1AC

Advantage 1
Advantage 1 is Taiwan
Taiwan war is inevitable in the status quo draws in the
United States it is the most dangerous global tripwire
Bandow 8/15 (Doug, Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute,
specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties. He worked as special assistant
to President Ronald Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry. He
writes regularly for leading publications such as Fortune magazine, National
Interest, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Times. Bandow speaks
frequently at academic conferences, on college campuses, and to business
groups. Bandow has been a regular commentator on ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN,
Fox News Channel, and MSNBC. He holds a JD from Stanford University.,
Missile Accident Reminds U.S. of Dangers of Taiwan Commitment, The Cato
Institute, 8/15/16, http://www.cato.org/blog/missile-accident-reminds-us-
dangers-taiwan-commitment, Kent Denver-jKIM)

Taiwan long has been one of the globes most dangerous tripwires .
Other than a brief period after World War II, the island has not been ruled by the mainland for more than a century. The 23
China
million people living on what was once called Formosa have made a nation. However, the Peoples Republic of
views Taiwanalso known as the Republic of China (ROC)as part of the PRC. As China
has grown wealthier, it has created a military increasingly capable of
defeating Taiwan. At the same time, economic ties between the two nations
have grown, yet the Taiwanese population has steadily identified more with
Taiwan than the PRC. The election of Tsai Ing-wen of the traditional pro-
independence Democratic Progress Party as president in January greatly
discomfited Beijing. As Chinese patience wanes, American policy
based on ambiguity grows riskier . Washingtons commitment to Taiwan developed out of the
World War II alliance with the ROC. However, Washington loosened its commitment to Taipei with President Richard
Nixons opening to China. President Jimmy Carter furthered the process when the United States shifted official recognition
to the PRC. The American military commitment has become steadily less
certain. Would the United States really risk Los Angeles for Taipei, as one Chinese
general famously asked? Washington officials hope never to have to answer that question, but the recent

Taiwanese missile misfire offers a dramatic reminder of the danger

of guaranteeing other nations security. A Taiwanese vessel
mistakenly shot an anti-ship missile toward China , destroying a
Taiwanese fishing boat, killing the captain and injuring several other crewmen. While nothing today
suggests that the PRC is planning war, at some point Beijing might find a casus belli

to be convenient . And then America would be in the middle. Of course,

American officials want to believe that the mere mention of America
would be enough to thwart Chinese ambitions. However, history is
full of cases when deterrence fails. Moreover, security guarantees tend
to make their recipients more irresponsible. President Chen Shui-bian, the first
DPP president, lost few opportunities to poke the great dragon across
the strait, feeling secure with the United States seemingly on his side. Worse, security
guarantees effectively transfer the power to choose war to other
states. Indeed, alliances often act as transmission belts of war.
Americans must decide just how committed they are to Taiwans
independence, and do so now, rather than in the midst of a crisis . Such a crisis
could emerge after an errant Taiwanese missile sinks a Chinese ship ,
followed by an ultimatum from Beijing to Taipei to begin reunification talks. Taiwan is a good friend and
the Taiwanese people are entitled to decide their own future. Unfortunately, however, the island

abides in a bad neighborhood . It is hard to imagine a greater

catastrophe than war between the United States and the PRC. It would be
impossible to justify Washington not only threatening but actually following
virtually

through on its military threats against China if the latter moved

against Taiwan. The United States needs to have a serious conversation with Taipei now, well in advance of
the moment when the latter expects the American cavalry to arrive in a crisis. Moreover, Washington
should consider a plan to back away militarily in seeking a Chinese
commitment to an unhurried peaceful resolution to the issue. Doing so
might encourage an economically embattled PRC to trim a military build-up
that would be less necessary without the challenge of facing Taiwan
backed by America. As I point out for China-US Focus, U.S. officials tend to assume that
Washingtons commitments will never be challenged. But the
Taiwanese mishap reminds us of the inevitable unexpected in
international relations , and the terrible costs which often result. Is
America really prepared to risk Los Angeles for Taipei? If not, Washington must decide what
price it is willing to pay to assist Taiwan and then configure its foreign and
military policies accordingly.

Its now or never Trumps foreign policy towards Taiwan

is emboldening China increases nationalism and stokes
military efforts
Hernandez 17 (Javier C. Hernandez, editor for the NYT, 1-3-2017, "UNPO:
Taiwan: President Criticises China for Resorting to Threats to Intimidate
Island," UNPO, http://unpo.org/article/19742 /Kent Denver-NK)
Step by step, Beijing is going back to the old path of dividing, coercing
and even threatening and intimidating Taiwan, she told journalists in Taipei, the
capital, at a year-end news conference. Tensions between Taiwan and China, which
have been rivals since the Communist Revolution of 1949, intensified
in December [2016] after Ms. Tsai spoke on the phone with the
American president-elect, Donald J. Trump, breaking a longstanding
diplomatic practice. In recent weeks, China has stepped up military
activities near Taiwan, sending its sole aircraft carrier through the
waters near the island and dispatching military planes in the region.
On Monday [2 January 2017], Beijing announced that So Tom and Prncipe,
an island nation off the west coast of Africa that was one of Taiwans
fewer than two dozen remaining diplomatic allies, had switched its
allegiance to the mainland, provoking an outcry in Taiwan. Despite
Beijings recent actions, which she said had hurt the feelings of the Taiwanese people and destabilized
relations, Ms. Tsai vowed to avoid a confrontation. We will not bow to pressure, and we will of course not
revert to the old path of confrontation, she said. Ms. Tsai faces the delicate task of registering discontent
with Beijing while also sending a message that Taiwan will exercise restraint. The United States, which sees
Taiwan as one of its most reliable allies in Asia and has sold billions of dollars of weapons to the island, has
the election of Mr. Trump could
long sought to avoid a conflict between the two sides. But
complicate matters. He has antagonized Beijing with a series of
critical comments. The president-elect has also questioned the One
China policy, which has underpinned relations between Washington
and Beijing for decades, and criticized Chinas military buildup in the
disputed South China Sea. Bonnie S. Glaser, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington, said Ms. Tsais words might reassure American officials that she would
not pursue rash policies in the face of Chinas show of strength. She remains calm, rational and patient,
Ms. Tsai, whose Democratic Progressive Party
Ms. Glaser wrote in an email. Still,
has traditionally favored independence for Taiwan, could face
serious challenges in the coming months. Many people in Taiwan are
nervous that Mr. Trump will use the island as a bargaining chip
against China. And Ms. Tsais preference for stability in the region
may not mesh with Mr. Trumps bombastic style. Richard C. Bush, the director of
the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington, said Ms. Tsai understood
the need to maintain a balance among relations with China, relations with the United States and domestic
Tsais vision, however, may not align well with the
politics. Ms.
incoming Trump administrations apparent belief that it can pressure
China on all fronts more than the Obama administration has, he said.
Ms. Tsai also sought to quell concerns about planned stopovers in Houston and San Francisco during a visit
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign
to Central America scheduled for January [2017].
Affairs on Thursday [29 December 2016] called on the United States
to block Ms. Tsai from entering the country, warning that such a visit
would embolden independence activists in Taiwan. Ms. Tsai described the visit
as unofficial, saying, A transit stop is just a transit stop.

The impact outweighs:

ProbabilityTaiwan is comparatively the most probable
cause of nuclear escalation military tensions and US
foreign-policy stance make deterrence and traditional
checks irrelevant.
Littlefield and Lowther 15 Alex Littlefield, Assistant Professor in
the Department of International Trade at Feng Chia University (Taiwan), holds
a Ph.D. in International Politics from National Chung Hsing University
(Taiwan), and Adam Lowther, Research Professor at the Air Force Research
Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, Director of the School of Advanced
Nuclear Deterrence Studies at the Air Force Global Strike Command, former
Assistant Professor of Political Science at Arkansas Tech University and
Columbus State University, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the
University of Alabama, 2015 (Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between
China and America, The Diplomat, August 11th, Available Online at
http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-
china-and-america/, Accessed 06-25-2016)
 While there are several scenarios where conflict between
Possible Scenario
the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a
conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC
and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive
action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination
could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from
intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-
denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the
American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan. If thwarted in its initial
efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may
be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland
China . A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to
escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regimes relative weakness and
the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will
include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle
conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear

weapon (against a U.S. carrier in Chinas self-declared waters for example) as a means of
forcing de-escalation. In the view of China, such a strike would not be
a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in
sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a
defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S.
intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the
minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not
China. It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric
response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is
incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military
campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly
have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the U nited States
far more is at stake for China than it is for the U nited S tates. In essence,
the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S.
conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one . Without making
too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck , or
yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of Chinas
strategic thinking in fact it is explicitly rejected the PRC will see the situation
very differently than the United States. China likely has no desire to
become a nuclear peer of the United States. It does not need to be in
order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does
have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security
interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is
necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a
regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto
independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to
Chinas power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without
Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own
neighborhood. Chinas maritime land reclamation strategy for
Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical
and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful
place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan
and South Korea is greatly diminished . Chinas relationship with the Philippines,
which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically. Although China criticizes the United
States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so
that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues
than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic audience that
demands ever higher levels of prosperity. Central to Chinas ability to guarantee that

prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of

commerce and communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately, too
many Americans underestimate the importance of these core
interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go
in order to guarantee them even the use of nuclear weapons . Should
China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes
bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side.
China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its
geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a
crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan
Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-
independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is
the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response
to remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits
Crisis. The U.S. brought an end to the mainlands antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships
sailed into the Straits. Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, China continues to
expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war
games that simulate an attack on Taiwan. China has not forgotten
the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier
groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second
Artillery Corps nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results
China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard , overwhelmed , and
forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate .

Magnitudenuclear war with China causes extinction and

immediately kills billions
Wittner 11 Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the
State University of New York at Albany, holds a Ph.D. in History from Columbia
University, 2011 (Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?, Huntington News,
November 28th, Available Online at http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446,
Accessed 02-07-2013)

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will
be used . After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with
nations employing their deadliest weapons . The current
deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us
with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering
tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by Chinas
growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged Chinas claims in the
South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with
other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was
need this lead to nuclear war? Not
asserting our own position as a Pacific power. But

necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could . After all, both the United States

and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government
threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over
the future of Chinas offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation,
President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would be used
just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else. Of course, China didnt have nuclear weapons
then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose
nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast
nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling
persists.Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars
between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there havent been very manyat least
not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and

nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can

occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistans foreign secretary
threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use any weapon in its arsenal. During the
conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own
nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, dont nuclear weapons deter a nuclear
attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didnt feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATOs
strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a
Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really
believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing Star Wars and its
modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensiveand probably unworkable
military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear
might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them
from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese
counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear
warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only
about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would
A nuclear attack by
win any nuclear war with China. But what would that victory entail?

China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in

a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying
horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll
in a nuclear war would be far higher . Both nations would be reduced
to smoldering, radioactive wastelands . Also, radioactive debris sent
aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on
a nuclear winter around the globe destroying agriculture ,
creating worldwide famine , and generating chaos and destruction .
Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is
currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its
number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to
spend hundreds of billions of dollars modernizing its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities
To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear
over the next decade.

war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to
get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have
resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to

improve U.S.-China relations . If the American and Chinese people

are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world , they
should be working to encourage these policies .

The plan resolves the Taiwan issue:

Ending commitment to Taiwan results in elimination of the
security dilemma between the United States and China
solves war
Charles L Glaser, 2015, is a professor in the Elliott School of International
Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington
University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring
2015), pp. 4990, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent
Denver-MB

Second, ending the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan could greatly

moderate the intensifying military competition between the United
States and China , which is adding to strains in their relationship.72
Most directly, the United States is developing its AirSea Battle concept
to counter Chinas A2/AD capabilities, which are intended primarily
to undermine the U.S. ability to come to Taiwans aid.73 The impact
of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan on Chinas military requirements
and capabilities, however, arguably reaches much further. China
worries that in a conflict over Taiwan the United States will interrupt
its SLOCs. This vulnerability would leave China open to U.S.
coercion during severe crises and conventional wars.74 The United
States dominates the SLOCs from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of
Malacca and still enjoys significant military advantages in the South
China and East China Seas. The requirement for both China and the
United States to control these SLOCs during a crisis or war creates
a security dilemma, which adds to strains in the U.S.-China
relationship. There is no military-technical solution to this security
dilemma, however, because two countries cannot control the same
space.75 A decision by the United States to end its commitment to
Taiwan could moderate this security dilemma in two important ways.
By eliminating the scenario that is most likely to bring the United
States and China into a large war, accommodation should
significantly reduce the importance that China places on controlling
its SLOCs. Although China would likely still find U.S. control
undesirable, the military threat the United States posed to Chinas
security would be greatly reduced. In addition, as explained above,
U.S. accommodation could signal that U.S. goals in the region are
limited, which should contribute to improving the U.S.-China
relationship by increasing Chinas assessment that U.S. motives are
benign, which would in turn further reduce the severity of the
security dilemma .76

The plan removes the biggest flashpoint of war and

creates sustainable US-China relations
Glaser 11 Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and
International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict
Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington
University, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean
at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former
Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a
Masters in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University, 2011 (Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean
Pessimism, Foreign Affairs, Volume 90, Number 2, March/April, Available
Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)
Accommodation On Taiwan? The prospects for avoiding intense military
competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may
nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington
will find disagreeable -- particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the
Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part

of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for

Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan
declares independence, and much of China's conventional military
buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan
and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China
places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and
China whatever they might formally agree to have such different attitudes
regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special
dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it
in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over
Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war , because each
step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved.
Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan
will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will
not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States
would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort
of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests
and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control
Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which
the United States found itself following events rather than leading them .
Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing
improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing
more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis . In addition to its improved
conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to
increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale
U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's
current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force
enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization
might remove that check on Chinese action , leading Beijing to
behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S.
attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan , meanwhile, could fuel a
conventional and nuclear arms race . Enhancements to U.S.
offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile
defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S.
motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general
poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations . Given such risks, the United States
should consider backing away from its commitment to Taiwan . This
would remove the most obvious and contentious flash point
between the United States and China and smooth the way for better
relations between them in the decades to come. Critics of such a move
argue that it would result in not only direct costs for the United States and Taiwan but indirect costs as
well: Beijing would not be satisfied by such appeasement; instead, it
would find its appetite whetted and make even greater demands
afterward spurred by Washington's lost credibility as a defender
of its allies. The critics are wrong , however, because territorial
concessions are not always bound to fail. Not all adversaries are
Hitler, and when they are not, accommodation can be an effective
policy tool. When an adversary has limited territorial goals,
granting them can lead not to further demands but rather to
satisfaction with the new status quo and a reduction of tension .
 Advantage 2
Advantage 2 is relations
Plan is the most important action that could boost US-
China relationsall other alt causes would be resolvedit
radically changes the nature of US-China cooperation and
spills over to other issues
Charles L Glaser, 2015, is a professor in the Elliott School of International
Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington
University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring
2015), pp. 4990, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent
Denver-MB
More important, however, is that focusing on the quality of current cross-strait
relations overlooks two other less direct, but potentially more significant, benefits of
U.S. accommodation on Taiwan. First, U.S. support for Taiwan is one of
the most important, possibly the most important , policy-driven sources
of Chinas suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions . Although the United
States does not take a position on what the final outcome of the Taiwan issue should be, China

considers U.S. support of Taiwan a key source of strategic distrust .

A recent study by two leading authorities on U.S.-China relations
concludes that Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as
confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in
Chinas domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful unification from
occurring, thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese core
interest. In a similar vein, their report argues that continuing to provide Taiwan
with advanced weapons . . . is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes
and has added to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese
interests and sentiments as long as Chinas power position is
secondary to Americas.68 Nathan and Scobell conclude that most Chinese see
strategic motives at the root of American behavior . They believe
that keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the U.S. tie China
down. 69 Similarly, a prominent Chinese analyst argues: The position the U.S. takes
on the Taiwan issue determines the essence of American strategy
toward China, and thus determines the quality and status of U.S.-
China relations. 70 Xu Hui, a professor at Chinas National Defense University, holds that U.S.
policies toward Taiwan have been and are the fundamental cause of
some anti-American sentiment among the Chinese public. . . . I assure
you that a posture change of the U.S. policy on Taiwan will remove
the major obstacle for our military-to- military relations and also
strengthen Sino-American cooperation by winning the hearts and
minds of 1.3 billion Chinese people. 71 In short, ending the U.S.
commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve
U.S.-China relations , which in turn could increase the possibility of
cooperation on other issues and reduce the probability of
competition and conflict.

The Tsai phone call put relations on the brink the Taiwan
stance is key the plan is necessary to set the right
precedent
Tisdall 12/12 (Simon Tisdall, 12-12-2016, Donald Trump attempting to
play Nixon's 'China card' in reverse," Guardian,
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/12/donald-trump-us-china-
relations-taiwan-nixon, Accessed: 12-12-2016, /Kent Denver-MB)
By once again testing Chinas nerves over Taiwan, Donald Trump is
injecting a dangerous element of uncertainty and unpredictability
into US relations with Beijing the exact opposite of what American
presidents usually try to do when dealing with potentially hostile
rival superpowers. Trumps public questioning of the long-
established One China policy, under which Washington accepts that
Taiwan is part of China, is a knife in the troubled heart of the US-China
relationship established by Richard Nixons famous opening to China and
his groundbreaking meeting with Mao Zedong in 1972. At the same time as
riling China, Trump is fomenting a triangular strategic upheaval by
building bridges to Russia. His expected choice of Vladimir Putins buddy
and Exxon Mobil oilman Rex Tillerson as secretary of state is the latest straw
in the wind. In effect, Trump is playing Nixons China card in reverse. His
approach can be summed up: make nice with Russia, talk tough to
China. Trumps willingness to upset the global balance of power and
roll the strategic dice so dramatically heralds a new age of
uncertainty in international relations . It potentially affects ongoing
crises and looming controversies from Syria and Ukraine to Tibet
and the Arctic, where US and Russian oil companies have shared
interests. The symbolic importance to Chinas communist leaders of
reunification with Taiwan the last bastion of Chiang Kai-sheks
nationalists in the civil war that followed Japans defeat in 1945 cannot be
overestimated . They regard Taiwan as a renegade province and its
sovereignty as non-negotiable. Trumps statement on Sunday linking
continued US adherence to the One China policy to other problematic issues,
such as trade and currency, will be deeply alarming for Beijing . In its
toughest riposte to date, Geng Shuang, foreign ministry spokesman, said
the sound and steady growth of China-US relations [was] out of the
question were Trump to persist with his approach. We urge the
incoming US administration to properly deal with Taiwan-related
matters in a prudent manner, Geng said. Trump and prudence are not
traditional bedfellows. Far from soothing Beijings fears following his
protocol-shredding telephone call with Taiwans president, he deliberately
escalated the row. Maybe Trump was trying to justify his earlier gaffe;
maybe his sense of self-importance was punctured. Nobody could tell him
who he may and may not speak to, he said. Or maybe Trump was placing
China on notice that unless he obtained more balanced trade and
jobs, the US would deem all aspects of the bilateral relationship
including regional security, Chinas military buildup and cooperation
over the threat posed by North Koreas nuclear weapons programme
up for review .

U.S.-China cooperation is crucial to address all global

challenges.
Cohen et al. 9 William S. Cohen, Chairman and CEO of The Cohen
Groupa strategic business consulting firm, served as Secretary of Defense
from 1997 until 2001, served in the U.S. Senate from 1979 to 1997 and in the
U.S. House of Representatives from 1975 to 1979, et al., 2009 (Smart Power
in U.S.-China Relations, Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations: A Report of the
CSIS Commission on China, March, Available Online at
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090304_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_we
b.pdf, Accessed 08-13-2012, p. 1)
The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations over the next months, years, and
decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global
security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral
arrangement. In this sense, many analysts consider the U.S.-China
diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without
question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the
protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests. Yet within that broad
framework, the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the
success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global
challenges : global financial stability , energy security and climate
change , nonproliferation , and terrorism , among other pressing
issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive
direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and
Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-
China cooperation.
 Plan
The United States federal government should negotiate a
phased grand bargain with the Peoples Republic of China
by offering to end the commitment of the United States to
defend Taiwan in exchange for a commitment by the
Peoples Republic of China to peacefully resolve its
maritime and land disputes in the South China Sea and
East China Sea, and to officially accept the United States
long-term military security role in East Asia.
 Solvency
Chinas leaders will say Yes its a good deal and good
politics.
Glaser 16 Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and
International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict
Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington
University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public
Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University
of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds
a Ph.D. and a Masters in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University, 2016 (Grand Bargain or Bad Idea? U.S.
Relations with China and Taiwan, International Security, Volume 40, Number
4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse)
The probability that China would accept the grand bargain might be
low, but neither the history that Kim reviews nor current Chinese
thinking make this a certainty. As I [End Page 188] note in my article, there are reasons
for doubting that China would make the required concessions: Chinas positions on its long-standing
disputes in the South China and East China Seas appear to have hardened over the past decade.
Meanwhile, Chinese nationalism continues to grow, and President Xi Jinping appears committed to
the
increasing Chinas global prestige, which could rule out geopolitical compromises. Nevertheless,

grand bargain would provide China with a major achievement at

arguably little cost . Current Chinese nationalist claims have blown
the importance of the maritime and sovereignty disputes in the
South China and East China Seas far out of proportion to their
material value. If Chinas leaders decide to prioritize other goals,
they might be able to deflate these nationalist claims , bringing
them back in line with their actual value and selling this new
interpretation domestically. At the same time, Chinese leaders
should see that the grand bargain would provide large benefits to
China , including elimination of the United States as a barrier to bringing
Taiwan under its full sovereign control and, closely related, a large
reduction in the security threat posed by the United States. The grand
bargain, therefore, could be appealing to a Chinese leadership that
faces daunting domestic challenges and intensifying regional
opposition to its assertive policies and growing military might . Thus,
while the probability of China accepting the grand bargain may be low, one should not entirely discount
the possibility.
Plan demonstrates resolve avoids their appeasement
and allies disads even if they say no the plan
communicates valuable information about Chinas
intentionsonly a qpq bargain solves
Charles L Glaser, 2015, is a professor in the Elliott School of International
Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington
University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring
2015), pp. 4990, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent
Denver-MB

Insisting on Chinese concessions would also demonstrate U.S.

resolve to protect American interests. By making its willingness to
end its commitment to Taiwan contingent on Chinese concessions,
the United States would make clear that it is willing to run the risk
of protecting Taiwan and its allies interests in the South China and
East China Seas, if China were uncompromising. Once again, the key
issue from the U.S. perspective comes back to information if
China is more likely to have unlimited aims, then the risks of U.S.
accommodation are larger and the United States should therefore be
less willing to adopt this strategy. As argued above, Chinas refusal to
accept a grand bargain, especially one that is so clearly weighted
toward its interests (unless China is determined to push the United States
out of Northeast Asia), would indicate more ambitious Chinese aims.
Thus, compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a package
deal that included Chinese concessions would demonstrate a higher
level of U.S. resolve . In addition, resolution of the maritime
disputes would directly increase U.S. security by eliminating
disputes that, via alliance commitments, could draw the United
States into dangerous crises with China.

Defensive realism is true and shapes Chinas rise

resolving the security dilemma makes China feel secure
and satisfied
- The security dilemma proves this only occurs between defensive
realist states since its aggression due to violations of security
- China has shifted from an offensive realist to defensive realist state
Raditio cites that after Mischief Reef China China sought to adopt the
strategy of engagement in the SCS
- Second, China doesnt mean
Raditio 14 (Klaus Heinrich, PhD student at the Department of Government
and International Relations of the University of Sydney; Junior Policy Associate
at China Studies Centre of the University of Sydney, China and the Tension in
the South China Sea: A Defensive Realist Perspective, University of Sydney,
2014, https://aacs.ccny.cuny.edu/2014conference/Papers/Klaus
%20Raditio.pdf, KentDenver-NK)

China is a defensive realist state It is necessary to identify the nature of

the states involved to discover whether a security dilemma applies in the SCS,
because security dilemmas only take place between defensive realist
states . Although Tang mentions security dilemmas between two states, this paper argues that it can
apply between two or more states. In this context, this paper aims to elaborate the situation in the SCS
among its claimants, especially between China on the one side, and other SCS claimants, i.e. Vietnam, the
Philippines and Malaysia, on the other side.Unlike an offensive realist state, which seeks
security by power maximisation even if it violates other states security, a
defensive realist state does not pursue security by offending others, unless
it has very exceptional reasons .'? In fact, a defensive realist state is very reluctant to
launch attacks, and prefers a resistance behaviour when facing an imminent threat. Is In addition , a

defensive realist state pursues security instead of expansion and

considers cooperation a feasible means of self-defence ." A defensive realist
state also voluntarily restrains itself and accepts other countries' constraints."
The main military strategy of a defensive realist state is self-defence and
deterrence, not expansion . It favours a strategy between engagement
and passive containment, and rejects active containment, let alone
preventive war.2' From the above-mentioned criteria for a defensive realist state, one can be
assured that China is a defensive realist state, as well as other claimants in
the SCS, mainly Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. These countries do
not have ambitions to expand, and seek security in terms of self-help
instead of pursuing hegemonic power . The debate on China's nature will be much
more intensive and vigorous compared with other claimants in the SCS. This is because China has been
accused of being assertive, aggressive and abrasive in the SCS, whereas other claimants have seldom
been accused of such things. I argue that the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia can be categorised as
defensive realist states, because of their non-expansionary behaviour and their attitude towards
Regarding China, Tang argues that, since 1978, the country has
cooperation.

shifted from being an offensive realist state to a defensive realist

state. Furthermore, Tang attributes China's success in the past three decades
to this shift in its strategy.22 Ralf Emmers also suggested that in the more specific period after
1995, relations between China and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Nations) members bilaterally and
multilaterally reached a golden age.23 China and the ASEAN cooperated in various fields, which resulted in
truly significant achievements, such as the ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS in
2002, and China's accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 2003. One may
argue that China's attitude resembled a defensive realist state only in the late 1990s to the mid-2000s,
I would contend for
and since then its attitude has shifted to a more aggressive stance. However,
several reasons that, although there is a shift in China's SCS strategy towards
aggressiveness, it is still a defensive realist state. First, during the period of
de-escalation after the Mischief Reef Incident (the late 1990s to the mid-2000s), China
adopted the strategy of engagement towards other claimants, with
the aim of buying time to consolidate its claims in the SCS particularly to
jurisdiction over the disputed waters and maritime rightsand deter other claimants from enhancing their
 China also
claims at China's expense, such as excluding China from resource exploration projects?
aimed to reduce the influence that external powers, especially the US, had
over other claimants to avoid complicating its efforts to consolidate its claim
in the SCS. The adoption of engagement strategy shows that China is
a defensive realist state. Second, China has never meant to be
expansionist . Regardless of how other states perceive China, its claim over
the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands is not something contemporary. China
has a well-established stance that did not appear unexpectedly nor recently .
As the country becomes more developed and powerful, it adjusts its strategy
to protect its interests. The importance of the SCS to China and its growing capability have made
it determined to assert its interests more vigorously, yet military conflict is not a viable option for China at
China itself regards its attitude as self-defence. It is
the moment. Third,
surrounded by the hostile attitudes of its neighbours. The strong presence of
the US in the region also adds to its uneasiness. The enhanced security
alliance between other claimants and external powers, especially the US,
could have been China's reason for adopting a more strident approach.25
China is neither an offensive realist state nor a pacifist state. Its proactive
behaviour in exercising what it perceives to be its rights to some extent is not beyond acceptable limits.
Fourth, China never dismisses cooperation as a means to avoid conflict. In
fact, the idea of cooperation in the SCS, known as Deng Xiaoping's "shelving disputes and
seeking joint development," was initiated by China. The country still formally
upholds this policy and has never ruled out the possibility o f de-
escalating the tension by reassurance and cooperation.

US-China engagement high under Obama strengthened

and expanded cooperation in every aspect no DA
uniqueness
Wang 9/19 (Jisi, President of The Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Peking University, China-U.S.
Relations Have Entered A New Normal, China-US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/china-u-s-relations-
have-entered-a-new-normal, /Kent Denver-jKIM)

Since the Obama administration came to office, there have been clear
adjustments to domestic and foreign policies. Its foreign policy has
stuck to the principle of economy first and stressed multilateral diplomacy
and smart power; it has been prudent in the use of force overseas, reduced national-defense
expenditures, and upheld a policy of dont do the stupid stuff ; it has improved relations with Cuba and
Iran, two countries with which it has deep-seated feuds. However, U.S.-Russia relations have stagnated and
the counter-terrorism situation is not bright. President Barack Obama has reiterated that
the United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful, stable, and
successful China, that Chinas political stability and economic
success are in the interest of the United States, and that the United States
hopes to strengthen cooperation with China. During the past few years,
China and the United States have maintained dialogues in the area of
international security. Despite issues such as the U.S. interference in the South China Sea
disputes and its plan to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea, China and
The Chinese and
the United States have nevertheless avoided direct conflict and serious crisis.

U.S. militaries have gradually built multifaceted and multilayered

dialogue and exchange mechanisms . China-U.S. bilateral trade is on
its way to surpass Chinas trade with the EU. Economic and trade
cooperation mechanisms between some of Chinas provinces and cities with relevant U.S.
states has become a new format, and investment by Chinese businesses

in the United States is growing rapidly . Chinas 13th Five-Year Plan included
the five development concepts of innovation, coordination, green energy, openness, and
sharing, and it gives more opportunities for China-U.S. cooperation .

Cultural and educational exchanges have continued to expand

between the two countries, and bilateral tourism is increasingly convenient and growing
rapidly. Cooperation by both countries on global governance issues such as
climate change has become a highlight. Economic cooperation and
cultural exchanges are the ballast stone and the thrusters of
China-U.S. relations. During President Xi Jinpings visits to the United States in September
2015 and in March 2016, he emphasized many times that the common
interests shared by China and the United States are far greater than
their differences. This is an important judgment of the facts, and it is absolutely not diplomatic
rhetoric.

Grand bargain solves the benefits of accommodation

while preserving credibility in the regionsolves aff
disads
Charles L Glaser, 2015, is a professor in the Elliott School of International
Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington
University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring
2015), pp. 4990, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent
Denver-MB
The United States choice of whether to end its commitment to
defend Taiwan is complicated further by uncertainty about the
nature and extent of Chinas goals. If China places relatively little
value on expanding its control and influence beyond Taiwan, then
even if U.S. accommodation generated doubts about U.S. resolve,
they would be of little consequence. In contrast, if China highly values winning all of its
maritime disputes and pushing the United States out of Northeast Asia, then reductions in U.S. credibility
would be more costly. Similarly, if Chinas aims are both limited and stable,
then U.S. accommodation would not risk creating a more dangerous
China . In contrast, if Chinas goals are still evolving and if U.S. accommodation would empower
domestic hard-liners, then U.S. security would be reduced. Therefore, the question arises
whether policies exist that would reduce the risks while preserving
the benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan . If combining certain
concessions by China in an overall package a grand bargain , for
lack of a better termcould achieve this goal, then the United
States best option might be to make ending its commitment to
Taiwan contingent on China making concessions of its own. The
preceding analysis suggests that the United States should design such a grand
bargain with a variety of purposes in mind: to gain information
about the nature and extent of Chinas motives; to demonstrate its
resolve to retain U.S. security commitments in the region; and,
related, to preserve the credibility of its commitment s to its allies.

Assurances are failing now funding, distractions, China

Green et al. 16 (Michael Green, PhD @ SAIS, is senior vice president for
Asia and Japan Chair at CSIS, chair in Japanese foreign policy at Georgetown,
served on the staff of the NSC as the director of Asian Affairs, senior fellow for
East Asian security on the Council of Foreign Relations; Kathleen Hicks, PhD in
Political Science @ MIT, is senior vice president, Henry A. Kissinger Chair, and
director of the International Security Program at CSIS, served as a senior
civilian official in the DoD; Mark Cancian, senior advisor to the International
Security Program, adjunct professor of strategic studies @ John Hopkins.
TEAM LEADS: Zach Cooper; John Schaus. A ton of different contributing
authors. Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025 Capabilities, Presence, and
Partnerships January 2016, CSIS,
http://csis.org/files/publication/160119_Green_AsiaPacificRebalance2025_Web
_0.pdf)
Nevertheless, the United States will need to continue and in some cases accelerate investments in regional
relationships, posture, operational concepts, and capabilities if it is to achieve the strategic goals of the
The past 14 years of war have left the military services with
rebalance.
significant challenges in recapitalizing equipment used at a pace faster
than programmed, reestablishing full-spectrum force readiness, and
confronting an expanding range of challenges from state and nonstate actors
globally. It is doing so while drawing down forces and structure and, the recent two-year budget deal
notwithstanding, with lower long-term defense spending projections than planned even a few years ago.
Chinas rapidly expanding military investments and increasingly coercive
actions in the region demonstrate both the long-term and near-term
challenges facing the United States and its allies and partners in protecting
vital regional and global interests. Although Washington seeks to cooperate with Beijing where
it can, the United States must also ensure that its engagements, posture, concepts, and capabilities allow
it to shape, deter, and, if necessarily, decisively defeat threats to U.S. interests. The threat of invasion by
North Korea continues to decrease, but the Norths missile and nuclear programs continue unabated while
scenarios for instability within North Korea appear less remote going forward. Over the last few years, the
Asia-Pacific region has witnessed significant developments that require a
reappraisal of U.S. strategy and force posture
, as well as an assessment of the strategy and force posture of U.S. allies and partners. Many of these
new challenges are
trends have improved prospects for regional security, but some
emerging, and some existing risks are worsening. These trends span issue areas of
geopolitics, diplomacy, economics, domestic politics, and military considerations. Geopolitically, most
states in the Asia-Pacific region are embracing closer security and economic ties with the United States. At
the same time, however, states across the region have become more sensitive to Chinas growing political,
economic, and military power, and are potentially vulnerable to Beijings increasingly coercive behavior.
Polls in Asian countries indicate strong support for the rebalance, with the notable exception of China.5 The
United States is working bilaterally, trilaterally, and multilaterally to reinforce critical rules and norms that
underpin a secure and prosperous regional and international order. Yet despite these efforts, there is more
acrimony and tension in the U.S.-China relationship, a general deterioration in relations with Russia, and
the authors heard a
increasing bellicosity from North Korea. In preparing this study,
consistent refrain from U.S. allies and partners that, despite their
appreciation for the goals of the rebalance, many regional observers worry
that U.S. efforts to manage the Iran nuclear negotiations, Russias
invasion of Ukraine, and conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
have distracted it from fully implementing the rebalance. The administration has
taken important steps to reinforce the rebalance strategy, beginning with the 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance and recently, the August 2015 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy prepared for Congress.6
The authors also found that the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) is well aligned with the rest of DOD in its
various lines of effort, including theater campaign planning. Much progress has been made since 2012,
when CSIS scholars found significant disconnects across the U.S. government and with allies and partners.
the implementation of the rebalance may be insufficient to
Nevertheless,
secure U.S. interests. Actions by countries in the region routinely
challenge the credibility of U.S. security commitments, and U.S. capability
development is not keeping pace with challenges by potential
competitors, resulting in the balance of military power in the region shifting
against the United States. First, the Obama administration still has not articulated
a clear, coherent, or consistent strategy for the region, particularly when it
comes to managing Chinas rise. The language used to explain the rebalance in
administration speeches and documents has varied substantially over the last four years.7 The 2012 CSIS
remains a problem in terms
independent assessment highlighted this shortcoming, but it
of reassuring allies and partners and sustaining congressional support .
Second, cuts to the defense budget from 20092015 have limited the Defense
Departments ability to pursue the rebalance . The October 2015 budget agreement
notwithstanding, long-term budget uncertainty and the large cuts already
implemented represent major changes from the environment that existed when
CSIS scholars conducted the 2012 review. Third, while the U.S. military has instituted major posture
the anti-access/area
changes and is developing new military capabilities to strengthen the rebalance,
denial (A2/AD) challenge is increasing and concerns are growing about the
ability of potential adversaries to hold at risk forward-deployed and
forward-operating forces throughout the region. Chinese military strategy places a
premium on investments in A2/AD capabilities. Its A2/AD umbrella includes long-range cruise and ballistic
missiles, advanced integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) systems, and submarines. The goal of these
systems is to restrict or outright deny an attacker freedom of entry or maneuver. Chinese investments in
cyber; electronic warfare (EW); a blue-water navy; missiles; and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities serve as powerful reminders of Chinas plans to push the United States
These capabilities give China the ability to hold at risk
out of the region in a conflict.
U.S. installations and naval assets in the Western Pacific, U.S. allies and partners,
and the freedom to use international air and waterways on which the U.S. economy depends. Absent
major operational or technology breakthroughs by the United States and its
allies and partners, substantial risk remains that Chinas strategy could undermine
the U.S. militarys ability to defend U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific . Fourth,
Chinas tolerance for risk has exceeded most expectationsas
demonstrated by Beijings increased operational tempo and construction of
military airfields and facilities on seven features in the Spratly Islands . This risk
tolerance requires the United States to reassess its China policy, and may lead allies and partners to do
the same.