
}
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15
}}}
}
Mediation differs from litigation, as well as arbitration and many other disput
e resolution processes, in that the mediator, in contrast to a judge or arbitrat
or, is not authorized to impose a decision.
}
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16
}}}
}
Rather, the mediator is authorized only to aid the parties in developing their
own agreements.
}
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17
}}}
}
Mediation, in short, is \u8220\'3ffacilitated negotiation,\u8221\'3f
}
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18
}}}
}
and the mediator is the negotiation facilitator.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
While the purists acknowledge that a range of facilitative and evaluative activi
ties currently fall under this generally accepted definition of mediation,
}
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19
}}}
}
they reject this inclusive conception of mediation on normative grounds. For th
e purists, mediation must be a purely facilitative, non-evaluative process in wh
ich \u8220\'3fparties are taught how to resolve their own disputes, listen to ea
ch other differently, broaden their own capacities for understanding and collabo
ration, and create resolutions that build relationships, generate more harmony,
and are \u8216\'3fwin-win.\u8221\'3f\u8217\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F20284591023_ID0EW6}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F20284591023_ID0EW6}
20
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Because the purists view mediation as a purely facilitative process, the purists
expect the mediator to behave in a purely facilitative
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*151
}
}
way. To do so, the facilitative mediator assists \u8220\'3fdisputing parties in
making their own decisions and evaluating their own situations.\u8221\'3f
}
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{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F21284591023_ID0EYA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F21284591023_ID0EYA}
21
}}}
}
Through the careful deployment of communication skills, information gathering a
nd organizing skills, and \u8220\'3fcounseling and calming skills,\u8221\'3f
}
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{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F22284591023_ID0E2A}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F22284591023_ID0E2A}
22
}}}
}
the facilitative mediator may \u8220\'3fpush disputing parties to question thei
r assumptions, reconsider their positions, and listen to each other\rquote s per
spectives, stories, and arguments\u8221\'3f and may \u8220\'3furge the parties t
o consider relevant law, weigh their own values, principles, and priorities, and
develop an optimal outcome.\u8221\'3f
}
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{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F23284591023_ID0ESB}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F23284591023_ID0ESB}
23
}}}
}
The facilitative mediator may not, however, offer \u8220\'3fan opinion or judgm
ent as to the likely court outcome or a \u8216\'3ffair\u8217\'3f or correct reso
lution of an issue in a dispute.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F24284591023_ID0E6B}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F24284591023_ID0E6B}
24
}}}
\par
}
}
}
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{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EGCAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EGCAG_1}
The purists prescribe mediator facilitation and proscribe mediator evaluation fo
r three primary reasons. First, the purists argue that mediation \u8220\'3fshoul
d stand as a distinct and clear-cut alternative to the evaluative and frequently
highly adversarial processes that lawyers know best.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F25284591023_ID0E1C}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F25284591023_ID0E1C}
25
}}}
}
The civil litigation system rests on an adversarial paradigm, which posits that
the \u8220\'3ftruth\u8221\'3f of a dispute emerges through the presentation of
competing positions to a judge or jury empowered to decide by applying rules of
law to the \u8220\'3ffacts\u8221\'3f asserted by the disputants.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F26284591023_ID0E6C}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F26284591023_ID0E6C}
26
}}}
}
Like litigation, such familiar \u8220\'3falternative\u8221\'3f dispute resoluti
on processes as arbitration
}
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{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F27284591023_ID0ECD}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F27284591023_ID0ECD}
27
}}}
}
and \u8220\'3frent a judge\u8221\'3f procedures
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F28284591023_ID0EFD}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F28284591023_ID0EFD}
28
}}}
}
are premised on the adversarial paradigm. Because disputants can participate in
any number of adversarial, evaluative dispute resolution processes, the purists
argue that \u8220\'3f[w]e need a genuine alternative to the adversarial paradig
m of disputants who fight and a neutral who assesses.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F29284591023_ID0EWD}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F29284591023_ID0EWD}
29
}}}
}
That alternative, claim the purists, is a purely facilitative, non-evaluative m
ediation process.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E6DAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E6DAG_1}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*152
}
}
Second, the purists argue that evaluation undermines party self-determination,
which they see as \u8220\'3fthe fundamental goal of mediation.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F30284591023_ID0ELE}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F30284591023_ID0ELE}
30
}}}
}
They contend that evaluative behavior undermines party self-determination becau
se the mediator\rquote s words and actions have a profound impact on the parties
\rquote ability to exercise their self-determination. \u8220\'3fThe truth is th
at we never know what happens when we utter something,\u8221\'3f Love argues. \u
8220\'3fWe never know the weight it has with people.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F31284591023_ID0EIF}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F31284591023_ID0EIF}
31
}}}
}
Specifically, mediator evaluations may redirect the
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*153
}
}
parties from each other to the mediator,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F32284591023_ID0EQF}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F32284591023_ID0EQF}
32
}}}
}
lock parties into adversarial negotiation positions,
}
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{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F33284591023_ID0ETF}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F33284591023_ID0ETF}
33
}}}
}
prevent parties from sharing information with one another,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F34284591023_ID0EWF}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F34284591023_ID0EWF}
34
}}}
}
and stop parties from engaging in creative problem-solving.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F35284591023_ID0E2F}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F35284591023_ID0E2F}
35
}}}
}
In short, mediator evaluation may prevent parties from \u8220\'3fcraft[ing] out
comes for themselves.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F36284591023_ID0E6F}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F36284591023_ID0E6F}
36
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EGGAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EGGAG_1}
Third, the purists advocate a purely facilitative, non-evaluative approach becau
se they believe evaluation threatens the neutrality of the mediation process. Ne
utrality, which \u8220\'3fis deeply imbedded in the ethos of mediation,\u8221\'3
f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F37284591023_ID0EYG}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F37284591023_ID0EYG}
37
}}}
}
promotes parties\rquote confidence and trust in the process,
}
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{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F38284591023_ID0E2G}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F38284591023_ID0E2G}
38
}}}
}
encourages parties to share information with one another,
}
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{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F39284591023_ID0E5G}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F39284591023_ID0E5G}
39
}}}
}
and plays a part in producing high levels of party satisfaction.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F40284591023_ID0EDH}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F40284591023_ID0EDH}
40
}}}
}
The purists contend that evaluation threatens the neutrality
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*154
}
}
of the mediation process because any evaluation \u8220\'3finvariably favors one
side over the other.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F41284591023_ID0EWH}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F41284591023_ID0EWH}
41
}}}
}
When a mediator offers an opinion favoring one party, that opinion can have del
eterious consequences. The advantaged party \u8220\'3fmay get locked into an una
cceptable claim or position and negotiations may stop altogether.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F42284591023_ID0EHI}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F42284591023_ID0EHI}
42
}}}
}
The disadvantaged party, by contrast, \u8220\'3fis likely to withdraw from the
mediation, believing that the mediator has \u8216\'3fsided\u8217\'3f with the ot
her party.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F43284591023_ID0EVI}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F43284591023_ID0EVI}
43
}}}
}
Only by steadfastly refusing to evaluate can a mediator \u8220\'3fencourage par
ties to examine and articulate underlying interests; recognize common interests
and complementary goals; and engage in creative problem-solving to find resoluti
ons acceptable and optimal for all parties.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F44284591023_ID0ECJ}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F44284591023_ID0ECJ}
44
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EJJAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EJJAG_1}
In sum, the purists believe that evaluation is \u8220\'3fconceptually different
from and operationally inconsistent with, the values and goals\u8221\'3f of faci
litative mediation.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F45284591023_ID0E1J}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F45284591023_ID0E1J}
45
}}}
}
Evaluators and facilitators use \u8220\'3fdifferent skills and techniques\u8221
\'3f and possess \u8220\'3fdifferent competencies, training norms, and ethical g
uidelines to perform their respective functions.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F46284591023_ID0EIK}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F46284591023_ID0EIK}
46
}}}
}
Because of the fundamental differences between facilitation and evaluation, the
purists contend that mediation must be a purely facilitative, non-evaluative pr
ocess that \u8220\'3freorient[s] the parties towards each other, not by imposing
rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of th
eir relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitude and disposition
s toward one another.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F47284591023_ID0EVK}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F47284591023_ID0EVK}
47
}}}
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E3KAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E3KAG_1}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*155
}
}
II. Lawyer-Mediator Facilitation
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EKLAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EKLAG_1}
The presence of lawyer-mediators compromises the purely facilitative mediation p
rocess envisioned by the purists in two ways. First, lawyers seldom have the per
sonalities and skills necessary to mediate in a purely facilitative way. Second,
disputants are likely to perceive lawyer-mediators as evaluative even when they
are exhibiting facilitative behaviors. Empirical evidence, though certainly not
conclusive, provides some support for both propositions.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E6LAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E6LAG_1}
A. The Lawyer\rquote s Standard Philosophical Map
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EJMAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EJMAG_1}
Professor Riskin observed nearly two decades ago that most lawyers operate accor
ding to a \u8220\'3fstandard philosophical map\u8221\'3f which rests on the twin
assumptions that disputants are adversaries and that disputes should be resolve
d according to the application of law to fact.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F48284591023_ID0ERM}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F48284591023_ID0ERM}
48
}}}
}
Because lawyers rely on this philosophical map, they are inclined to behave in
an evaluative fashion. Lawyers \u8220\'3fput people and events into categories t
hat are legally meaningful,\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F49284591023_ID0EAN}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F49284591023_ID0EAN}
49
}}}
}
\u8220\'3fthink in terms of rights and duties established by rules,\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F50284591023_ID0EMN}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F50284591023_ID0EMN}
50
}}}
}
and \u8220\'3ffocus on acts more than persons.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F51284591023_ID0E1N}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F51284591023_ID0E1N}
51
}}}
}
To do this, lawyers exercise formidable cognitive skills but are often plagued
by an \u8220\'3funder-cultivation of emotional faculties.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F52284591023_ID0E6N}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F52284591023_ID0E6N}
52
}}}
}
This underdevelopment of emotional faculties makes it difficult, if not impossi
ble, for lawyers to do what facilitative mediators must--\u8220\'3fbe aware of t
he many interconnections between and among disputants and others,\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F53284591023_ID0ELO}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F53284591023_ID0ELO}
53
}}}
}
appreciate \u8220\'3fthe qualities of these connections,\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F54284591023_ID0EOO}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F54284591023_ID0EOO}
54
}}}
}
and \u8220\'3fbe sensitive to emotional needs of all parties.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F55284591023_ID0E3O}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F55284591023_ID0E3O}
55
}}}
}
In sum, Riskin observed, \u8220\'3f[t]he philosophical map employed by most
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*156
}
}
practicing lawyers and law teachers . . . differs radically from that which a m
ediator must use.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F56284591023_ID0EOP}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F56284591023_ID0EOP}
56
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EVPAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EVPAG_1}
Riskin\rquote s observations about lawyers appear to be supported by a fairly si
zeable body of research on lawyers and law students.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F57284591023_ID0E4P}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F57284591023_ID0E4P}
57
}}}
}
Consistent with Riskin\rquote s observations, researchers have found that lawye
rs approach the world with \u8220\'3fa cognitive and rational outlook,\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F58284591023_ID0EAQ}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F58284591023_ID0EAQ}
58
}}}
}
possess relatively underdeveloped emotional and interpersonal faculties, and te
nd toward an adversarial orientation. These characteristics, in turn, make it un
likely that lawyer-mediators can sustain purely facilitative behavior in mediati
on.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EMQAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EMQAG_1}
1. Analytical Acumen
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EWQAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EWQAG_1}
Most lawyers, perhaps by personality as well as by training and practice, approa
ch the world in an abstract, analytical way. Lawyers are deemed so rational and
analytical, in fact, that \u8220\'3fbrain researchers have selected lawyers when
they wished to test an occupational group that is characteristically analytical
in its preferred mode of thought.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F59284591023_ID0EJR}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F59284591023_ID0EJR}
59
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EQRAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EQRAG_1}
Scholars using a variety of methodologies have demonstrated that lawyers are ana
lytically inclined. Researchers using a brain-dominance testing instrument, for
instance, have found that nearly 90% of lawyers are \u8220\'3fleft-brain dominan
t,\u8221\'3f indicating an analytical orientation.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F60284591023_ID0E2R}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F60284591023_ID0E2R}
60
}}}
}
Researchers have also used the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) to assess law
yers\rquote personalities. The MBTI, which is
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*157
}
}
based on Jungian psychology, measures four dimensions of personality, including
whether one is inclined toward \u8220\'3fthinking\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3ffeelin
g.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F61284591023_ID0EIS}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F61284591023_ID0EIS}
61
}}}
}
Thinkers \u8220\'3fmake decisions more analytically and impersonally\u8221\'3f
than Feelers.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F62284591023_ID0EWS}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F62284591023_ID0EWS}
62
}}}
}
\u8220\'3fWhen making decisions, they place more value on consistency and fairn
ess than on how others will be affected. They look for flaws and fallacies, exce
lling at critiquing conclusions and pinpointing what is wrong with something.\u8
221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F63284591023_ID0EHT}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F63284591023_ID0EHT}
63
}}}
}
Researchers from the 1960s to the 1990s have found that lawyers are substantial
ly more inclined toward the \u8220\'3fthinking\u8221\'3f orientation than the po
pulation as a whole.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F64284591023_ID0EMT}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F64284591023_ID0EMT}
64
}}}
}
Lawyers, in short, \u8220\'3ftend to be more logical, unemotional, rational, an
d objective\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F65284591023_ID0EYT}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F65284591023_ID0EYT}
65
}}}
}
than others and place a \u8220\'3fgreat emphasis on logic, thinking, rationalit
y, justice, fairness, rights, and rules.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F66284591023_ID0EFU}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F66284591023_ID0EFU}
66
}}}
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EMUAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EMUAG_1}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*158
}
}
2. Emotional Unintelligence
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E1UAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E1UAG_1}
Lawyers\rquote analytical tools give them \u8220\'3fenormous power,\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F67284591023_ID0EAV}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F67284591023_ID0EAV}
67
}}}
}
allowing them \u8220\'3fto generalize on the basis of diverse facts (working to
abstraction from the bottom up)\u8221\'3f and \u8220\'3fto apply an existing le
gal rule or factual generalization to a new set of facts (working through abstra
ction from the top down).\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F68284591023_ID0EYV}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F68284591023_ID0EYV}
68
}}}
}
As a result, lawyers can successfully perform the critical task of translating
\u8220\'3fthe complex and undefined difficulties presented by a client into a pr
oblem of a known type that can be reduced to puzzle form and attacked by the use
of a familiar set of rules.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F69284591023_ID0EGW}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F69284591023_ID0EGW}
69
}}}
}
Unfortunately, however, lawyers\rquote analytical prowess is \u8220\'3fpurchas
ed at the price of a loss of concrete information\u8221\'3f because abstract ana
lysis necessarily reduces complexity.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F70284591023_ID0EUW}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F70284591023_ID0EUW}
70
}}}
}
When information is too complex or too subtle to lend itself to abstract reduct
ion, lawyers often have difficulty understanding, interpreting, and working with
such information.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F71284591023_ID0EZW}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F71284591023_ID0EZW}
71
}}}
}
One task that requires \u8220\'3fa gestalt appreciation of an unedited set of c
oncrete data, rather than abstract analytical reduction,\u8221\'3f is the \u8220
\'3frecognition and interpretation of subtle displays of emotion.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F72284591023_ID0EPX}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F72284591023_ID0EPX}
72
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EWXAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EWXAG_1}
For all their analytical skills, most lawyers seem fairly uninterested in, and u
nskilled at, dealing with emotional and interpersonal content.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F73284591023_ID0E5X}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F73284591023_ID0E5X}
73
}}}
}
Researchers using the MBTI, for example, have found not only that lawyers are m
ore inclined toward the \u8220\'3fthinking\u8221\'3f orientation than the popula
tion as a whole,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F74284591023_ID0EBY}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F74284591023_ID0EBY}
74
}}}
}
but also that lawyers are substantially less inclined toward the \u8220\'3ffeel
ing\u8221\'3f orientation.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F75284591023_ID0EGY}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F75284591023_ID0EGY}
75
}}}
}
Feelers \u8220\'3fmake decisions more subjectively [than Thinkers], according t
o their values or what is more important to them. They also place greater emphas
is on how other people will be affected by their choices and actions . . . . It
is possible for them to decide whether something is acceptable or
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*159
}
}
agreeable without needing logical reasons.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F76284591023_ID0E3Y}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F76284591023_ID0E3Y}
76
}}}
}
Professors John Barkai and Virginia Fine administered the Truax Accurate Empath
y Scale to law students and found that even after undergoing empathy training, l
aw students obtained an average score below Level Five on the scale, \u8220\'3ft
he minimum level of facilitative interpersonal functioning.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F77284591023_ID0EKZ}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F77284591023_ID0EKZ}
77
}}}
}
Professor G. Andrew Benjamin and his colleagues, who undertook a comprehensive
study of the mental health and well-being of law students and lawyers, found ele
vated levels of mental distress
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F78284591023_ID0ENZ}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F78284591023_ID0ENZ}
78
}}}
}
and speculated that this could be due to the \u8220\'3f[u]nbalanced development
of [law] student interpersonal skills.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F79284591023_ID0E2Z}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F79284591023_ID0E2Z}
79
}}}
}
Professor James Hedegard, in his study of BYU law students found \u8220\'3fdrop
s in sociability and, more generally, interest in people\u8221\'3f during the fi
rst year of law school.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F80284591023_ID0EJ1}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F80284591023_ID0EJ1}
80
}}}
}
And Professor Sandra Janoff, who studied the moral reasoning of law students be
fore and after the first year of law school, found that law students became less
\u8220\'3fcaring\u8221\'3f during their first year of formal legal education.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F81284591023_ID0EN1}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F81284591023_ID0EN1}
81
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EU1AG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EU1AG_1}
On balance, this research suggests that lawyers are \u8220\'3fless interested in
people, in emotions, and interpersonal concerns\u8221\'3f than
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*160
}
}
others.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F82284591023_ID0EK2}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F82284591023_ID0EK2}
82
}}}
}
In fact, the research \u8220\'3fsuggests that humanistic, people-oriented indiv
iduals do not fare well, psychologically or academically, in law school or in th
e legal profession.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F83284591023_ID0EX2}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F83284591023_ID0EX2}
83
}}}
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E52AG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E52AG_1}
3. Adversarial Orientation
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EI3AG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EI3AG_1}
Whether because of their innate personalities, their legal training, the realiti
es of law practice, or some combination thereof, lawyers tend to mirror the adve
rsarial system. Research shows that lawyers are competitive and aggressive
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F84284591023_ID0ER3}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F84284591023_ID0ER3}
84
}}}
}
and that they perceive the world in rule-based, law-and-order, rights-oriented
terms. Lawyers tend to operate, in other words, on the assumption that society c
an best resolve its disputes through the aggressive application of rules to fact
s.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Researchers using different theoretical frameworks have found that lawyers are d
isproportionately oriented to an adversarial worldview. Professor Lawrence Landw
ehr, for instance, assessed lawyers using a test instrument derived from Profess
or Lawrence Kohlberg\rquote s theory of moral reasoning and development.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F85284591023_ID0EI4}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F85284591023_ID0EI4}
85
}}}
}
Kohlberg\rquote s
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*161
}
}
theory,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F86284591023_ID0EQ4}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F86284591023_ID0EQ4}
86
}}}
}
which has been called \u8220\'3fthe most widely accepted theory describing how
individuals develop their capacity to reason as moral agents,\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F87284591023_ID0E34}
87
}}}
}
posits that there are six stages of moral reasoning.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F88284591023_ID0EB5}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F88284591023_ID0EB5}
88
}}}
}
In his assessment of nearly 200 lawyers, Landwehr found that more than 90% of l
awyers reside at Kohlberg\rquote s stage four, while only 30-50% of the populati
on as a whole is concentrated at that stage.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F89284591023_ID0EG5}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F89284591023_ID0EG5}
89
}}}
}
Stage four is a \u8220\'3flaw and order\u8221\'3f stage, and those at stage fou
r are inclined toward \u8220\'3fauthority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of t
he social order.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F90284591023_ID0EU5}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F90284591023_ID0EU5}
90
}}}
}
Landwehr found that fewer than three percent of lawyers are at Kohlberg\rquote
s stage five, while approximately 25% of the adult population as a whole is at t
hat stage.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F91284591023_ID0EZ5}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F91284591023_ID0EZ5}
91
}}}
}
Those at stage five, like those at stage four, are legalistic in orientation, b
ut they recognize
}
\u8220\'3fthe relativism of personal values and opinions\u8221\'3f and place \u8
220\'3fa corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus.\u8
221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F92284591023_ID0EQ6}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F92284591023_ID0EQ6}
92
}}}
}
Those at stage five, in short, are less deferential to established rules and ar
e more willing to question established frameworks for resolving disputes.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F93284591023_ID0EU6}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F93284591023_ID0EU6}
93
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*162
}
}
Challenging the universality of Kohlberg\rquote s theory,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F94284591023_ID0EFA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F94284591023_ID0EFA}
94
}}}
}
Professor Carol Gilligan
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F95284591023_ID0EIA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F95284591023_ID0EIA}
95
}}}
}
posited that women reason in a \u8220\'3fcare\u8221\'3f - based, relationship-o
riented way, while men are more inclined to reason in an abstract, \u8220\'3frig
hts\u8221\'3f -based way.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F96284591023_ID0ENA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F96284591023_ID0ENA}
96
}}}
}
Applying a Gilligan-based assessment instrument to law students, Janoff found t
hat male students were likely to enter law school with a \u8220\'3frights\u8221\
'3f orientation, while \u8220\'3fwomen were more likely to respond to moral dile
mmas with a care perspective.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F97284591023_ID0E2A}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F97284591023_ID0E2A}
97
}}}
}
At the end of the first year, however, \u8220\'3fthere was no significant diffe
rence between the rights orientations of women and men.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F98284591023_ID0EJB}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F98284591023_ID0EJB}
98
}}}
}
By the end of the first year, women, like men, \u8220\'3fwere less likely to be
oriented to the interconnectedness of others. They also were more likely to reg
ard individuals as separate entities. In addition, women were more likely to rel
y on principles for conflict resolution and to seek reasons for particular behav
iors.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F99284591023_ID0E4B}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F99284591023_ID0E4B}
99
}}}
}
The research evidence suggests then that \u8220\'3flawyers\rquote approach to
problems and values is significantly more homogeneous and more focused on object
ive, rational analysis of rules and codified rights than the general population.
\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F100284591023_ID0EK}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F100284591023_ID0EK}
100
}}}
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ERCBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ERCBG_1}
4. Summary
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E2CBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E2CBG_1}
Lawyers are analytically oriented, emotionally and interpersonally underdevelope
d, and as adversarial as the legal system within
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*163
}
}
which they operate.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F101284591023_ID0EI}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F101284591023_ID0EI}
101
}}}
}
Lawyers\rquote default personality or \u8220\'3fphilosophical map\u8221\'3f ma
y serve them well when they represent clients in litigation
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F102284591023_ID0EL}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F102284591023_ID0EL}
102
}}}
}
or when they function as neutrals in processes like arbitration or evaluative m
ediation, but does it serve them well when they attempt to function as facilitat
ive mediators?
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EUDBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EUDBG_1}
On the one hand, it seems likely that lawyers\rquote analytical skills, emotion
al distance, and comfort with a rule-based regime will aid them in carrying out
some of the facilitative mediator\rquote s tasks. Lawyer-mediators, for instance
, will likely be able to discern the substantive content conveyed by disputants,
identify issues to be discussed, structure the conversation in a logical and li
near fashion, avoid emotional involvement in the dispute, and contemplate a vari
ety of legal considerations that might potentially aid the parties in reaching r
esolution.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EDEBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EDEBG_1}
On the other hand, it seems likely that lawyers\rquote personalities and predis
positions will preclude them from mediating in a purely facilitative, non-evalua
tive way. Lawyers are so analytically inclined, for instance, it seems unlikely
that they will consistently be able to exercise the flexibility, creativity, and
imagination necessary to aid parties in resolving their disputes.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F103284591023_ID0EO}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F103284591023_ID0EO}
103
}}}
}
Lawyers, in other words, are likely to skillfully exercise \u8220\'3f[j]udgment
, criticism, tough-mindedness, and practicality,\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F104284591023_ID0E1}
104
}}}
}
but to the detriment of the imagination, creativity, and \u8220\'3fgeneration o
f options and breakthrough ideas\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F105284591023_ID0EG}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F105284591023_ID0EG}
105
}}}
}
necessary in facilitative mediation.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
106
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ERFBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ERFBG_1}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*164
}
}
Because lawyers appear to possess relatively underdeveloped emotional and inter
personal faculties, it seems unlikely that lawyers will be skilled at actively l
istening to parties, attending to their verbal and non-verbal cues, picking up o
n subtle displays of emotion, and \u8220\'3freorienting\u8221\'3f the parties to
ward one another.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F107284591023_ID0E4}
107
}}}
}
Lawyers, in short, are unlikely to \u8220\'3frecognize the importance of yearni
ngs for mutual respect, equality, security, and other such non-material interest
s as may be present\u8221\'3f
}
in the mediation.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
108
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ERGBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ERGBG_1}
Moreover, lawyers tend to be so adversarial, it seems likely that their mediatio
n behavior will be influenced, even if only subtly, by their awareness of potent
ially applicable legal principles and procedures. It seems unlikely, in other wo
rds, that lawyers, in contrast to other professionals with different personaliti
es, skills, and knowledge, will truly be able to mediate outside \u8220\'3fthe s
hadow of the law\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F109284591023_ID0E1}
109
}}}
}
and the legal system.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EDHBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EDHBG_1}
Although the available empirical evidence does not--and could not-- describe how
all lawyers behave, it does describe the tendencies that most lawyers are likel
y to exhibit. Consistent with Riskin\rquote s astute observations, the empirical
evidence suggests that most lawyers are unlikely to be able to sustain purely f
acilitative, non-evaluative behavior in mediation.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ESHBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ESHBG_1}
B. The Disputant\rquote s Standard Perceptual Map
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E3HBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E3HBG_1}
Many in the mediation community acknowledge that most lawyers are not well-suite
d to mediate in a purely facilitative, non-evaluative way. Riskin, for instance,
observed that \u8220\'3fmost lawyers, most of the time\u8221\'3f operate accord
ing to the lawyer\rquote s standard philosophical map, rather than the mediator\
rquote s philosophical map.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F110284591023_ID0EQ}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F110284591023_ID0EQ}
110
}}}
}
Even Kovach
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*165
}
}
and Love recognize that most lawyers are disinclined to mediate in a facilitati
ve way. \u8220\'3fLawyers like most people feel more comfortable with what they
know best,\u8221\'3f Kovach and Love acknowledge.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F111284591023_ID0EG}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F111284591023_ID0EG}
111
}}}
}
When functioning as mediators, \u8220\'3fthey revert to their default adversari
al mode, analyzing the legal merits of the case in order to move towards settlem
ent.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F112284591023_ID0EU}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F112284591023_ID0EU}
112
}}}
}
Although \u8220\'3fmany such \u8216\'3fmediators\rquote also have training in
facilitative techniques, case evaluation dominates their practice.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F113284591023_ID0EB}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F113284591023_ID0EB}
113
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EIKBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EIKBG_1}
Despite widespread recognition that lawyers are not likely to be drawn to, and s
killed at, facilitative mediation, many in the mediation community would argue t
hat those few lawyers capable of purely facilitative behavior are the very lawye
rs that gravitate toward mediation. But even if a subset of lawyers is capable o
f mediating in a purely facilitative, non-evaluative way--and it seems likely th
at such a subset exists--the mediation process is still unlikely to be a truly f
acilitative one because disputants are likely to perceive facilitative behavior
on the part of lawyer-mediators differently than they perceive facilitative beha
vior on the part of non-lawyer-mediators. Disputants, in short, are likely to se
e the world through a \u8220\'3fstandard perceptual map\u8221\'3f that predispos
es them to perceive lawyers as evaluators.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E1KBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E1KBG_1}
Although we do not possess a wealth of empirical evidence about the disputant\rq
uote s perceptual map, what we do know from that evidence, and what we can reaso
nably infer, suggests that disputants are likely to see and hear lawyer-mediator
s differently than non-lawyer-mediators. In short, disputants are likely to perc
eive lawyer-
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*166
}
}
mediators as legal experts who possess \u8220\'3fhard\u8221\'3f personalities a
nd questionable ethics. These perceptions, in turn, are likely to render mediati
on evaluative, at least from the perspective of the disputants.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F114284591023_ID0EM}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F114284591023_ID0EM}
114
}}}
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ETLBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ETLBG_1}
1. Lawyers as Legal Experts
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E4LBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E4LBG_1}
From the first year of law school to the final days of law practice, lawyers are
likely to find that non-lawyers perceive them as professionals to whom they sho
uld defer because of their perceived intelligence and substantive expertise in i
nnumerable legal areas. Law students routinely report receiving questions like t
he following from family and friends: \u8220\'3fHow much can I get from Bob in t
he divorce?\u8221\'3f \u8220\'3fIf a cop stops me for speeding, does he have the
right to search under my seat?\u8221\'3f
}
\u8220\'3fYour uncle and I have never had a will. Would you prepare one for us?
\u8221\'3f Similarly, practicing lawyers routinely receive questions from client
s about areas of the law with which they are wholly unfamiliar. When a client hi
res a divorce lawyer, for example, he is likely to assume that he can also get e
xpert advice from the lawyer on estate planning, criminal matters, or workers\rq
uote compensation issues. Although laypersons seem generally aware that doctors
have limited subject matter expertise--e.g., most adult males realize they shou
ld not consult an OB/GYN or a pediatrician if they are having stomach problems--
they often overestimate the breadth of lawyers\rquote knowledge and expertise.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EXNBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EXNBG_1}
What systematic empirical evidence there is supports the anecdotal experiences o
f most law students and lawyers. In the early 1990s, for instance, the ABA commi
ssioned Peter D. Hart Research Associates \u8220\'3fto conduct a comprehensive s
urvey of the public\rquote s view of the [legal] profession.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
115
}}}
}
The researchers found, among other things, that \u8220\'3f[n]early two-thirds o
f the public view lawyers as smart and knowledgeable.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F116284591023_ID0EZ}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F116284591023_ID0EZ}
116
}}}
}
When \u8220\'3f[a]sked whether or not various qualities described lawyers,\u822
1\'3f in fact, \u8220\'3fthe strongest positive responses were that lawyers were
smart and knowledgeable and know how to solve
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*167
}
}
problems.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F117284591023_ID0EV}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F117284591023_ID0EV}
117
}}}
}
The public, in short, \u8220\'3fperceive[s] lawyers as smart, knowledgeable, an
d competent problem solvers in civil disputes.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F118284591023_ID0EC}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F118284591023_ID0EC}
118
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EJQBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EJQBG_1}
Disputants\rquote perceptions of lawyers as intelligent and knowledgeable profe
ssionals may give lawyer-mediators credibility with disputants that non-lawyer-m
ediators do not have.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F119284591023_ID0ER}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F119284591023_ID0ER}
119
}}}
}
Assuming disputants believe their disputes have a legal dimension, they may, fo
r instance, appreciate having a mediator with legal expertise mediating their di
spute. On the other hand, disputants may overestimate lawyers\rquote legal know
ledge and understanding of legal processes. This, in turn, may cause them to int
erpret facilitative comments and questions from lawyer-mediators differently tha
n from non-lawyer-mediators, imputing legal opinions to members of the former gr
oup but not to members of the latter.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EARBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EARBG_1}
2. Lawyers as Gladiators
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EKRBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EKRBG_1}
Lawyers are also likely to find that non-lawyers perceive them as verbal gladiat
ors who possess \u8220\'3fhard\u8221\'3f personality traits consistent with the
gladiator image.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F120284591023_ID0ES}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F120284591023_ID0ES}
120
}}}
}
The available empirical evidence suggests that non-lawyers perceive lawyers as
dominant and aggressive professionals who are lacking in caring and compassion.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E2RBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E2RBG_1}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*168
}
}
Researchers using the Revised Interpersonal Adjective Scales (IAS-R), for insta
nce, attempted to assess how subjects rate lawyers and other professionals on th
e \u8220\'3fdominance\u8221\'3f scale.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F121284591023_ID0EH}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F121284591023_ID0EH}
121
}}}
}
\u8220\'3fDominant\u8221\'3f individuals are \u8220\'3fforceful, assertive, dom
inant and self-confident\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
122
}}}
}
and are inclined to \u8220\'3fdirect, persuade, advise, control, influence, org
anize and supervise.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F123284591023_ID0EY}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F123284591023_ID0EY}
123
}}}
}
Preferring \u8220\'3fthe roles of leader, chairman, executive, official and arb
iter,\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F124284591023_ID0EE}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F124284591023_ID0EE}
124
}}}
}
dominant individuals \u8220\'3factively take charge, make decisions, and win ar
guments.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
125
}}}
}
Researchers found that subjects rated lawyers very high on the \u8220\'3fdomina
nce\u8221\'3f scale,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
126
}}}
}
more than three times as high as they rated the second-place profession.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F127284591023_ID0E1}
127
}}}
}
Conversely, survey evidence demonstrates that non-lawyers rate lawyers quite lo
w in compassion and caring. In the ABA-sponsored Hart survey,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F128284591023_ID0EA}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F128284591023_ID0EA}
128
}}}
}
for instance, researchers found that \u8220\'3f[t]he majority view is that, com
pared to lawyers in the past, today\rquote s attorney is less caring and compass
ionate.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
129
}}}
}
In fact, \u8220\'3f[f]ewer than one in five felt the phrase \u8216\'3fcaring an
d compassionate\u8217\'3f describes lawyers, as contrasted to nearly half (46 pe
rcent) who said the phrase does not apply.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F130284591023_ID0E2}
130
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ECVBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ECVBG_1}
It is conceivable that disputants\rquote perceptions of lawyers as gladiators m
ight serve lawyer-mediators well in facilitative mediation. For instance, disput
ants might perceive lawyer-mediators as \u8220\'3fstrong\u8221\'3f and objective
neutrals likely to guide them to an efficient resolution.
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*169
}
}
On the other hand, disputants\rquote views of lawyer-mediators as gladiators s
eems likely to undermine the lawyer-mediators\rquote efforts to mediate in a pu
rely facilitative, non-evaluative way. Because disputants are likely to view law
yer-mediators as dominant, aggressive, and uncaring, disputants may be hesitant
to open up to lawyer-mediators in the same way they would open up to psychothera
pist-mediators or social worker-mediators. They may expect lawyer-mediators to b
e uninterested in, and inattentive to, emotional considerations present in the d
ispute, and they may be inclined to grant undue deference to lawyer-mediators be
cause of their perceived \u8220\'3ftake charge\u8221\'3f personalities.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E6VBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E6VBG_1}
3. Lawyers as Deceivers
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EJWBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EJWBG_1}
Jokes targeting lawyers\rquote perceived dishonesty--e.g., \u8220\'3fHow do you
know when a lawyer is lying? When his lips are moving\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F131284591023_ID0E2}
131
}}}
}
--are among the most common of lawyer jokes and reflect a widespread public sent
iment that lawyers are dishonest and unethical. The survey data on this score ar
e voluminous. Since 1976,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F132284591023_ID0EE}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F132284591023_ID0EE}
132
}}}
}
for instance, no more than 25 percent of the population at any one time has rat
ed lawyers \u8220\'3fhigh\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3fvery high\u8221\'3f in \u8220\'
3fhonesty and ethical standards\u8221\'3f in Gallup polls.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F133284591023_ID0EJ}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F133284591023_ID0EJ}
133
}}}
}
Consider, for example, a 1995 Gallup poll, in which a mere 16 percent of those
surveyed rated lawyers\rquote ethical standards \u8220\'3fhigh\u8221\'3f or \u8
220\'3fvery high,\u8221\'3f placing lawyers seventeenth (tied) out of twenty six
professions.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
134
}}}
}
Or consider a 1996 Gallup poll, in which 18 percent of those surveyed rated law
yers\rquote ethical standards as \u8220\'3fhigh\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3fvery hig
h,\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
135
}}}
}
ranking lawyers below pharmacists, clergy, college teachers, medical doctors, d
entists, engineers, police, funeral directors, bankers, public-opinion pollsters
, journalists, TV reporters,
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*170
}
}
building contractors, and local officeholders.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F136284591023_ID0E2}
136
}}}
}
In short, \u8220\'3faccording to Gallup polls, majorities of Americans consiste
ntly give pharmacists, members of the clergy, dentists, and doctors high ratings
for honesty and ethics, yet no more than 27 percent of Americans surveyed since
1976 rate lawyers as highly ethical.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
137
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EPYBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EPYBG_1}
Disputants\rquote perceptions of lawyers as dishonest and unethical cannot poss
ibly aid lawyer-mediators in mediation unless it makes it easier for lawyer-medi
ators than for non-lawyer-mediators to exceed deflated expectations on the part
of the disputants.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F138284591023_ID0EX}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F138284591023_ID0EX}
138
}}}
}
It seems much more likely, however, that this perception will be harmful to law
yer-mediators in mediation. Because disputants are likely to enter mediation wit
h fairly low opinions of lawyer-mediators\rquote honesty and ethical standards,
disputants are more likely to be skeptical of the neutrality and impartiality o
f lawyer-mediators than non-lawyer-mediators.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EDZBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EDZBG_1}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*171
}
}
4. Summary
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ERZBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ERZBG_1}
Disputants are likely to view lawyer-mediators as legal experts possessing more
comprehensive knowledge than they in fact possess, as adversarial types endowed
with \u8220\'3fhard\u8221\'3f personalities, and as advocates uninhibited by str
ingent ethical standards.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F139284591023_ID0EZ}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F139284591023_ID0EZ}
139
}}}
}
Because of this standard perceptual map, disputants are unlikely to experience
the mediation process as a purely facilitative one, even if the lawyer-mediators
exhibit purely facilitative behaviors.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EC1BG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EC1BG_1}
It is possible, of course, that disputants perceive lawyers and lawyer-mediators
differently. There is evidence, for instance, that the public believes judges a
re more ethical than lawyers, and perhaps lawyer-mediators are viewed more like
\u8220\'3fjudges\u8221\'3f than \u8220\'3flawyers.\u8221\'3f
}
There is evidence suggesting that non-lawyers who hire lawyers view them more fa
vorably than they view lawyers generally,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
140
}}}
}
and perhaps disputants perceive lawyer-mediators the same way they perceive the
ir own counsel. There is also evidence suggesting that disputants who have compl
eted mediation rate mediators, at least some of whom were lawyers, quite favorab
ly.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F141284591023_ID0EW}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F141284591023_ID0EW}
141
}}}
}
But even if disputants perceive lawyers more favorably when they occupy the rol
e of mediator, disputants\rquote perceptions of lawyer-mediators are inevitably
going to be informed by their perceptions of lawyers generally.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E61BG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E61BG_1}
C. Mediation Hypothetical
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EJ2BG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EJ2BG_1}
The empirical evidence on lawyers and non-lawyers\rquote perceptions of lawyers
suggests that mediation is unlikely to be purely facilitative as long as lawyer
s serve as mediators. While the empirical evidence is compelling, some may find
a mediation anecdote more insightful than any compilation of studies and statist
ics.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F142284591023_ID0EU}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F142284591023_ID0EU}
142
}}}
}
Consider, then, the following mediation hypothetical:
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*172
}
}
Suppose that a plaintiff named Patty, who has slipped and fallen in the Mom-and
-Pop Grocery Store, agrees to mediate her claim against David, the proprietor of
that store. Suppose, further, that this mediation progresses in expected fashio
n,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
143
}}}
}
passing through the following four stages before the parties succeed (or not) i
n resolving their dispute: (1) introduction; (2) opening statements; (3) informa
tion gathering; and (4) assisted negotiation.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ET3BG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ET3BG_1}
1. Introduction
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
The mediation process typically begins with mediator introductions.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F144284591023_ID0EF}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F144284591023_ID0EF}
144
}}}
}
Suppose the lawyer-mediator begins this hypothetical mediation as follows:
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Good afternoon. My name is Greg Lopez. I have been asked by the court to attempt
to mediate your dispute. I have not met either of you before, so I\rquote d lik
e to begin by introducing myself. I am a lawyer with 10 years of experience repr
esenting clients in lawsuits, but I am here today as a mediator, not as a lawyer
. My role is to learn about the matters that have brought you here and to aid yo
u in developing solutions that will be acceptable to each of you.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EM5BG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EM5BG_1}
Now suppose the mediator is a non-lawyer who begins the mediation as follows:
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EY5BG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EY5BG_1}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*173
}
}
Good afternoon. My name is Greg Lopez. I have been asked by the court to attemp
t to mediate your dispute. I have not met either of you before, so I\rquote d li
ke to begin by introducing myself. I am a psychotherapist with 10 years of exper
ience counseling clients in individual and group settings, but I am here today a
s a mediator, not as a psychotherapist. My role is to learn about the matters th
at have brought you here and to aid you in developing solutions that will be acc
eptable to each of you.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EX6BG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EX6BG_1}
In each introduction,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F145284591023_ID0E4}
145
}}}
}
the mediator discloses his background, explains that he is appearing as a media
tor, and explains further that he intends to facilitate the disputants\rquote n
egotiations. The only difference between the two introductions, of course, is th
at the mediator in the former discloses that he is a lawyer, while the mediator
in the latter discloses that he is a therapist. This single difference is critic
al, however, because the introduction \u8220\'3fsets the stage for the remainder
of the mediation.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
146
}}}
}
It is at this introductory stage that the mediator attempts to establish credib
ility with the disputants
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
147
}}}
}
and control over the process,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
148
}}}
}
and the disputants, in turn, form their first impressions of the mediator.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F149284591023_ID0E3}
149
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EDBAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EDBAI_1}
With these introductions, the mediators have set very different stages for the r
emainder of the mediation because the disputants--Patty and David--are likely to
perceive each of the mediators differently based on their respective profession
al affiliations.
}
The disputants, in short, are likely to perceive the lawyer-mediator as more kn
owledgeable about the law and legal processes, more controlling
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*174
}
}
and less compassionate, and less honest than the non-lawyer-mediator.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F150284591023_ID0ET}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F150284591023_ID0ET}
150
}}}
}
These perceptions may, as noted above, imbue the lawyer-mediator with some cred
ibility that the non-lawyer-mediator does not possess.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
151
}}}
}
It seems likely, however, that the disputants\rquote perceptions of the member
s of each profession will increase the chances that the disputants will perceive
the former mediator as relatively more evaluative, and relatively less facilita
tive, than the latter.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EBCAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EBCAI_1}
Indeed, some proponents of facilitative mediation object to mediators identifyin
g their professional affiliation.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
152
}}}
}
This reaction to the disclosure of the mediator\rquote s professional backgroun
d suggests that these scholars may share my view that disputants\rquote percept
ions of the mediator and mediation process are likely to be colored if they lear
n the mediator is a lawyer.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ESCAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ESCAI_1}
2. Opening Statements
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E3CAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E3CAI_1}
Following introductions, the mediator typically invites each party to make an op
ening statement. \u8220\'3fThe opening statement stage,\u8221\'3f Kovach explain
s, \u8220\'3fis the time for parties to fully express and explain to the mediato
r, and, more importantly, to each other, in their own words, how they view the d
ispute.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
153
}}}
}
Suppose Patty, the plaintiff in this dispute, makes the following opening state
ment:
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
After church on Sunday, I went to the Mom-and-Pop Grocery Store to buy groceries
for the week. I started down the fresh fruit aisle, when I heard my friend Lula
, who sings in the church choir with me, shout at me from behind. I started to t
urn back to talk to her, and as I did, my heel slipped on a grape peel on the fl
oor. I fell down and broke my arm and my jaw as I landed. Also, my dress caught
on my shopping cart and ripped off, so I was left nearly naked on the floor. One
of the store employees pointed and laughed at me. Another employee came over an
d tried to help me up.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
154
}}}
\par
}
}
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E3EAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E3EAI_1}
Consider the manner in which the lawyer-mediator and the non-lawyer-mediator are
likely to \u8220\'3fhear\u8221\'3f Patty\rquote s story. Employing his well-hon
ed analytical skills, the lawyer-mediator is likely to skillfully translate Patt
y\rquote s story into a legally cognizable one, identifying causes of action (e.
g., negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress), elements which mu
st be established to make out each cause
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*175
}
}
of action (e.g., breach of duty, outrageous conduct), prospective defendants (e
.g., grocery store, \u8220\'3flaughing\u8221\'3f employee), key issues (e.g., co
nstructive notice), witnesses (e.g., \u8220\'3flaughing\u8221\'3f employee, \u82
20\'3fhelping\u8221\'3f employee, Lula), damage items (e.g., medical expenses, l
ost wages, pain and suffering), and affirmative defenses (e.g., comparative faul
t).
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EQFAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EQFAI_1}
The non-lawyer-mediator may also have a sense of the legal claims relevant to th
e dispute, but the non-lawyer-mediator--particularly if she is a psychotherapist
or social worker--is more likely than the lawyer-mediator to be attentive to th
e emotional, non-material considerations present in the dispute. She is likely t
o wonder not only about the legal claims, in other words, but also about the imp
act of the broken jaw on plaintiff\rquote s singing in the choir, the embarrassm
ent she suffered as a consequence of lying naked on the floor, the reactions of
the employees to her fall, etc. Rather than internally translating all of plaint
iff\rquote s claims into money damages,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F155284591023_ID0E3}
155
}}}
}
the non-lawyer-mediator is more likely than the lawyer-mediator to be cognizant
of non-monetary considerations that might be important to the plaintiff, like a
n apology from the \u8220\'3flaughing\u8221\'3f employee.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
156
}}}
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EHGAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EHGAI_1}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*176
}
}
3. Information Gathering
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EVGAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EVGAI_1}
Given their initial interpretations of Patty\rquote s story (as well as David\rq
uote s), the mediators are likely to go about their next task
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F157284591023_ID0E2}
157
}}}
}
--gathering additional information--in slightly different ways. The lawyer-media
tor will be more inclined to ask questions designed to elicit the legally releva
nt information about the dispute, while the non-lawyer-mediator will be more inc
lined to ask questions designed to elicit information about all aspects of the d
ispute, not merely those that are legally relevant. Even if both mediators go ab
out gathering additional information in the same, facilitative way, Patty and Da
vid are likely to hear each mediator\rquote s open, closed, and reality-testing
questions a little differently:
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EKHAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EKHAI_1}
To gather general information about the dispute, the mediator will begin by aski
ng \u8220\'3fopen\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3fopen-ended\u8221\'3f questions, which a
re designed to elicit \u8220\'3fthe broadest possible answer[s].\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F158284591023_ID0ET}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F158284591023_ID0ET}
158
}}}
}
In the dispute between Patty and David, the mediator might ask Patty such open-
ended questions as: \u8220\'3fWhat else can you tell me about your fall?\u8221\'
3f or \u8220\'3fHow did you feel when the accident happened?\u8221\'3f or \u8220
\'3fWhat do you want from David?\u8221\'3f
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EWIAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EWIAI_1}
Closed questions, by contrast, call for less elaborate, more focused answers. Cl
osed questions may take a number of forms, including requests for clarification,
leading questions, and yes/no questions.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
159
}}}
}
In the dispute between Patty and David, the mediator might ask Patty such close
d questions as: \u8220\'3fHave you had any prior injuries to your arm or jaw?\u8
221\'3f or \u8220\'3fWhat problems has this accident caused your family?\u8221\'
3f
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E2JAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E2JAI_1}
Reality-testing questions, which may be open or closed, challenge the respondent
to consider the strengths and weaknesses of her story or claims.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F160284591023_ID0ED}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F160284591023_ID0ED}
160
}}}
}
Consider the following reality-testing questions that the mediator might ask Pa
tty in this case: \u8220\'3fWhat do you think the jury will make of the fact tha
t you were looking back at Lula when you fell?\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3fGiven that
he did not yet realize that you had seriously
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*177
}
}
hurt yourself, do you think the jury will find the employee\rquote s laughter o
utrageous?\u8221\'3f
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ECLAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ECLAI_1}
Upon hearing these facilitative questions, Patty and David are likely to perceiv
e them differently depending upon whether the mediator is a lawyer or non-lawyer
. When a lawyer-mediator asks an open question like, \u8220\'3fHow did you feel
when the accident happened?\u8221\'3f, a closed question like, \u8220\'3fWhat pr
oblems has this caused your family?\u8221\'3f, or a reality-testing question lik
e, \u8220\'3fWhat do you think the jury will make of the fact that you were look
ing back at Lula when you fell?\u8221\'3f, disputants like Patty and David will
assume he is inquiring about, and subtly opining on, legally relevant aspects of
the dispute. This assumption, in turn, will influence the information they disc
lose (and withhold) and will increase the likelihood that the mediation will be
adversarial and evaluative.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EPMAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EPMAI_1}
4. Assisted Negotiation
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EZMAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EZMAI_1}
After introducing himself and the mediation process, and after eliciting informa
tion through opening statements and follow-up questioning, the mediator focuses
on facilitating negotiation between the parties. The mediator is likely to begin
by identifying the issues to be addressed in the mediation. In so doing, the me
diator strives to \u8220\'3fidentify negotiating issues precisely\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
161
}}}
}
and in \u8220\'3flanguage that is nonjudgmental.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
162
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EQNAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EQNAI_1}
The lawyer-mediator, accustomed to translating client stories into legally cogni
zable claims and causes of action, is likely to identify the negotiating issues
in legalistic terms: e.g., \u8220\'3fwhether defendant was negligent,\u8221\'3f
\u8220\'3fwhether plaintiff was contributorily negligent,\u8221\'3f
}
\u8220\'3fwhether defendant\rquote s employee engaged in outrageous conduct.\u82
21\'3f The non-lawyer-mediator, who is probably unfamiliar with the law of negli
gence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, is more likely to frame
the negotiating issues in non-legalistic, nonjudgmental terms: e.g., \u8220\'3fP
atty\rquote s fall,\u8221\'3f \u8220\'3fthe fruit aisle,\u8221\'3f \u8220\'3fcus
tomer relations.\u8221\'3f Framing the issues in legalistic, adversarial terms i
s likely to lead to a legalistic, adversarial mediation, while framing the issue
s in non-legalistic, nonjudgmental terms is more likely to result in a facilitat
ive mediation.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ELOAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ELOAI_1}
Even assuming the lawyer-mediator successfully frames the negotiation issues in
non-legalistic and nonjudgmental terms--e.g., \u8220\'3fPatty\rquote s fall,\u82
21\'3f \u8220\'3fthe fruit aisle,\u8221\'3f and \u8220\'3fcustomer relations\u82
21\'3f--the lawyer-
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*178
}
}
mediator is likely to have difficulty behaving in a purely facilitative way whe
n he then attempts to \u8220\'3fmove the parties toward generating ideas, option
s or alternatives which might resolve the case.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
163
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EHPAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EHPAI_1}
To aid the parties in generating options, the mediator must engage the parties i
n a period of \u8220\'3fdivergent\u8221\'3f thinking, \u8220\'3fduring which a v
ariety of potential solutions are generated before any are critically evaluated,
let alone adopted.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
164
}}}
}
In this case, for instance, the mediator might aid Patty and David in consideri
ng any or all of the following options: money damages, store credit, store coupo
ns, termination of the laughing employee, apology by the laughing employee, new
store policies regarding fruit aisle clean-up, posting of warning signs in the f
ruit aisle, etc. This process requires \u8220\'3f[i]magination and creativity,\u
8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F165284591023_ID0E5}
165
}}}
}
yet, as Dean Paul Brest and Professor Linda Krieger recognize, \u8220\'3f\u8216
\'3fcreative\u8217\'3f is not the first adjective that comes to mind when people
think of lawyers. We [lawyers] are viewed--perhaps by ourselves as well as by o
thers--as conservative, risk-averse, precedent-bound, and wedded to a narrow, le
galistic range of problem solving strategies.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F166284591023_ID0EP}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F166284591023_ID0EP}
166
}}}
}
Brest and Krieger concede that \u8220\'3f[t]here may be substance to this view,
\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F167284591023_ID0E2}
167
}}}
}
and indeed, the empirical evidence described above paints a picture of lawyers
as rigidly analytical or \u8220\'3fconvergent\u8221\'3f in their thinking,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F168284591023_ID0E5}
168
}}}
}
which calls into question the lawyer-mediator\rquote s ability to perform the c
ritical facilitative task of option generation.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EHRAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EHRAI_1}
Because of the difficulty the lawyer-mediator may have assisting the parties in
generating options and ideas, the lawyer-mediator may, during this stage of medi
ation, \u8220\'3fmeet privately with each party\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F169284591023_ID0EN}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F169284591023_ID0EN}
169
}}}
}
in caucus.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
170
}}}
}
The caucus \u8220\'3fenables the parties and the mediator to be more direct.\u8
221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
171
}}}
}
The mediator may \u8220\'3ftake[ ] a more active role in prompting options,\u82
21\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F172284591023_ID0EM}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F172284591023_ID0EM}
172
}}}
}
urge the parties \u8220\'3fto take a realistic look
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*179
}
}
at their objectives,\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F173284591023_ID0E4}
173
}}}
}
and \u8220\'3feducat[e] the parties about the negotiating process.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
174
}}}
}
Given the more active and direct role the mediator is likely to play in caucus,
it seems even more likely in caucus than in open session that Patty and David w
ill view the lawyer-mediator\rquote s facilitative behavior as more evaluative t
han the non-lawyer-mediator\rquote s identical behavior.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EUTAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EUTAI_1}
5. Summary
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E5TAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E5TAI_1}
At each stage of the mediation, the lawyer-mediator is more likely than the non-
lawyer-mediator to be drawn to evaluative behaviors and to have difficulty with
facilitative behaviors. And even if a fraction of lawyer-mediators in a fraction
of mediations can sustain facilitative conduct, disputants like Patty and David
are likely to perceive lawyers differently from non-lawyers in ways that preclu
de the process from being a purely facilitative, non-evaluative one.
}
It is possible, of course, to imagine a mediation in which the lawyer mediates
in a purely facilitative way and the disputants perceive the lawyer-mediator\rqu
ote s conduct in a purely facilitative way. Nonetheless, mediation, at a bare mi
nimum, is much more likely to be evaluative, and much less likely to be facilita
tive, when lawyers serve as mediators.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ETUAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ETUAI_1}
D. The Lawyer-Mediator\rquote s Role
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E4UAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E4UAI_1}
Given that lawyers are unlikely to be able to mediate in a purely facilitative w
ay, should lawyers be allowed to serve as mediators? The answer to this question
turns on one\rquote s view of mediation.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EMVAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EMVAI_1}
The mediation purists believe that mediation must be a purely facilitative, non-
evaluative process open only to mediators who behave in a purely facilitative wa
y. Lawyer-mediators appear not to have a place at the purists\rquote mediation
table. To be sure, the purists have not advocated a ban on lawyer-mediators. Non
etheless, because purists are committed to a purely-facilitative process, and be
cause lawyer-mediators are unlikely to be able to conduct such a process, a proh
ibition against lawyer-mediators seems consistent with the purist view of mediat
ion.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F175284591023_ID0E3}
175
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EDWAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EDWAI_1}
The mediation pluralists, by contrast, believe that mediation should be open to
facilitative and evaluative mediators. \u8220\'3fIt is too late,\u8221\'3f Riski
n argues on behalf of the pluralists, \u8220\'3ffor commentators or
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*180
}
}
mediation organizations to tell practitioners who are widely recognized as medi
ators that they are not, in the same sense that it is too late for the Pizza Ass
ociation of Naples, Italy to tell Domino\rquote s that its product is not the ge
nuine article.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F176284591023_ID0E3}
176
}}}
}
Because the pluralists have adopted an inclusive view of mediation, the lawyer-
mediator does have a place at the pluralists\rquote mediation table despite the
lawyer-mediator\rquote s proclivity for evaluation.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EFXAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EFXAI_1}
Like the purists, I believe that mediators should strive to facilitate. Unlike t
he purists, however, I believe, along with the pluralists, that mediation should
be an eclectic process in which different types of mediators are available to s
uit different disputants.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
177
}}}
}
Some mediated disputes demand a facilitative approach, and in those disputes, n
on-lawyer-mediators are likely to be better mediators than lawyer-mediators. Oth
er mediated disputes call for a relatively more evaluative approach, and in thos
e disputes, lawyer-mediators can use their evaluative skills--including their an
alytical acumen, emotional detachment, and legal expertise--to great advantage.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
178
}}}
}
In all likelihood, most mediated disputes call for some combination of facilita
tive and evaluative approaches, and in those disputes, lawyer-mediators and non-
lawyer-mediators each have unique attributes to offer to disputants.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EBYAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EBYAI_1}
III. The Implications for Lawyering
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ELYAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ELYAI_1}
I have argued in this article that lawyers operate according to a standard philo
sophical map that predisposes them to practice law and mediation in an evaluativ
e rather than a facilitative way. The purpose of this part of the article is to
ask--and propose tentative answers to--three questions. First, should lawyers ad
opt a different philosophical map? Recognizing the value of the lawyer\rquote s
standard philosophical map, I argue that lawyers should retain--but enrich--the
standard philosophical map. Second, assuming lawyers should enrich the standard
philosophical map, is it possible for them to do so? The empirical evidence on t
his point is unclear, but I believe it
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*181
}
}
supports the proposition that one socializing institution--law school-- can hel
p enrich the lawyer\rquote s standard philosophical map.
}
Third, assuming law schools can influence the standard philosophical map, what
should law schools do? Acknowledging that there are significant impediments to m
ajor reform in the legal academy, I make only one proposal: that law schools and
law professors should strive to teach law students not only to \u8220\'3fthink
like a lawyer\u8221\'3f but also to \u8220\'3ffeel like a lawyer.\u8221\'3f
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ERZAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ERZAI_1}
A. Should Lawyers Adopt a Different Philosophical Map?
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E2ZAI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E2ZAI_1}
What philosophical map should guide lawyers? From a normative perspective, lawye
rs should adopt whatever philosophical map induces them to produce the most just
ice or happiness or other agreed-upon good for their clients and society. Howeve
r, the purpose of this inquiry is not to address the normative question--i.e., t
he \u8220\'3fshould\u8221\'3f question with a capital \u8220\'3fS\u8221\'3f--but
rather the prescriptive question--i.e., the \u8220\'3fshould\u8221\'3f question
with a lowercase \u8220\'3fs.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
179
}}}
}
From a prescriptive perspective, lawyers should adopt whatever philosophical ma
p enables them to function effectively as lawyers.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ES1AI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ES1AI_1}
Thoughtful people may very well disagree about what it means to be a good lawyer
, but I suspect all would agree that to function at a high level lawyers need to
have the ability to use multiple approaches to address client problems.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F180284591023_ID0E1}
180
}}}
}
Good lawyering, in short, demands flexibility because the tasks that lawyers co
mmonly perform--e.g., counseling a client, writing a brief, picking a jury, argu
ing a motion, negotiating a deal--require different approaches and demand differ
ent skills.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ED2AI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ED2AI_1}
The lawyer\rquote s standard philosophical map--which advances an analytical, no
n-emotional, adversarial orientation to law practice--reflects an evaluative app
roach to lawyering. Guided by the standard map, lawyers are well-equipped to wri
te persuasive legal briefs, argue pre-trial motions, cross-examine witnesses, an
d perform other evaluative tasks. Because the lawyer\rquote s standard philosoph
ical map
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*182
}
}
advances this critically important component of lawyering, lawyers should certa
inly not abandon it.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E12AI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E12AI_1}
The problem with the lawyer\rquote s standard philosophical map is that it serve
s only as a partial guide. Most assuredly, the lawyer\rquote s standard philosop
hical map does help lawyers perform such evaluative tasks as writing briefs and
arguing motions, but it provides much less guidance to lawyers called upon to li
sten to and counsel distressed clients, negotiate with co-counsel, work with a f
amily to create an estate plan, solve a problem in a novel way, and perform othe
r facilitative tasks. The lawyer\rquote s standard philosophical map, in short,
is like any geographic map. Though helpful, geographical maps are limited becaus
e they depict a three-dimensional world in two dimensions. Likewise, the lawyer\
rquote s standard philosophical map charts a course appropriate for a two-dimens
ional world despite the fact that lawyers inhabit a three-dimensional world whic
h requires them to approach problems in flexible fashion.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Cartographers have not abandoned two-dimensional maps, but they have developed g
lobes to more accurately depict the Earth\rquote s geography. Likewise, lawyers
should not abandon their standard philosophical map, but they should seek to enr
ich it so that it more accurately reflects the skills and approaches that good l
awyering demands. Good lawyering requires lawyers to develop evaluative skills,
like analytical reasoning, dispassionate analysis, and \u8220\'3fadversarialness
.\u8221\'3f These attributes, in turn, enable lawyers to participate effectively
in evaluative processes like trial. Good lawyering also requires lawyers to dev
elop facilitative skills, like listening, empathizing, and creative problem-solv
ing.
}
These attributes enable lawyers to effectively interview and counsel clients, n
egotiate with co-counsel and opposing counsel, develop relationships with collea
gues, etc. The lawyer\rquote s standard philosophical map facilitates the develo
pment of the former set of attributes, but lawyers need to cultivate something l
ike a \u8220\'3fmediator\rquote s philosophical map\u8221\'3f to help develop th
e latter set of attributes.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
181
}}}
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b1
B. Can Lawyers Adopt a Different Philosophical Map?
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Assuming lawyers should enrich the philosophical map that guides their behavior,
can they? The answer to this question depends on the origins of the lawyer\rquo
te s standard philosophical map. If lawyers
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*183
}
}
are born with the standard philosophical map--if, in other words, they are inna
tely analytical, dispassionate, and adversarial in orientation--it seems likely
that they will have difficulty embracing other orientations. If, on the other ha
nd, the lawyer\rquote s standard philosophical map is a product of socialization
, education, and training, it seems likely that those institutions that play a c
entral role in the development of lawyers may be able to help lawyers change.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EW5AI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EW5AI_1}
Unfortunately, the evidence on the origins of the lawyer\rquote s standard philo
sophical map is inconclusive. Most of the available research is designed solely
to assess lawyers\rquote and law students\rquote personality traits, not to de
termine how or when lawyers developed those traits. For example, Landwehr\rquote
s assessment of lawyers\rquote moral reasoning informs us that lawyers are adv
ersarially oriented,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F182284591023_ID0EC}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F182284591023_ID0EC}
182
}}}
}
but it does not tell us how or when lawyers developed that orientation. Similar
ly, the MBTI research indicates that lawyers and law students are more inclined
toward the \u8220\'3fthinking\u8221\'3f orientation than the \u8220\'3ffeeling\u
8221\'3f orientation,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
183
}}}
}
but it does not tell us where this inclination originated.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
184
}}}
}
And several researchers have found that lawyers and law students are competitiv
e and aggressive,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
185
}}}
}
but they have not documented the source of these tendencies. Thus, most of the
research on lawyer attributes does not identify the source or sources of the law
yer\rquote s standard philosophical map.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
There is some evidence to suggest that lawyers have acquired aspects of the lawy
er\rquote s standard philosophical map long before beginning their formal legal
training. Professor Susan Daicoff, who has carefully reviewed and summarized the
empirical evidence on lawyer attributes in two articles,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
186
}}}
}
observes that \u8220\'3f[e]mpirical research over the last forty years has esta
blished that attorneys differ from the general population in the United States\u
8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
187
}}}
}
and contends that some attorney attributes appear \u8220\'3fbefore law school,
and thus are long-standing, ingrained personality traits that are likely to be v
ery difficult to change.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F188284591023_ID0E6}
188
}}}
}
But there is also evidence to suggest that lawyers
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*184
}
}
acquire the standard philosophical map--or that it becomes more prominent--duri
ng law school. For example, Janoff found that law students became less \u8220\'3
fcaring\u8221\'3f during the first year of law school,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
189
}}}
}
Hedegard found that law students became less sociable and that they lost intere
st in other people during the first year of law school,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
190
}}}
}
and Benjamin and his colleagues found that law students experienced elevated le
vels of mental distress after attending law school.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
191
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EYBBI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EYBBI_1}
The research evidence is inconclusive, but it suggests that lawyers acquire the
standard philosophical map through some combination of nature and nurture. Lawye
rs probably possess attributes from early in their lives that are consistent wit
h the lawyer\rquote s standard philosophical map, but subsequent life experience
s--in particular, law school--appear to play a critical role in strengthening th
ese attributes and inculcating others consistent with the lawyer\rquote s philos
ophical map.
}
Most lawyers are probably born with some degree of analytical acumen, for examp
le, but law school is likely to hone it, place renewed emphasis on it, and stunt
emotional development in the process. Because law school seems to play such a f
ormative role in charting the lawyer\rquote s standard philosophical map, law sc
hool can probably play a formative role in charting a better map.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ENCBI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ENCBI_1}
C. What Role Should Law Schools Play?
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
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{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EXCBI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EXCBI_1}
Like many before me
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F192284591023_ID0E4}
192
}}}
}
(and many after, I suspect), I believe law schools should strive to enrich the
philosophical map that informs the way lawyers practice law. Because I recognize
that law schools are remarkably resistant to fundamental change, I make only on
e modest proposal in this article.
\par
}
}
}
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{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EJDBI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EJDBI_1}
Law schools commonly claim that they teach law students how to \u8220\'3fthink l
ike a lawyer.\u8221\'3f Thinking like a lawyer is important, but law
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*185
}
}
schools tend to overestimate the importance of analytical skills to the detrime
nt of emotional insight. I believe that law schools and law professors can enric
h the lawyer\rquote s standard philosophical map by encouraging law students enr
olled in the traditional law school curriculum--particularly the first-year curr
iculum--not only to think like lawyers but also to feel like lawyers.
\par
}
}
}
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{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EAEBI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EAEBI_1}
Talk of feelings often gives law professors (as well as law students and lawyers
) pause. Many law professors are uncomfortable because they worry that acknowled
ging the relevance of feelings will undermine their efforts to teach thinking. T
his is misguided for two reasons:
\par
}
}
}
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First, law students need to appreciate the important role that emotion can play
in the development of legal doctrine (even if feelings are often rationalized or
described as \u8220\'3fpolicy reasons\u8221\'3f in the classroom). Tort law, fo
r example, is designed not merely to achieve efficiency through appropriate leve
ls of deterrence but also to promote corrective justice by compensating injured
victims. When courts require tortfeasors to compensate victims, they are motivat
ed not merely by thoughts of abstract justice but also by feelings of compassion
. Emotions are even central to understanding legal doctrine and behavior in a Co
rporations or Business Organizations course. Professor Robert Thompson, a leadin
g corporate scholar, explains that the students who take his Corporations course
learn that it not just \u8220\'3fa class on business and money\u8221\'3f but ra
ther a class that \u8220\'3fis really about people and core human emotions.\u822
1\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
193
}}}
}
More generally, Professor Susan Bandes observes in the introduction to her accl
aimed book, The Passions of Law:
\par
}
}
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{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
The law . . . is imbued with emotion. Not just the obvious emotions like mercy a
nd the desire for vengeance but disgust, romantic love, bitterness, uneasiness,
fear, resentment, cowardice, vindictiveness, forgiveness, contempt, remorse, sym
pathy, hatred, spite, malice, shame, respect, moral fervor, and the passion for
justice. Emotion pervades not just the criminal courts, with their heat-of-passi
on and insanity defenses and their angry or compassionate jurors but the civil c
ourtrooms, the appellate courtrooms, the legislatures. It propels judges and law
yers, as well as jurors, litigants, and the lay public.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
194
}}}
\par
}
}
}
}
}
}
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{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E2GBI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E2GBI_1}
Second, and more significantly, lawyers represent clients. Clients come to lawye
rs with problems about which they often have deep
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*186
}
}
feelings, including sadness, fear, embarrassment, anger, and vengeance. Law stu
dents might think that feelings play an important role only in domestic disputes
or criminal law, but the fact is that clients embroiled in disputes over employ
ment rights, the use of intellectual property, alleged breaches of commercial co
ntracts, or almost any topic experience a range of emotions that good lawyers id
entify, and if appropriate, help their clients voice.
}
Good lawyers, in short, must (and inevitably, do) both think and feel for their
clients.
\par
}
}
}
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{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EVHBI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EVHBI_1}
It is one thing, of course, to urge law schools and law professors to teach thei
r students to embrace the emotive aspects of law and lawyering in the classroom.
It is another thing altogether to facilitate this. Nonetheless, I offer the fol
lowing three suggestions.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
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{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EHIBI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EHIBI_1}
One way law professors can embrace the emotive aspects of law is by expanding th
e conventional classroom dialogue. Law professors can inquire not only about the
legally relevant facts, the issues presented, and the holding of a case, but al
so about the emotive aspects of a case. What do you think the plaintiff wanted?
How did the plaintiff feel after incurring the injury? How did the defendant fee
l when the plaintiff accused him of carelessness? What options did the lawyers h
ave for helping their respective clients address the dispute between them?
\par
}
}
}
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Law professors can also enrich their classes by assigning--and then discussing--
\u8220\'3fcase-study\u8221\'3f materials that provide more detailed information
about the participants in disputes. In a Torts class, for example, professors mi
ght assign The Passengers of Palsgraf
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
195
}}}
}
(a book chapter providing details about the lives of some of the people involve
d in the famous Palsgraf case), A Civil Action
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
196
}}}
}
(a book describing a toxic tort case primarily from the perspective of the plai
ntiff\rquote s counsel) or Damages
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
197
}}}
}
(a book describing a medical malpractice case involving a severely compromised
baby told from the perspective of the plaintiffs, the defendants, and their coun
sel). Law students are more likely to empathize with disputants if they read abo
ut them through case-study materials than if their only exposure to the disputan
ts is through the arid recitations of \u8220\'3ffacts\u8221\'3f typical of most
appellate cases.
\par
}
}
}
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{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E4JBI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E4JBI_1}
Third, law professors might enrich their law school courses by including some ex
periential exercises which can be conducted inside
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*187
}
}
or outside the classroom. In their pioneering work at the University of Missour
i, for example, Professors Riskin and Westbrook have devised--with the help of s
cholars from around the country--a supplemental first-year curriculum designed t
o inculcate in students a broader conception of what it means to be a lawyer.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
198
}}}
}
The centerpiece of the supplementary curriculum is a set of dispute resolution
exercises in which students conduct simulations designed to help them \u8220\'3f
try on\u8221\'3f the role of lawyer or disputant in client counseling, negotiati
on, mediation, arbitration, and the like.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
199
}}}
}
Research evidence suggests that the so-called Missouri plan has succeeded in in
culcating in its students a broader conception of the lawyer.
}
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{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F200284591023_ID0EW}{\*\bkmkend co_footnoteRe
ference_F200284591023_ID0EW}
200
}}}
\par
}
}
}
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{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E4KBI_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E4KBI_1}
Through these and other innovations in the standard curriculum, as well as throu
gh the teaching of lawyering and dispute resolution courses that give primacy to
empathy, listening, and the like, law schools may be able to enrich the philoso
phical maps that guide at least some of their students.
\par
}
}
}
}
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Conclusion
\par
}
}
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Riskin\rquote s grid has engendered a robust debate on the practice of mediation
. Thoughtful scholars have argued on the one hand that there is no such thing as
purely facilitative mediation
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
ference_F201284591023_ID0E3}
201
}}}
}
and on the other hand that it is the only kind of mediation.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
202
}}}
}
By comparison, I have made the rather modest claim that lawyer-mediators compro
mise facilitative mediation because of the way they tend to be and the way dispu
tants tend to perceive them. Because I embrace an eclectic view of mediation, I
am not troubled by the implications of my argument for the practice of mediation
.
}
I am troubled, however, by the implications of my argument for the practice of
law. In my view, law
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf20 \f2 \b1
*188
}
}
schools can, and should, attempt to enrich students\rquote views of lawyering.
In law school, students should begin to learn what it means to be a lawyer, not
merely what it means to think like one.
\par
}
}
}
}
}{
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Acting Associate Dean, Associate Professor of Law & Senior Fellow at the Center
for Study of Dispute Resolution, University of Missouri School of Law. B.A. 1989
, Stanford; Ed.M. 1991, Harvard; J.D. 1994, Stanford. For their advice and comme
nts on this article, I am grateful to Richard Birke, Tracey George, Jim Levin, B
obbi McAdoo, Richard Reuben, Len Riskin, Jean Sternlight, and Josh Stulberg. For
financial support, I am again grateful to the University of Missouri Law School
Foundation.
\par
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Leonard L. Riskin,
}
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\fldrslt
Understanding Mediators\rquote Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid
for the Perplexed, 1 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 7, 13 (1996)
[[hereinafter Riskin, Grid]; see also Leonard L. Riskin,
}
lt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_105909_111" }
{\fldrslt
Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, 12 Alternatives to High Cost L
itig. 111, 111 (1994)
[hereinafter Riskin, Mediator Orientations].
\par
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See, e.g., Riskin, Grid, supra note 1, at 17.
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Id. at 24.
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Riskin, Mediator Orientations, supra note 1, at 111. To bring the distinction be
tween facilitative and evaluative mediation into the sharpest possible focus, Ri
skin classifies behaviors that fall at the extreme end of each type of practice:
\u8220\'3fAt the extreme of [the] facilitative end,\u8221\'3f Riskin explains,
\u8220\'3fis conduct intended simply to allow the parties to communicate with an
d understand one another.\u8221\'3f Riskin, Grid, supra note 1, at 24. An extrem
e evaluative mediator, by contrast, engages in \u8220\'3fbehaviors intended to d
irect some or all of the outcomes of the mediation.\u8221\'3f Id.
\par
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See, e.g., James J. Alfini,
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drslt
Evaluative Versus Facilitative Mediation: A Discussion, 24 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 9
19, 919 (1997)
[hereinafter Alfini, Discussion] (noting that the debate over facilitative and
evaluative mediation \u8220\'3fis raging in the law reviews and the literature o
n dispute resolution\u8221\'3f); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
}
1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_3041_1887" }{\f
ldrslt
When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Prof
essionals, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1871, 1887 (1997)
(\u8220\'3fThe current, most heated debate concerns the question whether mediat
ion is facilitative or evaluative or both.\u8221\'3f); Leonard L. Riskin,
}
1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
Foreword, 2000 J. Disp. Resol. 245
(introducing a symposium on the facilitative/evaluative debate); Jeffrey W. Ste
mpel,
}
drslt
Beyond Formalism and False Dichotomies: The Need for Institutionalizing A Flexib
le Concept of the Mediator\rquote s Role, 24 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 949, 949-50 (19
97)
(noting that the facilitative versus evaluative debate is raging in Florida and
nationally) [[hereinafter Stempel, Beyond Formalism]; Harry M. Webne-Behrman, F
orum, The
}
ldrslt
Emergence of Ethical Codes and Standards of Practice in Mediation: The Current S
tate of Affairs, 1998 Wisc. L. Rev. 1289, 1299
(\u8220\'3fMediators are currently engaged in significant professional debates
that will impact modes of practice in the coming generation. Nowhere is this mor
e acute than in the debate between \u8216\'3fevaluative\u8217\'3f and \u8216\'3f
facilitative\u8217\'3f orientations to mediation.\u8221\'3f); Should Mediators E
valuate? A Debate Between Lela P. Love and James B. Boskey, Cardozo Online J. Co
nflict Resol. (Dec. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Love/Boskey Debate].
\par
}
}
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Even some of the harshest critics of the normative implications of Riskin\rquote
s grid accept its descriptive accuracy. Professors Kim Kovach and Lela Love, fo
r instance, concede that the Riskin Grid is descriptively accurate, see Kimberle
e K. Kovach & Lela P. Love,
}
\fldrslt
Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin\rquote s Grid, 3 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 71,
76 (1996)
[hereinafter Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation], and that regulatory regimes \u8
220\'3fmirror[ ] the inclusive picture of mediation offered by the Grid,\u8221\'
3f
}
dType=Y&serNum=0109009342&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transiti
onType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
id. at 82.
See also Kathy Kirk,
}
drslt
Mediation Training: What\rquote s the Point, Are the Tricks Really New, and Can
an Old Dog Learn?, 37 Washburn L.J. 637, 643 (1998)
(noting that \u8220\'3fin Kansas there are two distinct styles of mediation use
d: facilitative and evaluative\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
While most appear to accept the descriptive accuracy of the Riskin Grid, some sc
holars challenge it. See, e.g., John Lande,
}
drslt
How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?, 24 Fla. St. U.
L. Rev. 839, 850 n.40 (1997)
(contending that \u8220\'3fit is more useful to think of this as a continuum ra
ther than a discrete dichotomy\u8221\'3f); Stempel, Beyond Formalism, supra note
5, at 952 (arguing that \u8220\'3fthe view that mediators act as either facilit
ators or evaluators represents a triumph of excessively formalist thinking at a
time when effective dispute resolution law and policy require a functional appro
ach\u8221\'3f); Joseph B. Stulberg,
}
drslt
Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing the \u8216\'3fGri
d\u8217\'3f Lock, 24 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 985, 986 (1997)
[hereinafter Stulberg, Piercing] (calling Riskin\rquote s \u8220\'3ffacilitativ
e/evaluative dichotomy\u8221\'3f a \u8220\'3ffalse one\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Others offer alternative models of mediation. See, e.g., Robert A. Baruch Bush &
Joseph P. Folger, The Promise of Mediation:Responding to Conflict Through Empow
erment and Recognition 28-32 (1994) (distinguishing between \u8220\'3ftransforma
tive\u8221\'3f and \u8220\'3fproblem solving\u8221\'3f mediators); Deborah M. Ko
lb, The Mediators 23-45 (1983) (distinguishing between \u8220\'3forchestrators\u
8221\'3f and \u8220\'3fdeal-makers\u8221\'3f); James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashin
g, and Hashing it Out: Is This the End of \u8216\'3fGood Mediation\u8217\'3f?,
}
dType=Y&pubNum=1141&cite=19FLASTULREV47&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cb
lt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_1141_66" }{\f
ldrslt
19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 47, 66-73 (1991)
(identifying \u8220\'3ftrashing,\u8221\'3f \u8220\'3fbashing,\u8221\'3f and \u8
220\'3fhashing it out\u8221\'3f as three styles of mediation) [hereinafter Alfin
i, Trashing]; Jeanne M. Brett et al., Mediator Style and Mediation Effectiveness
,
}
dType=Y&pubNum=206508&cite=2NEGOTIATIONJ277&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&r
s=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_206508_28
0" }{\fldrslt
2 Negotiation J. 277, 280 (1986)
(distinguishing between deal-making mediators and those who engage in shuttle d
iplomacy); Ellen A. Waldman,
}
drslt
Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple Model Approach, 48
Hastings L.J. 703, 707 (1997)
(identifying \u8220\'3fnorm-generating,\u8221\'3f \u8220\'3fnorm-educating,\u82
21\'3f and \u8220\'3fnorm-advocating\u8221\'3f as three models of mediation).
\par
}
}
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F7284591023_ID0ESYA" }{\fld
rslt
7
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, \u8216\'3f
}
lt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
Evaluative\u8217\'3f Mediation is an Oxymoron, 14 Alternatives to High Cost Liti
g. 31 (1996)
[hereinafter Kovach & Love, Oxymoron]; Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra
note 6.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F8284591023_ID0EVYA" }{\fld
rslt
8
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 6; Kovach & Love, Oxymoron, sup
ra note 7; Lela P. Love, The
}
Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 937 (1
997)
[hereinafter Love, Top Ten Reasons]; Love/Boskey Debate, supra note 5 (comments
of Lela P. Love).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F9284591023_ID0E4YA" }{\fld
rslt
9
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Stulberg, Piercing, supra note 6. Stulberg\rquote s critique differs from Ko
vach and Love\rquote s in that he believes Riskin\rquote s \u8220\'3ffacilitativ
e/evaluative dichotomy is a false one ...\u8221\'3f Id. at 986. Nevertheless, he
shares their view that mediation should be understood solely as a facilitative
process. Id. (\u8220\'3fI argue that any orientation that is \u8216\'3fevaluativ
e\u8217\'3f as portrayed on the Riskin grid is conduct that is both conceptually
different from, and operationally inconsistent with, the values and goals chara
cteristically ascribed to the mediation process.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F10284591023_ID0ELZ" }{\fld
rslt
10
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Stulberg, Piercing, supra note 6, at 1001.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F11284591023_ID0EPZ" }{\fld
rslt
11
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See generally sources cited supra notes 7-9.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F12284591023_ID0E5Z" }{\fld
rslt
12
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See sources cited supra notes 7-9; see also Marjorie Corman Aaron,
}
\fldrslt
ADR Toolbox: The Highwire Art of Evaluation, 14 Alternatives to High Cost Litig.
62, 62 (1996)
(identifying \u8220\'3fstrategies mediators can use to reduce the risks of eval
uation\u8221\'3f); Alfini, Discussion, supra note 5 (moderating a debate involvi
ng Donna Gebhart, Lela Love, Cheryl McDonald, Robert Moberly, Javier Perez-Abreu
, Kathy Reuter, Carmen Stein, Jeff Stempel, and Lawrence Watson on the relative
merits of evaluative and facilitative mediation); Alfini, Trashing, supra note 6
; John Bickerman,
}
Evaluative Mediator Responds, 14 Alternatives to High Cost Litig. 70 (1996)
(responding to Kovach and Love); Dwight Golann & Marjorie Corman Aaron,
}
\fldrslt
Using Evaluations in Mediation, 52 Disp. Resol. J. 26, 26 (1997)
(attributing to others the argument that \u8220\'3f[e] valuation is a legitimat
e weapon in the mediator\rquote s arsenal\u8221\'3f); Robert B. Moberly,
}
{\fldrslt
Mediator Gag Rules: Is It Ethical For Mediators To Evaluate Or Advise?, 38 S. Te
x. L. Rev. 669, 678 (1997)
(arguing \u8220\'3fagainst ethical rules that prohibit mediator evaluation\u822
1\'3f); James H. Stark, The
}
Ethics of Mediation Evaluation:Some Troublesome Questions and Tentative Proposal
s, From An Evaluative Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 769
(explaining how and when it is appropriate to offer an evaluation); Stempel, Be
yond Formalism, supra note 5, at 950 (endorsing \u8220\'3fflexible mediation tha
t permits judicious use of evaluative techniques\u8221\'3f and arguing that \u82
20\'3f[c]onceptual oversimplification occurs when the debate is cast in the wood
en form of evaluation versus facilitation\u8221\'3f); Donald T. Weckstein, In
}
Praise of Party Empowerment--And Of Mediator Activism, 33 Willamette L. Rev. 501
, (1997)
(advocating activist or evaluative mediation).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F13284591023_ID0E41" }{\fld
rslt
13
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See generally infra Part I.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F14284591023_ID0ED2" }{\fld
rslt
14
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Leonard L. Riskin,
}
1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_1216_43" }{\fld
rslt
Mediation and Lawyers, 43 Ohio St. L.J. 29, 43-44 (1982)
[hereinafter Riskin, Philosophical Map].
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F15284591023_ID0EI5" }{\fld
rslt
15
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Riskin, Grid, supra note 1, at 7.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F16284591023_ID0EN5" }{\fld
rslt
16
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Leonard L. Riskin & James E. Westbrook, Dispute Resolution and Lawyer
s 313 (2d ed. 1997).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F17284591023_ID0ES5" }{\fld
rslt
17
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F18284591023_ID0EV5" }{\fld
rslt
18
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Riskin, Grid, supra note 1, at 13.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F19284591023_ID0EE6" }{\fld
rslt
19
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See supra note 6.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F20284591023_ID0EW6" }{\fld
rslt
20
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Love, Top Ten Reasons, supra note 8, at 943-44.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F21284591023_ID0EYA" }{\fld
rslt
21
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 939.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F22284591023_ID0E2A" }{\fld
rslt
22
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Kimberlee K. Kovach, Mediation: Principles And Practice 36 (1994).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F23284591023_ID0ESB" }{\fld
rslt
23
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Love, Top Ten Reasons, supra note 8, at 939.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F24284591023_ID0E6B" }{\fld
rslt
24
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 6, at 80.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F25284591023_ID0E1C" }{\fld
rslt
25
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Kovach & Love, Oxymoron, supra note 7, at 32.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F26284591023_ID0E6C" }{\fld
rslt
26
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in Talks on American Law 34-36 (
Harold J. Berman ed., 2d. ed. 1971).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F27284591023_ID0ECD" }{\fld
rslt
27
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
\u8220\'3f[A]rbitration typically contains the essential elements of court adjud
ication: proofs and arguments are submitted to a neutral third party who has the
power to issue a binding decision.\u8221\'3f Stephen B. Goldberg et al., Disput
e Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation, and Other Processes 199 (2d ed. 1992).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F28284591023_ID0EFD" }{\fld
rslt
28
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See generally
}
dType=Y&pubNum=101488&cite=1982AMBFOUNDRESJ79&originationContext=document&vr=3.0
&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
Barlow F. Christensen, Private Justice:California\rquote s General Reference Pro
cedure, 1982 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 79
(describing California\rquote s \u8220\'3frent a judge\u8221\'3f procedure).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F29284591023_ID0EWD" }{\fld
rslt
29
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Love, Top Ten Reasons, supra note 8, at 943; see also id. at 944 (\u8220\'3fIn t
he corporate world, phalanges of consultants assist in promoting creative proble
m-solving and building teams capable of successful collaboration. Similarly, the
legal community needs a model from among the array of dispute resolution proces
ses that will assist parties to evolve in their understandings, relationships, a
nd arrangements, using the opportunity represented by conflict situations.\u8221
\'3f); Lela P. Love & Kimberlee K. Kovach,
}
drslt
ADR: An Eclectic Array of Processes, Rather Than One Eclectic Process, 2000 J. D
isp. Resol. 295, 306
(\u8220\'3fShould the mediation process become engulfed by the adversarial para
digm now, disputants will be robbed of one of the richest opportunities to exper
ience collaborative approaches to problem solving and dispute resolution.\u8221\
'3f); Stulberg, Piercing, supra note 6, at 988 (noting that the critics of the R
iskin Grid \u8220\'3fmaintain that evaluative activity by a mediator distorts th
e distinctive attributes of the mediation process ...\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F30284591023_ID0ELE" }{\fld
rslt
30
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 6, at 88 (identifying \u
8220\'3fvoluntary self-determination by parties\u8221\'3f as \u8220\'3fthe funda
mental goal of mediation\u8221\'3f); Kovach & Love, Oxymoron, supra note 7, at 3
2 (identifying \u8220\'3fpromoting self-determination of parties and helping the
parties examine their real interest and develop mutually acceptable solutions\u
8221\'3f as the \u8220\'3fprimary objectives of mediation\u8221\'3f). The purist
s rely in part on the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators to support their
contention that party autonomy is the primary goal of mediation. See, e.g., Kova
ch & Love, Oxymoron, supra note 7, at 31 (\u8220\'3fThe Model Standards of Condu
ct for Mediators, recently promulgated by the American Bar Association, the Amer
ican Arbitration Association and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolut
ion, are at odds with \u8216\'3fevaluative mediation.\u8217\'3f These standards
say that the principle of self-determination is central to the mediation process
and prohibit a mediator from providing professional advice.\u8221\'3f); Love, T
op Ten Reasons, supra note 8, at 940-41 (\u8220\'3fThe Model Standards of Conduc
t for Mediators highlight party self-determination as being the fundamental prin
ciple of mediation. The committee that created the Model Standards rejected medi
ation as an evaluative process.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F31284591023_ID0EIF" }{\fld
rslt
31
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Alfini, Discussion, supra note 5, at 933-34 (quoting Lela Love); see also id. at
930 (quoting Donna Gebhart) (\u8220\'3fI believe very strongly that when, or if
, I evaluate the case, because they [i.e., parties] generally value what I say,
it will affect their decision. They may be settling for something that they woul
dn\rquote t really be happy with.\u8221\'3f); Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation,
supra note 6, at 100 (\u8220\'3fThe exact impact of actions and words is unknowa
ble. If a precondition to giving an evaluation is determining that an evaluation
will be \u8216\'3fnon-directive\u8217\'3f or will not interfere with self-deter
mination, the safest and wisest course is to give no evaluation at all.\u8221\'3
f); Love, Top Ten Reasons, supra note 8, at 943 (noting, for example, that \u822
0\'3f[t]he mediator\rquote s opinion that one of the parties should buy a carpet
to lessen the impact of sounds heard by a neighbor or that one of the parties d
oes not have standing to bring a particular claim in court carries enormous weig
ht.\u8221\'3f). In short, the purists believe evaluative mediation undermines pa
rty autonomy because they overestimate mediators and underestimate parties. The
purists claim to have a great deal of respect for parties embroiled in disputes.
They claim that they perceive parties to \u8220\'3fhave the resources and creat
ive capacity to resolve their own disputes better-and differently-than an arbitr
ator or a judge would,\u8221\'3f see Kovach & Love, Oxymoron, supra note 7, at 3
2, yet they believe these parties will wilt in the face of a mediator\rquote s e
xpression of her opinion.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F32284591023_ID0EQF" }{\fld
rslt
32
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 6, at 99 (\u8220\'3fIf t
he neutral assumes an evaluative role or orientation, the parties\rquote focus
during the process shifts towards influencing the neutral decision-maker and awa
y from crafting outcomes for themselves.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F33284591023_ID0ETF" }{\fld
rslt
33
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., id. at 100 (\u8220\'3fEvaluation inhibits or eliminates party partici
pation when it undermines one party\rquote s negotiation position and, conversel
y, locks another party into a particular posture.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F34284591023_ID0EWF" }{\fld
rslt
34
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., id. at 102 (\u8220\'3fIf the mediator ultimately provides an evaluati
on, the mediator can expect to elicit only information like that shared in an ad
versarial process, especially if the parties are sophisticated. Accordingly, the
evaluative mediator is handicapped in building an information base upon which m
ore optimal, \u8216\'3fwin-win\u8217\'3f solutions might develop.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F35284591023_ID0E2F" }{\fld
rslt
35
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., id. at 103 (\u8220\'3fAn evaluative orientation on the part of the ne
utral tends to replicate the adversarial process and place the parties in an adv
ersarial mode. The resulting defensive and offensive postures of the parties inh
ibit collaboration and creativity.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F36284591023_ID0E6F" }{\fld
rslt
36
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 6, at 99; see also id. at 102-03 (a
rguing that mediators \u8220\'3fmust embrace a facilitative orientation to assis
t the parties in generating a truly self-determined outcome\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F37284591023_ID0EYG" }{\fld
rslt
37
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Riskin, Grid, supra note 1, at 47.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F38284591023_ID0E2G" }{\fld
rslt
38
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 6, at 101 (connecting me
diator neutrality and \u8220\'3fthe trust of parties\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F39284591023_ID0E5G" }{\fld
rslt
39
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., id. at 101-02 (\u8220\'3fMediators enhance the informational environm
ent--both in terms of the quantity and the reliability of the information--by us
ing as inducements for openness their own neutrality and the benefits of a mutua
lly advantageous or \u8216\'3fwin-win\u8217\'3f outcome.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F40284591023_ID0EDH" }{\fld
rslt
40
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose Gallagher,
}
drslt
Surveying the State of the Mediative Art: A Guide to Institutionalizing Mediatio
n in Louisiana, 57 La. L. Rev. 885, 923 (1997)
(reporting based on a review of empirical studies that the \u8220\'3fperceived
neutral role of the mediator\u8221\'3f enhances party \u8220\'3fperceptions of t
he legitimacy of the dispute resolution process\u8221\'3f); Chris Guthrie & Jame
s Levin,
}
drslt
A \u8216\'3fParty Satisfaction\u8217\'3f Perspective on a Comprehensive Mediatio
n Statute, 13 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 885, 893 (1998)
(noting that party satisfaction with the mediation process is enhanced when it
is \u8220\'3funbiased\u8221\'3f); Nina R. Meierding, Does Mediation Work? A Surv
ey of Long-Term Satisfaction and Durability Rates for Privately Mediated Agreeme
nts, 11 Mediation Q. 157, 163, 170 (1990) (finding \u8220\'3fa high level of sat
isfaction\u8221\'3f among parties to mediation in which the vast majority of the
m felt the mediator was \u8220\'3funbiased\u8221\'3f); Joseph P. Tomain & Jo Ann
e Lutz, A Model for Court-Annexed Mediation,
}
dType=Y&pubNum=1494&cite=5OHSJDR1&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&
transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_1494_16" }{\fldrslt
5 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 1, 16 (1989)
(attributing party satisfaction with court-annexed mediation in part to \u8220\
'3funbiased\u8221\'3f mediators); Mary P. Van Hook, Resolving Conflict Between F
armers and Creditors: An Analysis of the Farmer-Creditor Mediation Process, 8 Me
diation Q. 63, 70 (1990) (finding that impartiality is an important part of succ
essful farmer-creditor mediation).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F41284591023_ID0EWH" }{\fld
rslt
41
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Kovach & Love, Oxymoron, supra note 7, at 31; see also Love, Top Ten Reasons, su
pra note 8, at 939 (arguing that evaluation \u8220\'3fcan compromise the mediato
r\rquote s neutrality--both in actuality and in the eyes of the parties-- becaus
e the mediator will be favoring one side in his or her judgment\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F42284591023_ID0EHI" }{\fld
rslt
42
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Love, Top Ten Reasons, supra note 8, at 945.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F43284591023_ID0EVI" }{\fld
rslt
43
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 945; see also Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 6, at 101 (\u8
220\'3fTo the extent that a mediator\rquote s evaluation favors or disfavors a p
arty or seems wrong to a party, the disadvantaged party may withdraw from the me
diation.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F44284591023_ID0ECJ" }{\fld
rslt
44
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Kovach & Love, Oxymoron, supra note 7, at 31.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F45284591023_ID0E1J" }{\fld
rslt
45
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Stulberg, Piercing, supra note 6, at 986.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F46284591023_ID0EIK" }{\fld
rslt
46
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Love, Top Ten Reasons, supra note 8, at 939; see also Kovach & Love, Mapping Med
iation, supra note 6, at 109 (noting that evaluative and facilitative mediation
assume \u8220\'3fdifferent qualifications, skills, and tasks\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F47284591023_ID0EVK" }{\fld
rslt
47
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Lon Fuller, Mediation--Its Forms and Functions,
}
dType=Y&pubNum=1228&cite=44SCALLREV305&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cbl
t1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_1228_325" }{\f
ldrslt
44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 305, 325 (1971)
.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F48284591023_ID0ERM" }{\fld
rslt
48
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Riskin, Philosophical Map, supra note 14, at 43-44. In a recent reflection, Prof
essor Jim Coben argues that the lawyers\rquote standard philosophical map also
includes \u8220\'3fthe notion of law as the exclusive measure of fairness and eq
uity, the assumption that justice is done within the adversarial system when the
zealous advocate vigorously represents her clients\rquote interests without re
gard to other\rquote s interests, and the idea that a duty exists to zealously e
xploit rules and processes to aid the client.\u8221\'3f James R. Coben,
}
drslt
Summer Musings on Curricular Innovations to Change the Lawyer\rquote s Standard
Philosophical Map, 50 U. Fla. L. Rev. 735, 737 (1998)
.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F49284591023_ID0EAN" }{\fld
rslt
49
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Riskin, Philosophical Map, supra note 14, at 45.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F50284591023_ID0EMN" }{\fld
rslt
50
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F51284591023_ID0E1N" }{\fld
rslt
51
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F52284591023_ID0E6N" }{\fld
rslt
52
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id; see also
}
dType=Y&pubNum=100319&cite=15JLEGALPROF241&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs
=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_100319_243
" }{\fldrslt
Beryl Blaustone, To Be Of Service: The Lawyer\rquote s Aware Use of The Human Sk
ills Associated With The Perceptive Self, 15 J. Legal Prof. 241, 243 (1990)
(\u8220\'3f[F]ew lawyers are intrapersonally developed; that is, few are self-a
ware of their own behavioral preferences, modes of communication, values, and se
nse of self.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F53284591023_ID0ELO" }{\fld
rslt
53
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F54284591023_ID0EOO" }{\fld
rslt
54
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F55284591023_ID0E3O" }{\fld
rslt
55
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F56284591023_ID0EOP" }{\fld
rslt
56
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 43 (emphasis added). According to Riskin, the mediator\rquote s philosoph
ical map rests on the twin assumptions that \u8220\'3fall parties can benefit th
rough a creative solution to which each agrees\u8221\'3f and that each \u8220\'3
fsituation is unique and therefore not to be governed by any general principle e
xcept to the extent that the parties accept it.\u8221\'3f Id. at 44.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F57284591023_ID0E4P" }{\fld
rslt
57
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
For a more comprehensive treatment, see Susan Daicoff,
}
Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes Bear
ing on Professionalism, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 1337 (1997)
[hereinafter Daicoff, Know Thyself]; see also Susan Daicoff,
}
Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers Change? A Critique of Solu
tions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to Empirically-Derived Attor
ney Personality Attributes, 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 547 (1998)
[hereinafter Daicoff, Changing Spots].
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F58284591023_ID0EAQ" }{\fld
rslt
58
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F59284591023_ID0EJR" }{\fld
rslt
59
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Graham B. Strong, The
}
drslt
Lawyer\rquote s Left Hand: Nonanalytical Thought in the Practice of Law, 69 U. C
olo. L. Rev. 759, 761 (1998)
(citing to Stephen Arndt & Dale E. Berger, Cognitive Mode and Asymmetry in Cere
bral Functioning, 14 Cortex 78, 82-84 (1978) and Robert E. Ornstein, The Split a
nd the Whole Brain, Human Nature, May 1978, at 76, 78).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F60284591023_ID0E2R" }{\fld
rslt
60
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Strong, supra note 59, at 761-62 n.14 (citing to Cynthia Kelly & Bernice McC
arthy, Presentation at the Annual meeting of the Association of American Law Sch
ools (Jan. 4, 1985)).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F61284591023_ID0EIS" }{\fld
rslt
61
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Renee Baron, What Type Am I? 5 (1998).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F62284591023_ID0EWS" }{\fld
rslt
62
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 27.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F63284591023_ID0EHT" }{\fld
rslt
63
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id; see also Larry Richard, The
}
dType=Y&serNum=0103285103&pubNum=101&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1
.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_101_76" }{\fldrs
lt
Lawyer Types, 79 A.B.A. J. 74, 76 (July 1993)
(\u8220\'3fThinkers make decisions in a detached, objective and logical manner.
They employ syllogistic thinking, and make a conscious effort not to let their
personal preferences get in the way of making a \u8216\'3fright\u8217\'3f decisi
on. Feelers, on the other hand, prefer to make decisions by using a more persona
l, subjective and values-based approach.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F64284591023_ID0EMT" }{\fld
rslt
64
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
In 1967, Paul VanR. Miller, who administered the MBTI to first-year students fro
m four law schools and a control group of liberal arts undergraduates, found tha
t \u8220\'3f72% of the law students were \u8216\'3fThinking\u8217\'3f types wher
eas 54% of the liberal arts undergraduates were \u8216\'3fThinkers.\u8221\'3f\u8
217\'3f Paul VanR. Miller, Personality Differences and Student Survival in Law S
chool,
}
dType=Y&pubNum=3196&cite=19JLEGALEDUC460&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=c
blt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_3196_465" }{
\fldrslt
19 J. Legal Educ. 460, 465 (1967)
. Nearly two decades later, Gerald Macdaid and colleagues found that 74.6% of re
cent male law school graduates and 64.9% of primarily-male practicing lawyers pr
eferred \u8220\'3fthinking\u8221\'3f to \u8220\'3ffeeling\u8221\'3f on the MBTI.
}
Strong, supra note 59, at 762 n.14 (citing to Gerald P. Macdaid et al., Myers-B
riggs Type Indicator Atlas of Type Tables 311-12 tbls. 8623162 & 8629439 (1986))
. More recent research supports these findings. Don Peters found that nearly 80%
of the more than 600 University of Florida law students who took the MBTI in th
e 1980s preferred the thinking orientation. Don Peters,
}
rslt
Forever Jung: Psychological Type Theory, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and Lea
rning Negotiation, 42 Drake L. Rev. 1, 17 (1993)
. Vernellia Randall found that 77.9% of entering law students preferred the thin
king orientation to the feeling orientation. Vernellia R. Randall, The
}
rslt
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, First Year Law Students and Performance, 26 Cumb. L
. Rev. 63, 91 (1995)
. Larry Richard found in his large study of practicing lawyers that \u8220\'3ffu
lly 81 percent of male lawyers preferred thinking, as did 66 percent of female l
awyers.\u8221\'3f Richard, supra note 63, at 76. See also Thomas L. Shaffer & Ro
bert S. Redmount, Lawyers, Law Students and People 94-95 (1977) (using the 16PF
\u8220\'3fpersonality factors\u8221\'3f test to find that law students, law facu
lty, and law alumni are \u8220\'3fmore \u8216\'3ftough-minded\u8217\'3f than oth
er people are\u8221\'3f); Frank L. Natter, The Human Factor: Psychological Type
in Legal Education, 24 Res. Psychol. Type 24, 24 (1981) (finding in a pilot stud
y of 28 law students that 63% of them preferred the \u8220\'3fthinking\u8221\'3f
orientation on the MBTI); Don Peters & Martha M. Peters,
}
drslt
Maybe That\rquote s Why I Do That: Psychological Type Theory, the Myers-Briggs T
ype Indicator, and Learning Legal Interviewing, 35 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 169, 181
n.43 (1990)
(finding in a pilot study of 23 law students enrolled in a legal clinic that mo
re than 60% of them preferred the \u8220\'3fthinking\u8221\'3f orientation on th
e MBTI).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F65284591023_ID0EYT" }{\fld
rslt
65
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Daicoff, Know Thyself, supra note 57, at 1405.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F66284591023_ID0EFU" }{\fld
rslt
66
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F67284591023_ID0EAV" }{\fld
rslt
67
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Strong, supra note 59, at 776.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F68284591023_ID0EYV" }{\fld
rslt
68
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F69284591023_ID0EGW" }{\fld
rslt
69
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F70284591023_ID0EUW" }{\fld
rslt
70
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F71284591023_ID0EZW" }{\fld
rslt
71
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 776-77.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F72284591023_ID0EPX" }{\fld
rslt
72
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 777.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F73284591023_ID0E5X" }{\fld
rslt
73
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
In Howard Gardner\rquote s terms, lawyers may possess relatively high levels of
\u8220\'3flogical-mathematical\u8221\'3f and \u8220\'3flinguistic\u8221\'3f inte
lligence, but they tend not to possess such high levels of the \u8220\'3fpersona
l\u8221\'3f intelligences, Howard Gardner, Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multipl
e Intelligences 73-98, 128-69, 237-76 (1983), especially \u8220\'3fthe ability t
o notice and make distinctions among other individuals and, in particular, among
their moods, temperaments, motivations, and intentions.\u8221\'3f Id. at 239.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F74284591023_ID0EBY" }{\fld
rslt
74
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See supra text accompanying note 64.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F75284591023_ID0EGY" }{\fld
rslt
75
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See supra text accompanying note 64. Of course, given the scoring of the MBTI, h
igh scores on \u8220\'3fthinking\u8221\'3f necessarily mean low scores on \u8220
\'3ffeeling.\u8221\'3f
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F76284591023_ID0E3Y" }{\fld
rslt
76
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Baron, supra note 61, at 27.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F77284591023_ID0EKZ" }{\fld
rslt
77
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
John L. Barkai & Virginia O. Fine, Empathy Training for Lawyers and Law Students
,
}
dType=Y&pubNum=1244&cite=13SWULREV505&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt
drslt
13 Sw. U. L. Rev. 505, 526 (1983)
. Prior to the empathy training, the experimental group obtained an average scor
e of 2.46, while the control group scored 2.16, both on a seven-point scale. Id.
at 526 n.63. Following the four-hour empathy training, the experimental group (
which received the empathy training) scored 4.91, while the control group (which
obviously did not receive the empathy training) scored 1.39. Id. at 526 n.64.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F78284591023_ID0ENZ" }{\fld
rslt
78
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role of Legal Education in Producing Psycholog
ical Distress Among Law Students and Lawyers,
}
dType=Y&pubNum=101488&cite=1986AMBFOUNDRESJ225&originationContext=document&vr=3.
0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_101488
_247" }{\fldrslt
1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 225, 247
(\u8220\'3f[O]n the basis of epidemiological data, only 3-9% of individuals in
industrial nations suffer from depression; prelaw subject group means did not di
ffer from normative expectations. Yet, 17-40% of law students and alumni in our
study suffered from depression, while 20-40% of the same subjects suffered from
other elevated symptoms.\u8221\'3f
}
) (footnote omitted).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F79284591023_ID0E2Z" }{\fld
rslt
79
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 250. Benjamin et al. explain \u8220\'3f[c]onventional legal education tha
t concentrates on the development of analytic skills while ignoring interpersona
l development may increase distress levels and prevent the alleviation of sympto
ms,\u8221\'3f id, and identify excessive workloads and high student-faculty rati
os as other potential causes of elevated mental distress, id. at 248-49.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F80284591023_ID0EJ1" }{\fld
rslt
80
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
James M. Hedegard, The Impact of Legal Education: An In-Depth Examination of Car
eer-Relevant Interests, Attitudes, and Personality Traits Among First-Year Law S
tudents,
}
dType=Y&pubNum=101488&cite=1979AMBFOUNDRESJ791&originationContext=document&vr=3.
0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_101488
_835" }{\fldrslt
1979 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 791, 835
.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F81284591023_ID0EN1" }{\fld
rslt
81
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Sandra Janoff, The
}
drslt
Influence of Legal Education on Moral Reasoning, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 193, 229 (1991
)
.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F82284591023_ID0EK2" }{\fld
rslt
82
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Daicoff, Know Thyself, supra note 57, at 1405.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F83284591023_ID0EX2" }{\fld
rslt
83
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id; see also Richard, supra note 63, at 76 (\u8220\'3fFeelers have a rough time
of it [in the legal profession] .... The constant adversarial mentality wears on
the feeler, while for the thinker it can represent one of the most stimulating
parts of practice.\u8221\'3f). Interestingly, in her study of law students, dent
al students, and social work students, Barbara Nachman found that \u8220\'3f[r]e
gard for feelings of others as an aim of discipline, concern for human suffering
as an ethic instilled in the children, and appeal to consideration for others a
s a method of discipline (\u8216\'3fyou will make mother feel bad\u8217\'3f) was
[sic] more frequently reported by social workers than by the other two groups.\
u8221\'3f Barbara Nachmann, Childhood Experience and Vocational Choice in Law, D
entistry, and Social Work, 7 J. Counseling Psychol. 243, 249 (1960).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F84284591023_ID0ER3" }{\fld
rslt
84
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Martin J. Bohn, Jr., Psychological Needs of Engineering, Pre-Law, Pre
-Medical, and Undecided College Freshmen, 12 J.C. Student Personnel 359, 361 (19
71) (finding in a \u8220\'3fpsychological need\u8221\'3f study that lawyers were
\u8220\'3fperceived a having some definite need requirements, such as the needs
to be a leader, to attract attention, and to avoid feeling inferior or taking a
subordinate role\u8221\'3f); John M. Houston et al., Assessing Competitiveness:
A Validation Study of the Competitiveness Index, 13 Personality & Individual Di
fferences 1153 (1992) (confirming that lawyers are more competitive than nurses)
; Janet S. St. Lawrence et al., Stress Management Training for Law Students:Cogn
itive-Behavioral Intervention, 1 Behavioral Sci. & Law 101, 106 (1983) (noting l
aw students\rquote \u8220\'3fcompetitive approach to life\u8221\'3f); Sue Winkl
e Williams & John C. McCullers, Personal Factors Related to Typicalness of Caree
r and Success in Active Professional Women, 7 Psychol. Women Q. 343, 354 (1983)
(speculating that \u8220\'3fachievement in law may be associated with the tradit
ionally masculine characteristics of aggressiveness and competitiveness\u8221\'3
f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F85284591023_ID0EI4" }{\fld
rslt
85
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Lawrence J. Landwehr, Lawyers as Social Progressives or Reactionaries: The Law a
nd Order Cognitive Orientation of Lawyers,
}
dType=Y&pubNum=100146&cite=7LPSYR39&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.
0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
7 Law & Psychol. Rev. 39 (1982)
.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F86284591023_ID0EQ4" }{\fld
rslt
86
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See generally 1 Anne Colby & Lawrence Kohlberg, The Measurement of Moral Judgmen
t (1987).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
rslt
87
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Steven Hartwell,
}
{\fldrslt
Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential Teaching, 1 Clinical L. Rev. 50
5, 506-07 (1995)
.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F88284591023_ID0EB5" }{\fld
rslt
88
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
1 Colby & Kohlberg, supra note 86, at 15-19.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F89284591023_ID0EG5" }{\fld
rslt
89
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Landwehr, supra note 85, at 44. Landwehr speculates that the unusual concentrati
on of lawyers at stage four is a consequence of \u8220\'3flegal thinking.\u8221\
'3f Id. at 49.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F90284591023_ID0EU5" }{\fld
rslt
90
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Lawrence Kohlberg, The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education, 56 P
hi Delta Kappan 670, 671 t.1 (1975).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F91284591023_ID0EZ5" }{\fld
rslt
91
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Landwehr, supra note 85, at 45.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F92284591023_ID0EQ6" }{\fld
rslt
92
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Kohlberg, supra note 90, at 671 t.1.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F93284591023_ID0EU6" }{\fld
rslt
93
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Landwehr, supra note 85, at 46 (\u8220\'3fThe cognitive structure of
a stage 4 person may permit careful scrutiny of whether someone has acted within
the civil or criminal legal rules but the same structure severely inhibits the
ability to question the rules themselves. In contrast, the stage 5 cognitive pro
cess is one of questioning and opting for changing the law when such change is p
erceived as necessary to achieve social goals.\u8221\'3f) (footnote omitted); se
e also
}
June Louin Tapp & Felice J. Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategies for an Ethic
al Legality, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1974)
. Tapp and Levine developed a \u8220\'3flegal socialization and development\u822
1\'3f model influenced by Kohlberg\rquote s theory.
}
Id. at 2, 12.
According to their model, individuals engage in legal reasoning at one of three
levels: preconventional, conventional, and postconventional.
}
Id. at 2.
They developed an open-ended questionnaire designed to assess legal reasoning a
ccording to their model. They then administered their questionnaire to college s
tudents, teachers, prison inmates, and law students, finding that law students a
pproach the world in accord with the \u8220\'3flaw-and-order, conventional level
\u8221\'3f of their model.
}
Id. at 22, 25-26.
They also found that twice as many prison inmates as law students (16% to 8%) a
pproach the world in accord with the postconventional level,
}
id. at 25-26,
a level at which \u8220\'3flegal directives are not derived from the dictates o
f unilateral authority,\u8221\'3f but rather \u8220\'3fare human constructs refl
ecting the active, consensual participation of equals moving toward shared expec
tations.\u8221\'3f
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F94284591023_ID0EFA" }{\fld
rslt
94
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
\u8220\'3f[I]n the research from which Kohlberg derives his theory, females simp
ly do not exist.\u8221\'3f
}
Id. at 18.
\u8220\'3fKohlberg\rquote s six stages that describe the development of moral j
udgment from childhood to adulthood are based empirically on a study of eighty-f
our boys whose development Kohlberg has followed for a period of over twenty yea
rs.\u8221\'3f Id. (citations omitted).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F95284591023_ID0EIA" }{\fld
rslt
95
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (1982).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F96284591023_ID0ENA" }{\fld
rslt
96
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., id. at 62-63. For a thoughtful philosophical exploration of the \u822
0\'3fcare\u8221\'3f perspective, see Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach t
o Ethics & Moral Education (1984).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F97284591023_ID0E2A" }{\fld
rslt
97
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Janoff, supra note 81, at 218.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F98284591023_ID0EJB" }{\fld
rslt
98
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 232.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F99284591023_ID0E4B" }{\fld
rslt
99
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 232-23; see also Janet Taber et al.,
}
ldrslt
Project, Gender, Legal Education, and the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study o
f Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1209, 1251 (1988)
(finding fewer differences than expected between the moral reasoning of male an
d female law students and lawyers and speculating that \u8220\'3f[t]he socializa
tion of female law students and graduates into the traditional \u8216\'3flegal\u
8217\'3f mode of thinking may explain the fact that women and men did not differ
on any of the abstract factors\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnote_F100284591023_1}{\*\bkmkend co_footnote_F100284591023_
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F100284591023_ID0EK" }{\fld
rslt
100
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Daicoff, Know Thyself, supra note 57, at 1397. But see id. at 1409 (\u8220\'3fWh
ile there is evidence to suggest that their stage of moral development and decis
ion-making styles may be more homogeneous than the general population and more f
ocused on maintaining rules, regulations, social order, and conformity, there is
also evidence that their stage of moral development does not differ from the mo
ral development of other similarly educated adults, and that law school has no r
eal effect on their moral development.\u8221\'3f) (footnotes omitted).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F101284591023_ID0EI" }{\fld
rslt
101
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See supra Part II.A.1-3.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F102284591023_ID0EL" }{\fld
rslt
102
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See generally Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie,
}
Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76
Tex. L. Rev. 77 (1997)
(demonstrating experimentally that lawyers are less likely than their clients t
o fall prey to psychological barriers that may impede their clients from accepti
ng economically-rational settlements). But see Daicoff, Know Thyself, supra note
57, at 1394 (noting that lawyers\rquote rational, unemotional personalities \u
8220\'3fmight explain why lawyers and their clients at times have trouble intera
cting with and relating to each other\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F103284591023_ID0EO" }{\fld
rslt
103
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See generally
}
dType=Y&pubNum=1359&cite=59VALR551&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0
&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_1359_611" }{\fldrs
lt
Robert Stevens, Law Schools and Law Students, 59 Va. L. Rev. 551, 611 (1973)
(noting that in law school
}
\u8220\'3f[i]magination and creativity, supreme achievements by most educational
standards, seemed to have been demoted in favor of attaining legal tools, vocab
ulary, and skills of analysis\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
104
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
James L. Adams, Conceptual Blockbusting: A Guide to Better Ideas 46 (3d ed. 1986
).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F105284591023_ID0EG" }{\fld
rslt
105
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
106
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Theorists from various disciplines warn of the detrimental impact that judging a
nd analysis can have on the conceptualization and creative resolution of problem
s and disputes. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 104, at 46 (\u8220\'3fJudgment, cri
ticism, tough-mindedness, and practicality are of course essential in problem-so
lving. However, if applied too early or too indiscriminately in the problem-solv
ing process, they are extremely detrimental to conceptualization.\u8221\'3f); Ro
ger Fisher, William Ury & Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes:Negotiating Agreement Wit
hout Giving In 58 (2d ed. 1991) (\u8220\'3fNothing is so harmful to inventing as
a critical sense waiting to pounce on the drawbacks of any new idea. Judgment h
inders imagination.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
107
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Based on a review of \u8220\'3fvideotaped and transcribed law student-client and
attorney-client first interviews,\u8221\'3f for instance, Professor Gay Gellhor
n concluded that \u8220\'3fclients reveal critical self-information in their ope
ning words, regardless of when those words occur and regardless of the legal int
erviewer\rquote s role in eliciting them. This information usually is not acknow
ledged by legal interviewers, with negative consequences. Failure to hear and se
e affects the legal interviewer\rquote s ability to form a relationship with a c
lient, to comprehend the full range of information the client needs to share, an
d to collaborate with the client to tell a story in legally and emotionally effe
ctive language.\u8221\'3f Gay Gellhorn,
}
{\fldrslt
Law and Language: An Empirically-Based Model for the Opening Moments of Client I
nterviews, 4 Clinical L. Rev. 321, 321 (1998)
(footnote omitted).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
108
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
109
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See
}
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The C
ase of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979)
.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F110284591023_ID0EQ" }{\fld
rslt
110
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F111284591023_ID0EG" }{\fld
rslt
111
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F112284591023_ID0EU" }{\fld
rslt
112
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 94.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F113284591023_ID0EB" }{\fld
rslt
113
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id; see also Jonathan M. Hyman,
}
\fldrslt
Slip-Sliding Into Mediation:Can Lawyers Mediate Their Clients\rquote Problems?,
5 Clinical L. Rev. 47, 87 (1998)
(\u8220\'3fMany lawyers will feel most comfortable with a narrow, evaluative ap
proach to mediation.\u8221\'3f); Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 6,
at 96 (\u8220\'3fLawyers customarily speak for their clients and present advers
arial arguments about the merits of the case. Accordingly, they attempt to draw
mediation back into their adversarial paradigm.\u8221\'3f); id. at 105 (arguing
that the exclusion of non-lawyer mediators pulls \u8220\'3fmediation back toward
s the adversarial norm\u8221\'3f); Love, Top Ten Reasons, supra note 8, at 942 (
arguing that \u8220\'3fif the field is theirs, lawyer-mediators will likely pull
mediation into an adversarial paradigm\u8221\'3f); Paul J. Spiegelman,
}
drslt
Certifying Mediators: Using Selection Criteria to Include the Qualified--Lessons
from the San Diego Experience, 30 U.S.F. L. Rev. 677, 693 (1996)
(\u8220\'3fRestricting the practice of mediation to lawyers or other profession
als could deprive mediation of its nonadversarial approach, potentially transfor
ming it into the type of legalistic process to which it is supposed to be an alt
ernative.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F114284591023_ID0EM" }{\fld
rslt
114
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
This argument rests on the assumption that the mediator will disclose his or her
professional background to the disputants either prior to, or at the outset of,
the mediation. It may, in fact, be the case that some mediators in some mediati
on programs may not disclose that they are trained as lawyers. See Riskin, Philo
sophical Map, supra note 14, at 36 (reporting that lawyer-mediators in the Houst
on Neighborhood Justice Center in the early 1980s were \u8220\'3fenjoined not to
give legal advice, and they generally do not let disputants know that they are
lawyers\u8221\'3f). Nevertheless, most in the mediation community seem to assume
that mediators will disclose their backgrounds as lawyers to the parties prior
to, or at the outset of, the mediation (or that their backgrounds will be disclo
sed by the courts that refer cases to mediation).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
115
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Gary A. Hengstler,
}
lt
Vox Populi, 79 A.B.A. J. 60, 60 (1993)
.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F116284591023_ID0EZ" }{\fld
rslt
116
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 61.
\par
}
}
}\i0 \ri20 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj \intbl \cell \row }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F117284591023_ID0EV" }{\fld
rslt
117
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Marc Galanter, The
}
drslt
Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes, and Political
Discourse, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 805, 809-10 (1998)
; see also Randall Samborn, Anti-Lawyer Attitude Up, Nat\rquote l L.J., Aug. 9,
1993, at 1 (\u8220\'3fAs for confidence in lawyers\rquote abilities [in a Natio
nal Law Journal-sponsored survey], 64 percent [of the general public] said they
either were \u8216\'3fvery certain\u8217\'3f or \u8216\'3fsomewhat certain\u8217
\'3f that if they hired an attorney, he or she would perform competently.\u8221\
'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F118284591023_ID0EC" }{\fld
rslt
118
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Hengstler, supra note 115, at 64.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F119284591023_ID0ER" }{\fld
rslt
119
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g.,
}
drslt
Joseph B. Stulberg, Book Review, 14 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 259, 264 (1998)
(reviewing Dwight Golann, Mediating Legal Disputes: Effective Strategies for La
wyers and Mediators (1996)) (arguing that mediators should be lawyers in \u8220\
'3flegal mediation\u8221\'3f to \u8220\'3felicit the confidence of advocates\u82
21\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F120284591023_ID0ES" }{\fld
rslt
120
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in The Good Lawyer: Lawyer\
rquote s Role and Lawyers\rquote Ethics 83, 89 (David Luban ed., 1983) (\u8220\
'3fLitigation is commonly referred to as a war, or more often as a battle. The o
ther battle metaphors flow from this premise. For example, some refer to the rol
es that trial lawyers play in this war. They can be heroes, hired guns, gladiato
rs, warriors, champions, generals, lone gunfighters, or the man on the firing li
ne.\u8221\'3f); Annetee J. Scieszinski,
}
.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_101_119" }{\fldr
slt
Return of the Problem-Solvers, 81 A.B.A. J. 119, 119 (1995)
(\u8220\'3fThe media, which for better or worse educates the public about the r
ole of the lawyer, paints a gladiator who will end up either the conqueror or th
e conquered.\u8221\'3f); Susan P. Sturm,
}
{\fldrslt
From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting Conversations About Women, the Ac
ademy, and the Legal Profession, 4 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol\rquote y. 119, 121-22
(1997)
(\u8220\'3f[The] \u8216\'3fgladiator\u8217\'3f model of legal education and law
yering celebrates analytical rigor, toughness, and quick thinking. It defines su
ccessful performance as fighting to win: an argument, a conflict, or a case. Eve
n in more informal settings such as negotiations or in-house advising, lawyering
often proceeds within the gladiator model.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F121284591023_ID0EH" }{\fld
rslt
121
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Heather M. McLean & Rudolf Kalin, Congruence Between Self-Image and Occupational
Stereotypes in Students Entering Gender-Dominated Occupations, 26 Canadian J. B
ehavioural Sci. 142, 148 (1994). In addition to lawyers, the study subjects asse
ssed the personalities of engineers, physicians, nurses, rehabilitation therapis
ts, and teachers. Id.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
122
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Jerry S. Wiggins & Ross Broughton, The Interpersonal Circle:A Structural Model f
or the Integration of Personality Research, 1 Perspectives in Personality 1, 42
(Robert Hogan & Warren H. Jones eds. 1985). See also Jerry S. Wiggins, A Psychol
ogical Taxonomy of Trait-Descriptive Terms: The Interpersonal Domain, 37 J. Pers
. & Soc. Psychol. 395, 405 (1979) (explaining that \u8220\'3fdominance\u8221\'3f
is an \u8220\'3finterpersonal trait\u8221\'3f comprised of the following adject
ives:dominant, assertive, forceful, domineering, firm, self-confident, self-assu
red, un-self-conscious).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F123284591023_ID0EY" }{\fld
rslt
123
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Wiggins & Broughton, supra note 122, at 21.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F124284591023_ID0EE" }{\fld
rslt
124
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
125
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 42.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
126
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
McLean & Kalin, supra note 121, at 151 (\u8220\'3fHigher dominance scores were c
learly evident for the occupation lawyer than for the other occupations.\u8221\'
3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
127
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 152 (showing a mean score for lawyers above .75 and a mean score for engi
neers, the second-highest-scoring profession, below .25).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F128284591023_ID0EA" }{\fld
rslt
128
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
129
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Hengstler, supra note 115, at 62.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
130
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. (emphasis added).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
131
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Deborah L. Rhode, The
}
drslt
Professionalism Problem, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 283, 286 (1998)
.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F132284591023_ID0EE" }{\fld
rslt
132
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
While I rely on survey data from 1976 to the present, I do not in any way mean t
o imply that the public\rquote s view of lawyers has been unusually low during t
he last quarter of the twentieth century. In fact, there is evidence to suggest
that lawyers were held in even lower regard earlier in the century. See Galanter
, supra note 117, at 810 (\u8220\'3fIn reading the polls\rquote story of declin
ing regard for lawyers, we should be wary of assuming that opinion about the leg
al profession has fallen from its normal plane of respect to a historic low. Thi
s \u8216\'3fhistoric low\u8217\'3f reading comports with the scenario, favored b
y many lawyers, in which the profession has fallen from an earlier state of grac
e into an abject and debased condition. Public estimation of lawyers was far low
er at earlier points in American history.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F133284591023_ID0EJ" }{\fld
rslt
133
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Amy E. Black & Stanley Rothman,
}
drslt
Shall We Kill All the Lawyers First?: Insider and Outside Views of the Legal Pro
fession, 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol\rquote y 835, 852
t.6 (1997) (citing to the Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll, December 9-11, 1996).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
134
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 852
t.6.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
135
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
136
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 853 t.7. Lawyers, who placed 15th on the list of 26 professions, ranked a
head of newspaper reporters, business executives, labor union leaders, real esta
te agents, stockbrokers, senators, congressmen, state officeholders, insurance s
alesmen, advertising practitioners, and car salesmen. Id. Psychologists, psychot
herapists, counselors, and social workers, among others, were not included in th
e survey.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
137
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 851. Black and Rothman report other survey data demonstrating that member
s of the public have a low opinion of lawyers\rquote honesty and ethical standa
rds. They report data from the 1995 American Family Values Survey showing that f
ew people think lawyers are good role models. Id. at 854 (citing to Michaels Opi
nion Research, American Family Values Survey 1995, Aug. 9-26, 1995) (\u8220\'3fO
nly two percent of respondents considered lawyers excellent role models, but 78
percent of those surveyed classified lawyers as fair or poor role models. Moreov
er, lawyers ranked eleventh out of fifteen comparison groups included in the sur
vey, receiving lower ratings than athletes, journalists, and radio announcers.\u
8221\'3f). They report data from a 1987 Yankelovich Clancy Shulman survey in whi
ch only 35 percent of respondents indicated that they perceive lawyers to have \
u8220\'3fhigh ethical standards.\u8221\'3f Id. at 854-55 (citing to Yankelovich
Clancy Shulman, Time/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman Poll, Jan. 19-21, 1987). Additio
nally, they report data from the Hart and Teeter Research Companies finding that
\u8220\'3f18 percent of respondents gave lawyers high or very high rankings [of
their ethical standards], and 41 percent said lawyers have low or very low ethi
cal standards.\u8221\'3f Id. at 855 (citing to Hart and Teeter Research Companie
s, NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll, Oct. 27-31, 1995). See also Hengstler, sup
ra note 115, at 62 (reporting that the ABA-commissioned Hart survey found that \
u8220\'3fbarely one in five (22 percent) said the phrase \u8216\'3fhonest and et
hical\u8217\'3f describes lawyers. Nearly twice as many (40 percent) said this d
escription does not apply.\u8221\'3f); James Podgers,
}
lt
Message Bearers Wanted, 85 A.B.A. J. 89, 89 (1999)
(reporting that only 14 percent of respondents in a 1998 ABA-sponsored survey b
y M/A/R/C Research gave lawyers a \u8220\'3fhigh confidence\u8221\'3f rating).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F138284591023_ID0EX" }{\fld
rslt
138
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Guthrie & Levin, supra note 40, at 888-89 (asserting that \u8220\'3f[
a] party is likely to report high levels of satisfaction with mediation if it me
ets or exceeds her prior expectations.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F139284591023_ID0EZ" }{\fld
rslt
139
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See supra Section II.B.1-3.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
140
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 117, at 808 (reporting based on several surveys
that \u8220\'3f[o]ver half of American adults have used lawyers and most report
themselves satisfied with the service provided\u8221\'3f). But see Daicoff, Chan
ging Spots, supra note 57, at 552 (contending that the ABA\rquote s 1993 poll \u
8220\'3fdebunked the idea that people hate lawyers in general but like their own
\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F141284591023_ID0EW" }{\fld
rslt
141
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
For a recent compilation of the research on party satisfaction, see Guthrie & Le
vin, supra note 40.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F142284591023_ID0EU" }{\fld
rslt
142
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Don Peters,
}
{\fldrslt
Oiling Rusty Wheels: A Small Claims Mediation Narrative, 50 Fla. L. Rev. 761, 76
1-62 (1998)
(\u8220\'3fStories help people learn. They foster understanding of complicated
interactions. They help make sense of multi-layered processes by showing how dis
parate elements come together creating integrated action sequences.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
143
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
While there is no such thing as a \u8220\'3ftypical\u8221\'3f mediation, most ac
ademics and practitioners characterize the process similar to the way I have cha
racterized it. See, e.g., Mark D. Bennett & Michele S.G. Hermann, The Art of Med
iation 25 (1996) (identifying intake, contracting, information gathering and iss
ue identification, agenda setting, resolving each issue, reaching agreement, and
drafting the agreement as stages of mediation); John W. Cooley, Mediation Advoc
acy 15 (1996) (\u8220\'3fClassical mediation consists of eight stages: (1) initi
ation, (2) preparation, (3) introduction, (4) problem statement, (5) problem cla
rification, (6) generation and evaluation of alternative(s), (7) selection of al
ternative(s), and (8) agreement. In a typical mediation, stages 4, 5, 6, and 7 s
ometimes overlap or are repeated before the parties reach a consensus on all iss
ues and conclude a final agreement.\u8221\'3f); Dwight Golann, Mediating Legal D
isputes: Effective Strategies for Lawyers and Mediators 62 (1996) (emphasis in o
riginal) (arguing that \u8220\'3fmediation usually takes place in two or three b
asic stages: the opening session (also commonly referred to as the joint session
), private caucuses, and less commonly, moderated negotiations\u8221\'3f); Kovac
h, supra note 22, at 31 (arguing that the \u8220\'3fbasic model\u8221\'3f of med
iation is comprised of nine mandatory stages-preliminary arrangements, mediator\
rquote s introduction, opening statements by the parties, information gathering,
issue and interest identification, option generation, bargaining and negotiatio
n, agreement, and closure-and four optional stages-ventilation, agenda setting,
caucus, and reality testing); Joseph B. Stulberg, Taking Charge/Managing Conflic
t 58 (1987) (arguing that mediation is comprised of \u8220\'3fsix distinct, cons
ecutive segments\u8221\'3f which he labels as follows: begin the discussion, acc
umulate information, develop the agenda and discussion strategies, generate move
ment, escape to separate sessions, and resolve the dispute).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F144284591023_ID0EF" }{\fld
rslt
144
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
145
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Each introduction is truncated, of course. In a typical mediation, the mediator
will provide additional information about factors including the process, behavio
ral guidelines, and confidentiality. See Christopher W. Moore, The Mediation Pro
cess 20, 194 (2d ed. 1996) (identifying eleven elements that the \u8220\'3fopeni
ng statement usually contains\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
146
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Kovach, supra note 22, at 32.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
147
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Stulberg, supra note 143, at 65 (\u8220\'3fBeginning effectively is e
xtremely important. If the mediator is hesitant, rambling, disorganized, or disr
espectful, the parties will not have any confidence that he can help them. If th
e mediator presents himself as a person who is confident, articulate, and decisi
ve, the parties instinctively will trust him.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
148
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g.,Cooley, supra note 143, at 16 (noting that in the introductory stage o
f the mediation the mediator, among other things, \u8220\'3festablishes control
of the process\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
149
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
It is possible, of course, that the disputants may have met the mediator prior t
o the onset of the mediation session, in which case they will obviously have for
med first impressions of the mediator prior to the mediation session.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F150284591023_ID0ET" }{\fld
rslt
150
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See supra Section II.B.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
151
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See supra Section II.B.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
152
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See supra note 114.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
153
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
154
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
The \u8220\'3ffacts\u8221\'3f of this hypothetical are based loosely on the fact
s of a hypothetical contained in Kovach, supra note 22, at 257.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
155
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Spiegelman, supra note 113, at 695 (arguing that \u8220\'3frequiring
mediators to be lawyers ... risks placing too heavy an emphasis on reducing disp
utes to a dollar figure at the expense of creatively exploring options.\u8221\'3
f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
156
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Consider Professor Kenney Hegland\rquote s oft-repeated anecdote:
\par
}
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
In my first year Contracts class, I wished to review various doctrines we had re
cently studied. I put the following:
\par
}
}
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
In a long term installment contract, Seller promises Buyer to deliver widgets at
the rate of 1000 a month. The first two deliveries are perfect. However, in the
third month Seller delivers only 999 widgets. Buyer becomes so incensed with th
is that he rejects the delivery, cancels the remaining deliveries and refuses to
pay for the widgets already delivered. After stating the problem, I asked \u821
6\'3fIf you were Seller, what would you say?\u8217\'3f What I was looking for wa
s a discussion of the various common law theories which would force the buyer to
pay for the widgets delivered and those which would throw buyer into breach for
canceling the remaining deliveries. In short, I wanted the class to come up wit
h the legal doctrines which would allow Seller to crush Buyer.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
After asking the question, I looked around the room for a volunteer. As is so of
ten the case with first year students, I found that they were all either writing
in their notebooks or inspecting their shoes. There was, however, one eager fac
e, that of an eight year old son of one of my students. It seems that he was suf
fering through Contracts due to his mother\rquote s sin of failing to find a sit
ter. Suddenly he raised his hand. Such behavior, even from an eight year old, mu
st be rewarded.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
\u8216\'3fOK,\u8217\'3f I said, \u8216\'3fWhat would you say if you were the sel
ler?\u8217\'3f
\par
}
}
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
\u8216\'3fI\rquote d say \u8216\'3fI\rquote m sorry.\u8217\'3f
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Riskin, Philosophical Map, supra note 14, at 46 (quoting from Kenney Hegland, Wh
y Teach Trial Advocacy? An Essay on Never Ask Why, in Humanistic Educ. in Law, M
onograph III, at 68-69 (1982)). For more on apology, see Jonathan R. Cohen,
}
Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1009 (1999)
.
\par
}
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
157
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Kovach, supra note 22, at 115 (\u8220\'3fInformation gathering is a s
ignificant stage of mediation and should not be overlooked or hurried through. O
nce parties begin to focus on issues and options for settlement, they become rel
uctant to share additional information. They stop listening, and become entrench
ed in positions. Therefore, the information exchange must occur early in the ses
sion.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F158284591023_ID0ET" }{\fld
rslt
158
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 117.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
159
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 117-18.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F160284591023_ID0ED" }{\fld
rslt
160
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., id. at 33 (describing \u8220\'3freality testing\u8221\'3f as \u8220\'
3fchecking out with each side the realistic possibility of attaining what he or
she is hoping for\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
161
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Stulberg, supra note 143, at 84.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
162
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 83.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
163
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Kovach, supra note 22, at 33 (noting that the mediator engages in option generat
ion \u8220\'3f[o]nce the mediator has the issues identified\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
164
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On
}
drslt
Teaching Professional Judgment, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 527, 541 (1994)
.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
165
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F166284591023_ID0EP" }{\fld
rslt
166
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
167
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
168
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See supra Section II.A.1.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F169284591023_ID0EN" }{\fld
rslt
169
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
170
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Stulberg, supra note 143, at 107 (\u8220\'3fA mediator chooses to mee
t separately with the parties--to caucus with them--because he believes that doi
ng so will contribute to the settlement process.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
171
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F172284591023_ID0EM" }{\fld
rslt
172
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
173
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
174
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
175
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
176
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Riskin, Grid, supra note 1, at 13.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
177
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
The leading proponent of \u8220\'3feclectic mediation\u8221\'3f is Professor Ste
mpel. For his most recent thoughts on this topic, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, The
}
Inevitability of the Eclectic: Liberating ADR from Ideology, 2000 J. Disp. Resol
. 247
.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
178
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
It is worth observing that the typical lawyer\rquote s discomfort with emotion m
ay be detrimental in evaluative as well as facilitative mediation. A lawyer-medi
ator uncomfortable with emotion may fail to develop rapport with the disputants,
neglect a claimant\rquote s emotional harms, ignore the emotional tension betwe
en the disputants, etc. Any of these \u8220\'3ffailings\u8221\'3f on the part of
the mediator might undermine even an evaluative mediation.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
179
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
The distinction between \u8220\'3fnormative\u8221\'3f and \u8220\'3fprescriptive
\u8221\'3f is often slippery. See Christine Jolls et al.,
}
ldrslt
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1474 (1998)
(observing that \u8220\'3fnormative analysis is no different from prescriptive
analysis\u8221\'3f in conventional economics). The basic idea, however, is that
normative refers \u8220\'3fmore broadly [[to] the ends of the legal system\u8221
\'3f while prescriptive refers more narrowly to the achievement of specified end
s.
}
Id. at 1474.
\par
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
180
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
But see Daicoff, Changing Spots, supra note 57, at 590 (acknowledging that \u822
0\'3fit may undermine the American legal system to have lawyers change in these
ways, if equal access to justice and lawyer satisfaction depend on rational, obj
ective lawyers adopting the amoral professional role\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
181
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Riskin contrasts the lawyer\rquote s standard philosophical map with a mediator\
rquote s philosophical map in his seminal 1982 article. See Riskin, Philosophica
l Map, supra note 14, at 43-44.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F182284591023_ID0EC" }{\fld
rslt
182
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See supra text accompanying notes 85-93.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
183
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See generally sources cited supra note 64.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
184
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
But see Randall, supra note 64, at 91 (finding a strong preference among law stu
dents for the \u8220\'3fthinking\u8221\'3f orientation at the beginning of their
first year of law school).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
185
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See generally sources cited supra note 84.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
186
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Daicoff, Know Thyself, supra note 57; Daicoff, Changing Spots, supra note 57
.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
187
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Daicoff, Changing Spots, supra note 57, at 566.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
188
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Daicoff, Changing Spots, supra note 57, at 594. One study of pre-law students pr
ovides support for the claim that some of these lawyer attributes appear to be p
resent prior to legal training. See Bohn, supra note 84. In this study, Professo
r Martin Bohn found that pre-law undergraduates were more competitive than pre-m
ed, engineering, and undecided undergraduates. Id. at 361. Pre-law students appe
ared to have a psychological need \u8220\'3fto be a leader, to attract attention
, and to avoid feeling inferior or taking a subordinate role.\u8221\'3f Id. This
study suffers from two significant limitations, however. First, Bohn included o
nly male undergraduates in his study. Id. at 359. Second, there is no way of kno
wing how many of the undergraduates who identified themselves as \u8220\'3fpre-l
aw\u8221\'3f actually became lawyers, particularly given that they appear to hav
e participated in the study as college freshmen. Id.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
189
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See supra text accompanying note 81. For a different view, see generally
}
blt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
Thomas E. Willging & Thomas G. Dunn, The Moral Development of the Law Student: T
heory and Data on Legal Education, 31 J. Legal Educ. 306 (1981)
(finding that the first year of law school did not affect the moral development
of law students).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
190
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
191
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
192
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Coben, supra note 48.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
193
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Jane Salem, Devil\rquote s Advocate, 30 Vanderbilt Lawyer 25, 25 (2000).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
194
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Susan A. Bandes, Introduction, in The Passions of Law 2 (Susan A. Bandes ed. 199
9).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
195
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
John T. Noonan, Jr., Persons and Masks of the Law: Cardozo, Holmes, Jefferson, a
nd Wythe as Makers of the Masks 111-51 (1976).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
196
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Jonathan Harr, A Civil Action (1995).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
197
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Barry Werth, Damages: One Family\rquote s Legal Struggles in the World of Medici
ne (1998).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
198
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See
}
blt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_3196_509" }{
\fldrslt
Leonard L. Riskin & James E. Westbrook, Integrating Dispute Resolution Into Stan
dard First-Year Law School Courses: The Missouri Plan, 39 J. Legal Educ. 509, 50
9-14 (1998)
.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
1}
rslt
199
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Leonard L. Riskin et al., Instructor\rquote s Manual with Simulation and Pro
blem Materials to Accompany Riskin & Westbrook Dispute Resolution and Lawyers (2
d ed. 1998).
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
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{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F200284591023_ID0EW" }{\fld
rslt
200
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Ronald M. Pipkin,
}
{\fldrslt
Teaching Dispute Resolution in the First Year of Law School: An Evaluation of th
e Program at the University of Missouri-Columbia, 50 Fla. L. Rev. 609, 626-30 (1
998)
.
\par
}
}
}
w }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
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rslt
201
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Stempel, supra note 177; see also Richard Birke,
}
drslt
Evaluation and Facilitation: Moving Past Either/Or, 2000 J. Disp. Resol. 309, 31
0
(arguing that \u8220\'3fthere is no such thing as a purely facilitative mediati
on of a legal dispute\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
w }
3 \clbrdrb \clbrdrl \trql \clvertalt \cellx600
\clbrdrb \clbrdrr \trql \cellx10080
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
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rslt
202
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See supra Part II. See generally John Lande,
}
drslt
Toward More Sophisticated Mediation Theory, 2000 J. Disp. Resol. 321, 327
(noting that the debate has been fruitful but often characterized by \u8220\'3f
rigid, orthodox, extremist, narrow, purist, dogmatic, emotional, strident, and e
ven just plain irritating\u8221\'3f arguments) (footnotes omitted).
\par
}
}
}
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End of Document
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\u169\'3f 2011 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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}\sect }

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