[G.R. No.
203041, June 05, 2013] The antecedents of this case, which were succinctly summarized by the RTC, are as
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MOISES CAOILE, Accused-
Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The accused-appellant challenges in this appeal the March 21, 2012 Decision1 promulgated
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03957, which affirmed with
modification the judgment2 of conviction for two counts of Rape rendered against him by
Branch 32 of the Agoo, La Union Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Family Court Case Nos.
A-496 and A-497.
Accused-appellant Moises Caoile (Caoile), in two separate Amended Informations filed
before the RTC on January 5, 2006, was charged with two separate counts of Rape of a
Demented Person under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
FAMILY COURT CASE No. A-496
That on or about April 6, 2005, in the Municipality of Rosario, La Union, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing the
mental disability of the victim, did the[n] and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with one [AAA],3 a demented person with a mental age of seven
(7) years old against her will and, to her damage and prejudice.4
FAMILY COURT CASE No. A-497
That on or about May 12, 2005, in the Municipality of Rosario, La Union, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing the
mental disability of the victim, did the[n] and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with one [AAA], a demented person with a mental age of seven (7)
years old against her will and, to her damage and prejudice.5
Caoile pleaded not guilty to both charges upon his arraignment6 for both cases on March 1,
2006. After the completion of the pre-trial conference on March 8, 2006,7 joint trial on the
merits ensued.
follows:
Evidence for the Prosecution
[AAA], the herein victim, was left in the care of her grandmother and auntie in Alipang,
Rosario, La Union when her mother left to work abroad when she was still young. One of
their neighbors was the accused whose daughter, Marivic, was the playmate of [AAA].
One day, the accused invited [AAA] to go to the bamboo trees in their place. Upon
reaching thereat, the accused directed [AAA] to lie down on the ground. [AAA] followed
the instruction of the accused whom she called uncle Moises. Thereafter, the accused
removed [AAA]s short pant[s] and panty and inserted his penis into her vagina. [AAA]
felt pain but she did not do anything. After two minutes or so, the accused removed his
penis inside [AAA]s vagina. [AAA] stood up and wore again her short pant[s] and panty.
Before the accused allowed [AAA] to go home, the former gave the latter a medicine,
which she described as a red capsule with white casing, with the instruction of taking the
same immediately upon reaching home. As instructed by her uncle Moises, [AAA] took the
medicine as soon as she got home.
Four (4) days thereafter, and while [AAA] was at the pumping well near their house, the
accused invited her to gather guavas at the mountain. [AAA] accepted her uncle Moisess
invitation. At the mountain, the accused led [AAA] to lie down, and then he removed her
short pant[s] and panty. Thereafter, the accused inserted his penis inside the vagina of
[AAA]. After the sexual intercourse, the accused and [AAA] gathered guavas, and went
home.
One day, while [AAA] was sleeping in their house, Marivic woke her up and invited her to
play at their house. At the accuseds house, and while [AAA] and Marivic were playing,
the accused invited [AAA] to gather santol fruits. [AAA] went with the accused, and once
again the accused had carnal knowledge [of] her.
Sometime in April 2005, [AAA] heard her friend, [BBB], complaining to Lucio Bafalar, a
Barangay Tanod, that the accused mashed her breast. Upon hearing the story of [BBB],
[AAA] blurted out that she, too, was abused by the accused.
[CCC], [AAA]s aunt, immediately went home [to] Rosario when she learned that her niece
was raped by the accused, and together with [AAA] and Barangay Captain Roming
Bartolome they went to the Rosario Police Station to report the incident. After executing
their respective affidavits, [AAA] was examined by [Dr.] Claire Maramat at San Fernando,
La Union.
1
After examining [AAA] on June 21, 2005, Dr. Claire Maramat found out that [AAA]s
genitalia suffered a multiple hymenal laceration which, at the time of the examination, was
already healed, thus, possibly, it was inflicted a week or months prior to the examination.
According to Dr. Maramat, a multiple hymenal laceration may be caused by several
factors, such as trauma to the perineal area or penetration of a penis.
Dr. Maramat also took seminal fluid from the vagina, the cervix and the cervical canal of
[AAA], and forwarded the same to Dr. Brenda Rosuman, a pathologist at the Ilocos
Training and Regional Medical Center (ITRMC), for examination.
Dr. Rosuman testified that after examining the seminal fluids taken from [AAA], she found
the presence of spermatozoa, which means that [AAA] had sexual intercourse, and the
predominance of coccobacilli, meaning that [AAA] could be suffering from infection
caused by hygiene or acquired through sexual intercourse. She further testified that,
according to some books, spermatozoa can live in the vaginal tract within 17 days from
sexual intercourse. She clarified, however, that in her medical experience, she rarely finds
spermatozoa in a specimen beyond three (3) days.
Claire Baliaga, a psychologist of the Philippine Mental Health Association, Baguio-
Benguet Chapter, testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation on [AAA] on
August 10, 2007; that [AAA] obtained an overall score performance of 55, which is
classified within the mental retardation range; and that [AAA] has the mental age of a
seven-year, nine-month old child who is inadequate of sustaining mental processes and in
solving novel problems employing adoptive strategies.
Dr. Roderico V. Ramos, a psychiatrist of the ITRMC, testified that he evaluated the mental
condition of [AAA], that after psychiatric evaluation, [AAA] was given a diagnosis of
moderate mental retardation; that a person who is mentally retardate do not function the
way his age required him to be; that [AAA] was eighteen (18) years old at the time he
examined her, but the mental functioning of her brain is around five (5) to six (6) years old;
and that [AAA] can only do what a five or six-year old child could do.
Dr. Ramos further testified that generally a mentally retardate cannot finish primary
education. He, however, explained that parents of mentally retardates begged the teachers
to give passing marks to their sons/daughters, and out of pity, they would be able to finish
primary education.8
Evidence for the Defense
Accused Moises Caoile knew [AAA] because they were neighbors. [AAA] was, in fact, a
playmate of his children and a frequent visitor in their house. When accused and [AAA]
became familiar with one another, the latter would go to the formers house even when the
children were not there, and they would [talk] and [tease] each other.
In the year 2005, the wife of the accused worked at the town proper of Rosario, La Union.
The wife would leave early in the morning, and returned home late at night. More often
than not, the accused was left alone in the house since all his children were attending
school. It was during his so called alone moments that the accused courted [AAA]. He gave
her money, chocolates or candies. Time came when [AAA] would stay at the accused[s]
house, from Monday to Sunday, with or without the children. Soon thereafter, accused and
[AAA] found themselves falling in love with one other. As lovers, they had their intimate
moments, and their first sexual intercourse happened on April 6, 2005 on the mountain.
From then on, the accused and [AAA] repeatedly had sexual intercourse, and most of
which were initiated by [AAA], especially their sexual intimacies in Agri Motel,
Pangasinan.
During their relationship, [AAA] suggested that they [live] together as husband and wife.
The accused refused because he cannot leave his family.
The accused did not know that [AAA] was a demented person since she acted like a normal
individual. In fact, she went to a regular school and she finished her elementary education.
The accused did not force himself [on] [AAA]. [AAA] knew that he is a married man, but
she, nonetheless, loved him without reservation.
The defense moved that it be allowed to have [AAA] be evaluated by a psychiatrist of its
own choice. As prayed for the defense, [AAA] was evaluated by Dr. Lowell A. Rebucal of
the Department of Psychiatry, Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. In his
Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Rebucal concluded that [AAA] is suffering from Mild
Mental Retardation.9nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
Ruling of the RTC
On May 6, 2009, after weighing the respective evidence of the parties, the RTC rendered
its Joint Decision finding Caoile guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
1. In FC Case No. A-496, accused Moises Caoile is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1(d) and Article 266-B of Republic Act No. 8353, and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2
2. In FC Case No. A-497, accused Moises Caoile is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1(d) and Article 266-B of Republic Act No. 8353, and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
3. The accused is further ordered to indemnify the private complainant the amounts
of P50,000.00 for each count of rape as compensatory damages and P50,000.00 for
each count of rape as moral damages.10
Caoile elevated the RTC ruling to the Court of Appeals, claiming that his guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt by attacking the credibility of AAA and the methods used
to determine her mental state.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated March 21, 2012, in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03957, the Court of
Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC decision. The dispositive portion of the Court
of Appeals Decision reads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Joint Decision dated May 6, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), First Judicial Region, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union, in
Family Court Case Nos. A-496 and A-497, entitled People of the Philippines, Plaintiff,
versus Moises Caoile, Accused, finding appellant Moises Caoile guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of rape is AFFIRMED with modification in that aside from civil
indemnity and moral damages, appellant Moises Caoile is ORDERED to indemnify
[AAA] exemplary damages amounting to P30,000.00 for each count of rape.11 (Citation
omitted.)
Issue
Caoile is now before this Court, on appeal,12 with the same lone assignment of error he
posited before the Court of Appeals,13 to wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF TWO COUNTS OF RAPE.14
In essence, Caoile is attacking the credibility of AAA, and claims that she might not be a
mental retardate at all, having been able to give categorical and straightforward answers
during her testimony. Moreover, Caoile avers that it has not been shown that AAA
underwent the proper clinical, laboratory, and psychometric tests to arrive at the conclusion
that she fell within the range of mental retardation. Caoile argues that while it is true that
his denial and sweetheart defenses are generally deemed weak and unavailing, his
conviction should nevertheless be founded on the strength of the prosecutions evidence
and not on the flaws of his defenses.15
This Courts Ruling
Caoile was tried and convicted of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) in relation to
Article 266-B, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
8353. Said provisions read:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
xxxx
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
xxxx
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
Validity of the Amended Informations
Taking a cue from the Court of Appeals, this Court would like, at the outset, to address the
validity of the Amended Informations vis--vis the crime Caoile was actually convicted of.
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides for two
circumstances when having carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental disability is
considered rape:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
1. Paragraph 1(b): when the offended party is deprived of reason x x x; and
3
2. Paragraph 1(d): when the offended party is x x x demented.16
Caoile was charged in the Amended Informations with rape of a demented person under
paragraph 1(d). The term demented17 refers to a person who has dementia, which is a
condition of deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individuals
former intellectual level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity.18 On the other
hand, the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1(b) has been interpreted to include
those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation.19 Thus, AAA, who was
clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person who is
deprived of reason, and not one who is demented.
The mistake, however, will not exonerate Caoile. In the first place, he did not even raise
this as an objection. More importantly, none of his rights, particularly that of to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,20 was violated. Although
the Amended Informations stated that he was being charged with the crime of rape of a
demented person under paragraph 1(d), it also stated that his victim was a person with a
mental age of seven (7) years old. Elucidating on the foregoing, this Court, in People v.
Valdez,21 held:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
For [a] complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is
controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or
the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law
made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to
be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime
will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime
charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts
and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by
reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of
alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the
nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his
defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.
Thus, the erroneous reference to paragraph 1(d) in the Amended Informations, did not
cause material and substantial harm to Caoile. Firstly, he simply ignored the error.
Secondly, particular facts stated in the Amended Informations were averments sufficient to
inform Caoile of the nature of the charges against him.
Mental Condition of AAA
Caoiles insistence, to escape liability, that AAA is not a mental retardate, cannot be
accepted by this Court.
The fact that AAA was able to answer in a straightforward manner during her testimony
cannot be used against her. The capacity of a mental retardate to stand as a witness in court
has already been settled by this Court. In People v. Castillo,22 we
said:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
It bears emphasis that the competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as
witnesses have been upheld by this Court where it is shown that they can communicate
their ordeal capably and consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity of the
complainants accusations, it even lends greater credence to her testimony, that, someone as
feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the
rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of the accused. Moreover, it is
settled that when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that she has been raped and her testimony alone is sufficient if it satisfies the
exacting standard of credibility needed to convict the accused. (Citations omitted.)
More importantly, AAAs medical condition was verified not only by one expert, but three
witnesses a psychologist and two psychiatrists, one of whom was even chosen by the
defense and testified for the defense. All three experts confirmed that AAA suffered from
mental retardation. Caoile cannot, at this point, properly impeach his own witness without
violating established rules of evidence.
This Court further disagrees with Caoiles claim that the experts merely impressed that
they conducted a psychological evaluation on [AAA] in which she obtained a performance
classified within the mental retardation range.23 The experts findings on AAAs mental
condition were based on several tests and examinations, including the Stanford-Binet
Test,24 which Caoile, relying on this Courts ruling in People v. Cartuano, Jr.,25 considered
as one of the more reliable standardized tests.26 Besides, this Court has already qualified the
applicability of Cartuano in cases involving mentally deficient rape victims, to wit:
People v. Cartuano applies only to cases where there is a dearth of medical records to
sustain a finding of mental retardation. Indeed, the Court has clarified so in People v. Delos
Santos, declaring that the records in People v. Cartuano were wanting in clinical,
laboratory, and psychometric support to sustain a finding that the victim had been suffering
from mental retardation. It is noted that in People v. Delos Santos, the Court upheld the
finding that the victim had been mentally retarded by an examining psychiatrist who had
4
been able to identify the tests administered to the victim and to sufficiently explain the
results of the tests to the trial court.27 (Citations omitted.)
Borrowing our words in People v. Butiong,28 [i]n direct contrast to People v. Cartuano,
this case did not lack clinical findings on the mentality of the victim. Here, the psychiatric
evaluation report of Caoiles own expert witness is the final nail on the coffin of Caoiles
argument.
In addition, this Court will not contradict the RTCs findings, which were affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, absent any valid reason. The trial courts assessment of the witnesses
credibility is given great weight and is even conclusive and binding upon this
Court.29 In People v. Sapigao, Jr.,30 we explained in detail the rationale for this
practice:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a
matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling
examination. These are important in determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in
unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the
emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the witness
credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity and can take advantage of these aids.
These cannot be incorporated in the record so that all that the appellate court can see are
the cold words of the witness contained in transcript of testimonies with the risk that some
of what the witness actually said may have been lost in the process of transcribing. As
correctly stated by an American court, There is an inherent impossibility of determining
with any degree of accuracy what credit is justly due to a witness from merely reading the
words spoken by him, even if there were no doubt as to the identity of the words. However
artful a corrupt witness may be, there is generally, under the pressure of a skillful cross-
examination, something in his manner or bearing on the stand that betrays him, and thereby
destroys the force of his testimony. Many of the real tests of truth by which the artful
witness is exposed in the very nature of things cannot be transcribed upon the record, and
hence they can never be considered by the appellate court.
Carnal Knowledge of a
Mental retardate amounts to Rape
Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. This is because a mentally
deficient person is automatically considered incapable of giving consent to a sexual act.
Thus, what needs to be proven are the facts of sexual intercourse between the accused and
the victim, and the victims mental retardation.31
Verily, the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish that AAA is a mental retardate.
Anent the fact of sexual congress, it is worthy to note that aside from the prosecutions own
testimonial and documentary evidence, Caoile never denied being physically intimate with
AAA. In fact, he has confirmed such fact, and even claimed that he and AAA often had
sex, they being sweethearts.
Sweetheart Defense
Unfortunately, such defense will not exculpate him from liability. Carnal knowledge of a
female, even when done without force or intimidation, is rape nonetheless, if it was done
without her consent. To expound on such concept, this Court, in People v.
Butiong,32 said:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
In rape committed by means of duress, the victims will is nullified or destroyed. Hence,
the necessity of proving real and constant resistance on the part of the woman to establish
that the act was committed against her will. On the other hand, in the rape of a woman
deprived of reason or unconscious, the victim has no will. The absence of will determines
the existence of the rape. Such lack of will may exist not only when the victim is
unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also when she is suffering some mental
deficiency impairing her reason or free will. In that case, it is not necessary that she
should offer real opposition or constant resistance to the sexual intercourse. Carnal
knowledge of a woman so weak in intellect as to be incapable of legal consent
constitutes rape. Where the offended woman was feeble-minded, sickly and almost an
idiot, sexual intercourse with her is rape. Her failure to offer resistance to the act did
not mean consent for she was incapable of giving any rational consent.
The deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental abnormality or deficiency is
enough. Cohabitation with a feebleminded, idiotic woman is rape. Sexual intercourse
with an insane woman was considered rape. But a deafmute is not necessarily
deprived of reason. This circumstances must be proven. Intercourse with a deafmute
is not rape of a woman deprived of reason, in the absence of proof that she is an
imbecile. Viada says that the rape under par. 2 may be committed when the offended
woman is deprived of reason due to any cause such as when she is asleep, or due to
lethargy produced by sickness or narcotics administered to her by the accused. x x x.
Consequently, the mere fact that Caoile had sexual intercourse with AAA, a mental
retardate, makes him liable for rape under the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Defense of Lack of knowledge of
AAAs mental condition
5
Similarly, Caoiles allegation that he did not know that AAA was mentally retarded will not
suffice to overturn his conviction.

The Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes the rape of a mentally disabled person
regardless of the perpetrators awareness of his victims mental condition. However, the
perpetrators knowledge of the victims mental disability, at the time he committed the
rape, qualifies the crime and makes it punishable by death33 under Article 266-B, paragraph
10, to wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

xxxx

10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical
handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.

There is no sufficient evidence to establish the qualifying circumstance of knowledge by

Caoile of AAAs mental disability. The trial court and the Court of Appeals which did not
make any finding on the said qualifying circumstance correctly convicted said accused of
simple rape only.

This Court finds the award of damages as modified by the Court of Appeals in order.
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,34 however, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

CR.-H.C. No. 03957 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellant MOISES CAOILE is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
simple rape in Family Court Case Nos. A-496 and A-497 under subparagraph (b) of Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua for
each count of rape. The award of civil indemnity and moral damages, both in the amount of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), and exemplary damages in the amount of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), all for each count of rape, are maintained, subject to interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

6
 [G.R. No. 208007, April 02, 2014]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. RODRIGO GUTIEREZ Y
ROBLES ALIAS ROD AND JOHN LENNON, AccusedAppellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
For a measly five or tenpeso tip that a 10yearold child would need for lunch money, a
known acquaintance of their family would destroy a childs dignity by having illicit carnal
knowledge of her. This case involves an act that is so dastardly that it is punished by
Article 266A of the Revised Penal Code as statutory rape which carries a sentence of
reclusion perpetua.
We are asked to review the Court of Appeals decision1 in CAG.R. CRHC No. 02955.
This decision affirmed the conviction of the accusedappellant for statutory rape under
Article 266A of the Revised Penal Code and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On November 30, 2005, an information2 was filed against the accusedappellant before the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 59. The information reads:
That on or about November 29, 2005, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the offended party, (AAA),
who is under twelve (12) years old.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, Rodrigo Gutierez pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the victim, AAA, who was then 10 years old and a Grade 2
student at Camp 7 Elementary School in Baguio City. She testified that on November 29,
2005, she went home from school at around 12 noon to have lunch.3 On the way home, she
met Rodrigo at his house. He brought her to his room and laid her down on the bed. He
then raised her skirt and removed her panties. He pulled down his pants and then inserted
his penis into her vagina.4
According to AAA, Rodrigo stayed on top of her for a long time, and when he withdrew
his penis, white liquid came out. He then gave her five pesos (?5.00) before she went back
to school.5
AAA went back to school at about 2:10 p.m. Her adviser, Agustina Chapap, asked her
where she came from because she was tardy. AAA initially did not answer. When asked
again why she was tardy, AAA admitted she came from Uncle Rod. She also admitted
that she went there to ask for money. Chapap then brought AAA to Rona Ambaken, AAAs
previous teacher. Together, they brought AAA to the principals office. AAA was brought to
the comfort room where Ambaken inspected her panties. The principal was able to confirm
that AAA was touched since AAAs private organ was swelling. Her underwear was also
wet.6
Another teacher, Jason Dalisdis, then brought AAA to Baguio General Hospital where her
underwear was again inspected. Dr. Anvic Pascua also examined her. On the way to the
hospital, Dalisdis passed by the barangay hall and the police station to report the incident. 7
AAA also disclosed during trial that the accusedappellant had done the same thing to her
about 10 times on separate occasions. After each act, he would give her ten (P10.00) or five
(P5.00) pesos.8
The prosecution also presented Dr. Asuncion Ogues as an expert witness. Dr. Ogues was
the superior of Dr. Pascua who examined AAA. Dr. Ogues testified based on the medical
certificate issued by the examining physician that there was blunt force penetrating trauma
that could have been caused by sexual abuse. She also stated that there was another
medicolegal certificate issued by Dr. Carag, surgical resident of the Department of
Surgery of Baguio General Hospital, showing findings of some hematoma in AAAs legs. 9
In his defense, Rodrigo denied that AAA went to his house at 12 noon on November 29,
2005 and claimed he was already at work at 1:30 p.m. He has known AAA for a long time
since his family rented the house of AAAs grandfather from 2001 to 2004.10 When the
police came and asked him if he knew AAA, he answered in the affirmative. He was then
brought to Baguio General Hospital where he was told that AAA identified him as the one
who raped her.11
Rodrigo admitted that he had a relationship with AAAs sister, and they even lived together
as commonlaw spouses.12 He also admitted that a similar complaint was filed against him
by AAAs mother when AAA was eight years old, but they settled the case at the barangay
level.13
On July 4, 2007, the trial court rendered a judgment14 finding Rodrigo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of statutory rape and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
He was additionally required to indemnify the offended party P50,000.00 moral damages
and P25,000.00 exemplary damages with costs of suit.
7
Rodrigo appealed15 to the Court of Appeals claiming that AAAs testimony fell short of the
requirement of the law on the quantum of evidence required. He argued that she did not cry
for help when her familys house was just nearby, which was cause for reasonable doubt
that the trial court failed to appreciate.
On February 28, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision16 affirming the conviction.
Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age and (2)
the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or
intimidation; whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it
was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim
is proven and that there was sexual intercourse.

On March 11, 2013, Rodrigo filed a notice of appeal17 with the appellate court, which was People v. Teodoro20 explained the elements of statutory rape committed under Article 266
given due course in a resolution18 dated March 15, 2013. A, paragraph (1) (d):

Hence, this appeal was instituted.
In the resolution19 of September 9, 2013, this court required the parties to submit their
respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired. Both parties, however, manifested that
they were dispensing with the filing of a supplemental brief as their arguments were
already substantially and exhaustively discussed in their respective briefs filed before the
appellate court.
The only issue to be resolved by this court is whether the prosecution was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the accusedappellant was guilty of statutory rape punishable
under Article 266A of the Revised Penal Code.
Rape is defined in Article 266A of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Rape under paragraph 3 of this article is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual
modes of committing rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of
a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and physical evidence of
injury are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman
and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and
cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the childs consent is
immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern good from evil. (Emphasis
supplied)
The defense did not dispute the fact that AAA was 10 years old at the time of the incident.
Her birth certificate was presented before the trial court.21 What is critical in this case,
therefore, is whether there is a showing that Rodrigo had carnal knowledge of AAA.

Art. 266A. Rape: When and How Committed. Rape is committed: In the testimony of AAA, she narrated that on November 29, 2005, she met Rodrigo in his
house, thus:

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the Q: Now, when you met the accused, what did he do?
following circumstances: A: He brought me in the room, Maam.
Q: The room is located inside his house?
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation; A: Yes, Maam.
Q: And, was that the first time you entered the room?
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; A: (The witness nods.)
Q: After entering the room, what did Uncle Rod tell you?
A: He laid me down, Maam.
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
COURT:
Q: Where?
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is A: On the bed, Maam.
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. PROS. BERNABE:
Q: Who were the persons inside the room aside from you and Uncle Rod?
xxxx A: (Witness shook her head meaning no persons around.)

8
Q: After lying down on the bed, what did he do next? bears the earmarks of credibility, especially if no ill willas in this casemotivates her to
A: He raised up my skirt. testify falsely against the accused. It is wellsettled that when a woman, more so when she
Q: After raising up your skirt, what else did he do? is a minor, says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is required to prove the
ravishment. The accused may thus be convicted solely on her testimonyprovided it is
A: He removed my panty, Maam.
credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
Q: Was he able to remove it from your legs your panty? [sic] things.24
A: No, Maam.
Q: Until where was he able to remove?
A: (Witness is pointing down to the ankle.) AAAs ordeal was supported by the testimonies of her teachers whose concern for her led
Q: After pulling down your panty until your ankle, what happened? to the discovery of the crime. The medical certificate presented in court, together with the
testimonies of the physicians, is consistent with the finding that she was sexually abused.
A: He pulled down his short pants, Maam.
Q: After pulling down his short pants, what did Uncle Rod do? Rodrigo asserted that AAAs failure to cry out for help shows reasonable doubt. He noted
A: He brought out his penis. that her house was just near his house where the incident happened.
Q: After bringing out his penis, what did he do next?
A: He inserted his penis to my vagina, Maam. This argument is so feeble that it could only have been put up out of desperation.
Q: Will you please show us where is your vagina?
A: (The witness stood and pointed to her private part.) Rodrigo was referred to by the childvictim as Uncle Rod. He admitted that AAAs
family had known him for a long time. Rodrigo had the trust and respect that any elder in
Q: You also mentioned AAA that Uncle Rod inserted his penis to your vagina, could
the family of AAA had. Instead of providing the moral guidance that his status allowed
you point to the ari of Uncle Rod?
him, he took advantage of AAAs youthful innocence to satiate his illicit carnal desires. To
A: (The witness pointed to a portion where the private part of the elder brother was cover this up and seemingly justify his actions, he gave his childvictim the measly sum of
standing.) five pesos. Rodrigo knew that what he did was wrong; AAA would have probably doubted
Q: Was it painful when Uncle Rod inserted his penis inside your vagina? whether such act was normal among adults.
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: Did you cry when Uncle Rod inserted his penis inside your vagina? With his moral ascendancy, it would not be unreasonable to assume that even the child
A: Yes, Maam. victims desire for help would be muffled by her fear of her Uncle Rod. To a young 10
Q: Did he stay long on top of you? At around how many minutes? yearold, the ordinary world can be daunting. To be so young and silently aware that one is
A: Very long, Maam. the victim of such callous depravation by Rodrigo, who she could have expected to take
care of her, can create the kind of lasting fear that diminishes the development of her own
Q: Did he withdraw his penis from your vagina?
person and her own convictions.
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: And after he withdrew his penis inside your vagina, what happened? In any case, whether she cried for help is immaterial in a charge of statutory rape since
A: There is some white liquid that came out of his penis, Maam.22 [t]he law presumes that such a victim, on account of her tender age, does not and cannot
have a will of her own.25
As shown by her testimony, AAA was able to narrate in a clear and categorical manner the
ordeal that was done to her. As a childvictim who has taken significant risks in coming to Beyond reasonable doubt, Rodrigo Gutierez raped AAA, a minor who was only 10 years of
court, her testimony deserves full weight and credence. People v. Veloso23 stated that: age, on November 29, 2005.

In a litany of cases, this Court has ruled that the testimonies of childvictims of rape are to
be given full weight and credence. Reason and experience dictate that a girl of tender years,
who barely understands sex and sexuality, is unlikely to impute to any man a crime so
serious as rape, if what she claims is not true. Her candid narration of how she was raped
Article 266B of the Revised Penal Code requires that the penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed in cases of rape stated in the first paragraph of Article 266A where there
are no aggravating or qualifying circumstances present. The lower courts correctly imposed
this penalty.
9
Their award of damages, however, must be modified in light of recent jurisprudence.

It is settled that the award of civil indemnity is mandatory upon a finding that rape was
committed, along with the award of moral and exemplary damages.26 In People v.
Degay,27 the accusedappellant was found guilty of raping his nineyearold neighbor.
This court did not hesitate to increase the award of civil indemnity and moral damages
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. In People v. Gambao,28 we have also increased the award
of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to P100,000.00 each.

Due to the utter heinousness of the crime involved in this case, we, therefore, exercise our
judicial prerogative and increase the damages to P100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

There are not enough words to condemn the depravity that one adult can do to a child
victim. The many years that Rodrigo Gutierez will, by law, serve in prison will, of course,
not make up for the wrong and the injury that he has so selfishly and callously caused and
with utter disregard for what truly makes us human: that we care, nurture, and protect our
children because we hope that they can make their world better than ours. All this was lost
on Rodrigo Gutierez. The five pesos that he gave on every occasion that he defiled his
childvictim simply underscores the ignominy of his act.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals finding the accusedappellant

Rodrigo Gutierez y Robles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The accusedappellant is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and is ordered to pay AAA the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, with an interest
of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision until its full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.

10

[G.R. No. 196435, January 29, 2014]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. JOEL CRISOSTOMO Y
MALLIAR,[1] AccusedAppellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
[T]he trial courts evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses is entitled to the highest
respect absent a showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case. 2
On appeal is the October 22, 2010 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R.
CRH.C. No. 03832 which affirmed with modification the July 3, 2008 Decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 73 finding appellant Joel Crisostomo
y Malliar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape by sexual assault and one
count of statutory rape.
In three separate Informations,5 appellant was charged with rape committed as follows:
Criminal Case No. 9916235 (Rape by Sexual Assault)
That, on or about the 8th day of April, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd designs, did
then and there commit an act of sexual assault by using a lighted cigarette as an instrument
or object and [inserting] the same into the genital orifice of AAA,6 a minor who is six
(6) years of age, thereby causing the labia majora of the vagina of said minor to suffer a
third degree burn, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 9916236 (Rape by Sexual Assault)
That, on or about the 8th day of April, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd designs, did
then and there commit an act of sexual assault by using a lighted cigarette as an instrument
or object and [inserting] the same into the anal orifice of AAA, a minor who is six (6)
years of age, thereby causing the perianal region of the said anal orifice of said minor to
suffer a third degree burn, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 9916237 (Statutory Rape)
That, on or about the 8th day of April, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd designs and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge [of] AAA, a minor who is six (6) years of age; that
on the same occasion that the Accused raped said minor, the accused did, then and there
burn her buttocks by the use of a lighted cigarette, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned on January 9, 2001, appellant pleaded not guilty.7 Pretrial conference
was terminated upon agreement of the parties. Trial on the merits ensued.
Factual Antecedents
The facts as summarized by the RTC, are as follows:
The victim in these cases[,] AAA[,] testified that at noon time of April 8, 1999, she was x
x x playing x x x with her playmates whereupon she wandered by the house of accused
which x x x was just below their house. AAA clarified during her crossexamination
that there was a vulcanizing shop owned by her father located in their house x x x and
where accused was employed. While AAA was at the house of accused, she claimed that
her genitals and buttocks were burned with a lighted cigarette by the said accused. AAA
testified further that her clothes were taken off by the same accused who also took his
clothes off after which he allegedly placed himself on top of her, inserted his penis and
proceeded to have illicit carnal knowledge [of] the then six (6) year old girl. (TSN May 29,
2001, pp. 59; TSN Aug. 7, 2001, pp. 1012.)
BBB, father of AAA, presented in court his daughters birth certificate (Exhibit B)
which stated that she was born on April 4, 1993 (TSN Sept. 25, 2001, p. 4). On the other
hand, Dr. Emmanuel Reyes the MedicoLegal Officer who examined AAA identified his
MedicoLegal Report (Exhibit M) and testified that the victim indeed had two (2) third
degree burns in the perianal region. Dr. Reyes testified that it was possible that the said
burns were caused by a lighted cigarette stick being forced on the victims skin. Moreover,
Dr. Reyes confirmed that there was a loss of virginity on the part of the victim and that the
same could have been done 24 hours from the time of his examination which was also on
11
April 8, 1999. (TSN Nov. 7, 2001 pp. 1117)
CCC [aunt of AAA] testified that x x x she x x x assisted the mother of AAA in
bringing the victim to the Pasig General Hospital and thereafter to Camp Crame where a
doctor also examined AAA and confirmed that the latter was indeed a victim of rape.
CCC testified that they then proceeded to the Womens [D]esk to file the instant
complaint against the accused. (TSN August 5, 2003 pp. 48)
On the other hand, [a]ccused denied the allegation of rape against him. Accused presented
his brotherinlaw Rogelio Oletin who testified that he was tending the store located at the
house of accused when the latter supposedly arrived from work at 10:00 [a.m.] of April 8,
1999 and slept until 5:00 [p.m.] of the same day. According to Rogelio that is the usual
routine of accused as the latter worked in the night shift schedule as vulcanizer in the
vulcanizing shop owned by the victims father. (TSN February 3, 2006 pp. 68)
When accused testified on November 17, 2006, he essentially confirmed the testimony of
his brotherinlaw that it was impossible for him to have raped AAA on the date and
time stated in the information as his night shift work schedule just would not permit such
an incident to occur. Accused added that he knew of no reason why the family of the
private complainant would pin the crime against him. (TSN Nov. 17, 2006 pp. 911 & 14)
In an effort to explain the burn marks on the delicate parts of AAAs body, the defense
presented a supposed playmate of AAA in the person of Mary Pabuayan. According to
Mary, she was then 7 years old when she and two other playmates together with AAA
and Joel []Liit[] the son of accused were burning worms near a santol tree in their
neighborhood on a Good Friday in the year 1999. This Joel []Liit[] supposedly lighted a
straw which inadvertently burned the anal portion of AAAs body. Marys exact words
were to the effect that napatakan ang puwit ni AAA.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 3, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty of three counts of
rape, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Joel Crisostomo y Malliar is found GUILTY
of all offenses stated in the three (3) Criminal Informations and is hereby sentenced to the
following:
a) In Criminal Information # 9916235 and Criminal Information # 9916236, accused is
to suffer the Indeterminate Penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day of
Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
Reclusion Temporal as maximum and is ordered to pay the victim AAA civil indemnity
of P30,000.00, moral damages of P30,000.00 and exemplary damages of P15,000.00 for
each of the two Criminal Informations.
b) In Criminal Information # 9916237, accused is to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and is ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity of P75,000.00, moral damages of
P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of P30,000.00 with cost [of] suit for all Criminal
Informations.
SO ORDERED.9
Aggrieved, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal10 which was given due course by the trial
court in its Order11 dated February 2, 2009.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In his Brief filed before the CA, appellant raised the following assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT
GUILTY FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE (ARTICLE 266A PAR. 1 AND ART. 267B, PAR.
7 IN RELATION TO R.A. NO. 7610) DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.12
Appellant claimed that the trial court gravely erred when it lent full credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. In particular, appellant insisted that the trial court
erred in finding AAAs testimony credible considering that she was unsure whether a
match, rod or a cigarette stick, was used in burning her private parts.13 Appellant argued
that AAA never showed signs of shock, distress, or anxiety despite her alleged traumatic
experience.14 Appellant also alleged that CCCs testimony should be disregarded as she
was not even present when the rape incidents happened.15 He opined that CCC
influenced her niece, AAA, to file the suit against him which bespoke of illmotive on
her part. Appellant concluded that these inconsistencies and contradictions are enough to
set aside the verdict of conviction imposed upon by the RTC.16
However, the CA gave short shrift to appellants arguments. The CA rendered its Decision
disposing as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed July 3, 2008 Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalties imposed, and to be read
thus:
1. For Criminal Case Nos. 9916235 and 9916236, Joel Crisostomo is hereby sentenced
12
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten17 (8) years and one
(1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay AAA Thirty Thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as civil indemnity, Thirty Thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as moral damages,
and Fifteen Thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as exemplary damages, all for each count of rape
by sexual assault; and
(2) For Criminal Case No. 9916237, Joel Crisostomo is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility of parole, and ordered to pay AAA
SeventyFive Thousand pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages, and Thirty Thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary
damages, and all the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.18
Hence, this appeal19 which the CA gave due course in its Resolution20 of January 6, 2011.
In a Resolution21 dated June 15, 2011, this Court required the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs. In its Manifestation and Motion,22 the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) informed this Court that it will no longer file a Supplemental Brief because it had
already exhaustively discussed and refuted all the arguments of the appellant in its brief
filed before the CA. Appellant likewise filed a Manifestation In Lieu of Supplemental
Brief23 praying that the case be deemed submitted for decision based on the pleadings
submitted.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly found appellant guilty of two counts of rape by
sexual assault and one count of rape by sexual intercourse. Article 266A of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) provides:
ART. 266A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above should be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person. (Emphases supplied)
When the offended party is under 12 years of age, the crime committed is termed statutory
rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is
carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is
the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that
the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years.24 In
this case, the prosecution satisfactorily established all the elements of statutory rape.
AAA testified that on April 8, 1999, appellant took off her clothes and made her lie
down. Appellant also removed his clothes, placed himself on top of AAA, inserted his
penis into her vagina, and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her. At the time of the
rape, AAA was only six years of age. Her birth certificate showed that she was born on
April 4, 1993. AAAs testimony was corroborated by Dr. Emmanuel Reyes who found
AAA to have fresh and bleeding hymenal lacerations.
Likewise, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt appellants guilt for two counts
of rape by sexual assault. Records show that appellant inserted a lit cigarette stick into
AAAs genital orifice causing her labia majora to suffer a 3rd degree burn. Appellant
likewise inserted a lit cigarette stick into AAAs anal orifice causing 3rd degree burns in
her perianal region.
We agree with the CA that AAAs uncertainty on whether it was a match, rod or a
cigarette stick that was inserted into her private parts, did not lessen her credibility. Such
uncertainty is so inconsequential and does not diminish the fact that an instrument or
object was inserted into her private parts. This is the essence of rape by sexual assault.
[T]he gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault x x x is the insertion of the penis
into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another
persons genital or anal orifice.25 In any event, inconsistencies in a rape victims
testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial
matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape. 26 We also held
in People v. Piosang27 that
13
[t]estimonies of childvictims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of
tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what
transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she
would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not have
invented a horrible story. x x x
Moreover, appellants argument that AAA did not manifest any stress or anxiety
considering her traumatic experience is purely speculative and bereft of any legal basis.
Besides, it is settled that people react differently when confronted with a startling
experience. There is no standard behavioral response when one is confronted with a
traumatic experience. Some may show signs of stress; but others may act nonchalantly.
Nevertheless, AAAs reaction does not in any way prove the innocence of appellant. As
correctly pointed out by the OSG, regardless of AAAs reactions, it did not diminish the
fact that she was raped by appellant or that a crime was committed.28
We also agree with the CA that CCCs efforts to hale appellant to the court should not be
equated with illmotive on her part. On the contrary, we find CCCs efforts to seek
justice for her niece who was raped more in accord with the norms of society. At any rate,
even if we disregard CCCs testimony, appellants conviction would still stand. We
agree with the observation of the OSG that CCCs testimony actually had no great
impact on the case. In truth, her testimony [was] composed mainly of the fact that she was
the one who accompanied the mother of AAA in bringing AAA to the Pasig General
Hospital and thereafter to Camp Crame and later on to the Womens desk.29
On the other hand, appellants alibi and denial are weak defenses especially when weighed
against AAAs positive identification of him as the malefactor. Appellant did not even
attempt to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the
time of its commission. In fact, he admitted that he lived just four houses away from the
house of AAA. His denial is also unsubstantiated hence the same is selfserving and
deserves no consideration or weight. The RTC properly disregarded the testimony of
Rogelio Oletin (Oletin), appellants brotherinlaw, who claimed that appellant was at his
house at the time of the incident. As appellant already admitted, his house is near the house
of AAA hence there was no physical impossibility for him to be present at the crime
scene. Also, the RTC observed that Oletins testimony did not prove beneficial to the
defense. Suffice it to state that the private prosecutor correctly noted that the said witness
was always smiling and laughing when answering questions propounded to him as if
making a mockery of the proceedings which his own brotherinlaw was facing.30
Pursuant to Article 266B of the RPC, the penalty for statutory rape (Criminal Case No.
9916237) is death when the victim is a child below seven years old. There is no dispute
that at the time the rape was committed on April 8, 1999, AAA was only six years old,
having been born on April 4, 1993. However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346,31 the
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed on the appellant but without eligibility for
parole.32 The CA thus correctly imposed the said penalty on appellant.
On the other hand, rape by sexual assault committed against a child below seven years old
is punishable by reclusion temporal.33 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there
being no other aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty shall
be prision mayor34 as minimum, to reclusion temporal,35 as maximum. The CA thus
correctly imposed the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
for each count of sexual assault.
As regards damages, the CA correctly awarded the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. 9916237
(statutory rape). However, the award of moral damages must be increased to P75,000.00 in
line with prevailing jurisprudence.36 As regards Criminal Case No. 9916235 and Criminal
Case No. 9916236 (rape by sexual assault), the CA likewise properly awarded the
amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as moral damages, for each
count. However, the award of exemplary damages for each count of rape by sexual assault
must be increased to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 37 In addition, all
damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of
judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The October 22, 2010 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CAG.R. CRH.C. No. 03832 which affirmed with modification the July 3,
2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73 finding appellant
Joel Crisostomo y Malliar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape by sexual
assault and one count of statutory rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the
award of moral damages in Criminal Case No. 9916237 (statutory rape) is increased to
P75,000.00 and the award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. 9916235 and
Criminal Case No. 9916236 (rape by sexual assault) is increased to P30,000.00 for each
count. In addition, interest is imposed on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
14

[G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AAA, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
21ST DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL
OPORTO, AND MOISES ALQUIZOLA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated June 6, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN. The CA reversed
and set aside the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del
Norte, Branch 21, dated February 28, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 21-1211, and acquitted
private respondents Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises Alquizola of the
crime of rape for the prosecutions failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private respondents Carampatana,
Oporto and Alquizola were charged, together with Christian John Lim, Emmanuel dela
Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and Joseph Villame, for allegedly
raping AAA,3 to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about 10:30 oclock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at Alsons Palace,
Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd
designs forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-year-old minor, with an intoxicating liquor and once
intoxicated, brought said AAA at about dawn of March 26, 2004 at Alquizola Lodging
house, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, and once inside said lodging house, accused RAYMUND CARAMPATANA and
JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA while
accused MOISES ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed her against her will and
consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective counsels, entered a plea of not
guilty to the offense charged.5cralawlawlibrary
Following pre-trial,6 trial on the merits ensued. Accused Christian John Lim, however,
remains at-large.
The factual antecedents follow:
On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high school graduation
ceremony. Afterwards, they had a luncheon party at their house in Maranding, Lala, Lanao
del Norte. AAA then asked permission from her mother to go to the Maranding Stage
Plaza because she and her bandmates had to perform for an election campaign. She went
home at around 4:00 p.m. from the plaza. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told her father that she
would be attending a graduation dinner party with her friends. AAA, together with Lim,
Oporto, and Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of one Mark Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan,
Maranding. After eating, Lim invited them to go to Alsons Palace, which was merely a
walking distance away from Gemenos house. Outside the Alsons Palace, they were
greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae Fiel. After a while, they
went inside and proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor where they again saw
Montesco with Harold Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, a
certain Diego, and one Angelo. Rudinas suggested that they have a drinking session to
celebrate their graduation, to which the rest agreed.
They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks two (2) bottles of
Emperador Brandy. Then they arranged themselves in a circle for the drinking spree. Two
(2) glasses were being passed around: one glass containing the sweetener (Pepsi) and the
other glass containing the liquor. At first, AAA refused to drink because she had never
tried hard liquor before. During the session, they shared their problems with each other.
When it was AAAs turn, she became emotional and started crying. It was then that she
took her first shot. The glasses were passed around and she consumed more or less five (5)
glasses of Emperador Brandy.
Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oportos lap. Oporto then started
kissing her head and they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she told
them to stop, and simply tried to hide her face with the cap. But they just laughed at her.
Then, Roda also kissed her. At that time, AAA was already sleepy, but they still forced her
to take another shot. They helped her stand up and make her drink. She even heard Lim
say, Hubuga na, hubuga na, (You make her drunk, you make her drunk). She likewise
heard someone say, You drink it, you drink it. She leaned on Oportos lap again, then she
fell asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her the Emperador Brandy bottle to drink the
remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse but they insisted, so she drank directly from the
bottle. Again, she fell asleep.
15

The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs, and then
she was asleep again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at
the Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized that place because she had been there
before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And during one of the
times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different parts of
her body, and having intercourse with her. She started crying. She tried to resist when she
felt pain in her genitals. She also saw Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room,
watching as Oporto abused her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was
inserting his penis into her private organ. She cried and told him to stop. Alquizola then
joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00 a.m. of the next day. She was all alone. Her body
felt heavy and exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but without her lower
garments. The upper half of her body was on top of the bed but her feet were on the floor.
There were also red stains on her shirt. After dressing up, she hailed a trisikad and went
home. When AAA reached their house, her father was waiting for her and was already
furious. When she told them that she was raped, her mother started hitting her. They
brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a report. Thereafter, they proceeded to the
district hospital for her medical examination.
Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the morning of
March 26, 2004, and found an old hymenal laceration at 5 oclock position and hyperemia
or redness at the posterior fornices. The vaginal smear likewise revealed the presence of
sperm.
On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According to the defense
witnesses, in the evening of March 25, 2004, Oporto, Carampatana, Lim, and AAA had
dinner at Gemenos house. Gemeno then invited Oporto to attend the graduation party
hosted by Montesco at Alsons Palace, owned by the latters family. When they reached
the place, Oporto told Montesco that they had to leave for Barangay Tenazas to fetch one
Arcie Ariola. At about 11:30 p.m., Oporto and Carampatana returned to Alsons Palace but
could not find AAA and Lim. The party subsequently ended, but the group agreed to
celebrate further. AAA, Rudinas, Dela Cruz, Lim, and Oporto contributed for two (2)
bottles of Emperador Brandy and one (1) liter of Pepsi.
Several persons were in the room at that time: AAA, Carampatana, Oporto, Dela Cruz,
Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, Villame, and Lim. Also present but did not join the drinking
were Gemeno, Montesco, Angelo Ugnabia, Al Jalil Diego, Mohamad Janisah Manalao, one
Caga, and a certain Bantulan. Gemeno told AAA not to drink but the latter did not listen
and instead told him not to tell her aunt. During the drinking session, AAA rested on
Oportos lap. She even showed her scorpion tattoo on her buttocks. And when her legs
grazed Batoctoys crotch, she remarked, What was that, penis? Roda then approached
AAA to kiss her, and the latter kissed him back. Oporto did the same and AAA also kissed
him. After Oporto, Roda and AAA kissed each other again.
Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises Alquizola was at the
Alquizola Lodging House drinking beer with his cousin, Junver, and Fiel. They stopped
drinking at around midnight. Fiel then requested Alquizola to accompany her to Alsons
Palace to see her friends there. They proceeded to the second floor and there they saw
AAA lying on Oportos lap. Fiel told AAA to go home because her mother might get
angry. AAA could not look her in the eye, just shook her head, and said, I just stay here.
Alquizola and Fiel then went back to the lodging house. After thirty minutes, they went to
Alsons Palace again, and saw AAA and Oporto kissing each other. AAA was lying on his
lap while holding his neck. Subsequently, they went back to the lodging house to resume
drinking.
After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she refused and instead
instructed them to take her to the Alquizola Lodging House because she has a big problem.
AAA, Lim, and Carampatana rode a motorcycle to the lodging house. When they arrived,
AAA approached Alquizola and told him, Kuya, I want to sleep here for the meantime.
Alquizola then opened Room No. 4 where AAA, Oporto, and Carampatana stayed. There
were two beds inside, a single bed and a double-sized bed. AAA lay down on the single
bed and looked at Carampatana. The latter approached her and they kissed. He then
removed her shirt and AAA voluntarily raised her hands to give way. Carampatana
likewise removed her brassiere. All the while, Oporto was at the foot of the bed.
Thereafter, Oporto also removed her pants. AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier
for him to pull her underwear down. Oporto then went to AAA and kissed her on the lips.
Carampatana, on the other hand, placed himself in between AAAs legs and had intercourse
with her. When he finished, he put on his shorts and went back to Alsons Palace to get
some sleep. When he left, Oporto and AAA were still kissing. Alquizola then entered the
room. When AAA saw him, she said, Come Kuya, embrace me because I have a
problem. Alquizola thus started kissing AAAs breasts. Oporto stood up and opened his
pants. AAA held his penis and performed fellatio on him. Then Oporto and Alquizola
changed positions. Oporto proceeded to have sexual intercourse with AAA. During that
time, AAA was moaning and calling his name. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept
with Alquizola on the carpet. Oporto then had intercourse with AAA two more times. At
3:00 a.m., he went back to Alsons Palace to sleep. At around 6:00 a.m., Oporto and
Carampatana went back to the lodging house. They tried to wake AAA up, but she did not
move so they just left and went home. Alquizola had gone outside but he came back before
7:00 a.m. However, AAA was no longer there when he arrived.
On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and
Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It, however, acquitted Dela
Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the prosecution to prove their
16
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the indivisible prison term
of reclusion perpetua; to pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 for and by way of civil
indemnity;
b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged,
and the court hereby sentences him to suffer a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years also of prision mayor as maximum; to
pay AAA the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and another amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity;
c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as ACCOMPLICE
in the commission of the crime charged, and the court hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to pay AAA the
amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages and another sum of P30,000.00 for and by way of
civil indemnity;
d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy
and Joseph Villame NOT GUILTY of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to
prove their guilt therefor beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court acquits them of
said charge; and
e) Ordering accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola to pay, jointly and severally, the
amount of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and expenses of litigations; and the costs of suit.
The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused Carampatana, Oporto and
Alquizola shall be credited to them and deducted from their prison terms provided they
comply with the requirements of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused Raymund Carampatana surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained
since then up to the present. Accused Alquizola also surrendered voluntarily on 26 March
2004 and detained since then up to this time, while accused Joefhel Oporto who likewise
surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 was ordered released to the custody of the
DSWD, Lala, Lanao del Norte on 31 March 2004, and subsequently posted cash bond for
his provisional liberty on 17 September 2004 duly approved by this court, thus resulted to
an order of even date for his release from the custody of the DSWD.
Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on the prosecution
to prosecute the case against accused Christian John Lim as soon as he is apprehended.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the case to the CA. On June
6, 2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the trial courts ruling
and, consequently, acquitted private respondents. The decretal portion of said decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors therefrom, the Decision on appeal is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
accused-appellants RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO and MOISES
ALQUIZOLA are instead ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.8
In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. It gave more credence to the version of the defense and ruled that AAA
consented to the sexual congress. She was wide awake and aware of what private
respondents were doing before the intercourse. She never showed any physical resistance,
never shouted for help, and never fought against her alleged ravishers. The appellate court
further relied on the medical report which showed the presence of an old hymenal
laceration on AAAs genitalia, giving the impression that she has had some carnal
knowledge with a man before. The CA also stressed that AAAs mothers unusual reaction
of hitting her when she discovered what happened to her daughter was more consistent
with that of a parent who found out that her child just had premarital sex rather than one
who was sexually assaulted.
On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition for Certiorari9 under
Rule 65, questioning the CA Decision which reversed private respondents conviction and
ardently contending that the same was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her petition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ACQUITTING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.10
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The private respondents present the following arguments in their Comment dated
November 7, 2008 to assail the petition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
17
 I.
A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND
THE PROSECUTION CANNOT APPEAL THE ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II.
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE
PART OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT.
III.
CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS
FIRST FILED.
IV.
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS THE APPELLATE COUNSEL OF
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES IN ALL CRIMINAL CASES.11
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own Comment on April 1, 2009. It
assigns the following errors:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I.
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MAY VALIDLY APPEAL AN ORDER OF
ACQUITTAL AS TO THE CIVIL ASPECT OF THE CRIME.
II.
THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING
BEEN RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE
JEOPARDY.12
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.
At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate a
fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way
of achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no
violation of due process and fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally construed. 13
Liberal construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice.
The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or the exemption of a case from their
operation, is warranted when compelling reasons exist or when the purpose of justice
requires it. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not
on sheer technicalities.14cralawlawlibrary
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a
judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a
judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred
from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated. 15
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal, but only
with respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may be
assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that
the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of
judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and
void.16 If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting petitioners prayer is not tantamount
to putting private respondents in double jeopardy.17cralawlawlibrary
As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action, the Court said in People
v. Santiago:18cralawlawlibrary
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of
the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in
the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the
prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an
appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the
Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines
on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However,
the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of
the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting
18
to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition
may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State
and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the
civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision
or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant
should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action
may be prosecuted in [the] name of said complainant.19
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Private respondents argue that the action should have been filed by the State through the
OSG. True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.
This is because the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the
Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the OSG.20cralawlawlibrary
Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance of her private
counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA when it
acquitted private respondents. As the aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the right to bring
the action in her name and maintain the criminal prosecution. She has an immense interest
in obtaining justice in the case precisely because she is the subject of the violation.
Further, as held in Dela Rosa v. CA,21 where the Court sustained the private offended
partys right in a criminal case to file a special civil action for certiorari to question the
validity of the judgment of dismissal and ruled that the Solicitor Generals intervention was
not necessary, the recourse of the complainant to the Court is proper since it was brought in
her own name and not in that of the People of the Philippines. In any event, the OSG joins
petitioners cause in its Comment,22thereby fulfilling the requirement that all criminal
actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor.23cralawlawlibrary
Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for the sake of argument, that
AAA can file the special civil action for certiorari without violating their right against
double jeopardy, still, it must be dismissed for petitioners failure to previously file a
motion for reconsideration.
True, a motion for reconsideration is a condicio sine qua non for the filing of a petition
for certiorari. Its purpose is for the court to have an opportunity to correct any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of
the case. This rule, however, is not absolute and admits well-defined exceptions, such as:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b)
where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject
matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and
there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of
arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i)
where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.24cralawlawlibrary
Here, petitioners case amply falls within the exception. AAA raises the same questions as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court, essentially revolving on the guilt of the
private respondents. There is also an urgent necessity to resolve the issues, for any further
delay would prejudice the interests, not only of the petitioner, but likewise that of the
Government. And, as will soon be discussed, the CA decision is a patent nullity for lack of
due process and for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be shown to have acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An acquittal is
considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion when it is shown that the prosecutions
right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham. The burden is on
the petitioner to clearly demonstrate and establish that the respondent court blatantly
abused its authority such as to deprive itself of its very power to dispense
justice.25cralawlawlibrary
AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave abuse of judicial
discretion, totally disregarded her testimony as well as the trial courts findings of fact,
thereby adopting hook, line, and sinker, the private respondents narration of facts.
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal
can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.26 There is grave abuse of discretion when the disputed act of the lower court goes
beyond the limits of discretion thus effecting an injustice.27cralawlawlibrary
The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that
the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting private
respondents.
It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence presented by
19
the defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. At first, it may seem that its
narration of the facts28 of the case was meticulously culled from the evidence of both
parties. But a more careful perusal will reveal that it was simply lifted, if not altogether
parroted, from the testimonies of the accused, especially that of
Oporto,29 Carampatana,30 and Alquizola,31 the accused-appellants in the case before it. The
appellate court merely echoed the private respondents testimonies, particularly those as to
the specific events that transpired during the crucial period - from the dinner at Gemenos
house to the following morning at the Alquizola Lodging House. As a result, it presented
the private respondents account and allegations as though these were the established facts
of the case, which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling of acquittal.
Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire
evidence presented, regardless of the party who offered the same.32 It simply cannot
acknowledge that of one party and turn a blind eye to that of the other. It cannot appreciate
one partys cause and brush the other aside. This rule becomes particularly significant in
this case because the parties tendered contradicting versions of the incident. The victim is
crying rape but the accused are saying it was a consensual sexual rendezvous. Thus, the
CAs blatant disregard of material prosecution evidence and outward bias in favor of that of
the defense constitutes grave abuse of discretion resulting in violation of petitioners right
to due process.33cralawlawlibrary
Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the observations of the RTC and
made its own flimsy findings to justify its decision of acquittal.
First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the whole ordeal.
The fact that she never showed any physical resistance, never cried out for help, and never
fought against the private respondents, bolsters the claim of the latter that the sexual acts
were indeed consensual.
But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of the assault.
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
cralawred
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation;
or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is
under twelve years of age.34 Here, the accused intentionally made AAA consume hard
liquor more than she could handle. They still forced her to drink even when she was
already obviously inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, but
the latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the time the private respondents
ravished her. The CA, however, readily concluded that she agreed to the sexual act simply
because she did not shout or offer any physical resistance, disregarding her testimony that
she was rendered weak and dizzy by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of
the crime.35 The appellate court never provided any reason why AAAs testimony should
deserve scant or no weight at all, or why it cannot be accorded any credence. In reviewing
rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim is and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant
a judgment of conviction if found to be credible. Also, it has been established that when a
woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that
she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can
be convicted on that basis alone. This is because from the nature of the offense, the sole
evidence that can usually be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the
complainants testimony itself.36 The trial court correctly ruled that if AAA was not
truthful to her accusation, she would not have opened herself to the rough and tumble of a
public trial. AAA was certainly not enjoying the prying eyes of those who were listening
as she narrated her harrowing experience.37cralawlawlibrary
AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated her. She tried
to resist, but because of the presence of alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed. The RTC
found AAAs testimony simple and candid, indicating that she was telling the truth. The
trial court likewise observed that her answers to the lengthy and humiliating questions were
simple and straightforward, negating the possibility of a rehearsed testimony.38
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct):
xxxx
Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you that you went asleep, when did you regain
your consciousness?
A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the remaining wine inside the bottle of
Emperador Brandy.cralawred
20
xxxx Q: Where?
A: Alquizola Lodging House, sir.cralawred
Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to drink the remaining contained (sic) of the
bottle of Emperador Brandy? xxxx
A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to refuse but they insisted.
Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light, what happened?
Q: Who handed over to you that bottle, if you can remember? A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir.
A: It was Christian John Lim, sir.
Q: So, you fell asleep again?
Q: Did you drink that Emperador directly from the bottle? A: Yes, sir.cralawred
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: What happened after that?
A: I fell asleep again, sir. Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again?
A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir.
Q: When did you regain your consciousness?
A: When somebody was carrying me down to the spiral stairs. Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you see?
A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir.
Q: Can you remember the person or persons who was or who were carrying you?
A: Yes, sir. Q: He was on top of you?
A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while answering)
Q: Who?
A: They were Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy. Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto was on top of you?
A: I was starting to cry, sir.
Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy carry you?
A: I placed my hands to their shoulder (sic), sir: Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is (sic) your reaction?
A: I was saying dont because I feel pain my private organ (sic).
xxxx
Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words?
Q: After that, what happened, if any? A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he sexually abused me.
A: I was already asleep, sir, when we went downstairs.
ATTY. GENERALAO: We want to make it on record, Your Honor, that the witness is
Q: You mean to say that you cannot remember anymore? crying.cralawred
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: Now, when again did you regain your consciousness?
A: When we entered the room and the light was switch (sic) on, I was awakened by the ATTY. GENERALAO: May I continue, Your Honor.
flash of light.
COURT: Continue.
Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when you were awakened that (sic) flash of
light. ATTY. GENERALAO: Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on top of you, who else
A: Yes, sir. was there inside that room?
21
A: Moises Alquizola and Raymund Carampatana, sir.
Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel when you said that you feel
Q: With respect to Raymund Carampatana, what was he doing? (sic) something in your private part when you saw Raymund Carampatana?
A: He was at my feet while looking at us. A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, sir.

Q: Was it dress (sic) up or undressed? Q: Then after that you fell asleep again?
A: Dressed up, sir. A: Yes, sir.

Q: What about Moises Alquizola, what was he doing? Q: When did you wake-up (sic)?
A: He was beside us standing and looking at me, sir. A: I woke up at about 7:00 oclock a.m in the next (sic) day, sir.39

Q: Was he dressed up or undressed? ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

A: I could not remember, sir.cralawred On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation of the defense. It
noted that their account of the events was seemingly unusual and incredible.40 Besides, the
xxxx defense of consensual copulation was belatedly invoked and seemed to have been a last
ditch effort to avoid culpability. The accused never mentioned about the same at the pre-
Q: After that, what happened? trial stage. The trial court only came to know about it when it was their turn to take the
A: I went asleep again, sir. witness stand, catching the court by surprise.41 More importantly, it must be emphasized
that when the accused in a rape case claims that the sexual intercourse between him and the
Q: Then, when again did you or when again did you wake up? complainant was consensual, as in this case, the burden of evidence shifts to him, such that
A: When I feel (sic) pain something inside my private part (sic), I saw Raymund he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the relationship. Being an
Carampatana, sir. affirmative defense that needs convincing proof, it must be established with sufficient
evidence that the intercourse was indeed consensual.42 Generally, the burden of proof is
Q: On top of you? upon the prosecution to establish each and every element of the crime and that it is the
A: No, sir, because he was in between my legs, sir. accused who is responsible for its commission. This is because in criminal cases,
conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt.43 Burden of evidence is that logical
Q: What was your reaction? necessity which rests on a party at any particular time during the trial to create a prima
A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told him dont. facie case in his favor or to overthrow one when created against him. A prima facie case
arises when the party having the burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient to
Q: At that point, who else was inside that room when you found Raymund Carampatana? support a finding and adjudication for him of the issue in litigation.44 However, when the
A: Only the three of them, sir. accused alleges consensual sexual congress, he needs convincing proof such as love notes,
mementos, and credible witnesses attesting to the romantic or sexual relationship between
Q: Including Moises Alquizola? the offender and his supposed victim. Having admitted to carnal knowledge of the
A: Yes, sir. complainant, the burden now shifts to the accused to prove his defense by substantial
evidence.45cralawlawlibrary
Q: What was he doing?
A: He was started (sic) to kiss me. Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge of AAA but
unfortunately failed to discharge the burden required of them. Carampatana narrated that
Q: Where in particular? upon reaching the room at the lodging house, AAA lay down on the bed and looked at
A: In my face, sir. him. He then approached her and they kissed. He removed her shirt and brassiere.
Thereafter, Oporto also removed AAAs lower garments and then went to kiss AAA.
Q: Then after that, what happened? Carampatana then placed himself in between AAAs legs and had intercourse with her.46
A: I fell asleep again, sir. On the other hand, Oporto himself testified that he had sexual intercourse with AAA three
22
times. While Carampatana was removing AAAs shirt and brassiere, Oporto was watching
at the foot of the bed. Then he removed her pants and underwear, and AAA even lifted her
buttocks to make it easier for him to pull the clothes down. When Carampatana left after
having sexual intercourse with AAA, according to Oporto, he then stood up, opened his
pants, and took out his penis so that AAA could perform fellatio on him. Then he
proceeded to have sexual intercourse with AAA. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and
slept with Alquizola on the carpet. After a few minutes, he woke up and went back to the
room and again had intercourse with AAA. He went back to sleep and after some time, he
woke up to the sound of AAA vomitting. Shortly thereafter, he made love with AAA for
the third and last time.47 Despite said shameless admission, however, the accused failed to
sufficiently prove that the lack of any physical resistance on AAAs part amounts to
approval or permission. They failed to show that AAA had sexual intercourse with them
out of her own volition, and not simply because she was seriously intoxicated at that time,
and therefore could not have given a valid and intelligent consent to the sexual act.
The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense witnesses, was showy and exaggerated
when testifying, even flashing a thumbs-up to some of the accused after her testimony, an
indication of a rehearsed witness.48 To be believed, the testimony must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the attending
circumstances.49cralawlawlibrary
When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even
conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity
to observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a
better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence.50 Matters
of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who is in a better position than the
appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of
witnesses who have personally appeared before him.51 The appellate courts are far
detached from the details and drama during trial and have to rely solely on the records of
the case in its review. On the matter of credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, the
Court acknowledges said limitations and recognizes the advantage of the trial court whose
findings must be given due deference.52 Since the CA and the private respondents failed to
show any palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial
court, these findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and
binding.53cralawlawlibrary
The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining physician found old hymenal
laceration on AAAs private organ. The lack of a fresh hymenal laceration, which is
expected to be present when the alleged sexual encounter is involuntary, could mean that
AAA actually consented to the fornication. According to Dr. Acusta, when sex is
consensual, the vagina becomes lubricated and the insertion of the penis will not cause any
laceration. It presumed that complainant, therefore, was no longer innocent considering the
presence of old hymenal laceration that could have resulted from her previous sexual
encounters. The defense, however, failed to show that AAA was sexually promiscuous and
known for organizing or even joining sex orgies. It must be noted that AAA was a minor,
barely 17 years old at the time of the incident, having just graduated from high school on
that same day. In a similar case,54the Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x Indeed, no woman would have consented to have sexual intercourse with two
men or three, according to Antonio Gallardo in the presence of each other, unless
she were a prostitute or as morally debased as one. Certainly, the record before Us
contains no indication that Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year high school student, can be
so characterized. On the contrary, her testimony in court evinced the simplicity and candor
peculiar to her youth. In fact, appellants could not even suggest any reason why Farmacita
would falsely impute to them the commission of the crime charged.55
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts, and be subjected to public trial and humiliation if her
claim were not true.56 And even if she were indeed highly promiscuous at such a young
age, the same could still not prove that no rape was actually committed. Even a
complainant who was a woman of loose morals could still be the victim of rape. Even a
prostitute may be a victim of rape. The victims moral character in rape is immaterial
where, as in this case, it is shown that the victim was deprived of reason or was rendered
unconscious through intoxication to enable the private respondents to have sex with her.
Moreover, the essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman against her consent.57 A
freshly broken hymen is not one of its essential elements. Even if the hymen of the victim
was still intact, the possibility of rape cannot be ruled out. Penetration of the penis by entry
into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to
justify a conviction for rape. To repeat, rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of
the womans genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for rape.58cralawlawlibrary
Neither does AAAs mothers act of hitting her after learning about the rape prove
anything. It is a truism that the workings of the human mind when placed under
emotional stress are unpredictable, and the people react differently.59 Different people
react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral
response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.60 At
most, it merely indicates the frustration and dismay of a mother upon learning that her
daughter had been defiled after partying late the night before. It is a settled rule that when
there is no showing that private complainant was impelled by improper motive in making
the accusation against the accused, her complaint is entitled to full faith and credence. 61 So
if AAA in fact consented to the sexual act, why did she still need to immediately tell her
parents about it when she could have just kept it to herself? Why did she ever have to
shout rape? She was not caught in the act of making love with any of the private
23
respondents,62 nor was she shown to have been in a relationship with any of them of which
her family disapproved.63 She never became pregnant as a result of the deed. And if AAA
cried rape to save her reputation, why would she have to drag the private respondents into
the case and identify them as her rapists? Absent any circumstance indicating the contrary,
she brought the charge against the private respondents simply because she was, in fact,
violated and she wants to obtain justice. Her zeal in prosecuting the case, even after the
CA had already acquitted the private respondents, evinces the truth that she merely seeks
justice for her honor that has been debased.64 Unfortunately, the CA chose to ignore these
telling pieces of evidence. Its findings are against the logic and effect of the facts as
presented by AAA in support of her complaint,65 contrary to common human experience,
and in utter disregard of the relevant laws and jurisprudence on the crime of rape.
Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy because his
participation in the crime was uncertain,66 citing People v. Lobrigo.67 It found that his
participation was not in furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit the crime of rape.68 The
Court, however, finds that the RTC erred in ruling that Alquizolas liability is not of a
conspirator, but that of a mere accomplice. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that
there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the
malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. Conspiracy is
proved if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors committed
an offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert.69 Proof of conspiracy
need not even rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective
conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of the crime indicating a
common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the
offense.70cralawlawlibrary
In Lobrigo, the Court declared:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to Gregorio's and Dominador's
participation in the crime conflict on material points.
Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were carrying weapons during
the mauling and whether they participated in the mauling by more than just boxing the
victim. Noel stated that they did not, Domingo stated that they did.
In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal blow is not necessary. In this case,
the rule is not applicable because conspiracy with respect to Gregorio and Dominador is
not proven. Their exact participation in the crime is uncertain.71 (Emphasis Supplied)
In People v. Dela Torre,72 the Court upheld the findings of the lower courts that there was
conspiracy:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The RTC held that:
While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually ravished the victim based on
the testimony of the private complainant that Amoroso succeeded in inserting his penis to
her private parts and that Reynaldo dela Torre and Ritchie Bisaya merely kissed her and
fondled her private parts, accused [D]ela Torre can likewise be held liable for the bestial
acts of Amoroso as it is quite apparent that the three of them conspired and mutually helped
one another in raping the young victim.
The Court of Appeals held that:
[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his tacit and spontaneous
participation and cooperation of pulling her towards the parked jeep, molesting her and
doing nothing to prevent the commission of the rape, made him a co-conspirator. As
such, he was properly adjudged as a principal in the commission of the crime.73
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Lobrigo, Alquizolas participation in the crime is not
at all uncertain. As the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a room so
the rape could be accomplished with ease and furtiveness. He was likewise inside the
room, intently watching, while Oporto and Carampatana sexually abused AAA. He did not
do anything to stop the bestial acts of his companions. He even admitted to kissing AAAs
lips, breasts, and other parts of her body. Indubitably, there was conspiracy among
Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually abuse AAA. Hence, the act of any one
was the act of all, and each of them, Alquizola including, is equally guilty of the crime of
rape. While it is true that the RTC found Alquizola guilty as mere accomplice, when he
appealed from the decision of the trial court,74 he waived the constitutional safeguard
against double jeopardy and threw the whole case open to the review of the appellate court,
which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the accused-appellant.75cralawlawlibrary
Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single Information, it,
however, actually charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint or
information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective. 76 The rationale
behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused
the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare
for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which
might confuse him in his defense.77 Non-compliance with this rule is a ground78 for
quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his
plea,79 otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.80 The accused herein, however, cannot
avail of this defense simply because they did not file a motion to quash questioning the
validity of the Information during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have
24
waived their right to question the same. Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed to
the accused are merely different counts specifying the acts of perpetration of the same
crime, as in the instant case, there is no duplicity to speak of.81 There is likewise no
violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against them because the
Information, in fact, stated that they took turns in having carnal knowledge against the
will of AAA on March 25, 2004.82 Further, allegations made and the evidence presented
to support the same reveal that AAA was indeed raped and defiled several times. Here,
according to the accused themselves, after undressing AAA, Carampatana positioned
himself in between her legs and had intercourse with her. On the other hand, Oporto
admitted that he had sexual intercourse with AAA three times. When two or more offenses
are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before
trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose
upon him the proper penalty for each offense.83 Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola can
then be held liable for more than one crime of rape, or a total of four (4) counts in all, with
conspiracy extant among the three of them during the commission of each of the four
violations. Each of the accused shall thus be held liable for every act of rape committed by
the other. But while Oporto himself testified that he inserted his sexual organ into AAAs
mouth, the Court cannot convict him of rape through sexual assault therefor because the
same was not included in the Information. This is, however, without prejudice to the filing
of a case of rape through sexual assault as long as prescription has not yet set in.
Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two or more persons is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the RPC. But in view of
the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the absence of an
aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the lighter penalty of reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed upon them,84 for each count. With regard to Oporto, appreciating in his favor
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the proper imposable penalty upon him
is reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua to death. Being a
divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Oporto can be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the
minimum of which shall be within the range of prision mayor (the penalty next lower in
degree to reclusion temporal) and the maximum of which shall be within the range
of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, there being the ordinary mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance. 85 With
that, the Court shall impose the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each count of rape committed.86 However, Oporto
shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51, R.A. No. 9344,87 which
extends even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he
committed the crime when he was still a child,88 and provides for the confinement of
convicted children as follows:89cralawlawlibrary
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training
Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the
court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the foregoing provision
should be taken into consideration by the judge in order to accord children in conflict with
the law, who have already gone beyond twenty-one (21) years of age, the proper treatment
envisioned by law.
As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages, in each case. Exemplary damages of
P30,000.00 shall likewise be imposed by way of an example and to deter others from
committing the same bestial acts.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN
is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court hereby renders judgment:
a) Finding accused-respondent Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case;
b) Finding accused-respondent Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, in each case; and
c) Finding accused-respondent Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case.
The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay AAA, jointly and severally,
the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each of the four (4) counts of rape. The case
is REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section
51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
Let the records of this case be forwarded to the court of origin for the execution of
judgment.
25
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[G.R. No. 178321 : October 05, 2011]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CONRADO
LAOG Y RAMIN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
For our review is the March 21, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 00234 which affirmed appellant's conviction for murder in Criminal Case No.
2162-M-2000 and rape in Criminal Case No. 2308-M-2000.
Appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin was charged with murder before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 11, of Malolos, Bulacan. The Information,2which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000, alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a lead pipe and with intent to kill one Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, did
then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of
superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and hit with the said lead pipe the said
Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, thereby inflicting upon said Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal serious
physical injuries which directly caused her death.
Contrary to law.
He was likewise charged before the same court with the crime of rape of AAA. 3 The
second Information,4which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2308-M-2000, alleged:
That on or about the 6thday of June, 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd designs, by means of force, violence and intimidation, that is, by
attacking and hitting with a lead pipe one [AAA] which resulted [in] her incurring serious
physical injuries that almost caused her death, and while in such defenseless situation, did
then and there have carnal knowledge of said [AAA] against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The two cases were
thereafter tried jointly because they arose from the same incident.
The prosecution presented as its principal witness AAA, the rape victim who was 19 years
old at the time of the incident. Her testimony was corroborated by her grandfather BBB,
Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, and her neighbor CCC.
AAA testified that at around six o'clock in the evening of June 6, 2000, she and her friend,
Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, were walking along the rice paddies on their way to apply for
work at a canteen near the National Highway in Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan. Suddenly,
appellant, who was holding an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them and forcibly brought
them to a grassy area at the back of a concrete wall. Without warning, appellant struck
AAA in the head with the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall down. When
Jennifer saw this, she cried out for help but appellant also hit her on the head with the lead
pipe, knocking her down. Appellant stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and
thereafter covered her body with thick grass.5 Appellant then turned to AAA. He hit AAA
in the head several times more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the face. While AAA
was in such defenseless position, appellant pulled down her jogging pants, removed her
panty, and pulled up her blouse and bra. He then went on top of her, sucked her breasts and
inserted his penis into her vagina. After raping AAA, appellant also covered her with grass.
At that point, AAA passed out.6
When AAA regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining hard. She crawled until
she reached her uncle's farm at daybreak on June 8, 2000.7When she saw him, she waved at
him for help. Her uncle, BBB, and a certain Nano then brought her to Carpa Hospital in
Baliuag, Bulacan where she stayed for more than three weeks. She later learned that
Jennifer had died.8
During cross-examination, AAA explained that she did not try to run away when appellant
accosted them because she trusted appellant who was her uncle by affinity. She said that
she never thought he would harm them.9
BBB testified that on June 8, 2000, at about six o'clock in the morning, he was at his rice
field at Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan when he saw a woman waving a hand and then fell
down. The woman was about 200 meters away from him when he saw her waving to him,
and he did not mind her. However, when she was about 100 meters away from him, he
recognized the woman as AAA, his granddaughter. He immediately approached her and
saw that her face was swollen, with her hair covering her face, and her clothes all wet. He
asked AAA what happened to her, and AAA uttered, "Si Tata Coni" referring to appellant
who is his son-in-law.10 With the help of his neighbor, he brought AAA home.11 AAA was
later brought to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where she recuperated for three weeks.
26
CCC, neighbor of AAA and Jennifer, testified that sometime after June 6, 2000, she visited
AAA at the hospital and asked AAA about the whereabouts of Jennifer. AAA told her to
look for Jennifer somewhere at Buenavista. She sought the assistance of Barangay
Officials and they went to Buenavista where they found Jennifer's cadaver covered with
grass and already bloated.12
Meanwhile, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, a medico-legal officer of the Province of Bulacan,
conducted the autopsy on the remains of Jennifer. His findings are as follows:
...the body is in advanced stage of decomposition[;] ... eyeballs and to[n]gue were
protru[d]ed; the lips and abdomen are swollen; ... desquamation and bursting of bullae and
denudation of the epidermis in the head, trunks and on the upper extremities[;] [f]rothy
fluid and maggots coming from the nose, mouth, genital region and at the site of
wounds, ... three (3) lacerations at the head[;] two (2) stab wounds at the submandibular
region[;] four [4]punctured wounds at the chest of the victim[.]
... cause of death of the victim was hemorrhagic shock as result of stab wounds [in] the
head and trunk.13
The prosecution and the defense also stipulated on the testimony of Elizabeth Patawaran,
Jennifer's mother, as to the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000. It was
stipulated that she spent P25,000 for Jennifer's funeral and burial.14
Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges against him. Appellant testified that he
was at home cooking dinner around the time the crimes were committed. With him were
his children, Ronnie, Jay, Oliver and Conrado, Jr. and his nephew, Rey Laog. At around
seven o'clock, he was arrested by the police officers of San Rafael, Bulacan. He learned
that his wife had reported him to the police after he "went wild" that same night and struck
with a lead pipe a man whom he saw talking to his wife inside their house. When he was
already incarcerated, he learned that he was being charged with murder and rape.15
Appellant further testified that AAA and Jennifer frequently went to his nipa hut whenever
they would ask for rice or money. He claimed that in the evening of June 5, 2000, AAA
and Jennifer slept in his nipa hut but they left the following morning at around seven
o'clock. An hour later, he left his house to have his scythe repaired. However, he was not
able to do so because that was the time when he "went wild" after seeing his wife with
another man. He admitted that his nipa hut is more or less only 100 meters away from the
scene of the crime.16
The defense also presented appellant's nephew, Rey Laog, who testified that he went to
appellant's house on June 5, 2000, at around three o'clock in the afternoon, and saw AAA
and Jennifer there. He recalled seeing AAA and Jennifer before at his uncle's house about
seven times because AAA and his uncle had an illicit affair. He further testified that
appellant arrived before midnight on June 5, 2000 and slept with AAA. The following
morning, at around six o'clock, AAA and Jennifer went home. He and appellant meanwhile
left the house together. Appellant was going to San Rafael to have his scythe repaired
while he proceeded to his house in Pinakpinakan, San Rafael, Bulacan.17
After trial, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision18on June 30, 2003 finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2162-M-2000, this court finds the accused Conrado
Laog GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran, the following sums of money:
a. P60,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2308-M-2000, this Court hereby finds the accused
Conrado Laog GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape under Art. 266-A par. (a) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the private complainant the following sums of money.
a. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.19
Appellant appealed his conviction to this Court. But conformably with our pronouncement
in People v. Mateo,20the case was referred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
In a Decision dated March 21, 2007, the CA affirmed with modification the trial court's
judgment. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Joint Decision, dated
June 30, 2003, of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 11, in Criminal
Case Nos. 2162-M-2000 & 2308-M-2000, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case [No.] 2162-M-2000, Accused-Appellant is further
ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran [an] additional P25,000.00 as actual
27
damages. The exemplary damages awarded by the Trial Court in 2162-M-2000 & 2308-
M-2000 are hereby reduced to P25,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.21
Appellant is now before this Court assailing the CA's affirmance of his conviction for both
crimes of rape and murder. In a Resolution22dated August 22, 2007, we required the parties
to submit their respective Supplemental Briefs, if they so desire. However, the parties
submitted separate Manifestations in lieu of Supplemental Briefs, adopting the arguments
in their respective briefs filed in the CA. Appellant had raised the following errors
allegedly committed by the trial court:
I Here, both the trial and appellate courts gave credence and full probative weight to the
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS
[AAA].
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION
TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.23
Appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for
the killing of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal and the rape of AAA. He assails AAA's credibility,
the prosecution's main witness, and points out alleged inconsistencies in her testimony.
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to establish that he carefully planned the
execution of the crimes charged. According to him, AAA's narration that he waylaid them
while walking along the rice paddies on their way to apply for work negates evident
premeditation since there was no evidence that the said path was their usual route.
Appellant further contends that the trial court and CA erred in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. He argues that for abuse of superior strength to
be appreciated in the killing of Jennifer, the physical attributes of both the accused and the
victim should have been shown in order to determine whether the accused had the capacity
to overcome the victim physically or whether the victim was substantially weak and unable
to put up a defense. Additionally, he attempts to cast doubt upon AAA's testimony, arguing
that it lacked some details on how, after she was raped and stabbed by appellant, she was
still able to put on her clothes and crawl to her grandfather's farm.
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellant principally attacks the credibility of prosecution witness AAA. Jurisprudence
has decreed that the issue of credibility of witnesses is "a question best addressed to the
province of the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive
and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying
which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts"24and "absent any substantial reason
which would justify the reversal of the trial court's assessments and conclusions, the
reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings, particularly when no
significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded
which when considered would have affected the outcome of the case."25This rule is even
more stringently applied if the appellate court concurred with the trial court.26
testimony of AAA, the lone eyewitness to Jennifer's killing and was herself brutally
attacked by appellant who also raped her. Appellant had not shown any sufficiently
weighty reasons for us to disturb the trial court's evaluation of the prosecution eyewitness'
credibility. In particular, we defer to the trial court's firsthand observations on AAA's
deportment while testifying and its veritable assessment of her credibility, to wit:
From the moment [AAA] took the stand, this Court has come to discern in her the
trepidations of a woman outraged who is about to recount the ordeal she had gone through.
She took her oath with trembling hands, her voice low and soft, hardly audible. Face down,
her eyes were constantly fixed on the floor as if avoiding an eye contact with the man she
was about to testify against. After a few questions in direct, the emotion building up inside
her came to the fore and she burst into tears, badly shaken, unfit to continue any further
with her testimony. Thus, in deference to her agitated situation, this Court has to defer her
direct-examination. When she came back, however, to continue with her aborted
questioning, this time, composed and collected, direct and straightforward in her narration,
all vestiges of doubt on her credibility vanished.27
Indeed, records bear out that AAA became so tense and nervous when she took the witness
stand for the first time that the trial court had to cut short her initial direct examination.
However, during the next hearing she was able to narrate her harrowing ordeal in a clear
and straightforward manner, describing in detail how appellant waylaid them and
mercilessly hit and attacked her and Jennifer with a lead pipe and ice pick before raping
her. We quote the pertinent portions of her testimony:
Q: During your previous testimony, Madam Witness, you said that you're not able
to reach your place of work on June 6, 2000, what is the reason why you did not
reach your place of work?
A: We were waylaid (hinarang) by Conrado Laog, sir.
28
 Q: After Conrado Laog stabbed Jennifer, what happened next?
Q: In what manner were you waylaid by Conrado Laog? A: He covered Jennifer with grasses, sir.
A: Conrado Laog hit me with the pipe on my head, sir.
Q: And after that, what did Conrado Laog do?
xxxx A: He came back to me, sir.

Q: Where were you when you were hit? Q: When Conrado Laog came back to you, what did you do, if any?
A: We were walking along the rice puddies (sic), Your Honor. A: He hit me with the pipe several times, sir.

Fiscal: Q: And what happened to you?

A: And he stabbed me on my face, sir.
Q: And what happened to you when you were hit with the lead pipe by Conrado
Laog? Q: Then, what happened to you?
A: I fell down (nabuwal) because I felt dizzy, sir. A: After that, he pulled down my jogging pants, sir. He removed my panty and my
blouse and my bra.
Q: Now, what happened next, if any?
A: I heard Jennifer crying, sir. Q: After that, what did he do next?
A: And then, he went on top of me, sir.
Q: And you heard Jennifer but did you see her?
A: Yes, sir. Q: Then, what happened?
A: He sucked my breast, sir.
Q: Where was Conrado Laog when you heard Jennifer crying?
A: He was beside me, sir. Q: And after that?
A: He was forcing his penis into my vagina, sir.
Court:
Q: Did he suc[c]eed in putting his penis into your vagina?
Q: How about Jennifer, where was she when you heard her crying? A: Yes, sir.
A: She was standing on the rice puddies, (sic), Your Honor.
Q: For how long did the accused Conrado Laog insert his penis into your vagina?
Fiscal: A: For quite sometime, sir.

Q: And what was Conrado Laog doing? Q: After that, what happened?
A: He approached Jennifer, sir. A: After that, he stood up, sir.

Q: Then, what happened next? Q: And where did he go?

A: He hit Jennifer with the pipe, sir. A: After that, he covered me with grasses, sir.

Q: And what happened to Jennifer? Q: And after that, what did you do?
A: She fell down, sir. A: I fell unconscious, sir.

Q: What did Conrado Laog do next? Q: Now, if Conrado Laog is inside the courtroom, will you be able to point to him?
A: He stabbed Jennifer, sir.
Interpreter
29
: or less only 100 meters from the crime scene. Thus, his defense of alibi is not worthy of
Witness is pointing to a man wearing an inmate's uniform and when asked his
name, answered: Conrado Laog.
x x x x28
On the other hand, appellant merely interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed
that at the time of the incident, he was at his house with his children and nephew cooking
dinner. His defense, however, cannot prevail over the straightforward and credible
testimony of AAA who positively identified him as the perpetrator of the murder and rape.
Time and again, we have held that positive identification of the accused, when categorical
and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of the appellant whose testimony is not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.29AAA was firm and unrelenting in pointing
to appellant as the one who attacked her and Jennifer, stabbing the latter to death before
raping AAA. It should be noted that AAA knew appellant well since they were relatives by
affinity. As correctly held by the CA, with AAA's familiarity and proximity with the
appellant during the commission of the crime, her identification of appellant could not be
doubted or mistaken. In fact, AAA, upon encountering appellant, did not run away as she
never thought her own uncle would harm her and her friend. Moreover, the most natural
reaction of victims of violence is to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the
crime and observe the manner in which the crime is being committed.30There is no
evidence to show any improper motive on the part of AAA to testify falsely against
appellant or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime. Thus, the logical
conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.31
In People v. Nieto,32we reiterated that --
It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any strong evidence to
support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and
involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise
unavailing. Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and
difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is
negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly, alibi is
unacceptable when there is a positive identification of the accused by a credible witness.
Lastly, in order that alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has been
somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it would
have been impossible for him to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene.
Appellant does not dispute that he was near the vicinity of the crime on the evening of June
6, 2000. In fact, during his cross-examination, appellant admitted that his house was more
any credit for the added reason that he has not shown that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
In view of the credible testimony of AAA, appellant's defenses of denial and alibi deserve
no consideration. We stress that these weak defenses cannot stand against the positive
identification and categorical testimony of a rape victim.33
Appellant attempts to discredit AAA's accusation of rape by pointing out that while she
testified on being very weak that she even passed out after she was raped by appellant, she
nevertheless stated that when she crawled her way to her grandfather's farm she was
wearing her clothes. Appellant also contends that the prosecution should have presented the
physician who examined AAA to prove her allegations that she was beaten and raped by
appellant.
We are not persuaded.
Based on AAA's account, appellant did not undress her completely -- her blouse and bra
were merely lifted up ("nililis") while her undergarments were just pulled down, which
therefore explains why she still had her clothes on when she crawled to her grandfather's
farm. Nonetheless, this matter raised by appellant is a minor detail which had nothing to do
with the elements of the crime of rape. Discrepancies referring only to minor details and
collateral matters -- not to the central fact of the crime -- do not affect the veracity or
detract from the essential credibility of witnesses' declarations, as long as these are
coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole.34For a discrepancy or inconsistency in
the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt
the innocence of the appellant for the crime charged.35It cannot be overemphasized that the
credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies
in her testimony.36
As to the fact that the physician who examined AAA at the hospital did not testify during
the trial, we find this not fatal to the prosecution's case.
It must be underscored that the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the
victim's testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical
examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape; the victim's
testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict.37 Thus we have ruled that a medical
examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely corroborative in
character and is not an indispensable element for conviction in rape. What is important is
that the testimony of private complainant about the incident is clear, unequivocal and
credible,38as what we find in this case.
While we concur with the trial court's conclusion that appellant indeed was the one who
30
raped AAA and killed Jennifer, we find that appellant should not have been convicted of
the separate crimes of murder and rape. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case
for review on any question, including one not raised by the parties.39 The facts alleged and
proven clearly show that the crime committed by appellant is rape with homicide, a special
complex crime provided under Article 266-B, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.40
In People v. Larraaga,41this Court explained the concept of a special complex crime, as
follows:
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law
provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is
called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised
Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with
serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with
homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of
the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were
made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim
is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed;["] and that this provision gives
rise to a special complex crime. In the cases at bar, particularly Criminal Case No. CBU-
45303, the Information specifically alleges that the victim Marijoy was raped "on the
occasion and in connection" with her detention and was killed "subsequent thereto and on
the occasion thereof." Considering that the prosecution was able to prove each of the
component offenses, appellants should be convicted of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape. x x x42(Emphasis
supplied.)
A special complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has its own definition and
special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado, in his Separate
Opinion in the case of People v. Barros,43 explained that composite crimes are "neither of
the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the
Revised Penal Code], since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more
grave or less grave felonies [compound crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a
necessary means to commit another [complex crime proper]. However, just like the regular
complex crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a
single penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes although composed of two or
more offenses."44
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single penalty for
the composite acts of rape and the killing committed by reason or on the occasion of the
rape.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape of AAA and
the killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable for rape with homicide
under the above provision. There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer to prevent her
from aiding AAA or calling for help once she is able to run away, and also to silence her
completely so she may not witness the rape of AAA, the original intent of appellant. His
carnal desire having been satiated, appellant purposely covered AAA's body with grass, as
he did earlier with Jennifer's body, so that it may not be easily noticed or seen by passersby.
Appellant indeed thought that the savage blows he had inflicted on AAA were enough to
cause her death as with Jennifer. But AAA survived and appellant's barbaric deeds were
soon enough discovered.
The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with homicide were
consummated, and it is immaterial that the person killed in this case is someone other than
the woman victim of the rape. An analogy may be drawn from our rulings in cases of
robbery with homicide, where the component acts of homicide, physical injuries and other
offenses have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery. In People v. De
Leon,45we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit
robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent
to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place
before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or
31
distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the
commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of
robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive
elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim
of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed,
or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is
committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that
the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with
homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the
felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or
on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of
robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus,
includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.46 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be
understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed
by reason or on occasion of the rape.47Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances
(treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information
have been duly established by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to
murder and the crime committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of
robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a
generic aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v. Macabales48
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating
circumstance of treachery is present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against
persons and not to crimes against property. However, we find that the trial court in this
case correctly characterized treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying,
circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in defending himself when his
arms were held by two of the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant
Macabales, as their other companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled
that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance. Robbery
with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the
Revised Penal Code. There is no special complex crime of robbery with murder under
the Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the circumstances proven
concerning the actual commission of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify
the homicide to murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine
the penalty to be imposed.49(Emphasis supplied.)
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that is plainly and
obviously advantageous to the aggressor and purposely selected or taken advantage of to
facilitate the commission of the crime.50 It is taken into account whenever the aggressor
purposely used excessive force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available
to the person attacked.51
In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the head with a
lead pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead. Clearly, the manner by which
appellant had brutally slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by first hitting her in the head
with a lead pipe to render her defenseless and vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly,
unmistakably showed that appellant intentionally used excessive force out of proportion to
the means of defense available to his unarmed victim. As aptly observed by the appellate
court:
It has long been established that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an
unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority
which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman
was unable to defend herself. Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the
opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking advantage of superior strength
does not mean that the victim was completely defenseless. Abuse of superiority is
determined by the excess of the aggressor's natural strength over that of the victim,
considering the momentary position of both and the employment of means weakening the
defense, although not annulling it. By deliberately employing deadly weapons, an ice pick
and a lead pipe, [a]ccused-[a]ppellant clearly took advantage of the superiority which his
strength, sex and weapon gave him over his unarmed victim. The accused-appellant's
sudden attack caught the victim off-guard rendering her defenseless.52
Abuse of superior strength in this case therefore is merely a generic aggravating
circumstance to be considered in the imposition of the penalty. The penalty provided in
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is death. However, in view of the
passage on June 24, 2006 of R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
the Death Penalty in the Philippines" the Court is mandated to impose on the appellant the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.53
The aggravating/qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and use of deadly
weapon have greater relevance insofar as the civil aspect of this case is concerned. While
the trial court and CA were correct in holding that both the victim of the killing (Jennifer)
and the rape victim (AAA) are entitled to the award of exemplary damages, the basis for
such award needs further clarification.
32

Articles 2229 and 2230 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.
Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
In view of the presence of abuse of superior strength in the killing of Jennifer, her heirs are
entitled to exemplary damages pursuant to Article 2230. With respect to the rape
committed against AAA, Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides
that a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat or
intimidation under Article 266-A (a), whenever such rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death. Since the use of a deadly weapon raises the penalty for the rape, this circumstance
would justify the award of exemplary damages to the offended party (AAA) also in
accordance with Article 2230.
Article 266-B likewise provides for the imposition of death penalty if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the aggravating/qualifying circumstances enumerated therein.
Among these circumstances is minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphasis supplied.)
AAA's relationship to appellant, who is his uncle by affinity, was not alleged in the
information but admitted by appellant when he testified in court:
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF
CONRADO LAOG By:
Atty. Roque:
xxxx
Q Do you know a person by the name of [AAA]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know her?
A Because she is our neighbor. Her house is just adjacent to ours, sir.
Q How are you related to [AAA]?
A Her mother and my wife are sisters.
Q So she is your niece-in-law?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x54(Emphasis supplied.)
The failure of the prosecution to allege in the information AAA's relationship to appellant
will not bar the consideration of the said circumstance in the determination of his civil
liability. In any case, even without the attendance of aggravating circumstances, exemplary
damages may still be awarded where the circumstances of the case show the "highly
reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender." Citing our earlier ruling in the case
of People v. Catubig,55this Court clarified in People v. Dalisay56:
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts generally
awarded exemplary damages in criminal cases when an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, had been proven to have attended the commission of the crime,
even if the same was not alleged in the information. This is in accordance with the
aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no
longer consider the aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in the determination
of the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has
been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages. Pertinent are
the following sections of Rule 110:
xxxx
Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that courts may still award
exemplary damages based on the aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating
circumstance has not been alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases
instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules which remained pending
thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive application of the Revised Rules should
not adversely affect the vested rights of the private offended party.
Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially those involving
rape, dichotomized: one awarding exemplary damages, even if an aggravating
circumstance attending the commission of the crime had not been sufficiently alleged but
was consequently proven in the light of Catubig; and another awarding exemplary damages
only if an aggravating circumstance has both been alleged and proven following the
Revised Rules. Among those in the first set are People v. Laciste, People v. Victor, People
v. Orilla, People v. Calongui, People v. Magbanua, People of the Philippines v. Heracleo
33
Abello y Fortada, People of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People of the
Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And in the second set are People v. Llave, People of the
Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, and People of the Philippines v. Edwin Mejia. Again,
the difference between the two sets rests on when the criminal case was instituted, either
before or after the effectivity of the Revised Rules.
xxxx
Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the grant of exemplary
damages--taking into account simply the attendance of an aggravating circumstance in the
commission of a crime, courts have lost sight of the very reason why exemplary damages
are awarded. Catubig is enlightening on this point, thus--
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages
are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of
undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for
those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used
interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages
when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and
humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and
wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused
by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant--associated with such circumstances
as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or
fraud or gross fraud--that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages
are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a
person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are
intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar
conduct in the future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only
in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of
the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much
the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be
awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus,
in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with
perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters.
Also, in People v. Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the
moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a
pregnant married woman. Recently, in People of the Philippines v. Cristino
Caada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and The People of the Philippines v.
Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve
as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual
abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article 2229, rather than
Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio
Morales' words in her separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y
Par, "[t]he application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as
in the present one, defeats the underlying public policy behind the award of exemplary
damages--to set a public example or correction for the public good."57(Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the brutal manner by which appellant carried out his lustful design against his
niece-in-law who never had an inkling that her own uncle would do any harm to her and
her friend, justified the award of exemplary damages. Appellant's sudden and fierce attack
on AAA -- hitting her several times on the head with a lead pipe before stabbing her face
until she fell down, hurriedly lifting her bra and blouse and pulling down her
undergarments, raping her while she was in such a defenseless position, covering her body
with grasses and abandoning her to die in a grassy field -- was truly despicable and
outrageous. Such vicious assault was made even more reprehensible as it also victimized
Jennifer, who sustained more stab wounds and beatings, causing her violent death. Article
2229 of the Civil Code allows the award of exemplary damages in order to deter the
commission of similar acts and to allow the courts to forestall behavior that would pose
grave and deleterious consequences to society.58 In line with current jurisprudence, the
amount of P30,000 each for AAA and the heirs of Jennifer as exemplary damages was
correctly awarded by the trial court.
We also affirm the trial court and CA in ordering appellant to pay the heirs of Jennifer
Patawaran-Rosal the amounts of P50,000 as moral damages. In cases of murder and
homicide, the award of moral damages is mandatory, without need of allegation and proof
other than the death of the victim.59Anent the award of civil indemnity, the same is
increased to P75,000 to conform with recent jurisprudence.60 As to expenses incurred for
the funeral and burial of Jennifer, the CA correctly awarded her heirs the amount of
P25,000 as actual damages, said amount having been stipulated by the parties during the
trial.
Lastly, we affirm the award of P50,000 to AAA as civil indemnity for the crime of rape, as
well as the award of P50,000 as moral damages. Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory
upon a finding of the fact of rape while moral damages are awarded upon such finding
without need of further proof, because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered
moral injuries entitling the victim to such award.61
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The March 21, 2007
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin is
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape With Homicide under Article
34
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and is accordingly
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal P75,000
as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral damages, P25,000 as actual damages and
P30,000 as exemplary damages. He is further ordered to pay to the victim AAA the sums
of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral damages and P30,000 as
exemplary damages.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196315, October 22, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEONARDO CATAYTAY Y
SILVANO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an Appeal1 from the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32275
dated August 11, 2010 affirming the conviction of accused-appellant Leonardo
Cataytay y Silvano for the crime of rape.
Accused-appellant Cataytay was charged of said crime in an Information dated September
9, 2003:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 07th day of September 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines,
a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
lewd designs[,] and by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge [of AAA],3 19 years of age but with a
mental age of a 5 year old, hence, a retardate, or demented, which is known to accused at
the time of the commission of the offense, against her will and consent and to her damage
and prejudice.4
Accused-appellant Cataytay entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment on October 3,
2003. Trial thereafter ensued.
BBB (AAAs mother) testified that she knew accused-appellant Cataytay as her neighbor
in their compound in Mandaluyong City. Accused-appellant was a shoe repairman who
had a shop six houses away from BBBs house.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On September 7, 2003, at around 6:30 p.m., BBB left AAA in their house to look for
BBBs youngest daughter. Thirty minutes later, when she reached the bridge near Block
37, her neighbor, Lito, told her that there was a problem, and brought her to
the barangay outpost. AAA and the accused-appellant were already at the outpost. Lito
told the persons at the outpost that she was the mother of the victim. When BBB saw
AAA, the latter told her, Mommy, ni-rape po ako. BBB asked her who raped her. AAA
responded by pointing to accused-appellant. During the interviews made by
the barangay officials, AAA narrated how she was raped by accused-appellant, which
ended when a certain Mimi knocked at the door. When accused-appellant answered the
knock, Mimi told the former that she will shout if he does not leave the house. AAA went
out of the house and sought help from their neighbors. One of their neighbors, Amelita
Morante, called the barangay officials at the outpost.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
BBB identified a Psychological Evaluation Report from the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD) dated May 25, 1999, which was conducted in connection with
another rape case. The report stated that AAA had the mental capacity of an eight-year-old
child.7 BBB also identified AAAs birth certificate which showed that she was biologically
19 years old at the time of the incident.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
35

On cross-examination, BBB confirmed that AAA was the victim in a rape case in 1999
against a certain Norberto Lerit. BBB admitted that she did not personally witness the
alleged rape committed by the accused-appellant.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
When AAA appeared as the second witness for the prosecution, the prosecution manifested
that by merely looking at her, it was apparent that she was mentally retardate. 10 AAA, who
was crying while being asked questions, testified that she was raped by accused-appellant
by inserting his penis into her, despite her protestations. After the deed, she was given
money by accused-appellant. She knew the accused-appellant before the incident as a shoe
repairman.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
DSWD Social Worker Arlene Gampal testified that she referred AAA to the National
Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for psychological examination. She also conducted a
Social Case Study upon AAA in relation to the incident of sexual abuse at the hands of the
accused.12 NCMH Psychologist Susan Sabado was presented as a prosecution witness,
but her testimony was dispensed with when the defense agreed to a stipulation regarding
her expertise and that the tests conducted on AAA affirmed that the latter had a mental
capacity of a seven-year-old child.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Police Chief Inspector (PC/Insp.) Bonnie Chua, the medico-legal officer who examined
AAA on September 8, 2003 was likewise presented as a prosecution witness. The defense
agreed to a stipulation that the findings of the examination were consistent with recent
sexual intercourse.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For the defense, accused-appellant testified that on September 7, 2003, at around 7:00
p.m., he was in his house together with his brother, feeding his four-year-old daughter. He
then went out and proceeded to a videoke bar, which was around 20 meters from his
house.15 He stayed at the videoke bar for less than 15 minutes, as barangay officers
suddenly arrived and arrested him. Upon asking why he was being arrested, the officers
told him that he was the suspect in the rape of AAA. He was brought to the Barangay Hall,
where he denied the accusations against him. He estimated that the house of BBB was
more or less 50 meters away from his house,16 and that it would take more or less a one
minute walk from the videoke bar to the house of AAA.17 Accused-appellant admitted that
by merely looking at AAA, he could tell that she has a mental
disability.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accused-appellants brother, Jose Fresco Cataytay (Jose), testified that at 6:30 p.m. of
September 7, 2003, accused-appellant was inside their house feeding his daughter. At
around 7:00 p.m., accused-appellant told Jose that he will go to the videoke bar, which was
around 30 meters away from their house. Accused-appellant stayed in the videoke bar for
5 to 10 minutes, then went back to their house and watched television. Accused-appellant
was arrested that night within the vicinity of their house by the barangay tanods. He
estimated that AAAs house is 20 to 30 meters away from the videoke bar, and that it would
take less than five minutes to reach the house of AAA from
the videoke bar.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Alicia Panaguitol (Alicia), a neighbor of AAA and accused-appellant, testified that she
lives two meters away from AAAs house and 60 meters away from that of accused-
appellant. She was inside her house at around 7:00 p.m. of September 7, 2003, during
which time she heard AAA shouting that she was raped. She asked AAA who raped her.
AAA replied Pilay, apparently referring to their neighbor who was called Jun Pilay.
Alicia saw Jun Pilay run from AAAs house towards a dark
area.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On February 5, 2009, the RTC rendered its Judgment finding accused-appellant guilty as
charged, and disposing of the case as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, accused LEONARDO CATAYTAY y
SILVANO is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape against
one [AAA] defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Article 266-B paragraph 10 of the same Code.
As a consequence thereof, accused LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of from TWENTY YEARS (20) and ONE
(1) DAY to FORTY (40) YEARS of reclusion perpetua.
Further, accused LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO is hereby ordered to indemnify
the victim [AAA], the amount of SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) as
and by way of moral damages and SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) by
way of exemplary damages.
Finally, the period of detention of accused LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO at the
Mandaluyong City Jail is hereby fully credited to his
account.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
32275. On August 11, 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DENIED. The decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that an additional award of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is granted to the victim and the award of exemplary damages
of P75,000.00 is reduced to P30,000.00. The penalty of imprisonment to be served is
simply reclusion perpetua.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
36
 A- Leonardo Cataytay.
Hence, this appeal, where accused-appellant Cataytay adopted his Appellants Brief with INTERPRETER:
the Court of Appeals, which contained the following assignment of Witness at this moment is now crying.
errors:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Q- Nandito ba si Leonardo Cataytay, [AAA], nandito ba siya ngayon sa office ni
Judge? Tingin ka sa office ni Judge kung nandito ngayon si Leonardo, sabi mo
I isusumbong mo siya kay Judge, diba?
COURT:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED- Ituro mo nga kung nandiyan siya, sige.
APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT INTERPRETER:
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. Witness pointed to the male person seated in the first row of the gallery, wearing
white t-shirt, who when asked to identify himself, answered to the name of
II LEONARDO CATAYTAY Y SILVANO.
PROS. LAZARO:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED- Q- [AAA], itinuro mo si Leonardo, sabi mo kanina isusumbong mo siya, bakit mo
APPELLANT DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE WAS ILLEGALLY siya isusumbong, anong ginawa niya sayo?
ARRESTED.23ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary A- Ni-rape po ako.
Q- Ilang beses ka niya ni-rape?
A- Isa lang po.
In his appellants brief, accused-appellant claims that BBBs testimony concerning the Q- Papaano ka niya ni-rape?
details of the commission of the rape as narrated by AAA is hearsay and therefore has no A- Pinasok niya yung ari niya sa akin.
probative value. Accused-appellant also points out that the Psychological Evaluation Q- Anong sinabi mo sa kanya nung ni-rape ka niya, anong sinabi mo kay Leonardo?
Report dated May 25, 1999 and Psychological Report dated June 29, 2009 illustrate that A- Ayaw ko na po.
AAA can be easily influenced. Q- Anong sinabi naman ni Leonardo habang nire-rape ka niya?
A- Wag daw po ako maingay.
At the outset, we agree with accused-appellant that the details concerning the manner of the Q- Kasi pag maingay ka, ano daw ang gagawin sayo?
commission of the rape, which was merely narrated by AAA at the barangay outpost, is A- Uulitin daw niya po.
hearsay and cannot be considered by this Court. A witness can testify only on the facts that Q- Anong sinabi ni Leonardo sayo pagkatapos ka niyang ni-rape, [AAA]? May
she knows of his own personal knowledge, or more precisely, those which are derived from sinabi sayo pagkatapos ka niya ni-rape? Meron o wala?
her own perception.24 A witness may not testify on what she merely learned, read or heard A- Wala po.
from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof Q- May binigay sya sayo?
of the truth of what she has learned, read or heard.25cralawredchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary A- Opo.
Q- Anong binigay niya? Punasan mo ang luha mo.
Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the details of the rape which BBB merely heard A- Pera po.
from AAAs narration, we nevertheless find no reason to disturb the findings of fact of the Q- Alam mo kung magkano?
trial court. Despite lacking certain details concerning the manner in which AAA was A- Hindi po.27
allegedly raped, the trial court, taking into consideration the mental incapacity of AAA and
qualifying her to be a child witness,26 found her testimony to be credible and AAAs mental condition may have prevented her from delving into the specifics of the
convincing:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary assault in her testimony almost three years later, unlike the way she narrated the same when
she was asked at the barangay outpost merely minutes after the incident. However, as we
Q- Uulitin ko sa iyo yung unang tinanong ko sayo ha, bakit ka nandito sa office ni have ruled in a litany of cases, when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been
Judge, para ano? raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. Youth
A- Para magsumbong. and, as is more applicable in the case at bar, immaturity are generally badges of truth.28
Q- Sinong isusumbong mo? Furthermore, the report of PC/Insp. Chua that the findings of the physical examination
37
were consistent with recent sexual intercourse, provide additional corroboration to the
testimonies of AAA and BBB. It should be noted that this report was stipulated upon by
the prosecution and the defense.
We have pronounced time and again that both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses
which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness
that the accused committed the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has
a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally
held to prevail.29 For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be sufficiently convincing as to
preclude any doubt on the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus
criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident.30 In the case at bar, accused-
appellant and his brother, second defense witness Jose, claim that the former was taking
care of his daughter in his house at around 7:00 p.m. of September 7, 2003. He then went
out and proceeded to a videoke bar, which was merely 20 meters away from his house.
Accused-appellant and his brother admitted that their house was merely 50 meters away, or
around a one-minute walk, from the house of AAA, where the alleged incident occurred.
Accused-appellant was therefore clearly in the immediate vicinity of the locus criminis at
the time of the commission of the crime, and thus accused-appellants defense of alibi must
fail.
Other than alibi and denial, accused-appellant presented the testimony of Alicia, a neighbor
of AAA and accused-appellant, to prove that another person raped AAA. However, the
record is clear that AAA positively identified accused-appellant as the culprit both at
the barangay outpost minutes after the incident, and in open court. It is furthermore
axiomatic that when it comes to evaluating the credibility of the testimonies of the
witnesses, great respect is accorded to the findings of the trial judge who is in a better
position to observe the demeanor, facial expression, and manner of testifying of witnesses,
and to decide who among them is telling the truth.31 The trial court, which was able to
carefully observe the testimony of Alicia, was not adequately convinced by her allegations.
To recall, the Information charged accused-appellant of committing the following act: by
means of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
have carnal knowledge [of AAA], 19 years of age but with a mental age of a 5 year old,
hence, a retardate, or demented, which is known to accused at the time of the commission
of the offense, against her will and consent and to her damage and prejudice.32 The
Information, as worded, can conceivably comprehend rape under either paragraph 1(b) or
1(d) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:cralawlawlibrary
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;chanrobleslaw
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;chanrobleslaw
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;chanrobleslaw
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Caoile,33 we differentiated the terms deprived of reason and demented, as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of
deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individual's former
intellectual level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand,
the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1 (b) has been interpreted to include those
suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. Thus, AAA, who was
clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person who is
deprived of reason, and not one who is demented.
In the case at bar, AAA was clinically diagnosed to have mental retardation with the mental
capacity of a seven-year old child.34 The prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate on
the conclusion of the psychologist that the mental age of the victim whose chronological
age at the time of the commission of the offense is nineteen (19) years old x x x is that of a
seven (7) year old child.35 Accused-appellant is therefore criminally liable for rape under
paragraph 1(b) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. The appropriate penalty is
provided for by Article 266-B, which relevantly provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:cralawlawlibrary
xxxx
10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical
handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.
Since the accused-appellants knowledge of AAAs mental retardation was alleged in the
Information and admitted by the former during the trial, the above special qualifying
circumstance is applicable, and the penalty of death should have been imposed. With the
38
passage, however, of Republic Act No. 934636 prohibiting the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall instead be imposed.
The RTC sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twenty
years and one day to forty years of reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals correctly
modified the penalty to be simply reclusion perpetua. Since reclusion perpetua is an
indivisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law cannot be
applied.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As regards accused-appellants civil liability, the RTC ordered him to pay AAA in the
amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. The
Court of Appeals modified the trial courts decision by granting the additional award of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and reducing the award of exemplary damages to
P30,000.00. In accordance, however, to People v. Lumaho,38 where the penalty for the
crime committed is death which cannot be imposed because of Republic Act No. 9346, we
increase the amounts of indemnity and damages to be imposed as follows: P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In addition, we impose 6% interest per annum from finality of judgment until fully
paid.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 32275 dated August 11, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION increasing the amounts of indemnity and damages to be imposed as
follows: P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00
as exemplary damages. All amounts are furthermore subject to interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 206393, January 21, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL
JOSON Y ROGANDO, Defendant-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For consideration by the Court is the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated 31 August 2012
that affirmed the judgment2 of conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Dasmarinas
(RTC), Cavite, Branch 90 sitting in Imus, Cavite, convicting appellant Michael
Joson y Rogando of the crime or rape of his 14-year old sister.
Appellant was charged with violation of Articles 266-A of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Republic Act No. 7610 in an Information, the accusatory portion of which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 14th day of May 2009, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being the biological brother and thus a relative within the second degree of consanguinity
of [AAA],3 a minor fourteen (14) years of age and born on March 24, 1995, motivated by
lust and with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation and taking advantage of
his moral ascendancy over her, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of said [AAA], against her will and consent, thereby debasing,
degrading and demeaning her intrinsic worth and integrity as a child, to the damage and
prejudice of said complainant.4cralawlawlibrary
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The prosecutions evidence is
based on the sole testimony of the victim. AAA lives with appellant and his common-law
partner. AAA testified that at around 1:00 in the morning of 14 May 2009, and while
appellants wife was away, AAA was awakened by appellant undressing her. AAA tried to
struggle but appellant was tightly holding her arms. After undressing her, appellant kissed
and mounted her. Appellant was able to insert his penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain in
her genitalia. Thereafter, appellant went back to sleep leaving AAA crying. At about 6:00
or 7:00 in the morning, appellant left AAA with a letter apologizing for what happened and
begging her not to tell on his wife. The letter reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Ne!
Sorry Ne. Patawarin mo ko. Dala lang ng kalasingan kaya ko nagawa ang ganung bagay.
Sana po wala ng ibang makaalam nito lalu na si Ate Cindy mo. Ayokong masira na naman
ang pamilya ko at mga buhay natin. Paki tapon muna to pag tapos mong
basahin.5cralawlawlibrary
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of that same date, AAA related to appellants wife the rape
incident.6 And on 1 June 2009, AAA, accompanied by her father, reported the incident to
the police and she executed a sworn statement detailing the rape. 7cralawred
The prosecution presented a provisional medico-legal report on the examination conducted
on AAA by Irene D. Baluyut of Philippine General Hospital which essentially states that
there is no evident injury on AAA at the time of the examination.
39
 who has moral ascendancy over a victim that would substitute for force and intimidation.
Also submitted as part of the prosecutions evidence is the birth certificate of AAA to prove Appellant further points out that there was no showing of any resistance on the part of
that she was still a minor at the time the rape was committed on 14 May 2009. AAA to his alleged sexual advances.

Appellant admitted that AAA is his sister but he proffered the defense of alibi and claimed
that he was staying in Alfonso, Cavite on 14 May 2009 and only went back to his house in
Dasmarias on 26 May 2009. Appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and
speculated that AAA resented him because he was strict with his sister. Appellant also
denied writing the apology letter and presented his specimen handwriting in
court.8cralawred
After evaluating the evidence, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and meted out the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Upon a careful evaluation of the case, we find no reason to reverse appellants conviction.
For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the
prosecution must prove that: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he
accomplished this act through force, threat or intimidation, when she was deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was
demented.14cralawred
AAA gave a complete account of her ordeal in the hands of her own brother, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused MICHAEL JOSON y ROGANDO guilty Q: Do you know one Michael Joson?
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as defined in Article 266-A paragraph 1 of A: Opo.
the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, and hereby sentences the Q: Why do you know him?
accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and the said accused is hereby ordered A: He is my brother.
to indemnify the victim by way of moral damages in the amount of Php50,000.00, civil Q: Is he inside the courtroom?
indemnity ex-delicto in the amount of Php50,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount A: Opo.
of Php25,000.00.9cralawlawlibrary Q: Please point to him. (Witness points to a man wearing a yellow tshirt, who when
asked what his name is, answered Michael Joson.)
The trial court found credible the testimony of AAA. It noted that appellant even wrote to Q: On May 14, 2009, around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, where were you?
the victim that he was sorry for what he has done. The trial court considered the letter as A: Nasa bahay po.
admission against appellants interest. Q: What were you doing in your house?
A: Tulog po.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.10 On 31 August 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered Q: What time did you wake up?
the assailed decision affirming the judgment of conviction. A: Sa tingin ko po mga 1:00 oclock.
Q: Will you please tell this Honorable Court the reason why you woke up early?
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal11 with the appellate court. In a Resolution12 dated 19 A: Hinuhubaran po niya ako.
June 2013, the Court ordered the elevation of the records and directed the parties to file Q: Who are you referring to?
their respective supplemental briefs should they so desire. However, appellant and the A: Ng kapatid ko.
Office of the Solicitor- General both manifested that they were adopting their respective Q: He was undressing you? So what did you do while he was undressing you, while
appeal briefs previously filed with the Court of Appeals.13cralawred you were lying or sleeping? Thats why you were awakened?
A: Opo.
In his Appeal Brief, appellant maintains that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements Q: So what happened next when you felt that he was undressing you?
of rape as defined under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, particularly the elements A: Pumalag po ako, kasi hinihigpitan po niya ako sa braso ko.
of force, threat or intimidation. Appellant argues that AAA did not allege that she was Q: So what else did you do?
threatened by appellant with the use of any firearm or any bladed weapon nor did appellant A: Sabi po niya kasi, wag daw po ako maingay.
say anything to threaten or intimidate her. With respect to moral ascendancy, appellant Q: Who was your companion in the house, aside from your brother?
contends that the Court in a recent case did not consider a brother as one of those close kin Who else was there in the house?
40
A: Wala po. Q: And what happened next, at 6:00 oclock in the morning or 7:00 oclock?
Q: Where were they? A: May iniwan po siyang sulat.
A: Yung asawa niya po, umuwi sa kanila. Q: Where did he go, if you know?
Q: What about your parents, where were they? A: Sa trabaho po.
A: Yung tatay ko po, nagtatrabaho. Q: What was the letter all about?
Q: Your mother? A: Humihingi po siya ng sorry.15
A: Patay na po. cralawlawlibrary
Q: What happened next when you were told not to shout?
A: Hinubaran niya po yung ibaba ko, tapos pumatong po siya sa ibabaw ko tapos
pinaghahalikan niya ko. Her testimony has established all the elements of rape required under Article 266-A of the
Q: Was he able to undress you? Revised Penal Code. First, appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA positively
A: Opo. identified her own brother as the assailant. She was likewise unwavering in her narration
Q: Totally? that appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Second, appellant employed threat, force
A: Opo. and intimidation to satisfy his lust. At this juncture, we quote with approval the ruling of
Q: Thereafter, what did you do? the Court of Appeals on this point:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A: Pinaghahalikan niya po ako.
Q: What were you doing? The Supreme Court has, time and again, ruled that the force or violence that is required in
A: Umiiyak lang po ako. rape cases is relative; when applied, it need not be overpowering or irresistible. That it
Q: What about the accused, what did he do to you? enables the offender to consummate his purpose is enough. The parties relative age, size
A: Pumatong po siya sa ibabaw ko. and strength should be taken into account in evaluating the existence of the element of
Q: He went on top of you? Thereafter what did the accused do next? force in the crime of rape. The degree of force which may not suffice when the victim is an
A: Pilit niya pong ipinapasok ang ari niya sa ari ko. adult may be more than enough if employed against a person of tender age.
Q: Was he able to insert his penis?
A: Opo. In the case at bench, the accused-appellant employed that amount of force sufficient to
Q: For how long? consummate the rape. It must be stressed that, at the time of the incident, AAA was only 14
A: Matagal po. years old. Considering the tender years of the offended party as compared to the accused-
Q: How did you feel when his organ was inside your organ? appellant who was in the prime of his life, the act of the accused-appellant in pinning the
A: Masakit po. arms of AAA to avoid any form of resistance from her suffices. Force or intimidation is not
Q: And what (sic) you trying to do while his organ was inside? limited to physical force. As long as it is present and brings the desired result, all
A: Umiiyak lang po ako. consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point.chanrobleslaw
Q: After that, what happened next?
A: Pinaghahalikan niya pa rin po ako, tapos tumayo po siya sandali tapos humiga xxxx
po uli siya. Natulog po.
Q: What about you, you went to sleep also? We are not persuaded by the accused-appellants insistence that the absence of any
A: Hindi po, umiiyak lang po ako. resistance on the part of AAA raised doubts as to whether the sexual congress was without
Q: The following day, in the morning, were you not able to sleep after that incident? her consent. The failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the
A: Hindi po. rapist is not tantamount to consent. Physical resistance need not be established in rape
Q: What did you do? when threats and intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself to her attackers
A: Doon lang po, umiiyak lang po. of because of fear.
Q: What about the accused?
A: Doon lang din po siya. Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman voluntarily
Q: Beside you? succumbed to the lust of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform reaction. Some may
A: Opo. offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all.
41
After all, resistance is not an element of rape and its absence does not denigrate AAAs
claim that the accused-appellant consummated his bestial act. 16cralawlawlibrary
Anent appellants argument that as a brother he lacks moral ascendancy over her sister, the
victim, that could substitute for force and intimidation, our ruling in People v.
Villaruel,17 as cited by the Court of Appeals, has rejected such proposition.
The fact remains that Myra positively testified in court that her brother sexually molested
her in the morning of February 21, 1996. The accused-appellant was her older brother who
had definitely moral ascendancy over her. He, being the eldest had definitely moral
ascendancy over her. He, being the eldest among the children since both of their parents
were dead, the accused-appellant stood as guardian of the siblings. Thus, when the
complainant was roused from her sleep to accompany the accused-appellant to buy bread,
the complainant obediently followed him. To the accused-appellant, this was highly
improbable that the complainant would entertain his plea to go out with him at such an
unholy hour or even allegedly knowing fully well that the latter had taken shabu and liquor.
There is nothing incredible with the complainants story. Notwithstanding the time or the
physical condition of her brother, Myra certainly did not expect that he had other ill
motives against her. It certainly is not normal for a brother to take out his lust on his sister.
Myra also testified that she did not resist his advances for fear of her life as her brother had
two (2) fan knives poking at her as she was being raped. More importantly, the moral
ascendancy and influence the accused-appellant has over the complainant sufficiently
substitute for the force and intimidation required in rape.18cralawlawlibrary
Moreover, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals found AAAs testimony credible.
The trial court, having the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during
the trial, can best assess the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies. Thus, the trial
courts findings are accorded great respect unless the trial court has overlooked or
misconstrued some substantial facts, which if considered might affect the result of the
case.19cralawred
With respect to appellants defense of denial and alibi, it is an oft- repeated rule that
positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill-
motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter prevails over a denial which, if
not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence is negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law. They cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 20cralawred
We likewise agree that appellant should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides that the death penalty shall also be imposed if
the crime of rape is committed when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty,
however, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
In conformance with the prevailing jurisprudence, we deem it proper to modify the amount
of damages awarded in this case. In People v. Gambao,21 we increase the amounts of
indemnity and damage where the penalty for the crime committed is death but which
cannot be imposed because of Republic Act No. 9346, as
follow:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
2. P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and
thus needs no proof; and
3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.
All damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of judgment until fully paid.22cralawred
cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' decision dated 31 August 2012 finding appellant
Michael Joson y Rogando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The civil indemnity
awarded is increased to P100,000.00; moral damages to P100,000.00; and the exemplary
damages to P100,000.00. The award of damages shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
42
 Before this Court is the appeal of the Decision dated April 29, 2009 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00361-MIN,1 which affirmed the Consolidated Decision2 dated
December 23, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Tubod, Lanao del Norte
in Criminal Case Nos. 118-07-2005 and 159-07-2005 to 166-07-2005, acquitting accused-
appellant Vicente Candellada of the charge of attempted rape but finding him guilty of
eight counts of rape.

Accused-appellant was charged with attempted rape before the RTC under the following
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 118-07-2005:
That on or about December 28, 2004, at about 7:00 oclock in the evening at x x x, Lanao
del Norte, Philippines an[d] within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, who is father of [AAA3], a 14-year-old minor, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with lewd design, and who was under the influence of liquor,
wanted to have sexual intercourse with said [AAA], but the latter strongly refused, so that
accused got mad and boxed, and battered [AAA], by the use of a piece of wood, but did not
perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of Rape as a
consequence by reason of the fact that [AAA], shouted for help and the people of x x x,
Lanao del Norte, were able to apprehend the aforesaid accused.4
Accused-appellant was likewise charged with eight counts of consummated rape
committed on May 30, 2004,5 June 2, 2004,6 June 12, 2004,7 July 10, 2004,8 August 13,
2004,9November 5, 2004,10 December 15, 2004,11 and December 25, 200412 under eight
Informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 159-07-2005 to 166-07-2005. The
Informations were similarly worded except for the different dates of commission of the
crime and read as follows:
That on or about [date] at x x x, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, through force, threats and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have (sic) carnal knowledge upon
[AAA], the accuseds own daughter, a minor 14 years of age, against her will and consent,
which sexual abuse by the accused debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of said child as a human being.

CONTRARY to and in VIOLATION of R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law
G.R. No. 189293, July 10, 2013 in relation to R.A. 7610 otherwise known as the Anti-Child Abuse Law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICENTE Accused-appellant was arraigned on May 17, 2005 with the assistance of counsel. He
CANDELLADA, Accused-Appellant. pleaded not guilty to the charges against him.13

DECISION During pre-trial, the defense admitted that accused-appellant is the father of private
complainant AAA and that AAA was 15 years of age at the time of the commission of the
crimes charged and/or filing of the cases.14
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Thereafter, the nine criminal cases were tried jointly.

43

15
The prosecution presented as witnesses Dr. Jovenal Magtagad (Magtagad), the Municipal
Health Officer who physically examined AAA on December 29, 2004; AAA,16 the victim
herself; Elsie Gemina (Gemina),17 the owner of the house in Lanao del Norte where
accused-appellant and AAA lived; and Senior Police Officer (SPO) 4 Rosa Bastigue
(Bastigue),18 Womens Desk Police Non-Commissioned Officer (PNCO), Magsaysay
Police Station. It also presented the following documentary evidence: Geminas
Affidavit19 dated January 3, 2005; AAAs Sworn Statement20 dated January 3, 2005; Joint
Affidavit21 dated January 3, 2005 of SPO4 Bastigue, Police Investigator SPO3 Orlando
Caroro, and Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) Officer Virgilio
Yaral (Yaral); and Dr. Magtagads Medical Certificate22 dated December 29, 2004.
The evidence for the prosecution presented the following version of events:
AAA was born in Davao on January 10, 1990. She was 15 years old when she testified
before the RTC on August 24, 2005.23
AAA was the second of three daughters of accused-appellant and his deceased first wife.
AAA lived with accused-appellant and the latters second wife, while AAAs two sisters
lived with accused-appellants mother. While they were still living in Davao, accused-
appellant impregnated AAA. When AAA was already five months pregnant, accused-
appellant brought her with him to Lanao del Norte. Accused-appellant and AAA arrived in
Lanao del Norte on May 30, 2004.24
Accused-appellant approached Gemina, who he came to know during a previous visit to
Lanao del Norte in 1993. Accused-appellant asked permission if he could stay at Geminas
old house with his wife, introducing AAA to Gemina as his wife. Gemina immediately
noticed that AAA was pregnant. She also commented that AAA was so young she could
already be accused-appellants daughter, but accused-appellant only laughed. Gemina and
her husband allowed accused-appellant and AAA to stay at their old house on the condition
that accused-appellant would pay for the electricity.25
While they were staying at Geminas old house, accused-appellant had intercourse with
AAA many times, but AAA could only remember eight specific dates, i.e., on May 30,
2004; June 2, 2004; June 12, 2004; July 10, 2004; August 13, 2004; November 5, 2004;
December 15, 2004; and December 25, 2004. When asked to explain what intercourse
meant, AAA stated that accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA further
testified that she consistently resisted accused-appellants bestial acts but he threatened to
stab her with a knife. Lastly, AAA narrated that she delivered a baby boy with Geminas
help on September 24, 2004, but the baby died four days later, on September 28, 2004.26
On December 28, 2004, accused-appellant again made amorous advances on AAA. AAA
refused so accused-appellant became violently angry. He mauled AAA and hit her head
with a piece of wood, which rendered her unconscious.27 Gemina, who saw what happened,
asked help from the Barangay Captain. The Barangay Captain and civilian volunteers
arrested the accused-appellant.28
According to Gemina, since accused-appellant and AAA arrived in Lanao del Norte, the
two lived as husband and wife. However, sometime in December 2004, a drunk accused-
appellant already admitted to Geminas husband that AAA was his (accused-appellants)
daughter. Gemina further testified that the mauling incident that took place on December
28, 2004 was already the fourth time she saw accused-appellant maltreating AAA.29
After conducting a physical examination of AAA on December 29, 2004, Dr. Magtagad
observed hematoma, contusions, and abrasions on different parts of AAAs body, which
were caused by a blunt object, possibly a piece of wood.30 Dr. Magtagad estimated that
AAAs injuries would heal in five to seven days. AAA did not mention being raped by
accused-appellant to Dr. Magtagad.
SPO4 Bastigue, SPO3 Caroro, and DSWD Officer Yaral were assigned to AAAs case.
They were initially investigating only the mauling of AAA, but during the course of their
investigation, AAA claimed that she had been raped by accused-appellant at least eight
times.31 In their Joint Affidavit though, SPO4 Bastigue, SPO3 Caroro, and DSWD Officer
Yaral reported only the mauling of AAA and did not mention her being raped by accused-
appellant. SPO4 Bastigue reasoned on the witness stand that maybe the investigator merely
forgot to include the rapes in the Joint Affidavit.
The sole evidence for the defense is accused-appellants testimony, summarized as follows:
Accused-appellant acknowledged that AAA is his daughter with his deceased first
wife.32 Accused-appellant stated that AAA was born on January 10 but since he was
unschooled, he could not remember the exact year of AAAs birth.
Accused-appellant recalled that AAA went to school in Davao. Accused-appellant and
AAA had misunderstandings because he would admonish AAA for roaming around late in
the evening. In 2004, AAA got pregnant and had to stop her studies. Accused-appellant did
not inquire from AAAs sisters, friends, classmates, or teachers who impregnated AAA.
Accused-appellant, upon the insistence of his second wife, brought AAA to Lanao del
Norte to conceal AAAs pregnancy. Accused-appellant and AAA stayed at Geminas old
house while in Lanao del Norte. Accused-appellant denied introducing AAA to Gemina as
his wife. He introduced AAA to Gemina as his daughter and said that AAA was
impregnated by a classmate. By accused-appellants account, AAA gave birth on October
10, 2004 but the baby died. Accused-appellant and AAA were planning to go back to
Davao in January 2005 after accused-appellant had saved enough money from making
charcoal and cutting grass.33
44
Accused-appellant outright called AAA a liar. He denied raping AAA eight times between
May 30, 2004 to December 25, 2004. He also asserted that he could not have made an
attempt to rape AAA on December 28, 2004 as he was already in jail by that time.
Accused-appellant claimed that he was already arrested on December 23, 2004, a Tuesday,
after he struck AAA.34
The RTC rendered its Consolidated Decision on December 23, 2005. The RTC found that
there was not enough evidence to prove accused-appellants culpability for the charge of
attempted rape on December 28, 2004. Citing Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, 35 the
RTC pointed out that the overt acts committed by accused-appellant resulted only in AAAs
physical injuries that took five to seven days to heal and slight physical injuries were not
necessarily included in the charge of attempted rape. As for the charge of eight counts of
consummated rape, the RTC pronounced that [AAAs] down-to-earth testimony was
convincing and straightforward that she was abused [by] her father in x x x Lanao del
Norte.36 In the end, the RTC adjudged:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing consideration, and by the weight or quantum
of evidence, the Court renders judgment as follows:
1. For failure of the prosecution to establish the [g]uilt of accused beyond reasonable
doubt in Crim. Case No. 118-07-2005, for attempted rape in relation with Republic
Act No. 9262, acquits him thereof;
2. In Criminal Case Nos. 159-07-2005, 160-07-2005, 161-07-2005, 162-07-2005,
163-07-2005, 164-07-2005, 165-07-2005, and 166-07-2005, pursuant to Article 266-B,
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known
as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, in relation with Republic Act No. 7[6]10, otherwise
known as Anti-Child Abuse Law, finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape as charged and committed against his minor daughter, [AAA], and
sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH in each of the 8 counts thereof;
3. Accused is order[ed] to pay moral damages to complainant of P75,000.00 and
exemplary damages of P25,000.00 in each of the 8 cases of rape;
4. The [Bureau of Jail Management and Penology] warden of Tubod, Lanao de Norte
is ordered to deliver the living body of accused to the National Penitentiary,
Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila within 15 days from the promulgation of the
decision.37
The records of the eight rape cases were then forwarded to the Court of Appeals for
appellate review.
In his Brief, accused-appellant contended that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of eight counts of rape. AAAs short and simple answers during her
testimony were short of a mere allegation. Despite remembering the dates of the alleged
crimes, AAA could not vividly describe how she was molested. AAA merely repeated that
on all eight occasions, accused-appellant had intercourse with her by inserting his penis
into her vagina. AAAs uniform manner of describing the alleged rapes created a strong
suspicion that her testimony had been coached, rehearsed, or contrived. Accused-appellant
also labeled AAAs testimony incredible because according to AAA, accused-appellant
immediately inserted his penis into her vagina without even taking off their undergarments.
Thus, accused-appellant argued that the presumption of innocence accorded to accused-
appellant must prevail, for it could not be overcome by mere suspicion, conjecture, or
probability. The standard has always been proof beyond reasonable doubt.38
Plaintiff-appellee, for its part, maintained that the RTC judgment of conviction against
accused-appellant was consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. However, it prayed that the
sentence imposed upon accused-appellant be modified in accordance with Republic Act
No. 9346, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines.39
In its Decision dated April 29, 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
conviction against accused-appellant but modified the sentence and award of damages:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the court a quo is modified, and
after taking into account the qualified aggravating circumstances of minority of the victim
and her relationship with accused-appellant Vicente Candellada, he (Vicente Candellada) is
DIRECTED and ORDERED to serve the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without the
eligibility for parole for each rape committed under Criminal Cases Nos. 159-07-2005,
160-07-2005, 161-07-200[5], 162-07-2005, 163-07-200[5], 164-0[7]-200[5], 165-07-2005,
and 166-07-2005. Accused-appellant Vicente Candellada is further DIRECTED and
ORDERED to pay AAA the following for each rape committed:
P75,000.00 as Civil Indemnity;
P75,000.00 as Moral Damages;
P25,000.00 as Exemplary Damages.
Hence, the instant appeal.
Accused-appellant insists that the RTC erred in convicting him despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
There is no merit in the appeal.
45
Qualified rape is defined and punished under the following provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended:
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx
ART. 266-B. Penalties. x x x.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim[.]
For a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary
elements of (1) sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and without consent; and
in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements that (4) the
victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape, and (5) the offender is a parent
(whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim.40
The fourth and fifth elements, minority and relationship, were admitted by accused-
appellant during the pre-trial conference.
The existence of the first three elements was established by AAAs testimony. Relevant are
the pronouncements of the Court in People v. Manjares41 that:
In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony
of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal
course of things, as in this case. There is a plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the
accused in a rape case by holding that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed and, where her
testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof.
Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly declared that it takes a certain amount of
psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own
father to jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family including
herself to a lifetime of shame. For this reason, courts are inclined to give credit to the
straightforward and consistent testimony of a minor victim in criminal prosecutions for
rape. (Citations omitted.)
The Court will not disturb the finding of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that
AAAs testimony deserves full faith and credence. In resolving rape cases, primordial
consideration is given to the credibility of the victims testimony. The settled rule is that the
trial court's conclusions on the credibility of witnesses in rape cases are generally accorded
great weight and respect, and at times, even finality. Having seen and heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial court stood in a
much better position to decide the question of credibility. Findings of the trial court on such
matters are binding and conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted.42 No such facts or circumstances exist in the present case.
The uniform way by which AAA described the eight rape incidents does not necessarily
mean that her testimony was coached, rehearsed, and contrived. Also, AAAs failure to
mention that accused-appellant removed their undergarments prior to the rape does not
destroy the credibility of AAAs entire testimony. Rape victims do not cherish keeping in
their memory an accurate account of the manner in which they were sexually violated.
Thus, errorless recollection of a harrowing experience cannot be expected of a witness,
especially when she is recounting details from an experience so humiliating and painful as
rape.43 In addition, bearing in mind that AAA had been repeatedly raped by accused-
appellant for a period of time (beginning in Davao, which resulted in AAAs pregnancy), it
is not surprising for AAA to recall each incident in much the same way. What is important
is that AAA had categorically testified that on eight specific dates, her father, accused-
appellant, armed with a knife, successfully had sexual intercourse with her by inserting his
penis into her vagina.
It is noteworthy to mention that even if accused-appellant did not use a knife or made
threats to AAA, accused-appellant would still be guilty of raping AAA, for in rape
committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law
spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed;
moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation.44
Although Gemina did not personally witness the rapes of AAA by accused-appellant, she
did confirm that accused-appellant had introduced AAA as his wife; and when Gemina
46
stayed a week with accused-appellant and AAA at the old house, Gemina observed that the
two apparently lived as husband and wife. Accused-appellants imprudence in representing SO ORDERED.
himself as AAAs husband to the public lends credence to AAAs assertions that accused-
appellant took perverted liberties with her in private.

Accused-appellants denial and alibi deserve scant consideration. No jurisprudence in

criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to
contrive and difficult to disprove, and for which reason it is generally rejected. It has been
consistently held that denial and alibi are the most common defenses in rape cases. Denial
could not prevail over complainant's direct, positive and categorical assertion. As between
a positive and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth, on one hand, and a bare
denial, on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.45

Accused-appellant proffered a general denial of all eight rapes. Accused-appellants alibi

that he was arrested and imprisoned on December 23, 2004 is not supported by positive,
clear, and satisfactory evidence. In fact, it was entirely uncorroborated. Moreover, he was
charged of seven other counts of rape that happened on earlier dates. In contrast,
prosecution witnesses AAA, Gemina, and SPO4 Bastigue consistently testified that
accused-appellant was arrested only on December 28, 2004.

With the guilt of accused-appellant for the eight rapes already established beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility of parole, instead of death, for each count of rape, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9346. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9346 imposes the penalty
of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code. Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9346 further provides that persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua,
or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, shall not be eligible for parole
under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.46

As for the damages, the Court affirms the award to AAA of P75,000.00 civil indemnity and
P75,000.00 moral damages for each count of rape. However, in line with
jurisprudence,47 the Court increases the amount of exemplary damages awarded to AAA
from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 for each count of rape; and imposes an interest of 6% per
annum on the aggregate amount of damages awarded from finality of this judgment until
full payment thereof.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00361-
MIN is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of exemplary damages
awarded to AAA shall be increased to P30,000.00 for each count of rape, and all damages
awarded shall be subject to interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid. No costs.

47

G.R. No. 191362, October 09, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARCIANO CIAL Y
LORENA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed before this Court is the November 24, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03162 which affirmed with modifications the November
26, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62
finding appellant Marciano Cial y Lorena guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified rape.
On February 5, 2004, appellant was charged with the crime of rape. The Information3 reads
as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
That on or about the month of December, 2002, at Barangay Balubad, Municipality of
Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of AAA,4 a
minor, 13 years old, against her will.
That the commission of the rape was attended by the qualifying circumstances of minority,
the victim being less than 18 years old, and relationship, the accused being the common-
law husband of complainants mother.
Contrary to law.chanrob1esvirtualawlibrary
During his arraignment on June 29, 2004, appellant pleaded not guilty.5 After pre-trial, trial
on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The version of the prosecution as summarized in the Appellees Brief6 is as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AAA is one of the six (6) children born to BBB and CCC. After CCC died,
BBB cohabited with appellant Marciano Cial (also known as Onot). Appellant and
BBB have two (2) children.
In 2002, AAA, then thirteen (13) years old, was a Grade I pupil and was residing with
her family and appellant in x x x Quezon Province. AAA calls appellant Papa.
Sometime in December 2002, appellant called AAA and told her to go to the bedroom
inside their house. Once inside, appellant took off AAAs shorts and panty and spread her
legs. Appellant pulled his pants down to his thighs and inserted his penis into the little girls
vagina. AAA felt intense pain but she did not try to struggle because appellant had a bolo
on his waist. After satiating his lust, appellant threatened to kill AAA and her family if
she reported the incident to anyone. At that time, AAAs maternal grandmother was in
the house but was unaware that AAA was being ravished.
48
xxxx
Unable to endure the torment, AAA confided her ordeal to her mother. But AAAs
mother did not believe her. AAA ran away from home and went to her maternal uncles
house. There, she disclosed her harrowing experience to her mothers siblings. Her uncle
appeared to be angered by appellants wrong doing. But nonetheless, her uncle allowed
appellant to bring her home when appellant fetched her.
For fear that she might be raped again, AAA ran away and went to the house of her aunt.
Her aunt helped her file the complaint against her stepfather.
On March 19, 2003, AAA was brought to Doa Marta Memorial District Hospital in
Atimonan, Quezon where she was physically examined by Dr. Arnulfo Imperial. Dr.
Imperial issued a Medico-Legal Report which essentially states
that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1) she was negative to pubic hair; there was a negative physical injury at the pubic area,
with normal external genitalia;
2) the hymen has an old laceration on the 12 oclock and 5 oclock positions, introitus
admits one examining finger with ease; and
3) spermatozoa determination result was negative for examination of
spermatozoa.chanrob1esvirtualawlibrary
According to Dr. Imperial, the negative result for pubic hair as indicated in his report
means that the victim has not yet fully developed her secondary characteristics which
usually manifests during puberty. Dr. Imperial explained that the easy insertion of one
finger into her vagina means that the child was no longer a virgin and that it would be
difficult to insert even the tip of the little finger into the private part of a virgin as she
would have suffered pain. On the absence of spermatozoa on the victims genitals, Dr.
Imperial explained that a sperm has a life span of three (3) days. The lapse of almost four
months from the time of the rape would naturally yield negative results for spermatozoa.
On April 7, 2003, AAA and her aunt sought the assistance of the Crisis Center for
Women at Gumaca, Quezon. AAA was admitted to the said center and still continued to
reside therein at the time of her testimony.7
Version of the Defense
As to be expected, appellant denied the charge. He alleged that he treated AAA as his
own daughter. He also claimed that AAAs aunt fabricated the charge because appellant
called her a thief.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The trial court lent credence to the testimony of AAA especially considering that the
same is corroborated by the medical findings. On the other hand, the RTC found
appellants defense not only laughable and sickening but also completely
untrue.8cralawlibrary
The court a quo also found the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship to be
present. Thus, on November 26, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant
guilty of qualified rape. Considering, however, the proscription on the imposition of the
death penalty, the trial court instead sentenced appellant to reclusion perpetua.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, accused Marciano Cial is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and the
complainant AAA is awarded moral and exemplary damages in the amount of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.9
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Appellant appealed to the CA but the appellate court found the appeal to be without merit
and dismissed the same. The appellate court thus affirmed the RTC finding appellant guilty
of qualified rape but with modifications as to the damages, viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
FOR THESE REASONS, the decision dated November 26, 2007 of the RTC is
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. MARCIANO CIAL y LORENA is sentenced to reclusion perpetua conformably with
R.A. No. 9346, without eligibility for parole; and
2. He is ordered to indemnify AAA (a) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P75,000.00 as
moral damages; and (c) P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA found that the elements of rape have been duly established. AAAs testimony
proved that appellant had carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent.
The examining doctor corroborated AAAs narration by testifying that the hymenal
lacerations could have been possibly caused by an erect penis. The CA disregarded
49
appellants contention that he could not have raped AAA in the presence of AAAs
grandmother as lust is no respecter of time and place.11 Moreover, the appellate court
found that the prosecution satisfactorily established AAAs minority as well as the
qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant being the common-law husband of
AAAs mother.
overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be
respected, for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent
application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. (Citations
omitted.)13

Hence, this appeal raising the following arguments, viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I testified in court.14
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
CIRCUMSTANCES CLEARLY POINTING TO THE INNOCENCE OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE.12
Besides, it would not be amiss to point out that AAA was only 13 years of age when she
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of
tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what
transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she
would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not have
invented a horrible story. x x x15

Appellant argues that if he indeed raped AAA in the manner that she narrated, it would
be improbable for AAAs maternal grandmother not to have noticed the same. Appellant
also claims that it was illogical for AAAs uncle to allow AAA to return home after jurisprudence that rape can be committed even in places where people congregate. As held
learning about the alleged rape incident. Appellant also insists that the examining physician
was unsure as to what actually caused AAAs hymenal lacerations.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
In this appeal, appellant assails the factual findings of the trial court and the credibility it
lent to the testimony of the victim. As a general rule, however, this Court accords great
respect to the factual findings of the RTC, especially when affirmed by the CA. We find no
cogent reason to depart from this rule.
Time and again, we have held that when it comes to the issue of credibility of the victim or
the prosecution witnesses, the findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect
and, generally, the appellate courts will not overturn the said findings unless the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case. This is so
because trial courts are in the best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and
spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses manner of
testifying, her furtive glance, blush of unconscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering
tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath all of which are useful aids
for an accurate determination of a witness honesty and sincerity. Trial judges, therefore,
can better determine if such witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to
weigh conflicting testimonies. Again, unless certain facts of substance and value were
We are not persuaded by appellants argument that if he indeed raped AAA inside their
house, then AAAs maternal grandmother would have noticed the same. It is settled
by the CA, lust is no respecter of time and place.16 Thus, the presence of AAAs
grandmother would not negate the commission of the rape; neither would it prove
appellants innocence.
There is also no merit to appellants contention that it was irrational for AAAs uncle to
allow her to return home even after learning about the rape incident. The considerations or
reasons which impelled AAAs uncle to allow her to return home are immaterial to the
rape charge. Such have no bearing on appellants guilt.
Likewise undeserving of our consideration is appellants imputation that the examining
physician was unsure as to what caused AAAs hymenal lacerations. It must be stressed
that the examining physician was presented to testify only on the fact that he examined the
victim and on the results of such examination. He is thus expected to testify on the nature,
extent and location of the wounds. Dr. Arnulfo Imperial (Dr. Imperial) found, among
others, that AAA suffered hymenal lacerations. This refers to the location and nature of
the wounds suffered by the victim. Dr. Imperial could not be expected to establish the
cause of such lacerations with particularity because he has no personal knowledge of how
these hymenal lacerations were inflicted on AAA. He could only surmise that the
lacerations could have been caused by activities like cycling, horseback riding x x x or the
insertion of [a] hard object [into] the vagina of the victim x x x [such as] the penis.17 In
any case, a medical examination is not even indispensable in prosecuting a rape charge. In
fact, an accuseds conviction for rape may be anchored solely on the testimony of the
victim. At best, the medical examination would only serve as corroborative evidence.

50

We find however that both the trial court and the CA erred in convicting appellant of the
crime of qualified rape. According to both courts, the twin qualifying circumstances of
minority and relationship attended the commission of the crime. We rule otherwise.
In its Formal Offer of Evidence,18 the prosecution mentioned AAAs Certificate of Live
Birth. Also attached to the Folder of Exhibits marked as Exhibit B is AAAs Certificate
of Live Birth showing that AAA was born on October 31, 1991. However, upon closer
scrutiny, we note that the said Certificate of Live Birth was never presented or offered
during the trial of the case. During the March 28, 2006 hearing, the prosecution manifested
before the RTC that it will be presenting AAAs Certificate of Live Birth at the next
setting. In its Order19 dated June 27, 2006, the trial court reset the hearing of the case to
allow the prosecution to present evidence with respect to AAAs Certificate of Live
Birth. However, up until the prosecution rested its case, nobody was presented to testify on
AAAs Certificate of Live Birth. Records show that the prosecution presented only
AAA and Dr. Imperial as its witnesses. Dr. Imperial never testified on AAAs age. On
the other hand, AAA even testified on the witness stand that she does not know her
age, viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q. Do you remember how old were you during that time?
A. I do not know, maam.
Q. Do you know your birthday?
A. I do not know, maam.20
Clearly, the prosecution failed to prove the minority of AAA.
The same is true with respect to the other qualifying circumstance of relationship. The
prosecution likewise miserably failed to establish AAAs relationship with the appellant.
Although the Information alleged that appellant is the common-law husband of AAAs
mother, AAA referred to appellant as her step-father.
Q. And who is Onot?
A. He is my step father, maam.
Q. What do you mean step father, what is his relation to your mother?
A. He is the husband of my mother, maam.
xxxx
Q. When did this Onot become the husband of your mother?
A. I could no longer remember, maam.
Q. Were you still small or big when he [became] the husband of your mother?
A. I was still small when he [became] the husband of my mother, maam.
Q. And how do you call this Onot?
A. Papa, maam.
Q. Is this Onot whom you called Papa inside this room now?
A. Yes, maam. (Witness pointed [to] the bald man who when asked his name responded
that he is Mar[c]iano Cial).
Q. Do you know that person?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. Why do you know him?
A. Because he is the husband of my mother, maam.21
Meanwhile, appellant claimed that he is married to AAAs
mother:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q. You [identified] yourself Mr. Witness as married. You are married to the mother of
AAA?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Q. So, you mean to say that you are the step father of AAA?
A. Yes, sir.22
Even the RTC interchangeably referred to appellant as the common-law husband of
AAAs mother23 as well as the step-father of AAA.24 Moreover, the RTC failed to cite
any basis for its reference to appellant as such. In fact, the RTC Decision is bereft of any
discussion as to how it reached its conclusion that appellant is the common-law husband of
AAAs mother or that AAA is his step-daughter.
The CA committed the same error. Notwithstanding appellants claim that he is married to
AAAs mother, it went on to declare, without any explanation or justification, that
appellant is the common-law husband of AAAs mother, viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
x x x Also, given that Marciano and AAAs mother were not legally married, the qualifying
circumstance that the accused is the common-law husband of the victims mother may be
properly appreciated.25
The terms common-law husband and step-father have different legal connotations. For
appellant to be a step-father to AAA, he must be legally married to AAAs
mother.26cralawlibrary
Suffice it to state that qualifying circumstances must be proved beyond reasonable doubt
just like the crime itself. In this case, the prosecution utterly failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. As such,
appellant should only be convicted of the crime of simple rape, the penalty for which
51
is reclusion perpetua.27cralawlibrary
As regards damages, AAA is entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00,
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of
P30,000.00. In addition, interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages
awarded from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The November 24, 2009 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03162 is MODIFIED. Appellant Marciano
Cial y Lorena is hereby found guilty of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Appellant is ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All
damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of
this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. MANOLITO LUCENA Y
VELASQUEZ, ALIAS MACHETE, AccusedAppellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The subject of this appeal is the Decision1 dated 24 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in
CAG.R. CRH.C. No. 03371 affirming the Decision2 dated 30 April 2008 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 260, in Criminal Cases Nos. 030763 to 03
0765, finding herein appellant Manolito Lucena y Velasquez alias Machete guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape, thereby sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count and ordering him to pay AAA3 the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity also for each count.
Three (3) similarly worded Informations,4 all dated 24 June 2003 allege:
That on or about the 28th day of April 2003, in the City of Paraaque, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed [appellant], a Barangay
Tanod Volunteer, who took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of the
crime, by means of force, threat or intimidation and with the use of a gun did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant
AAA, a minor, 17 years of age, against her will and consent. (Emphasis and italics
supplied).
The appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to all the charges
against him.5 Thereafter, the cases were jointly tried.
The prosecution presented AAA, the victim herself; and Dr. Merle Tan (Dr. Tan) of the
Child Protection Unit, University of the Philippines Philippine General Hospital (UP
PGH), who examined the victim.
The testimonies of the abovenamed prosecution witnesses established that on 28 April
2003, at around 11:30 p.m., while AAA, who was then 17 years old, having been born on
52
10 July 1986, was walking and chatting with her friends along one of the streets of San
Dionisio, Paraaque City, two (2) barangay tanods, one of whom is the appellant,
approached and informed them that they were being arrested for violating a city ordinance
imposing curfew against minors. AAAs companions, however, managed to escape, thus,
she alone was apprehended.6AAA was then ordered by the barangay tanods to board the
tricycle. Afraid that she might spend the night in jail, AAA pleaded with them and protested
that she did not commit any offense as she was just chatting with her friends. AAAs plea,
however, remained unheeded.7
AAA was then brought by the two (2) barangay tanods within the vicinity of the San
Dionisio Barangay Hall. Afterwards, one of them alighted from the tricycle and went
inside the barangay hall. The appellant, on the other hand, stayed in the tricycle to guard
AAA. After a while, the barangay tanod, the one who went inside the barangay hall,
returned. But, the appellant told the former that he will just be the one to bring AAA back
to her house.8
But, instead of escorting AAA back to her house, the appellant brought her
to Kabuboy Bridge in San Dionisio, Paraaque City. While on their way, the appellant
threatened AAA that he would kill her once she resists or jumps off the tricycle. Upon
arrival, the appellant ordered AAA to alight from the tricycle. AAA asked the appellant
what he would do with her but the former did not respond. The appellant then took out the
backseat of the tricycle and positioned it in a grassy area. He subsequently pointed a gun at
AAA and commanded her to lie down and to take off her clothes. The appellant later put
the gun down on the ground and inserted his penis into AAAs vagina despite the latters
plea not to rape her. Satisfied, the appellant stopped. But, after a short while, or after about
five (5) minutes, the appellant, once again, inserted his penis into AAAs vagina.
Thereafter, he stopped. On the third time, the appellant inserted again his penis into AAAs
vagina. Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant stopped and finally ordered AAA to dress
up. The appellant even threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone about
what happened between them.9
The appellant, thereafter, directed AAA to board the tricycle. He then brought AAA in front
of a school in Paraaque City. But, before allowing AAA to get off, the appellant repeated
his threat to kill her should she tell anyone about the incident.10
The following day, AAA took the courage to seek the assistance of their barangay
kagawad, who simply advised her to just proceed to the barangay hall to lodge her
complaint against the appellant. AAA and her mother subsequently went to PGH, where
she was subjected to physical examination by Dr. Tan,11 which resulted in the following
findings:
HYMEN Tanner Stage 3, healing laceration[s] 3 and 5 oclock area with petechiae, fresh
laceration at 9 oclock area with eccymosi at 810 oclock area, Type of Hymen:
Crescentic
xxx
Perianal Skin: fresh laceration[s] at 12 and 1 oclock area. No
ANAL EXAMINATION
evident injury at the time of examination.
xxx
IMPRESSIONS
Disclosure of sexual abuse.
Genital findings show clear Evidence Of Blunt Force Or Penetrating
Trauma.12 (Emphasis supplied).
AAA also went to the Coastal Road Police Headquarters, where she executed her sworn
statement accusing the appellant of rape. AAA was able to identify the appellant as her
assailant because the former was wearing a jacket emblazoned with Barangay Police, as
well as a Barangay Identification Card, at the time of the incident.13
The appellant and Rodel Corpuz (Corpuz) took the witness stand for the defense.
In the course of Corpuzs direct examination, however, the parties made the following
stipulations: (1) that the [herein appellant] was the assigned barangay radio operator on
that date, [28 April 2003], and he stayed at the barangay hall from 12:00 midnight to 5:00
a.m.; (2) that the witness was there up to 12:00 midnight, but at about past 12:00, he left
and returned after two (2) hours, at 2:00 oclock a.m.; and (3) that when he woke up at 5:00
oclock in the morning, the [appellant] was still there. With these stipulations, Corpuzs
testimony was dispensed with.14
The appellant, for his part, could only muster the defenses of denial and alibi. He, thus,
offered a different version of the story.
On 28 April 2003, the appellant claimed that he was on duty as a radio operator at
the barangay hall. His task as such was to receive complaints from the residents of
the barangay, as well as to receive calls from fellow barangay officials who are in need of
assistance. On the same day, he received a call from his companion, who is also
a barangay tanod. He cannot, however, recall any unusual incident that transpired on that
day.15
53
The appellant admitted that he knew AAA as the one who lodged a complaint against him
but he denied that he knew her personally. He also vehemently denied the following: (1)
that he raped AAA; (2) that he was one of those barangay tanods who apprehended AAA
for violating the curfew ordinance of their barangay; and (3) that he was the one driving
the tricycle in going to the barangay hall. Instead, the appellant claimed that after 12:00
midnight of 28 April 2003, he went home already. In fact, he was shocked when he was
arrested on 25 September 2003 as he did not commit any crime.16
In its Decision dated 30 April 2008, the trial court, giving credence to the categorical,
straightforward and positive testimony of AAA, coupled with the medical findings of
sexual abuse, convicted the appellant of three (3) counts of rape as defined and penalized
under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266A, in relation to Article 266B, of the Revised Penal
Code of the Philippines, as amended. The trial court, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the [herein appellant] MANOLITO
LUCENA y VELASQUEZ alias MACHETE, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
three (3) counts of Rape (under Art. 266a par. 1(a) in relation to Art. 266B of the
RPC as amended by RA 8353) and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count of Rape. In addition, the [appellant] is ordered to pay [AAA] the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each
count.17 (Emphasis and italics theirs).
The appellant appealed18 the trial courts Decision to the Court of Appeals with the
following assignment of errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE [HEREIN
APPELLANT] OF RAPE DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE THE
ELEMENT OF FORCE AND INTIMIDATION.
II.
GRANTING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE [APPELLANT] COMMITTED THE CRIME
CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF
THREE (3) COUNTS OF RAPE.19
After a thorough study of the records, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed
Decision dated 24 August 2009 sustaining appellants conviction for three (3) counts of
rape, as well as the damages awarded to AAA. In doing so, the Court of Appeals explained
that the facts revealed that the appellant succeeded thrice in inserting his penis into AAAs
vagina. The said three (3) penetrations happened one after another at an interval of five (5)
minutes, wherein the appellant would take a rest after satiating his lust and after regaining
his strength would again rape AAA. Undoubtedly, the appellant decided to commit those
separate and distinct acts of sexual assault on AAA. Thus, his conviction for three (3)
counts of rape is irrefutable.20
Hence, this appeal.21
Both parties in their manifestations22 before this Court adopted their respective appeal
briefs23 filed with the Court of Appeals in lieu of Supplemental Briefs.
In his Brief, the appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that force or
intimidation attended the commission of rape. Records revealed that AAA did not even
attempt to resist his alleged sexual advances over her person. Instead, AAA opted to remain
passive throughout her ordeal despite the fact that during the three (3) episodes of their
sexual intercourse he was unarmed and she, thus, had all the opportunity to escape, which
she never did. These reactions of AAA were contrary to human experience, thus, cast
serious doubts on the veracity of her testimony and on her credibility as a witness.
The appellant similarly argues that the result of AAAs medical examination is quite
disturbing as it appears that her anal orifice was also penetrated by a hard object though
nothing was said to this effect in her testimony.
The appellant likewise avers that he cannot be convicted of three counts of rape. The
intervening period of five (5) minutes between each penetration does not necessarily prove
that he decided to commit three separate acts of rape. He maintains that what is of prime
importance is that he was motivated by a single criminal intent.
With the foregoing, the appellant believes that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt; hence, his acquittal is inevitable.
This Court holds otherwise. The conviction of the appellant, thus, stands but the damages
awarded in favor AAA must be modified.
54
Primarily, in reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided with three settled principles: (1) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove,
it is even more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2)
considering the intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.24
Rape is a serious transgression with grave consequences both for the accused and the
complainant. Following the above principles, this Court is dutybound to conduct a
thorough and exhaustive evaluation of a judgment of conviction for rape.25
After a careful scrutiny of the entire records, however, this Court finds no justifiable reason
to reverse the rulings of the lower courts.
All the Informations in this case charged the appellant with rape under paragraph 1(a),
Article 266A, in relation to paragraph 2, Article 266B, of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. These provisions specifically state:
ART. 266A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the
offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx
ART. 266B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. (Emphasis supplied).
Certainly, carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following instances constitutes
rape: (1) when force or intimidation is used; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or
is otherwise unconscious; and (3) when she is under twelve (12) years of age. 26
The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or
irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation
be so great or be of such character as could not be resisted it is only necessary that the
force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had
in mind.27 Further, it should be viewed from the perception and judgment of the victim at
the time of the commission of the crime. What is vital is that the force or intimidation
be of such degree as to cow the unprotected and vulnerable victim into submission.
Force is sufficient if it produces fear in the victim, such as when the latter is
threatened with death.28
In the case at bench, as can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes and as
observed by the trial court, which the Court of Appeals sustained, AAAs categorical,
straightforward and positive testimony revealed that the appellant was armed with a gun
and the same was pointed at her while she was ordered to lie down and to take off her
clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for her life and personal safety. The appellant
then put the gun down on the ground and successfully inserted his penis into AAAs vagina,
not only once but thrice. This happened despite AAAs plea not to rape her. And, after
satisfying his lust, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell
anyone about the incident. This same threat of killing AAA was first made by the appellant
while the former was still inside the tricycle on their way to Kabuboy Bridge.29 It cannot be
denied, therefore, that force and intimidation were employed by the appellant upon AAA in
order to achieve his depraved desires.
While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the ground the moment
he inserted his penis into AAAs vagina and was actually unarmed on those three (3)
episodes of sexual intercourse, the same does not necessarily take away the fear of being
killed that had already been instilled in the mind of AAA. Emphasis must be given to the
fact that the gun was still within appellants reach, therefore, he could still make good of
his threat on AAA at anytime the latter would show any resistance to his evil desires.
AAAs lack of physical resistance, therefore, is understandable and would not in any way
discredit her testimony.
It must be borne in mind that when a rape victim becomes paralyzed with fear, she cannot
be expected to think and act coherently. Further, as has been consistently held by this
55
Court, physical resistance is not an essential element of rape and need not be established
when intimidation is exercised upon the victim, and, the latter submits herself, against her
will, to the rapists embrace because of fear for her life and personal safety. The victims
failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary her submission to the
criminal acts of her aggressor. It bears stressing that not every rape victim can be expected
to act with reason or in conformity with the usual expectations of everyone. The workings
of a human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable; people react
differently. Some may shout, some may faint, while others may be shocked into
insensibility.30
In his attempt to ruin AAAs credibility in order to exculpate himself from all the charges,
the appellant puts stress on the portion of the result of AAAs medical examination
disclosing that even her anal orifice was also penetrated by a hard object, which she never
mentioned in her testimony.
To the mind of this Court, such argument is flimsy and totally misplaced. It would not even
work to appellants advantage and would not in any way cast doubt on the veracity of
AAAs testimony. As this Court has previously stated, a medical examination and a medical
certificate, albeit corroborative of the commission of rape, are not indispensable to a
successful prosecution for rape.31 Moreover, even though AAA made no mention of any
anal penetration, such omission would not change the fact that she was, indeed, raped by
the appellant. As succinctly found by both lower courts, AAA categorically,
straightforwardly, clearly and positively narrated her harrowing experience in the hands of
the appellant. She recounted in detail how the appellant took advantage of her by bringing
her to Kabuboy Bridge, where nobody was present; commanding her to lie down and
undress herself at a point of a gun; and successfully inserting his penis into her vagina, not
only once but thrice. AAA stated that after the first penetration the appellant stopped. After
about five minutes, however, the appellant, once again, inserted his penis into her vagina.
Thereafter, the appellant stopped. For the third and last time, the appellant again inserted
his penis into her vagina. This narration was consistent with the rest of the medical findings
showing fresh hymenal lacerations on AAAs vagina, which according to Dr. Tan is a clear
evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma a disclosure of sexual abuse.
For his ultimate defense, the appellant puts forward denial and alibi. Notably, these
defenses are totally inconsistent with his line of argument that the rape was committed
without force or intimidation thereby implying that the sexual intercourse between him and
AAA was consensual.
Time and again, this Court has viewed denial and alibi as inherently weak defenses, unless
supported by clear and convincing evidence, the same cannot prevail over the positive
declarations of the victim who, in a simple and straightforward manner, convincingly
identified the appellant as the defiler of her chastity.32 Simply put, the positive assertions of
AAA that he raped her are entitled to greater weight. While denial and alibi are legitimate
defenses in rape cases, bare assertions to this effect cannot overcome the categorical
testimony of the victim,33 as in this case.
Also, appellants alibi that on the night the rape incident happened, he was at
the barangay hall doing his job as radio operator and at 12:00 midnight he already went
home, failed to sufficiently establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime when it was committed. Moreover, the corroborating testimony of
defense witness Corpuz that the appellant left at about past 12:00 midnight, almost the
same time the rape incident happened, and then returned after two (2) hours, even bolster
the possibility of the appellants presence at the scene of the crime.
This Court also notes that the appellant failed to show any illmotive on the part of AAA to
testify falsely against him. This bolsters the veracity of AAAs accusation since no woman
would concoct a tale that would tarnish her reputation, bring humiliation and disgrace to
herself and her family, and submit herself to the rigors, shame, and stigma attendant to the
prosecution of rape, unless she is motivated by her quest to seek justice for the crime
committed against her.34
In light of the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the appellants guilt for the
crime of rape has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
As to the number of rapes committed. The appellant, citing People v. Aaron (Aaron
Case),35 insists that he cannot be convicted of three (3) counts of rape despite the three (3)
penetrations because he was motivated by a single criminal intent. This Court finds this
contention fallacious.
In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the victims vagina; he then
withdrew it and ordered the latter to lie down on the floor and, for the second time, he
inserted again his penis into the victims vagina; the accused, thereafter, stood up and
commanded the victim to lie near the headboard of the makeshift bed and, for the third
time, he inserted again his penis into the victims vagina and continued making pumping
motions. From these sets of facts, this Court convicted the accused therein for only one
count of rape despite the three successful penetrations because there is no indication in the
records from which it can be inferred that the accused decided to commit those separate
and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful desire to change positions inside
the room where the crime was committed. This Court, thus, viewed that the three
penetrations occurred during one continuing act of rape in which the accused was
obviously motivated by a single criminal intent.
The circumstances in the present case, however, are far different from the Aaron Case.
Here, we quote with approval the observations of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed that
of the trial court, to wit:
56

We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant] should be convicted of three (3)
counts of rape. It appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting
his penis into the private part of [AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the
other at an interval of five (5) minutes wherein the [appellant] would rest after satiating
his lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would again rape
[AAA]. Hence, it can be clearly inferred from the foregoing that when the [appellant]
decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he
was not motivated by a single impulse[,] but rather by several criminal intent. Hence,
his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is indubitable.36 (Emphasis supplied).
rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of the
finality of this judgment until fully paid.40
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R.
CRH.C. No. 03371 dated 24 August 2009 finding herein appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three counts of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS that: (1) the exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00, for
each count of rape, is awarded in favor of AAA; and (2) the appellant is ordered to pay
AAA the interest on all damages at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality
of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.

This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed, the three insertions into
AAA were in satiation of successive but distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the
appellants conviction for three counts of rape is proper.

As to penalty. The second paragraph of Art. 266B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
provides that [w]henever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon x x x
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. As it was properly alleged and proved
that the appellant used a gun in order to consummate his evil desires, thus, both lower
courts correctly imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of
rape.

As to damages. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory in a finding of rape is distinct from

and should not be denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural
foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.37 The award of
moral damages, on the other hand, is automatically granted in rape cases without need of
further proof other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape
victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award.38 Hence, this Court
upholds the P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages, for each count of
rape, that were awarded by both lower courts in favor of AAA.

In addition, this Court deems it proper to award exemplary damages in favor of AAA. The
award of exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the Civil Code if there is an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying.39 In this case, since the
qualifying circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon was present in the commission of
the crime, exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00, for each count of rape, is
awarded in favor of AAA. Moreover, in line with recent jurisprudence, the interest at the

57
 G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love, cherish and protect his
wife, to give her a home, to provide her with the comforts and the necessities of life within
his means, to treat her kindly and not cruelly or inhumanely. He is bound to honor her x x
x; it is his duty not only to maintain and support her, but also to protect her from
oppression and wrong."1

REYES, J.:

Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit
within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy
expressly legislated in Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

The Case

This is an automatic review2 of the Decision3 dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353, which affirmed the Judgment4 dated April 1, 2002 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, in Criminal Case Nos.
99-668 and 99-669 convicting him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count.

The Facts

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,5 were married on October 18, 1975. They Ii ved
together since then and raised their four (4) children6 as they put up several businesses over
the years.

On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit,7 alleging that her husband,
the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in
Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the
accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.

58
On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Joint
Resolution,8 finding probable cause for grave threats, less serious physical injuries and rape
and recommending that the appropriate criminal information be filed against the accused-
appellant.
On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC respectively
docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-6689 and Criminal Case No. 99-669.10 The Information
in Criminal Case No. 99-668 charged the accused-appellant as follows:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan
de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the
latter[']s will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan
de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the
latter's will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July 21, 1999.11 On August
18, 1999, the accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reinvestigation,12 which was denied by
the trial court in an Order13 dated August 19, 1999. On even date, the accused-appellant
was arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty to both charges.14
On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended
Information15 averring that the name of the private complainant was omitted in the original
informations for rape. The motion also stated that KKK, thru a Supplemental Affidavit
dated November 15, 1999,16 attested that the true dates of commission of the crime are
October 16, 1998 and October 1 7, 1998 thereby modifying the dates stated in her previous
complaint-affidavit. The motion was granted on January 18, 2000.17 Accordingly, the
criminal informations were amended as follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-668:
That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon
person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.18
Criminal Case No. 99-669:
That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon
person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.19
The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his not guilty plea to
both indictments and a joint trial of the two cases forthwith ensued.
Version of the prosecution
The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her daughters
MMM and 000, which, together with pertinent physical evidence, depicted the following
events:
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one of the
laborers. They got married after a year of courtship.20 When their first child, MMM, was
born, KKK and the accused-appellant put up a sari-sari store.21 Later on, they engaged in
several other businesses -trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK managed the businesses
except for the rice mill, which, ideally, was under the accused-appellant's supervision with
the help of a trusted employee. In reality, however, he merely assisted in the rice mill
business by occasionally driving one of the trucks to haul goods.22
Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as fervent as KKK's
dedication. Even the daughters observed the disproportionate labors of their parents.23 He
would drive the trucks sometimes but KKK was the one who actively managed the
businesses.24
She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on the other hand, did not
acquiesce with that objective.25
59
In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a house in Villa Ernesto,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.26 Three of the children transferred residence therein while
KKK, the accused-appellant and one of their sons stayed in Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She
shuttled between the two places regularly and sometimes he accompanied her.27 In 1998,
KKK stayed in Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City most of the days of the week. 28 On
Wednesdays, she went to Dangcagan, Bukidnon to procure supplies for the family store
and then returned to Cagayan de Oro City on the same day.29
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the accused-
appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of
course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm.30However, in 1997, he started to be
brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her
penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so
she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.31
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his complaint that
she failed to attend to him. She was preoccupied with financial problems in their businesses
and a bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at home because "a woman must stay in the
house and only good in bed (sic) x x x." She disobeyed his wishes and focused on her goal
of providing a good future for the children.32
Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK and the accused-
appellant slept together in Cebu City where the graduation rites of their eldest daughter
were held. By October 14, 1998, the three of them were already back in Cagayan de Oro
City.33
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went about
their nightly routine. The family store in their residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m.
before supper was taken. Afterwards, KKK and the children went to the girls' bedroom at
the mezzanine of the house to pray the rosary while the accused-appellant watched
television in the living room.34 OOO and MMM then prepared their beds. Soon after, the
accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with him to their conjugal bedroom in
the third floor of the house. KKK complied.35
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she
did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near
the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: "[W]hy are you lying on the
c{o]t[?]", and to instantaneously order: "You transfer here [to] our bed."36
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain
due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier.
He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the
floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the
bed.37
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to
copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his
hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.38
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by
holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides.39 KKK
stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.40
The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his
own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in
penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by
desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."42
With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other enclosing the
spouses' bedroom,43KKK's pleas were audible in the children's bedroom where MMM lay
awake.
Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie, don't do that to me,
have pity on me,"44 MMM woke up 000 who prodded her to go to their parents'
room.45 MMM hurriedly climbed upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of her parents'
bedroom and inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is crying?"46 The accused-appellant then
quickly put on his briefs and shirt, partly opened the door and said: "[D]on 't interfere
because this is a family trouble," before closing it again. 47 Since she heard her mother
continue to cry, MMM ignored his father's admonition, knocked at the bedroom door again,
and then kicked it.48 A furious accused-appellant opened the door wider and rebuked MMM
once more: "Don't interfere us. Go downstairs because this is family trouble!" Upon seeing
KKK crouching and crying on top of the bed, MMM boldly entered the room, approached
her mother and asked: "Ma, why are you crying?" before asking her father: "Pa, what
happened to Mama why is it that her underwear is torn[?]"49
When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her mother get up in
order to bring her to the girls' bedroom. KKK then picked up her tom underwear and
covered herself with a blanket.50 However, their breakout from the room was not easy. To
prevent KKK from leaving, the accused-appellant blocked the doorway by extending his
arm towards the knob. He commanded KKK to "[S]tay here, you sleep in our room," when
the trembling KKK pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to go out." He then held KKK's hands but
60
she pulled them back. Determined to get away, MMM leaned against door and embraced
her mother tightly as they pushed their way out.51
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to what
happened.52 KKK relayed: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex
with him when I'm not feeling well." The girls then locked the door and let her rest."53
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing the family
store on October 17, 1998, KKK and the children took their supper. The accused-appellant
did not join them since, according to him, he already ate dinner elsewhere. After resting for
a short while, KKK and the children proceeded to the girls' bedroom and prayed the rosary.
KKK decided to spend the night in the room's small bed and the girls were already fixing
the beddings when the accused-appellant entered.
"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked KKK, who responded that
she preferred to sleep with the children.54 He then scoffed: "Its alright if you will not go
with me, anyway, there are women that could be paid [P] 1,000.00." She dismissed his
comment by turning her head away after retorting: "So be it." After that, he left the room.55
He returned 15 minutes later56 and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became
infuriated. He lifted her from the bed and attempted to carry her out of the room as he
exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here[?] Lets go to our bedroom." When she defied him, he
grabbed her short pants causing them to tear apart.57 At this point, MMM interfered, "Pa,
don't do that to Mama because we are in front of you."58
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant who yelled,
"[E]ven in front of you, I can have sex of your mother [sic J because I'm the head of the
family." He then ordered his daughters to leave the room. Frightened, the girls obliged and
went to the staircase where they subsequently heard the pleas of their helpless mother
resonate with the creaking bed.59
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly pulled
KKK's short pants and panties. He paid no heed as she begged, "[D]on 't do that to me, my
body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do [sic].
I cannot withstand sex."60
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands, mounted
her and forced himself inside her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short
pants and briefs, stood up, and went out of the room laughing as he conceitedly uttered:
"[I]t s nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex." He then
retreated to the masters' bedroom.61
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried
upstairs but found the door locked. MMM pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her arm,
reached for the doorknob inside and disengaged its lock. Upon entering the room, MMM
and OOO found their mother crouched on the bed with her hair disheveled. The girls
asked: "Ma, what happened to you, why are you crying?" KKK replied: "[Y}our father is a
beast and animal, he again forced me to have sex with him even if I don't feel well. "62
Version of the defense
The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father owned a land adjacent to
that of KKK's father. He came to know KKK because she brought food for her father's
laborers. When they got married on October 18, 1975, he was a high school graduate while
she was an elementary graduate.
Their humble educational background did not deter them from pursuing a comfortable life.
Through their joint hard work and efforts, the couple gradually acquired personal
properties and established their own businesses that included a rice mill managed by the
accused-appellant. He also drove their trucks that hauled coffee, copra, or com. 63
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17, 1998. He claimed that
on those dates he was in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling com. On October 7, his truck met
an accident somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He left the
truck by the roadside because he had to attend MMM's graduation in Cebu on October 12
with KKK. When they returned to Bukidnon on October 14, he asked KKK and MMM to
proceed to Cagayan de Oro City and just leave him behind so he can take care of the truck
and buy some com.64
Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until June 1999 corroborated the
above claims. According to him, on October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was within the
vicinity of the rice mill's loading area in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning a pick-up truck.
On October 17, 1998, he and the accused-appellant were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, loading
sacks of com into the truck. They finished loading at 3 :00 p.m. The accused-appellant then
instructed Equia to proceed to Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon while the former
attended a fiesta in New Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan, Bukidnon. At around 4:00 p.m.,
Equia, together with a helper and a mechanic, left for Maluko in order to tow the stalled
truck left there by the accused-appellant in October 7 and thereafter, bring it to Cagayan de
Oro City together with the separate truck loaded with com.
They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours to turn the truck around
and hoist it to the towing bar of the other truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the accused-
appellant arrived in Maluko. The four of them then proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City
61
where they arrived at 3 :00 a.m. of October 18, 1998. The accused-appellant went to Gusa
while the other three men brought the damaged truck to Cugman.65
The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge
because he took over the control and management of their businesses as well as the
possession of their pick-up truck in January 1999. The accused-appellant was provoked to
do so when she failed to account for their bank deposits and business earnings. The entries
in their bank account showed the balance of P3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996 but after
only a month or on November 30, 1996, the amount dwindled to a measly P9,894.88.66 Her
failure to immediately report to the police also belies her rape allegations.67
KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant gradually
detected from her odd behavior. While in Cebu on October 12, 1998 for MMM's
graduation rites, the accused-appellant and KKK had sexual intercourse. He was surprised
when his wife asked him to get a napkin to wipe her after having sex. He tagged her
request as "high-tech," because they did not do the same when they had sex in the past.
KKK had also become increasingly indifferent to him. When he arrives home, it was an
employee, not her, who opened the door and welcomed him. She prettied herself and would
no longer ask for his permission whenever she went out.68
Bebs,69 KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the accused-appellant
several love letters purportedly addressed to Bebs but were actually intended for KKK. 70
KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-appellant came to know as:
Arsenio, Jong-Jong, Joy or Joey, somebody from the military or the Philippine National
Police, another one is a government employee, a certain Fernandez and three other
priests.71 Several persons told him about the paramours of his wife but he never confronted
her or them about it because he trusted her.72
What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by OOO on November 2,
1998. At that time, OOO was listening loudly to a cassette player. Since he wanted to watch
a television program, he asked OOO to tum down the volume of the cassette player. She
got annoyed, unplugged the player, spinned around and hit the accused-appellant's head
with the socket. His head bled. An altercation between the accused-appellant and KKK
thereafter followed because the latter took OOO's side. During the argument, OOO blurted
out that KKK was better off without the accused-appellant because she had somebody
young, handsome, and a businessman unlike the accused-appellant who smelled bad, and
was old, and ugly.73
KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-fourths thereof going to
her and one-fourth to the accused-appellant. However, the separation did not push through
because the accused-appellant's parents intervened.74 Thereafter, KKK pursued legal
separation from the accused-appellant by initiating Barangay Case No. 00588-99 before the
Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City and thereafter obtaining a
Certificate to File Action dated February 18, 1999.75
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment76 dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version proffered by the
prosecution by giving greater weight and credence to the spontaneous and straightforward
testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. The trial court also upheld as sincere and
genuine the two daughters' testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for daughters to
testify against their own father for a crime such as rape if the same was not truly
committed.
The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the accused-
appellant's accusations of extra-marital affairs and money squandering against KKK. The
trial court shelved the accused-appellant's alibi for being premised on inconsistent
testimonies and the contradicting declarations of the other defense witness, Equia, as to the
accused-appellant's actual whereabouts on October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC ruling
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY" beyond
reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate charges of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each, to pay complainant [P]50,000.00 in each case as
moral damages, indemnify complainant the sum of (P]75,000.00 in each case, [P]50,000.00
as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.77
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision78 dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The CA held
that Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the amendment of
the original informations. Further, the accused-appellant was not prejudiced by the
amendment because he was re-arraigned with respect to the amended informations.
The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimony of the victim
herself and the corroborative declarations of MMM and OOO, was able to establish,
beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements of rape under R.A. No. 8353. The accused-
appellant had carnal knowledge of KKK by using force and intimidation.
62
The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical examination did not
negate the commission of the crime because a medical certificate is not necessary to prove
rape.
The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he and KKK are husband and
wife with mutual obligations of and right to sexual intercourse, there must be convincing
physical evidence or manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation used upon KKK
such as bruises. The CA explained that physical showing of external injures is not
indispensable to prosecute and convict a person for rape; what is necessary is that the
victim was forced to have sexual intercourse with the accused.
In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant are spouses
only reinforces the truthfulness of KKK's accusations because no wife in her right mind
would accuse her husband of having raped her if it were not true.
The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained by KKK when she
stated that she only found out that a wife may charge his husband with rape when the fiscal
investigating her separate complaint for grave threats and physical injuries told her about it.
Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of convincing evidence that
it was physically impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the
time of the commission of the crimes, considering that Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the place
where he allegedly was, is only about four or five hours away. Accordingly, the decretal
portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.79
Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution80 dated July 6, 2009, the Court notified
the parties that, if they so desire, they may file their respective supplemental briefs. In a
Manifestation and Motion81 dated September 4, 2009, the appellee, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, expressed that it intends to adopt its Brief before the CA. On April
16, 2012, the accused-appellant, through counsel, filed his Supplemental Brief, arguing that
he was not in Cagayan de Oro City when the alleged rape incidents took place, and the
presence of force, threat or intimidation is negated by: (a) KKK's voluntary act of going
with him to the conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998; (b) KKK's failure to put up
resistance or seek help from police authorities; and ( c) the absence of a medical certificate
and of blood traces in KKK's panties.82
Our Ruling
I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection
The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English practices of 'bride
capture' whereby a man conquered a woman through rape and 'stealing an heiress' whereby
a man abducted a woman and married her.83
The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the woman's chastity but
rather to punish the act of obtaining the heiress' property by forcible marriage 84 or to
protect a man's valuable interest in his wife's chastity or her daughter's virginity.85
If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her father's property and if a
man raped his wife, he was merely using his property.86
Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such treatment was
justified under three ideologies.
Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman was the property of her
father until she marries to become the property of her husband.87 If a man abducted an
unmarried woman, he had to pay the owner, and later buy her from the owner; buying and
marrying a wife were synonymous.88
From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity upon marriage and the
law denied her political power and status under the feudal doctrine of coverture. 89
A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she misbehaved, allowing him
to bring order within the family.90
This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a similar concept. Upon
marrying, the woman becomes one with her husband. She had no right to make a contract,
sue another, own personal property or write a will.91
II. The marital exemption rule
In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in England, conceived the
irrevocable implied consent theory that would later on emerge as the marital exemption
rule in rape. He stated that:
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by
their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind
unto her husband, which she cannot retract.92
63
The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United States of America
(USA) and England. It gives legal immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his
wife, an act which would be rape if committed against a woman not his wife. 93 In those
jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as "the forcible penetration of the body of a
woman who is not the wife of the perpetrator."94
The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was Commonwealth v.
Fogerty95 promulgated in 1857. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pronounced
that it would always be a defense in rape to show marriage to the victim. Several other
courts adhered to a similar rationale with all of them citing Hale's theory as basis. 96
The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909. A husband was
endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife.97 The privilege
was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he
will be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her.98
In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in the USA demanding for
its abolition for being violative of married women's right to be equally protected under rape
laws.99
In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by proscribing the
application of the rule in cases where the husband and wife are living apart pursuant to a
court order "which by its terms or in its effects requires such living apart," or a decree,
judgment or written agreement of separation.100
In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when the Court of
Appeals of New York declared the same unconstitutional in People v. Liberta101 for lack of
rational basis in distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. The decision,
which also renounced Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, ratiocinated as follows:
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and
nonmarital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the
exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights
incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny. We
therefore declare the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be
unconstitutional.
Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman to sexual
intercourse has been cited most frequently in support of the marital exemption. x x x Any
argument based on a supposed consent, however, is untenable. Rape is not simply a sexual
act to which one party does not consent. Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates
the bodily integrity of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and
psychic harm x x x. To ever imply consent to such an act is irrational and absurd. Other
than in the context of rape statutes, marriage has never been viewed as giving a husband
the right to coerced intercourse on demand x x x. Certainly, then, a marriage license should
not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married
woman has the same right to control her own body as does an unmarried woman x x x. If a
husband feels "aggrieved" by his wife's refusal to engage in sexual intercourse, he should
seek relief in the courts governing domestic relations, not in "violent or forceful self-help x
x x."
The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the common-law
doctrines that a woman was the property of her husband and that the legal existence of the
woman was "incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband x x x." Both these
doctrines, of course, have long been rejected in this State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the
common-law world - [or] in any modem society - is a woman regarded as chattel or
demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition
as a whole human being x x x."102 (Citations omitted)
By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well as the District
of Columbia, outlawing the act without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted
some exemptions to a husband from prosecution such as when the wife is mentally or
physically impaired, unconscious, asleep, or legally unable to consent.103
III. Marital Rape in the Philippines
Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until now. It
appears, however, that the old provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to
Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, albeit in a limited form. According to Chief
Justice Ramon C. Aquino,104 a husband may not be guilty of rape under Article 335 of Act
No. 3815 but, in case there is legal separation, the husband should be held guilty of rape if
he forces his wife to submit to sexual intercourse.105
In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW).106 Hailed as
the first international women's bill of rights, the CEDAW is the first major instrument that
contains a ban on all forms of discrimination against women. The Philippines assumed the
role of promoting gender equality and women's empowerment as a vital element in
addressing global concerns.107 The country also committed, among others, to condemn
discrimination against women in all its forms, and agreed to pursue, by all appropriate
means and without delay, a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this
end, undertook:
64
 (a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national
constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to
ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this
principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where
appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women;
xxxx
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish
existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination
against women;
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against
women.108
In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the Philippines enshrined the
principle of gender equality in the 1987 Constitution specifically in Sections 11 and 14 of
Article II thereof, thus:
Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights.
xxxx
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. The Philippines also acceded to
adopt and implement the generally accepted principles of international law such as the
CEDA W and its allied issuances, viz:
Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity
with all nations. (Emphasis ours)
The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender equality. In 1997,
R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC.109 The
law reclassified rape as a crime against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes
against chastity. More particular to the present case, and perhaps the law's most progressive
proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and
criminalizing its perpetration, viz:
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended
party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife
as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the
crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab
initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in
defining rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to
the rapist's legal relationship with his victim, thus:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations
of the 10th Congress on the law's progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No.
650. In spite of qualms on tagging the crime as 'marital rape' due to conservative Filipino
impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to include and
penalize marital rape under the general definition of 'rape,' viz:
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point
of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill No. 6265, we never
agreed to marital rape. But under Article 266-C, it says here: "In case it is the legal husband
who is the offender... " Does this presuppose that there is now marital rape? x x x.
65
MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited, very limited 17 years of
private practice in the legal profession, Madam Speaker, and I believe that I can put at
stake my license as a lawyer in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits a husband
from being sued by the wife for rape. Even jurisprudence, we don't have any jurisprudence
that prohibits a wife from suing a husband. That is why even if we don't provide in this bill
expanding the definition of crime that is now being presented for approval, Madam
Speaker, even if we don't provide here for marital rape, even if we don't provide for sexual
rape, there is the right of the wife to go against the husband. The wife can sue the husband
for marital rape and she cannot be prevented from doing so because in this jurisdiction
there is no law that prohibits her from doing so. This is why we had to put second
paragraph of 266-C because it is the belief of many of us. x x x, that if it is true that in this
jurisdiction there is marital rape even if we don't provide it here, then we must provide for
something that will unify and keep the cohesion of the family together that is why we have
the second paragraph.
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House version specifically
House Bill No. 6265 our provision on a husband forcing the wife is not marital rape, it is
marital sexual assault.
MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no crime of sexual assault.
So, Your Honor, direct to the point, under Article 266-C, is it our understanding that in the
second paragraph, quote: "In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, this refers to
marital rape filed against the husband? Is that correct?
MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is no.
MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault, what do you call- it?
MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor, we have already stated
that. Because under 1 and 2 it is all denominated as rape, there is no crime of sexual
assault. That is why I am sorry that our House version which provided for sexual assault
was not carried by the Senate version because all sexual crimes under this bicameral
conference committee report are all now denominated as rape whether the penalty is from
reclusion perpetua to death or whether the penalty is only prision mayor. So there is marital
rape, Your Honor, is that correct?
xxxx
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of this. I am in favor of
punishing the husband who forces the wife even to 30 years imprisonment. But please do
not call it marital rape, call it marital sexual assault because of the sanctity of marriage. x x
x.110 (Emphasis ours)
HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape but marital rape is not
excluded.
HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific mention.
HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: xx x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this marital rape can be
implicitly contained in the second paragraph. x x x So marital rape actually was in the
House version x x x. But it was not another definition of rape. You will notice, it only says,
that because you are the lawful husband does not mean that you cannot commit rape.
Theoretically, I mean, you can beat up your wife until she's blue. And if the wife complains
she was raped, I guess that, I mean, you just cannot raise the defense x x x[:] I am the
husband. But where in the marriage contract does it say that I can beat you up? That's all it
means. That is why if we stop referring to it as marital rape, acceptance is easy. Because
parang ang marital rape, married na nga kami. I cannot have sex. No, what it is saying is
you're [the] husband but you cannot beat me up. x x x. That's why to me it's not alarming. It
was just a way of saying you're [the] husband, you cannot say when I am charged with rape
x x x.
PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHAN!: All right, so how do you propose it if we put it in[?]
HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful husband does not
mean you can have carnal knowledge by force[,] threat or intimidation or by depriving
your wife reason, a grave abuse of authority, I don't know how that cannot apply. Di ba
yung, or putting an instrument into the, yun ang sinasabi ko lang, it is not meant to have
another classification of rape. It is all the same definition x x x.
xxxx
HON.ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x x x, we can say that this
rule is implicit already in the first proviso. It implies na there is an instance when a
husband can be charged [with] rape x x x.
66
HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.
HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete natin ito. But it is understood
that this rule of evidence is now transport[ed], put into 266-F, the effect of pardon.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of pardon. We will remove
marital rape.
HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3 but we will retain the
one on page 8, the effect of pardon. x x x [I]t is inferred but we leave it because after all it
is just a rule of evidence. But I think we should understand that a husband cannot beat at
his wife to have sex. Di ha? I think that should be made clear. x x x.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape. All we are saying is that
if you're [the] legal husband, Jesus Christ, don't beat up to have sex. I almost want, you are
my wife, why do you have to beat me up.
So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as inferred in proviso, I mean,
we can face up, I hope, to the women and they would understand that it is half achieved.
HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we are not defining or
creating a new crime but instead, we are just defining a rule of evidence. x x x.
HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a rule of evidence the
fact that he is husband is not, does not negate.111
CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the point in discussion. The
only disagreement now is where to place it. Let us clear this matter. There are two
suggestions now on marital rape. One is that it is rape if it is done with force or
intimidation or any of the circumstances that would define rape x x x immaterial. The fact
that the husband and wife are separated does not come into the picture. So even if they are
living under one roof x x x for as long as the attendant circumstances of the traditional rape
is present, then that is rape.112
PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr. Chairman, x x x [t]his provision on
marital rape, it does not actually change the meaning of rape. It merely erases the doubt in
anybody's mind, whether or not rape can indeed be committed by the husband against the
wife. So the bill really says, you having been married to one another is not a legal
impediment. So I don't really think there is any need to change the concept of rape as
defined presently under the revised penal code. This do[es] not actually add anything to the
definition of rape. It merely says, it is merely clarificatory. That if indeed the wife has
evidence to show that she was really brow beaten, or whatever or forced or intimidated into
having sexual intercourse against her will, then the crime of rape has been committed
against her by the husband, notwithstanding the fact that they have been legally married. It
does not change anything at all, Mr. Chairman.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no change on this x x x.113
The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A.
No. 9262,114 which regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be
committed by a man against his wife within or outside the family abode, viz:
Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts committed
by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
family abode, which result in or is likely to result in. physical, sexual, psychological harm
or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the
following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against
a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or
her child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive
remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body,
forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or
forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home
or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual
activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
67
Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and other forms of non-
personal violence are the most common type of spousal violence accounting for 23%
incidence among ever-married women. One in seven ever-married women experienced
physical violence by their husbands while eight percent (8%) experienced sexual
violence.115
IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments
The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable implied
consent theory. In his appeal brief before the CA, he posits that the two incidents of sexual
intercourse, which gave rise to the criminal charges for rape, were theoretically consensual,
obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK, were a legally married and cohabiting
couple. He argues that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and
wife unless the contrary is proved.
The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed and treated differently
from ordinary rape cases and that the standards for determining the presence of consent or
lack thereof must be adjusted on the ground that sexual community is a mutual right and
obligation between husband and wife.116
The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied consent theory
evolved have already been superseded by modem global principles on the equality of rights
between men and women and respect for human dignity established in various international
conventions, such as the CEDAW. The Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW,
recognized that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in
society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between them. Accordingly, the
country vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of
conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices,
customs and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.117 One of
such measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape
cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife's body and
thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least,
presumed.
Another important international instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women, which was Promulgated118 by the UN General
Assembly subsequent to the CEDA W. The Declaration, in enumerating the forms of
gender-based violence that constitute acts of discrimination against women, identified
'marital rape' as a species of sexual violence, viz:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means any act of
gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or
psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.
Article 2
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the
following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering,
sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape,
female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal
violence and violence related to exploitation;119 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within
marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits
sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDA W and its
accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has
sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital
consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal120 to that he accords himself. He
cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without
her full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its international
commitments and accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on marital
activities121 that have lost their relevance in a progressive society.
It is true that the Family Code,122 obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule
sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous
and mutual123 and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife
excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is
a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual
communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
68
continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time
it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening marital
relationship.124 When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to advance
a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to
protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State policies. Besides,
a husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to
engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's intervention to declare her
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital obligation.125 But he cannot and
should not demand sexual intimacy from her coercively or violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the
elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal
protection clause. The Constitutional right to equal protection of the laws126 ordains that
similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and
unjustly discriminate against others; no person or class of persons shall be denied the same
protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances.127
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a)
rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the
victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all three forms of the crime
shows that the law does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those
committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by their
husband and those raped by any other man alike.
The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily discriminates against married
rape victims over unmarried rape victims because it withholds from married women raped
by their husbands the penal redress equally granted by law to all rape victims.
Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in rejecting the
argument akin to those raised by herein accused-appellant. A marriage license should not
be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married
woman has the same right to control her own body, as does an unmarried woman.128 She
can give or withhold her consent to a sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot
unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case she refuses.
Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide
freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and
reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence.129 Women do not divest
themselves of such right by contracting marriage for the simple reason that human rights
are inalienable.130
In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape nor
provide for different definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and
apply what the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and
unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth. Neither can the Court frame distinct or
stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it would inequitably burden its victims
and unreasonably and irrationally classify them differently from the victims of non-marital
rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and the
evidentiary rules on rape any differently if the aggressor is the woman's own legal husband.
The elements and quantum of proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in rape cases
should apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship between the accused and his
accuser.
Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in accordance with the established
legal principles and evidentiary policies in the prosecution and resolution of rape cases and
found that no reversible error can be imputed to the conviction meted the accused-
appellant.
The evidence for the prosecution was
based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim.
Hence, the strict mandate that all courts must examine thoroughly the testimony of the
offended party. While the accused in a rape case may be convicted solely on the testimony
of the complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless, duty-bound to establish that their
reliance on the victim's testimony is justified. Courts must ensure that the testimony is
credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human nature. If the testimony of the
complainant meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis
thereof.131
It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to the highest respect. This is in view of its inimitable opportunity
to directly observe the witnesses and their deportment, conduct and attitude, especially
during cross-examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its evaluation was tainted with
arbitrariness or certain facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied, the same will not be disturbed on appeal.132
69
After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous scrutiny of the
entire records of the trial proceedings and the transcript of each witnesses' testimony, the
Court found no justification to disturb its findings.
Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both credible and
spontaneous. Hailed to the witness stand on six separate occasions, KKK never wavered
neither did her statements vacillate between uncertainty and certitude. She remained
consistent, categorical, straightforward, and candid during the rigorous cross-examination
and on rebuttal examination, she was able to convincingly explain and debunk the
allegations of the defense.
Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the victim by force, threat
or intimidation, fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is
incapable of giving free and voluntary consent because he/she is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious or that the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.
Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent was wrestled from her
through force and intimidation both of which were established beyond moral certainty by
the prosecution through the pertinent testimony of KKK, viz:
On the October 16, 1998 rape incident:

She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to have sex with him despite (Direct Examination)
her refusal on October 16, 1998. He initially ordered her to sleep beside him in their
conjugal bed by violently throwing the cot where she was resting. In order not to aggravate ATTY. LARGO:
his temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, he insinuated for them to have sex. When she
rejected his advances due to abdominal pain and headache, his request for intimacy
transformed into a stubborn demand. Unyielding, KKK held her panties but the accused- Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your husband, do you
appellant forcibly pulled them down. The tug caused the small clothing to tear apart. She remember what happened?
reiterated that she was not feeling well and begged him to stop. But no amount of
resistance or begging subdued him. He flexed her two legs apart, gripped her hands, A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him.
mounted her, rested his own legs on hers and inserted his penis into her vagina. She
continued pleading but he never desisted.133 Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you?

Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October 1 7, 1998 is likewise A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I warded off his hand.
unmistakable. After the appalling episode in the conjugal bedroom the previous night,
KKK decided to sleep in the children's bedroom. While her daughters were fixing the Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand?
beddings, the accused-appellant barged into the room and berated her for refusing to go
with him to their conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted to stay in the children's bedroom,
A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by touching or knocking
the accused-appellant got angry and pulled her up. MMM's attempt to pacify the accused-
her lap which means that he wanted to have sex."
appellant further enraged him. He reminded them that as the head of the family he could do
whatever he wants with his wife. To demonstrate his role as patriarch, he ordered the
children to go out of the room and thereafter proceeded to force KKK into sexual Q So, what did you do after that?
intercourse. He forcibly pulled down her short pants and panties as KKK begged "Dont do
that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well. (at this juncture the
me to do. I cannot withstand sex."134 But her pleas fell on deaf ears. The accused-appellant witness is sobbing)
removed his shorts and briefs, spread KKK's legs apart, held her hands, mounted her and
inserted his penis into her vagina. After gratifying himself, he got dressed, left the room as Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex with you?
he chuckled: "Its nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex."135
A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie [sic] was tom.
Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that must
be proved is the absence of the victim's consent to the sexual congress.136 Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?

70
A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because he is so strong. (Cross-Examination)

xx xx ATTY. AMARGA;

Q So, when your pantie [sic] was tom by your husband, what else did he do? Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband normally remove your
panty?
A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.
A Yes, Sir.
Q So after that what else did he do?
Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty because according to you
A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands no matter how I he normally do that if he have sex with you?
wrestled but I failed because he is stronger than me.
A Yes, Sir.
COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is giving her testimony.
Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?
ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont'ng.)
A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty because I don't want to
Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two legs and rode on you have sex with him at that time.
and held your two hands?
Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your panty?
A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my whole body is aching."
A Yes, Sir.
Q How did you say that to your husband?
Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time?
A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."
A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.
Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?
xxxx
xxxx
Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he also remove your
A I shouted when I uttered that words. nightgown?

xxxx A No, Sir.

Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire? Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?

xxxx A He raised my duster [sic] up.

A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything.137 Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster [sic]?
71
A No, only on the breast level.138
On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO
Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?
A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short pant and pantie forcible.
Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and pantie?
A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I
cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex."
Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it down?
A It was tom.
Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband, what did he do?
A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and mounted on me and
succeeded in having sex with me.139
The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her by gripping
her hands, flexing her legs and then resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the
consummation of his much-desired non-consensual sexual intercourse.
Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient intimidation upon KKK.
His actuations prior to the actual moment of the felonious coitus revealed that he imposed
his distorted sense of moral authority on his wife. He furiously demanded for her to lay
with him on the bed and thereafter coerced her to indulge his sexual craving.
The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with him on their
bed, when she insisted to sleep in the children's bedroom and the fact that he exercises
dominance over her as husband all cowed KKK into submission.
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal bedroom
on October 16, 1998 cannot be stretched to mean that she consented to the forced sexual
intercourse that ensued. The accused-appellant was KKK's husband and hence it was
customary for her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No consent can be deduced from such
act of KKK because at that juncture there were no indications that sexual intercourse was
about to take place. The issue of consent was still irrelevant since the act for which the
same is legally required did not exist yet or at least unclear to the person from whom the
consent was desired. The significant point when consent must be given is at that time when
it is clear to the victim that her aggressor is soliciting sexual congress. In this case, that
point is when the accused-appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK
comprehended to be an invitation for a sexual intercourse, which she refused.
Resistance, medical certificate and blood traces.
We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that KKK should have hit
him to convey that she was resisting his sexual onslaught. Resistance is not an element of
rape and the law does not impose upon the victim the burden to prove resistance140 much
more requires her to raise a specific kind thereof.
At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accused-
appellant to recognize that she seriously did not assent to a sexual congress. She held on to
her panties to prevent him from undressing her, she refused to bend her legs and she
repeatedly shouted and begged for him to stop.
Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be
just enough to bring about the desired result. What is necessary is that the force or
intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind141 or is
of such a degree as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim to bow into submission.142
Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of blood traces in KKK's panties
or the lack of a medical certificate do not negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of
blood on the victim's underwear that determines the fact of rape143 inasmuch as a medical
certificate is dispensable evidence that is not necessary to prove rape.144 These details do
not pertain to the elements that produce the gravamen of the offense that is -sexual
intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent.145
The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v. Godoy,146 the evidentiary
circumstances of which are, however, disparate from those in the present case. In Godoy,
the testimony of the complainant was inherently weak, inconsistent, and was controverted
by the prosecution's medico-legal expert witness who stated that force was not applied
based on the position of her hymenal laceration. This led the Court to conclude that the
72
absence of any sign of physical violence on the victim's body is an indication of
consent.147 Here, however, KKK's testimony is, as discussed earlier, credible, spontaneous
and forthright.
The corroborative testimonies of
MMM and OOO are worthy of credence.
The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies lacked probative
value as they did not witness the actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape
is essentially committed in relative isolation, thus, it is usually only the victim who can
testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse.148 Hence, the probative value
of MMM and OOO's testimonies rest not on whether they actually witnessed the rape but
on whether their declarations were in harmony with KKK's narration of the circumstances,
preceding, subsequent to and concurrent with, the rape incidents.
MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK's narration. MMM
heard KKK shouting and crying: "Eddie, dont do that to me, have pity on me"149 on the
night of October 16, 1998 shortly after KKK and the accused-appellant went to their
conjugal bedroom. When MMM went upstairs to check on her mother, the accused-
appellant admonished her for meddling. Frustrated to aid her mother who persistently
cried, MMM kicked the door so hard the accused-appellant was prompted to open it and
rebuke MMM once more. OOO heard all these commotion from the room downstairs.
MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her hair disheveled while her
tom panty lay on the floor. After a brief struggle with the accused-appellant, MMM and
KKK were finally able to escape and retreat to the children's bedroom where KKK narrated
to her daughters: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him
when I'm not feeling well. "
KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following night after the accused-
appellant barged inside the children's bedroom. The couple had an argument and when
MMM tried to interfere, the accused-appellant ordered her and OOO to get out after
bragging that he can have sex with his wife even in front of the children because he is the
head of the family. The girls then stayed by the staircase where they afterwards heard their
mother helplessly crying and shouting for the accused-appellant to stop.
Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that the accused-
appellant, through the use of force and intimidation, had non-consensual and forced carnal
knowledge of his wife, KKK on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom coupled with her verbal and
physical resistance were clear manifestations of coercion. Her appearance when MMM saw
her on the bed after the accused appellant opened the door on October 16, 1998, her
conduct towards the accused-appellant on her way out of the room, and her categorical
outcry to her children after the two bedroom episodes - all generate the conclusion that the
sexual acts that occurred were against her will.
Failure to immediately report to the
police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.
The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because they
failed to report the rape incidents to the police authorities or that KKK belatedly filed the
rape charges. Delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual assaults does not
necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained. 150
At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband forcing his wife to
submit to sexual intercourse is considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that she could
sue his husband for rape when Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr. (Prosecutor Tabique) told
her about it when she filed the separate charges for grave threats and physical injuries
against the accused-appellant.151
It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353
abolishing marital exemption in rape cases hence it is understandable that it was not yet
known to a layman as opposed to legal professionals like Prosecutor Tabique. In addition,
fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the common factor that deter rape victims
from reporting the crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in marital rape cases. This
is in view of the popular yet outdated belief that it is the wife's absolute obligation to
submit to her husband's carnal desires. A husband raping his own wife is often dismissed as
a peculiar occurrence or trivialized as simple domestic trouble.
Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape, the stigma
and public scrutiny that could have befallen KKK and her family had the intervention of
police authorities or even the neighbors been sought, are acceptable explanations for the
failure or delay in reporting the subject rape incidents.
The victim -S testimony on the
witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her
complaint-affidavit as evidence.
73
The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-affidavit for rape is not fatal in
view of the credible, candid and positive testimony of KKK on the witness stand.
Testimonial evidence carries more weight than the affidavit since it underwent the
rudiments of a direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross examinations. Affidavits or statements
taken ex parte are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they
are inferior to testimony given in court.152
Ill motive imputed to the victim
The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does not inspire belief as it is
riddled with loopholes generated by incongruent and flimsy evidence. The prosecution was
able to establish that the P3 Million deposit in the spouses' bank account was the proceeds
of their loan from the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI). Exhibit J, which is a BPI ML
instruction sheet dated October 31, 1996 in the amount of P3,149,840.63 is the same
amount the accused-appellant claimed to have entrusted to her wife. Although the accused-
appellant denied being aware of such loan, he admitted that approximately P3 Million was
spent for the construction of their house. These pieces of evidence effectively belie the
accused appellant's allegation that KKK could not account for the money deposited in the
bank.153
Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant failed to explain how
Bebs could be his wife KKK when the letter-sender greeted Bebs a "happy birthday" on
October 28 while KKK's birthday is June 23. The accused-appellant also did not present
Bebs herself, being a more competent witness to the existence of the alleged love letters for
KKK. He likewise failed, despite promise to do so, to present the original copies of such
love letters neither did he substantiate KKK's supposed extra-marital affairs by presenting
witnesses who could corroborate his claims. Further, the Court finds it unbelievable that an
able man would not have the temerity to confront his wife who has fooled around with 10
men - some of whom he has even met. The accused-appellant's erratic statements on the
witness stand are inconsistent with the theory of extra-marital romance making it
reasonable to infer that he merely made up those malicious stories as a desperate ploy to
extricate himself out of this legal quandary.
At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the accused-appellant's
unfounded suspicions that hold no evidentiary weight in law and thus incompetent to
destroy KKK's credibility and that of her testimony. In sum, the defense failed to present
sufficiently convincing evidence that KKK is a mere vindictive wife who is harassing the
accused-appellant with fabricated rape charges.
Alibi
It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent theory as defense, the
accused-appellant has essentially admitted the facts of sexual intercourse embodied in the
two criminal informations for rape. This admission is inconsistent with the defense of alibi
and any discussion thereon will thus be irrelevant.
At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable,
but also because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over
the positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses who had no improper motive to
testify falsely.154
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some
other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical
impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between the place where the
accused was and the place where the crime was committed when the crime transpired, but
more importantly, the facility of access between the two places.155
Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed attended a fiesta in
Dangcagan, Bukidnon or was hauling com with Equia on the dates of commission of the
crime, the same will not easily exonerate him. The accused-appellant failed to adduce clear
and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at his residence in
Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crime. Dangcagan, Bukidnon
can be traversed by about four or five hours from Cagayan de Oro City, and even less by
private vehicle which was available to the accused appellant at any time. 156 Thus, it was not
physically impossible for him to be at the situs criminis at the dates and times when the two
rape incidents were committed.
Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the positive identification and
credible testimony of the victim, and her two daughters, the Court must give weight to the
latter, especially in the absence of ill motive on their part to falsely testify against the
accused-appellant.
Conclusion
All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was sufficiently
overcome by KKK's clear, straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two
separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, without her consent
and against her will. Evidence of overwhelming force and intimidation to consummate rape
is extant from KKK's narration as believably corroborated by the testimonies of MMM and
74
OOO and the physical evidence of KKK's tom panties and short pants. Based thereon, the
reason and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the accused-appellant is guilty of
raping his wife on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
Penalties
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape, meted upon the
accused-appellant for being in accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the RPC.
Further, he shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346, which
states that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible
for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended."157
The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount of P50,000.00. Moral
damages are granted to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape under
the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she
underwent.158
The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the finding that rape took
place.1wphi1 Considering that the crime committed is simple rape, there being no
qualifying circumstances attendant in its commission, the appropriate amount
is P50,000.00159 and not P75,000.00 as awarded by the RTC.
To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a similar form of domestic
violence, an award of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages is imperative.160
The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum to
be reckoned from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. 161
A Final Note
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman's
value and dignity as a human being. It respects no time, place, age, physical condition or
social status. It can happen anywhere and it can happen to anyone. Even, as shown in the
present case, to a wife, inside her time-honored fortress, the family home, committed
against her by her husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The herein
pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our rape laws provide the atonement they
seek from their sexually coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their
wives. A husband does not own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she
does not divest herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and
thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to marital coitus. A husband
aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to
felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can seek succor before the Family Courts
that can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an
annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological
communion that achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and
self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual
coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement,
menacing personalities may use this as a tool to harass innocent husbands. In this regard,
let it be stressed that safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place to spot and
scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape complaints and any person who institutes untrue
and malicious charges will be made answerable under the pertinent provisions of the RPC
and/or other laws.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count,
without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts of
PS0,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, for each count of rape. The award of damages shall earn legal interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
75

G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD
RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner, v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN
VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1,
2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed
the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van
Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the
instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree
issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18)
months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines. 6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son
in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00
more or less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines,
respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan,
Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established
a business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of
Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are
presently living in Cebu City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support
from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph
E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latters unjust refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also
submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a
Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein
76
respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof,
states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of
Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately
deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a
fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic
abuse to the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order
against respondent.16 Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted
bail.17
Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which
respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was
arraigned.19
Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection
order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over
the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the
instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien, the
dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute
an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case
DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional
liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondents
obligation to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do
so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which equally applies to all persons in the
Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligors
nationality.24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in
the memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since
the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in
regard to a parents duty and obligation to give support to his child. Consequently, he
cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless
it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support
to his child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a
parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima
facie case exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No.
9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition
despite the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with
the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,28 which lays down the
instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme
Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
77
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45
Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter
situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition
to raise only questions of law.
In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of
the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby
judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was
rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The first mode of appeal is
taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The
second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court
only on questions of law. (Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and
the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law the response
thereto concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts,
i.e., whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262
for his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law
concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions
punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties.
The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive
ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases.
Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only
waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations
of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should prevail over the
observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless,
we do not fully agree with petitioners contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is
imperative that the legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parents obligation
to support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce
decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from
complying with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented
by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial
support.32Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated
to petitioner for any financial support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the
New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since
Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words,
insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on
support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies
to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights
and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and
duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the
RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether
he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do
so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights
and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e., the laws of the nation to which they
belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15). 39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioners
son under Article 195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant
obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to
support petitioners son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case
has the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily
concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the
matter of provision of and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the
78
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never
proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands
does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during
or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has
already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.43
In view of respondents failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is
the same as our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands
as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant
case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of
parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera',45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a
foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the
nationality principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by
respondent does not completely show that he is not liable to give support to his son after
the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioners allegation that under the
second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondents obligation to support his child is
specifically stated,46which was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent
states that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not
punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability, in light of the ruling in Bank
of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly
pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the
jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not
find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one
or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the
others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parents
obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation
is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child
to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to
support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to
perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country
if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under
Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support to
petitioners son, to wit:
79
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which
the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the
woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against
the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed
with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement
or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support
legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient
financial support;
xxxx
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her
child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of
financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.51
criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime 52 under
Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe
in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10)
years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the
crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioners
child calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the
truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this
issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and
September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to
conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered an act of violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find

strength in petitioners claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to
Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that:[p]enal
laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and
sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to
treaty stipulations. On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of
respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the
Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such,
our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is
likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondents argument that granting, but not admitting, that
there is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the

80
 Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse
under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.1 Only when the laying of hands is shown
beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the
intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child
abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.

The Case

On June 22, 2005,2 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of the petitioner for
the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.

Antecedents

On June 26, 2000, the Prosecutors Office of Legazpi City charged the petitioner in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Legazpi City with child abuse, an act in violation of Section
10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, alleging as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

That on or about the 11th day of May 2000, in the City of Legazpi Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit on the person of JAYSON DELA CRUZ, a
twelve year-old,

Grade VI pupil of MABA Institute, Legazpi City, acts of physical abuse and/or
maltreatment by striking said JAYSON DELA CRUZ with his palm hitting the latter at his
back and by slapping said minor hitting his left cheek and uttering derogatory remarks to
the latters family to wit: "Mga hayop kamo, para dayo kamo digdi, Iharap mo dito ama
mo" (You all animals, you are all strangers here. Bring your father here), which acts of the
accused are prejudicial to the childs development and which demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of the said child as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his
older brother, both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Nio at Oro Site in
Legazpi City; that when the procession passed in front of the petitioners house, the latters
daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that
G.R. NO. 169533 : March 20, 2013
the petitioner confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them names like "strangers" and
"animals"; that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson
GEORGE BONGALON, Petitioner, v.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
on the face;4 that the petitioner then went to the brothers house and challenged Rolando
dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house to take on the
DECISION petitioner; that Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and
reported the incident; that Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional
BERSAMIN, J.:
81
Training and Teaching Hospital;5 that the doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical
certificates attesting that Jayson suffered the following contusions, to wit: (1) contusion .5
x 2.5 scapular area, left; and (2) +1x1 cm. contusion left zygomatic area and contusion .5 x
2.33 cm. scapular area, left.6chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He
explained that he only talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn,
his minor daughters, had told him about Jayson and Roldans throwing stones at them and
about Jaysons burning Cherrylyns hair. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging
Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from harming his
daughters.7chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
To corroborate the petitioners testimony, Mary Ann Rose testified that her father did not
hit or slap but only confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her daughters "Kimi"
and why he had burned Cherrlyns hair. Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson
and calling him a "sissy." She insisted that it was instead Jayson who had pelted her with
stones during the procession. She described the petitioner as a loving and protective
father.8chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC found and declared the petitioner guilty of child abuse as charged, to
wit:9chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused GEORGE BONGALON @ "GI" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Republic Act No. 7610, and is hereby ordered to undergo imprisonment of six
(6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor in its minimum period.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner assailed the credibility of the Prosecution witnesses by citing their
inconsistencies. He contended that the RTC overlooked or disregarded material facts and
circumstances in the records that would have led to a favorable judgment for him. He
attacked the lack of credibility of the witnesses presented against him, citing the failure of
the complaining brothers to react to the incident, which was unnatural and contrary to
human experience.
The CA affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty,10 viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 20, 2003 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 9 of Legazpi City is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
accused-appellant George Bongalon is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum term, to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and 1 day of prision mayor as the maximum term.
Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Jayson de la Cruz the additional
amount of P5,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.11chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The petitioner asserts that he was not guilty of the crime charged; and that even assuming
that he was guilty, his liability should be mitigated because he had merely acted to protect
her two minor daughters.
Ruling of the Court
At the outset, we should observe that the petitioner has adopted the wrong remedy in
assailing the CAs affirmance of his conviction. His proper recourse from the affirmance of
his conviction was an appeal taken in due course. Hence, he should have filed a petition for
review on certiorari. Instead, he wrongly brought a petition for certiorari. We explained
why in People v. Court of Appeals:12chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction
only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal
office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to
prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. As observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. "the
special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison detre for the rule is when a court
exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprived it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed
by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a
void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence,
where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decisionnot the jurisdiction of the court to render said decisionthe same is beyond the
province of a special civil action for certiorari. The proper recourse of the aggrieved party
82
from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 whole case for review, we should deem it our duty to correct errors in the appealed
of the Revised Rules of Court. judgment, whether assigned or not.17chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

It is of no consequence that the petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of The law under which the petitioner was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is
the CA in his petition. The allegation of grave abuse of discretion no more warrants the Section 10 (a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610, which relevantly
granting of due course to the petition as one for certiorari if appeal was available as a states:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
proper and adequate remedy. At any rate, a reading of his presentation of the issues in his
petition indicates that he thereby imputes to the CA errors of judgment, not errors of Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions
jurisdiction. He mentions instances attendant during the commission of the crime that he Prejudicial to the Childs Development.
claims were really constitutive of justifying and mitigating circumstances; and specifies
reasons why he believes Republic Act No. 7610 favors his innocence rather than his guilt (a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
for the crime charged.13 The errors he thereby underscores in the petition concerned only responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs development including those
the CAs appreciation and assessment of the evidence on record, which really are errors of covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
judgment, not of jurisdiction. Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period.
Even if we were to treat the petition as one brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, it
would still be defective due to its being filed beyond the period provided by law. Section 2 xxx
of Rule 45 requires the filing of the petition within 15 days from the notice of judgment to
be appealed. However, the petitioner received a copy of the CAs decision on July 15, Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as
2005,14 but filed the petition only on September 12, 2005,15 or well beyond the period follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
prescribed by the Rules of Court.
Section 3. Definition of terms.
The procedural transgressions of the petitioner notwithstanding, we opt to forego quickly
dismissing the petition, and instead set ourselves upon the task of resolving the issues xxx
posed by the petition on their merits. We cannot fairly and justly ignore his plea about the
sentence imposed on him not being commensurate to the wrong he committed. His plea is (b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
worthy of another long and hard look. If, on the other hand, we were to outrightly dismiss includes any of the following:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
his plea because of the procedural lapses he has committed, the Court may be seen as an
unfeeling tribunal of last resort willing to sacrifice justice in order to give premium to the
rigidity of its rules of procedure. But the Rules of Court has not been intended to be rigidly (1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
enforced at all times. Rather, it has been instituted first and foremost to ensure justice to
maltreatment;cralawlibrary
every litigant. Indeed, its announced objective has been to secure a "just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."16 This objective will be beyond
realization here unless the Rules of Court be given liberal construction and application as (2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
the noble ends of justice demand. Thereby, we give primacy to substance over form, which,
to a temple of justice and equity like the Court, now becomes the ideal ingredient in the dignity of a child as a human being;cralawlibrary
dispensation of justice in the case now awaiting our consideration.
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
The petitioners right to liberty is in jeopardy. He may be entirely deprived of such
birthright without due process of law unless we shunt aside the rigidity of the rules of
procedure and review his case. Hence, we treat this recourse as an appeal timely brought to (4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
the Court. Consonant with the basic rule in criminal procedure that an appeal opens the
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
83
 xxx
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the
petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we
disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the
above-quoted provisions. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his
laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of
Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson.
The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the
moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for
the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of
Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to
debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that
was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is
resolved in favor of the petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all
possible circumstances in his favor.18chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
daughters, and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyns hair, the petitioner was entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of passion. Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period
(i.e., one day to 10 days) in the absence of any aggravating circumstance that offset the
mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law
being inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not exceeding one year,24 the petitioner shall
suffer a straight penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.
The award of moral damages to Jayson is appropriate. Such damages are granted in
criminal cases resulting in physical injuries.25 The amount of P5,000.00 fixed by the lower
courts as moral damages is consistent with the current
jurisprudence.26chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ENTER a new
judgment: (a) finding petitioner George Bongalon GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 1, Article 266, of the Revised
Penal Code; (b) sentencing him to suffer the penalty of 10 days of arresto menor; and (c)
ordering him to pay Jayson Dela Cruz the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages, plus the
costs of suit.

What crime, then, did the petitioner commit? SO ORDERED.

Considering that Jaysons physical injury required five to seven days of medical
attention,19 the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical
attendance during the same period.

xxx

The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day to 30
days of imprisonment.20 In imposing the correct penalty, however, we have to consider the
mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of the Revised Penal
Code,21 because the petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the
exercise of his will power.22 Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing
only in the honest belief of the accused.23 It is relevant to mention, too, that in passion or
obfuscation, the offender suffers a diminution of intelligence and intent. With his having
acted under the belief that Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones at his two minor

84
 The petitioner, a public schoolteacher, was charged with and found guilty of child abuse, a
violation of Republic Act No. 7610.1 The victim was her own Grade 1 pupil whom she
physically maltreated for having accidentally bumped her knee while she was drowsing off
on a bamboo sofa as he entered the classroom. Her maltreatment left him with physical
injuries, as duly certified by a physician.

Whether or not the petitioner thereby committed child abuse is the question that this appeal
must determine, in light of the Court's pronouncement in Bongalon v. People of the
Philippines2 that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child
abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is
shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished
as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.

Antecedents

The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, summed up the factual antecedents
in its comment,3 as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On February 13, 1996, seven year old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at
Pughanan Elementary School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was
hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher,
petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa (TSN, March 14, 1997,
pp. 5-6). Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her. When
Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6),
petitioner went to Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his
armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan's body hit a desk. As a result,
he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael Ryan up by his ears and
repeatedly slammed him down on the floor. Michael Ryan cried (TSN, March 14, 1997, p.
6; TSN, November 13, 1997, p. 7).

G.R. No. 173988, October 08, 2014 After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break, Michael
Ryan, accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went
FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. home crying and told his mother about the incident (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 7). His
mother and his Aunt Evangeline Gonzales reported the incident to their Barangay Captain,
DECISION Gonzalo Larroza (TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4) who advised them to have Michael Ryan
examined by a doctor. Michael Ryan's aunt and Barangay Councilman Ernesto Ligante
BERSAMIN, J.: brought him to the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Hospital where he was examined by Dr. Teresita
Castigador. They, likewise, reported the incident to the Police Station (TSN, July 27, 1997,
p. 6; TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4).
85

The medical certificate issued by Dr. Teresita Castigador reads, in part:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head.
The petitioner was criminally charged with child abuse in the Regional Trial Court in Iloilo
City (RTC), and the case was assigned to Branch 27 of that court. The information alleged
as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo, upon approval and Directive of the Deputy
OMBUDSMAN for the Visayas accuses FELINA ROSALDES of the crime of
VIOLATION OF CHILD ABUSE LAW (Section 10 (a) of R..A. 7610), committed as
follows:
That on or about the 13th day of February 1996, in the Municipality of Lambunao, Province
of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being a public school teacher in Grade 1 of Pughanan Elementary School, with a
Salary Grade below 26, under the DECS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously maltreat her pupil Michael Ryan Gonzales, a seven year old child, by pinching
him on different parts of his body, and thereafter slumping him to the ground, thereby
causing Michael Ryan Gonzales to lose his consciousness and has suffered injuries on
different parts of his body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On June 26, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of child
abuse,5 disposing as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section
10 (a), Article VI of R.A. 7610, the Court sentences her to an indeterminate prison term
ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correctional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the
costs.
No pronouncement as to civil liability, the same not having been proved.
SO ORDERED.6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the petitioner through its assailed decision
promulgated on May 11, 2005,7 with a modification of the
penalty, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by
us DISMISSING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision rendered on
June 26, 2003 by the court a quo in Criminal Case No. 46893 with
the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correctional, as the
minimum of it, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the maximum
thereof.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In her petition for review on certiorari,9 the petitioner submits
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that the acts of the
petitioner constitute child abuse penalized under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610[,]
and not under the Revised Penal Code.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that petitioner's
constitutional right to due process and her right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against her was not violated when the essential elements of the crime
charged were not properly recited in the information.10
Countering, the State, through the OSG, insists that the issues the petitioner is raising are
mainly factual and, therefore, not reviewable under the mode of appeal chosen; that the
affirmance of her conviction by the CA was in accord with the pertinent law and
jurisprudence, and supported by the overwhelming evidence of the trial; and that the
information charging her with child abuse was sufficient in form and substance. 11
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
First of all, the State correctly contends that the petitioner could raise only questions of law
in her present recourse. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the appeal is limited to
86
questions of law. The immediate implication of the limitation is to have the findings of fact
by the CA, which affirmed the findings of fact by the trial court, conclude the Court by
virtue of its not being a trier of fact. As such, the Court cannot analyze or weigh the
evidence all over again.
It is true that the limitation of the review to errors of law admits of exceptions. Under
Section 4, Rule 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, the following situations are
the exceptions in which the Court may review findings of fact by the lower courts, to wit:
(a) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture;
(b) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (c) there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) the findings of fact are conflicting; (f)
the collegial appellate courts went beyond the issues of the case, and their findings are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) the findings of fact of the
collegial appellate courts are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) said findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondents; (j) the findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are premised on the
supposed evidence, but are contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) all other similar
and exceptional cases warranting a review of the lower courts' findings of fact. A further
exception is recognized when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.12 Yet, none of the exceptions applies herein.
Secondly, the petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries
suffered by Michael Ryan to maltreat or malign him in a manner that would debase,
demean or degrade his dignity. She characterizes her maltreatment as an act of discipline
that she as a schoolteacher could reasonably do towards the development of the child. She
insists that her act further came under the doctrine of in loco parentis.
The contention of the petitioner is utterly bereft of merit.
Although the petitioner, as a schoolteacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her
pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive.
The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands.13 She could not justifiably
claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of
him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned
the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator, teacher or individual
engaged in child care exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco
parentis), viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same
authority over the person of the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care
exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child, (n)
Proof of the severe results of the petitioner's physical maltreatment of Michael Ryan was
provided by Dr. Teresita Castigador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y.
Ladrido Memorial Hospital in Iloilo who examined the victim at about 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of February 13, 1996, barely three hours from the time the boy had sustained his
injuries. Her Medical Report stated as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head.
Reflecting her impressions of the physical injuries based on the testimonial explanations of
Dr. Castigador, the trial judge observed in the decision of June 26,
2003:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A petechiae (wound no. 1), according to Dr. Castigador is a discoloration of the skin caused
by the extravasation of blood beneath it. She opined that the petechiae and tenderness of
the ears of the victim could have been caused by pinching. As to the lumbar pain and
tenderness at the third and fourth level of the vertebrae (wound no. 2), the doctor
testified that during her examination of the victim the latter felt pain when she put
pressure on the said area. She stated that this could be caused by pressure or contact
with a hard object. Wound No. 3 is located on the victim's left inner thigh. According
to her this could not have been caused by ordinary pinching with pressure. Wound
No. 4 is located on the upper part of the left thigh. Dr. Castigador testified that she
noticed that the boy was limping as he walked.14
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child
abuse thusly:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxxx
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child
87
which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;chanrobleslaw
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an
act by deeds or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity
of a child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the
petitioner "went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old
boy, when she pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the
armpits and threw him on the floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body hit the desk
causing him to lose consciousness [but instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-
appellant further held the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the floor."15 On her
part, the trial judge said that the physical pain experienced by the victim had been
aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to school altogether out
of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to another school where he
had to adjust again.16 Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that
the petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic
worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being.
It was also shown that Michael Ryan's physical maltreatment by the petitioner was neither
her first or only maltreatment of a child. Prosecution witness Louella Loredo revealed on
cross examination that she had also experienced the petitioner's cruelty.17 The petitioner
was also convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City (Branch 39) in Criminal Case No. 348921 for
maltreatment of another child named Dariel Legayada.18 Such previous incidents
manifested that the petitioner had "a propensity for violence," as the trial judge stated in
her decision of June 26, 2003.19
Thirdly, the petitioner submits that the information charging her with child abuse was
insufficient in form and substance, in that the essential elements of the crime charged were
not properly alleged therein; and that her constitutional and statutory right to due process of
law was consequently violated.
The petitioner's submission deserves scant consideration.
Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
proximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
The information explicitly averred the offense of child abuse charged against the petitioner
in the context of the statutory definition of child abuse found in Section 3 (b) of Republic
Act No. 7610, supra, and thus complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain the petitioner's challenge against the
sufficiency of the information in form and substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge
was prior to the time she pleaded to the information through a motion to quash on the
ground that the information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did not
charge an offense. She did not do so, resulting in her waiver of the challenge.
Fourthly, the RTC did not grant civil damages as civil liability ex delicto because no
evidence had been adduced thereon.20 The CA saw nothing wrong with the omission by the
trial court. The explanation tendered by the trial judge for the omission was misplaced,
however, because even without proof of the actual expenses, or testimony on the victim's
feelings, the lower courts still had the authority to define and allow civil liability arising
from the offense and the means to fix their extent. The child abuse surely inflicted on
Michael Ryan physical and emotional trauma as well as moral injury. It cannot also be
denied that his parents necessarily spent for his treatment. We hold that both lower courts
committed a plain error that demands correction by the Court. Indeed, as the Court pointed
out in Bacolod v. People,21 it was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties
when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the
accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a
waiver of its recovery," explaining the reason for doing so in the following
manner:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate
under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it was of
conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended
its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and
(4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be
recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the
88
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or
waived." Their disregard compels us to act as we now do lest the Court be unreasonably
seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the
correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as
the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any
time a matter of law and justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the
parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their
judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights
and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of
such rights and obligations would they be true to the judicial office of administering justice
and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments
of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the
Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong
penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and
set the civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining
victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless
the enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived. 22
Moral damages should be awarded to assuage the moral and emotional sufferings of the
victim, and in that respect the Court believes and holds that P20,000.00 is reasonable. The
victim was likewise entitled to exemplary damages, considering that Article 2230 of
the Civil Code authorizes such damages if at least one aggravating circumstance attended
the commission of the crime. The child abuse committed by the petitioner was aggravated
her being a public schoolteacher, a factor in raising the penalty to its maximum period
pursuant to Section 31(e) of Republic Act No. 7610. The amount of P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages is imposed on in order to set an example for the public good and as a
deterrent to other public schoolteachers who violate the ban imposed by Article 233 of the
Family Code, supra, against the infliction of corporal punishment on children under their
substitute parental authority. The lack of proof of the actual expenses for the victim's
treatment should not hinder the granting of a measure of compensation in the form of
temperate damages, which, according to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, may be recovered
when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with
certainty. There being no question about the injuries sustained requiring medical treatment,
temperate damages of at least P20,000.00 are warranted, for it would be inequitable not to
recognize the need for the treatment. Lastly, interest of 6% per annum shall be charged on
all the items of civil liability, to be reckoned from the finality of this decision until full
payment.
The penalty for the child abuse committed by the petitioner is that prescribed in Section
10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development. -
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to
be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those
covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period.
xxxx
The CA revised the penalty fixed by the RTC by imposing the indeterminate penalty of
four years, two months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and
one day of prision mayor, as the maximum, on the ground that the offense was aggravated
by the petitioner being a public schoolteacher.23 It cited Section 31(e) of Republic Act No.
7610, which commands that the penalty provided in the Act "shall be imposed in its
maximum period if the offender is a public officer or employee." Her being a public
schoolteacher was alleged in the information and established by evidence as well as
admitted by her. The revised penalty was erroneous, however, because Section 10 (a) of
Republic Act No. 7610 punishes the crime committed by the petitioner with prision
mayor in its minimum period, whose three periods are six years and one day to six years
and eight months, for the minimum period; six years, eight months and one day to seven
years and four months, for the medium period; and seven years, four months and one day
to eight years, for the maximum period. The maximum of the indeterminate sentence
should come from the maximum period, therefore, and the Court fixes it at seven years,
four months and one day of prision mayor. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence
should come from prision correccional in the maximum period, the penalty next lower
than prision mayor in its minimum period, whose range is from four years, two months and
one day to six years. Accordingly, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is four years,
nine months and 11 days, and the maximum is seven years, four months and one day
of prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 11, 2005, subject
to the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum,
to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the maximum; (b)
the petitioner shall pay to Michael Ryan Gonzales P20,000.00 as moral damages,
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P20,00Q.00 as temperate damages, plus interest at
the rate of 6% per annum on each item of the civil liability reckoned from the finality of
89
this decision until full payment; and (c) the petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
Armando Chingh y Parcia (Armando) seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of
SO ORDERED Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01119 convicting him of Statutory Rape and Rape
Through Sexual Assault.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

On March 19, 2005, an Information for Rape was filed against Armando for inserting his
fingers and afterwards his penis into the private part of his minor victim, VVV,2 the
accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about March 11, 2004 in the City of Manila, Philippines, [Armando], with lewd
design and by means of force, violence and intimidation did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly commit sexual abuse and lascivious conduct upon a ten (10)
year old minor child, [VVV], by then and there pulling her in a dark place then mashing
her breast and inserting his fingers in her vagina and afterwards his penis, against her will
and consent, thereby causing serious danger to the normal growth and development of the
child [VVV], to her damage and prejudice.

Contrary to law.3

Upon his arraignment, Armando pleaded not guilty to the charge. Consequently, trial on the
merits ensued.

At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the victim, VVV; the victim's
father; PO3 Ma. Teresa Solidarios; and Dr. Irene Baluyot. The defense, on the other hand,
presented the lone testimony Armando as evidence.

Evidence for the Prosecution

Born on 16 September 1993, VVV was only 10 years old at the time of the incident. On 11
March 2004 at around 8:00 p.m., along with five other playmates, VVV proceeded to a
store to buy food. While she was beckoning the storekeeper, who was not then at her
station, Armando approached and pulled her hand and threatened not to shout for help or
[G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011] talk. Armando brought her to a vacant lot at Tindalo Street, about 400 meters from the
store. While in a standing position beside an unoccupied passenger jeepney, Armando
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ARMANDO mashed her breast and inserted his right hand index finger into her private part. Despite
CHINGH Y PARCIA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. VVV's pleas for him to stop, Armando unzipped his pants, lifted VVV and rammed his
phallus inside her vagina, causing her to feel excruciating pain.
DECISION
Threatened with death if she would tell anyone what had happened, VVV kept mum about
PERALTA, J.: her traumatic experience when she arrived home. Noticing her odd and uneasy demeanor
90
as well as her blood-stained underwear, however, her father pressed her for an explanation.
VVV confessed to her father about her unfortunate experience. Immediately, they reported
the matter to the police authorities. After his arrest, Armando was positively identified by
VVV in a police line-up.
The genital examination of VVV conducted by Dr. Irene Baluyot (Dr. Baluyot) of the
Philippine General Hospital's Child Protection Unit, in the morning of 12 March 2004,
showed a ''fresh laceration with bleeding at 6 o'clock position" in the child's hymen and
"minimal bleeding from [said] hymen laceration." Her impression was that there was a
"clear evidence"' of "penetrating trauma" which happened within 24 hours prior to the
examination. The photograph of the lacerated genitalia of VVV strongly illustrated and
buttressed Dr. Baluyot's medical report.4
Evidence for the Defense
Armando denied that he raped VVV. Under his version, in (sic) the night of 11 March
2004, he and his granddaughter were on their way to his cousin's house at Payumo St.,
Tondo, Manila. As it was already late, he told his granddaughter to just go home ahead of
him while he decided to go to Blumentritt market to buy food. While passing by a small
alley on his way thereto, he saw VVV along with some companions, peeling "dalanghita."
VVV approached him and asked if she could go with him to the market because she will
buy "dalanghita" or sunkist. He refused her request and told VVV instead to go home. He
then proceeded towards Blumentritt, but before he could reach the market, he experienced
rheumatic pains that prompted him to return home. Upon arriving home, at about 8:30
o'clock in the evening, he watched television with his wife and children. Shortly thereafter,
three (3) barangay officials arrived, arrested him, and brought him to a police precinct
where he was informed of VVV's accusation against him.5
On April 29, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), Branch 43, after finding the
evidence of the prosecution overwhelming against the accused's defense of denial and alibi,
rendered a Decision6 convicting Armando of Statutory Rape. The dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused ARMANDO CHINGH
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Statutory Rape defined and
penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
RA 8353 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to
indemnify private complainant [VVV] the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as
compensatory damages, fifty thousand pesos (P50.000.00) as moral damages and to pay the
costs.
It appearing that accused is detained, the period of his detention shall be credited in the
service of his sentence.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Armando appealed the Decision before the CA, which was docketed as CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01119.
On December 29, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision7 finding Armando not only guilty of
Statutory Rape, but also of Rape Through Sexual Assault. The decretal portion of said
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS: accused-appellant is hereby found GUILTY of two counts
of rape and is, accordingly, sentenced to suffer, for the crime of statutory rape, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and, for the offense of rape through sexual assault, the indeterminate
penalty of 3 years, 3 months and 1 day of prision correctional, as minimum, to 8 years and
11 months and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay the
victim, a total of P80,000.00 as civil indemnity, P80,000.00 as moral damages; and
P40,000.00 as exemplary damages, or a grand total of P200,000.00 for the two counts of
rape.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.8
In fine, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, and considering that the appeal opened
the entire case for judicial review, the CA also found Armando guilty of the crime of Rape
Through Sexual Assault. The CA opined that since the Information charged Armando with
two counts of rape: (1) by inserting his finger in the victim's vagina, which is classified as
Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended; and (2) for inserting his penis in the private part of his victim, which is
Statutory Rape, and considering that Armando failed to object thereto through a motion to
quash before entering his plea, Armando could be convicted of as many offenses as are
charged and proved.
The CA ratiocinated that coupled with the credible, direct, and candid testimony of the
victim, the elements of Statutory Rape and Rape Through Sexual Assault were indubitably
established by the prosecution.
Armando now comes before this Court for relief.
91

In a Resolution9 dated September 26, 2007, the Court required the parties to file their
respective supplemental briefs. In their respective Manifestations,10 the parties waived the
filing of their supplemental briefs, and instead adopted their respective briefs filed before
the CA.
Hence, Armando raises the following errors:
I candid and truthful testimony of traumatic events. VVV's testimony was corroborated and
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF
THE CRIME OF RAPE UNDER ARTICLE 266-A, PARAGRAPH 1 (D) OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE IN SPITE THE UNNATURAL AND UNREALISTIC
TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE
OFFENSE CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Simply stated, Armando is assailing the factual basis of his conviction, which in effect,
mainly questions the credibility of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution,
particularly his victim, VVV.
Armando maintains that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that will
overcome the presumption of innocence. Likewise,
Armando insists that the RTC gravely erred in convicting him based on the unrealistic and
unnatural testimony of the victim. Armando claims that VVV's testimony was so
inconsistent with common experience that it deserves careful and critical evaluation. First,
it was so unnatural for VVV to remain quiet and not ask for help when the accused
allegedly pulled her in the presence of several companions and bystanders; second, VVV
did not resist or cry for help while they were on their way to the place where she was
allegedly abused, which was 300 to 400 meters away from where he allegedly pulled her;
third, VVV could have run away while Armando was allegedly molesting her, but she did
not; fourth, Armando could not have inserted his penis in the victim's organ while both of
them were standing, unless the victim did not offer any resistance.
Generally, the Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses, as it was in the better position to observe their candor and behavior on the
witness stand. Evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter
best undertaken by the trial court; it had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
and their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, especially under cross-examination. Its
assessment is entitled to respect unless certain facts of substance and value were
overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.11
From the testimony of the victim, VVV, she positvely identified Armando as the one who
ravanged her on that fateful night of March 11, 2004. VVV clearly narrated her harrowing
experience in the hands of the accused. Notwithstanding her innocence and despite the
thorough cross-examination by Armando's counsel, VVV never faltered and gave a very
bolstered by the findings of Dr. Irene Baluyot that the victim's genital area showed a fresh
laceration with bleeding at 6 o'clock position in her hymen.12 Dr. Baluyot concluded that an
acute injury occurred within 24 hours prior to the examination and that the occurrence of
rape within that period was very possible.13 Also, the age of VVV at the time the incident
occurred, which was 10 years old, was duly established by her birth certificate,14 her
testimony,15 and that of her father's.16
Time and again, this Court has held that when the offended parties are young and immature
girls, as in this case, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired,
considering not only their relative vulnerability, but also the shame and embarrassment to
which they would be exposed if the matter about which they testified were not true.17 A
young girl would not usually concoct a tale of defloration; publicly admit having been
ravished and her honor tainted; allow the examination of her private parts; and undergo all
the trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial, had
she not in fact been raped and been truly moved to protect and preserve her honor, and
motivated by the desire to obtain justice for the wicked acts committed against
her.18 Moreover, the Court has repeatedly held that the lone testimony of the victim in a
rape case, if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction.19
On the other hand, Armando admitted that he saw VVV on the date of the incident, but
denied the accusations against him and merely relied on his defense that he was watching
TV with his family when barangay officials arrested him.
Armando's defenses were also unavailing. His contention that it was unnatural and
unrealistic for VVV to remain quiet when he pulled her from her companions and why she
did not cry for help or run away when he was allegedly ravaging her deserves scant
consideration. Clearly, the reason why VVV did not shout for help was because Armando
told her not to shout or talk.20 Likewise, the reason why VVV did not run when Armando
was molesting her was because his finger was still inside her private part.21 Moreover,
Armando's argument that he could not have inserted his penis in the victim's organ while
both of them were standing is preposterous. It is settled that sexual intercourse in a
standing position, while perhaps uncomfortable, is not improbable.22
Armando tendered nothing but his bare denial and contention that he was elsewhere when
92
the crime was committed. Aside from this, he presented no more evidence to substantiate
his claims. Jurisprudence dictates that denial and alibi are the common defenses in rape
cases. Sexual abuse is denied on the allegation that the accused was somewhere else and
could not have physically committed the crime. This Court has always held that these two
defenses are inherently weak and must be supported by clear and convincing evidence in
order to be believed. As negative defenses, they cannot prevail over the positive testimony
of the complainant.23 Consequently, Armando's bare denial and alibi must fail against the
testimony of VVV and her positive identification that he was the perpetrator of the horrid
deed. Unmistakably, it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that Armando had carnal
knowledge of VVV.
Anent Armando's conviction for the crime of Rape Through Sexual Assault.
The CA correctly found Armando guilty of the crime of Rape Through Sexual Assault
under paragraph 2, Article 266-A, of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8353, or The Anti-Rape Law of
1997.24 From the Information, it is clear that Armando was being charged with two
offenses, Rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, and rape as
an act of sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A. Armando was charged with
having carnal knowledge of VVV, who was under twelve years of age at the time, under
paragraph 1 (d) of Article 266-A, and he was also charged with committing an act of sexual
assault by inserting his finger into the genital of VVV under the second paragraph of
Article 266-A. Indeed, two instances of rape were proven at the trial. First, it was
established that Armando inserted his penis into the private part of his victim,
VVV. Second, through the testimony of VVV, it was proven that Armando also inserted his
finger in VVV's private part.
The Information has sufficiently informed accused-appellant that he is being charged with
two counts of rape. Although two offenses were charged, which is a violation of Section
13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that "[a] complaint
or information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single
punishment for various offenses." Nonetheless, Section 3, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure also states that "[w]hen two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may
convict the appellant of as many as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty
for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense."
Consequently, since Armando failed to file a motion to quash the Information, he can be
convicted with two counts of rape.
As to the proper penalty, We affirm the CA's imposition of Reclusion Perpetua for rape
under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A. However, We modify the penalty for Rape Through
Sexual Assault.
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual abuse, VVV was ten (10)
years old. This calls for the application of R.A. No. 7610, or "The Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," which defines sexual
abuse of children and prescribes the penalty therefor in Section 5 (b), Article III, to wit:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female,
who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed
to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article
335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period.25
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child
exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It covers
not only a situation where a child is abused for profit, but also where one through
coercion, intimidation or influence engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child.26
Corollarilly, Section 2 (h) of the rules and regulations27 of R.A. No. 7610 defines
"Lascivious conduct" as:
[T]he intentional touching,' either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.28
In this case, the offended party was ten years old at the time of the commission of the
offense. Pursuant to the above-quoted provision of law, Armando was aptly prosecuted
93
under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; and for Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2,
8353,29 for Rape Through Sexual Assault. However, instead of applying the penalty Article 266-A, he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten
prescribed therein, which is prision mayor, considering that VVV was below 12 years of (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15)
age, and considering further that Armando's act of inserting his finger in VVV's private part years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is
undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct, the appropriate imposable penalty should be likewise ordered to pay VVV the total of P80,000.00 as civil indemnity, P80,000.00 as
that provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in moral damages, and P60,000.00 as exemplary damages.
its medium period.
SO ORDERED.
The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused who commits acts of lasciviousness
under Article 366, in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, suffers the more
severe penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period than the one who commits Rape
Through Sexual Assault, which is merely punishable by prision mayor. This is undeniably
unfair to the child victim. To be sure, it was not the intention of the framers of R.A. No.
8353 to have disallowed the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to sexual abuses committed to
children. Despite the passage of R.A. No. 8353,

R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which must be applied when the victims are children or
those "persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take
care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition."30

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty
shall be that which could be properly imposed under the law, which is fifteen (15) years,
six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal. On the other hand, the
minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which
is reclusion temporal in its minimum period, or twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.

Hence, Armando should be meted the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years, ten (10)
months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years,
six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

As to Armando's civil liabilities, the CA correctly awarded the following damages: civil
indemnity of P50,000.00 and another P50,000.00 as moral damages for Rape under
paragraph l(d), Article 266-A; and civil indemnity of P30,000.00 and moral damages also
of P30,000.00 for Rape under paragraph 2, Article 266-A. In line, however, with prevailing
jurisprudence, we increase the award of exemplary damages from P25,000.00 and PI
5,000.00, for Rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A and Rape under paragraph 2,
Article 266-A, respectively, to P30,000.00 for each count of rape.31

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated December 29,
2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01119 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. For Rape
under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A, Armando Chingh y Parcia is sentenced to suffer the
94

G.R. No. 207949, July 23, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARMANDO DIONALDO Y
EBRON, RENATO DIONALDO Y EBRON, MARIANO GARIGUEZ, JR.Y
RAMOS, AND RODOLFO LARIDO Y EBRON, Accused-Appellants.
RE SOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated February 15, 2013 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888 finding accused-appellants Armando
Dionaldo y Ebron (Armando), Renata Dionaldo y Ebron (Renata), Mariano Gariguez,
Jr. y Ramos (Mariano), and Rodolfo Larido y Ebron (Rodolfo) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The Facts
At around 8 o'clock in the morning of May 16, 2003, Roderick Navarro (Roderick)
dropped his brother Edwin Navarro (Edwin) off at the Health Is Wealth Gym in Caloocan
City. Thirty minutes later, he received a text message from another brother who told him
that Edwin had been kidnapped.2 Records show that three (3) men, later identified as
Armando, Renato, and Mariano, forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin down the stairway of
the gym and pushed him inside a dark green Toyota car with plate number UKF 194.3 Upon
receiving the message, Roderick immediately reported the incident to the police. At around
10 o`1clock in the morning of the same day, he received a phone call from Edwin's
kidnappers who threatened to kill Edwin if he should report the matter to the
police.4cralawlawlibrary
The following day, Roderick received another call from the kidnappers, who demanded the
payment of ransom money in the amount of P15,000,000.00. Roderick told them he had no
such money, as he only had P50,000.00. On May 19, 2003, after negotiations over the
telephone, the kidnappers agreed to release Edwin in exchange for the amount of
P110,000.00. Roderick was then instructed to bring the money to Batangas and wait for
their next call.5cralawlawlibrary
At around 7:30 in the evening of the same day, as Roderick was on his way to Batangas to
deliver the ransom money, the kidnappers called and instructed him to open all the
windows of the car he was driving and to turn on the hazard light when he reaches the
designated place. After a while, Roderick received another call directing him to exit in
Bicutan instead and proceed to C-5 until he arrives at the Centennial Village. He was told
to park beside the Libingan ng mga Bayani. After several hours, an orange Mitsubishi car
with plate number DEH 498 pulled up in front of his vehicle where four (4) men alighted.
Roderick saw one of the men take a mobile phone and upon uttering the word alat, the
men returned to their car and drove away.6cralawlawlibrary
Meanwhile, a team had been organized to investigate the kidnapping of Edwin, headed by
SPO3 Romeo Caballero (SPO3 Caballero) and PO3 Nestor Acebuche (PO3 Acebuche) of
the Camp Crame Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER). During the course of
the investigation, Rodolfo, an employee at the Health Is Wealth Gym, confessed to PO3
Acebuche that he was part of the plan to kidnap Edwin, as in fact he was the one who
95
tipped off Mariano, Renato, Armando and a certain Virgilio7 Varona8 (Virgilio) on the
condition that he will be given a share in the ransom money. Rodolfo gave information on
the whereabouts of his cohorts, leading to their arrest on June 12, 2003. In the early
morning of the following day or on June 13, 2003, the PACER team found the dead body
of Edwin at Sitio Pugpugan Laurel, Batangas, which Roderick identified.9cralawlawlibrary
Thus, accused-appellants as well as Virgilio were charged in an Information10 which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 16th day of May, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and
mutually helping one another, being then private persons, did then and there by force and
intimidation willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of motor vehicle and
superior strength take, carry and deprive EDWIN NAVARRO Y ONA, of his liberty against
his will, for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand of P15,000,000.00 was
made as a condition of the victim?s release and on the occasion thereof, the death of the
victim resulted.
Contrary to law.
During arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty 11 and interposed the defenses
of denial and alibi. Except for Rodolfo, they individually claimed that on said date and
time, they were in their respective houses when they were taken by men in police uniforms,
then subsequently brought to Camp Crame, and there allegedly tortured and detained. On
the other hand, Rodolfo, for himself, averred that at around 8 o?clock in the evening of
June 12, 2003, while walking on his way home, he noticed that a van had been following
him. Suddenly, four (4) persons alighted from the vehicle, boarded him inside, blindfolded
him, and eventually tortured him. He likewise claimed that he was made to sign an
extrajudicial confession, purporting too that while a certain Atty. Nepomuceno had been
summoned to assist him, the latter failed to do so.12cralawlawlibrary
During trial, the death of the victim, Edwin, was established through a Certificate of
Death13 with Registry No. 2003-050 (subject certificate of death) showing that he died on
May 19, 2003 from a gunshot wound on the head.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision14 dated June 13, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129
(RTC), in Crim. Case No. C-68329, convicted accused-appellants of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
It gave credence to the positive and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses which clearly established that it was the accused- appellants who forcibly
dragged a bloodied Edwin into a car and, consequently, deprived him of his liberty.15 In
light thereof, it rejected accused-appellants' respective alibis and claims of torture, which
were not substantiated. It also held that the crime of Kidnapping had been committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom, which is punishable by death. However, in view of the
suspended imposition of the death penalty pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 9346,16 only
the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed.17 Further, the RTC found that conspiracy
attended the commission of the crime, as the accused-appellants' individual participation
was geared toward a joint purpose and criminal design.18cralawlawlibrary
Notably, while the RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses prove that
the victim Edwin was abducted, deprived of liberty, and eventually killed,19 a fact which is
supported by the subject certificate of death, it did not consider said death in its judgment.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision20 dated February 15, 2013, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC's conviction of
accused-appellants, finding that the prosecution was able to clearly establish all the
elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, namely: (a) the
offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner
deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and
(d) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed simulating
public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped
or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a
minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.21 It
likewise sustained the finding that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom, as sufficiently proven by the testimony of the brother of the
victim.22 Moreover, the CA affirmed that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime,
as the acts of accused-appellants emanated from the same purpose or common design, and
they were united in its execution.23cralawlawlibrary
Separately, the CA found that accused-appellants? claims of torture were never supported,
and that Rodolfo voluntarily signed the extrajudicial confession and was afforded
competent and independent counsel in its execution.24cralawlawlibrary
Aggrieved by their conviction, accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not accused- appellants are guilty
of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
96
 The Courts Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Well-settled is the rule that the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial
court to determine. Its assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight,
and it is conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless,
through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been
considered. Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case,
or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves
high respect by the appellate court.25cralawlawlibrary
In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave weight and credence to the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses, which they found to be straightforward and
consistent. Through these testimonies, it was clearly established that accused-
appellants, who were all private individuals, took the victim Edwin and deprived him
of his liberty, which acts were illegal, and for the purpose of extorting ransom.26 Thus,
seeing no semblance of arbitrariness or misapprehension on the part of the court a quo, the
Court finds no compelling reason to disturb its factual findings on this score.
Anent the finding that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, the Court likewise
finds the conclusion of the RTC in this regard, as affirmed by the CA, to be well-taken.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it, and when conspiracy is established, the
responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual, rendering all of them equally
liable regardless of the extent of their respective participations.27 In this relation, direct
proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it can be presumed from and proven by the
acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and community of
interests.28 Hence, as the factual circumstances in this case clearly show that accused-
appellants acted in concert at the time of the commission of the crime and that their acts
emanated from the same purpose or common design, showing unity in its execution,29 the
CA, affirming the trial court, correctly ruled that there was conspiracy among them.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court is, however, constrained to modify the ruling of
the RTC and the CA, as the crime the accused- appellants have committed does not, as the
records obviously bear, merely constitute Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but
that of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in
view of the victim?s (i.e., Edwin's) death, which was (a) specifically charged in the
Information, 30 and (b) clearly established during the trial of this case. Notably, while this
matter was not among the issues raised before the Court, the same should nonetheless be
considered in accordance with the settled rule that in a criminal case, an appeal, as in this
case, throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court can
correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed
judgment.31cralawlawlibrary
After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by RA 7659,
Article 267 of the same Code now provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female or a public officer;
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
(Emphases supplied)
The Court further elucidated in People v. Mercado:32cralawlawlibrary
In People v. Ramos, the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes of
kidnapping for ransom and murder committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced to death.
On appeal, this Court modified the ruling and found the accused guilty of the special
complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder under the last paragraph of
Article 267, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court
said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of special complex
crime? of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction
drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was
purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not
deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now
is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of
whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the
97
kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor
be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under
the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659.33
(Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom, accused-appellants conviction must be modified from
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention to the special complex crime of Kidnapping
for Ransom with Homicide, which carries the penalty of death. As earlier intimated, the
enactment of RA 9346 had suspended the imposition of the death penalty. This means that
the accused-appellants could, as the CA and trial court properly ruled, only be sentenced to
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. To this, the Court adds that the accused-appellants are
not eligible for parole.34cralawlawlibrary
prevailing jurisprudence.40cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 15, 2013 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888 is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that all the accused appellants herein are equally found GUlLTY of
the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, and are sentenced to
each suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and to pay,
jointly and severally, the family of the kidnap victim Edwin Navarro the following
amounts: (1) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and (3)
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.cralawred

On a final note, the Court observes that the RTC and the CA failed to award civil indemnity
as well as damages to the family of the kidnap victim. In People v. Quiachon,35 the Court
explained that even if the death penalty was not to be imposed on accused-appellants in
view of the prohibition in RA 9346, the award of civil indemnity was nonetheless proper,
not being dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that
qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the crime.36 In the present case, considering that both the qualifying
circumstances of ransom and the death of the victim during captivity were duly alleged in
the information and proven during trial, civil indemnity in the amount of P100,000.00 must
therefore be awarded to the family of the victim, to conform with prevailing
jurisprudence.37cralawlawlibrary

Similarly, the Court finds that the award of moral damages is warranted in this case. Under
Article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar injury, while Article
2219 of the same Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal
detention. It cannot be denied, in this case, that the kidnap victim?s family suffered mental
anguish, fright, and serious anxiety over the detention and eventually, the death of Edwin.
As such, and in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,38 moral damages in the amount
of P100,000.00 must perforce be awarded to the family of the victim.

Finally, exemplary damages must be awarded in this case, in view of the confluence of the
aforesaid qualifying circumstances and in order to deter others from committing the same
atrocious acts. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,39 therefore, the Court awards
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to the family of the kidnap victim.

In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all
damages awarded from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid, pursuant to
98

[G.R. No. 186417 : July 27, 2011]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FELIPE
MIRANDILLA, JR., DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For Review before this Court is the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 00271, 1 dated 29 February 2008, finding accused Felipe Mirandilla, Jr.,
(Mirandilla) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of special complex crime of kidnapping with
rape; four counts of rape; and, one count of rape through sexual assault.
Mirandilla is now asking this Court to acquit him. He contends that he could not have
kidnapped and raped the victim, AAA, 2 whom he claims to be his live-in partner. The
records, however, reveal with moral certainty his guilt. Accordingly, We modify the CA
Decision and find him guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal
detention with rape.
THE FACTS
AAA narrated her 39-day ordeal in the hands of Mirandilla.
It was 2 December 2000, eve of the fiesta in Barangay San Francisco, Legazpi City. At the
plaza, AAA was dancing with her elder sister, BBB. 3
AAA went out of the dancing hall to buy candies in a nearby store. While making her way
back through the crowd, a man grabbed her hand, his arm wrapped her shoulders, with a
knife's point thrust at her right side. She will come to know the man's name at the police
station, after her escape, to be Felipe Mirandilla, Jr. 4 He told her not to move or ask for
help. Another man joined and went beside her, while two others stayed at her back, one of
whom had a gun. They slipped through the unsuspecting crowd, walked farther as the
deafening music faded into soft sounds. After a four-hour walk through the grassy fields,
they reached the Mayon International Hotel, where they boarded a waiting tricycle. Upon
passing the Albay Cathedral, the others alighted, leaving AAA alone with Mirandilla who
after receiving a gun from a companion, drove the tricycle farther away and into the
darkness. Minutes later, they reached the Gallera de Legazpi in Rawis. 5
Mirandilla dragged AAA out of the tricycle and pushed her inside a concrete house. At
gunpoint he ordered her to remove her pants. 6 When she defied him, he slapped her and hit
her arms with a gun, forced his hands inside her pants, into her panty, and reaching her
vagina, slipped his three fingers and rotated them inside. The pain weakened her. He
forcibly pulled her pants down and lifting her legs, pushed and pulled his penis
inside. 7 "Sayang ka," she heard him whisper at her, 8 as she succumbed to pain and
exhaustion.
When AAA woke up the following morning, she found herself alone. She cried for help,
shouting until her throat dried. But no one heard her. No rescue came.
At around midnight, Mirandilla arrived together with his gang. Pointing a gun at AAA, he
ordered her to open her mouth; she sheepishly obeyed. He forced his penis inside her
mouth, pulling through her hair with his left hand and slapping her with his right. After
satisfying his lust, he dragged her into the tricycle and drove to Bogtong, Legazpi. At the
road's side, Mirandilla pushed her against a reclining tree, gagged her mouth with cloth,
99
punched her arm, thigh, and lap, and pulled up her over-sized shirt. Her underwear was
gone. Then she felt Mirandilla's penis inside her vagina. A little while, a companion warned
Mirandilla to move out. And they drove away. 9
They reached a nipa hut and AAA was thrown inside. Her mouth was again covered with
cloth. Mirandilla, with a gun aimed at her point blank, grabbed her shirt, forced her legs
open, and again inserted his penis into her vagina. 10
The following evening, Mirandilla and his gang brought AAA to Guinobatan, where she
suffered the same fate. They repeatedly detained her at daytime, moved her back and forth
from one place to another on the following nights, first to Bonga, then back to Guinobatan,
where she was locked up in a cell-type house and was raped repeatedly on the grassy field
right outside her cell, then to Camalig, where they caged her in a small house in the middle
of a rice field. She was allegedly raped 27 times.11
One afternoon, in Guinobatan, AAA succeeded in opening the door of her cell. Seeing that
Mirandilla and his companions were busy playing cards, she rushed outside and ran,
crossed a river, got drenched, and continued running. She rested for awhile, hiding behind a
rock; she walked through the fields and stayed out of people's sight for two nights. Finally,
she found a road and followed its path, leading her to the house of Evelyn Guevarra who
brought her to the police station. It was 11 January 2001. AAA was in foul smell, starving
and sleepless. Evelyn Guevarra gave her a bath and the police gave her food. When the
police presented to her pictures of suspected criminals, she recognized the man's face - she
was certain it was him. He was Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., the police told her. 12
The following morning, accompanied by the police, AAA submitted herself to Dr. Sarah
Vasquez, Legazpi City's Health Officer for medical examination. The doctor discovered
hymenal lacerations in different positions of her hymen, indicative of sexual
intercourse. 13 Foul smelling pus also oozed from her vagina - AAA had contracted
gonorrhoea. 14
Mirandilla denied the charges against him. This is his version.
Mirandilla first met AAA on 3 October 2000. By stroke of fate, they bumped into each
other at the Albay Park where AAA, wearing a school uniform, approached him. They had
a short chat. They were neighbors in Barangay San Francisco until Mirandilla left his wife
and daughter there for good. 15
Two days later, Mirandilla and AAA met again at the park. He started courting her, 16 and,
after five days, as AAA celebrated her 18th birthday, they became lovers. Mirandilla was
then 33 years old.
Immediately, Mirandilla and AAA had sex nightly in their friends' houses and in cheap
motels. On 24 October 2000, after Mirandilla went to his mother's house in Kilikao, they
met again at the park, at their usual meeting place, in front of the park's comfort room, near
Arlene Moret, a cigarette vendor who also served as the CR's guard. 17 They decided to
elope and live as a couple. They found an abandoned house in Rawis, at the back
of Gallera de Legazpi. Emilio Mendoza who owned the house, rented it to them for
P1,500.00. 18 They lived there from 28 October until 11 December 2000. 19 From 12
December 2000 until 11 January 2001, 20 Mirandilla and AAA stayed in Rogelio
Marcellana's house, at the resettlement Site in Banquerohan, Legazpi City.
Mirandilla and AAA's nightly sexual intimacy continued, with abstentions only during
AAA's menstrual periods, the last of which she had on 7 December 2000. 21 In late
December, however, Mirandilla, who just arrived home after visiting his mother in Kilikao,
saw AAA soaked in blood, moaning in excruciating stomach pain. 22 AAA had abortion -
an inference he drew upon seeing the cover of pills lying beside AAA. Mirandilla claimed
that AAA bled for days until she left him in January 2001 after quarrelling for days. 23
Mirandilla, however, had a second version of this crucial event. He claimed that AAA
missed her menstruation in December 2000 24 and that he would not have known she had
an abortion had she not confessed it to him. 25
THE RTC RULING
Mirandilla was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 5,
with kidnapping with rape (Crim. Case No. 9278), four counts of rape (Crim. Case Nos.
9274 to 9277), and rape through sexual assault (Crim. Case No. 9279).
The RTC, in its decision dated 1 July 2004, convicted Mirandilla of kidnapping, four
counts of rape, and one count of rape through sexual assault with this finding:
This Court has arrived at the factual conclusion that Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., in the company
of three others [conferrers], kidnapped AAA in Barangay xxx, City of xxx, on or on about
midnight of December 2, 2000 or early morning of December 3, 2000, held her in
detention for thirty-nine days in separate cells situated in the City of xxx; xxx; and xxx.
Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., carnally abused her while holding a gun and/or a knife for twenty
seven times, employing force and intimidation. The twenty seven sexual intercourses were
eventually perpetrated between the City of xxx and the towns of xxx and xxx. At least
once, Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., put his penis inside the mouth of AAA against her will while
employing intimidation, threats, and force. 26
THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING
100
On review, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC ruling, convicting Mirandilla. It
found him guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape (instead of
kidnapping as the RTC ruled), four counts of rape, and one count of rape by sexual
assault. 27 It rejected Mirandilla's defense that he and AAA were live-in partners and that
their sexual encounters were consensual. 28 It noted that Mirandilla failed to adduce any
evidence or any credible witness to sustain his defense. 29
Hence, this appeal.
Mirandilla repeats his allegations that the prosecution's lone witness, AAA, was not a
credible witness and that he and AAA were live-in partners whose intimacy they expressed
in consensual sex.
OUR RULING
We find Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal
detention with rape.
Mirandilla admitted in open court to have had sexual intercourse with AAA, which
happened almost nightly during their cohabitation. He contended that they were live-in
partners, entangled in a whirlwind romance, which intimacy they expressed in countless
passionate sex, which headed ironically to separation mainly because of AAA's intentional
abortion of their first child to be - a betrayal in its gravest form which he found hard to
forgive.
In stark contrast to Mirandilla's tale of a love affair, is AAA's claim of her horrific ordeal
and her flight to freedom after 39 days in captivity during which Mirandilla raped her 27
times.
First Issue:
Credibility of Prosecution Witness
Jurisprudence is consistent that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must not only
come from a credible witness but must be credible in itself - tested by human experience,
observation, common knowledge and accepted conduct that has evolved through the
years. 30
Daggers v. Van Dyck, 31 illuminates:
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it
must be credible in itself - such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human
testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation, and experience. Whatever
is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance. 32
First, the trial judge, who had the opportunity of observing AAA's manner and demeanour
on the witness stand, was convinced of her credibility: "AAA appeared to be a simple and
truthful woman, whose testimony was consistent, steady and firm, free from any material
and serious contradictions." 33 The court continued:
The record nowhere yields any evidence of ill motive on the part of AAA to influence her
in fabricating criminal charges against Felipe Mirandilla, Jr. The absence of ill motive
enhances the standing of AAA as a witness. x x x.
When AAA testified in court, she was sobbing. While she was facing Felipe Mirandilla, Jr.,
to positively identify him in open court, she was crying. Felipe Mirandilla Jr.'s response
was to smile. AAA was a picture of a woman who was gravely harmed, craving for justice.
x x x. 34
Second, the trial court found AAA's testimony to be credible in itself. AAA's ordeal was
entered into the police blotter immediately after her escape, 35 negating opportunity for
concoction. 36 While in Mirandilla's company, none of her parents, brothers, sisters,
relatives, classmates, or anyone who knew her, visited, saw, or talked to her. None of them
knew her whereabouts. 37 AAA's testimony was corroborated by Dr. Sarah Vasquez,
Legazpi City's Health Officer, who discovered the presence not only of hymenal
lacerations but also gonorrhoea, a sexually transmitted disease.
More importantly, AAA remained consistent in the midst of gruelling cross examination.
The defense lawyer tried to impeach her testimony, but failed to do so.
The Court of Appeals confirmed AAA's credibility in affirming the RTC decision.
We emphasize that a trial court's assessment of a witness' credibility, when affirmed by the
CA, is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance of weight or influence. 38 This is so because of the judicial experience
that trial courts are in a better position to decide the question of credibility, having heard
the witnesses themselves and having observed firsthand their deportment and manner of
testifying under gruelling examination. 39 Thus, in Estioca v. People, 40 we held:
In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is guided by the
following principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower
courts, unless there is a showing that it overlooked or misapplied some fact or circumstance
of weight and substance that may affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial
101
court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had
the opportunity to examine their demeanour when they testified on the witness stand; and
(3) a witness who testifies in a clear, positive and convincing manner is a credible
witness. 41
Second Issue
"Sweetheart Theory" not Proven
Accused's bare invocation of sweetheart theory cannot alone, stand. To be credible, it must
be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. 42 Usually, these are
letters, notes, photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers. 43
The sweetheart theory as a defense, however, necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first
element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the burden to prove only force or
intimidation, the coupling element of rape. Love, is not a license for lust. 44
This admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is not only an
affirmative defense that needs convincing proof; 45 after the prosecution has successfully
established a prima facie case, 46 the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused, 47 who
has to adduce evidence that the intercourse was consensual. 48
A prima facie case arises when the party having the burden of proof has produced evidence
sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for him of the issue in litigation. 49
Burden of evidence is "that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time
during the trial to create a prima facie case in his favour or to overthrow one when
created against him." 50(Emphasis supplied)
Mirandilla with his version of facts as narrated above attempted to meet the
prosecution's prima facie case. To corroborate it, he presented his mother, Alicia
Mirandilla; his relatives, Rogelio Marcellana and Emilio Mendoza; and, his friend Arlene
Moret.
Arlene Moret, the cigarette vendor who also served as the CR's guard, testified that on 30
October 2000, AAA and Mirandilla arrived together at the park. 51 They approached her
and chatted with her. On cross examination, she claimed otherwise: Mirandilla arrived
alone two hours earlier, chatting with her first, before AAA finally came. 52 She also
claimed meeting the couple for the first time on 30 October 2000, only to contradict herself
on cross examination with the version that she met them previously, three times at least, in
the previous month. 53 On the other hand, Mirandilla claimed first meeting AAA on 3
October 2000 at the park. 54
The accused's mother, Alicia Mirandilla, testified meeting her son only once, and living in
Kilikao only after his imprisonment. 55 This contradicted Mirandilla's claim that he visited
his mother several times in Kilikao, from October 2000 until January 2001. 56
Even Mirandilla contradicted himself. His claim that he saw AAA soaked in blood,
agonizing in pain, with the abortifacient pills' cover lying nearby, cannot be reconciled with
his other claim that he came to know AAA's abortion only through the latter's admission. 57
Taken individually and as a whole, the defense witnesses' testimonies contradicted each
other and flip-flopped on materials facts, constraining this Court to infer that they
concocted stories in a desperate attempt to exonerate the accused.
As a rule, self-contradictions and contradictory statement of witnesses should be
reconciled, 58 it being true that such is possible since a witness is not expected to give error-
free testimony considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. 59 But,
this principle, learned from lessons of human experience, applies only to minor or trivial
matters - innocent lapses that do not affect witness' credibility. 60 They do not apply to self-
contradictions on material facts. 61 Where these contradictions cannot be reconciled, the
Court has to reject the testimonies, 62 and apply the maxim, falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus. Thus,
To completely disregard all the testimony of a witness based on the maxim falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus, testimony must have been false as to a material point, and the witness
must have a conscious and deliberate intention to falsify a material point. In other words,
its requirements, which must concur, are the following: (1) that the false testimony is as to
one or more material points; and (2) that there should be a conscious and deliberate
intention to falsity. 63
Crimes and Punishment
An appeal in criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one
not raised by the parties. 64 This was our pronouncement in the 1902 landmark case of U.S.
v. Abijan, 65 which is now embodied in Section 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court:
SEC 11. Scope of Judgment. - The Court of Appeals may reverse, affirm, or modify the
judgment and increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the
case to the Regional Trial Court for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case. (Emphasis
supplied)
The reason behind this rule is that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial
102
court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole
case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such
judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant. 66
To reiterate, the six informations charged Mirandilla with kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape (Crim. Case No. 9278), four counts of rape (Crim. Case Nos. 9274-75-
76-77), and one count of rape through sexual assault (Crim. Case No. 9279).
The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 9278 alleged that
Mirandilla kidnapped AAA and seriously and illegally detained her for more than three
days during which time he had carnal knowledge of her, against her will. 67
The Court agrees with the CA in finding Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape, instead of simple kidnapping as the RTC ruled. It was the RTC, no
less, which found that Mirandilla kidnapped AAA, held her in detention for 39 days and
carnally abused her while holding a gun and/or a knife. 68
Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code states that:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation; xxx.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.
AAA was able to prove each element of rape committed under Article 266-A, par. 1(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, that (1) Mirandilla had carnal knowledge of her; (2) through force,
threat, or intimidation. She was also able to prove each element of rape by sexual assault
under Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code: (1) Mirandilla inserted his penis
into her mouth; (2) through force, threat, or intimidation.
Likewise, kidnapping and serious illegal detention is provided for under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code:
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. xxx
An imminent Spanish commentator explained:
la detencin, la pricin, la privacin de la libertad de una persona, en cualquier forma y
por cualquier medio por cualquier tiempo en virtud de la cual resulte interrumpido el
libre ejercicio de su actividad." 69
Emphatically, the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659, 70 states that when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed. This provision gives rise to a special complex crime. As the
Court explained in People v. Larraaga, 71 this arises where the law provides a single
penalty for two or more component offenses. 72
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex
crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. 73 This
is because these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A.
No. 7659 punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated
the seriousness of rape because no matter how many times the victim was raped, like in the
present case, there is only one crime committed - the special complex crime of kidnapping
with rape.
However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender should not
have taken the victim with lewd designs, otherwise, it would be complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape. In People v. Garcia, 74 we explained that if the taking was by forcible
abduction and the woman was raped several times, the crimes committed is one complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as much as the forcible abduction was only
necessary for the first rape; and each of the other counts of rape constitutes distinct and
separate count of rape. 75
It having been established that Mirandilla's act was kidnapping and serious illegal detention
(not forcible abduction) and on the occasion thereof, he raped AAA several times, We hold
that Mirandilla is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime
103
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape, warranting the penalty of death.
However, in view of R.A. No. 9346 entitled, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines, 76 the penalty of death is hereby reduced to reclusion
perpetua, 77 without eligibility for parole. 78
We, therefore, modify the CA Decision. We hold that the separate informations of rape
cannot be considered as separate and distinct crimes in view of the above discussion.
As to the award of damages, we have the following rulings.
This Court has consistently held that upon the finding of the fact of rape, the award of civil
damages ex delicto is mandatory. 79 As we elucidated in People v. Prades, 80 the award
authorized by the criminal law as civil indemnity ex delicto for the offended party, aside
from other proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages
in civil law. 81 Thus, we held that the civil liability ex delicto provided by the Revised
Penal Code, that is, restitution, reparation, and indemnification, 82 all correspond to actual
or compensatory damages in the Civil Code. 83
84
In the 1998 landmark case of People v. Victor, the Court enunciated that if, in the crime
of rape, the death penalty is imposed, the indemnity ex delicto for the victim shall be in
the increased amount of NOT 85 less than P75,000.00. To reiterate the words of the
Court: "this is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and
the financial fluctuation over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the
Court over the incidence of heinous crimes..." 86 xxx (Emphasis supplied)
After the enactment R.A. 9346, 87 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty, questions
arose as to the continued applicability of the Victor 88 ruling. Thus, in People v.
Quiachon, 89 the Court pronounced that even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed
because of R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity ex delicto of P75,000.00 still applies because
this indemnity is not dependent on the actual imposition of death, but on the fact that
qualifying circumstances warranting the penalty of death attended the commission of
the offense. 90As explained in People v. Salome, 91 while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, the fact remains that the penalty provided for by the
law for a heinous offense is still death, and the offense is still heinous. 92 (Emphasis
supplied)
such amount as the Court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the
basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice. Indeed, the conventional requirement
of allegata et probata in civil procedure and for essentially civil cases should be dispensed
with in criminal prosecutions for rape with the civil aspect included therein, since no
appropriate pleadings are filed wherein such allegations can be made. (Emphasis supplied)
Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and
psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages are too obvious to
still require the recital thereof at the trial by the victim, since the Court itself even
assumes and acknowledges such agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility. What
exists by necessary implication as being ineludibly present in the case need not go through
superfluity of still being proven through a testimonial charade. (Emphasis supplied) 95
AAA is also entitled to exemplary damages of P30,000.00, pursuant to the present
jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 00271 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused Felipe
Mirandilla, Jr., is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape under the last paragraph of Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by R.A. No. 7659, and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and to pay the offended party
AAA, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code, 93 without the necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than the fact of rape.
This move of dispensing evidence to prove moral damage in rape cases, traces its origin
in People v. Prades, 94 where we held that:

The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under consideration, moral
damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in
104
 Mirandilla is now asking this Court to acquit him. He contends that he could not have
kidnapped and raped the victim, AAA, 2 whom he claims to be his live-in partner. The
records, however, reveal with moral certainty his guilt. Accordingly, We modify the CA
Decision and find him guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal
detention with rape.

THE FACTS

AAA narrated her 39-day ordeal in the hands of Mirandilla.

It was 2 December 2000, eve of the fiesta in Barangay San Francisco, Legazpi City. At the
plaza, AAA was dancing with her elder sister, BBB. 3

AAA went out of the dancing hall to buy candies in a nearby store. While making her way
back through the crowd, a man grabbed her hand, his arm wrapped her shoulders, with a
knife's point thrust at her right side. She will come to know the man's name at the police
station, after her escape, to be Felipe Mirandilla, Jr. 4 He told her not to move or ask for
help. Another man joined and went beside her, while two others stayed at her back, one of
whom had a gun. They slipped through the unsuspecting crowd, walked farther as the
deafening music faded into soft sounds. After a four-hour walk through the grassy fields,
they reached the Mayon International Hotel, where they boarded a waiting tricycle. Upon
passing the Albay Cathedral, the others alighted, leaving AAA alone with Mirandilla who
after receiving a gun from a companion, drove the tricycle farther away and into the
darkness. Minutes later, they reached the Gallera de Legazpi in Rawis. 5

Mirandilla dragged AAA out of the tricycle and pushed her inside a concrete house. At
gunpoint he ordered her to remove her pants. 6 When she defied him, he slapped her and hit
her arms with a gun, forced his hands inside her pants, into her panty, and reaching her
vagina, slipped his three fingers and rotated them inside. The pain weakened her. He
[G.R. No. 186417 : July 27, 2011]
forcibly pulled her pants down and lifting her legs, pushed and pulled his penis
inside. 7 "Sayang ka," she heard him whisper at her, 8 as she succumbed to pain and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FELIPE
exhaustion.
MIRANDILLA, JR., DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
When AAA woke up the following morning, she found herself alone. She cried for help,
DECISION
shouting until her throat dried. But no one heard her. No rescue came.
PEREZ, J.:
At around midnight, Mirandilla arrived together with his gang. Pointing a gun at AAA, he
ordered her to open her mouth; she sheepishly obeyed. He forced his penis inside her
For Review before this Court is the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
mouth, pulling through her hair with his left hand and slapping her with his right. After
HC No. 00271, 1 dated 29 February 2008, finding accused Felipe Mirandilla, Jr.,
satisfying his lust, he dragged her into the tricycle and drove to Bogtong, Legazpi. At the
(Mirandilla) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of special complex crime of kidnapping with
road's side, Mirandilla pushed her against a reclining tree, gagged her mouth with cloth,
rape; four counts of rape; and, one count of rape through sexual assault.
punched her arm, thigh, and lap, and pulled up her over-sized shirt. Her underwear was
105
gone. Then she felt Mirandilla's penis inside her vagina. A little while, a companion warned
Mirandilla to move out. And they drove away. 9
They reached a nipa hut and AAA was thrown inside. Her mouth was again covered with
cloth. Mirandilla, with a gun aimed at her point blank, grabbed her shirt, forced her legs
open, and again inserted his penis into her vagina. 10
The following evening, Mirandilla and his gang brought AAA to Guinobatan, where she
suffered the same fate. They repeatedly detained her at daytime, moved her back and forth
from one place to another on the following nights, first to Bonga, then back to Guinobatan,
where she was locked up in a cell-type house and was raped repeatedly on the grassy field
right outside her cell, then to Camalig, where they caged her in a small house in the middle
of a rice field. She was allegedly raped 27 times.11
One afternoon, in Guinobatan, AAA succeeded in opening the door of her cell. Seeing that
Mirandilla and his companions were busy playing cards, she rushed outside and ran,
crossed a river, got drenched, and continued running. She rested for awhile, hiding behind a
rock; she walked through the fields and stayed out of people's sight for two nights. Finally,
she found a road and followed its path, leading her to the house of Evelyn Guevarra who
brought her to the police station. It was 11 January 2001. AAA was in foul smell, starving
and sleepless. Evelyn Guevarra gave her a bath and the police gave her food. When the
police presented to her pictures of suspected criminals, she recognized the man's face - she
was certain it was him. He was Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., the police told her. 12
The following morning, accompanied by the police, AAA submitted herself to Dr. Sarah
Vasquez, Legazpi City's Health Officer for medical examination. The doctor discovered
hymenal lacerations in different positions of her hymen, indicative of sexual
intercourse. 13 Foul smelling pus also oozed from her vagina - AAA had contracted
gonorrhoea. 14
Mirandilla denied the charges against him. This is his version.
Mirandilla first met AAA on 3 October 2000. By stroke of fate, they bumped into each
other at the Albay Park where AAA, wearing a school uniform, approached him. They had
a short chat. They were neighbors in Barangay San Francisco until Mirandilla left his wife
and daughter there for good. 15
Two days later, Mirandilla and AAA met again at the park. He started courting her, 16 and,
after five days, as AAA celebrated her 18th birthday, they became lovers. Mirandilla was
then 33 years old.
Immediately, Mirandilla and AAA had sex nightly in their friends' houses and in cheap
motels. On 24 October 2000, after Mirandilla went to his mother's house in Kilikao, they
met again at the park, at their usual meeting place, in front of the park's comfort room, near
Arlene Moret, a cigarette vendor who also served as the CR's guard. 17 They decided to
elope and live as a couple. They found an abandoned house in Rawis, at the back
of Gallera de Legazpi. Emilio Mendoza who owned the house, rented it to them for
P1,500.00. 18 They lived there from 28 October until 11 December 2000. 19 From 12
December 2000 until 11 January 2001, 20 Mirandilla and AAA stayed in Rogelio
Marcellana's house, at the resettlement Site in Banquerohan, Legazpi City.
Mirandilla and AAA's nightly sexual intimacy continued, with abstentions only during
AAA's menstrual periods, the last of which she had on 7 December 2000. 21 In late
December, however, Mirandilla, who just arrived home after visiting his mother in Kilikao,
saw AAA soaked in blood, moaning in excruciating stomach pain. 22 AAA had abortion -
an inference he drew upon seeing the cover of pills lying beside AAA. Mirandilla claimed
that AAA bled for days until she left him in January 2001 after quarrelling for days. 23
Mirandilla, however, had a second version of this crucial event. He claimed that AAA
missed her menstruation in December 2000 24 and that he would not have known she had
an abortion had she not confessed it to him. 25
THE RTC RULING
Mirandilla was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 5,
with kidnapping with rape (Crim. Case No. 9278), four counts of rape (Crim. Case Nos.
9274 to 9277), and rape through sexual assault (Crim. Case No. 9279).
The RTC, in its decision dated 1 July 2004, convicted Mirandilla of kidnapping, four
counts of rape, and one count of rape through sexual assault with this finding:
This Court has arrived at the factual conclusion that Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., in the company
of three others [conferrers], kidnapped AAA in Barangay xxx, City of xxx, on or on about
midnight of December 2, 2000 or early morning of December 3, 2000, held her in
detention for thirty-nine days in separate cells situated in the City of xxx; xxx; and xxx.
Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., carnally abused her while holding a gun and/or a knife for twenty
seven times, employing force and intimidation. The twenty seven sexual intercourses were
eventually perpetrated between the City of xxx and the towns of xxx and xxx. At least
once, Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., put his penis inside the mouth of AAA against her will while
employing intimidation, threats, and force. 26
THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING
On review, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC ruling, convicting Mirandilla. It
106
found him guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape (instead of
kidnapping as the RTC ruled), four counts of rape, and one count of rape by sexual
assault. 27 It rejected Mirandilla's defense that he and AAA were live-in partners and that
their sexual encounters were consensual. 28 It noted that Mirandilla failed to adduce any
evidence or any credible witness to sustain his defense. 29
Hence, this appeal.
Mirandilla repeats his allegations that the prosecution's lone witness, AAA, was not a
credible witness and that he and AAA were live-in partners whose intimacy they expressed
in consensual sex.
OUR RULING
We find Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal
detention with rape.
Mirandilla admitted in open court to have had sexual intercourse with AAA, which
happened almost nightly during their cohabitation. He contended that they were live-in
partners, entangled in a whirlwind romance, which intimacy they expressed in countless
passionate sex, which headed ironically to separation mainly because of AAA's intentional
abortion of their first child to be - a betrayal in its gravest form which he found hard to
forgive.
In stark contrast to Mirandilla's tale of a love affair, is AAA's claim of her horrific ordeal
and her flight to freedom after 39 days in captivity during which Mirandilla raped her 27
times.
First Issue:
Credibility of Prosecution Witness
Jurisprudence is consistent that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must not only
come from a credible witness but must be credible in itself - tested by human experience,
observation, common knowledge and accepted conduct that has evolved through the
years. 30
Daggers v. Van Dyck, 31 illuminates:
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it
must be credible in itself - such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human
testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation, and experience. Whatever
is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance. 32
First, the trial judge, who had the opportunity of observing AAA's manner and demeanour
on the witness stand, was convinced of her credibility: "AAA appeared to be a simple and
truthful woman, whose testimony was consistent, steady and firm, free from any material
and serious contradictions." 33 The court continued:
The record nowhere yields any evidence of ill motive on the part of AAA to influence her
in fabricating criminal charges against Felipe Mirandilla, Jr. The absence of ill motive
enhances the standing of AAA as a witness. x x x.
When AAA testified in court, she was sobbing. While she was facing Felipe Mirandilla, Jr.,
to positively identify him in open court, she was crying. Felipe Mirandilla Jr.'s response
was to smile. AAA was a picture of a woman who was gravely harmed, craving for justice.
x x x. 34
Second, the trial court found AAA's testimony to be credible in itself. AAA's ordeal was
entered into the police blotter immediately after her escape, 35 negating opportunity for
concoction. 36 While in Mirandilla's company, none of her parents, brothers, sisters,
relatives, classmates, or anyone who knew her, visited, saw, or talked to her. None of them
knew her whereabouts. 37 AAA's testimony was corroborated by Dr. Sarah Vasquez,
Legazpi City's Health Officer, who discovered the presence not only of hymenal
lacerations but also gonorrhoea, a sexually transmitted disease.
More importantly, AAA remained consistent in the midst of gruelling cross examination.
The defense lawyer tried to impeach her testimony, but failed to do so.
The Court of Appeals confirmed AAA's credibility in affirming the RTC decision.
We emphasize that a trial court's assessment of a witness' credibility, when affirmed by the
CA, is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance of weight or influence. 38 This is so because of the judicial experience
that trial courts are in a better position to decide the question of credibility, having heard
the witnesses themselves and having observed firsthand their deportment and manner of
testifying under gruelling examination. 39 Thus, in Estioca v. People, 40 we held:
In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is guided by the
following principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower
courts, unless there is a showing that it overlooked or misapplied some fact or circumstance
of weight and substance that may affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial
107
court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had
the opportunity to examine their demeanour when they testified on the witness stand; and
(3) a witness who testifies in a clear, positive and convincing manner is a credible
witness. 41
Second Issue
"Sweetheart Theory" not Proven
Accused's bare invocation of sweetheart theory cannot alone, stand. To be credible, it must
be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. 42 Usually, these are
letters, notes, photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers. 43
The sweetheart theory as a defense, however, necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first
element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the burden to prove only force or
intimidation, the coupling element of rape. Love, is not a license for lust. 44
This admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is not only an
affirmative defense that needs convincing proof; 45 after the prosecution has successfully
established a prima facie case, 46 the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused, 47 who
has to adduce evidence that the intercourse was consensual. 48
A prima facie case arises when the party having the burden of proof has produced evidence
sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for him of the issue in litigation. 49
Burden of evidence is "that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time
during the trial to create a prima facie case in his favour or to overthrow one when
created against him." 50(Emphasis supplied)
Mirandilla with his version of facts as narrated above attempted to meet the
prosecution's prima facie case. To corroborate it, he presented his mother, Alicia
Mirandilla; his relatives, Rogelio Marcellana and Emilio Mendoza; and, his friend Arlene
Moret.
Arlene Moret, the cigarette vendor who also served as the CR's guard, testified that on 30
October 2000, AAA and Mirandilla arrived together at the park. 51 They approached her
and chatted with her. On cross examination, she claimed otherwise: Mirandilla arrived
alone two hours earlier, chatting with her first, before AAA finally came. 52 She also
claimed meeting the couple for the first time on 30 October 2000, only to contradict herself
on cross examination with the version that she met them previously, three times at least, in
the previous month. 53 On the other hand, Mirandilla claimed first meeting AAA on 3
October 2000 at the park. 54
The accused's mother, Alicia Mirandilla, testified meeting her son only once, and living in
Kilikao only after his imprisonment. 55 This contradicted Mirandilla's claim that he visited
his mother several times in Kilikao, from October 2000 until January 2001. 56
Even Mirandilla contradicted himself. His claim that he saw AAA soaked in blood,
agonizing in pain, with the abortifacient pills' cover lying nearby, cannot be reconciled with
his other claim that he came to know AAA's abortion only through the latter's admission. 57
Taken individually and as a whole, the defense witnesses' testimonies contradicted each
other and flip-flopped on materials facts, constraining this Court to infer that they
concocted stories in a desperate attempt to exonerate the accused.
As a rule, self-contradictions and contradictory statement of witnesses should be
reconciled, 58 it being true that such is possible since a witness is not expected to give error-
free testimony considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. 59 But,
this principle, learned from lessons of human experience, applies only to minor or trivial
matters - innocent lapses that do not affect witness' credibility. 60 They do not apply to self-
contradictions on material facts. 61 Where these contradictions cannot be reconciled, the
Court has to reject the testimonies, 62 and apply the maxim, falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus. Thus,
To completely disregard all the testimony of a witness based on the maxim falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus, testimony must have been false as to a material point, and the witness
must have a conscious and deliberate intention to falsify a material point. In other words,
its requirements, which must concur, are the following: (1) that the false testimony is as to
one or more material points; and (2) that there should be a conscious and deliberate
intention to falsity. 63
Crimes and Punishment
An appeal in criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one
not raised by the parties. 64 This was our pronouncement in the 1902 landmark case of U.S.
v. Abijan, 65 which is now embodied in Section 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court:
SEC 11. Scope of Judgment. - The Court of Appeals may reverse, affirm, or modify the
judgment and increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the
case to the Regional Trial Court for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case. (Emphasis
supplied)
The reason behind this rule is that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial
108
court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole
case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such
judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant. 66
To reiterate, the six informations charged Mirandilla with kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape (Crim. Case No. 9278), four counts of rape (Crim. Case Nos. 9274-75-
76-77), and one count of rape through sexual assault (Crim. Case No. 9279).
The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 9278 alleged that
Mirandilla kidnapped AAA and seriously and illegally detained her for more than three
days during which time he had carnal knowledge of her, against her will. 67
The Court agrees with the CA in finding Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape, instead of simple kidnapping as the RTC ruled. It was the RTC, no
less, which found that Mirandilla kidnapped AAA, held her in detention for 39 days and
carnally abused her while holding a gun and/or a knife. 68
Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code states that:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation; xxx.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.
AAA was able to prove each element of rape committed under Article 266-A, par. 1(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, that (1) Mirandilla had carnal knowledge of her; (2) through force,
threat, or intimidation. She was also able to prove each element of rape by sexual assault
under Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code: (1) Mirandilla inserted his penis
into her mouth; (2) through force, threat, or intimidation.
Likewise, kidnapping and serious illegal detention is provided for under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code:
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. xxx
An imminent Spanish commentator explained:
la detencin, la pricin, la privacin de la libertad de una persona, en cualquier forma y
por cualquier medio por cualquier tiempo en virtud de la cual resulte interrumpido el
libre ejercicio de su actividad." 69
Emphatically, the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659, 70 states that when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed. This provision gives rise to a special complex crime. As the
Court explained in People v. Larraaga, 71 this arises where the law provides a single
penalty for two or more component offenses. 72
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex
crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. 73 This
is because these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A.
No. 7659 punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated
the seriousness of rape because no matter how many times the victim was raped, like in the
present case, there is only one crime committed - the special complex crime of kidnapping
with rape.
However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender should not
have taken the victim with lewd designs, otherwise, it would be complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape. In People v. Garcia, 74 we explained that if the taking was by forcible
abduction and the woman was raped several times, the crimes committed is one complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as much as the forcible abduction was only
necessary for the first rape; and each of the other counts of rape constitutes distinct and
separate count of rape. 75
It having been established that Mirandilla's act was kidnapping and serious illegal detention
(not forcible abduction) and on the occasion thereof, he raped AAA several times, We hold
that Mirandilla is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime
109
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape, warranting the penalty of death.
However, in view of R.A. No. 9346 entitled, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines, 76 the penalty of death is hereby reduced to reclusion
perpetua, 77 without eligibility for parole. 78
We, therefore, modify the CA Decision. We hold that the separate informations of rape
cannot be considered as separate and distinct crimes in view of the above discussion.
As to the award of damages, we have the following rulings.
This Court has consistently held that upon the finding of the fact of rape, the award of civil
damages ex delicto is mandatory. 79 As we elucidated in People v. Prades, 80 the award
authorized by the criminal law as civil indemnity ex delicto for the offended party, aside
from other proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages
in civil law. 81 Thus, we held that the civil liability ex delicto provided by the Revised
Penal Code, that is, restitution, reparation, and indemnification, 82 all correspond to actual
or compensatory damages in the Civil Code. 83
84
In the 1998 landmark case of People v. Victor, the Court enunciated that if, in the crime
of rape, the death penalty is imposed, the indemnity ex delicto for the victim shall be in
the increased amount of NOT 85 less than P75,000.00. To reiterate the words of the
Court: "this is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and
the financial fluctuation over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the
Court over the incidence of heinous crimes..." 86 xxx (Emphasis supplied)
After the enactment R.A. 9346, 87 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty, questions
arose as to the continued applicability of the Victor 88 ruling. Thus, in People v.
Quiachon, 89 the Court pronounced that even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed
because of R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity ex delicto of P75,000.00 still applies because
this indemnity is not dependent on the actual imposition of death, but on the fact that
qualifying circumstances warranting the penalty of death attended the commission of
the offense. 90As explained in People v. Salome, 91 while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, the fact remains that the penalty provided for by the
law for a heinous offense is still death, and the offense is still heinous. 92 (Emphasis
supplied)
such amount as the Court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the
basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice. Indeed, the conventional requirement
of allegata et probata in civil procedure and for essentially civil cases should be dispensed
with in criminal prosecutions for rape with the civil aspect included therein, since no
appropriate pleadings are filed wherein such allegations can be made. (Emphasis supplied)
Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and
psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages are too obvious to
still require the recital thereof at the trial by the victim, since the Court itself even
assumes and acknowledges such agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility. What
exists by necessary implication as being ineludibly present in the case need not go through
superfluity of still being proven through a testimonial charade. (Emphasis supplied) 95
AAA is also entitled to exemplary damages of P30,000.00, pursuant to the present
jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 00271 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused Felipe
Mirandilla, Jr., is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape under the last paragraph of Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by R.A. No. 7659, and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and to pay the offended party
AAA, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code, 93 without the necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than the fact of rape.
This move of dispensing evidence to prove moral damage in rape cases, traces its origin
in People v. Prades, 94 where we held that:

The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under consideration, moral
damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in
110

G.R. No. 209227, March 25, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLIE
OROSCO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated March 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 05171 which affirmed the Decision2 dated June 24, 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court of Legazpi City, Branch 10 finding the accused-appellant Charlie Orosco guilty of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Appellant, along with Abner Astor, John Doe and Peter Doe, were charged with
Robbery with Homicide defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. The Information reads as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 16th day of May, 2006, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, with intent of gain and by means of violence, did
then and there [willfully], unlawfully, feloniously and forcibly enter the store owned by one
Lourdes Yap situated at Purok 4, Barangay Rawis, Legazpi City, and once inside said store,
take, steal and carry away cash money, to the damage and prejudice of said Lourdes Yap,
and by reason of or on occasion of said robbery, and for the purpose of enabling them to
take, steal and carry away the aforesaid cash money in pursuance of their conspiracy, did
then and there [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously and taking advantage of their
superior strength and with intent to kill, attack, assault and stab the aforesaid Lourdes Yap,
thereby inflicting upon her injury which directly caused her untimely death, to the damage
and prejudice of her legal heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3cralawred
cralawlawlibrary
The factual scenario presented by the prosecution is based on the eyewitness account of
Albert M. Arca (Arca), the postmortem findings of Sr. Pol. Chief Insp. Dr. James Margallo
Belgira who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, and the victims grandson,
Ryan Francis Yap.
Arca testified that on May 16, 2006, about one oclock in the afternoon, he went to the
store of Lourdes Yap (Yap) at Purok 4, Barangay Rawis, Legazpi City. He was buying ice
but it was not yet hardened (frozen) so he went home. At around two oclock, he was again
sent on errand to buy ice at the same store. After purchasing the ice, he noticed there was a
verbal tussle between Yap and two male customers. The men were arguing that they were
given insufficient change and insisting they gave a P500 bill and not P100. When Yap
opened the door, the two men entered the store. From outside the store and thru its open
window grills, he saw one of the men placed his left arm around the neck of Yap and
covered her mouth with his right hand while the other man was at her back restraining her
hands. He recognized the man who was holding the hands of Yap as Charlie Orosco
(appellant), while he described the man who covered her mouth as thin, with less hair and
dark complexion. The latter stabbed Yap at the center of her chest. When they released
her, she fell down on the floor. Appellant then took a thick wad of bills from the base of the
religious icon or santo at the altar infront of the stores window, after which he and the
man who stabbed Yap fled together with two other men outside who acted as lookouts.
111
Arca went near the bloodied victim but also left and went home afraid because he was seen
by one of the lookouts.4cralawred
Yap was brought to the Aquinas University Hospital but she was declared dead on arrival.
Later, at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Legazpi City District office, Arca gave
descriptions of the faces of appellant and the dark thin man who stabbed Yap (John
Doe). From a surveillance digital photo and video clip shown to him, Arca positively
identified Abner Astor (Astor) as one of the two men sitting beside the store as lookouts.
Consequently, warrants of arrest were issued against appellant and Astor. But only
appellant was arrested as Astor, John Doe and Peter Doe remained at large.
Dr. Belgira affirmed the findings in his Medico-Legal
Report5 stating:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
TRUNK:
1) Stab wound, left anterior costal region, measuring 2 x 0.5 cm, 5 cm from the
anterior midline, 9 cm deep. The wound tract is directed posteriorwards, upwards
and medialwards, cutting the sixth anterior thoracic rib and piercing the heart.
CONCLUSION:
The cause of death is hemorrhagic shock secondary to a stab wound of the
trunk.cralawlawlibrary
He explained that it was possible that the lone stab wound caused by a sharp object, such as
a knife, was inflicted while the victim was standing, and found no other injuries such as
defense wounds.6cralawred
For his defense, appellant testified that on the date and time of the incident, he was at his
house in Bigaa taking care of his three-year-old child while his wife was washing clothes.
He stayed in the house until his wife finished the laundry at past 3:00 p.m. He denied
knowing Yap and his co-accused Astor. While he admitted that he was a resident of Purok
4, Bgy. Rawis, his family transferred to their other house at Bigaa. He denied knowing
Arca and he does not know of any motive for Arca to testify against him. He worked in a
copra company in Lidong but stopped reporting for work after May 16, 2006 as he was
selling fish. He was arrested by the police at the rotunda in Legazpi when he was buying
medicine for his sick child.7cralawred
Appellants wife, Teresa Magdaong-Orosco also testified to confirm that at the time of the
incident he was at their house while she was doing the laundry just adjacent to their house.
On cross-examination, she was asked the distance between their place and Bgy. Rawis and
she replied that it will take less than one hour from Bigaa to Rawis.8cralawred
On June 24, 2011, the trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant of the crime
charged, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the Court hereby finds accused Charlie Orosco
GUILTY of the crime of robbery with homicide. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs of Lourdes Yap P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the fact of death, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
Insofar as the other accused is concerned, the case is hereby sent to the archives, pending
their eventual arrest.
So Ordered.9cralawlawlibrary
Appellant went to the CA but his appeal was dismissed. The CA upheld his conviction as it
found no compelling reason to deviate from the factual findings and conclusions of the trial
court.
In this petition, appellant reiterates the arguments he raised before the CA that the trial
court erred in giving credit to the uncorroborated eyewitness testimony of Arca who could
not point to him during the trial, and that even granting that criminal charges may be
imputed against him, it should only be robbery and not the complex crime of robbery with
homicide considering the fact that it was not him who stabbed Yap.
The appeal lacks merit.
It is settled that witnesses are to be weighed not numbered, such that the testimony of a
single, trustworthy and credible witness could be sufficient to convict an accused. The
testimony of a sole witness, if found convincing and credible by the trial court, is sufficient
to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Corroborative evidence is necessary
only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or
that his observation had been inaccurate.10cralawred
In this case, both the trial and appellate courts found the testimony of the lone eyewitness,
Arca, convincing notwithstanding that he was quite slow in narrating the incident to the
court and that he initially desisted from physically pointing to appellant as the one who
held Yaps hands from behind and took her money at the store after she was stabbed by
appellants cohort (John Doe).
112
In his direct examination, Arca named appellant as one of those who robbed and killed Yap Your Honor, it is understandable that even he is slow, he keeps on glancing at the
but refused to pinpoint him in open court, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary person.
COURT
ACP NUQUI Observations are all noted.
xxxx xxxx
Q. This person who was holding the hands of Lourdes Yap, were you able to identify ACP NUQUI
him? At this point, Your Honor, I would like to make of record that when it comes to
A. Yes, sir. the person of Charlie Orosco, Your Honor, he stopped and did not say ---- he did
Q. Do you know the name of this person? not nod or do anything of what he has been doing when the other persons were
A. Yes, sir. He is Charlie. identified.
Q. Do you know the family name? COURT
A. Orosco, sir. Okay. Noted.11
Q. If this Charlie Orosco whom you said was then holding the hands of Lourdes Yap,
if he is in Court, would you please point to him?
WITNESS (answering) Arca continued with his testimony on how Yap was stabbed by appellants companion and
A. Yes, sir. appellant taking the thick wad of P1,000 bills before fleeing along with the two lookouts.
Q. Please look around you and point at him. When asked for the fourth time to pinpoint appellant, Arca was still hesitant:
A. He is here.
Q. If he is in Court, please point at him. Q. Now, is this Charlie Orosco here in Court?
Q. Why cant you point at him? A. Yes, sir, he is around.
COURT INTERPRETER Q. This person who took the money or Charlie Orosco you said he is in Court, will
At this juncture, the witness is somewhat trembling. you please look at him.
ACP NUQUI xxxx
Oh, you see. ACP NUQUI (continuing)
ATTY. BAARES Q. Is he now in Court?
The witness can not answer. A. Yes, sir.
ACP NUQUI Q. Please point at him.
By the look of the witness, Your Honor, he is afraid. Perhaps. ATTY BAARES
xxxx The same observation, Your Honor.
ACP NUQUI (continuing) COURT
Q. Please point at him. Oh, the same observation?
ATTY. BAARES ACP NUQUI
We have already foreseen the witness to pinpoint at anyone. Yes, Your Honor, he is hesitant. It is understandable because he is afraid.
ACP NUQUI xxxx
No. He said that the. COURT (to the witness)
ATTY. BAARES Q. Why can you not point at Charlie Orosco who according to you he is inside
Then, let him voluntarily do it. the Court?
ACP NUQUI WITNESS (answering)
Okay. A. I cant afford to point at him.
ATTY. BAARES ACP NUQUI (to the witness)
Your Honor, I move that the prosecutor will transfer to another question because Q. Why?
we keep on waiting already. A. I am afraid.
ACP NUQUI
113
COURT robbed and killed the victim, Arca was trembling and constantly looking towards the
He can not because he is afraid.12 (Emphasis supplied) direction of accused Orosco. Though simple-minded, Arca was well-aware of the possible
cralawlawlibrary consequences his testimony could trigger. To the Courts mind, Arcas act of constantly
looking towards Oroscos direction whenever he was asked to point out one of the culprits,
is a mute but eloquent manner of identifying Orosco as one of the perpetrators of the
At the next hearing, Arca was recalled to the witness stand and this time he was able to crime. As such, Arcas act is sufficient identification already.
pinpoint appellant as among those persons who robbed and killed Yap,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Later, when Arca was recalled to the stand to answer some additional questions, he was
able to gather enough courage to point out to Orosco as the man who held the hands of
PROSECUTOR NUQUI Lourdes Yap while his companion stabbed her. Arca stated that he was hesitant to identify
Q- You mentioned that you saw two (2) persons talking to Lourdes Yap. Who are and point out accused earlier because he feared what Orosco might do to him. Incidentally,
these persons you are referring to? both Orosco and his wife stated that they do know neither Albert Arca nor Lourdes Yap.
ATTY. CHAN Thus, it appears that there is no reason whatsoever for Arca to lie and attribute the crime to
Your Honor please, we are again registering our objection. Orosco. Following settled jurisprudence, Arcas positive identification of Orosco prevails
COURT over the latters alibi.14cralawlawlibrary
Witness may answer.
WITNES
S We find no compelling or cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court on its
A- Charlie Orosco and a certain thin person. evaluation of Arcas testimony. The well-settled rule in this jurisdiction is that the trial
PROSECUTOR NUQUI courts findings on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect
Q- Why are you able to say that Charlie Orosco was one of the persons talking, and will not be disturbed on appeal without any clear showing that it overlooked,
how long have you known Charlie Orosco? misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which
A- He always go with a fisherman and act as helper and because of that I know could affect the result of the case.15cralawred
him.
xxxx Appellant repeatedly harped on the hesitation of Arca to point to him at the trial. However,
PROSECUTOR NUQUI as the trial courts firsthand observation of said witness deportment revealed, Arcas fear
Q- You mentioned that you have long known Charlie Orosco. Will you look of appellant sufficiently explains his initial refusal to point to him in open court during his
around and point to him if he is in Court? direct examination. Arca was finally able to point to appellant as one of the perpetrators of
INTERPRETER the robbery and killing of Yap during his additional direct examination when he had
At this juncture, the witness is pointing to a man wearing a yellow T-shirt apparently mustered enough courage to do so.
with handcuff and when asked answered by the name of Charlie Orosco.
PROSECUTOR NUQUI Robbery with homicide is defined under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
No further questions Your Honor.13 amended, which provides in part:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties. Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall
Assessing the identification made by Arca, the trial court concluded that he had positively suffer:
identified appellant as one of the perpetrators of the robbery and killing of
Yap, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary 1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have
Here, Albert Arca, the prosecutions main witness, positively identified accused Orosco as been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.cralawlawlibrary
one of [the] two men who robbed and killed Lourdes Yap on that fateful day. As observed
by the trial court during the bail hearings, when asked to identify one of the men who

114

The elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are: (1) the taking of personal property
is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs
to another; (3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or
on the occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is committed.16 Homicide is
said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if it is committed (a)
to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the
culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to
eliminate witnesses to the commission of the crime.17 In robbery with homicide, the
original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated
on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the
taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the
robbery.18cralawred
Here, the homicide was committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery as
appellant and John Doe had to kill Yap to accomplish their main objective of stealing her
money. The earlier verbal tussle where the two pretended to have paid a greater amount and
asked for the correct change was just a ploy to get inside the store where the victim kept
her earnings. To verify whether the cash payment was indeed a P500 or P100 bill, the
victim let them enter the store but once inside they got hold of her and stabbed her.
Appellant, however, argues that if he had committed any offense, it was only robbery since
Arca testified that it was John Doe, whom he described as a thin man, who stabbed the
victim.
We disagree.
The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly showed that appellant acted in
conspiracy with his co-accused. Appellant and John Doe first engaged the unsuspecting
victim in a verbal altercation until she allowed them to enter the store. Upon getting inside,
they held the victim with John Doe wrapping his arm around her neck while appellant held
her hands at the back. With the victim pressed between the two of them, John Doe stabbed
her once in her chest before releasing her. Once she fell down, appellant quickly took the
money placed at the altar inside the store and fled together with John Doe and the two
lookouts outside the store. All the foregoing indicate the presence of conspiracy between
appellant and his co-accused in the perpetration of robbery and killing of the victim.
It must be stressed that appellant played a crucial role in the killing of the victim to
facilitate the robbery. He was behind the victim holding her hands while John Doe grabbed
her at the neck. His act contributed in rendering the victim without any means of defending
herself when John Doe stabbed her frontally in the chest. Having acted in conspiracy with
his co-accused, appellant is equally liable for the killing of Yap.
As we held in People v. Baron19cralawred
The concerted manner in which the appellant and his companions perpetrated the crime
showed beyond reasonable doubt the presence of conspiracy. When a homicide takes place
by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they actually
participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there was an endeavor to prevent
the killing. There was no evidence adduced in this case that the appellant attempted to
prevent the killing. Thus, regardless of the acts individually performed by the appellant
and his co-accused, and applying the basic principle in conspiracy that the act of one is the
act of all, the appellant is guilty as a co-conspirator. As a result, the criminal liabilities of
the appellant and his co-accused are one and the same. (Emphasis
supplied)cralawlawlibrary
In sum, the CA did not err in affirming the conviction of appellant for robbery with
homicide. Appellant was positively identified by prosecution eyewitness Arca as among
those who perpetrated the robbery and killing of Yap at the latters store on May 16, 2006
in Bgy. Rawis, Legazpi City. This positive identification prevails over accuseds defense of
alibi. As pointed out by the trial court, it was not physically impossible for appellant to be
at the scene of the crime considering the presence of many public conveyances which
would drastically cut the one hour walk from Bigaa to Rawis to only a couple of
minutes.20cralawred
On the award of damages, the trial court was correct in sentencing appellant to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for
the fact of death and P75,000.00 as moral damages, conformably with prevailing
jurisprudence.21 We also find the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00
proper due to the presence of the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of
superior strength, though these were not alleged in the information. While an aggravating
circumstance not specifically alleged in the information (albeit established at trial) cannot
be appreciated to increase the criminal liability of the accused, the established presence of
one or two aggravating circumstances of any kind or nature entitles the offended party to
exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code because the requirement of
specificity in the information affected only the criminal liability of the accused, not his
civil liability.22cralawred
The aforesaid sums shall earn the legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the finality of judgment until full payment.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated March 22, 2013 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05171 affirming the Decision dated June 24,
2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 10 in Criminal Case No. 10916
is AFFIRMED. The sums awarded as civil indemnity (P75,000.00), moral damages
(P75,000.00) and exemplary damages (P30,000.00) shall earn legal interest at the rate of
115
6% per annum from the finality of judgment until full payment.

With costs against the accused-appellant. Before this Court is an appeal of the February 11, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 041552 affirming with modification the August 24,
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary 2009 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, San Jose, Camarines Sur in
Crim. Case No. T-2678 and finding appellant Joseph4 Barra guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of attempted robbery with homicide instead of special complex crime of
robbery with homicide.

On March 21, 2004, an information5 for the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide was filed against appellant, to wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

That on or about 11:00 P.M. of October 9, 2003, at Barangay Tinawagan, Tigaon,

Camarines Sur, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named
accused, while armed with a firearm, after gaining entrance into the residence of his victim,
with intent to gain, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take and steal money from Elmer Lagdaan y Azur; that on the
occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling him to take and steal the
money, the herein accused, with intent to kill, did then and there feloniously shoot said
Elmer Lagdaan, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound which caused his death, to the
prejudice of his heirs. (Emphases deleted.)

On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.6 Trial ensued thereafter.

Dr. Peafrancia N. Villanueva, Municipal Health Officer of Tigaon, Camarines Sur,

examined the corpse of Elmer Lagdaan and stated in her Postmortem
Report7:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Findings:

1. Gunshot wound, point of entry, 0.5 x 0.5 cms, circular, with inverted edges at the
G.R. No. 198020, July 10, 2013 mid left frontal area. Hematoma formation is noted at the site of entry.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSEPH BARRA, Accused-

Appellant. CAUSE OF DEATH:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

DECISION MASSIVE HE[M]ORRHAGE SECONDARY [TO] GUNSHOT WOUND

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Dr. Villanueva testified that the victim sustained a gunshot wound due to the circular and

116
inverted edges of the point of entry. She concluded that since there was no point of exit,
the victim was shot at close range.8
Ricardo de la Pea testified that he knew appellant for a long time. He stated that he was
on his way home to the neighboring barangay, when, at around 9:00 p.m. on October 9,
2003, in the light of a bright moon, he saw appellant enter the house of Lagdaan, which
was lit with a lamp, and poked a gun to the victims right forehead and demanded money.
De la Pea hid behind a tree ten meters away. When the victim stated that the money was
not in his possession, appellant shot him. He went home and reported the incident the
following morning.9
Ely Asor testified that on the night of October 9, 2003, he was on his way to the victims
house to collect his daily wage when he saw appellant in the yard of the victims house. He
inquired from appellant if the victim was around. Appellant responded that the victim was
not around. Asor went home. It was while Asor was in his house that he heard a gunshot.
It was the following morning that he learned that the victim died. Asor then proceeded to
report the incident.10
The victims mother, Flora Lagdaan, testified that she spent for funeral and burial expenses
in the amount of P33,300.00.
In his defense, appellant denied the charges against him. Appellant claimed that he was in
Batangas City, with his brother Benjamin, visiting his sister when he was arrested and
brought to Camarines Sur and charged with the crime of robbery with murder.11
Appellants brother, Benjamin, tried to corroborate his testimony.12
The RTC, after taking into consideration all the evidence presented, found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. It stated that the
affirmative testimony of the prosecutions witnesses deserved more weight than the
appellants defense of denial and alibi. Thus, finding the prosecutions witnesses to be
credible and that the killing of the victim to be by reason of the robbery, the RTC decisions
decretal portion read:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused,
Joseph Barra GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide as
defined and penalized under Article 291(1) of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences him
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. To pay the surviving heirs of Elmer
Lagdaan, the sum of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death, as actual damages in
the amount of Php55,579.80, as moral damages in the sum of Php50,000.00 and to pay the
costs.
The accused is entitled to the full credit of his preventive imprisonment if he abides by the
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners during his confinement, otherwise he
shall only be entitled to four-fifths (4/5) thereof.13
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals only found appellant guilty of attempted robbery
with homicide. It stated that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Regarding the trial courts finding that accused-appellant is responsible for the death of
Lagdaan, WE will not disturb the same as it is well supported by the evidence on record
and in accord with prevailing law and jurisprudence. However, WE disagree with its
determination of the nature of the crime that accused-appellant committed. Instead of
robbery with homicide at its consum[m]ated stage, accused-appellant should have been
declared guilty only of attempted robbery with homicide.
As correctly observed by the OSG,14 the only evidence introduced by the government to
establish robbery is the statement of De la Pea that when accused-appellant reached the
victims place, the latter barged into the said residence, poked a gun at the victims
forehead, demanded money and when the victim refused to accede to his demand, fired a
gun and shot the victim. Indeed, no iota of evidence was presented to establish that
accused-appellant took away the victims money or any property, for that matter.
The fact of asportation must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Since this fact was
not duly established, accused-appellant should be held liable only for the crime of
attempted robbery with homicide as defined and penalized under Article 297 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides
When by reason of or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is
committed, the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua, unless the homicide committed shall deserve a
higher penalty under the provisions of this Code.
The appellant is guilty of attempted robbery with homicide only when he commenced the
commission of robbery directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution
which would produce robbery by reason of some causes or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.
117
The claim of the defense that accused-appellant should be convicted only of the crime of
homicide is bereft of merit. The killing of the victim herein was by reason of or on the
occasion of robbery.
The attendant circumstances clearly show accused-appellants intent to rob the victim. That
motive was manifested by accused-appellants overt act of poking a gun at the victims
forehead demanding money from the latter. When the victim refused to accede to the
demand, accused-appellant shot the former. The killing was an offshoot of accused-
appellants intent to rob the victim. Accused-appellant was bent on resorting to violent
means to attain his end. Due to the victims failure to give his money, the crime of robbery
was, however, not consummated.15 (Citations omitted.)
Thus, the Court of Appeals stated:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed Judgment is
hereby MODIFIED as follows -
1) Accused-appellant is adjudged GUILTY of the crime of Attempted Robbery with
Homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA,
2) Accused-appellant is directed to pay the heirs of Elmer Lagdaan the
following:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
a) the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
b) the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
c) the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
d) the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
e) the cost of suit.16
Appellant filed his notice of appeal on February 18, 2011.17
After appellants confinement was confirmed, both the OSG and appellant manifested that
they would adopt the pleadings filed in the Court of Appeals in lieu of supplemental
briefs.18
Appellant argues that his identity as the perpetrator of the crime was not sufficiently
established by the prosecution. Appellant stated that the testimonies of the prosecutions
witnesses were rife with inconsistencies. Moreover, appellant argued that the elements for
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide were not proven particularly the
element of taking of personal property.
We affirm the February 11, 2011 decision of the Court of Appeals with modification on the
award of damages.
In People v. Bocalan and Gatdula19 we stated that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
[F]indings of facts of the trial court, its calibration and assessment of the probative weight
of the testimonial evidence of the parties and its conclusions anchored on its findings are
accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique
advantage of the trial court in observing at close range the demeanor, conduct and
deportment of the said witnesses as they testify, unless the trial court ignored,
misunderstood and misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which if considered will
change the outcome of the case. x x x. (Citation omitted.)
In the present case, while appellant questions the credibility of the prosecutions witnesses,
he does not present any sufficient evidence to prove that the RTC indeed ignored,
misunderstood and misinterpreted the facts and circumstances of the case. We also found,
after reviewing the records, nothing that would indicate any misinterpretation or
misapprehension of facts on the part of the appellate court that would substantially alter its
conclusions.
Appellant in this case was charged with robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties. Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall
suffer:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
1. The penalty of from reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion
of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed; or when the robbery
shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
In People v. Quemeggen,20 this Court gave the requisites to be proven by the prosecution
for appellant to be convicted of robbery with homicide, to wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
1. The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against
persons;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
118
2. The property taken belongs to another;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
However, in conformity with current policy, we impose on all the monetary awards for
damages interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision
3. The taking is animo lucrandi; and until fully paid.23

4. By reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed. WHEREFORE, the February 11, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 04155 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of exemplary
(Citation omitted.) damages shall be increased to P30,000.00 and all monetary awards for damages shall earn
interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully
paid.
In the case before us, appellants intention was to extort money from the victim. By reason
of the victims refusal to give up his personal property - his money - to appellant, the No pronouncement as to costs.
victim was shot in the head, causing his death. We, however, agree with the Court of
Appeals that the element of taking was not complete, making the crime one of attempted SO ORDERED.
robbery with homicide as opposed to the crime appellant was convicted in the RTC.
Appellant is, therefore, liable under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code, not under
Article 294 as originally held by the RTC. Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code
states:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Article 297. Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain circumstances.
When by reason or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is
committed, the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua, unless the homicide committed shall deserve a
higher penalty under the provisions of this Code.

The elements to be convicted under Article 297 were discussed in People v. Macabales,21 to
wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

The elements of Robbery with Homicide as defined in Art. 297 of the Revised Penal Code
are: (1) There is an attempted or frustrated robbery. (2) A homicide is committed.

In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the victim
refused to give his money to appellant and no personal property was shown to have been
taken. It was for this reason that the victim was shot. Appellant can only be found guilty
of attempted robbery with homicide, thus punishable under Article 297 of the Revised
Penal Code. Since the RTC and the Court of Appeals found appellants crime to be
aggravated by disregard of dwelling, the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the maximum
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Anent the awards of damages by the Court of Appeals, after a careful review of existing
rules and recent jurisprudence, we find the same to be in order and need not be disturbed. 22

119
 G.R. No. 197562, April 20, 2015

AURORA ENGSON FRANSDILLA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by armed persons and robbery with
violence against or intimidation of persons was committed when the accused, who held
firearms, entered the residential house of the victims and inflicted injury upon the victims
in the process of committing the robbery. Hence, the penalty is that imposed for the
robbery in an inhabited house, the more serious crime. All the accused are liable because
the act of one is the act of all.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Case

Aurora Engson Fransdilla (Fransdilla), the lone appellant, seeks to reverse the decision
promulgated on February 28, 2011,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed her
conviction and that of her co-accused for robbery on the basis of conspiracy, with
modifications as to the penalty imposed, under the decision rendered on September 15,
1999 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, in Quezon City2

As factual background, the CA adopted the summary rendered by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) in its appellee's brief, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On February 20, 1991 between 3 o'clock and 4 o'clock in the afternoon, at private
complainants' residence at No. 24, Mabait St., Teachers Village, Quezon City, private
complainant Lalaine Yreverre saw appellant Aurora Engson in front of their gate. Upon
noticing Aurora, Lalaine went to the gate and asked Aurora what is their purpose, as there
were four (4) of them. Aurora then inquired about Cynthia Yreverre, Lalaine's sister. The
latter replied that Cynthia was in the Japanese Embassy and asked Aurora if there was any
other person whom she wanted to talk to. It was then that Aurora told Lalaine that she was
from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). It was upon said pretension
that Lalaine offered herself to instead talk to her and allowed her to enter their house.
When they were already having a conversation, Aurora asked Lalaine if she could use the
telephone, which the latter acceded to and handed her a cordless telephone. Lalaine noticed
that Aurora seemed to keep on dialing the telephone and even said that the person she was
calling did not know how to use the telephone. But still, Aurora kept on dialing the
telephone.

120
Thereafter, appellant Aurora asked for a cigarette. After Lalaine gave Aurora the cigarette,
the four (4) other men outside the gate, who were with Aurora, suddenly came inside the
house. The four (4) men stood behind Aurora who was still dialing the telephone. When
Aurora told that she could not contact the person she was calling, she asked Lalaine if she
could use the comfort room, which the latter again permitted. Aurora stood up, put down
the telephone, got her bag and went to the comfort room. When Aurora came back, she sat
down again but in crossed-legs as she said she was having a menstrual period. Upon saying
that, Lalaine's attention was focused on her. At this juncture, accused Edgardo Cacal poked
a gun at Lalaine's neck and announced that it was a hold-up. While appellant Edgardo
Cacal was poking a gun at Lalaine's neck, accused Danilo Cuanang and the two (2) other
men proceeded to the kitchen. In the kitchen, Danilo and his two (2) other companions
herded their maids, private complainant's niece and cousin inside the bodega.
Accused Cacal who was still poking the gun at Lalaine's neck, thereafter, pulled Lalaine's
hair and dragged her upstairs and brought her inside Cynthia's room. The gun still being
poked at Lalaine, Cacal looked around the room and when he spotted upon the vault he
dropped Lalaine, opened the door and called for his companions to come along. Accused
Cuanang came up and the two (Cacal and Cuanang) carried the vault and brought it
downstairs. But before they went downstairs, they threatened Lalaine not to follow them
and to just stay in the room, but Lalaine opened the door and followed them.
When Lalaine was halfway downstairs, accused Cacal turned his back and saw her.
Accused Cacal then brought her inside her room. Inside the room, Cacal pushed her
towards her bed and she fell. Cacal told her to just stay, and then he searched the room.
Lalaine managed to stand up but Cacal slapped her. While sitting, accused Cuanang came
and tied her arms at her back. While she was being tied, appellant Aurora Fransdilla peeped
inside the room. It was also at the time that accused Cacal and Cuanang searched the entire
room and took all the jewelries and things they saw.
When Cuanang and Cacal left the room, Lalaine followed them. While in the middle
downstairs, she saw Cacal, Cuanang and their two other companions tucking their guns
around their waists. Appellants and their co-accused then left the house on board two (2)
cars that were waiting for them just outside the house, and one of which, a black Colt
Mirage, was driven by accused Manuel Silao, together with appellant Edgardo Silao who
was seated at the front passenger seat.
At this point, Lalaine shouted for help, thereafter, a relative came by to help and untied her.
Lalaine then called her sister Cynthia and related the incident. Cynthia reported the
incident to the police authorities. Not too long thereafter, the police investigated the
incident.
In relation thereto, Lalaine executed her sworn statement on February 20, 1991 (Exhibit
"J"). After said investigation, Lalaine underwent medical examination at the East Avenue
Medical Center as her hands were bruised when she was tied by her hands and her face
being slapped by one of the accused. A medical certificate was issued in relation thereto
(Exhibit "N").
Thereafter, Lalaine went to Camp Karingal at Sikatuna, Quezon City where there were at
least fifteen (15) person(s) presented before her in the police line-up, but she was not able
to identify any of the accused among said line-up.
After which, she went to the Station Investigation Division (SID) Station 4, Quezon City
where she was shown about fifty (50) pictures in order for her to identify the robbers, but
she was not able to identify any of them.
Since she failed to identify any of the malefactors, she proceeded to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), Manila. She was referred to a cartographer for the sketch of herein
appellants and their co-accused as the malefactors in robbing their house (Exhibits "B", "C"
and "D").
Thereafter, Lalaine proceeded to the Western Police District, Manila. There, she went to the
rogues gallery where a picture of about (5) persons were shown to her. After carefully
examining the pictures, Lalaine was able to pinpoint the picture of accused Danilo
Cuanang as one of the robbers. She was also able to identify Manuel "Sonny" Silao in a
group picture where she identified accused Cuanang (Exhibits "E" and "F") It was also in
said rogues gallery that they were able to get accused Cuanang's address at Iriga, Cubao,
Quezon City.
Lalaine, together with her police officers companions, proceeded to Cuanang's indicated
address. Upon arrival thereat, they inquired from the security guard of the townhouse if
Danilo Cuanang was residing there, which the latter confirmed.
On the following day Lalaine and her police companions went back to Cuanang's house.
Lalaine knocked at the door and accused Cuanang himself opened the door. When Lalaine
confronted him and told him that he was one of those who entered their house, the latter
did not answer. Lalaine asked Cuanang if he could come with them at the PNP-SID, Station
4, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City and the latter acceded.
On their way to the police station, Lalaine inquired on Cuanang about their lady companion
(herein appellant Fransdilla), but the latter just bowed his head. When Lalaine threatened
him that if he would not tell the whereabouts of their lady companion (herein appellant
Aurora) he would be answerable for all the things stolen, the latter replied that they had no
share in the stolen items. Lalaine then asked the name of their lady companion and the
latter said that her name was Jessica Engson (also known as Aurora Engson Fransdilla) and
she was living in Antipolo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Cuanang also volunteered himself to
accompany them to Aurora's house provided that they should not hurt him. Agreeing
121
thereto, the group of Lalaine, accompanied by Cuanang, proceeded to Aurora's house at the two (2) pairs of gold earings P 10,000.00
given address. Upon arrival thereat, Lalaine inquired from a child if Aurora was awake, and one (1) gold necklace with pendant 180,000.00
upon asking, she saw appellant Aurora who was trembling at that time. Lalaine noticed that one (1) Louie Viton Brown Leather (sic)... 11,000.00
Aurora was nervous and even told her that Lalaine was able to remember her face.
one (1) Gucci Ladies watch 13,000.00
Appellant even voluntarily told Lalaine that she would tell her the whole truth. She
(Aurora) told that she was instructed by her companions Edgar (Silao), Sonny (Manuel two (2) gold earrings w/diamond pendant... 80,000.00
Silao) and Danilo Cacal. Lalaine even confronted her when she implicated her cousins CASH MONEY 7,000.00
(Sonny and Edgar). belonging to LALAINE YREVERRE Y Panganiban, all in the total amount of
PhP2,701,000.00, Philippines Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended
Upon reaching PNP Station 4, SID, Kamuning, Quezon City, Lalaine and her police party in the aforementioned sum and in such other amounts as maybe awarded under the
companions rested for a while before they proceeded to 921 Adelina St., Sampaloc, Manila, provisions of the Civil Code.
where accused Manuel "Sonny" Silao lived. Upon reaching the said address, Lalaine
knocked at the gate, and a maid opened the same and allowed them to enter the house. In CONTRARY TO LAW.4
the house, Lalaine asked the maid where Sonny's room was and the latter said it was on the
At the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
third floor. When Lalaine and her police companions were going upstairs, they passed by
the second floor and saw accused Cacal sitting on a folding bed. She then told her police
companions that that man (Cacal) was among those who entered and robbed their house, 1. The identity of all the accused as indicated in the information.
Cacal just remained silent. Thereafter, the group proceeded to the third floor of the house,
knocked at the door and it was Manuel's (a.k.a. Sonny) wife who opened it. At this point,
2. The accused Manuel Silao and Edgar Silao are brothers and first cousins of
Manuel (a.k.a. Sonny) was lying on the bed and holding his gun, thus, Pat. Randy
Quitoriano immediately handcuffed him. Lalaine's group invited Manuel and Danilo to go private complainant Cynthia Yreverre and prosecution witness Lalaine Yreverre.
with them at the police station; both acceded.
3. The accused Manuel Silao had entered the house of complainant on several
On March 21, 1991, Lalaine went back to the PNP Station 4, SID, Kamuning, Quezon City,
where she was informed that they (Rod Fortaleza's group) were able to recover some occasions to visit relatives.
money (dollar bills) from appellant Edgardo Silao. When these dollar bills were shown to
her, she recognized that these were the same dollar bills withdrawn by her sister Cynthia 4. The accused Edgardo Cacal is the driver of Manuel Silao and knows Manuel's
from the RCBC Bank as the bills bear red markings (Exhibits "M" to "M-5".3
brother accused Edgar Silao.
Fransdilla and her co-accused were eventually charged with robbery under the following
information, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 5. The accused Manuel Silao has a pending criminal case for illegal possession of
That on or about the 20th day of February, 1991, in Quezon City Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, firearms before the RTC, Manila.
confederating with and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, and by means of violence and intimidation 6. The accused Manuel Silao is the owner of one Cal. 9mm Springfield bearing
upon person rob the residence of CYNTHIA YREVERRE Y PANGANIBAN located at Serial No. 64624 with one magazine containing eight (8) ammunitions, although only
No. 24-B Mabait St., Teacher's Village, Quezon City, this City, by pretending to be from
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT AGENCY (POEA) and once inside took, rob, 4 were delivered to the Court.
and carried away the following items therefrom, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
nine (9) pieces of expensive jewelry .... P1 .5 M 7. The accused were all investigated in connection with the instant case, without the
$30,000.00 (U.S. Dollars equivalent to ... 900,000.00
assistance of counsel.
belonging to CYNTHIA YREVERRE Y PANGANIBAN.

122
8. The person depicted in the picture marked as Exhibit "E" is accused Manuel Silao
while the one in the photograph marked as Exhibit "D" is accused Danilo Cuanang.
5 observed that the clear and categorical testimony of Lalaine positively showed that
9. On February 20, 1991, Edgar Silao was in Quezon City.
The prosecution presented complainants Lalaine Yreverre and Cynthia Yreverre, NBI
Illustrator Amando Mendoza, SPO2 Randolf Quitoriano, RCBC Manager Ma. Teresa
Jamir, Joel Yreverre and Dr. Richard Pascual as its witnesses during the trial on the merits.
On its part, the defense relied on Celia Syquian, Edgardo Y. Silao, Dominador Pilar,
Lourdes Samson Lopez, and Danilo Cuanang as witnesses.
As stated, the RTC convicted Fransdilla and her co-accused of robbery, decreeing in its
decision of September 15, 1999, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused AURORA ENGSON
FRANSDILLA, EDGARDO CACAL Y SANCHEZ, DANILO CUANANG Y VALDEZ,
MANUEL SILAO Y YREVERRE and EDGARDO SILAO Y YREVERRE GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Robbery punished under Article 299
of the Revised Penal Code and in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and in
the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, hereby sentences said accused
to imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY to FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of reclusin temporal as minimum to SEVENTEEN
(17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to TWENTY (20) YEARS o
reclusin temporal as maximum. Said accused are likewise ordered to indemnify the herein
private complainants the amount of TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND, the value of the property taken less the amount recovered, and to pay the
amount of PhP200,000.00 as exemplary damages.
6 Conspiracy of Fransdilla with
SO ORDERED.
As to Fransdilla, the RTC ruled that several facts and circumstances either proved by the
Prosecution or admitted by the Defense established her having conspired with her co-
accused in committing the offense charged.7
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of all of the accused, but modified the penalty
imposed by the RTC, as follows:8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 15, 1999 of the trial court is affirmed
subject to the modification that accused-appellants and accused are sentenced to an
imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusin temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Rejecting the claim of insufficiency of the proof of conspiracy raised by Fransdilla, the CA
Fransdilla's acts demonstrated her common design with the other accused to commit the
robbery,9 stressing that "it is a common design which is the essence of conspiracy, though
the conspirators may act separately and on different manner but always leading to the same
unlawful result." It adverted to Fransdilla's various acts as evincing her role in the
concerted resolve to commit the robbery, such as introducing herself to Lalaine as a
representative of the POEA in order to gain access into the house; trying to distract Lalaine
by using the telephone, asking for a cigarette, going to the bathroom, and pretending that
she was then having her menstrual period in order to have her cohorts enter the house; and
peeping inside the bedroom when her co-accused were tying Lalaine up to enable
themselves to search for and take away jewelry and other valuables inside the latter's
bedroom without hindrance.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Issue
The accused still insists on her innocence, protesting that the CA erred in affirming the
conviction despite the failure to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt as a co-
conspirator in robbery.10
Ruling of the Court
The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the CA.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1.
her co-accused was established
beyond reasonable doubt
It bears stressing that Fransdilla opted not to present evidence in her defense during the
trial. On appeal, the core of her contentions in the CA was that the Prosecution did not
establish her having conspired with the other accused in committing the robbery. She
reiterates such contentions here, stating that the State's formal offer of evidence did not
include any reference to any evidence specifically incriminating her.
The Court rejects Fransdilla's contentions.
Our review of the records of the trial reveals that contrary to Fransdilla's contentions, the
State competently and credibly established her active participation in the execution of the
robbery through Lalaine's testimony detailing her specific acts, as follows:
123
Q - Miss Yrreverre, do you recall if there was any unusual incident that happened on that
particular date and time on February 20, 1991 between 3:00 o'clock to 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - What was it?
A- On February 20, 1991, between 3:00 to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon while I was resting
at our sala I saw them and I met them at the gate and I asked the lady because there were
four of them I asked the lady to come in.
Q - How did the lady come in?
A - When I saw the lady I asked the lady what is her purpose and she said I am from the
POEA and she is looking for my sister Cynthia Yrreverre, sir.
Q - What happened after that?
A - When she inquired about my sister I told her that my sister Cynthia Yrreverre is in
Japan embassy and she said if there is any other person she could talked to.
Q - What was your answer?
A - When she said that she is from POEA I recommended myself to her and I said you can
talk to me and I allowed her to enter our house, sir.
Q - After you allowed that lady who represented herself to you that she is from the POEA
to enter, what happened next?
A - I let her enter our house and I inquired and asked from her who are the persons she
know in POEA, sir.
Q - And what happened next after that?
A - She mentioned a name whom according to her from the POEA but I do not remember
anymore, sir.
Q - What happened next after that?
A - While we were chatting or conversing for a while she asked if she can use our
telephone, sir.
Q - And what was your answer to that?
A - I said yes and I handed to her the cordless telephone, sir.
Q - What happened after you gave the telephone to the lady who represented herself that
she is from the POEA?
A - After I gave the cordless telephone she keep on dialing, dialing and dialing and
according to her she constantly dialing the number and she even remarked: "the person she
is calling does not know how to use the telephone"...
Q - What happened after that remarks?
A - She still kept on dialing and she remarked that she did not know how to use the phone...
Q - What happened after that?
A - After that, she asked for a cigarette sir.
Q - Did you give to the lady who represented herself that she is from the POEA a cigarette?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - What happened next after that? A - After I gave the cigarette the four (4) men entered
suddenly and came in our house.
Q - Where did they come from?
A - I do not know, sir.
Q - From what direction of the house they came from Miss Witness, do you know?
A - They came from the outside of the gate, sir, and suddenly entered our house, sir.
Q - When for the first time did you see that lady who represented herself that she is from
the POEA and the four (4) men burged (sic) in your house?
A- Last February 20, 1991 only, sir.
xxxx
ATTYl COPE:
Q - Miss Yrreverre, would you look around the courtroom and pinpoint if that lady who
represented herself from the POEA is here present?
A - Witness is pointing to a lady wearing black and when asked by the interpreter she
answered to the name of Aurora Engson Fransdilla.
xxxx
Q - Miss Yrreverre, what happened after four (4) men suddenly entered your residence on
that particular date and time you mentioned earlier?
A - As I was looking on the lady dialing, kept on dialing the number in the telephone I saw
the four (4) men standing behind the lady, sir.
Q - And when you saw the lady, you are referring to Aurora Engson Fransdilla?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - What happened after that?
A - When we were in the sala we were talking Aurora Engson Fransdilla remarked she can
124
not really contact the number as it was busy, sir. Q - What happened after that?
A While Cacal who was still poking the gun at my neck held and pulled the tail of my
Q - What happened next after that? hair and dragged me upstairs and brought me upstairs to the room of my sister Cynthia
A - And Aurora Engson Fransdilla after which asked if she can use the comfort room to Irreverre, sir
which I agreed, sir.
Q - What happened next?
Q - What happened next? A - While I was at the room of my sister Cynthia and while the gun was still poked at my
A - She stood up and put down the cordless telephone and took her bag because she wanted neck and still held by Cacal he looked around the room, sir.
to get a napkin as she said she still has to call up before going to the comfort room, sir.
Q - What happened after that?
Q - What happened next? A While I was looking around the room he saw the vault of my sister Cynthia Yrreverre,
A - After which she sat down again and crossed legs and remarked that she had a monthly sir.
period so my attention was focused on her, sir.
Q - What happened next then?
Q - What happened after that? A- Suddenly he dropped me and opened the door and shouted that one (1) of your should
A - While my attention was with Aurora Engson Fransdilla, Cacal approached me and come up.
poked the gun on my neck, sir.
Q - What happened after that?
Q - What happened after that? A- While they carried the vault of my sister downstairs Cuanang came up and Cuanang
A - And he announced hold-up. carried the vault with Cacal and before they went down they told me, Cacal told me that
you should not follow us. You should stay here.
Q - Who announced that hold-up?
A - Cacal, sir. xxxx

Q - What happened after that? ATTY. COPE:

A - While Cacal poked a gun at my neck Cuanang and the two other men went to the Q - Miss Yrreverre, will you please describe the vault which Cuanang and Cacal got from
kitchen to which I could see very well in my position from where I stood, sir. the room of your sister Cynthia Yrreverre?
A - Witness is demonstrating the size of the vault it is a small one it is as small television.
COURT:
Q - How many men went to the kitchen? ATTY. VALDEZ:
A- The three (3) others went to the kitchen, sir. Can we measure that Your Honor.

ATTY. COPE: COURT:

Q - What happened next? You agree on the size.
A - While Cacal was poking the gun at my neck, I saw Cuanang and the two (2) men
herded our maids my one cousin and my niece, sir in the bodega, sir. WITNESS:
A- Witness is pointing half of the area of the table which is more or less 1 1/2 x 1 1/2 cubic
Q - What happened next? feet.
A - And our maids and my niece and my cousin were locked inside the bodega, sir.
ATTY. COPE:
Q - Where is this bodega located Miss Witness? Q - After Cuanang and Cacal brought out the vault from the room and you were told by
A - In our kitchen, sir. Cacal to stay from the room and not to get out, what did you do?
A - When the two (2) got out I just stay and they simultaneously closed the door, sir.
125
 peeped into your room?
Q - What happened next then? A - While my hands was (sic) tied, that was the time Cacal and Cuanang took my jewelries,
A When they closed the door I got the courage to open the door and followed them, sir. sir.

Q - What happened then? COURT:

A - I went down the stairs when I was at the middle of the stairs Cacal turned his back and Q - Where did she get those pieces of jewelry?
he saw me and came after me and brought me up to my room, sir. A - In my room at the headboard of my bed, sir.

Q - How far was your room to the room of your sister Cynthia Yrreverre? ATTY. COPE:
A - Just near sir, the dividing portion for the room of my niece is so near. Q - What else if there were any taken by Cacal and Cuanang?
A - Many sir.
Q - What happened after Cacal brought you to your room?
A - While I was in my room he pushed me towards my bed, sir. Q - What are those?
A - They took the following: two pairs of gold earrings, one gold necklace with pendant,
Q - What happened after that? one Loui(s) Vuitton brown leather, one Gucci Ladies watch, two gold earrings with
A - So when he pushed me and I was felt on my back he said to me just stay right there and diamond pendant and cash money of SEVEN THOUSAND (P7,000.00) PESOS.
he searched my room (naghalughog), sir.
ATTY. COPE:
xxxx Q - This one gold necklace with pendant how much did you buy this?
A- I bought that for PI80,000.00, sir.
ATTY. COPE:
Q - How did you fall Miss Witness? COURT:
A - When he pushed me I felt at my back sir and Cacal searched my room, sir. How many karats this gold necklace?

Q - What happened after that? WITNESS:

A - While Cacal was searching (naghahalughog) I stood up when Cacal saw me stood up That is 18 karats gold, sir.
he slapped me, sir.
ATTY. COPE:
Q - What happened when you were slapped by Cacal? Q - Miss Yrreverre, how about the two gold earrings with diamond pendant, how much did
A - He said (putang ina mo matigas ang ulo mo) son of a bitch you are hard headed. you buy this?
A- I bought that for EIGHTY THOUSAND (P80,000.00) PESOS.
Q - And what happened after that?
A While I was sitting Cuanang came inside my room and he tied my hands at my back, COURT:
sir Q - Do you know the karats of this diamond? How big is this?
A - It is as big as big mongo, sir.
Q - What happened after that?
A - While I was being tied by Cuanang at my back Aurora Engson Fransdilla peeped inside ATTY. COPE:
my room, sir. Q - This two pairs of gold earrings, how much did you buy this, how much is this?
A-TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS, sir.
Q - Is that Aurora Engson Fransdilla the lady who represented to you from the POEA?
A - Yes, sir. Q - What else?
A - One gold necklace with pendant, sir.
Q - What happened after that while you were hogtied by Cuanang and Aurora Fransdilla
126
Q - How much is this?
A- ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND (PI80,000.00) PESOS, sir.
Q - How about this Louie Vitton brown leather bag, how much did you buy this?
A- I bought that for ELEVEN THOUSAND (PI 1,000.00) PESOS, sir.
Q - This Gucci ladies watch, how much did you buy this?
A-THIRTEEN THOUSAND (P13,000.00) PESOS, sir.
COURT:
What kind of Gucci is this, US Gucci or Hongkong?
WITNESS:
I do not remember anymore, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q - How much did you buy this?
A - I bought that for THIRTEEN THOUSAND (P13,000.00) PESOS, sir.11
The State thus discharged its burden to produce before the trial court sufficient evidence
against all the accused, including Fransdilla, that would warrant a judgment of conviction.
Fransdilla's non-presentation of her defense, despite her being directly incriminated by
Lalaine, denied the Court her explanation for her specific overt acts of complicity in the
robbery and thus rendered the incriminating evidence unrefuted. By this the Court simply
means that Fransdilla did not discharge her burden of evidence, which is "the duty of a
party to start and continue giving evidence at any stage of the trial until he has established
a prima facie case, or the like duty of the adverse party to meet and overthrow that prima
facie case thus established."12
As such, the prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proof against Fransdilla.
In the eyes of the law, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it.13 For an accused to be
validly held to have conspired with her co-accused in committing the crime, her overt acts
must evince her active part in the execution of the crime agreed to be committed. The overt
acts of each of the conspirators must tend to execute the offense agreed upon, for the
merely passive conspirator cannot be held to be still part of the conspiracy without such
overt acts, unless such conspirator is the mastermind. Here, Fransdilla was satisfactorily
shown not to have been a mere passive co-conspirator, but an active one who had
facilitated the access into the house by representing herself as an employee of the POEA.
In that respect, it is not always required to establish that two or more persons met and
explicitly entered into the agreement to commit the crime by laying down the details of
how their unlawful scheme or objective would be carried out.14 Conspiracy can also be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense is perpetrated, or can be inferred
from the acts of the several accused evincing their joint or common purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest.15 Once conspiracy is established, the act of
each conspirator is the act of all.
In establishing conspiracy, the State could rely on direct as well as circumstantial evidence.
Lalaine's testimony against Fransdilla constituted both kinds of evidence. Lalaine's direct
testimony showed the latter's overt participation in the execution of the robbery, while the
following circumstances indicated the unity of action and common purpose or design to
commit the robbery among Fransdilla and her co-accused, specifically: (1) Fransdilla and
her co-accused went together to the complainants' house at around 3:00 to 4:00 p.m. of
February 20, 1991; (2) she talked to Joel to solicit information on the whereabouts of
Cynthia; (3) upon learning that Cynthia was not home, she stepped outside the gate and
talked to two men sitting inside a vehicle parked outside the house; (4) she pretended to be
an employee of the POEA in order to gain entry into the house; (5) she performed acts
purposely aimed to distract Lalaine in order to give her cohorts the opportunity to enter the
house and commit the robbery; (5) during the robbery, she was not tied up like the
household members, but moved freely around the house, and at one point Lalaine spotted
her peeping into the bedroom where Lalaine was then being held; and (7) she and the
others fled together in two separate vehicles after the robbery.
In light of the foregoing, the CA justly concluded that the State established beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt for of all the accused, including Fransdilla, for the
robbery.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2.
Correction of the Indeterminate Sentence
was necessary to conform to the letter and spirit
the Indeterminate Sentence Law
That the trial judge fixed the indeterminate sentence at "imprisonment of TWELVE (12)
YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS
of reclusion temporal as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS
and ONE (1) DAY to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum" was a
patent elementary error. Such fixing contravened the letter and spirit of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, Section 1 of which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the
minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
127
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225)
The CA justifiably deemed it necessary to correct the indeterminate sentence. Under
Section 1, supra, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is a penalty "within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the [Revised Penal] Code for the offense,"
and the maximum is "that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code." Considering that the clear objective of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to have the convict serve the minimum penalty before
becoming eligible for release on parole pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law,16 both
the minimum and the maximum penalties must be definite, not ranging. This objective
cannot be achieved otherwise, for determining when the convict would be eligible for
release on parole would be nearly impossible if the minimum and the maximum were
as indefinite as the RTC fixed the indeterminate sentence. Indeed, that the sentence is an
indeterminate one relates only to the fact that such imposition would leave the period
between the minimum and the maximum penalties indeterminate "in the sense that he may,
under the conditions set out in said Act, be released from serving said period in whole or in
part."17
3.
Crime committed was the complex crime of
robbery in an inhabited house by armed men
under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code
Citing Napolis v. Court ofAppeals.,18 the CA ruled that all the accused, including Fransdilla,
were guilty of committing the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house under
Article 299, Revised Penal Code, and robbery with intimidation or violence under Article
294, Revised Penal Code. Thus, it held that the penalty for the complex crime under Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code was that for the more serious offense, to be imposed in its
maximum period. Taking into consideration that no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances were present, it set the indeterminate sentence of 12 years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
We concur with the CA.
In Napolis v. Court of Appeals, the Court abandoned the doctrine adopted in United States
v. De los Santos19 that when the felonies of robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299
of the Revised Penal Code and robbery with violence against or intimidation of a person
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code are committed, the penalty for the latter crime
(although the lighter one) should be imposed because the violence against or intimidation
of a person was the "controlling qualification," on the theory that "robbery which is
characterized by violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than
ordinary robbery committed by force upon things, because where violence or intimidation
against the person is present there is greater disturbance of the order of society and the
security of the individual." Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcin
observed:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Upon mature deliberation, We find ourselves unable to share the foregoing view. Indeed,
one who, by breaking a wall, enters, with a deadly weapon, an inhabited house and steals
therefrom valuable effects, without violence against or intimidation upon persons, is
punishable under Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal. Pursuant to
the above view, adhered to in previous decisions, if, aside from performing said acts, the
thief lays hand upon any person, without committing any of the crimes or inflicting any of
the injuries mentioned in subparagraphs (1) to (4) of Art. 294 of the same Code, the
imposable penalty - under paragraph (5) thereof- shall be much lighter. To our mind, this
result and the process of reasoning that has brought it about, defy logic and reason.
The argument to the effect that the violence against or intimidation of a person supplies the
"controlling qualification," is far from sufficient to justify said result. We agree with the
proposition that robbery with "violence or intimidation against the person is evidently
graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things," but, precisely, for this
reason, We cannot accept the conclusion deduced therefrom in the cases above cited
- reduction of the penalty for the latter offense owing to the concurrence of violation or
intimidation which made it a more serious one. It is, to our mind, more plausible to believe
that Art. 294 applies only where robbery with violence against or intimidation of a person
takes place without entering an inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299
of the Revised Penal Code.
We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as We do, when the elements
of both provisions are present, that the crime is a complex one, calling for the imposition
as provided in Art. 48 of said Code of the penalty for the most serious offense, in its
maximum period, which, in the case at bar, is reclusion temporal in its maximum period.
This penalty should, in turn, be imposed in its maximum period - from nineteen (19) years,
one (1) month and eleven (11) days to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal - owing to
the presence of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime. xxx.20
Napolis v. Court of Appeals is controlling in this case. To start with, the information fully
alleged the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299, Revised
Penal Code, and robbery with intimidation or violence under Article 294, Revised Penal
Code by averring that "the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with
and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
with intent to gain, and by means of violence and intimidation upon person rob the
residence x x x." And, secondly, the Prosecution competently proved the commission of the
complex crime by showing during the trial that the accused, after entering the residential
house of the complainants at No. 24-B Mabait St., Teacher's Village, Quezon City, took
128
away valuables, including the vault containing Cynthia's US dollar currencies, and in the
process committed acts of violence against and intimidation of persons during the robbery
by slapping and threatening Lalaine and tying her up, and herding the other members of the
household inside the bodega of the house.
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Article 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties. Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall
suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusin perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.21
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusin perpetua when the
robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or if by reason or
on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of
Article 263 shall have been inflicted; Provided, however, that when the robbery
accompanied with rape is committed with a use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death (As amended by PD No. 767).
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, any of
the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph, shall have been inflicted.
4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium
period, if the violence or intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery shall
have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission of the crime, or when
the course of its execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person not
responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries covered by sub-divisions 3 and
4 of said Article 263.
5. The penalty of prisin correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period in other cases. (As amended by R. A. 18).
Paragraph 5, supra, is the relevant provision, under which the penalty is prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period.
On the other hand, Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code
states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Article 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to
worship. Any armed person who shall commit robbery in an inhabited house or public
building or edifice devoted to religious worship, shall be punished by reclusion temporal, if
the value of the property taken shall exceed 250 pesos, and if:
(a) The malefactors shall enter the house or building in which the robbery was committed,
by any of the following means:
1. Through an opening not intended for entrance or egress.
2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window.
3. By using false keys, picklocks or similar tools.
4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority.
Or if
(b) The robbery be committed under any of the following circumstances:
1. By the breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or sealed
furniture or receptacle;
2. By taking such furniture or objects to be broken or forced open outside the place of the
robbery.
When the offenders do not carry arms, and the value of the property taken exceeds 250
pesos, the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed.
The same rule shall be applied when the offenders are armed, but the value of the property
taken does not exceed 250 pesos.
When said offenders do not carry arms and the value of the property taken does not exceed
250 pesos, they shall suffer the penalty prescribed in the two next preceding paragraphs, in
its minimum period.
If the robbery be committed in one of the dependencies of an inhabited house, public
building, or building dedicated to religious worship, the penalties next lower in degree than
those prescribed in this article shall be imposed.
Relevant are paragraph (a)4 (because Fransdilla pretended to be from the POEA) and
paragraph (b)2 (because the accused brought the vault down from Cynthia's upstairs
bedroom and forced it open outside the place where the robbery was
committed), supra. The penalty for the crime is reclusion temporal.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the complex crime is that for
the more serious felony, which, in this case, was the robbery in an inhabited house by
129
armed men punishable by reclusion temporal, to be imposed in the maximum
period (i.e., 17 years, four months and one day to 20 years). Hence, the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four
months of reclusion temporal, must be corrected to 17 years, four months and one
day of reclusion temporal.
4.
Exemplary damages to be deleted
for lack of legal basis
The CA affirmed the order of the RTC for the accused to return the value of the articles
stolen totaling P2,250,000.00 and to pay to the complainants P200,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
Article 2230 of the Civil Code authorizes the grant of exemplary damages as part of the
civil liability in crimes only when one or more aggravating circumstances were present in
the commission of the crime. With the conceded absence of any aggravating circumstance
in the commission of the crime, therefore, we delete the P200,000.00 as exemplary
damages for lack of legal basis. However, interest of 6% per annum should be imposed on
the P2,250,000.00,22 to be reckoned from the filing of the information until full payment
because the value of the stolen articles, which the information individually averred, could
be established with reasonable certainty.23
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review
on certiorari and AFFIRMS in all respects the conviction of accused AURORA
ENGSON FRANSDILLA for the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by
armed men under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and robbery with violence against
and intimidation of persons under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, subject to the
following MODIFICATIONS, namely: (1) she shall suffer the indeterminate sentence of
12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, four months and one day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; (2) the award of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages is deleted for
lack of legal basis; and (3) and the actual damages of P2,250,000.00 shall earn interest of
6% per annum reckoned from the filing of the information until full payment.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
G.R. No. 200308, February 23, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MERA JOY ELEUTERIO
NIELLES, @ MERA NIELLES DELOS REYES, Accused-Appellant.
R ES OLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Appellant Mera Joy Eleuterio Nielles @ Mera Nielles Delos Reyes was charged with the
crime of Qualified Theft in an Information that reads as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about and sometime in July, 2004 in the City of Makati, Philippines and a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the
cashier of complainant Juanita J. Flores and as such enjoying the trust and confidence
reposed upon her by the said complainant, with intent to gain and without the knowledge
and consent of the owner thereof, with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and carry away collected money in the
total amount of P640,353.86 to the damage and prejudice of the complainant, in the
aforementioned amount of P640,353.86.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
In an Order2 dated January 18, 2005, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 132, ordered appellants release from confinement after having posted a bond in the
amount P100,000.00 undertaken by Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Company, Inc. under
Bond No. 8385. Appellant was thereafter arraigned where she pleaded not guilty to the
charges.3 Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution established that private complainant Juanita Flores (Flores) was engaged
in the business of guaranteeing purchase orders and gift checks of Shoemart and Landmark
and disposing, selling or transferring them for consideration. Appellant initially worked as
Flores househelp but was eventually hired to work at Flores office performing clerical
jobs like sorting invoices. When Flores business grew, appellant was assigned to bill and
collect from sub-guarantors, and to encash and deposit checks. On July 15, 2004, appellant
collected P640,353.86 from the sub-guarantors. However, appellant did not remit the
amount to Flores or deposit it in her (Flores) account. Instead, she issued 15 personal
checks totaling P640,353.86 and deposited them to Flores account. All the checks were
dishonored upon presentment due to account closed. Appellant thereafter absconded.
For her part, appellant denied having stolen the amount of P640,353.86.
130

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
In a Judgment4 dated March 26, 2008, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 132, found
appellant guilty of the crime of qualified theft, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Given the foregoing, accused Nielles took P640,353.86 belonging to private complainant
Juanita J. Flores, without the latters consent. The taking was done with intent to gain
because when the accuseds checks bounced, she failed to remit or return the amount. The
accuseds act was accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things, but rather by the use of abuse of confidence reposed [by]
private complainant [upon] her. Thus, the elements of theft, as well as the circumstances
that made the same as qualified theft, are present in the instant case.
Accused Nielles, on the other hand, denied having stolen and carried away P640,353.86.
Aside from her bare denial, she did not present any evidence to support this claim. In fact,
she did not deny that the checks were issued and deposited by her. Furthermore, she did
not provide any reason or motive why Juanita would file the present case against her.
Accordingly, her denial has no basis and deserves no consideration.5
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The dispositive portion of the RTC Judgment reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Wherefore, the Court finds the accused, Mera Joy Eleuterio Nielles a.k.a. Mera Nielles
Delos Reyes, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft and hereby
sentences her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years of prision
correccional, as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. She is
ordered to pay private complainant Juanita J. Flores P640,353.86 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.6
Aggrieved, appellant filed a notice of appeal. At the same time, she submitted a Renewal
Certificate7 of her bond effective for the period January 18, 2008 to January 18, 2009.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA)
In her Brief, appellant asserted that since private complainant Flores was abroad on July
15, 2004, she could not have personally known whether appellant indeed collected amounts
from the sub-guarantors. She posited that mere issuance of the 15 checks is not proof that
she received/collected payments from the sub-guarantors or that she failed to remit the
monies belonging to Flores. She insisted that the prosecution failed to establish that she
indeed collected monies from the sub-guarantors amounting to P640,353.86. Appellant
also theorized that she might have issued the checks in favor of the sub-guarantors for
whatever transactions they have between them; and that thereafter, when she went to these
sub-guarantors to collect their dues for private complainant, these sub-guarantors used the
same checks she previously issued as their payment for private complainant. For that
reason her personal checks were deposited in private complainants account.
The CA, however, in its Decision8 dated May 26, 2011, was not impressed by appellants
protestations. It held that the fact that Flores was out of the country during the commission
of the offense is irrelevant since the prosecution has satisfactorily established that upon her
arrival in the Philippines, she immediately investigated the matter and talked to the sub-
guarantors. Flores also confirmed that indeed appellant issued 15 personal checks in lieu
of the amounts collected and deposited the same to Flores account but were all dishonored
upon presentment. Significantly, the CA noted that aside from her bare denial, appellant
did not present any evidence to support her claim that she did not steal the amount of
P640,353.86 from Flores. In fine, the CA found all the elements for the crime of qualified
theft to be present.
Thus, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court,
viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED. Accordingly,
the assailed 26 March 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
132 in Criminal Case No. 04-3643 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. She is further
ordered to pay Private Complainant the amount of P640,353.86.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, this appeal. In a Resolution10 dated April 18, 2012, we required both parties to file
their Supplemental Briefs. The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it is no
longer filing its supplemental brief. On the other hand, appellant maintains in her
Supplemental Brief11 that the prosecution failed to establish that she unlawfully took the
amount of P640,353.86 belonging to Flores. She claims that mere issuance of the checks
does not prove unlawful taking of the unaccounted amount. She insists that, at most, the
issuance of the checks proves that the same was issued for consideration. On February 5,
2013, appellant furnished this Court her bond renewal certificate12 issued by Far Eastern
Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. effective for the period January 18, 2013 to January 18, 2014.
Our Ruling
We concur with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the prosecution
satisfactorily established all the elements of qualified theft, to wit: 1) taking of personal
131
property; 2) that said property belongs to another; 3) that the said taking was done with
intent to gain; 4) that it was done without the owners consent; 5) that it was accomplished
without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, or of force upon things; and 6)
that it was done with grave abuse of confidence.13 As correctly found by the appellate
court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Private complainant testified that Accused-appellant took the amount of P640,353.86 from
her without her consent by failing to turn over the amount she collected from the formers
sub-guarantors. Instead, she issued fifteen (15) personal checks and deposited the same to
Private Complainants account which however, all bounced for the reason account
closed. The taking of the amount collected by Accused-appellant was obviously done
with intent to gain as she failed to remit the same to Private Complainant. Intent to gain is
presumed from the act of unlawful taking. Further, the unlawful act was accomplished by
Accused-appellant without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, [or] of force
upon things as the payment to her of the said amount was voluntarily handed to her by the
sub-guarantors as she was known to be entrusted with the collection of payments.
The circumstance of grave abuse of confidence that made the same as qualified theft was
also proven. Accused-appellant herself testified that as a cashier, her functions and
responsibilities include billings and collections from their agents and making of deposits
and withdrawals in behalf of Private Complainant. Moreover, when the payment for the
purchase orders or gift checks becomes due, she would fill up the four (4) blank checks
given by the sub-guarantor with the knowledge and consent of Private Complainant. It is
beyond doubt that an employee like a cashier who comes into possession of the monies she
collected enjoys the confidence reposed in her by her employer, as in the instant case. 14
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We are one with the trial court and the appellate court in finding that the element of taking
of personal property was satisfactorily established by the prosecution. During her cross-
examination, private complainant Flores testified that upon having been apprised of the
unremitted collections, she conducted an investigation and inquired from her sub-
guarantors who admitted making payments to appellant.15 She also testified during cross-
examination that when appellant arrived from Hongkong, the latter went to Flores office
and admitted to having converted the collections to her personal use. 16 Interestingly, when
it was her turn to testify, appellant did not rebut Flores testimony. During her direct
examination, appellant only testified thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Atty. Regino Question:
Madam Witness, you are being charged here with taking, stealing and carrying away
collected money in the total amount of P640,353.86, that is owned by Juanita J. Flores.
What can you say about this allegation?
Witness:
That is not true, sir.
Atty. Regino Question:
What is your basis in stating that?
Witness:
I never took that six hundred forty thousand that they are saying and, I never signed any
document with the sub-guarantors that I [took] money from them.17
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Notably, when Flores testified during her cross-examination that she talked to the sub-
guarantors who admitted having made payments to appellant, the latters counsel no longer
made further clarifications or follow-up questions. Thus, Flores testimony on this fact
remains on record unrebutted. Clearly, it is futile on the part of the appellant to belatedly
claim in her Brief before the appellate court that the prosecution should have presented
these sub-guarantors so they could be cross-examined.18 There is likewise no merit in her
contention that the prosecution is guilty of suppression of evidence when they did not
present these sub-guarantors19 simply because the defense, on its own initiative, could very
well compel, thru the compulsory processes of the court, the attendance of these sub-
guarantors as witnesses.20 Moreover, we note that appellant did not even attempt to
discredit the testimony of Flores to the effect that upon her arrival from Hongkong,
appellant went to Flores office and admitted to having committed the offense.
Significantly, when appellant was placed on the witness stand, she did not even make any
attempt to explain her issuance of the 15 checks. In fact, during her entire testimony, she
never made any mention about the personal checks that she issued and deposited in Flores
account. It was only in her Memorandum21 filed with the trial court and her
Brief22 submitted to the appellate court that the same was discussed. However, her
explanation as to its issuance is so convoluted that it defies belief. All that appellant could
claim is that the issuance of the checks only proves that the same was for a consideration
but omitted to explain what the consideration was. She also theorized that she might have
issued the checks to the sub-guarantors for her personal transactions but likewise failed to
elaborate on what these transactions were. In any event, if indeed appellant did not steal
the amount of P640,353.86 belonging to Flores, how come she issued 15 personal checks
in favor of the latter and deposited the same in her account, albeit they were subsequently
dishonored? Besides, we note that in appellants Counter Affidavit23 dated August 20, 2004
subscribed before 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor Hannibal S. Santillan of Makati City, she
already admitted having taken without the knowledge and consent of private complainant
several purchase orders and gift checks worth thousands of pesos. She claimed though that
she was only forced to do so by Edna Cruz and cohorts.
We also concur with the findings of the trial court and the CA that the prosecution
established beyond reasonable doubt that the amount of P640,353.86 actually belonged to
132
Flores; that appellant stole the amount with intent to gain and without Flores consent; that based on our foregoing discussion, appellant must be ordered arrested and committed to
the taking was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, or prison to start serving her sentence.
of force upon things; and that it was committed with grave abuse of confidence.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed May 26, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
Anent the penalty imposed, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code G.R. CR No. 31635 is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132
state:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary is DIRECTED to issue a warrant for the arrest of appellant and to order her commitment
at the Correctional Institution for Women, and to submit to this Court a Report of such
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by: commitment, all within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution. The Superintendent,
Correctional Institution for Women is DIRECTED to confirm to this Court the
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing confinement of appellant within ten (10) days therefrom.
stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the
thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the
total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.cralawred

xxxx

Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher
by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if
committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property
stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken
on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity,
vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

Based on the foregoing, since the amount taken is P640,353.86, then the imposable penalty
shall be the maximum period of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, or
eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years, adding one (1) year for
each additional P10,000.00. Thus, from P640,353.86, we deduct P22,000.00, giving us a
balance of P618,353.86 which we divide by P10,000.00. We now have sixty-one (61)
years which we will add to the basic penalty of eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day to ten (10) years. However, as stated in Article 309, the imposable penalty for
simple theft should not exceed a total of twenty (20) years. Thus, if appellant had
committed only simple theft, her penalty would be twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal. Considering however that in qualified theft, the penalty is two degrees higher,
then the appellate court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.24cralawlawlibrary

Finally, we note that appellant has not yet been committed to prison. In view thereof and
133
 ENGR. ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA, Petitioner, v.PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Engr. Anthony V.
Zapanta, challenging the June 27, 2005 decision2 and the November 24, 2005 resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28369. The CA decision affirmed the
January 12, 2004 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, in
Criminal Case No. 20109-R, convicting the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft. The
CA resolution denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The Factual Antecedents

An April 26, 2002 Information filed with the RTC charged the petitioner, together with
Concordia O. Loyao, Jr., with the crime of qualified theft, committed as follows:That
sometime in the month of October, 2001, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of [the] Honorable Court, xxx accused ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA, being then
the Project Manager of the Porta Vaga Building Construction, a project being undertaken
then by the Construction Firm, ANMAR, Inc. under sub-contract with A. Mojica
Construction and General Services, with the duty to manage and implement the fabrication
and erection of the structural steel framing of the Porta Varga building including the
receipt, audit and checking of all construction materials delivered at the job site a position
of full trust and confidence, and CONCORDIO O. LOYAO, JR., alias "JUN", a telescopic
crane operator of ANMAR, Inc., conspiring, confederating, and mutually aiding one
another, with grave abuse of confidence and with intent of gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the Porta Vaga project
site along Session road, Baguio City, wide flange steel beams of different sizes with a total
value of P2,269,731.69 without the knowledge and consent of the owner ANMAR, Inc.,
represented by its General Manager LORNA LEVA MARIGONDON, to the damage and
prejudice of ANMAR, Inc., in the aforementioned sum of P2,269,731.69, Philippine
Currency.5chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Arraigned on November 12, 2002, the petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty."6 Loyao
remains at-large.

In the ensuing trial, the prosecution offered in evidence the oral testimonies of Danilo
Bernardo, Edgardo Cano, Roberto Buen, Efren Marcelo, private complainant Engr. Lorna
Marigondon, and Apolinaria de Jesus,7 as well as documentary evidence consisting of a
G.R. NO. 170863 : March 20, 2013

134
security logbook entry, delivery receipts, photographs, letters, and sworn affidavits. The
prosecution's pieces of evidence, taken together, established the facts recited below.
In 2001, A. Mojica Construction and General Services (AMCGS) undertook the Porta Vaga
building construction in Session Road, Baguio City. AMCGS subcontracted the fabrication
and erection of the building's structural and steel framing to Anmar, owned by the
Marigondon family. Anmar ordered its construction materials from Linton Commercial in
Pasig City. It hired Junio Trucking to deliver the construction materials to its project site in
Baguio City. It assigned the petitioner as project manager with general managerial duties,
including the receiving, custody, and checking of all building construction
materials.8chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On two occasions in October 2001, the petitioner instructed Bernardo, Junio Trucking's
truck driver, and about 10 Anmar welders, including Cano and Buen, to unload about 10 to
15 pieces of 20 feet long wide flange steel beams at Anmar's alleged new contract project
along Marcos Highway, Baguio City. Sometime in November 2001, the petitioner again
instructed Bernardo and several welders, including Cano and Buen, to unload about 5 to 16
pieces of 5 meters and 40 feet long wide flange steel beams along Marcos Highway, as well
as on Mabini Street, Baguio City.9chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sometime in January 2002, Engr. Nella Aquino, AMCGS' project manager, informed Engr.
Marigondon that several wide flange steel beams had been returned to Anmar's warehouse
on October 12, 19, and 26, 2001, as reflected in the security guard's logbook. Engr.
Marigondon contacted the petitioner to explain the return, but the latter simply denied that
the reported return took place. Engr. Marigondon requested Marcelo, her warehouseman, to
conduct an inventory of the construction materials at the project site. Marcelo learned from
Cano that several wide flange steel beams had been unloaded along Marcos Highway.
There, Marcelo found and took pictures of some of the missing steel beams. He reported
the matter to the Baguio City police headquarters and contacted Anmar to send a truck to
retrieve the steel beams, but the truck came weeks later and, by then, the steel beams could
no longer be found. The stolen steel beams amounted
to P2,269,731.69.10chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In his defense, the petitioner vehemently denied the charge against him. He claimed that
AMCGS, not Anmar, employed him, and his plan to build his own company had been
Engr. Marigondon's motive in falsely accusing him of stealing construction
materials.11chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The RTC's Ruling
In its January 12, 2004 decision,12 the RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified theft. It
gave credence to the prosecution witnesses' straightforward and consistent testimonies and
rejected the petitioner's bare denial. It sentenced the petitioner to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment from 10 years and 3 months, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum, to
indemnify Anmar P2,269,731.69, with legal interest from November 2001 until full
payment, and to pay Engr. Marigondon P100,000.00 as moral damages.
The CA's Ruling
On appeal, the petitioner assailed the inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses'
statements, and reiterated his status as an AMCGS employee.13chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In its June 27, 2005 decision,14 the CA brushed aside the petitioner's arguments and
affirmed the RTC's decision convicting the petitioner of qualified theft. It found that the
prosecution witnesses' testimonies deserve full credence in the absence of any improper
motive to testify falsely against the petitioner. It noted that the petitioner admitted his status
as Anmar's employee and his receipt of salary from Anmar, not AMCGS. It rejected the
petitioner's defense of denial for being self-serving. It, however, deleted the award of moral
damages to Engr. Marigondon for lack of justification.
When the CA denied15 the motion for reconsideration16 that followed, the petitioner filed
the present Rule 45 petition.
The Petition
The petitioner submits that, while the information charged him for acts committed
"sometime in the month of October, 2001," he was convicted for acts not covered by the
information, i.e., November 2001, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He further argues that the
prosecution failed to establish the fact of the loss of the steel beams since the corpus delicti
was never identified and offered in evidence.
The Case for the Respondent
The respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
counters that the issues raised by the petitioner in the petition pertain to the correctness of
the calibration of the evidence by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, which are issues of fact,
not of law, and beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition. In any case, the respondent
contends that the evidence on record indubitably shows the petitioner's liability for
qualified theft.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible error in
affirming the RTC's decision convicting the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft.
135
 Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Sufficiency of the allegation of date of the
commission of the crime
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which lays down the guidelines in
determining the sufficiency of a complaint or information,
provides:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where
the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in
the complaint or information. (italics supplied; emphasis ours)
As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the date of the commission of the offense, Section
11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure adds:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in the complaint
or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material
ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as
near as possible to the actual date of its commission. [italics supplied; emphasis ours]
Conformably with these provisions, when the date given in the complaint is not of the
essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be
sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any date within the period
of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action.
In this case, the petitioner had been fully apprised of the charge of qualified theft since the
information stated the approximate date of the commission of the offense through the
words "sometime in the month of October, 2001." The petitioner could reasonably deduce
the nature of the criminal act with which he was charged from a reading of the contents of
the information, as well as gather by such reading whatever he needed to know about the
charge to enable him to prepare his defense.
We stress that the information did not have to state the precise date when the offense was
committed, as to be inclusive of the month of "November 2001" since the date was not a
material element of the offense. As such, the offense of qualified theft could be alleged to
be committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.17 Clearly,
the month of November is the month right after October.
The crime of qualified theft was
committed with grave abuse of discretion
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308 and
309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said
property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done
without the owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the
circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of
confidence.18chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution's evidence proved, through the
prosecution's eyewitnesses, that upon the petitioner's instruction, several pieces of wide
flange steel beams had been delivered, twice in October 2001 and once in November 2001,
along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street, Baguio City; the petitioner betrayed the trust
and confidence reposed on him when he, as project manager, repeatedly took construction
materials from the project site, without the authority and consent of Engr. Marigondon, the
owner of the construction materials.
Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission
of the crime
The petitioner argues that his conviction was improper because the alleged stolen beams or
corpus delicti had not been established. He asserts that the failure to present the alleged
stolen beams in court was fatal to the prosecution's cause.
The petitioner's argument fails to persuade us.
"Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or
substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime
of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person murdered" or, in this case, to the
stolen steel beams. "Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this
Court has ruled that even a single witness' uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may
suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be
established by circumstantial evidence."19 "In theft, corpus delicti has two elements,
namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious
taking."20chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
136
In this case, the testimonial and documentary evidence on record fully established
the corpus delicti. The positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly
Bernardo, Cano and Buen, stating that the petitioner directed them to unload the steel
beams along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street on the pretext of a new Anmar project,
were crucial to the petitioner's conviction. The security logbook entry, delivery receipts and
photographs proved the existence and the unloading of the steel beams to a different
location other than the project site.
The petitioner should thus be convicted of qualified theft with the corresponding penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The June 27, 2005 decision and the
November 24, 2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28369
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Engr. Anthony V. Zapanta is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Costs against the petitioner.

Proper Penalty SO ORDERED.

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, sentenced the petitioner to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment from 10 years and three months, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum, and
to indemnify Anmar P2,269,731.69, with legal interest from November 2001 until full
payment. Apparently, the RTC erred in failing to specify the appropriate name of the
penalty imposed on the petitioner.

We reiterate the rule that it is necessary for the courts to employ the proper legal
terminology in the imposition of penalties because of the substantial difference in their
corresponding legal effects and accessory penalties. The appropriate name of the penalty
must be specified as under the scheme of penalties in the RPC, the principal penalty for a
felony has its own specific duration and corresponding accessory penalties.21 Thus, the
courts must employ the proper nomenclature specified in the RPC, such as "reclusion
perpetua" not "life imprisonment," or "ten days of arresto menor" not "ten days of
imprisonment." In qualified theft, the appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua based on
Article 310 of the RPC which provides that "the crime of qualified theft shall be punished
by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in Article
309."22chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

To compute the penalty, we begin with the value of the stolen steel beams, which
is P2,269,731.69. Based on Article 309 of the RPC, since the value of the items
exceeds P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, to be imposed in the maximum period, which is eight years, eight months and one
day to 10 years of prision mayor.

To determine the additional years of imprisonment, we deduct P22,000.00

from P2,269,731.69, which gives us P2,247,731.69. This resulting figure should then be
divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. We now have 224
years that should be added to the basic penalty. However, the imposable penalty for simple
theft should not exceed a total of 20 years. Therefore, had petitioner committed simple
theft, the penalty would be 20 years of reclusion temporal. As the penalty for qualified
theft is two degrees higher, the correct imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.

137

G.R. No. 182424, September 22, 2014
NENITA CARGANILLO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, we review the decision1 and the resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29371 which denied the appeal of Nenita
Carganillo (petitioner). The CA affirmed, with modification as to penalty, the judgment3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, convicting the petitioner of
the crime of estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
THE CASE
On September 23, 1998, Teresita Lazaro, a rice trader in Rizal, Nueva Ecija, gave the
petitioner the amount of P132,000.00 for the purpose of buying palay. The petitioner, who
was alleged to be an ahente or agent in the buy-and-sell of palay, agreed to deliver
the palay to the Lazaro Palay Buying Station on or before November 28, 1998. According
to the Kasunduan signed by the petitioner, the parties agreed that for every kilo
of palay bought the petitioner shall earn a commission of twenty centavos (P0.20). But if
no palay is purchased and delivered on November 28, the petitioner must return the
P132,000.00 to Teresita within one (1) week after November 28.
After failing to receive any palay or the P132,000.00 on November 28 and one (1) week
thereafter, respectively, Teresita made oral and written demands to the petitioner for the
return of the P132,000.00 but her demands were simply ignored. She thus filed an
affidavit-complaint for estafa against the petitioner before the Fiscals Office. Thereafter,
an Information4 for the crime of estafa was filed in court.
The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime and denied that she entered into a principal-
agent agreement with, and received the P132,000.00 from, Teresita. She alleged that she
owed Teresita a balance of P13,704.32 for the fertilizers and rice that she purchased from
the latter in 1995 and 1996,5 and that, in November 1996, she was made to sign a blank
Kasunduan that reflected no written date and amount.6 She likewise denied personally
receiving any written demand letter from Teresita.7cralawlawlibrary
In a decision dated November 19, 2004, the RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime
of estafa and sentenced her to suffer, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
imprisonment ranging from four (4) years and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.8 Also, the RTC ordered
the petitioner to indemnify Teresita the sum of P132,000.00 representing the amount
embezzled and to pay the costs of suit.9cralawlawlibrary
On appeal, the CA affirmed the petitioners conviction.10 The CA held that the prosecution
138
properly established the elements of the crime of estafa. In debunking petitioners claim
that her agreement with Teresita was merely a money loan, the CA stated
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this case, the Kasunduan dated September 23, 1998, which-accused-appellant admittedly
signed, is clear in its tenor and the failure to comply therewith makes out a case for estafa.
Accused-appellants insistence that she signed the said Kasunduan in blank is belied by her
admission of the existence or authenticity of the documentary exhibits x x x during the
prosecutions formal offer of evidence and her own testimony x x x.
Further, the CA ruled as immaterial the petitioners defense that she did not personally
receive a written letter of demand from Teresita. The CA held that even a verbal query as to
the whereabouts of the money suspected to be misappropriated is already tantamount to a
demand, and that the petitioner failed to refute Teresitas claim that she went to the
petitioners house to ask for the palay and/or the return of the
P132,000.00.11cralawlawlibrary
The CA, however, found error in the RTCs computation of the penalty and imposed upon
the petitioner an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1)
year for each additional P10,000.00 (in excess of P22,000.00), equivalent to eleven (11)
years, or a total of nineteen (19) years.12cralawlawlibrary
The petitioner elevated her judgment of conviction to the Court by filing a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
THE PETITION
In her petition, the petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the CA erred in affirming
(with modification) the judgment of conviction against her, despite the prosecutions failure
to prove her guilt of the crime of estafa beyond reasonable doubt.
The petitioner maintains that she is not engaged in the business of buying and
selling palay and that the Kasunduan between her and Teresita does not contain their real
agreement of a simple money loan. She argues that the prosecution failed to establish all
the elements of estafa because she never received the P132,000.00 from Teresita; that an
element of the crime is that the offender receives the money, or goods or other personal
property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligations
involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same.
THE COURTS RULING
We deny the present petition. The CA did not commit any reversible error in its
decision of September 10, 2007.
Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the offense
of estafa committed with abuse of confidence requires the following
elements:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same[;]
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender, or denial on his part of such receipt[;]
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.13
We find that all the elements of estafa are present in this case: that the petitioner received
in trust the amount of P132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palay and
misappropriated it when she failed to return the said amount to Teresita upon demand.
As the CA and the RTC did, we find worthy of credit and belief
the Kasunduan presented in evidence by the prosecution that was admittedly signed by
the petitioner and which contained the terms of agreement between her and Teresita. This
document clearly stated that the petitioner received in trust the amount of P132,000.00
from Teresita for the purpose of buying palay with the corresponding obligations to (1)
deliver the palay to the Lazaro Palay Buying Station on or before November 28, 1998, and
(2) return the P132,000.00 to Teresita one week after November 28 in the event that the
petitioner failed to make palay purchases.
It is settled that the agreement or contract between the parties is the formal expression of
the parties rights, duties, and obligations and is the best evidence of the parties intention.
Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.14 However, this rule, known as the Parol Evidence Rule, admits of exceptions.
Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a party to a written agreement may
present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement if he puts in issue
in his pleading the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;
139
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest
after the execution of the written agreement.
xxxx
In this case, the petitioner alleges that the subject Kasunduan failed to express the real
agreement between her and Teresita; that theirs was a plain and simple loan agreement and
not that of a principal-agent relationship in the buy-and-sell of palay. The documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by the petitioner, however, fail to support her claims.
The RTC found that the receipts presented by the petitioner to prove her loan obligation
with Teresita were vague, undated and unsigned.15 Also, the RTC observed that the
witnesses who testified that they saw the petitioner sign the Kasunduan were not even
certain of the real transaction between the petitioner and Teresita. 16 These findings of fact
and evidence, which were affirmed by the CA, are accorded respect and finality by this
Court. Where the factual findings of the trial court are affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals, there is great reason not to disturb these findings and to regard them not
reviewable by this Court. 17cralawlawlibrary
Also, we cannot sustain the petitioners claim that she had been the victim of a fraud
because Teresita deceived her into signing a blank document; that she signed
the Kasunduan, even if it had no date and amount written on it, because Teresita led her
to believe that the document would be used merely for show purposes with the
bank.18cralawlawlibrary
For fraud to vitiate consent, the deception employed must be the causal (dolo
causante) inducement to the making of the contract,19 and must be serious in character.20 It
must be sufficient to impress or lead an ordinarily prudent person into error, taking into
account the circumstances of each case.21cralawlawlibrary
In this case, we find no vitiated consent on the part of the petitioner. In her
Memorandum22 to this Court, she narrated that after she signed the Kasunduan, Teresita
subsequently made her execute a deed of sale over her property, which deed she refused to
sign.23 This statement negates the petitioners self-serving allegation that she was tricked by
Teresita into signing a blank Kasunduan, as she was fully aware of the possible
implications of the act of signing a document.
We affirm the correctness of the penalty imposed by the CA, as it is fully in accordance
with the law. We explained in People v. Temporada24 that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, when the
amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, is prisin correccional maximum to prisin
mayor minimum. The minimum term is taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere
within prisin correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months). xxx
On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty of prisin
correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum in its maximum period, adding 1 year
of imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that the total
penalty shall not exceed 20 years. xxx To compute the maximum period of the prescribed
penalty, prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum should be divided into
three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in
accordance with Article 65 of the RPC. Following this procedure, the maximum period
of prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months
and 21 days to 8 years. The incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to
anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court.
In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted by
P22,000.00, and the difference shall be divided by P10,000.00. Any fraction of a year shall
be discarded as was done starting with the case of People v. Pabalan in consonance with
the settled rule that penal laws shall be construed liberally in favor of the accused.
xxx25chanrobleslaw
In the recent case of Lito Corpuz v. People of the Philippines,26 we recognized the
perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to
impose on crimes against property, such as estafa, committed today based on the amount of
damage measured by the value of money eight years ago in 1932. This Court, however,
cannot modify these range of penalties in our decisions, as such action would be an
impermissible encroachment upon the power of the legislative branch of government and
would constitute proscribed judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.
We AFFIRM the decision dated September 10, 2007 and the resolution dated March 18,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29371, finding petitioner Nenita
Carganillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of estafa penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
SO ORDERED.cralawred
140
 DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated September 5, 2007
of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated July
30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.

The antecedent facts follow.

Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in
Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of
lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of
jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered
to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a
consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for
men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an
aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed
that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same
items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the
proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able
to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items
entrusted to him, but to no avail.

Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads as
follows:

That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having
received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth P45,000.00;
one (1) three-baht men's bracelet, 22k, worth P25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet,
G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014 22k, worth P12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos
(P98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on the part of said accused
LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner, to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items or to return the same, if not sold, said
vs. accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and with
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated
obligation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,

141
misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or
the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and
refused to return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos
(P98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in
the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo
Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which
can be summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is
engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every
collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business
with private complainant.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was
made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991
and used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of
jewelry, which he did not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
in the Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised
Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to
vary the penalty imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty
consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4)
YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS
MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion
Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant
Danilo Tangcoy the amount of P98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and
affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004
of the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer
the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00, or a
total of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the
present petition stating the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE
ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION
EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES,
AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT
FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE
UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT -
1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH
THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED,
IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED
IN THE INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY
DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF]
JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD AN ELEMENT OF
THE OFFENSE WAS PROVED;
142
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH -
1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2)
VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER ACCUSED IS MORE
STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH
HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND
APPLIED TO THIS CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE
STATE.
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated the
following counter-arguments:
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their
admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the designation of
the offense and the acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more
weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the
findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous
as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in
affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He now comes to this Court raising both
procedural and substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in
evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although
the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the
records show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the
time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA
also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to
the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt.
The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to
evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as
waived.5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective
Information filed against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the period
when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime
occurred was different from the one testified to by private complainant. This argument is
untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the Information was substantially complete
and in reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance in the Information
cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner6 and that the time
of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period
and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not
make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation
of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. In the case at
bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing rule. That
the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about the fifth (5th) day of
July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that Section 11 of
the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material
ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph
1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of
the commission thereof is not an essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure
of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the Information ipso facto
defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which accused-appellant
should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon
by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant,
143
therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges q For whom?
proferred against him.7
a Lito Corpuz, sir.
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads: q Were you able to look (sic) for him?

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means a I looked for him for a week, sir.
mentioned hereinbelow.
q Did you know his residence?
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
a Yes, sir.
xxxx
q Did you go there?
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any
other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for a Yes, sir.
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property; x x x q Did you find him?

The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or a No, sir.
other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?
return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation a I talked to him, sir.
or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made
by the offended party on the offender.8 q How many times?

Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended a Two times, sir.
party on the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private
complainant narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from
q What did you talk (sic) to him?
the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items with the
latter promising to pay them. Thus:
a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.
PROS. MARTINEZ
q Referring to Exhibit A-2?
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could have
been finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the deadline came? a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the items
are and he promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.
a I went looking for him, sir.
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full?

144
a No, sir.9
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.10 Demand need not
even be formal; it may be verbal.11 The specific word "demand" need not even be used to
show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to
the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a
demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind
of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent
with regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be
necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be
interpreted in its general meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus, the
failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money
entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the
crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds
or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way,
however, be established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar.14
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the
existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of
jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an
obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was
misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry
sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after the
agreed period despite demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner,
the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses,
this Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness
stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the
case.15 The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially
when such finding is affirmed by the CA.16 Truth is established not by the number of
witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and
credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered. 17
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the
question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving
property came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the
money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members
of the division reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first
impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and
resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their
academic opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean Jose
Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate
President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were later heard on
oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel
de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds
the following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the
courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the
amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However,
this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial
legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for
in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be
encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government. This, however, does not
render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the
framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article
5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are
not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has
knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by
law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be
made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice
and the injury caused by the offense.18
145
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case
which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to
render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal
legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any
penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to
make that act punishable by law through legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the
first except for the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the
corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the
first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief
Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate
with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this time,
of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined that
in Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a
recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it
believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that
is, that there can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically provided
for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary
to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely
powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on
the ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive
or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the matter to
the Chief Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal
provisions which it believes to be harsh.20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon C.
Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, in their book, The Revised
Penal Code,21 echoed the above-cited commentary, thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice
must be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or
justness of the penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon
conviction of violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe enough, are
questions as to which commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is the duty of the
courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all cases unless it clearly appears that a given
penalty falls within the prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel and unusual
punishment." A petition for clemency should be addressed to the Chief Executive.22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on
the current inflation rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00 . However, it would be
dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the
penalties. It must be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed
imposition of the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the penalties will not
cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the framers of the RPC
intended that to be so, it should have provided the same, instead, it included the earlier
cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to presume why the present legislature has
not made any moves to amend the subject penalties in order to conform with the present
times. For all we know, the legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter
the further commission of those punishable acts which have increased tremendously
through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it is apparent that it aims to
broaden the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime of Plunder, from its
original minimum amount of P100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature lowered it
to P50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold amount upon
which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply, from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not
seem to be excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding penalties.
In Theft, the provisions state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value
of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos,
but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be
the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of
this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the
case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000
pesos.
146
 3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000
pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200
pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not
exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not
exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under
the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the
value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said
amount, the provision of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made
applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when
the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted
under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for
the support of himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the above-provision states that
the penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6 months and 1
day to 4 years and 2 months). Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing stolen
is P6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It would seem
that under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the same as the penalty proposed.
In fact, after the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law, the
minimum penalty is still lowered by one degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto
mayor in its medium period to maximum period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making
the offender qualified for pardon or parole after serving the said minimum period and may
even apply for probation. Moreover, under the proposal, the minimum penalty after
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto
mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far from the minimum period
under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty imposed under the law
is not at all excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen in the
crime of Theft and the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the
minimum and the maximum amounts, which is the basis of determining the proper penalty
to be imposed, would be too wide and the penalty imposable would no longer be
commensurate to the act committed and the value of the thing stolen or the damage caused:
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the
penalties are not changed:
1. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00 will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00,
punished by prision mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day
to 10 years).
2. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, punished
by prision correccional medium and to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 6 years).24
3. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by
prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1
day to 4 years and 2 months).
4. P50.00 to P200.00 will become P5,000.00 to P20,000.00, punishable by arresto
mayor medium to prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years
and 4 months).
5. P5.00 to P50.00 will become P500.00 to P5,000.00, punishable by arresto
mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months).
6. P5.00 will become P500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto
mayor medium.
x x x x.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified
but the penalties are not changed, as follows:
1st. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00, will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00,
punishable by prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4 years,
2 months and 1 day to 8 years).25
147
 2nd. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, is to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their inherent power to legislate
punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 laws.
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).26
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional,
3rd. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:
arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to
2 years and 4 months). xxxx

4th. P200.00 will become P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4 JUSTICE PERALTA:
months and 1 day to 6 months).
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is unconstitutional because it is absurd.
that the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal
Protection Clause. DEAN DIOKNO:

The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined according Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.
to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of
reasonableness,27 which has four requisites:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than
Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
DEAN DIOKNO:
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty rule
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28 unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by Congress.

According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial JUSTICE PERALTA:
distinctions as P10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today,
which violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who commit estafa
involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties; however, this is no longer But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand
achieved, because a person who steals P142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as (P100,000.00) Pesos ...
someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite; and, the IPR
violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time DEAN DIOKNO:
the law was promulgated, conditions that no longer exist today.
Well, my presen ... (interrupted)
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the
incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection JUSTICE PERALTA:
clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the thing
subject matter of the crime exceeds P22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more
questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate remedy
148
For every One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand No, Your Honor.
(P22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get you
right? JUSTICE PERALTA:

DEAN DIOKNO: The Court cannot do that.

Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation. DEAN DIOKNO:

JUSTICE PERALTA: Could not be.

Ah ... JUSTICE PERALTA:

DEAN DIOKNO: The only remedy is to go to Congress...

If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law... DEAN DIOKNO:

JUSTICE PERALTA: Yes, Your Honor.

But if we de ... (interrupted) JUSTICE PERALTA:

DEAN DIOKNO: ... and determine the value or the amount.

....then.... DEAN DIOKNO:

JUSTICE PERALTA: Yes, Your Honor.

Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court cannot JUSTICE PERALTA:
fix the amount ...
That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty-Two
DEAN DIOKNO: Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.

No, Your Honor. DEAN DIOKNO:

JUSTICE PERALTA: Yes, Your Honor.

... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand JUSTICE PERALTA:
(P22,000.00) Pesos.
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
149
Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Thank you.
x x x x29
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States
Federal Supreme Court has expanded the application of a similar Constitutional provision
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just its
form. The court therein ruled that three things must be done to decide whether a sentence is
proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and gravity of the offense,
and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in
the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or
to less serious penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the
same crime in other jurisdictions.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in
Solem what respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court of
South Dakota after it took into account the latters recidivist statute and not the original
penalty for uttering a "no account" check. Normally, the maximum punishment for the
crime would have been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless,
respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under
South Dakotas recidivist statute because of his six prior felony convictions. Surely, the
factual antecedents of Solem are different from the present controversy.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable penalty
for the offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty
against a domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the crime, the helper will
essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer. After
accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the household, thus entrusting upon
such person the protection and safekeeping of the employers loved ones and properties, a
subsequent betrayal of that trust is so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a
higher penalty to deter the commission of such wrongful acts.
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent on the
subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious
implications. For example, in the crime of Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on
the amount of the money malversed by the public official, thus:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. Any
public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation
or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two
hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six
thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is
less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two
thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total
value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with
which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie
evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money due to
the unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount malversed
is P200.00 (under the existing law), the amount now becomes P20,000.00 and the penalty
is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4 months and 1 day to
6 years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the act of embezzlement of P20,000.00
compared to the acts committed by public officials punishable by a special law, i.e.,
Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section
3,31 wherein the injury caused to the government is not generally defined by any monetary
amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15 years)32under the Anti-Graft Law will now
150
become higher. This should not be the case, because in the crime of malversation, the
public official takes advantage of his public position to embezzle the fund or property of
the government entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things
(inhabited or uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of
unlawful entry are the bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief,
where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the damage caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value of
the thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will
now be the value of the thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force
employed in entering the premises. It may likewise cause an inequity between the crime of
Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and this kind of robbery because the
former is punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years,
4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00 (P100,000.00 now if the
ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the premises is with violence or intimidation, which is the
main justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of Robbery with force upon things,
it is punished with a penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder
is unarmed without the penalty of Fine despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry
that is the basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty that
can be imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day
to 6 months) if the value of the damage caused exceeds P1,000.00, but under the proposal,
the value of the damage will now become P100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable by
arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the value of the damaged property
does not exceed P200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not less than the value of
the damage caused and not more than P200.00, if the amount involved does not
exceed P200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the proposal, P200.00 will now
become P20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of P200.00 under the existing law
will now become P20,000.00. The amount of Fine under this situation will now become
excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact that the offense is categorized as a light
felony penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the RPC.33 Unless we also amend
Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on the penalty of Fine, but changing
the same through Court decision, either expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and
constitutionally feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be affected
by the proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on
the value of the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National
Library and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real property or usurpation of
real rights in property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries or landmarks), Article 316 (Other
forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article
328 (Special cases of malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or damaging statues,
public monuments or paintings). Other crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also be
affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses),
Article 215 (Prohibited Transactions),
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure of
accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible public officer
to render accounts before leaving the country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect
crimes which are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended.34 The law treats cutting, gathering,
collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without license as an offense as
grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.35 Under the law, the offender shall
be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 31036 of the Revised Penal
Code, which means that the penalty imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value
of the timber or forest products involved in the offense. Now, if we accept the said proposal
in the crime of Theft, will this particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far
as the penalty is concerned because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the
RPC? The answer is in the negative because the soundness of this particular law is not in
question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
Special Laws, and other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a
thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity and necessity. There may be some
provisions of the law that should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no position to
conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely making a
study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the present times. Such is not within
the competence of the Court but of the Legislature which is empowered to conduct public
hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can decide
whether or not to amend or to revise the questioned law or other laws, or even create a new
legislation which will adopt to the times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal
Code. During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present,
fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal
Code,37 each one proposing much needed change and updates to archaic laws that were
promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings were far
different from todays conditions.
151
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it
shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such
application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise
of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law
a construction which is repugnant to its terms.38 The Court should apply the law in a
manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to
its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon
the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to
an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial
legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine;
hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In
addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity
shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on
account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no
earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of
Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by
the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person
causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be
fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death
of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the
latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil
indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment
imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as
restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to the death of the victim could not be
contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in
the imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the
value of civil indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would
sustain the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the
law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is P3,000.00.
The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award
cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly
modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral
damages under Article 222039 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages
that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or
the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to
civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as
tantamount to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being punitive
in nature. Whether or not they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that
should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply the law, especially
when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation than that which is plainly
written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpios opinions is that
the incremental penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the courts
should only impose the penalty corresponding to the amount of P22,000.00, regardless if
the actual amount involved exceeds P22,000.00. As suggested, however, from now until
the law is properly amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished
by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of criminal justice would
occur when every accused convicted of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different
from the proper penalty that should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the application of the
law has no legal basis and directly runs counter to what the law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of criminal
justice by the Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 765940 in December
1993. The said law has been questioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no
punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time the death penalty was re-
imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No. 9346,41 the Court did not impede
the imposition of the death penalty on the ground that it is a "cruel punishment" within the
purview of Section 19 (1),42Article III of the Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act
of Congress suspending the imposition of the death penalty that led to its non-imposition
and not via the intervention of the Court.
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the
provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the
152
present action. Not only is it violative of due process, considering that the State and the Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso
concerned parties were not given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is you have to take into consideration several factors.
settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because
constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally,43 more so in the PROFESSOR TADIAR:
present controversy wherein the issues never touched upon the constitutionality of any of
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Yes.

Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is JUSTICE PERALTA:
generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in
respect of duration or amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has
regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the Per capita income.
pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and
imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.44 PROFESSOR TADIAR:

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty Per capita income.
to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute
is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that JUSTICE PERALTA:
to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive,"
"wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the Consumer price index.
community."45
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt it
to our modern time.
Yeah.
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the
JUSTICE PERALTA:
questioned monetary values to the present value of money based only on the current
inflation rate. There are other factors and variables that need to be taken into consideration,
researched, and deliberated upon before the said values could be accurately and properly Inflation ...
adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the accused, its socio-economic
impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in order to arrive PROFESSOR TADIAR:
at a wholistic change that all of us believe should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly,
the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public Yes.
hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised
Penal Code. This function clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor JUSTICE PERALTA:
Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit:
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?
xxxx
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing
all of those economic terms.
153
JUSTICE PERALTA: Thank you.46

Yeah, but ... Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view
that the role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active duty to
PROFESSOR TADIAR: prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court
should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but consider the
proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in
And I dont think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the
the past taken into consideration "changed conditions" or "significant changes in
value to One Hundred (P100.00) Pesos to ...
circumstances" in its decisions.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity of
the substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the Courts adjustment of
Yeah. indemnity in crimes against persons, which the Court had previously adjusted in light of
current times, like in the case of People v. Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code
PROFESSOR TADIAR: mandates a presumption that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

... One (P1.00.00) Peso in 1930. With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my
Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of
JUSTICE PERALTA: being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the
Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the Court should
That is legislative in nature. refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated
before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of
monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of money. The same cannot be said on
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the value of money, but
on several other factors. Further, since the law is silent as to the maximum amount that can
That is my position that the Supreme Court ... be awarded and only pegged the minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as civil
indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current conditions.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling of
Yeah, okay. the RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight
PROFESSOR TADIAR: (8) months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum. However, the CA
imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make the correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1)
adjustment that is a power that belongs to the legislature. year for each additional P10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.

JUSTICE PERALTA: In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v.
People48 is highly instructive, thus:
Thank you, Professor.
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
154
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose
of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which
case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in the penalty
into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of
each of the three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the maximum, medium and
minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days 49
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisin correccional maximum
to prisin mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of
which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 6550 of the
RPC.51 In the present case, the amount involved is P98,000.00, which exceeds P22,000.00,
thus, the maximum penalty imposable should be within the maximum period of 6 years, 8
months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article 315 also states that a period of one
year shall be added to the penalty for every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess
of P22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20
years.
Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00 more than the P22,000.00 ceiling
set by law, then, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, the maximum period of 6
years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7
years. Taking the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7
years, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the
estafa charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months
and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of
lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of
making and enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by
judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial
legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner
Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and
Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San
Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN
DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished
the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice.
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
155
 The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. In order to overcome the presumption of innocence, the Prosecution is
required to adduce against him nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Such
proof is not only in relation to the elements of the offense, but also in relation to the
identity of the offender. If the Prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is not
only the right of the accused to be freed, it becomes the Courts constitutional duty to
acquit him.

The Case

Gilbert R. Wagas appeals his conviction for estafa under the decision rendered on July 11,
2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City (RTC), meting on him the
indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 30 years of reclusion
perpetua, as maximum.

Antecedents

Wagas was charged with estafa under the information that reads:nadcralaw
That on or about the 30th day of April, 1997, and for sometime prior and subsequent
thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, with intent to gain and by means of false
pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud, to wit: knowing that he did not have sufficient funds deposited with the Bank of
Philippine Islands, and without informing Alberto Ligaray of that circumstance, with intent
to defraud the latter, did then and there issue Bank of the Philippine Islands Check No.
0011003, dated May 08, 1997 in the amount of P200,000.00, which check was issued in
payment of an obligation, but which check when presented for encashment with the bank,
was dishonored for the reason drawn against insufficient funds and inspite of notice and
several demands made upon said accused to make good said check or replace the same
with cash, he had failed and refused and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do
so, to the damage and prejudice of Alberto Ligaray in the amount aforestated.

G.R. No. 157943, September 04, 2013 CONTRARY TO LAW.1

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GILBERT REYES After Wagas entered a plea of not guilty,2 the pre-trial was held, during which the Defense
WAGAS, Accused-Appellant. admitted that the check alleged in the information had been dishonored due to insufficient
funds.3 On its part, the Prosecution made no admission.4cralawlibrary
DECISION
At the trial, the Prosecution presented complainant Alberto Ligaray as its lone witness.
BERSAMIN, J.: Ligaray testified that on April 30, 1997, Wagas placed an order for 200 bags of rice over
the telephone; that he and his wife would not agree at first to the proposed payment of the
156
order by postdated check, but because of Wagas assurance that he would not disappoint
them and that he had the means to pay them because he had a lending business and money
in the bank, they relented and accepted the order; that he released the goods to Wagas on
April 30, 1997 and at the same time received Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Check
No. 0011003 for P200,000.00 payable to cash and postdated May 8, 1997; that he later
deposited the check with Solid Bank, his depository bank, but the check was dishonored
due to insufficiency of funds;5 that he called Wagas about the matter, and the latter told him
that he would pay upon his return to Cebu; and that despite repeated demands, Wagas did
not pay him.6cralawlibrary
On cross-examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not personally meet Wagas because
they transacted through telephone only; that he released the 200 bags of rice directly to
Robert Caada, the brother-in-law of Wagas, who signed the delivery receipt upon
receiving the rice.7cralawlibrary
After Ligaray testified, the Prosecution formally offered the following: (a) BPI Check No.
0011003 in the amount of P200,000.00 payable to cash; (b) the return slip dated May 13,
1997 issued by Solid Bank; (c) Ligarays affidavit; and (d) the delivery receipt signed by
Caada. After the RTC admitted the exhibits, the Prosecution then rested its
case.8cralawlibrary
In his defense, Wagas himself testified. He admitted having issued BPI Check No. 0011003
to Caada, his brother-in-law, not to Ligaray. He denied having any telephone conversation
or any dealings with Ligaray. He explained that the check was intended as payment for a
portion of Caadas property that he wanted to buy, but when the sale did not push through,
he did not anymore fund the check.9cralawlibrary
On cross-examination, the Prosecution confronted Wagas with a letter dated July 3, 1997
apparently signed by him and addressed to Ligarays counsel, wherein he admitted owing
Ligaray P200,000.00 for goods received, to wit:nadcralaw
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated June 23, 1997 which is self-explanatory.
It is worthy also to discuss with you the environmental facts of the case for your
consideration, to wit:nadcralaw
1. It is true that I obtained goods from your client worth P200,000.00 and I promised
to settle the same last May 10, 1997, but to no avail. On this point, let me inform you
that I sold my real property to a buyer in Manila, and promised to pay the
consideration on the same date as I promised with your client. Unfortunately, said
buyer likewise failed to make good with such obligation. Hence, I failed to fulfill my
promise resultant thereof. (sic)
2. Again, I made another promise to settle said obligation on or before June 15,
1997, but still to no avail attributable to the same reason as aforementioned. (sic)
3. To arrest this problem, we decided to source some funds using the subject
property as collateral. This other means is resorted to for the purpose of settling the
herein obligation. And as to its status, said funds will be rele[a]sed within thirty (30)
days from today.
In view of the foregoing, it is my sincere request and promise to settle said obligation on or
before August 15, 1997.
Lastly, I would like to manifest that it is not my intention to shy away from any financial
obligation.
xxxx
Respectfully yours,
(SGD.)
GILBERT R. WAGAS10
Wagas admitted the letter, but insisted that it was Caada who had transacted with Ligaray,
and that he had signed the letter only because his sister and her husband (Caada) had
begged him to assume the responsibility.11 On redirect examination, Wagas declared that
Caada, a seafarer, was then out of the country; that he signed the letter only to
accommodate the pleas of his sister and Caada, and to avoid jeopardizing Caadas
application for overseas employment.12 The Prosecution subsequently offered and the RTC
admitted the letter as rebuttal evidence.13cralawlibrary
Decision of the RTC
As stated, the RTC convicted Wagas of estafa on July 11, 2002, viz:nadcralaw
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as charged and he is hereby sentenced as follows:nadcralaw
1. To suffer an indeterminate penalty of from twelve (12) years of pris[i]on mayor, as
minimum, to thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua as maximum;
157
2. To indemnify the complainant, Albert[o] Ligaray in the sum of P200,000.00;
3. To pay said complainant the sum of P30,000.00 by way of attorneys fees; and
4. the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.14
The RTC held that the Prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements
constituting the crime of estafa, namely: (a) that Wagas issued the postdated check as
payment for an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (b) that he failed to
deposit an amount sufficient to cover the check despite having been informed that the
check had been dishonored; and (c) that Ligaray released the goods upon receipt of the
postdated check and upon Wagas assurance that the check would be funded on its date.
Wagas filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration,15 arguing that the Prosecution
did not establish that it was he who had transacted with Ligaray and who had negotiated
the check to the latter; that the records showed that Ligaray did not meet him at any time;
and that Ligarays testimony on their alleged telephone conversation was not reliable
because it was not shown that Ligaray had been familiar with his voice. Wagas also sought
the reopening of the case based on newly discovered evidence, specifically: (a) the
testimony of Caada who could not testify during the trial because he was then out of the
country, and (b) Ligarays testimony given against Wagas in another criminal case for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
On October 21, 2002, the RTC denied the motion for new trial and/or reconsideration,
opining that the evidence Wagas desired to present at a new trial did not qualify as newly
discovered, and that there was no compelling ground to reverse its decision.16cralawlibrary
Wagas appealed directly to this Court by notice of appeal.17cralawlibrary
Prior to the elevation of the records to the Court, Wagas filed a petition for admission to
bail pending appeal. The RTC granted the petition and fixed Wagas bond at
P40,000.00.18 Wagas then posted bail for his provisional liberty pending
appeal.19cralawlibrary
The resolution of this appeal was delayed by incidents bearing on the grant of Wagas
application for bail. On November 17, 2003, the Court required the RTC Judge to explain
why Wagas was out on bail.20 On January 15, 2004, the RTC Judge submitted to the Court
a so-called manifestation and compliance which the Court referred to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report, and recommendation.21 On July 5, 2005,
the Court, upon the OCAs recommendation, directed the filing of an administrative
complaint for simple ignorance of the law against the RTC Judge.22 On September 12,
2006, the Court directed the OCA to comply with its July 5, 2005 directive, and to cause
the filing of the administrative complaint against the RTC Judge. The Court also directed
Wagas to explain why his bail should not be cancelled for having been erroneously
granted.23 Finally, in its memorandum dated September 27, 2006, the OCA manifested to
the Court that it had meanwhile filed the administrative complaint against the RTC
Judge.24cralawlibrary
Issues
In this appeal, Wagas insists that he and Ligaray were neither friends nor personally known
to one other; that it was highly incredible that Ligaray, a businessman, would have entered
into a transaction with him involving a huge amount of money only over the telephone; that
on the contrary, the evidence pointed to Caada as the person with whom Ligaray had
transacted, considering that the delivery receipt, which had been signed by Caada,
indicated that the goods had been Ordered by ROBERT CAADA, that the goods had
been received by Caada in good order and condition, and that there was no showing that
Caada had been acting on behalf of Wagas; that he had issued the check to Caada upon a
different transaction; that Caada had negotiated the check to Ligaray; and that the element
of deceit had not been established because it had not been proved with certainty that it was
him who had transacted with Ligaray over the telephone.
The circumstances beg the question: did the Prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt
the existence of all the elements of the crime of estafa as charged, as well as the identity of
the perpetrator of the crime?
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:nadcralaw
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:nadcralaw
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:nadcralaw
xxxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the
offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to
158
cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount Q: After the check was (sic) bounced, what did you do next?
necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank
and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of A: I made a demand on them.
funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
Q: How did you make a demand?
In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of postdating or issuing a
check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This A: I called him over the phone.
means that the offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party
by reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In other words, the Q: Who is that him that you are referring to?
Prosecution must show that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have
parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the A: Gilbert Wagas.30
offender.25cralawlibrary Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. Under the Negotiable
Instruments Law, this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by
The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check is postdated or issued in mere delivery without the need of an indorsement.31 This rendered it highly probable that
payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (b) lack or Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like Caada, his brother-
insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof.26 It is the in-law, who then negotiated it to Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did not
criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check that is punishable, not the non-payment himself see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and thereafter, and expressly stated
of a debt.27Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the drawer of the that the person who signed for and received the stocks of rice was Caada.
check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor. It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the
check in order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not
The Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to Caada because of the the mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply
postdated check the latter had given to him; and that the check was dishonored when because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still
presented for payment because of the insufficiency of funds. clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of
the check.
In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself,
must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.28 In that regard, the Prosecution did Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Caada who received the rice from him and who
not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by delivered the check to him. Considering that the records are bereft of any showing that
issuing the check. Caada was then acting on behalf of Wagas, the RTC had no factual and legal bases to
conclude and find that Caada had been acting for Wagas. This lack of factual and legal
Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom bases for the RTC to infer so obtained despite Wagas being Caadas brother-in-law.
he was transacting over the telephone, thus:
Q: On April 30, 1997, do you remember having a transaction with the accused in this case?
Finally, Ligarays declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him over the
telephone was not reliable because he did not explain how he determined that the person
A: Yes, sir. He purchased two hundred bags of rice from me. with whom he had the telephone conversation was really Wagas whom he had not yet met
or known before then. We deem it essential for purposes of reliability and trustworthiness
Q: How did this purchase of rice transaction started? (sic) that a telephone conversation like that one Ligaray supposedly had with the buyer of rice to
be first authenticated before it could be received in evidence. Among others, the person
A: He talked with me over the phone and told me that he would like to purchase two hundred bags of
with whom therice and conversed
witness he will justbyissue a check.
telephone should be first satisfactorily identified by
Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did not personally see and meet whoever he 32
voice recognition or any other means. Without the authentication, incriminating another
had dealt with and to whom he had made the demand for payment, and that he had talked person just by adverting to the telephone conversation with him would be all too easy. In
with him only over the telephone, to wit:nadcralaw this respect, an identification based on familiarity with the voice of the caller, or because of
clearly recognizable peculiarities of the caller would have sufficed.33 The identity of the
159
caller could also be established by the callers self-identification, coupled with additional During cross-examination, Ligaray was allowed another opportunity to show how he had
evidence, like the context and timing of the telephone call, the contents of the statement determined that his caller was Wagas, but he still failed to provide a satisfactory showing,
challenged, internal patterns, and other distinctive characteristics, and disclosure of to wit:nadcralaw
knowledge of facts known peculiarly to the caller.34cralawlibrary Q: Mr. Witness, you mentioned that you and the accused entered into [a] transaction of rice se

Verily, it is only fair that the caller be reliably identified first before a telephone A: Yes, sir.
communication is accorded probative weight. The identity of the caller may be established
by direct or circumstantial evidence. According to one ruling of the Kansas Supreme Q: But you cannot really ascertain that it was the accused whom you are talking with?
Court:nadcralaw
Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they are relevant to the A: I know it was him because I know him.
fact or facts in issue, and admissibility is governed by the same rules of evidence
concerning face-to-face conversations except the party against whom the conversations are Q: Am I right to say [that] that was the first time that you had a transaction with the acc
sought to be used must ordinarily be identified. It is not necessary that the witness be able, accused through telephone he issued a check in your favor?
at the time of the conversation, to identify the person with whom the conversation was had,
provided subsequent identification is proved by direct or circumstantial evidence A: No. Before that call I had a talk[ ] with the accused.
somewhere in the development of the case. The mere statement of his identity by the
party calling is not in itself sufficient proof of such identity, in the absence of Q: But still through the telephone?
corroborating circumstances so as to render the conversation admissible. However,
circumstances preceding or following the conversation may serve to sufficiently A: Yes, sir.
identify the caller. The completeness of the identification goes to the weight of the
evidence rather than its admissibility, and the responsibility lies in the first instance Q: There was no instant (sic) that the accused went to see you personally regarding the 2
with the district court to determine within its sound discretion whether the threshold
of admissibility has been met.35 (Bold emphasis supplied) A: No. It was through telephone only.
Yet, the Prosecution did not tender any plausible explanation or offer any proof to Q: In fact[,] you did not cause the delivery of these 200 bags of rice through the accused h
definitely establish that it had been Wagas whom Ligaray had conversed with on the
telephone. The Prosecution did not show through Ligaray during the trial as to how he had A: Yes. It was through Robert.
determined that his caller was Wagas. All that the Prosecution sought to elicit from him
was whether he had known and why he had known Wagas, and he answered as Q: So, after that phone call[,] you deliver[ed] th[ose] 200 sacks of rice through somebody
follows:nadcralaw
Q: Do you know the accused in this case? A: Yes, sir.37
Ligarays statement that he could tell that it was Wagas who had ordered the rice because
A: Yes, sir. he know[s] him was still vague and unreliable for not assuring the certainty of the
identification, and should not support a finding of Ligarays familiarity with Wagas as the
Q: If he is present inside the courtroom [] caller by his voice. It was evident from Ligarays answers that Wagas was not even an
acquaintance of Ligarays prior to the transaction. Thus, the RTCs conclusion that Ligaray
A: No, sir. He is not around. had transacted with Wagas had no factual basis. Without that factual basis, the RTC was
speculating on a matter as decisive as the identification of the buyer to be Wagas.
Q: Why do you know him?
The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was the person who had
A: I know him as a resident of Compostela because he is an ex-mayor of Compostela. conversed with Ligaray by telephone to place the order for the rice. The letter was admitted
exclusively as the States rebuttal evidence to controvert or impeach the denial of Wagas of
entering into any transaction with Ligaray on the rice; hence, it could be considered and
160
appreciated only for that purpose. Under the law of evidence, the court shall consider annum from the finality of this decision.
evidence solely for the purpose for which it is offered,38 not for any other
purpose.39 Fairness to the adverse party demands such exclusivity. Moreover, the high No pronouncement on costs of suit.
plausibility of the explanation of Wagas that he had signed the letter only because his sister
and her husband had pleaded with him to do so could not be taken for granted. SO ORDERED.

It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus probandi in
establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the
tenet ei incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that he who asserts, not
he who denies, must prove,40 and as a means of respecting the presumption of innocence in
favor of the man or woman on the dock for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the burden
of proof to show: (1) the correct identification of the author of a crime, and (2) the actuality
of the commission of the offense with the participation of the accused. All these facts must
be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without
solace from the weakness of the defense. That the defense the accused puts up may be
weak is inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed to discharge the onus of his
identity and culpability. The presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the Prosecution
to demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused to establish innocence. 41 Indeed, the
accused, being presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or her shoulders. For
this reason, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the
identity of the criminal. For even if the commission of the crime can be established,
without competent proof of the identity of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, there can
be no conviction.42cralawlibrary

There is no question that an identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of
mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary force.43 Thus, considering that the
circumstances of the identification of Wagas as the person who transacted on the rice did
not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not measure up to
the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases. Perforce, the
accuseds constitutional right of presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved is
not overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal,44 even though his innocence may be
doubted.45cralawlibrary

Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable where
the preponderance of the established facts so warrants.46 Wagas as the admitted drawer of
the check was legally liable to pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due
course.47 Consequently, we pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay the amount of the
dishonored check, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision rendered on July
11, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City; and ACQUITS Gilbert R.
Wagas of the crime of estafa on the ground of reasonable doubt, but ORDERS him to pay
Alberto Ligaray the amount of P200,000.00 as actual damages, plus interest of 6% per
161

[G.R. No. 181409 : February 11, 2010]
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG,
REPRESENTED BY MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, AS ADMINISTRATRIX,
PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILLIAM SATO,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. - No criminal, but only civil liability
shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief
committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased
spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating
in the commission of the crime. (emphasis supplied)
For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity created
between the husband and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and
the blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the death of one spouse, thus ending the
marriage which created such relationship by affinity? Does the beneficial application of
Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa thru falsification?
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix 1 of
petitioner intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong,
filed a complaint-affidavit2 for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese
national. Her complaint-affidavit read:
I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal age, single, and
resident of Unit 1111, Prince Gregory Condominium, 105 12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon
City, after being duly sworn, depose and state that:
1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzale[s], docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-95-23621[,] Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 104, being one (1) of her surviving daughters. Copy of the Letters of
162
Administration dated June 22, 1995 is hereto attached as Annex "A" to form an integral
part hereof.
2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to preserve the properties of the
Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], but also to recover such funds
and/or properties as property belonging to the estate but are presently in the possession or
control of other parties.
3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer with some of the children
of my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,] who predeceased our mother Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzales, having died in Japan in 1991.
4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy Mitsuko Sato, age[d] 27
and 24 respectively, I was able to learn that prior to the death of my mother Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], [s]pecifically on o[r] about November 24, 1992, their father
William Sato, through fraudulent misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature and
thumbmark of my mother on a Special Power of Attorney whereby my niece Wendy
Mitsuko Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her attorney-in-fact, to
sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. Said Special Power of
Attorney, copy of which is attached as ANNEX "A" of the Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko
Sato, was signed and thumbmark[ed] by my mother because William Sato told her that the
documents she was being made to sign involved her taxes. At that time, my mother was
completely blind, having gone blind almost ten (10) years prior to November, 1992.
5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by my mother in the presence of
Wendy, my other niece Belinda Kiku Sato, our maid Mana Tingzon, and Governor
Josephine Ramirez who later became the second wife of my sister's widower William Sato.
6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother signed the document in the belief
that they were in connection with her taxes, not knowing, since she was blind, that the
same was in fact a Special Power of Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties.
7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney, William Sato found buyers for
the property and made my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign three (3) deeds of absolute sale
in favor of (a) Anita Ng (Doc. 2194, Page No. 41, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary
Public Vicente B. Custodio), (b) Anita Ng (Doc. No. 2331, Page No. 68, Book No. V,
Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio) and (c) Ruby Lee Tsai (Doc. No. II,
Page No. 65, Book No. II, Series of 1993 of Notary Public Toribio D. Labid). x x x
8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the considerations appearing on the deeds
of absolute sale were not the true and actual considerations received by her father William
Sato from the buyers of her grandmother's properties. She attests that Anita Ng actually
paid P7,000,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3148 and P7,034,000.00 for the
property covered by TCT No. 3149. All the aforesaid proceeds were turned over to William
Sato who undertook to make the proper accounting thereof to my mother, Manolita
Carungcong Gonzale[s].
9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai paid P8,000,000.00
for the property covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0735, and the proceeds thereof
were likewise turned over to William Sato.
10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were falsified as Wendy Mitsuko C.
Sato has actual knowledge of the true amounts paid by the buyers, as stated in her
Affidavit, since she was the signatory thereto as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s].
11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any position to oppose or to
refuse her father's orders.
12. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold under the power of
attorney fraudulently secured from my mother, which total P22,034,000.00, William Sato
failed to account for the same and never delivered the proceeds to Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzale[s] until the latter died on June 8, 1994.
13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting and to deliver the
proceeds of the sales to me as Administratrix of my mother's estate, but he refused and
failed, and continues to refuse and to fail to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the estate
of the deceased Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] and of the heirs which include his six
(6) children with my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato. x x x3
Wendy Mitsuko Sato's supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney allegedly
issued by the deceased Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of Wendy were
attached to the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix.
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the
complaint.4 On appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the
resolution dated March 25, 1997 and directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an
Information against Sato for violation of Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal
Code.5 Thus, the following Information was filed against Sato in the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 87:6
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under Article 315[,]
par. 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
163
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, by means of deceit, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De
Carungcong[,] who was already then blind and 79 years old[,] to sign and thumbmark a
special power of attorney dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato,
daughter of said accused, making her believe that said document involved only her taxes,
accused knowing fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, then a
minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of her
properties all located at Tagaytay City, as follows:
1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square meters more or less
and covered by T.C.T. No. 3147;
2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No.
3148 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0722, Cadastral Lot No. 7106;
3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No.
3149 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0721, Cadastral Lot No. 7104;
4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less with Tax
Declaration No. GR-016-1735, Cadastral Lot No. 7062;
registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once in the
possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent documents, said
accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale covering
Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 3148 for P250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for
P250,000.00 and [Tax Declaration] GR-016-0735 for P650,000.00 and once in possession
of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied,
misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who died in 1994.
Contrary to law.7
Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to
increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000, the total amount stated in the deeds of
sale, to P22,034,000, the actual amount received by Sato.
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased
Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance.
The prosecution disputed Sato's motion in an opposition dated March 29, 2006.
In an order dated April 17, 2006,8 the trial court granted Sato's motion and ordered the
dismissal of the criminal case:
The Trial Prosecutor's contention is that the death of the wife of the accused severed the
relationship of affinity between accused and his mother-in-law. Therefore, the mantle of
protection provided to the accused by the relationship is no longer obtaining.
A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code convinces
this Court of the correctness of the contention of the [d]efense. While it is true that the
death of Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it
does not erase the fact that accused and Zenaida's mother, herein complainant, are still
son[-in-law] and mother-in-law and they remained son[-in-law] and mother-in-law even
beyond the death of Zenaida.
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso. "No
criminal, but only civil liability[,] shall result from the commission of the crime of theft,
swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by xxx 1) spouses,
ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line."
Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to] Revised Penal Code, preserves
family harmony and obviates scandal, hence even in cases of theft and malicious mischief,
where the crime is committed by a stepfather against his stepson, by a grandson against his
grandfather, by a son against his mother, no criminal liability is incurred by the accused
only civil (Vicente Alavare, 52 Phil. 65; Adame, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 63; Cristobal, 84
Phil. 473).
Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information meritorious, the same is
GRANTED and, as prayed for, case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.9 (underlining supplied in the original)
The prosecution's motion for reconsideration10 was denied in an order dated June 2, 2006.11
164
Dissatisfied with the trial court's rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by
Mediatrix, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals12 which, however, in a
decision13dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it. It ruled:
[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida did not extinguish the
relationship by affinity between her husband, private respondent Sato, and her mother
Manolita, and does not bar the application of the exempting circumstance under Article
332(1) of the Revised Penal Code in favor of private respondent Sato.
We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)] that
nothing in the law and/or existing jurisprudence supports the argument of petitioner that the
fact of death of Zenaida dissolved the relationship by affinity between Manolita and private
respondent Sato, and thus removed the protective mantle of Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code from said private respondent; and that notwithstanding the death of Zenaida,
private respondent Sato remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita, and a brother-in-law of
petitioner administratrix. As further pointed out by the OSG, the filing of the criminal case
for estafa against private respondent Sato already created havoc among members of the
Carungcong and Sato families as private respondent's daughter Wendy Mitsuko Sato joined
cause with her aunt [Mediatrix] Carungcong y Gonzales, while two (2) other children of
private respondent, William Francis and Belinda Sato, took the side of their father.
There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries elaborating on the provision of
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. However, from the plain language of the law, it is
clear that the exemption from criminal liability for the crime of swindling (estafa) under
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code applies to private respondent Sato, as son-in-law of
Manolita, they being "relatives by affinity in the same line" under Article 332(1) of the
same Code. We cannot draw the distinction that following the death of Zenaida in 1991,
private respondent Sato is no longer the son-in-law of Manolita, so as to exclude the former
from the exempting circumstance provided for in Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory
construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.
There should be no distinction in the application of law where none is indicated. The courts
could only distinguish where there are facts or circumstances showing that the lawgiver
intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely give effect
to the lawgiver's intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the
law does not include the power to correct by reading into the law what is not written
therein.
Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws are strictly
construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt
must be resolved in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of Article 332 (1)
of the Revised Penal Code's simple language is most favorable to Sato.14
The appellate court denied reconsideration.15 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders of the trial
court. It cites the commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on criminal law that the
rationale of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code exempting the persons mentioned
therein from criminal liability is that the law recognizes the presumed co-ownership of
the property between the offender and the offended party. Here, the properties subject
of the estafa case were owned by Manolita whose daughter, Zenaida Carungcong-Sato
(Sato's wife), died on January 28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida never became a co-owner
because, under the law, her right to the three parcels of land could have arisen only
after her mother's death. Since Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such
right came about and the mantle of protection provided to Sato by the relationship no
longer existed.
Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not be
invoked in case of death of the spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed.
Thus, while the death of Zenaida extinguished her marriage with Sato, it did not dissolve
the son-in-law and mother-in-law relationship between Sato and Zenaida's mother,
Manolita.
For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the exemption from
criminal liability provided under Article 332. Nothing in the law and jurisprudence
supports petitioner's claim that Zenaida's death dissolved the relationship by affinity
between Sato and Manolita. As it is, the criminal case against Sato created havoc among
the members of the Carungcong and Sato families, a situation sought to be particularly
avoided by Article 332's provision exempting a family member committing theft, estafa or
malicious mischief from criminal liability and reducing his/her liability to the civil aspect
only.
The petition has merit.
The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code. In particular, it calls for the determination of the following: (1) the effect of death on
the relationship by affinity created between a surviving spouse and the blood relatives of
the deceased spouse and (2) the extent of the coverage of Article 332.
Effect of Death on Relationship
By Affinity as Absolutory Cause
165
Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause16 in the crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling)
and malicious mischief. It limits the responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees
him from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to the offended party.
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held that
included in the exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children.17 By
virtue thereof, no criminal liability is incurred by the stepfather who commits malicious
mischief against his stepson;18 by the stepmother who commits theft against her
stepson;19 by the stepfather who steals something from his stepson;20 by the grandson who
steals from his grandfather;21 by the accused who swindles his sister-in-law living with
him;22 and by the son who steals a ring from his mother.23
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse. It is a
relationship by marriage or a familial relation resulting from marriage. 24 It is a fictive
kinship, a fiction created by law in connection with the institution of marriage and family
relations.
If marriage gives rise to one's relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of one's spouse,
does the extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship by
affinity?
Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that confronts us in this
case. That is why the trial and appellate courts acknowledged the "dearth of jurisprudence
and/or commentaries" on the matter. In contrast, in the American legal system, there are
two views on the subject. As one Filipino author observed:
In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are conflicting
views. There are some who believe that relationship by affinity is not terminated whether
there are children or not in the marriage (Carman vs. Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26).
However, the better view supported by most judicial authorities in other jurisdictions is
that, if the spouses have no living issues or children and one of the spouses dies, the
relationship by affinity is dissolved. It follows the rule that relationship by affinity ceases
with the dissolution of the marriage which produces it (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657, 659, 56
Am Dec. 288). On the other hand, the relationship by affinity is continued despite the death
of one of the spouses where there are living issues or children of the marriage "in whose
veins the blood of the parties are commingled, since the relationship of affinity was
continued through the medium of the issue of the marriage" (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb.
Ch. 331, 333).25
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates
with the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the
relationship of affinity between the parties.26 Under this view, the relationship by affinity is
simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is
indispensably and necessarily determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists
only for so long as the marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the
relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouse's blood relatives.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the
death of one spouse when there is a surviving issue.27 The rationale is that the relationship
is preserved because of the living issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both
parties is commingled.28
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity
between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after
the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or
not.29 Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the
marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage.
This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or
in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to
be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties.30
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we hold that
the second view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the
Revised Penal Code.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury disqualification and
incest.31 On the other hand, the continuing affinity view has been applied in the
interpretation of laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of
the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity
within the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity view is more
appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity in the same
line" is couched in general language. The legislative intent to make no distinction between
the spouse of one's living child and the surviving spouse of one's deceased child (in case of
a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to his or her parents-in-law) 32 can be drawn
from Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code without doing violence to its language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family as a
basic autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty of the
State to strengthen the solidarity of the family.33 Congress has also affirmed as a State and
national policy that courts shall preserve the solidarity of the family.34 In this connection,
the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal. 35 The view that
relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of one of the parties to the marriage that
created it is more in accord with family solidarity and harmony.
166

Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve
all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the
accused.36 This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be
presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.37
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.38 The rule applies
when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is
prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the
adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the
basic purpose of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony by
providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article 332(1) is to benefit the accused,
the Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is more favorable to the
accused. In this case, that interpretation is the continuing affinity view.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the
relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the
deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage which created the
affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of one's
relatives under Article 112 of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication of grave offense committed against one's relatives under Article
135 of the same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories under
Article 20 also of the same Code.)
SCOPE OF ARTICLE 332 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the
felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State
condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the offender
for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to hold the
offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein.
The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies
exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not
apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another
crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.39
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the
offense is determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the
offense.40 What controls is not the title of the Information or the designation of the offense
but the actual facts recited in the Information.41 In other words, it is the recital of facts of
the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the
crime being charged in the Information.42 It is the exclusive province of the court to say
what the crime is or what it is named.43 The determination by the prosecutor who signs the
Information of the crime committed is merely an opinion which is not binding on the
court.44
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged not with
simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents. In particular, the Information states that Sato, by means of deceit, intentionally
defrauded Manolita committed as follows:
(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that time) and
induced her to sign and thumbmark the same;
(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection with her taxes
when it was in fact a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing his minor daughter
Wendy to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of Manolita's properties in
Tagaytay City;
(c) relying on Sato's inducement and representation, Manolita signed and thumbmarked
the SPA in favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;
(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither delivered the
proceeds to Manolita nor accounted for the same and despite repeated demands, he
failed and refused to deliver the proceeds, to the damage and prejudice of the estate of
Manolita.
The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed by attributing
to Manolita (who participated in the execution of the document) statements other than
those in fact made by her. Manolita's acts of signing the SPA and affixing her thumbmark
to that document were the very expression of her specific intention that something be done
about her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark were the affirmation of her statement on
such intention as she only signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she could
not have read) because of Sato's representation that the document pertained to her taxes. In
signing and thumbmarking the document, Manolita showed that she believed and adopted
the representations of Sato as to what the document was all about, i.e., that it involved her
taxes. Her signature and thumbmark, therefore, served as her conformity to Sato's proposal
that she execute a document to settle her taxes.
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita granted his
daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for the purpose of selling, assigning,
167
transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolita's Tagaytay properties when the fact was
that Manolita signed and thumbmarked the document presented by Sato in the belief that it
pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the SPA, and everything that it
contained were falsely attributed to Manolita when she was made to sign the SPA.
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that
(1) "once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent
documents, [Sato] made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute
Sale" and
(2) "once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused,
misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and
benefit"
raise the presumption that Sato, as the possessor of the falsified document and the one who
benefited therefrom, was the author thereof.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the amendment of the
Information so as to increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000 to P22,034,000.
This was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on certiorari.
This meant that the amended Information would now state that, while the total amount of
consideration stated in the deeds of absolute sale was only P1,150,000, Sato actually
received the total amount of P22,034,000 as proceeds of the sale of Manolita's
properties.45 This also meant that the deeds of sale (which were public documents) were
also falsified by making untruthful statements as to the amounts of consideration stated in
the deeds.
Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was not
simple estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public documents (particularly, the special
power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary means to commit the estafa.
Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail himself of the
absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor.
EFFECT OF ABSOLUTORY CAUSE UNDER
ARTICLE 332 ON CRIMINAL LIABILITY
FOR THE COMPLEX CRIME OF ESTAFA
THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS
The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple
estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code,
should he not be absolved also from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents? No.
True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of
public document is required for a proper conviction for the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public document. That is the ruling in Gonzaludo v. People.46 It
means that the prosecution must establish that the accused resorted to the falsification of a
public document as a necessary means to commit the crime of estafa.
However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code and of the nature of a complex crime would negate exemption from criminal
liability for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, simply
because the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the
absolutory cause under Article 332.
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against
property, namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all
other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not affected by the absolutory cause
provided by the said provision. To apply the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code to one of the component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of
negating the existence of that complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332.
In other words, to apply Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a separate simple
crime, not as the component crime that it is in that situation. It would wrongly consider the
indictment as separate charges of estafa and falsification of public document, not as a
single charge for the single (complex) crime of estafa through falsification of public
document.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the offender
criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief and
considers the violation of the juridical right to property committed by the offender against
certain family members as a private matter and therefore subject only to civil liability. The
waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to property is achieved through (and
therefore inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and
presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved
is no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a paramount public
interest.
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.47 Thus, the
action provided under the said provision simply concerns the private relations of the parties
as family members and is limited to the civil aspect between the offender and the offended
party. When estafa is committed through falsification of a public document, however, the
168
matter acquires a very serious public dimension and goes beyond the respective rights and
liabilities of family members among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to
an act that breaches public interest in the integrity of public documents as a means to
violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed from the protective mantle of
the absolutory cause under Article 332.
In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, it would be wrong to consider the component crimes
separately from each other. While there may be two component crimes (estafa and
falsification of documents), both felonies are animated by and result from one and the same
criminal intent for which there is only one criminal liability.48 That is the concept of a
complex crime. In other words, while there are two crimes, they are treated only as one,
subject to a single criminal liability.
As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is violated (e.g.,
homicide which violates the right to life, theft which violates the right to property), 49 a
complex crime constitutes a violation of diverse juridical rights or interests by means of
diverse acts, each of which is a simple crime in itself.50 Since only a single criminal intent
underlies the diverse acts, however, the component crimes are considered as elements of a
single crime, the complex crime. This is the correct interpretation of a complex crime as
treated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality of crimes
where the same criminal intent results in two or more component crimes constituting a
complex crime for which there is only one criminal liability.51 (The complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document falls under this category.) This is different
from a material (or real) plurality of crimes where different criminal intents result in two or
more crimes, for each of which the accused incurs criminal liability.52 The latter category is
covered neither by the concept of complex crimes nor by Article 48.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes (concursus
delictuorum or concurso de delitos) gives rise to a single criminal liability and requires the
imposition of a single penalty:
Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more crimes, it is only one
crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed and the two or more crimes constituting
the same are more conveniently termed as component crimes.53 (emphasis supplied)
-- x -- -- x -- -- x --
In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute
only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. The
offender has only one criminal intent. Even in the case where an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the evil intent of the offender is only one. 54
For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public document
requires that the elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean that the
criminal liability for estafa may be determined and considered independently of that for
falsification. The two crimes of estafa and falsification of public documents are not
separate crimes but component crimes of the single complex crime of estafa and
falsification of public documents.
Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the complex crime
of estafa through falsification of public document, the liability for estafa should be
considered separately from the liability for falsification of public document. Such approach
would disregard the nature of a complex crime and contradict the letter and spirit of Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code. It would wrongly disregard the distinction between formal
plurality and material plurality, as it improperly treats the plurality of crimes in the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document as a mere material
plurality where the felonies are considered as separate crimes to be punished individually.
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS MAY BE
A NECESSARY MEANS FOR COMMITTING
ESTAFA EVEN UNDER ARTICLE 315 (3[A])
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the Revised
Penal Code are as follows:
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;
(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;
(3) the offended party personally signed the document and
(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.
While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not require
that the document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not mean that the
falsification of the document cannot be considered as a necessary means to commit the
estafa under that provision.
The phrase "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if it did, then the
offense as a "necessary means" to commit another would be an indispensable element of
169
the latter and would be an ingredient thereof.55 In People v. Salvilla,56 the phrase "necessary
means" merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and insure the
commission of the other.57 In this case, the crime of falsification of public document, the
SPA, was such a "necessary means" as it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and carry out
more effectively his evil design to swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he used the SPA
to sell the Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third persons.
95260 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court which is
directed to try the accused with dispatch for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents.
SO ORDERED.

When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit
another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime
under Article 48 of the same Code.58 The falsification of a public, official or commercial
document may be a means of committing estafa because, before the falsified document is
actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been
consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of
falsification of a public, official or commercial document.59 In other words, the crime of
falsification was committed prior to the consummation of the crime of estafa.60 Actually
utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another is
estafa.61 The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the
falsification of the document.62

Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show that the
falsification of public document was consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA
to Manolita who signed the same as a statement of her intention in connection with her
taxes. While the falsification was consummated upon the execution of the SPA, the
consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so
particularly when he had the properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the
sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as no
damage was yet caused to the property rights of Manolita at the time she was made to sign
the document) but by the subsequent use of the said document. That is why the falsification
of the public document was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for)
the commission of the estafa.

The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement, had made
Manolita sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or in favor of third parties.
In that case, the damage would have been caused by, and at exactly the same time as, the
execution of the document, not prior thereto. Therefore, the crime committed would only
have been the simple crime of estafa.63 On the other hand, absent any inducement (such as
if Manolita herself had been the one who asked that a document pertaining to her taxes be
prepared for her signature, but what was presented to her for her signature was an SPA), the
crime would have only been the simple crime of falsification.64

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 9, 2007
and the resolution dated January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No.
170

G.R. Nos. 209655-60, January 14, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PALMY TIBAYAN AND
RICO Z. PUERTO, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellants Palmy Tibayan (Tibayan) and
Rico Z. Puerto (Puerto) (accused-appellants) is the Decision2 dated June 28, 2013 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR Nos. 33063, 33562, 33660, 33660, 33669, 33939,
and 34398 which modified the Decisions dated December 4, 2009,3 June 24, 2010,4 August
2, 2010,5August 5, 2010,6 January 21, 2011,7 and August 18, 20118 of the Regional Trial
Court of Las Pias City, Branch 198 (RTC)and convicted accused-appellants of the crime
of Syndicated Estafa, defined and penalized under Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1689.9chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Facts
Tibayan Group Investment Company, Inc. (TGICI) is is an open-end investment company
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on September 21,
2001.10Sometime in 2002, the SEC conducted an investigation on TGICI and its
subsidiaries.In the course thereof, it discovered that TGICI was selling securities to the
public without a registration statement in violation of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise
known as The Securities Regulation Code, and that TGICI submitted a fraudulent
Treasurers Affidavit before the SEC. Resultantly, on October 21, 2003, the SEC revoked
TGICIs corporate registration for being fraudulently
procured.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The foregoing led to the filing of multiple criminal cases12 for Syndicated Estafa against
the incorporators and directors of TGICI,13 namely, Jesus Tibayan, Ezekiel D. Martinez,
Liborio E. Elacio, Jimmy C. Catigan, Nelda B. Baran, and herein accused-
appellants.14 Consequently, warrants of arrest were issued against all of them; however,
only accused-appellants were arrested, while the others remained at large.15
According to the prosecution, private complainants Hector H. Alvarez, Milagros Alvarez,
Clarita P. Gacayan, Irma T. Ador, Emelyn Gomez, Yolanda Zimmer, Nonito Garlan, Judy
C. Rillon, Leonida D. Jarina, Reynaldo A. Dacon, Cristina Dela Pea, and Rodney E.
Villareal16 (private complainants) were enticed to invest in TGICI due to the offer of high
interest rates, as well as the assurance that they will recover their investments. After giving
their money to TGICI, private complainants received a Certificate of Share and post-dated
checks, representing the amount of the principal investment and the monthly interest
earnings, respectively.17 Upon encashment, the checks were dishonored,as the account was
already closed, prompting private complainants to bring the bounced checks to the TGICI
office to demand payment. At the office, the TGICI employees took the said checks, gave
171
private complainants acknowledgement receipts, and reassured that their investments, as
well as the interests, would be paid. However, the TGICI office closed down without
private complainants having been paid and, thus, they were constrained to file criminal
complaints against the incorporators and directors of TGICI.18chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In their defense, accused-appellants denied having conspired with the other TGICI
incorporators to defraud private complainants. Particularly, Puerto claimed that his
signature in the Articles of Incorporation of TGICI was forged and that since January
2002,he was no longer a director of TGICI. For her part, Tibayan also claimed that her
signature in the TGICIs Articles of Incorporation was a forgery, as she was neither an
incorporator nor a director of TGICI.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The RTC Rulings
On various dates, the RTC issued six (6) separate decisions convicting Tibayan of 13
counts and Puerto of 11 counts of Estafa under Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the
RPC in relation to PD 1689, to wit: (a) in a Joint Decision20 dated December 4, 2009, the
RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts
of Estafa, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of 20 years
of reclusion temporal for each count, and ordering them to pay the amounts of
P1,500,000.00, to Hector H. Alvarez, and P119,405.23 and P800,000.00 to Milagros
Alvarez;21; (b) in a Joint Decision22 dated June 24, 2010, the RTC acquitted Puerto of all
the charges, but found Tibayan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Estafa,
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of 20 years of reclusion
temporal for each count, and ordering her to pay the amounts of P1,300,000.00 and
US$12,000.00 to Clarita P. Gacayan and P500,000.00 to Irma T. Ador;23; (c) in a Joint
Decision24 dated August 2, 2010, the accused-appellants were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Estafa, and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for a period of 20 years of reclusion temporal for each count, and ordered to
pay the amounts of P1,000,000.00 to Yolanda Zimmer and P556,376.00 to Nonito
Garlan;25;(d) in a Joint Decision26 dated August 5, 2010, the RTC found the accused-
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Estafa, sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of 20 years of reclusion temporal, and
ordering them to pay Emelyn Gomez the amount of P250,000.00;27; (e) in a
Decision28 dated January 21, 2011, accused-appellants were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Estafa each, and were sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment for a period of 20 years of reclusion temporal, and ordered to pay Judy C.
Rillon the amount of P118,000.00;29; and (f) in a Joint Decision30 dated August 18, 2011,
accused-appellants were each convicted of four (4) counts of Estafa, and meted different
penalties per count, as follows: (i) for the first count, they were sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for a period of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correcional medium, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum, and to pay Reynaldo A. Dacon the amount of P100,000.00; to;(ii) for the second
count, they were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of ten (10)
years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay Leonida D. Jarina the amount of P200,000.00;
(iii) for the third count, they were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a
period of ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay Cristina Dela Pea the amount of
P250,000.00; and (iv) for the last count, they were sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for a period of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correcional medium, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum, and to pay Rodney E. Villareal the amount of P100,000.00.31.
In the aforesaid decisions, the RTC did not lend credence to accused-appellants denials in
light of the positive testimonies of the private complainants that they invested their money
in TGICI because of the assurances from accused-appellants and the other
directors/incorporators of TGICI that their investments would yield very profitable returns.
In this relation, the RTC found that accused-appellants conspired with the other
directors/incorporators of TGICI in misrepresenting the company as a legitimate
corporation duly registered to operate as a mutual fund, to the detriment of the private
complainants.32 However, the RTC convicted accused-appellants of simple Estafa only, as
the prosecution failed to allege in the informations that accused-appellants and the other
directors/ incorporators formed a syndicate with the intention of defrauding the public, or it
failed to adduce documentary evidence substantiating its claims that the accused-appellants
committed Syndicated Estafa.33chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Aggrieved, accused-appellants separately appealed the foregoing RTC Decisions to the
CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR Nos. 33063, 33562, 336609, 336690, 33939, and 34398.
Thereafter, the CA issued a Resolution34 dated February 19, 2013 ordering the
consolidation of accused-appellants appeals.cralawred
The CA Ruling
In a Decision35 dated June 28, 2013, the CA modified accused-appellants conviction to that
of Syndicated Estafa, and accordingly, increased their respective penalties to life
imprisonment for each count.36 The CA also increased the amount of actual damages
awarded to private complainant Clarita P. Gacayan from P1,300,000.00 to P1,530,625.90,
apart from the award of US$12,000.00.37chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It held that TGICI and its subsidiaries were engaged in a Ponzi scheme which relied on
subsequent investors to pay its earlier investors and is what PD 1689 precisely aims to
punish. Inevitably, TGICI could no longer hoodwink new investors that led to its
collapse.38Thus, the CA concluded that as incorporators/directors of TGICI, accused-
appellants and their cohorts conspired in making TGICI a vehicle for the perpetuation of
fraud against the unsuspecting public.. As such, they cannot hide behind the corporate veil
172
and must be personally and criminally liable for their acts.39 The CA then concluded that
since the TGICI incorporators/directors comprised more than five (5) persons, accused-
appellants criminal liability should be upgraded to that of Syndicated Estafa, and their
respective penalties increased accordingly.40chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Undaunted, accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.cralawred
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not accused-appellants are
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Syndicated Estafa defined and penalized
under Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC in relation to PD 1689.cralawred
The Courts Ruling
The Court sustains the convictions of accused-appellants.
Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any means
mentioned herein below shall be punished by:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions; or by
means of other similar deceits.
xxxx
The elements of Estafa by means of deceit under this provision are the following: (a) that
there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such
false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property;
and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage.41chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In relation thereto, Section 1 of PD 1689 defines Syndicated Estafa as follows:
Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as
defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished
by life imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate
consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or
illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperatives, samahang nayon(s), or farmers associations, or funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
Thus, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa or other forms of swindling, as
defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC,, is committed; (b) the Estafa or swindling is
committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperative, samahang nayon(s), or farmers associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.42chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals TGICIs modus operandi of inducing
the public to invest in it on the undertaking that their investment would be returned with a
very high monthly interest rate ranging from three to five and a half percent (3%-
5.5%).43 Under such lucrative promise, the investing public are enticed to infuse funds into
TGICI. However, as the directors/incorporators of TGICI knew from the start that TGICI is
operating without any paid-up capital and has no clear trade by which it can pay the
assured profits to its investors,44 they cannot comply with their guarantee and had to simply
abscond with their investors money. Thus, the CA correctly held that accused-appellants,
along with the other accused who are still at large, used TGICI to engage in a Ponzi
scheme, resulting in the defraudation of the TGICI investors.
To be sure, a Ponzi scheme is a type of investment fraud that involves the payment of
purported returns to existing investors from funds contributed by new investors. Its
organizers often solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed
to generate high returns with little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the perpetrators
focus on attracting new money to make promised payments to earlier-stage investors to
create the false appearance that investors are profiting from a legitimate business. 45 It is
not an investment strategy but a gullibility scheme, which works only as long as there is an
ever increasing number of new investors joining the scheme.46 It is difficult to sustain the
scheme over a long period of time because the operator needs an ever larger pool of later
investors to continue paying the promised profits to early investors. The idea behind this
173
type of swindle is that the con-man collects his money from his second or third round of
investors and then absconds before anyone else shows up to collect. Necessarily, Ponzi
schemes only last weeks, or months at the most.47chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this light, it is clearthat all the elements of Syndicated Estafa, committed through a
Ponzi scheme,are present in this case, considering that: (a) the incorporators/directors of
TGICI comprising more than five (5) people, including herein accused-appellants,, made
false pretenses and representations to the investing public in this case,the private
complainants regarding a supposed lucrative investment opportunity with TGICI in order
to solicit money from them; (b) the said false pretenses and representations were made
prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c) relying on the same, private
complainants invested their hard earned money into TGICI; and (d) the
incorporators/directors of TGICI ended up running away with the private complainants
investments, obviously to the latters prejudice.
Corollary thereto, the CA correctly upgraded accused-appellants conviction from
simple Estafa to Syndicated Estafa. In a criminal case, an appeal throws the whole case
wide open for review. Issues whether raised or not by the parties may be resolved by the
appellate court.48 Hence, accused-appellants appeal conferred upon the appellate court full
jurisdiction and rendered it competent to examine the records, revise the judgment
appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.49
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 28, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR Nos. 33063, 33562, 33660, 33669, 33939, and 34398 is
hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, accused-appellants Palmy Tibayan and Rico Z. Puerto
are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of 13 and 11 counts, respectively, of
Syndicated Estafa and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment for each
count. Accused-appellants are further ordered to pay actual damages to each of the private
complainants in the following amounts: (a) P1,500,000.00 to Hector H. Alvarez; (b)
P119,405.23 and P800,000.00 to Milagros Alvarez; (c) P1,530,625.90 and US$12,000.00
to Clarita P. Gacayan; (d) P500,000.00 to Irma T. Ador; (e) P1,000,000.00 to Yolanda
Zimmer; (f) P556,376.00 to NonitoGarlan; (g) P250,000.00 to Emelyn Gomez; (h)
P118,000.00 to Judy C. Rillon; (i) P100,000.00 to Reynaldo A. Dacon; (j) P200,000.00 to
Leonida D. Jarina; (k) P250,000.00 to CristinaDela Pea; and (l) P100,000.00 to Rodney E.
Villareal.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183345, September 17, 2014
MA. GRACIA HAO AND DANNY HAO, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is the petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, filed by Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny Hao (petitioners). They seek the reversal of the
Court of Appeals (CA) decision2 dated February 28, 2006 and resolution3 dated June 13,
2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86289. These CA rulings affirmed the February 26, 20044 and
July 26, 20045orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, which respectively
denied the petitioners motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant of
arrest.6cralawlawlibrary
Factual Antecedents
On July 11, 2003 private complainant Manuel Dy y Awiten (Dy) filed a criminal complaint
against the petitioners and Victor Ngo (Ngo) for syndicated estafa penalized under Article
315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in relation with Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1689.7cralawlawlibrary
Dy alleged that he was a long-time client of Asiatrust Bank, Binondo Branch where Ngo
was the manager. Because of their good business relationship, Dy took Ngos advice to
deposit his money in an investment house that will give a higher rate of return. Ngo then
introduced him to Ma. Gracia Hao (Gracia), also known as Mina Tan Hao, who presented
herself as an officer of various reputable companies and an incorporator of State Resources
Development Corporation (State Resources), the recommended company that can give Dy
his higher investment return.8cralawlawlibrary
Relying on Ngo and Gracias assurances, Dy initially invested in State Resources the
approximate amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). This initial investment earned
the promised interests, leading Dy, at the urging of Gracia, to increase his investment to
almost One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00). Dy increased his investments
through several checks he issued in the name of State Resources. 9 In return, Gracia also
issued several checks to Dy representing his earnings for his investment. Gracia issued
checks in the total amount of One Hundred Fourteen Million, Two Hundred Eighty Six
Thousand, Eighty Six Pesos and Fourteen Centavos (P114,286,086.14). All these
checks10 were subsequently dishonored when Dy deposited them.
Dy sought the assistance of Ngo for the recovery of the amount of the dishonored checks.
Ngo promised assistance, but after a few months, Dy found out that Ngo already resigned
from Asiatrust Bank and could no longer be located. Hence, he confronted Gracia
regarding the dishonored checks. He eventually learned that Gracia invested his money in
the construction and realty business of Gracias husband, Danny Hao (Danny). Despite
their promises to pay, the petitioners never returned Dys money.
On July 17, 2003, Dy filed a supplemental affidavit to include in the criminal complaint
174
Chester De Joya, Allan Roxas, Samantha Roxas, Geraldine Chiong, and Lyn Ansuas all
incorporators and/or directors of State Resources.11cralawlawlibrary
On the basis of Dys complaint12 and supplemental affidavit,13 the public prosecutor filed an
information14 for syndicated estafa against the petitioners and their six co-accused. The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-219952 and was raffled to respondent RTC of
Manila, Branch 40.
Judge Placido Marquez issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners and the other
accused. Consequently, petitioners immediately filed a motion to defer arraignment and
motion to lift warrant of arrest. In their twin motions, they invoked the absence of probable
cause against them and the pendency of their petition for review with the Department of
Justice (DOJ).15cralawlawlibrary
In its February 26, 2004 order, the trial court denied the petitioners twin motions.16 The
petitioners moved for reconsideration but the trial court also denied this in its July 26, 2004
order.
Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with the CA.
The CAs Ruling
The CA affirmed the denial of the petitioners motion to defer arraignment and motion to
lift warrant of arrest.
In determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, a judge is mandated
to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. 17 The
CA noted that Judge Marquez only issued the warrants of arrest after his personal
examination of the facts and circumstances of the case. Since the judge complied with the
Rules, the CA concluded that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to
him.18cralawlawlibrary
In its decision, however, the CA opined that the evidence on record and the assertions in
Dys affidavits only show probable cause for the crime of simple estafa, not
syndicated estafa. Under PD No. 1689, in order for syndicated estafa to exist, the
swindling must have been committed by five or more persons, and the fraud must be
against the general public or at least a group of persons. In his complaint-affidavit, Dy
merely stated that he relied on the petitioners false representations and was defrauded into
parting with his money, causing him damage.19 Since there was no evidence that State
Resources was formed to defraud the public in general or that it was used to solicit money
from other persons aside from Dy, then the offense charged should only be for
simple estafa.20cralawlawlibrary
Nevertheless, the CA found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the warrants of arrest against the petitioners as there was still probable cause to
believe that the petitioners committed the crime of simple estafa.21cralawlawlibrary
The Petition
The petitioners submit that an examination of Dys affidavits shows inconsistencies in his
cited factual circumstances. These inconsistencies, according to the petitioners, negate the
existence of probable cause against them for the crime charged.
The petitioners also contend that it was only Ngo who enticed Dy to invest his money. As
early as August 1995, State Resources had already been dissolved, thus negating the
assertion that Dy advanced funds for this corporation.22 They question the fact that it took
Dy almost five years to file his complaint despite his allegation that he lost almost
P100,000,000.00.23cralawlawlibrary
Lastly, the petitioners claim that the warrants of arrest issued against them were null and
void. Contrary to the trial courts findings, the CA noted in the body of its decision, that PD
1689 was inapplicable to their case. There was no evidence to show that State Resources
was formed to solicit funds not only from Dy but also from the general public. Since
simple estafa and syndicated estafa are two distinct offenses, then the warrants of arrest
issued to petitioners were erroneous because these warrants pertained to two different
crimes.24cralawlawlibrary
The Courts Ruling
We resolve to DENY the petition.
Procedural Consideration
We note that the present petition questions the CAs decision and resolution on the petition
for certiorari the petitioners filed with that court. At the CA, the petitioners imputed grave
abuse of discretion against the trial court for the denial of their twin motions to defer
arraignment and to lift warrant of arrest.
This situation is similar to the procedural issue we addressed in the case of Montoya v.
Transmed Manila Corporation25 where we faced the question of how to review a Rule 45
petition before us, a CA decision made under Rule 65. We clarified in this cited case the
kind of review that this Court should undertake given the distinctions between the two
remedies. In Rule 45, we consider the correctness of the decision made by an inferior court.
In contrast, a Rule 65 review focuses on jurisdictional errors.
175
As in Montoya, we need to scrutinize the CA decision in the same context that the petition
for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it. Thus, we need to examine the CA decision
from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and not on the basis of whether the
trial courts denial of petitioners motions was strictly legally correct. In question form,
the question to ask is: did the CA correctly determine whether the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motions to defer arraignment and lift
warrant of arrest?
Probable Cause for the Issuance
of a Warrant of Arrest
Under the Constitution26 and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,27 a judge is
mandated to personally determine the existence of probable cause after his personal
evaluation of the prosecutors resolution and the supporting evidence for the crime
charged. These provisions command the judge to refrain from making a mindless
acquiescence to the prosecutors findings and to conduct his own examination of the facts
and circumstances presented by both parties.
Section 5(a) of Rule 112, grants the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal
complaint or information. He may: a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
failed to establish probable cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; or
c) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case
of doubt on the existence of probable cause.28cralawlawlibrary
In the present case, the trial court chose to issue warrants of arrest to the petitioners and
their co-accused. To be valid, these warrants must have been issued after compliance with
the requirement that probable cause be personally determined by the judge. Notably at this
stage, the judge is tasked to merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt
of the accused. In doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing; he only needs to
personally review the prosecutor's initial determination and see if it is supported by
substantial evidence.29cralawlawlibrary
The records showed that Judge Marquez made a personal determination of the existence of
probable cause to support the issuance of the warrants. The petitioners, in fact, did not
present any evidence to controvert this. As the trial court ruled in its February 26, 2004
order:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The non-arrest of all the accused or their refusal to surrender practically resulted in the
suspension of arraignment exceeding the sixty (60) days counted from the filing of co-
accused De Joyas motions, which may be considered a petition for review, and that of co-
accused Spouses Haos own petition for review. This is not to mention the delay in the
resolution by the Department of Justice. On the other hand, co-accused De Joyas
motion to determine probable cause and co-accused Spouses Haos motion to lift
warrant of arrest have been rendered moot and academic with the issuance of
warrants of arrest by this presiding judge after his personal examination of the facts
and circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the belief that they are
guilty of the crime that in fact happened.30 [Emphasis ours]
Under this situation, we conclude that Judge Marquez did not arbitrarily issue the warrants
of arrest against the petitioners. As stated by him, the warrants were only issued after his
personal evaluation of the factual circumstances that led him to believe that there was
probable cause to apprehend the petitioners for their commission of a criminal offense.
Distinction between Executive and
Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause
In a criminal prosecution, probable cause is determined at two stages. The first is at the
executive level, where determination is made by the prosecutor during the preliminary
investigation, before the filing of the criminal information. The second is at the judicial
level, undertaken by the judge before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In the case at hand, the question before us relates to the judicial determination of probable
cause. In order to properly resolve if the CA erred in affirming the trial courts issuance of
the warrants of arrest against the petitioners, it is necessary to scrutinize the crime
of estafa, whether committed as a simple offense or through a syndicate.
The crime of swindling or estafa is covered by Articles 315-316 of the RPC. In these
provisions, the different modes by which estafa may be committed, as well as the
corresponding penalties for each are outlined. One of these modes is estafa by means of
deceit. Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC defines how this particular crime is
perpetrated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of
other similar deceits.
Under this provision, estafa has the following elements: 1) the existence of a false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; 2) the execution of the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; 3) the
reliance by the offended party on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means,
176
which induced him to part with his money or property; and 4) as a result, the offended
party suffered damage.31cralawlawlibrary
As Dy alleged in his complaint-affidavit, Ngo and Gracia induced him to invest with State
Resources and promised him a higher rate of return.32 Because of his good business
relationship with Ngo and relying on Gracias attractive financial representations, Dy
initially invested the approximate amount of P10,000,000.00.
This first investment earned profits. Thus, Dy was enticed by Gracia to invest more so that
he eventually advanced almost P100,000,000.0033 with State Resources. Gracias
succeeding checks representing the earnings of his investments, however, were all
dishonored upon deposit.34 He subsequently learned that the petitioners used his money for
Dannys construction and realty business.35 Despite repeated demands and the petitioners
constant assurances to pay, they never returned Dys invested money and its supposed
earnings.36cralawlawlibrary
These cited factual circumstances show the elements of estafa by means of deceit. The
petitioners induced Dy to invest in State Resources promising higher returns. But unknown
to Dy, what occurred was merely a ruse to secure his money to be used in Dannys
construction and realty business. The petitioners deceit became more blatant when they
admitted in their petition that as early as August 1995, State Resources had already been
dissolved.37 This admission strengthens the conclusion that the petitioners misrepresented
facts regarding themselves and State Resources in order to persuade Dy to part with his
money for investment with an inexistent corporation.
These circumstances all serve as indicators of the petitioners deceit. Deceit is the false
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives or
is intended to deceive another, so that he shall act upon it to his legal
injury.38cralawlawlibrary
Thus, had it not been for the petitioners false representations and promises, Dy would not
have placed his money in State Resources, to his damage. These allegations cannot but lead
us to the conclusion that probable cause existed as basis to arrest the petitioners for the
crime of estafa by means of deceit.
We now address the issue of whether estafa in this case was committed through a
syndicate.
Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689,39 there is syndicated estafa if the following elements are
present: 1) estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the
RPC was committed; 2) the estafa or swindling was committed by a syndicate of five or
more persons; and 3) the fraud resulted in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, samahang nayon[s], or farmers
associations or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general
public.40cralawlawlibrary
The factual circumstances of the present case show that the first and second elements of
syndicated estafa are present; there is probable cause for violation of Article 315(2)(a) of
the RPC against the petitioners. Moreover, in Dys supplemental complaint-affidavit, he
alleged that the fraud perpetrated against him was committed, not only by Ngo and the
petitioners, but also by the other officers and directors of State Resources. The number of
the accused who allegedly participated in defrauding Dy exceeded five, thus satisfying the
requirement for the existence of a syndicate.
However, the third element of the crime is patently lacking. The funds fraudulently
solicited by the corporation must come from the general public. In the present case, no
evidence was presented to show that aside from Dy, the petitioners, through State
Resources, also sought investments from other people. Dy had no co-complainants alleging
that they were also deceived to entrust their money to State Resources. The general public
element was not complied with. Thus, no syndicated estafa allegedly took place, only
simple estafa by means of deceit.
Despite this conclusion, we still hold that the CA did not err in affirming the trial courts
denial of the petitioners motion to lift warrant of arrest.
A warrant of arrest should be issued if the judge after personal evaluation of the facts and
circumstances is convinced that probable cause exists that an offense was committed.
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an
offense was committed by the person sought to be arrested.41 This must be distinguished
from the prosecutors finding of probable cause which is for the filing of the proper
criminal information. Probable cause for warrant of arrest is determined to address the
necessity of placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice.42cralawlawlibrary
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,43 we explained the distinction between the two kinds of
probable cause determination:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The
executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It
is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad
discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he
believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for
trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether
177
or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been
correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court
itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the
judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the
accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is
necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest
warrant.44 [Emphasis ours]
With our conclusion that probable cause existed for the crime of simple estafa and that the
petitioners have probably committed it, it follows that the issuance of the warrants of arrest
against the petitioners remains to be valid and proper. To allow them to go scot-free would
defeat rather than promote the purpose of a warrant of arrest, which is to put the accused in
the courts custody to avoid his flight from the clutches of justice.
Moreover, we note that simple estafa and syndicated estafa are not two entirely different
crimes. Simple estafa is a crime necessarily included in syndicated estafa. An offense is
necessarily included in another offense when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.45cralawlawlibrary
Under this legal situation, only a formal amendment of the filed information under Section
14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court46 is necessary; the warrants of arrest issued against the
petitioners should not be nullified since probable cause exists for simple estafa.
with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of the 60-day
period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment.48cralawlawlibrary
As the trial court found in its February 26, 2004 order, the DOJs delay in resolving the
petitioners petition for review had already exceeded 60 days. Since the suspension of the
petitioners arraignment was already beyond the period allowed by the Rules, the
petitioners motion to suspend completely lacks any legal basis.
As a final note, we observe that the resolution of this case had long been delayed because
of the petitioners refusal to submit to the trial courts jurisdiction and their erroneous
invocation of the Rules in their favor. As there is probable cause for the petitioners
commission of a crime, their arrest and arraignment should now ensue so that this case may
properly proceed to trial, where the merits of both the parties evidence and allegations may
be weighed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition and AFFIRM
WITH MODIFICATION the February 28, 2006 decision and June 13, 2008 resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86289. We hereby order that petitioners Ma.
Gracia Hao and Danny Hao be charged for simple estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended and be arraigned for this charge. The warrants of arrest
issued stand.
SO ORDERED.cralawred

Suspension of Arraignment

Under Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, an arraignment may be suspended if
there is a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor pending at either the DOJ,
or the Office of the President. However, such period of suspension should not exceed sixty
(60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.

As the petitioners alleged, they filed a petition for review with the DOJ on November 21,
2003. Since this petition had not been resolved yet, they claimed that their arraignment
should be suspended indefinitely.

We emphasize that the right of an accused to have his arraignment suspended is not an
unqualified right. In Spouses Trinidad v. Ang,47 we explained that while the pendency of a
petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the Rules limit the
deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition
178
 Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 18 August 2009 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), which affirmed the Decision2 dated 06 January 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 37, Manila. The RTC had convicted accused Jaime Ong y Ong (Ong)
of the crime of violation of Presidential Decree No. (P.O.) 1612, otherwise known as. the
Anti-Fencing Law.

Ong was charged in an Information3 dated 25 May 1995 as

follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

That on or about February 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines. the said accused,
with intent of gain for himself or for another. did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously receive and acquire from unknown person involving thirteen (13) truck tires
worth P65, 975.00, belonging to FRANCISCO AZAJAR Y LEE, and thereafter selling One
(1) truck tire knowing the same to have been derived from the crime of robbery.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, Ong entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued, and the
RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612. The dispositive
portion of its Decision reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that the prosecution has established
the guilt of the accused JAIME ONG y ONG beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1612 also known as Anti-Fencing Law and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 10 years and 1 day to 16 years with accessory
penalty of temporary disqualification.

SO ORDERED.4chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Dissatisfied with the judgment, Ong appealed to the CA. After a review of the records, the
RTC's finding of guilt was affirmed by the appellate court in a Decision dated 18 August
2009.

Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.

G.R. NO. 190475 : April 10, 2013
JAIME ONG y ONG, Petitioner, v.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
The Facts
The version of the prosecution, which was supported by the CA, is as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SERENO, C.J.: Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires, described as
T494 1100 by 20 by 14. He acquired the same for the total amount of P223,401.81 from

179
Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in the
manufacturing and marketing of Firestone tires. Private complainant's acquisition was
evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated November 10, 1994 and an Inventory List
acknowledging receipt of the tires specifically described by their serial numbers. Private
complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them inside the
warehouse in 720 San Jose St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Barangay San Antonio Valley 1,
Sucat, Paraaque, owned by his relative Teody Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker of the
warehouse, was in charge of the tires. After appellant sold six (6) tires sometime in January
1995, thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside the warehouse.
On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal that all
thirty-eight (38) truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly
opened. Private complainant, together with caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery to the
Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.
Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous business
establishments in an attempt to locate the stolen tires. On February 24, 1995, private
complainant chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned
and operated by appellant. Private complainant inquired if appellant was selling any Model
T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone tires, to which the latter replied in the affirmative.
Appellant brought out a tire fitting the description, which private complainant recognized
as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the serial
number thereon. Private complainant asked appellant if he had any more of such tires in
stock, which was again answered in the affirmative. Private complainant then left the store
and reported the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the Southern Police
District.
On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a buy-bust
operation on appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team was composed of six (6) members,
led by SPO3 Oscar Guerrero and supervised by Senior Inspector Noel Tan. Private
complainant's companion Tito Atienza was appointed as the poseur-buyer.
On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team, in coordination with the
Western Police District, proceeded to appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team arrived
thereat at around 3:00 in the afternoon. Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store
while the rest of the team posted themselves across the street. Atienza asked appellant if he
had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14 Firestone truck tires available. The latter immediately
produced one tire from his display, which Atienza bought for P5,000.00. Atienza asked
appellant if he had any more in stock.
Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his
warehouse, which was located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck tires were
brought in, private complainant entered the store, inspected them and found that they were
the same tires which were stolen from him, based on their serial numbers. Private
complainant then gave the prearranged signal to the buy-bust team confirming that the tires
in appellant's shop were the same tires stolen from the warehouse.
After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust team went
inside appellant's store. However, appellant insisted that his arrest and the confiscation of
the stolen truck tires be witnessed by representatives from the barangay and his own
lawyer. Resultantly, it was already past 10:00 in the evening when appellant, together with
the tires, was brought to the police station for investigation and inventory. Overall, the buy-
bust team was able to confiscate thirteen (13) tires, including the one initially bought by
poseur-buyer Tito Atienza. The tires were confirmed by private complainant as stolen from
his warehouse.5chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had been engaged
in the business of buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24) years and denying that he
had any knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing. He further averred
that on 18 February 1995, a certain Ramon Go (Go) offered to sell thirteen (13) Firestone
truck tires allegedly from Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City, for P3,500 each. Ong bought all
the tires for P45,500, for which he was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18 February 1995 and
with the letterhead Gold Link Hardware & General Merchandise (Gold
Link).6chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12) others in his
bodega. The poseur-buyer bought the displayed tire in his store and came back to ask for
more tires. Ten minutes later, policemen went inside the store, confiscated the tires,
arrested Ong and told him that those items were stolen tires.7chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13) tires
found in the possession of Ong constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. Having failed
to overcome the presumption by mere denials, he was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of P.D. 1612.8chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's findings with modification by reducing the
minimum penalty from ten (10) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision
correcional.9chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
OUR RULING
The Petition has no merit.
Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to
gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
180
dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or
anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or
theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the
commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item,
object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for
another.10chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite quantum of
evidence in proving that all the elements of fencing are present in this case.
First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar), whose
testimony was corroborated by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the warehouse where the
thirty-eight (38) tires were stolen testified that the crime of robbery had been committed on
17 February 1995. Azajar was able to prove ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice
No. 456511 dated 10 November 1994 and an Inventory List.12 Witnesses for the prosecution
likewise testified that robbery was reported as evidenced by their Sinumpaang
Salaysay13 taken at the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.14 The report led to the
conduct of a buy-bust operation at Jong Markerting, Paco, Manila on 27 February 1995.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he
never denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The
facts do not establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of
robbery, but thirteen (13) out of thirty-eight (38) missing tires were found in his possession.
This Court finds that the serial numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in Ong's
possession.15 Ong likewise admitted that he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in
the total amount of 45,500 where he was issued Sales Invoice No.
980.16chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The
words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence
would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct
upon assumption that such fact exists.17 Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of
tires for the past twenty-four (24) years,18 ought to have known the ordinary course of
business in purchasing from an unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong and
offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask for proof of ownership of the
tires.19 The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until the delivery of tires happened
in just one day.20 His experience from the business should have given him doubt as to the
legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was his first time to transact with Go
and the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the streets.
In Dela Torre v. COMELEC,21 this Court had enunciated that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the
object of the sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such
circumstances include the time and place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord
with the usual practices of commerce. The nature and condition of the goods sold, and the
fact that the seller is not regularly engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise
suggest the illegality of their source, and therefore should caution the buyer. This justifies
the presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that "mere possession of any goods, . .
., object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be
prima facie evidence of fencing" a presumption that is, according to the Court, "reasonable
for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of . . .
possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
xxx.22chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires. Section 6 of
P.D. 1612 requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of any
good, article, item, object or anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or
supplier thereof to secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of
the Integrated National Police in the town or city where that store, establishment or entity
is located before offering the item for sale to the public. In fact, Ong has practiced the
procedure of obtaining clearances from the police station for some used tires he wanted to
resell but, in this particular transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman
who should have exercised prudence.
In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go. Logically, and
for all practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate
transaction and may be raised as a defense in the charge of fencing; however, that defense
is disputable.23 In this case, the validity of the issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the
prosecution was able to prove that Gold Link and its address were fictitious.24 Ong failed to
overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of the
transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the prima facie presumption under Section 5 of
P.D. 1612.
Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust
operation, Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing.
181
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima fqcie presumption of fencing
from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of
value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based
on the value of the 25 property.
The RTC and the CA correctly computed the imposable penalty based on P5,075 for each
tire recovered, or in the total amount of P65,975. Records show that Azajar had purchased
forty-four (44) tires from Philtread in the total amount of P223,40 1.81.26 Section 3 (p) of
Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court provides a disputable presumption that private
transactions have been fair and regular. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the ordinary
course of business is not overturned in the absence of the evidence challenging the
regularity of the transaction between Azajar ,and Phil tread.
In tine, after a careful perusal of the records and the evidence adduced by the parties, we do
not find sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the CA affirming the trial court's conviction
of Ong for violation of P.D. 1612 and modifying the minimum penalty imposed by
reducing it to six ( 6) years of prision correccional.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30213 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 181184 : January 25, 2012]
MEL DIMAT, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the need to prove in the crime of "fencing" that the accused knew or
ought to have known that the thing he bought or sold was the fruit of theft or
robbery.cralaw
The Facts and the Case
The government charged the accused Mel Dimat with violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law1 before the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 03, in Criminal Case 02-
202338.
Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo Ramirez and
Ruben Familara, testified in substance that in December 2000 Delgado's wife, Sonia,
bought from accused Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari bearing plate number WAH-569 for
P850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the vehicle's engine number as TD42-126134 and its
chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553.
On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group
(TMG) spotted the Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a
suspicious plate number. After stopping and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered that its
engine number was actually TD42-119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-YO3111.
They also found the particular Nissan Safari on their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it
to their Camp Crame office and there further learned that it had been stolen from its
registered owner, Jose Mantequilla.
Mantequilla affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari that carried plate number JHM-
818, which he mortgaged to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. The vehicle was
carnapped on May 25, 1998 at Robinsons Galleria's parking area. He reported the
carnapping to the TMG.
For his part, Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan
Safari in good faith and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that
gave its engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553.
Dimat later sold the vehicle to Delgado. He also claimed that, although the Nissan Safari
he sold to Delgado and the one which the police officers took into custody had the same
plate number, they were not actually the same vehicle.
On July 20, 2005 the RTC found Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law and
sentenced him to an imprisonment of 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day of prision mayor to 20
years of reclusion temporal. The court also ordered him to pay P850,000.00 as actual
damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, as well as the costs of suit.
On October 26, 2007 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in CA-G.R. CR 297942 the RTC
decision but modified the penalty to imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in
its medium period, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal in
its maximum period, as maximum, thus, the present appeal.
The Issue Presented
182

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that accused
Dimat knowingly sold to Sonia Delgado for gain the Nissan Safari that was earlier
carnapped from Mantequilla.
The Ruling of the Court
The elements of "fencing" are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused,
who took no part in the robbery or theft, "buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object
taken" during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the
thing derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself
or for another.3
and official receipt. But this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been
carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good
on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan
Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who
apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase. That she might
herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did not stand accused in the
case.cralaw
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October
26, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR 29794.
SO ORDERED.

Here, someone carnapped Mantequilla's Nissan Safari on May 25, 1998. Two years later in
December 2000, Dimat sold it to Delgado for P850,000.00. Dimat's defense is that the
Nissan Safari he bought from Tolentino and later sold to Delgado had engine number
TD42-126134 and chassis number CRGY60-YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of sale
covering those transactions. The Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla, on the other hand,
had engine number TD42-119136 and chassis number CRGY60-YO3111.

But Dimat's defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when
stopped on the road and inspected by the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis
numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale
did not reflect the correct numbers of the vehicle's engine and chassis.

Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But Presidential Decree
1612 is a special law and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum,
requiring no proof of criminal intent.4 Of course, the prosecution must still prove that
Dimat knew or should have known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to
Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out of
his acts.

Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter gave the
Nissan Safari to him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him the old
certificate of registration and official receipt of the vehicle and even promised to give him a
new certificate of registration and official receipt already in his name. But Tolentino
reneged on this promise. Dimat insists that Tolentino's failure to deliver the documents
should not prejudice him in any way. Delgado himself could not produce any certificate of
registration or official receipt.

Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not
properly documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration
183

[G.R. No. 187044 : September 14, 2011]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RENATO LAGAT
Y GAWAN A.K.A. RENAT GAWAN AND JAMES PALALAY Y VILLAROSA,
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This appeal was filed by accused-appellants Renato Lagat y Gawan (Lagat), also known as
Renat Gawan, and James Palalay y Villarosa (Palalay) to challenge the Court of
Appeals' October 8, 2008 Decision1 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02869, for affirming with
modification the March 19, 2007 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
21, Santiago City, wherein they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified
Carnapping in Criminal Case No. 21-4949.
Accused-appellants Lagat and Palalay were charged with the crime of Carnapping as
defined under Section 2 and penalized under Section 143 of Republic Act No. 6539. The
accusatory portion of the Information,4 reads:
That on or about the 12th day of April 2005, at Santiago City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, conniving with
each other, and mutually helping one another and with intent to gain and without the
consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away one (1) unit YASUKI tricycle bearing Engine No. 161FMJ41535420
and Motor No. LX8PCK0034D002243 then driven and owned by JOSE BIAG, valued at
P70,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof.
That in the course of the commission of carnapping, or on occasion thereof, the above-
named accused, conspiring, conniving confederating and helping each other, and with
intent to kill, did then and there assault, attack and wound the said JOSE BIAG with sharp
and pointed instrument directing blows against the vital parts of the body of the latter
thereby inflicting upon him multiple stab and hacking wounds which directly caused the
death of the said JOSE BIAG.
Lagat pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on June 16, 2005.5 Palalay, on the other hand,
did not enter any plea; hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the RTC for him.6
On August 1, 2005, both accused proposed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. 7 In their
plea-bargaining proposal,8 they asked that they be allowed to plead guilty to the crime of
Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and that the mitigating
circumstances of plea of guilty and/or no intention to commit so grave a wrong be
considered in their favor. They also asked that damages be fixed at P120,000.00. This
proposal was rejected9 by the prosecution; thus, the pre-trial conference proceeded. The
pre-trial Order contained the following facts as admitted by the parties:
1. That the cadaver of Jose Biag was recovered along Angadanan and Sn. Guillermo road
by members of the police together with Barangay Captain Heherson Dulay and Chief
Tanod Rumbaoa, Sr.
2. That the two accused were arrested in possession of palay allegedly stolen in Alicia,
Isabela.
3. That the cause of death of Jose Biag was multiple stab and hack wounds as described in
the Autopsy Report and death certificate which shall be submitted during trial. 10
184

After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution first presented Florida Biag (Florida), the wife of the victim Jose Biag
(Biag), to testify on the circumstances leading to Biag's disappearance and the discovery of
his body, the recovery of Biag's tricycle, and the expenses she incurred and the income she
had lost as a result of her husband's death. Florida testified that her husband was a farmer,
a barangay tanod, and a tricycle driver.11 On April 12, 2005, at around two o'clock in the
morning, her husband left to operate his tricycle for public use. It was around 11:00 a.m.
of April 13, 2005, when news reached her that their tricycle was with the Philippine
National Police (PNP) of the Municipality of Alicia and that her husband had figured in an
accident. After learning of the incident, Florida sought the help of their Barangay (Brgy.)
Captain, Heherson Dulay, who immediately left for Angadanan without her. At around
2:00 p.m., Brgy. Captain Dulay informed12 Florida of what had happened to her husband.13
Florida then presented in court the receipts14 evidencing the expenses she had incurred for
her husband's wake and funeral and for the repair of their tricycle, which was recovered
with missing parts. She also testified as to the income Biag was earning as a farmer,
a tanod, and a tricycle driver, and claimed that his death had caused her sleepless nights.15
The second witness for the prosecution was the Chief Tanod of Barangay Rizal, Poe
Rumbaoa, Sr. (Rumbaoa). He testified that on April 13, 2005, after he and Brgy. Captain
Dulay received Florida's report, they immediately went to the Alicia Police Station,
wherein they found Biag's tricycle. The PNP of Alicia showed them the identification card
recovered in the tricycle and told them that the tricycle was used in stealing palay from a
store in Angadanan, Isabela that belonged to a certain Jimmy Esteban (Esteban). Rumbaoa
and Brgy. Captain Dulay were also told that the owner of the tricycle was killed and
dumped along the Angadanan and San Guillermo Road. They were thereafter shown the
two suspects and the place where Biag's body was dumped. Rumbaoa said that he was able
to identify the body as Biag's, which was almost unrecognizable because it was bloated all
over, only because Biag had a mark on his right shoulder, which Rumbaoa knew of.16
Police Officer 2 (PO2) Arthur Salvador, a member of the PNP in Alicia, took the witness
stand next. He testified that on April 13, 2005, he was on duty along with other colleagues
at the Alicia PNP Station, when they received a report from Esteban that
the cavans of palay stolen from him were seen at Alice Palay Buying Station in Alicia,
Isabela, in a tricycle commandeered by two unidentified male persons. PO2 Salvador said
that upon receipt of this report, their Chief of Police composed a team, which included him,
PO2 Bernard Ignacio, and PO2 Nathan Abuan, to verify the veracity of the report. At Alice
Palay Buying Station, they saw the tricycle described to them by their chief, with
the cavans of palay, and the two accused, Lagat and Palalay. PO2 Salvador averred that he
and his team were about to approach the tricycle when the two accused "scampered"17 to
different directions. After "collaring" the two accused, they brought them to the Alicia
PNP Station together with the tricycle and its contents. PO2 Salvador asseverated that
when they reached the station, they asked the two accused if they had any papers to show
for both the tricycle and the palay, to which the two accused did not answer. They
allegedly kept silent even after they were informed of their rights not only to remain as
such, but also to have counsel, either of their own choosing, or to be assigned to them if
they cannot afford one. PO2 Salvador then continued that when they unloaded the tricycle,
they discovered bloodstains inside and outside the sidecar. He also personally found a
wallet containing the tricycle's Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt 18 issued by
the Land Transportation Office in the name of Jose Biag. When they asked the two
accused about their discoveries, Lagat and Palalay voluntarily answered that the name in
the papers is that of the owner of the tricycle, whom they killed and dumped along
Angadanan and San Guillermo Road, when they carnapped his tricyle. PO2 Salvador
alleged that upon hearing this revelation, they again informed Lagat and Palalay that
anything they say would be used against them, and that they had a right to counsel.
Thereafter, they coordinated with the PNP of Angadanan Police Station, and together with
the two accused, they proceeded to Angadanan-San Guillermo Road, where they found
Biag's body in a ravine just after the bridge near the road.19
The prosecution's last witness, PO2 Ignacio corroborated PO2 Salvador's testimony on the
events that led them to the tricycle, the palay, the two accused, and the body of Biag. He
also confirmed PO2 Salvador's claim that they had informed the two accused of their rights
but the latter just ignored them; hence, they continued with their investigation.20 PO2
Ignacio added that the two accused also told them how they killed Biag, to wit:
A- They rented a tricycle from Santiago to Alicia but they proceeded to Angadanan. And
upon arrival at the site, they poked a knife to the driver and the driver ran away. They
chased him and stabbed him, sir.21
Upon cross-examination, PO2 Ignacio averred that they were not able to recover the
murder weapon despite diligent efforts to look for it and that they had questioned the
people at Alice Palay Buying Station and were told that the two accused had no other
companion. PO2 Ignacio also admitted that while they informed Lagat and Palalay of their
constitutional rights, the two were never assisted by counsel at any time during the
custodial investigation.22
The prosecution also submitted the Post-Mortem Autopsy Report23 on Biag of Dr. Edgar
Romanchito P. Bayang, the Assistant City Health and Medico-Legal Officer of Santiago
City. The Report showed that Biag was likely killed between 12:00 noon and 2:00 p.m. of
April 12, 2004, and that he had sustained three stab wounds, an incise wound, two hack
wounds and an "avulsion of the skin extending towards the abdomen."24
After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to
Evidence25 without leave of court26 on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove their
185
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Lagat and Palalay averred that their constitutional rights on
custodial investigation were grossly violated as they were interrogated for hours without
counsel, relatives, or any disinterested third person to assist them. Moreover, the
admissions they allegedly made were not supported by documentary evidence. Palalay
further claimed that Rumbaoa's testimony showed that he had a "swelling above his right
eye" and "a knife wound in his left arm," which suggests that he was maltreated while
under police custody.27
The accused also claimed that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution
was not sufficient to convict them. They averred that aside from the alleged admissions
they had made, the prosecution had nothing else: they had no object evidence for the
bloodstains allegedly found in the tricycle; the murder weapon was never found; and no
eyewitness aside from the police officers was presented to show that they were in
possession of the tricycle at the time they were arrested. Lagat and Palalay argued that the
prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of events that showed their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, thus, they were entitled to enjoy the constitutional presumption of
innocence absent proof that they were guilty beyond reasonable doubt.28
As the accused filed their Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court, they in effect
waived their right to present evidence, and submitted the case for judgment on the basis of
the evidence for the prosecution.29
On March 19, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE in the light of the foregoing considerations the Court finds the accused
Renato Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y Villarosa GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
qualified carnapping and hereby sentences each of them to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. They are also ORDERED TO PAY Florida Biag the sum of Twelve thousand
three hundred pesos (P12,300.00) as actual damages plus Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) for death indemnity and another Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) for moral
damages.30
After evaluating the evidence the prosecution presented, the RTC agreed with the accused
that their rights were violated during their custodial investigation as they had no counsel to
assist them. Thus, whatever admissions they had made, whether voluntarily or not, could
not be used against them and were inadmissible in evidence.31
However, the RTC held that despite the absence of an eyewitness, the prosecution was able
to establish enough circumstantial evidence to prove that Lagat and Palalay committed the
crime, to wit:
1. The accused were caught by the Alicia PNP in possession of Biag's tricycle,
loaded with stolen palay;
2. The accused ran immediately when they saw the Alicia PNP approaching them;
3. The Alicia PNP found bloodstains on the tricycle and Biag's wallet with
documents to prove that Biag owned the tricycle;
4. The Alicia PNP contacted the PNP of Santiago City to inquire about a Jose Biag,
and this was how the barangay officials of Santiago City and Florida found out that
Biag's tricycle was with the Alicia PNP;
5. Biag left early morning on April 12, 2005 and never returned home;
6. The accused themselves led the Alicia PNP and Barangay Captain Dulay and
Rumbaoa to where they dumped Biag's body.32
The RTC convicted Lagat and Palalay of the crime of carnapping, qualified by the killing
of Biag, which, according to the RTC, appeared to have been done in the course of the
carnapping.33
Lagat and Palalay asked the RTC to reconsider its Decision on the grounds that it erred in
giving full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses and in relying on the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution.34
On May 29, 2007, the RTC denied35 this motion, holding that the testimonies of the
witnesses were credible and supported by the attending facts and circumstances, and that
there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict the accused.
Lagat and Palalay went36 to the Court of Appeals, asserting that their guilt was not
established beyond reasonable doubt.37 They averred that circumstantial evidence, to be
sufficient for a judgment of conviction, "must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent
with innocence,"38 which was allegedly not the case in their situation. They elaborated on
why the circumstantial evidence the RTC enumerated could not be taken against them:
1. The accused's possession of the tricycle cannot prove that they killed its owner;
186
2. Their act of fleeing may be due to the stolen palay (which is not the subject of this 3. The Alicia PNP, upon inspection of the tricycle, found traces of blood inside it,
case), and not the tricycle; together with the original receipt and certificate of registration of the vehicle in the
name of Jose Biag;
3. No evidence was given that would link the bloodstains found in the tricycle to
Biag himself. They could have easily been Palalay's, who was shown to have a knife 4. Palalay had a stab wound on his left arm when the Alicia PNP presented him and
wound; and Lagat to Brgy. Capt. Dulay and prosecution witness Rumbaoa;

4. The accused's act of pointing to the police and the barangay officials the ravine 5. Biag bore five (5) hack wounds on his body when the Alicia PNP recovered his
where Biag's body was dumped was part of their interrogation without counsel, which corpse in a ravine; and
the RTC itself declared as inadmissible in evidence.39
6. Lagat and Palalay failed to account for their possession of the bloodstained
tricycle immediately after their arrest.41
On October 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision with the following
dispositive portion:
The accused are now before us with the same lone assignment of error they posited before
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 19, 2007 of the RTC, Branch 21, Santiago City,
the Court of Appeals, to wit:
in Criminal Case No. 21-4949, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-
appellants Renato Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y Villarosa are ordered to pay to
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
private complainant the increased amount of P14,900.00 as actual damages. 40
GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION
TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.42
In affirming the conviction of the accused, the Court of Appeals held that the elements of
carnapping were all present in this case. The Court of Appeals pointed out that Lagat and
Ruling of the Court
Palalay were in possession of the missing tricycle when they were apprehended by the
Alicia PNP. Moreover, they failed to offer any explanation as to how they came to be in
Lagat and Palalay have been charged and convicted of the crime of qualified carnapping
possession of the tricycle. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the RTC that whatever
under Republic Act. No. 653943 or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. Section 2 of the Act
confession or admission the Alicia PNP extracted out of the accused could not be used in
defines "carnapping" and "motor vehicle" as follows:
evidence for having been done without the assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals
nonetheless affirmed the RTC's judgment as it was "convinced" that the following
"Carnapping" is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another
circumstantial evidence supported the conviction of the accused for qualified carnapping:
without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or
by using force upon things.
1. Biag and his tricycle went missing on April 12, 2005;
"Motor vehicle" is any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power using
the public highways, but excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street-sweepers, sprinklers,
2. Lagat and Palalay were found in unauthorized possession of the tricycle on April
lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts, amphibian trucks, and cranes if not used on
13, 2005; public highways, vehicles, which run only on rails or tracks, and tractors, trailers and
traction engines of all kinds used exclusively for agricultural purposes. Trailers having any
number of wheels, when propelled or intended to be propelled by attachment to a motor
vehicle, shall be classified as separate motor vehicle with no power rating.44

187
 upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the
The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under the Anti-Carnapping Act of thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.49
1972 are the following:
Lagat and Palalay's intent to gain from the carnapped tricycle was also proven as they were
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle; caught in a palay buying station, on board the stolen tricycle, which they obviously used to
transport the cavans of palay they had stolen and were going to sell at the station.
2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself; In Bustinera, we elucidated on the concept of "intent to gain" and said:

Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of
3. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the
benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is
upon things; and
performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner's consent
constitutes gain.50
4. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle.45

Having established that the elements of carnapping are present in this case, we now go to
the argument of the two accused that they cannot be convicted based on the circumstantial
The records of this case show that all the elements of carnapping are present and were
evidence presented by the prosecution.
proven during trial.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
The tricycle, which was definitively ascertained to belong to Biag, as evidenced by the
conviction if:
registration papers, was found in Lagat and Palalay's possession. Aside from this, the
prosecution was also able to establish that Lagat and Palalay fled the scene when the Alicia
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
PNP tried to approach them at the palay buying station. To top it all, Lagat and Palalay
failed to give any reason why they had Biag's tricycle. Their unexplained possession raises
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
the presumption that they were responsible for the unlawful taking of the tricycle. Section
3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states that:
(c) The combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to
the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime.
[A] person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the
taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him. In People v. Mansueto,51 we said:

Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which
In Litton Mills, Inc. v. Sales,46 we said that for such presumption to arise, it must be proven
the facts in issue may be established by inference. Such evidence is founded on experience
that: (a) the property was stolen; (b) it was committed recently; (c) that the stolen property
and observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection between the known and
was found in the possession of the accused; and (d) the accused is unable to explain his
proven facts and the facts sought to be proved.52
possession satisfactorily.47 As mentioned above, all these were proven by the prosecution
during trial. Thus, it is presumed that Lagat and Palalay had unlawfully taken Biag's
tricycle. In People v. Bustinera,48 this Court defined "unlawful taking," as follows: Hence, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent guilt of the accused.53
of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
188
A careful and exhaustive examination of the evidence presented, excluding those that are
inadmissible, show that the circumstantial evidence, when viewed as a whole, effectively
establishes the guilt of Lagat and Palalay beyond reasonable doubt. We considered the
following pieces of evidence as convincing:
First, Lagat and Palalay were found in possession of the tricycle the same day that it,
together with its owner Biag, was reported missing.
Second, Lagat and Palalay were found at a palay buying station, with the stolen tricycle
packed with cavans of palay allegedly stolen in Alicia, Isabela.
Third, Lagat and Palalay who were then on board the tricycle, jumped and ran the moment
they saw the Alicia PNP approaching them.
Fourth, Lagat and Palalay could not explain to the Alicia PNP why they were in possession
of Biag's tricycle.
Fifth, Biag's wallet and his tricycle's registration papers were found in the tricycle upon its
inspection by the Alicia PNP.
Sixth, Biag's body bore hack wounds as evidenced by the post-mortem autopsy done on
him, while his tricycle had traces of blood in it.
The foregoing circumstantial evidence only leads to the conclusion that Lagat and Palalay
conspired to kill Biag in order to steal his tricycle. Direct proof that the two accused
conspired is not essential as it may be inferred from their conduct before, during, and after
their commission of the crime that they acted with a common purpose and design.54 The
pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution are consistent with one another and the
only rational proposition that can be drawn therefrom is that the accused are guilty of
killing Biag to carnap his tricycle.
When a person is killed or raped in the course of or on the occasion of the carnapping, the
crime of carnapping is qualified and the penalty is increased pursuant to Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 6539, as amended:
Section 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this
term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle
taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and
not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without
violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less
than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping
is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon
things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner,
driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of
the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (As amended by R.A. No.
7659.) (Emphasis ours)
As there was no aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, the
RTC properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In conformity with prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of Jose Biag and P50,000.00 as moral damages for the
proven mental suffering of his wife as a result of his untimely death. However, when actual
damages proven by receipts during trial amount to less than P25,000.00, as in this case, the
award of temperate damages for P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser
amount.55 Thus, an award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of the amount of
P14,900.00 that the Court of Appeals awarded as actual damages is proper in this case.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider that under Article 2206 of the
Civil Code, the accused are also jointly and severally liable for the loss of the earning
capacity of Biag and such indemnity should be paid to his heirs.56 In People v. Jadap,57 this
Court said:
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages
for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity
may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is
self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which
case judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no
documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. In this case, no
documentary evidence was presented to prove the claim of the victim's heirs for damages
by reason of loss of earning capacity. However, the victim's father testified that at the time
of his son's death, he was only 20 years old and was working as a mason with a monthly
income of P3,000.00. We find the father's testimony sufficient to justify the award of
damages for loss of earning capacity.58
Biag's widow, Florida, testified that Biag worked as a farmer, tanod, and tricycle driver,
and that his income amounted to P40,000.00 per cropping season as a farmer,P2,000.00 per
month as a tanod, and P300.00 per day as a tricycle driver. However, since the prosecution
failed to present any document pertaining to Biag's appointment as a tanod, or that he
actually worked as a farmer, we shall consider only his earnings as a tricycle driver.
According to the death certificate59 submitted by the prosecution, Biag was 56 years old at
the time of his death.
189
The amount of damages recoverable for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased is
based on two factors: 1) the number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be
computed; and 2) the rate at which the losses sustained by the heirs of the deceased should
be fixed. The first factor is based on the formula (2/3 x 80 - age of the deceased at the time
of his death = life expectancy) which is adopted from the American Expectancy Table of
Mortality.60 Net income is computed by deducting from the amount of the victim's gross
income the amount of his living expenses. As there is no proof of Biag's living expenses,
the net income is estimated to be 50% of the gross annual income.61 Thus, the loss of
earning capacity of the deceased is computed as follows:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x [gross annual income - living expenses] 62
= 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross annual income - 50% of gross annual income]
= 2/3 [80-56] x [P109,500.00 - P54,750.00]
= 16 x P54,750.00
= P876,000.00
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the October 8, 2008 decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02869. Accused-appellants Renato
Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y Villarosa are found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED CARNAPPING and are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim
Jose Biag the following: (a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P50,000.00 as moral
damages; (c) P25,000.00 as temperate damages; (d) P876,000.00 as loss of earning
capacity; and (e) interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the
date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED
[G.R. NO. 163938 : March 28, 2008]
DANTE BUEBOS and SARMELITO BUEBOS, Petitioners, v. THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE law on arson has always been a constant source of confusion not only among
members of the bar, but also among those of the bench. The bewilderment often centers on
what law to apply and what penalty to impose.
In this case, the Court is again tasked to determine whether petitioners are liable for simple
arson or arson of an inhabited house which merits a penalty of up to reclusion perpetua.
Before the Court is a petition to review on certiorari under Rule 45 the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification that2 of the Regional Trial Court in
Tabaco, Albay, finding petitioners Dante Buebos and Sarmelito Buebos guilty of arson.
The Facts
On January 1, 1994 around 3:00 o'clock in the morning, Adelina B. Borbe was in her house
at Hacienda San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay watching over her sick child.3 She was lying down
when she heard some noise around the house. She got up and looked through the window
and saw the four accused, Rolando Buela, Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio
Cornel, Jr. congregating in front of her hut.4 When she went out, she saw the roof of her
nipa hut already on fire. She shouted for help. Instead of coming to her immediate succor,
the four fled.5
At some distance away, Olipiano Berjuela heard Adelina scream for help. Olipiano was
then drinking with Pepito Borbe to celebrate New Year's Eve. Olipiano immediately ran to
the place and saw a number of people jumping over the fence. When he focused his
flashlight on them, he was able to identify Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio
Cornel, Jr.6 He also saw Rolando Buela running away.7
On complaint of Adelina, petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos, together with Rolando
Buela and Antonio Cornel, Jr., were indicted for arson in an Information bearing the
following accusations:
That on or about the 1st day of January, 1994 at 3:00 o'clock in the Barangay Hacienda,
Island of San Miguel, Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, with intent to cause damage, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of the house of
ADELINA B. BORBE, to the latter's damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.8
The prosecution evidence portraying the foregoing facts was principally supplied by
private complainant Adelina Borbe and Olipiano Berjuela.
Upon the other hand, denial and alibi were the main exculpating line of petitioners and
their co-accused. The trial court summed up the defense evidence in the following tenor:
190
The defense contended that the accused were at different places at the time of the incident;
Rolando Buela claimed to be at sitio Tugon, Malictay, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay as there
was a novena prayer at his parents' house on occasion of the death anniversary of his late
grandfather; Dante Buebos also claimed to have been at Romeo Calleja's having gone there
in the evening of December 30, 1993 and left the place at 12:00 o'clock noontime of
January 1, 1994; Sarmelito Buebos asserted that he was at his residence at sitio Malictay,
Hacienda, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay on the day the incident happened and that he never
left his house; Antonio Cornel, Jr. likewise claimed to be at his residence at Agas after
having visited his in-laws; that he only came to know of the accusation five (5) days after
the incident happened when he visited his parents at Malictay; witnesses were likewise
presented by the accused to corroborate their testimonies.9
In downgrading the penalty, the CA opined that the accused could only be convicted of
simple arson, punishable by prision mayor, and not for burning of an inhabited house,
which is punishable by imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua. According to the appellate court, the information failed to allege with specificity
the actual crime committed. Hence, the accused should be found liable only for arson in its
simple form.12
Issues
Dissatisfied, Dante and Sarmelito Buebos have resorted to the present recourse. The
following arguments are now raised for the Court's consideration:

RTC and CA Dispositions

I.
On April 7, 1998, the RTC found all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
arson. The dispositive part of the judgment of conviction reads: WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing, this Court finds accused ROLANDO BUELA, DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE BASIS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL
DANTE BUEBOS, SARMELITO BUEBOS and ANTONIO CORNEL, JR. GUILTY
EVIDENCE;
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged; accordingly, each of the accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day II.
of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay the cost.

SO ORDERED.10 WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR.13
Via a notice of appeal, the four accused elevated the matter to the appellate court. In their
appeal, they contended that (1) the trial court erred in finding them guilty of the crime of
Our Ruling
arson; (2) that the trial court erred in finding conspiracy; and (3) the trial court erred in
failing to give weight and credence to their defense of denial and alibi.
Overview of the law on arson
On November 13, 2003, through an eight-page decision penned by Associate Justice
The confusion surrounding arson has been confounded by the dearth of annotation on this
Eliezer R. de los Santos, the CA disposed of the appeal in this wise:
part of our penal law. Certainly, the law on arson is one of the least commented in this
jurisdiction. For the guidance of the bench and bar, a brief legislative history of the body of
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby
laws on arson is in order.
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Each of the accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years of prision
Previously, arson was defined and penalized under nine different articles of the Revised
correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum.
Penal Code: Article 320 (destructive arson), Article 321 (other forms of arson), Article 322
(cases of arson not included in the preceding articles), Article 323 (arson of property of
SO ORDERED.11
small value), Article 324 (crimes involving destruction), Article 325 (burning one's own
property to commit arson), Article 326 (setting fire to property exclusively owned by the

191
offender, Article 326-a (in cases where death resulted as a consequence of arson), and
Article 326-b (prima facie evidence of arson). 7. Any building, whether used as a dwelling or not, situated in a populated or congested
area.
On March 7, 1979, citing certain inadequacies that impede the successful enforcement and
prosecution of arsonists, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree SECTION 3. Other Cases of Arson. - The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion
(P.D) No. 1613. P.D. 1613 supplanted the penal code provisions on arson. The pertinent perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
parts of the said presidential issuance read:

SECTION 1. Arson. - Any person who burns or sets fire to the property of another shall be 1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;
punished by prision mayor.
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
The same penalty shall be imposed when a person sets fire to his own property under
circumstances which expose to danger the life or property of another.
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;
SECTION 2. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the
following: 4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or
forest;
1. Any ammunition factory and other establishments where explosives, inflammable or
combustible materials are stored; 5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; andcralawlibrary

2. Any archive, museum, whether public or private, or any edifice devoted to culture, 6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.

education or social services; SECTION 4. Special Aggravating Circumstances in Arson. - The penalty in any case of
arson shall be imposed in its maximum period:
3. Any church or place of worship or other building where people usually assemble;
1. If committed with the intent to gain;
4. Any train, airplane or any aircraft, vessel or watercraft, or conveyance for transportation
of persons or property; 2. If committed for the benefit of another;

5. Any building where evidence is kept for use in any legislative, judicial, administrative or 3. If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the

other official proceedings; property burned;

6. Any hospital, hotel, dormitory, lodging house, housing tenement, shopping center, public 4. If committed by a syndicate. The offense is committed by a syndicate if it is planned or

or private market, theater or movie house or any similar place or building; carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons.

192
SECTION 5. Where Death Results from Arson. - If by reason of or on the occasion of
arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed.
SECTION 6. Prima Facie Evidence of Arson. - Any of the following circumstances shall
constitute prima facie evidence of arson:
1. If the fire started simultaneously in more than one part of the building or establishment.
2. If substantial amount of flammable substances or materials are stored within the building
not necessary in the business of the offender nor for household use.
3. If gasoline, kerosene, petroleum or other flammable or combustible substances or
materials soaked therewith or containers thereof, or any mechanical, electrical, chemical, or
electronic contrivance designed to start a fire, or ashes or traces of any of the foregoing are
found in the ruins or premises of the burned building or property.
4. If the building or property is insured for substantially more than its actual value at the
time of the issuance of the policy.
5. If during the lifetime of the corresponding fire insurance policy more than two fires have
occurred in the same or other premises owned or under the control of the offender and/or
insured.
6. If shortly before the fire, a substantial portion of the effects insured and stored in a
building or property had been withdrawn from the premises except in the ordinary course
of business.
7. If a demand for money or other valuable consideration was made before the fire in
exchange for the desistance of the offender or for the safety of other person or property of
the victim.
SECTION 7. Conspiracy to Commit Arson. - Conspiracy to commit arson shall be
punished by prision mayor in its minimum period.
SECTION 8. Confiscation of Object of Arson. - The building which is the object of arson
including the land on which it is situated shall be confiscated and escheated to the State,
unless the owner thereof can prove that he has no participation in nor knowledge of such
arson despite the exercise of due diligence on his part.
On November 11, 1980, the law on arson was again revisited via P.D. No. 1744. The new
law expanded the definition of destructive arson by way of reinstating Article 320 of the
Revised Penal Code. The amendatory legislation also paved the way for the reimposition of
the capital punishment on destructive arsonists.
When Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659 (An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain
Heinous Crimes) was passed on December 13, 1993, Article 320 again underwent a
revision. As it now stands, Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code is worded, thus:
Art. 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed
upon any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a
result of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where
people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to,
official governmental function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade,
workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such as but
not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals,
regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or
edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually
inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or
conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.
193

4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are
devoted to the service of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying
evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or
defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.
Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is
perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more persons or by a group of persons, regardless
of whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy the building or the burning merely
constitutes an overt act in the commission or another violation of law.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who
shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance,
storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death
results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
Of course, with the repeal of the Death Penalty Law on June 24, 2006 through R.A. No.
9346, arson is no longer a capital offense.14
We proceed to the crux of the petition.
Circumstantial evidence points to petitioners' culpability
Petitioners score the CA for convicting them of arson based on circumstantial evidence.
They argue that the inference that they were responsible for the burning of private
complainant's hut was not duly proven by the People.
Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that "indirectly proves a fact in issue
through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. Resort
thereto is essential when the lack of direct testimony would result in setting a felon free." 15
At the outset, We may well emphasize that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is
not the only basis on which a court draws its finding of guilt. Established facts that form a
chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of
reasoning towards a conviction.16 Verily, resort to circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by
Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.17
The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for a
conviction: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a
moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has
committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the
combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused.18
After a careful review of the evidence presented by both parties, We find that the
circumstantial evidence extant in the records is sufficient to identify petitioners as the
authors of the burning of the hut of private complainant Adelina Borbe:
1. Private complainant heard some noise emanating from outside her house at around 3:00
a.m.;
2. When she went out to check the disturbance, private complainant saw petitioners,
together with their two other co-accused, standing in front of the house;
3. Moments later, the roof of her house caught fire;
4. Petitioners and their cohorts absconded while private complainant desperately shouted
for help.
The facts from which the cited circumstances arose have been proved through positive
testimony.19 Evidently, these circumstances form an unbroken chain of events leading to
one fair conclusion - the culpability of petitioners for the burning of the hut. The Court is
convinced that the circumstances, taken together, leave no doubt that petitioner perpetrated
the arson.
194
Conspiracy evident from coordinated action of petitioners
Petitioners next contend that conspiracy was erroneously appreciated by both the trial and
appellate courts. They posit that the finding of conspiracy was premised on speculation and
conjecture.
The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit
it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred
from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with
respect to the commission of the offense. Corollarily, it is not necessary to show that two or
more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of
an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. The
rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert, each of them
doing his part to fulfill the common design. In such a case, the act of one becomes the act
of all and each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime
committed.20
In the case at bench, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of
petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos. Both of them stood outside the house of private
complainant Adelina. They were part of the group making boisterous noise in the vicinity.
Petitioners also fled together while the roof of Adelina's house was ablaze. These acts
clearly show their joint purpose and design, and community of interest.
We quote with approval the CA observation along this line:
Accused-appellant's assertion that conspiracy has not been established is belied by the
accounts of the prosecution witness. The manner by which the accused-appellants behaved
after the private complainant shouted for help clearly indicated a confederacy of purpose
and concerted action on the part of the accused-appellants. Even if there is no direct
evidence showing that all of the accused had prior agreement on how to set the roof of the
house on fire, the doctrine is well settled that conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime. Very seldom such prior agreement be
demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal undertakings are only rarely
documented by agreements in writing.21
Crime committed and the penalty
The RTC sentenced all four accused to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years
and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. On appeal, the CA reduced the sentence to
six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum. The CA ratiocinated:
The information charges accused-appellants with "violation of P.D. 1613" without
specifying the particular provision breached. The information having failed to allege
whether or not the burnt house is inhabited, and not having been established that the house
is situated in a populated or congested area, accused-appellants should be deemed to have
only been charged with plain arson under Section 1 of the decree. Under Section 1 of the
decree, the offense of simple arson committed is punishable by prision mayor.
There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances in the case at bar accused-
appellants should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period
as provided under Article 321, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by
Presidential Decree No. 1613. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
penalty should be anywhere within the range of prision correccional. 22
The legal basis of the trial court in convicting petitioners of arson is Section 3, paragraph 2
of P.D. No. 1613. The said provision of law reads:
SECTION 3. Other Cases of Arson. - The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
x x x
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.23 Admittedly, there is a confluence
of the foregoing elements here. However, the information failed to allege that what was
intentionally burned was an inhabited house or dwelling. That is fatal.
Sections 8 and 9 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure state:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation
of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing
it.
195
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances for the court to pronounce
judgment.
Under the new rules, the information or complaint must state the designation of the offense
given by the statute and specify its qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances.
Otherwise stated, the accused will not be convicted of the offense proved during the trial if
it was not properly alleged in the information.24
Perusing the information, there was no allegation that the house intentionally burned by
petitioners and their cohorts was inhabited. Rather, the information merely recited that
"accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to cause damage,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof
of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to the latter's damage and prejudice."25
Although the rule took effect only on December 1, 2000, while the petitioners were
convicted by the RTC on April 7, 1998, it may be applied retroactively. It is elementary that
rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive application insofar as they benefit the
accused.26
In fine, petitioners can be convicted only of simple arson, under Section 1, paragraph 1 of
P.D. No. 1613, punishable by prision mayor.
This is not a case of first impression. This Court has, on a number of occasions, modified
the RTC and CA judgments for having applied the wrong law and penalty on arson. In
People v. Soriano,27 the accused was found guilty of destructive arson, then a capital
offense. On automatic review, the Court held that he should be held liable only for simple
arson. The explanation:
However, we believe that the applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD
1613, which imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases
of arson as the properties burned by accused-appellant are specifically described as houses,
contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. The descriptions as
alleged in the second Amended Information particularly refer to the structures as houses
rather than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, par. 2, of
PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of
penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be construed strictly against the
government, and literally in favor of the accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning;
and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these
elements concur in the case at bar.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of
perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of
The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous
crimes "for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized
and ordered society." On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting
Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law
punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less
significant social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive
Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into
Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances present.
In the present case, the act committed by accused-appellant neither appears to be heinous
nor represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness as distinguished from those
acts punishable under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance was
established to convert the offense to Destructive Arson. The special aggravating
circumstance that accused-appellant was "motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner
or occupant of the property burned" cannot be appreciated in the present case where it
appears that he was acting more on impulse, heat of anger or risen temper rather than real
spite or hatred that impelled him to give vent to his wounded ego. Nothing can be worse
than a spurned lover or a disconsolate father under the prevailing circumstances that
surrounded the burning of the Cimagala house. Thus, accused-appellant must be held guilty
of Simple Arson penalized under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 for the act of intentionally
burning an inhabited house or dwelling.28
An oversight of the same nature was addressed by this Court in the more recent case of
People v. Malngan.29 Said the Court in Malngan:
The ultimate query now is which kind of arson is accused-appellant guilty of?cralawred
As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of the crime of arson: 1) destructive
arson, under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659;
and 2) simple arson, under Presidential Decree No. 1613. Said classification is based on the
kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the damage
caused, 48 to wit:
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, contemplates the
malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains,
196
vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by
any person or group of persons. The classification of this type of crime is known
as Destructive Arson, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The reason for
the law is self-evident: to effectively discourage and deter the commission of this dastardly
crime, to prevent the destruction of properties and protect the lives of innocent people.
Exposure to a brewing conflagration leaves only destruction and despair in its wake; hence,
the State mandates greater retribution to authors of this heinous crime. The exceptionally
severe punishment imposed for this crime takes into consideration the extreme danger to
human lives exposed by the malicious burning of these structures; the danger to property
resulting from the conflagration; the fact that it is normally difficult to adopt precautions
against its commission, and the difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrators; and, the greater
impact on the social, economic, security and political fabric of the nation. [Emphasis
supplied]
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Art. 320, death
should result, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The Revised Penal Code
remains the governing law for Simple Arson. This decree contemplates the malicious
burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in Art. 320, as
amended by RA 7659, and classified as other cases of arson. These include houses,
dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports,
wharves and other industrial establishments. Although the purpose of the law on Simple
Arson is to prevent the high incidence of fires and other crimes involving destruction,
protect the national economy and preserve the social, economic and political stability of the
nation, PD 1613 tempers the penalty to be meted to offenders. This separate classification
of Simple Arson recognizes the need to lessen the severity of punishment commensurate to
the act or acts committed, depending on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
[Emphasis supplied]
To emphasize:
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of
perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of the
Revised Penal Code (as amended) constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as
heinous crimes for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of
their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant
and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society. On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that
the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes
with less significant social, economic, political and national security implications than
Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be
converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances present.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Prescinding from the above clarification vis - -vis the description of the crime as stated
in the accusatory portion of the Information, it is quite evident that accused-appellant was
charged with the crime of Simple Arson - for having "deliberately set fire upon the two-
storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family x x x knowing the same to be
an inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a
conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining
residential houses, were razed by fire." [Emphasis supplied]
The facts of the case at bar is somewhat similar to the facts of the case of People v.
Soriano. The accused in the latter case caused the burning of a particular house.
Unfortunately, the blaze spread and gutted down five (5) neighboring houses. The RTC
therein found the accused guilty of destructive arson under paragraph 1 of Art. 320 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court, through Mr.
Justice Bellosillo, however, declared that:
"x x x [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which
imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as
the properties burned by accused-appellant are specifically described as houses,
contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. The descriptions as
alleged in the second Amended Information particularly refer to the structures as houses
rather than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, Par. 2, of
PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of
penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be construed strictly against the
government, and liberally in favor of the accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning;
and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these
elements concur in the case at bar."
As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant was charged with having
intentionally burned the two-storey residential house of Robert Separa. Said conflagration
likewise spread and destroyed seven (7) adjoining houses. Consequently, if proved, as it
was proved, at the trial, she may be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of the crime
of simple arson. Such is the case "notwithstanding the error in the designation of the
offense in the information, the information remains effective insofar as it states the facts
constituting the crime alleged therein." "What is controlling is not the title of the complaint,
nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly
violate, x x x but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein
recited."
197
There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC as Sec. 5 of PD No. 1613
categorically provides that the penalty to be imposed for simple arson is:
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. - If by reason of or on the occasion of arson
death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. [Emphasis
supplied]rbl r l l lbrr
Accordingly, there being no aggravating circumstance alleged in the Information, the
imposable penalty on accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.30
Now, to the penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty should range from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the
offense, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period [eight (8) years and one (1)
day to ten (10) years]. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence is prision correccional,
which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, to be imposed in any
of its periods.
The CA sentence is in accord with law and jurisprudence. We sustain it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in full.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188708, July 31, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. ALAMADA
MACABANDO, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is an appeal filed by appellant Alamada Macabando assailing the February 24, 2009
decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00208-MIN. The CA
decision affirmed in toto the August 26, 2002 judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
destructive arson, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
THE CASE
The prosecutions evidence showed that at around 4:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001, the
appellant broke bottles on the road while holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to
get even (manabla ko).3 Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn his house.4cralaw
virtualaw library
At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors shout that there was a
fire. When Cornelio went out of his house to verify, he saw smoke coming from the
appellants house. He got a pail of water, and poured its contents into the fire. 5 Eric
Quilantang, a neighbor whose house was just 10 meters from that of the appellant, ran to
the barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When Eric approached the burning
house, the appellant, who was carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not to interfere;
the appellant then fired three (3) shots in the air.6 The appellant also told the people around
that whoever would put out the fire would be killed.7cralaw virtualaw library
Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly went home to save his nephews and
nieces.8 Eric also returned to his house to save his belongings.9cralaw virtualaw library
Fire Officer (FO) II Victor Naive and FOI Reynaldo Maliao conducted a spot investigation
of the incident, and concluded, among others, that the fire started in the appellants house;
and that it had been intentional.10 Barangay Chairman Modesto Ligtas stated that the fire
gutted many houses in his barangay, and that he assisted the City Social Welfare and
Development Department personnel in assessing the damage.11cralaw virtualaw library
The defense, on the other hand, presented a different version of the events.
The appellant declared on the witness stand that he lived in the two-storey house in
Barangay 35, Limketkai Drive, which was owned by his sister, Madji Muslima
Edemal.12 He admitted that he felt angry at around 2:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001
because one of his radio cassettes for sale had been stolen.13 The appellant claimed that he
went to sleep after looking for his missing radio cassette, and that the fire had already
started when he woke up. He denied making a threat to burn his house, and maintained that
he did not own a gun. He added that the gunshots heard by his neighbors came from the
explosion of firecrackers that he intended to use during the New Year celebration.14cralaw
virtualaw library
198
Lomantong Panandigan, the appellants cousin, stated, among others, that he did not see the
appellant carry a revolver or fire a shot on December 21, 2001.15 Dimas Kasubidan, the
appellants brother-in-law, stated that he and the appellant lived in the same house, and that
the latter was asleep in his room at the ground floor before the fire broke out.16cralaw
virtualaw library
The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of destructive arson under Article 320
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, before the RTC.17 The appellant pleaded
not guilty to the charge on arraignment.18 In its judgment dated August 26, 2002, the RTC
found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto. It gave weight to the RTCs factual
findings since these findings were based on unrebutted testimonial and documentary
evidence. The CA held that the totality of the presented circumstantial evidence led to the
conclusion that the appellant was guilty of the crime charged.
THE COURTS RULING
We deny the appeal, but modify the crime committed by the appellant and the penalty
imposed on him.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
We point out at the outset that no one saw the appellant set fire to his house in Barangay
35, Limketkai Drive, Cagayan de Oro City. The trial and appellate courts thus resorted to
circumstantial evidence since there was no direct evidence to prove the appellants
culpability to the crime charged.
It is settled that in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient
to sustain a conviction provided that: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
is the one who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a
way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.19cralaw virtualaw
library
In the present case, the following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain that leads to
an unavoidable conclusion that the appellant, to the exclusion of others, set fire to his
house: first, the appellant, while holding an iron lead pipe, acted violently and broke bottles
near his house at around 4:00 p.m. of December 21, 2001; second, while he was still in a fit
of rage, the appellant stated that he would get even, and then threatened to burn his own
house; third, Judith Quilantang saw a fire in the appellants room approximately two hours
after the appellant returned to his house; fourth, the appellant prevented Cornelio, Eric, and
several other people from putting out the fire in his house; fifth, the appellant fired shots in
the air, and then threatened to kill anyone who would try to put out the fire in his
house; sixth, the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire; and finally, the
investigation conducted by the fire marshals of the Bureau of Fire Protection revealed that
the fire started in the appellants house, and that it had been intentional.
The combination of these circumstances, indeed, leads to no other conclusion than that the
appellant set fire to his house. We find it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to
prevent his neighbors from putting out the fire in his house, and threaten to kill them if they
did, if he had nothing to do with the crime. The first impulse of an individual whose house
is on fire is to save his loved ones and/or belongings; it is contrary to human nature, reason
and natural order of things for a person to thwart and prevent any effort to put out the fire
in his burning property. By carrying (and firing) a gun during the fire, the appellant showed
his determination to repel any efforts to quell the fire. Important to note, too, is the fact that
the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire which, to our mind, showed deliberate
planning and preparedness on his part to flee the raging fire; it likewise contradicted his
statement that he was asleep inside his house when the fire broke out, and that the fire was
already big when he woke up. Clearly, the appellants indifferent attitude to his burning
house and his hostility towards the people who tried to put out the fire, coupled with his
preparedness to flee his burning house, belied his claim of innocence. Notably, the
appellant failed to impute any improper motive against the prosecution witnesses to falsely
testify against him; in fact, he admitted that he had no misunderstanding with them prior to
the incident.
The Crime Committed
The CA convicted the appellant of destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC, as
amended, which reads:cralawlibrary
Article 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or
as a result of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or
where people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not
limited to, official governmental function or business, private transaction, commerce,
199
 trade, workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose
such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or
stops or terminals, regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that there are
persons in said building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of
whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to
transportation or conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto,
which are devoted to the service of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying
evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or
defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.
xxxx
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who
shall burn:cralawlibrary
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory,
ordinance, storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive
materials.
In sum, Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and
private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military,
government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons.20cralaw
virtualaw library
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613,21 on the other hand, currently governs simple arson.
Section 3 of this law provides:cralawlibrary
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion
Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo
grove or forest;
5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse. [italics and emphasis
ours]
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures,
regardless of size, not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659.22 This law punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that constitute
it have a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes
with less significant social, economic, political, and national security implications than
destructive arson.23cralaw virtualaw library
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is
intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
Both these elements have been proven in the present case. The Information alleged that the
appellant set fire to his own house, and that the fire spread to other inhabited houses.
These allegations were established during trial through the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses which the trial and appellate courts found credible and convincing, and through
the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection which stated that damaged houses
were residential, and that the fire had been intentional. Moreover, the certification from
the City Social Welfare and Development Department likewise indicated that the burned
houses were used as dwellings. The appellant likewise testified that his burnt two-story
house was used as a residence. That the appellants act affected many families will not
convert the crime to destructive arson, since the appellants act does not appear to be
heinous or represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness when compared to
those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established evidence only showed
200
that the appellant intended to burn his own house, but the conflagration spread to the (1 appellant Alamada Macabando is found guilty beyond
neighboring houses. ) reasonable doubt of simple arson under Section 3(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1613; and
In this regard, our ruling in Buebos v. People24 is particularly instructive, thus:cralawlibrary

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of
perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of (2 he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous ) ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
crimes "for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized
and ordered society." On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting
Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law
punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less
significant social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive SO ORDERED.
Arson.

The Proper Penalty

Under Section 3, paragraph 2, of P.D. No. 1613, the imposable penalty for simple arson
is reclusion temporal, which has a range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, to reclusion
perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable should be an
indeterminate penalty whose minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next
lower in degree, which is prision mayor, or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years, and whose maximum should be the medium period of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua, or sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years,
taking into account the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances that
attended the commission of the crime. Taking these rules into account, we therefore impose
on the appellant the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.

As regards the award of damages, we sustain the lower courts findings that the records do
not adequately reflect any concrete basis for the award of actual damages to the offended
parties. To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of
loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence obtainable.25cralaw virtualaw library

WHEREFORE, the assailed February 24, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR HC No. 00208-MIN is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:cralawlibrary

201
 MA. ROSARIO P. CAMPOS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
FIRST WOMENS CREDIT CORPORATION, Respondents.

R ES OLUTION

REYES, J.:

This resolves the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Ma. Rosario P.
Campos (Campos) to assail the Decision1 dated July 21, 2008 and Resolution2 dated
February 16, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31468, which
affirmed the conviction of Campos for fourteen (14) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (B.P. 22), otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law.

On March 17, 1995, Campos obtained a loan, payable on installments, from respondent
First Womens Credit Corporation (FWCC) in the amount of P50,000.00. She issued
several postdated checks in favor of FWCC to cover the agreed installment
payments.3 Fourteen of these checks drawn against her Current Account No. 6005-05449-
92 with BPI Family Bank-Head Office, however, were dishonored when presented for
payment, particularly:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Check No. Date Amount

138609 August 15, 1995 P3,333.33
138610 August 30, 1995 P3,333.33
138611 September 15, 1995 P3,333.33
138612 September 30, 1995 P3,333.33
138613 October 15, 1995 P3,333.33
138614 October 30, 1995 P3,333.33
138615 November 15, 1995 P3,333.33
138616 November 30, 1995 P3,333.33
138617 December 15, 1995 P3,333.33
138618 December 31, 1995 P3,333.33
138619 January 15, 1996 P3,333.33
138620 January 31, 1996 P3,333.33
138621 February 15, 1996 P3,333.33
138622 February 28, 1996 P3,333.33
P46,666.62
The checks were declared by the drawee bank to be drawn against a closed
account.4cralawlawlibrary

G.R. No. 187401, September 17, 2014
After Campos failed to satisfy her outstanding obligation with FWCC despite demand, she
was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City, Branch 48, with
violations of B.P. 22. Campos was tried in absentia, as she failed to attend court
proceedings after being arraigned.5cralawlawlibrary
202
On December 7, 1999, the MeTC rendered its decision with dispositive portion that
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the accused is hereby CONVICTED of
fourteen (14) counts of violations of BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22. She is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months imprisonment for each violation and to
indemnify the complainant the sum of P46,666.62 representing the total value of the
checks, plus legal interest from date of default until full payment.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.6chanrobleslaw
Feeling aggrieved, Campos appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On July 30, 2007,
the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 108 rendered its decision upholding Campos conviction. A
motion for reconsideration filed by Campos was denied for lack of merit.7cralawlawlibrary
Unyielding, Campos appealed the RTC decision to the CA, which rendered on July 21,
2008 its decision8 affirming the ruling of the RTC. Campos moved to reconsider, but her
motion was denied via a Resolution9 dated February 16, 2009. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari which cites the following issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. WHETHER OR NOT A DEMAND LETTER THAT WAS SENT THROUGH
REGISTERED MAIL IS SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF [B.P.
22] AS TO KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACT OF THE DISHONOR OF THE SUBJECT
CHECKS.
2. WHETHER OR NOT [CAMPOS] WANT OF INFORMATION OF THE FACT OF
THE CHECKS DISHONOR AND HER SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR
THEIR PAYMENT [ARE] TANTAMOUNT TO GOOD FAITH SO AS TO PERSUADE
THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT TO EXERCISE ITS EQUITY POWERS AND
TO LEND SUCCOR TO [CAMPOS] CASE.10chanrobleslaw
Campos argues that the crimes element requiring her knowledge at the time of the checks
issuance that she did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon presentment was not established by the prosecution. She denies having
received a notice of dishonor from FWCC. Insisting on an acquittal, Campos discredits the
MeTCs reliance on a supposed notice of dishonor that was sent to her by FWCC through
registered mail. She also invokes good faith as she allegedly made arrangements with
FWCC for the payment of her obligation after the subject checks were dishonored.
The petition lacks merit.
To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1)
the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon
its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.11cralawlawlibrary
The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An issue being advanced by
Campos through the present petition concerns her alleged failure to receive a written
demand letter from FWCC, the entity in whose favor the dishonored checks were issued. In
a line of cases, the Court has emphasized the importance of proof of receipt of such notice
of dishonor,12although not as an element of the offense, but as a means to establish that the
issuer of a check was aware of insufficiency of funds when he issued the check and the
bank dishonored it, in relation to the second element of the offense and Section 2 of B.P.
22. Considering that the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult to
establish, Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds,13 as it reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing, and issuance
of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or
credit with such bank, when presented within ninety days from the date of the check, shall
be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such
maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements
for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTCs finding that the required
notice of dishonor from FWCC was received by Campos. Campos, nonetheless, still
maintains that her personal receipt of the notice was not sufficiently established,
considering that only a written copy of the letter and the registry return receipt covering it
were presented by the prosecution.
The Court has in truth repeatedly held that the mere presentation of registry return receipts
that cover registered mail was not sufficient to establish that written notices of dishonor
had been sent to or served on issuers of checks. The authentication by affidavit of the
mailers was necessary in order for service by registered mail to be regarded as clear proof
of the giving of notices of dishonor and to predicate the existence of the second element of
the offense.14cralawlawlibrary
203

In still finding no merit in the present petition, the Court, however, considers Campos
defense that she exerted efforts to reach an amicable settlement with her creditor after the
checks which she issued were dishonored by the drawee bank, BPI Family Bank. Campos
categorically declared in her petition that, [she] has in her favor evidence to show that she
was in good faith and indeed made arrangements for the payment of her obligations
subsequently after the dishonor of the checks.15 Clearly, this statement was a
confirmation that she actually received the required notice of dishonor from FWCC. The
evidence referred to in her statement were receipts16 dated January 13, 1996, February 29,
1996, April 22, 1998 and May 26, 1998 issued by FWCC to Campos for payments in
various amounts ranging from P2,500.00 to P15,700.00. Campos would not have entered
into the alleged arrangements beginning January 1996 until May 1998 if she had not
received a notice of dishonor from her creditor, and had no knowledge of the insufficiency
of her funds with the bank and the dishonor of her checks.
Campos could have avoided prosecution by paying the amounts due on the checks or
making arrangements for payment in full within five (5) days after receiving notice.
Unfortunately for Campos, these circumstances were not established in the instant case.
She failed to sufficiently disclose the terms of her alleged arrangement with FWCC, and to
establish that the same had been fully complied with so as to completely satisfy the
amounts covered by the subject checks. Moreover, documents to prove such fact should
have been presented before the MeTC during the trial, yet Campos opted to be tried in
absentia, and thus waived her right to present evidence. While Campos blamed her former
counsel for alleged negligence that led to her failure to be present during the trial,17 it is
settled that the negligence of counsel binds his or her client. Given the circumstances, the
Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA which affirmed the conviction
of Campos.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 21, 2008 and
Resolution dated February 16, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31468
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.cralawred
G.R. No. 190834, November 26, 2014
ARIEL T. LIM, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on June 30, 2009, and its
Resolution2 dated January 4, 2010. The CA affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (RTC), convicting petitioner of one (1) count of violation of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 in Criminal Case No. 07-249932.
Records reveal that petitioner issued Bank of Commerce Check Nos. 0013813 and
0013814, dated June 30, 1998 and July 15, 1998, respectively, payable to CASH, in the
amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) for each check. He gave the
checks to Mr. Willie Castor (Castor) as his campaign donation to the latter's candidacy in
the elections of 1998. It was Castor who ordered the delivery of printing materials and used
petitioner's checks to pay for the same. Claiming that the printing materials were delivered
too late, Castor instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop Payment" order for the two checks.
Thus, the checks were dishonored by the bank because of said order and during trial, when
the bank officer was presented on the witness stand, he admitted that said checks were
drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF). Private complainant Magna B. Badiee sent two
demand letters to petitioner, dated My 20, 1998 and July 23, 1998 and, subsequently,
private complainant filed a complaint against petitioner before the Office of the Prosecutor.
After the lapse of more than one month from receipt of the demand letters, and after
receiving the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner issued a replacement
check dated September 8, 1998 in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00). Private complainant Magna B. Badiee was able to encash said replacement
check.
Nevertheless, on March 19, 1999, or six (6) months after petitioner had paid the amount of
the bounced checks, two Informations were filed against him before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila (MeTC), to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CRIMINAL CASE No. 327138-CR
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses ARIEL LIM of violation of B.P. Big. 22 committed as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That sometime in the month of April, 1998 in the City of Manila. Philippines, the said
204
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to
MAGNA B. BADIEE to apply on account or for value BANK OF COMMERCE CHECK
No. 0013814 dated July 15, 1998, payable to Cash in the amount of PI 00,000.00 said
accused knowing fully well that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which
check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "PAYMENT STOPPED," but
the same would have been dishonored for insufficient funds had not the accused, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, the said accused, despite receipt of
notice of such dishonor failed to pay said Magna B. Badiee the amount of the said check or
to make arrangement for payment in full of the same within five (5) banking days after
receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
CRIMINAL CASE No. 327139 - CR
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses ARIEL LIM of violation of B.R Big. 22 committed as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That sometime in the month of April, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to
MAGNA B. BADIEE to apply on account or for value BANK OF COMMERCE CHECK
No. 0013813 dated June 30, 1998 payable to Cash in the amount of PI 00,000.00 said
accused knowing fully well that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which
check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "PAYMENT STOPPED," but
the same would have been dishonored for insufficient funds had not the accused, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, the said accused, despite receipt of
notice of such dishonor failed to pay said Magna B. Badiee the amount of the said check or
to make arrangement for payment in full of the same within five (5) banking days after
receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On September 12, 2006, the MeTC promulgated its Decision finding petitioner guilty of
two (2) counts of violation of B.P. Big. 22. Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court
of Manila (RTC), and on July 20, 2007, the RTC issued a Decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, this court therefore modifies the lower court decision with respect to
criminal case no. 327138 (07-249931), because the lower court of Manila has no
jurisdiction to try and decide cases where the essential ingredients of the crime charged
happened in Quezon City. The decision of the lower court with respect to criminal case no.
327138 (07-249931) is ordered vacated and set aside for lack of jurisdiction.
The lower court findings that accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
Violation of BP 22 with respect to criminal case no. 07-24992 is affirmed and is ordered to
pay a fine of P100,000.00 plus costs. No findings as to civil liability because the court
agrees with the lower court that the check was paid, is affirmed and there is no cogent
reason to disturb the same. In case of failure to pay fine, the accused shall undergo
subsidiary imprisonment of not more than six (6) months.
SO ORDERED.5
A petition for review was then filed with the Court of Appeals, and on June 30, 2009, the
CA promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC judgment. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied per Resolution dated January 4, 2010.
Thus, the present petition wherein petitioner posits that jurisprudence dictates the dismissal
of the criminal case against him on the ground that he has fully paid the amount of the
dishonored checks even before the Informations against him were filed in court. Petitioner
mainly relies on Griffith v. Court of Appeals.6 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
likewise recommends the acquittal of petitioner, opining that Griffith7 is applicable to the
present case.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
In Griffith, the Court acquitted the accused therein due to the fact that two years before the
filing of the Information for violation of B.P. No. 22, the accused had, in effect, paid the
complainant an amount greater than the value of the bounced checks. The CA held that the
factual circumstances in Griffith are dissimilar from those in the present case. The Court
disagrees with such conclusion.
The CA found Griffith inapplicable to the present case, because the checks subject of this
case are personal checks, while the check involved in Griffith was a corporate check and,
hence, some confusion or miscommunication could easily occur between the signatories of
the check and the corporate treasurer. Although the factual circumstances in the present
case are not exactly the same as those in Griffith, it should be noted that the same kind of
confusion giving rise to petitioner's mistake very well existed in the present case. Here, the
check was issued by petitioner merely as a campaign contribution to Castor's candidacy. As
found by the trial court, it was Castor who instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop Payment"
205
order for the two checks because the campaign materials, for which the checks were used
as payment, were not delivered on time. Petitioner relied on Castor's word and complied
with his instructions, as it was Castor who was supposed to take delivery of said materials.
Verily, it is easy to see how petitioner made the mistake of readily complying with the
instruction to stop payment since he believed Castor's word that there is no longer any
valid reason to pay complainant as delivery was not made as agreed upon. Nevertheless,
two months after receiving the demand letter from private complainant and just several
days after receiving the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, accused issued a
replacement check which was successfully encashed by private complainant.
The CA also took it against petitioner that he paid the amount of the checks only after
receiving the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, which supposedly shows that
petitioner was motivated to pay not because he wanted to settle his obligation but because
he wanted to avoid prosecution. This reasoning is tenuous, because in Griffith, the accused
therein did not even voluntarily pay the value of the dishonored checks; rather, the
complainant was paid from the proceeds of the invalid foreclosure of the accused's
property. In said case, the Court did not differentiate as to whether payment was made
before or after the complaint had been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor. It only
mattered that the amount stated in the dishonored check had actually been paid before the
Information against the accused was filed in court. In this case, petitioner even voluntarily
paid value of the bounced checks. The Court, therefore, sees no justification for
differentiating this case from that of Griffith. Records show that both in Griffith and in this
case, petitioner had paid the amount of the dishonored checks before the filing of the
Informations in court. Verily, there is no reason why the same liberality granted to the
accused in Griffith should not likewise be extended to herein petitioner. The precept
enunciated in Griffith is herein reiterated, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the
issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we
should not apply penal laws mechanically. We must find if the application of the law is
consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, el cessat
lex. (When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the
spirit of the law also that gives it life. This is especially so in this case where a debtor's
criminalization would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor
having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for
payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the debtor's president to answer
for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection is no longer tenable nor
justified by law or equitable considerations.
In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has
already been effectively paid two years before the informations against him were filed,
we find merit in this petition. We hold that petitioner herein could not be validly and
justly convicted or sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. x x x8(Emphasis supplied)
In the more recent case of Tan v. Philippine Commercial International Bank,9 the foregoing
principle articulated in Griffith was the precedent cited to justify the acquittal of the
accused in said case. Therein, the Court enumerated the elements for violation of B.P. Big.
22 being "(1) The accused makes, draws or issues a check to apply to account or for value;
(2) The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient
funds in, or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment."10 To facilitate
proving the second element, the law created a prima facie presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds or credit, which is established when it is shown that the drawer of
the check was notified of its dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter, failed to
fully pay the amount of the check or make arrangements for its full payment. If the check,
however, is made good or the drawer pays the value of the check within the five-day
period, then the presumption is rebutted. Evidently, one of the essential elements of the
violation is no longer present and the drawer may no longer be indicted for B.P. Blg. 22.
Said payment within the period prescribed by the law is a complete defense.
Generally, only the full payment of the value of the dishonored check during the five-day
grace period would exculpate the accused from criminal liability under B.P. Blg. 22 but, as
the Court further elaborated in Tan:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In Griffith v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that were the creditor had collected more
than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks representing rental arrearages,
holding the debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. Big. 22 two years
after the said collection is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable
considerations. In that case, the Court ruled that albeit made beyond the grace period but
two years prior to the institution of the criminal case, the payment collected from the
proceeds of the foreclosure and auction sale of the petitioner's impounded properties, with
more than a million pesos to spare, justified the acquittal of the petitioner.cralawred
xxxx
In the present case, PCIB already extracted its proverbial pound of flesh by receiving and
keeping in possession the four buses - trust properties surrendered by petitioner in
about mid 1991 and March 1992 pursuant to Section 7 of the Trust Receipts Law, the
estimated value of which was "about P6.6 million." It thus appears that the total amount of
the dishonored checks - P1,785,855.75 -, x x x was more than fully satisfied prior to the
transmittal and receipt of the July 9,1992 letter of demand. In keeping with
jurisprudence, the Court then considers such payment of the dishonored checks to have
obliterated the criminal liability of petitioner.
206
It is consistent rule that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally action is more in keeping with justice and equity.
in favor of the accused. And since penal laws should not be applied mechanically, the Court
must determine whether the application of the penal law is consistent with the purpose and WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 30, 2009, in CA-G.R.
reason of the law. x x x11 (Underscoring supplied) CR No. 31725, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ariel T. Lim
is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 07-249932.
Thus, although payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond the 5-day
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
period provided for in B.P. Blg. 22, would normally not extinguish criminal liability, the
aforementioned cases show that the Court acknowledges the existence of extraordinary
cases where, even if all the elements of the crime or offense are present, the conviction of
the accused would prove to be abhorrent to society's sense of justice. Just like
in Griffith and in Tan,12 petitioner should not be penalized although all the elements of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are proven to be present. The fact that the issuer of the check had
already paid the value of the dishonored check after having received the subpoena from the
Office of the Prosecutor should have forestalled the filing of the Information in court. The
spirit of the law which, for B.P. Big. 22, is the protection of the credibility and stability of
the banking system, would not be served by penalizing people who have evidently made
amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages even before charges have been
filed against them. In effect, the payment of the checks before the filing of the informations
has already attained the purpose of the law.

It should be emphasized as well that payment of the value of the bounced check after the
information has been filed in court would no longer have the effect of exonerating the
accused from possible conviction for violation of B.P. Big. 22. Since from the
commencement of the criminal proceedings in court, there is no circumstance whatsoever
to show that the accused had every intention to mitigate or totally alleviate the ill effects of
his issuance of the unfunded check, then there is no equitable and compelling reason to
preclude his prosecution. In such a case, the letter of the law should be applied to its full
extent.

Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's ruling in this case should be well
differentiated from cases where the accused is charged with estafa under Article 315, par.
2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, where the fraud is perpetuated by postdating a check, or
issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or
his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. In said
case of estafa, damage and deceit are the essential elements of the offense, and the check is
merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a case, paying the value of the
dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal liability. It will merely satisfy the
civil liability of the crime but not the criminal liability.

In fine, the Court holds that herein petitioner must be exonerated from the imposition of
penalties for violation of B.P. Big. 22 as he had already paid the amount of the dishonored
checks six (6) months before the filing of Informations with the court. Such a course of

207

G.R. No. 199100, July 18, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROSENDO
AMARO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For consideration is the appeal by appellant Rosendo Amaro from the Decision1 dated 30
March 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02801, affirming the 26
February 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan and Puerto
Princesa City, Branch 50, which found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
forcible abduction with rape.
On 26 May 1998, appellant was charged with the crime of forcible abduction with rape
committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of March, 1998 at more or less 5:00 in the afternoon in front
of Boots & Maya located at Malvar Street, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of deceit at the
beginning and of force and intimidation later and with lewd designs, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abduct one [AAA],3 a seven (7) year old girl, by
forcing her and took her to his house at Bgy. Tagburos, Puerto Princesa City and without
any justifiable reason, accused detained and deprived her of her liberty for a period of
twenty eight (28) [sic] days; that while she is being detained accused ROSENDO AMARO
had carnal knowledge of said AAA all committed against her will.4
Appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial then proceeded.
AAA, who was then only 7 years old, testified that she was walking on her way home from
school when she passed by Boots & Maya store. She met a man, whom she later identified
in court as the appellant, who asked her to buy cigarettes. After buying the cigarettes and
handing it to appellant, the latter gave her bread and banana cue. After eating them, she
suddenly became dizzy and passed out. AAA was brought to the house of appellant. When
she regained consciousness, she saw appellant naked. Appellant then undressed her, kissed
her on the lips and neck, and inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her to feel pain.
AAA cried but appellant covered her mouth with his hand. AAA was detained for six (6)
days and was raped five (5) times by appellant. AAA clarified that appellants penis
touched the outer portion of her vagina.
During the cross-examination, AAA admitted that she voluntarily went with appellant
because the latter promised to bring her home.5
On the last day of her detention, AAA and appellant went out of the house. On their way to
San Jose, a certain Aunt Ruthie saw AAA walking and immediately picked her up and
brought her to the police station. Appellant noticed AAA being taken away but he did
208
nothing.6
The prosecution also presented AAAs mother, BBB, to corroborate her daughters
testimony. BBB narrated that on 26 March 1998, she was in the house when AAA came
home at around noon time to eat. Thereafter, AAA told BBB that she had to go back to
school. At around 5:00 p.m. when AAA had not come home, BBB went to the school to
look for her. When the teacher told BBB that that school children had already been sent
home, she proceeded to the police station to report her missing daughter. After six (6) days,
AAA was found by BBBs former employer who brought her to the police. Upon receiving
a call from the police, BBB immediately went to the police station and saw her daughter.
BBB observed that AAA was still in shock and could not walk properly so she was brought
to the doctor on the following day. She only learned that her daughter was raped after the
medical examination.
Appellant testified on his behalf. He denied abducting and raping AAA but admitted that he
brought the latter to his house when AAA approached him asking for bread first, before
begging him to take her with him because she was always being scolded by her parents.
Upon reaching his house, appellant entrusted AAA to the care of Florante Magays sister.
Appellant then went back to town to attend to his work as a mason. He only decided to go
back home when he heard his name on the radio in connection with the disappearance of a
girl. He picked up the child in Barangay Tagburos and brought her to her house in Buncag.
AAA walked alone towards her house.7
On 26 February 2007, the trial court rendered judgment in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
ROSENDO AMARO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Forcible
Abduction with Rape, as defined and penalized under Article 342 and Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 8353 in relation to Article 48 thereof. The accused
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the costs.
He is likewise ordered to pay the complainant-victim [AAA] the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as civil indemnity and FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) PESOS as moral damages.8
The trial court found AAAs testimony as credible and straightforward and supported by
medical findings.
From the aforesaid decision, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 30 March 2011, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision affirming the ruling of
the RTC.
Both parties opted not to file their Supplemental Briefs and instead adopted their Briefs
filed before the appellate court.9
In this appeal, appellant contends that the prosecutions evidence is insufficient to sustain
his conviction. According to appellant, he did not rape AAA because the latter was not in
his custody at the time said incident allegedly happened. Appellant adds that he entrusted
AAA to the custody of Florante Magays sister because he was working. Appellant also
insists that AAA voluntarily went with him to his house.
Thus, the resolution of this case hinges on whether or not the prosecution was able to
establish from the testimony of the complainant the guilt of the accused for the crime of
forcible abduction with rape beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised
Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil
status, or reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with
lewd designs. On the other hand, rape under Article 266-A is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman by: (1) force or intimidation, or (2) when the woman is deprived of
reason or is unconscious, or (3) when she is under twelve years of age.
The prosecution was able to prove all these elements in this case. The victim, AAA was a
seven (7) year-old girl who was taken against her will by appellant who told her that he
knew her mother and that he would bring her home.10 At her tender age, AAA could have
easily been deceived by appellant. The employment of deception suffices to constitute the
forcible taking, especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. It is the taking
advantage of their innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds.11 The
presence of lewd designs in forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the
victim.12
During the direct examination, AAA recounted the rape incident and positively identified
appellant as the perpetrator, thus:
Q: When Rosendo undressed himself what happened next?
xxxx
A: He undressed me.
PROSECUTOR SENA:
(to witness)
Q: And after you were undressed by Rosendo what happened next?
A: He kissed me.
Q: Where were you kissed by Rosendo?
A: In lips, Sir.
209
Q: Only your lips was kissed by Rosendo? was facilitated and ensured by her abduction.15
A: On my neck.
Q: Aside by being kissed by Rosendo, what else did he do to you? In the prosecution of rape cases, conviction or acquittal depends on the complainant's
A: He inserted his penis to my vagina. testimony because of the fact that usually only the participants are witnesses to their
Q: What do you mean by totoy? occurrences. The issue therefore boils down to credibility. Significantly, findings of fact of
the trial court should not be disturbed on appeal since conclusions as to the credibility of
(No answer) witnesses in rape cases lie heavily on the sound judgment of the trial court which is in a
better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their
PROSECUTOR SENA: deportment and manner of testifying.16
(to Court)
May I change the question, Your Honor. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
COURT: particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
All right. necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of
tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what
PROSECUTOR SENA: transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she
(to witness) would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity.17 Moreover, AAA testified in a straightforward
Q: [AAA], in what part of the body of Rosendo can you find that totoy that you said? manner.
(Witness pointed to her private part)
Q: And that bilalay that you mentioned in what part of your body can you find that? On the other hand, appellant set-up the defense of denial and alibi. It is jurisprudential that
(The same, witness pointed to her private part) denial and alibi are intrinsically weak defenses which must be buttressed by strong
Q: Were you able to see that totoy of Rosendo? evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Mere denial, without any strong evidence
A: Yes, Sir. to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the child-victim of the
Q: And how big was that? identity of the appellant and his involvement in the crime attributed to him.18 Alibi is
(witness demonstrated the length more or less 5 inches) evidence negative in nature and self-serving and cannot attain more credibility than the
Q: About how the diameter, how big is the diameter? testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence. 19
COURT:
It is not necessary to prove that, the size. The appellate court is correct in affirming the imposition of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua by ratiocinating, to wit:
PROSECUTOR SENA:
Just to prove. The presence of lewd intentions is established by the conduct of the accused during the
abduction. When the girl is defiled, the forcible abduction becomes the means to commit
(to witness) the rape, and since rape is the more serious offense, under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape is committed and penalized
Q: When the penis of Rosendo was being tried by Rosendo to penetrate your by reclusion perpetua, the penalty proper to rape.20
vagina[,] what did you feel?
A: Painful, Sir.13
For clarity, the lower courts should have emphasized that reclusion perpetua as the proper
The fact of sexual intercourse is corroborated by the medical findings that the victim penalty for the crime of statutory rape was imposed in lieu of death penalty pursuant to
suffered from laceration on the upper and lower part of the introitus.14 Republic Act No. 7659. When Republic Act No. 9346 prohibited the imposition of death
penalty, persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty will now be reduced
Appellant was properly charged of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. to reclusion perpetua. And in line with our recent ruling in People v. Gambao21 where we
AAAs abduction was a necessary means to commit rape. Sexual intercourse with AAA order an increase in the amount of damages to P100,000.00 each for civil indemnity, moral
210
and exemplary damages, we deem it necessary to increase the amount of damages
accordingly.

In addition, interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded
from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.22 G.R. No. 200080, September 18, 2013

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 30 March 2011 of the Court of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARVIN
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02801 is AFFIRMED, subject to CAYANAN, Accused-Appellant.
the MODIFICATION that ROSENDO AMARO shall pay P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus R ES OLUTION
interest of 6% per annum on the amount of damages, reckoned from the finality of this
decision until full payment. REYES, J.:

SO ORDERED. Accused-appellant Marvin Cayanan (Cayanan) seeks a review of the Decision1 dated July
14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR- HC No. 04256 affirming with
modifications the Consolidated Decision2 dated June 16, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 77. The RTC decision convicted Cayanan of the
crimes of Qualified Rape (Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2001) and Forcible Abduction with
Qualified Rape (Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001), and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each crime without eligibility for parole.

The CA, however, increased the award of damages originally awarded by the RTC: (1) in
Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2001, from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; and
(2) in Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001, from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
and from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 as moral damages. The CA also awarded an additional
P75,000.00 as moral damages in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2001 and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages in both criminal cases.3cralaw virtualaw library

The prosecution established that Cayanan took advantage of 15-year old AAA4 on February
1, 2001 while the victim was alone inside her house in x x x, Bulacan. Cayanan is the
victims brother-in-law, being married to her older sister, and the couple lived in a nearby
house. AAA was asleep when she felt someone caressing her. It turned out to be Cayanan.
He then started kissing her and told her to remove her shorts. When she refused, Cayanan
forcibly took it off and after the latter took off his own undergarment, he inserted his organ
into her genitalia. Cayanan, who had a knife with him, threatened to kill AAA if she
resisted and informed anybody of the incident.

On February 26, 2001, AAA was about to enter the school campus with her friend Armina
Adriano (Adriano) when Cayanan arrived on a tricycle driven by his uncle, Boy
Manalastas. Cayanan then pulled AAA towards the tricycle. She tried shouting but he
covered her mouth. They alighted somewhere and boarded a jeep. He brought her to a dress
shop in x x x, Bulacan where he asked someone to give her a change of clothes as she was
in her school uniform and later to a Jollibee outlet. He then brought her to his sisters house
211
in x x x where he raped her inside a bedroom. Afterwards, a certain couple Putay and
Tessie talked to Cayanan and she was brought to the barangay office where she was asked
to execute a document stating that she voluntarily went with Cayanan. It was the latters
mother and sister-in-law who brought her home later that evening. She told her mother and
brother of the incidents only after her classmate Adriano informed her family of what
happened in school and of the rape incidents. AAA testified that she did not immediately
tell her family because she was still in a state of shock.5cralaw virtualaw library
Adriano and the victims mother corroborated her testimony. A resident psychiatrist at the
National Center for Mental Health also testified that AAA was suffering from mental
depressive symptoms/chronic symptoms and presence of sexual abuse. 6cralaw virtualaw
library
Cayanan interposed the sweetheart defense. The RTC, however, did not give credit to his
defense, ruling that it is a weak defense and does not rule out the use of force given the
prosecutions evidence. He also failed to establish the genuineness and authenticity of the
love letters allegedly written by AAA.7cralaw virtualaw library
Finally, the CA did not commit any reversible error in increasing the amount of civil
indemnity and moral damages awarded in Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001, and in
awarding additional P75,000.00 as moral damages in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2001 and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in both criminal cases, as these are in accord with
prevailing jurisprudence.12cralaw virtualaw library
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 04256 is MODIFIED in that accused appellant Marvin Cayanan is found guilty of
Qualified Rape in Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001. In all other respects, the CA Decision
is AFFIRMED in toto.
Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the damages
awarded, to earn from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid, in line with
prevailing jurisprudence.13cralaw virtualaw library
SO ORDERED.

The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC.8cralaw virtualaw library

A review of the CA decision shows that it did not commit any reversible error in affirming
Cayanans conviction. Record shows that Cayanan forced AAA to have sex with him on
February 1, 2001 and threatened her and her family with physical harm. The testimony of
Adriano, meanwhile, corroborated AAAs testimony that Cayanan forcibly took her by the
school campus gate on February 26, 2001 and thereafter raped her. The defense failed to
show any reason why the prosecutions evidence should not be given weight or credit.

Moreover, the claim that they were sweethearts does not justify the commission of the
crimes. For the Court to even consider giving credence to the sweetheart defense, it must
be proven by compelling evidence. The defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in
support of the theory. Independent proof is required - such as tokens, mementos, and
photographs.9 And while Cayanan produced two love letters allegedly written by AAA, the
CA correctly sustained the finding of the RTC that these letters were unauthenticated and
therefore, bereft of any probative value.

The Court, however, finds that Cayanan should be convicted only of Qualified Rape in
Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001. Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the
real objective of the accused is to rape the victim.10 In this case, circumstances show that
the victims abduction was with the purpose of raping her. Thus, after Cayanan dragged her
into the tricycle, he took her to several places until they reached his sisters house where he
raped her inside the bedroom. Under these circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible
abduction.11cralaw virtualaw library

212
 [G.R. NO. 145226. February 06, 2004]

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO,Petitioner, v.PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES,Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the
judgment2 dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in
Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7)
months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution3 of the appellate court,
dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for reconsideration.

The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:rbl
r l l lbrr

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor
at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore.
The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in
Canada, they maintained constant communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her
in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at
the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

213
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio
behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take
effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago 4 at
the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The
complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with
Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information5 filed by the
City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6 rll
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case
for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the
bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No.
8688, as follows:rbl r l l lbrr In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y
Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccionalas
minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.7 rll
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first
marriage to Lucia was null and void abinitio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the
trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of
bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is
void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez
v. Gmur,9 which held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is
domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining
a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a
divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios
defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that
following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one
does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the
consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the
appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the
marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took
place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as
follows:rbl r l l lbrr
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.11 rll
subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could
not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 34912 of the
Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage
had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the
beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the
Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 1513 of
the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction.
Under Article 1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered
ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending that the
doctrine in Mendiola v. People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as
the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
214
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.16 However,
the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice
Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared
void abinitio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the
law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE
RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY,
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE
CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE
RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE
OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17 rll
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy
and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the
divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second
marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The
petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or
acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under
the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are
allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to
commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow
that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit
bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the
instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling
in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis ,18 which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted
provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 4019 of the Family Code, a
judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the
petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know
the law. The OSG counters that petitioners contention that he was in good faith because he
relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case
No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must
first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-
Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the
first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in
Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:rbl r l l lbrr
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the
annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on
August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar,
Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.21 rll
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio
and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court
thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and 423 of the
215
Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This
simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes,
reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date
of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never
married.24 The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in
Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a
marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning.
The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted
the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being
an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner,
must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute
in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of
innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we
held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry
on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is
now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October
21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of
the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners motion for
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been
proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan .25 In the
latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise
obtained afterthe second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein
that:rbl r l l lbrr

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent

one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the
earlier union is characterized by statutes as void.26 rll

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not
just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and
then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first
marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of
nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

216
 G.R. No. 172716 : November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner, v. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-

SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and
EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

The petition seeks the review[1] of the Orders[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
affirming sub-silencio a lower courts ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy
Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property. This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding
the second prosecution.

The Facts

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two
separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal
Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent
Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce
and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release
in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367
and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner
moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.[3]cralaw

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for Certiorari(S.C.A. No.
2803).craMeanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No.

217
2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded
with the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered
his arrest.[4] Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to
suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.[5] Petitioner
sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against Petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the
dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioners loss of standing to maintain the suit.
Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly
grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803
arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No.
2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this
proved unavailing.[6]cralaw
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained
him to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner
distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for
absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking
a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.[7]cralaw
Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803.
Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No.
82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense
of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the
multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting
petitioners standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent
Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight
physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with
grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide).craHence, the prosecution was obliged to
separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from
Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion
not to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal
party and private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to
seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance
at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether
petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No.
82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the
protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him
in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of the
terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,[8] in
relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing
this Court or the Court of Appeals to also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio,
dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees
to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. The appeal contemplated in
Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for Certiorari to review a pre-
arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and
jurisprudence. The RTCs reliance on People v. Esparas[9] undercuts the cogency of its
ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTCs ruling. There, the
Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death for importing
prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and
convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death
sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124.
[10]cralaw
The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one
considers the Rules of Courts treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-
218
arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114[11] of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the defendants absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its
bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30
days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in
absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the
bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not
ipso facto convert the accuseds status to that of a fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTCs observation that petitioner provided no explanation why he failed to
attend the scheduled proceeding[12] at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the
arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTCs proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTCs
refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered
petitioners arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as
of the filing of this petition.
Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense[13] protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for
the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon
a valid information.[14] It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No.
82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the
case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367
involve the same offense. Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two
cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise,
finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely
separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does
not.[15]cralaw
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against Petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the
same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony,
the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor
in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less
serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in
damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine
ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such
value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any
person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which,
if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those
provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall
impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the
period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law,
to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished
by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act
from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part
of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
219
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed
upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in
this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1)
the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of imprudence and negligence (paragraphs
1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and
9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the
definition of reckless imprudence and simple imprudence (paragraphs 7-
8).craConceptually, quasi-offenses penalize the mental attitude or condition behind the
act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,[16]
unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and
conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes
under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of
crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing
new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this
field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that
reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x[17]
on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to
intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as
opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3)
the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional
crimes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that reckless
imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely
determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified
assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt
with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible. x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating
only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating
circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for
each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense,
there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead,
our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at
arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act
would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter
could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can
be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the
individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.
[18] (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their
commission results in damage, either to person or property.[19]cralaw
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a
case for Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence, its jurisdiction being limited
to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible
with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law[20] (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code)
and since repeatedly reiterated,[21] stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary
doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller[22] that [r]eckless impudence is not a crime
in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x,[23] has long been abandoned
when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court
decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Fallers conceptualization of quasi-crimes by
holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely
methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence[24]
only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of
criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on
erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes
undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to
quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act
after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but
arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was
based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
220
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself
and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such
quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its
various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double
jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,[25] decided in 1954. There,
a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for
damage to property thru reckless imprudence because a prior case against the same
accused for reckless driving, arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution
was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was
brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless
imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the
consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in
the affirmative in People v. Belga[26] (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per
Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero[27] (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.),
People v. Narvas[28] (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People
v. Silva[29] (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v.
Macabuhay[30] (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v.
Buan[31] (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.),
Buerano v. Court of Appeals[32] (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova,
J.), and People v. City Court of Manila[33] (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per
Relova, J.).craThese cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally
impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the
Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for serious physical injuries and
damage to property thru reckless imprudence because of the accuseds prior acquittal of
slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, with both charges grounded on the
same act, the Court explained:[34]cralaw
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for
that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under
article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of
the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes
and prosecutions.[35] x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical
conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority.
Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,[36] decided by
the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an
accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous
conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a
motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based. Estiponas inconsistency with
the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all
doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.[37] There, we reviewed the
Court of Appeals conviction of an accused for damage to property for reckless
imprudence despite his prior conviction for slight and less serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence, arising from the same act upon which the second charge was based.
The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan:
[38]cralaw
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the
pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in
the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court,
speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that -
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted
of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of
criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in
the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done,
would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or
careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only
taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the
substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into
different crimes and prosecutions.
x x x
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the
Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of
221
 slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being
prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in
the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are
derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident,
because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for
the same offense.[39] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in
Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Courts
attention:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION
dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals
erred in not sustaining petitioners plea of double jeopardy and submits that its
affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR
finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence
should be set aside, without costs. He stressed that if double jeopardy exists
where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same
consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely
damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human
life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of
damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same
mishap.[40] (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioners submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to
extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A
more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioners case than People v. Silva,
[41] a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision,
was charged in two separate Informations with Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence and Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence.
Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking
the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration,
found merit in the accuseds claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial
court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny
People v. Belga:[42]cralaw
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the
case, holding:
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double
jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and
Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay,
with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a
collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No.
88).craWithout the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise
disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the
peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to property
through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of
the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries
through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers
injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose Belga
only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in
Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the
complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed against
him by the injured passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of
the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The
motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon
he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for
damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the
vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance
of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary
investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First
Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless
imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon
motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to
quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the
Supreme Court in the following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in
the case filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent
prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property
through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused
was charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a fast and reckless
manner ... thereby causing an accident. After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case
was dismissed in that court for failure of the Government to prosecute. But some time
thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount
of the damage was alleged to be P249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a
motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we
there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor
222
 The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of
violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal
Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in
the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or
not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec.
9).craAnother test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the
other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would
have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or whether one
crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
x x x
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of
the prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the
provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecutions
contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser
offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which
acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press
in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless
imprudence of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior
court.[43]cralaw
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence,
Diaz) for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application.[44] We declined the
invitation, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on
the ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the
JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath
said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall
squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal
of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-
examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of
delimiting or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further
elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are
analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage
to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a
delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On
the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the
identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.[45] (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC
succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually
incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining
and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the
Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of
multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light
felonies[46]); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The
legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving
multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but
the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight x x x,[47] a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences.
Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a
single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts
and their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a
hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models - that of a single criminal negligence
resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties
corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is
obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48s framework
apply to complex the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences
(excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the
prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the
single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under
Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved
the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by complexing one quasi-crime with its
multiple consequences[48] unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case
charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less
223
grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand,
resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts.
[49] Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent
Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691,[50] the MeTC has now
exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which
is prision correccional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the complexing of acts
penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave
felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of
double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the
other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not
deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the
resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all
the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number
or severity,[51] penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,[52] we
interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries, as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than
25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property
the amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries
there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split
into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property,
x x x.[53] (Emphasis supplied)
By additional penalty, the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field
demands choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the complexing of
a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light
felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article
365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple
consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13,
Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the
prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting
acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article
365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365,
articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.
A becoming regard of this Courts place in our scheme of government denying it the power
to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-
crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion
of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand
for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense
which is a necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in
Buan, we rejected the Solicitor Generals argument that double jeopardy does not bar a
second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly
because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies.
This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of
People vs. [Silva] x x x:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[T]he prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to
first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before
pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the
prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the
same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by
the inferior court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice
of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both
charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular
accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy
for the same offense.[54] (Emphasis supplied)
224
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges
under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant
occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to
mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge
will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged
and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.[55]cralaw

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and
simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True,
they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under
Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of
non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as light offenses (or, as here, for the
more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly).craIf it is so minded, Congress can re-craft
Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only G.R. No. 178145, July 07, 2014
the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts,
whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the REYNALDO S. MARIANO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the
effect of this ruling. R ES OLUTION

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006
and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double
jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
BERSAMIN, J.:
The courts of law are hereby reminded once again to exercise care in the determination of
the proper penalty imposable upon the offenders whom they find and declare to be guilty of
the offenses charged or proved. Their correct determination is the essence of due process of
law.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan charged the petitioner with frustrated
murder for hitting and bumping Ferdinand de Leon while overtaking the latters jeep in the
information filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), viz:

That on or about the 12th day of September, 1999, in the municipality of Angat, Province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of the motor
vehicle he was then driving, with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior
strength, hit, bump and run over with the said motor vehicle one Ferdinand de Leon,
thereby inflicting upon him serious physical injuries which ordinarily would have caused
the death of the said Ferdinand de Leon, thus performing all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not

225
produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to said Ferdinand de Leon.
Contrary to law.1
The CA summarized the antecedent events as follows:
At about 6:30 in the evening of September 12, 1999, Ferdinand de Leon was driving his
owner type jeep along Barangay Engkanto, Angat, Bulacan. With him were his wife,
Urbanita, and their two-year old son, as they just came from a baptismal party. Luis de
Leon, an uncle of Ferdinand, also came from the baptismal party and was driving his owner
type jeep. Accused-appellant Reynaldo Mariano was driving his red Toyota pick-up with
his wife, Rebecca, and their helper, Rowena Aos, as passengers. They had just attended a
worship service in Barangay Engkanto.
The Toyota pick-up overtook the jeep of Ferdinand de Leon and almost bumped it.
Ferdinand got mad, overtook the pick-up and blocked its path. Reynaldo Mariano stopped
the pick-up behind the jeep. Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and approached Reynaldo.
Ferdinand claimed that he and Reynaldo had an altercation. However, Reynaldo insisted
that he just stayed inside the pick-up and kept quiet while Ferdinand hurled invectives at
him. Urbanita tried to pacify Ferdinand and sought the assistance of Luis de Leon. Luis
intervened and told Ferdinand and Reynaldo magpasensiyahan na lamang kayo at
pagpasensiyahan mo si Ferdinand. Ferdinand and Reynaldo heeded the advice of Luis
and they went their separate ways.
Instead of proceeding to his house in Norzagaray, Ferdinand decided to drop by his
mothers house in San Roque, Angat to pick up some items. He parked his jeep in front of
the house of his mother and alighted therefrom. However, he was bumped by a moving
vehicle, thrown four (4) meters away and lost consciousness. Urbanita shouted, Mommy,
Mommy, nasagasaan si Ferdie. She identified the fast moving vehicle that bumped
Ferdinand as the same red Toyota pick-up driven by Reynaldo.
On the other hand, Reynaldo and his wife, Rebecca, tried to show that the jeep of
Ferdinand stopped on the road in front of the house of the latters mother about five (5) to
six (6) meters away from their pick-up. Reynaldo stopped the pick-up as he saw an
oncoming vehicle, which he allowed to pass. Thereafter, Reynaldo made a signal and
overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. However, Ferdinand suddenly alighted from his jeep, lost
his balance and was sideswiped by the overtaking pick-up. Reynaldo did not stop his pick-
up and he proceeded on his way for fear that the bystanders might harm him and his
companions. After bringing his companions to their house in Marungko, Angat, Bulacan,
Reynaldo proceeded to Camp Alejo S. Santos in Malolos, Bulacan to surrender and report
the incident.
Ferdinand was brought to the Sto. Nio Hospital in Bustos, Bulacan, where he stayed for
two and a half days and incurred medical expenses amounting to P17,800.00 On September
15, 1999, Ferdinand was transferred to St. Lukes Medical Center in Quezon City, where he
stayed until September 25, 1999 and incurred medical expenses amounting to P66,243.25.
He likewise spent P909.50 for medicines, P2,900.00 for scanning, P8,000.00 for doctors
fee and P12,550.00 for the services of his caregivers and masseur from September 12 to
October 31, 1999. Ferdinand suffered multiple facial injuries, a fracture of the inferior part
of the right orbital wall and subdural hemorrhage secondary to severe head trauma, as
evidenced by the certification issued by Dr. Hernando L. Cruz, Jr. of St. Lukes Medical
Center. Urbanita, received the amount of P50,000.00 from Reynaldo Mariano by way of
financial assistance, as evidenced by a receipt dated September 15, 1999.2
Under its decision rendered on May 26, 2003 after trial, however, the RTC convicted the
petitioner of frustrated homicide,3 to wit:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds the accused Reynaldo
Mariano GUILTY for the lesser offense of Frustrated Homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 50 thereof and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of three (3) years and four (4) months of Prision Correccional as
minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum and is hereby
directed to pay the complainant, Ferdinand de Leon, the amount of P196,043.25 less
P50,000.00 (already given) as actual damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and the
costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the CA promulgated its assailed decision on June 29, 2006,5 modifying the
felony committed by the petitioner from frustrated homicide to reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries, ruling thusly:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED and accused-appellant
Reynaldo Mariano is found guilty of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and
one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year, seven (7) months and eleven
(11) days of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify Ferdinand de Leon in the
amount of P58,402.75 as actual damages and P10,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.6
In this appeal, the petitioner argues that his guilt for any crime was not proved beyond
226
reasonable doubt, and claims that Ferdinands injuries were the result of a mere accident.
He insists that he lacked criminal intent; that he was not negligent in driving his pick-up
truck; and that the CA should have appreciated voluntary surrender as a mitigating
circumstance in his favor.
Ruling
We affirm the conviction of the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries.
The following findings by the CA compel us to affirm, to wit:
Reynaldo tried to show that he stopped his pick-up five (5) to six (6) meters behind the jeep
of Ferdinand, as he allowed an oncoming vehicle to pass. Thereafter, he overtook the jeep
of Ferdinand. However, the fact that Ferdinands body was thrown four (4) meters away
from his jeep showed that Reynaldo was driving his pick-up at a fast speed when he
overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. It is worthy to note that Reynaldo admitted that he has
known Ferdinand and the latters family since 1980 because they have a store where he
used to buy things. As aptly observed by the OSG, Reynaldo should have foreseen the
possibility that Ferdinand would alight from his jeep and go inside the house of his mother
where the store is also located.
xxxx
As aptly observed by the court a quo, only a vehicle that is moving beyond the normal rate
of speed and within the control of the drivers hands could have caused Ferdinands
injuries. The very fact of speeding is indicative of imprudent behavior, as a motorist must
exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the
conditions encountered, which will enable him or her to keep the vehicle under control and
avoid injury to others using the highway. As held in People v. Garcia:
A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to
be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring
punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which
no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person,
rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of
danger and injury.
Thus, had Reynaldo not driven his pick-up at a fast speed in overtaking the jeep of
Ferdinand, he could have easily stopped his pick-up or swerved farther to the left side of
the road, as there was no oncoming vehicle, when he saw that Ferdinand alighted from his
jeep and lost his balance, in order to avoid hitting the latter or, at least, minimizing his
injuries.7
The findings by the CA are controlling on the Court. Indeed, the findings of both lower
courts on the circumstances that had led to the injuries of Ferdinand fully converged except
for the RTCs conclusion that malicious intent had attended the commission of the offense.
Such findings cannot be disturbed by the Court in this appellate review, for it is a well-
settled rule that the findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are
binding and conclusive upon the Court.8
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.9 To constitute the offense of reckless
driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of the
motor vehicle, but a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required.10 The
Prosecution must further show the direct causal connection between the negligence and the
injuries or damages complained of. In Manzanares v. People,11 the petitioner was found
guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and serious physical injuries
because of the finding that he had driven the Isuzu truck very fast before it smashed into a
jeepney. In Pangonorom v. People,12 a public utility driver driving his vehicle very fast was
held criminally negligent because he had not slowed down to avoid hitting a swerving car.
In the absence of any cogent reasons, therefore, the Court bows to the CAs observations
that the petitioner had driven his pick-up truck at a fast speed in order to overtake the jeep
of Ferdinand, and in so attempting to overtake unavoidably hit Ferdinand, causing the
latters injuries.
Contrary to the petitioners insistence, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
cannot be appreciated in his favor. Paragraph 5 of Article 365, Revised Penal
Code, expressly states that in the imposition of the penalties, the courts shall exercise their
sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code. The rationale of the law, according to People v. Medroso, Jr.:13
x x x can be found in the fact that in quasi-offenses penalized under Article 365, the
carelessness, imprudence or negligence which characterizes the wrongful act may vary
from one situation to another, in nature, extent, and resulting consequences, and in order
that there may be a fair and just application of the penalty, the courts must have ample
discretion in its imposition, without being bound by what We may call the mathematical
formula provided for in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. On the basis of this
particular provision, the trial court was not bound to apply paragraph 5 of Article 64 in the
instant case even if appellant had two mitigating circumstances in his favor with no
aggravating circumstance to offset them.
227

Even so, the CA erred in imposing on the petitioner the penalty for reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries. The error should be avoided because no person
should be condemned to suffer a penalty that the law does not prescribe or provide for the
offense charged or proved. Verily, anyone judicially declared guilty of any crime must be
duly punished in accordance with the law defining the crime and prescribing the
punishment. Injustice would always result to the offender should the penalty exceed that
allowed by the law. The imposition of the correct penalty on the offender is the essence of
due process of law.
The penalty for the offender guilty of reckless imprudence is based on the gravity of the
resulting injuries had his act been intentional. Thus, Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code stipulates that had the act been intentional, and would constitute a grave felony, the
offender shall suffer arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; and if it would have constituted a light
felony, arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. Pursuant to Article 9 of
the Revised Penal Code, a grave felony is that to which the law attaches the capital
punishment or a penalty that in any of its periods is afflictive in accordance with Article 25
of the Revised Penal Code; a less grave felony is that which the law punishes with a
penalty that is correctional in its maximum period in accordance with Article 25 of
the Revised Penal Code; and a light felony is an infraction of law for the commission of
which a penalty of either arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both is
provided.
In turn, Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates the principal afflictive
penalties to be reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, and prision mayor; the
principal correctional penalties to be prision correccional, arresto mayor, suspension
and destierro; and the light penalties to be arresto menor and fine not exceeding P200.00.
Under this provision, death stands alone as the capital punishment.
The Revised Penal Code classifies the felony of serious physical injuries based on the
gravity of the physical injuries, to wit:
Article 263. Serious physical injuries. Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault
another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the
injured person shall become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if in
consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have lost the use of
speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or
a leg or shall have lost the use of any such member, or shall have become incapacitated for
the work in which he was therefor habitually engaged;
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if in
consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have become
deformed, or shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or
shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in which he as
habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety days;
4. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or incapacity
for labor of the injured person for more than thirty days.
If the offense shall have been committed against any of the persons enumerated in Article
246, or with attendance of any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248, the case
covered by subdivision number 1 of this Article shall be punished by reclusion temporal in
its medium and maximum periods; the case covered by subdivision number 2 by prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period; the case
covered by subdivision number 3 by prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods; and the case covered by subdivision number 4 by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to a parent who shall
inflict physical injuries upon his child by excessive chastisement.
In its decision,14 the CA found that Ferdinand had sustained multiple facial injuries, a
fracture of the inferior part of the right orbital wall, and subdural hemorrhage secondary to
severe head trauma; that he had become stuporous and disoriented as to time, place and
person. It was also on record that he had testified at the trial that he was unable to attend to
his general merchandise store for three months due to temporary amnesia; and that he had
required the attendance of caregivers and a masseur until October 31, 1999.
With Ferdinand not becoming insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind, his physical injuries did
not fall under Article 263, 1, supra. Consequently, the CA incorrectly considered the
petitioners act as a grave felony had it been intentional, and should not have imposed the
penalty at arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period. Instead, the petitioners act that caused the serious physical injuries, had it been
intentional, would be a less grave felony under Article 25 of the Revised Penal
Code, because Ferdinands physical injuries were those under Article 263, 3, supra, for
having incapacitated him from the performance of the work in which he was habitually
engaged in for more than 90 days.
228
Conformably with Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which ranges from one to four months. As
earlier mentioned, the rules in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code are not applicable in
reckless imprudence, and considering further that the maximum term of imprisonment
would not exceed one year, rendering the Indeterminate Sentence Law inapplicable,15 the
Court holds that the straight penalty of two months of arresto mayor was the correct
penalty for the petitioner.

The Court agrees with the CAs modification of the award of actual and moral damages
amounting to P58,402.75 and P10,000.00, respectively.

Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. This is because the courts cannot rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. To
justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual loss
suffered, which should be based on the amounts actually expended by the victim,16 or other
competent proof. Here, the receipts presented by the Prosecution proved the expenses G.R. No. 195671, January 21, 2015
actually incurred amounting to P108,402.75, but such aggregate was reduced by the
victims earlier receipt of P50,000.00 from the petitioner in the form of financial assistance.
ROGELIO J. GONZAGA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
Hence, the victim should recover only the unpaid portion of P58,402.75.
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Moral damages are given to ease the victims grief and suffering. Moral damages should
DECISION
reasonably approximate the extent of the hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong
done.17Accordingly, the CA properly reduced to P10,000.00 the moral damages awarded to
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Ferdinand.

In addition, we impose an interest of 6% per annum on the actual and moral damages
reckoned from the finality of this decision until the full payment of the obligation. This is
because the damages thus fixed thereby become a forbearance. The rate of 6% per
annum is pursuant to Circular No. 799, series of 2013, issued by the Office of the Governor
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas on June 21, 2013, and the pronouncement in Nacar v.
Gallery Frames.18
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006, subject
to the modifications that: (a) the penalty to be imposed on the petitioner shall be a straight
penalty of two months of arresto mayor; and (b) the awards for actual and moral damages
shall earn 6% interest rate per annum commencing from the finality of this decision until
fully paid.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 18,
2009 and the Resolution3 dated January 26, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 00427-MIN, which affirmed the Decision4 dated July 31, 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 10 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 9832-
99, finding petitioner Rogelio J. Gonzaga (Rogelio) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical
Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).cralawred
The Facts
At around 6 oclock in the morning of June 25, 1997, Dionesio Inguito, Sr. (Dionesio, Sr.)
was driving his motorcycle along Brgy. Kiara, Don Carlos, Bukidnon towards Brgy.
Bocboc5 of the same municipality, to bring his two (2)minor children, Dionesio Inguito, Jr.
(Dionesio, Jr.) and Cherry Inguito6 (Cherry), to school.7 While they were ascending the
curving road going to Bocboc on their proper lane on the right side of the road, a Toyota
Land Cruiser(Land Cruiser) driven by Rogelio was swiftly descending the same lane from
229
the opposite direction. Dionesio, Sr. blew the horn of his motorcycle to signal the Land
Cruiser to return to its proper lane but the Land Cruiser remained.8In order to avoid
collision, Dionesio, Sr.tried to swerve to the left, but the Land Cruiser suddenly swerved
towards the same direction and collided head-on with the
motorcycle.9chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a result of the collision, Dionesio, Sr. and his 2 children were thrown off the
motorcycle. Dionesio, Sr. was pinned beneath the Land Cruiser,10 while Cherry and
Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over the hood of the Land Cruiser and fell on the side of the
road,11 causing injuriesto their legs. Siblings Rolf, Cherry,12 and Jenny Ann Aquino,who
were traversing the same road aboard their own motorcycle,stopped to help and placed the
victims together13 on the rightmost side of the road facing Brgy. Bocboc,14while Rogelio
remained inside the Land Cruiser.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rolf left the scene of the incident to seek further assistance, leaving his two (2) sisters to
cater to the victims.16 Eventually, he chanced upon Kagawad Nerio Dadivas (Kgd.
Dadivas), who had just opened his store, and informed the latter of the vehicular
accident.After reporting the incident to the police and getting his vehicle, Kgd. Dadivas
proceeded to the site and loaded the victims to his vehicle with Rolfs
assistance.17 Meanwhile, Rolf went to Brgy. Kawilihan to inform Dionesio, Sr.s wife,
Clemencia Inguito (Clemencia), of what had transpired.18chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Thereafter, the victims were brought to the Emergency Hospital of Maramag where they
were treated.19Operations were performed on the legs of Dionesio, Jr. and Dionesio, Sr., but
the latter eventually expired. Cherrys leg was placed in a cast and she was confined in the
hospital, together with Dionesio, Jr., for more than one (1) month, or until July 26,
1997.20 All the expenses were shouldered by Clemencia.21chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In view of the foregoing mishap, the provincial prosecutor filed an Information22 charging
Rogelio for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical
Injuries and Damage to Property with the aggravating circumstance that accused failed to
lend on the spot to the injured party such help that was in his hands to give23 before the
RTC.Upon arraignment,24 Rogelio entered a plea of not
guilty.25chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In his defense, Rogelio claimed that he was driving the Land Cruiser on his proper lane
along the descending curving road towards the direction of Kalilangan, Bukidnon,
when,from a distance of about 70 meters away, he saw the motorcycles driven by Dionesio,
Sr.and Rolf racing towards the curve from the opposite direction.26 Dionesio, Sr. was
driving his motorcycle in a zigzag manner on the Land Cruisers lane while Rolf was on
his proper lane.27 Undecided which side of the road to take to avoid collision, Rogelio
stopped the Land Cruiser but the motorcycle of Dionesio, Sr., nonetheless, bumped into
it.28 As a result of the impact, Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over the roof and the
hood of the Land Cruiser, respectively, and fell on the side of the road, while Dionesio, Sr.
and the motorcycle were pinned beneath the land Cruiser.29 With the use of a jack handle
and the assistance of two (2) persons, i.e., Jose Bacus and Reynaldo Quidato, who arrived
at the scene, he was able to retrieve both Dionesio, Sr. and the motorcycle from beneath the
Land Cruiser. Thereafter, they loaded the victims on board the Land Cruiser so they may be
brought to the hospital, but the vehicle turned out to have defective brakes,so he asked
other persons to secure another vehicle instead.30chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The RTC Proceedings
In a Decision31 dated July 31, 2006 (July 31, 2006Decision), the RTC found Rogelio guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with
Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property punishable under Article 365 in
relation to Article 263 of the RPC.32chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It held that Rogelios act of driving very fast on the wrong side of the road was the
proximate cause of the collision, resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical
injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Considering further that Rogelio failed to offer any
help to the victims,33 the RTC sentenced him to suffer a higher indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years, two (2) months of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as maximum, and ordered him to pay the
following civil liabilities: (a) P50,000.00 as moral damages for the death of Dionesio, Sr.;
(b) P30,000.00as moral damages for the mental anguish suffered by the family; (c)
P200,000.00 for the medical expenses incurred; (d) P25,000.00 for the expenses incurred
during the wake and the burial; (e) P30,000.00 for the damaged motorcycle; (f) P60,000.00
for the loss of earning capacity; and (g) P30,000.00 as attorneys
fees.34chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rogelio filed a motion for reconsideration35 which was partly granted in a
Resolution36 dated February 22, 2007, reducing the penalty to four (4) months and one (1)
day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, with the same civil liabilities. The RTC reconsidered its
opinion regarding Rogelios claim of having extended aid to the victims, concluding that
the jack handle that was used to get the body of Dionesio, Sr. beneath the Land Cruiser
could have been his in the absence of showing who owned the same.37 Aggrieved, Rogelio
appealed to the CA.cralawred
The CA Ruling
In a Decision38 dated September 18, 2009, however, the CA reinstated the RTCs July 31,
2006 Decision, thereby imposing on Rogelio the original indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years, two (2) months of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) years
230
and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as maximum, and the same civil
liabilities, 39 hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld
Rogelios conviction in accordance with the RTCs July 31, 2006Decision.cralawred
The Courts Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 36540 of the RPC, consists in voluntarily, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason
of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform
such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
In order to establish a motorists liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be
shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries
or damages complained of. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be
something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle a willful and
wanton disregard of the consequences is required.41 Willful, wanton or reckless disregard
for the safety of others within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to
involve a conscious choice of a course of action which injures another, either with
knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would
disclose the danger to any reasonable person. Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of
precaution or conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct which
supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence and imprudence
under the operation of the penal law, without regard to whether the private offended
party may himself be considered likewise at fault.42chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the present case, the RTC and the CA uniformly found that Rogelios act of driving very
fast on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the collision, resulting to
the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Notably,
the road where the incident occurred was a curve sloping upwards towards Brgy. Bocboc
where the Inguitos were bound and descending towards the opposite direction where
Rogelio was going. Indeed, the very fact of speeding, under such circumstances, is
indicative of imprudent behavior.As a motorist, Rogelio was bound to exercise ordinary
care in such affair by driving at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the
conditions encountered, as this would enable him to keep the vehicle under control and
avoid injury to others using the highway.43] Moreover, it is elementary in traffic school that
a driver slows down before negotiating a curve as it may be reasonably anticipated that
another vehicle may appear from the opposite direction at any moment. Hence, excessive
speed, combined with other circumstances such as the occurrence of the accident on or near
a curve, as in this case, constitutes negligence.44 Consequently, the Court finds that
Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently in driving at a fast speed on the wrong side of the
road while approaching the curve where the incident happened, thereby rendering him
criminally liable, as well as civilly accountable for the material damages resulting
therefrom.
Nonetheless, while the CA and the RTC concurred that the proximate cause of the collision
was Rogelios reckless driving, the CA Decision made no mention as to the presence or
absence of the limiting element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC, which
imposes the penalty next higher in degree upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot
to the injured parties such help as may be in his hands to give. Based on case law, the
obligation under this paragraph: (a) is dependent on the means in the hands of the offender,
i.e., the type and degree of assistance that he/she, at the time and place of the incident, is
capable of giving; and (b) requires adequate proof.45chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is well to point out that the RTCs July 31, 2006Decision found that Rogelio failed to
offer any help to the victims46 and, thus, imposed on him the penalty next higher in degree.
However, upon Rogelios motion, the RTC reconsidered its earlier conclusion, holding that
the jack handle that was used to get the body of Dionesio, Sr. beneath the Land Cruiser
could have been his in the absence of showing who owned the same and, accordingly,
reduced the penalty.47 Nothing was said on this point by the CA which affirmed Rogelios
conviction based on the RTCs July 31, 2006Decision.
The Court has perused the records and found contradictory testimonies presented by the
prosecution and the defense on this matter. Considering however, that Cherry herself
admitted that the victims were first loaded on the Land Cruiser before they were transferred
to Kgd. Dadivass vehicle,48 the Court is inclined to sustain Rogelios claim that he tried to
extend help to the victims, but when he started the engine with the intention to go to the
hospital, he discovered that the vehicle had no brakes.49 Hence, in imposing the proper
penalty on the accused, the qualifying circumstance under the last paragraph of Article
365of the RPC should not be considered.
Here, Rogelio was charged with the offense of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365
in relation to Article 26350 of the RPC, a complex crime. Article 48 of the RPC provides
that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime, in this case, Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.
Under Article 365 of the RPC, when reckless imprudence in the use of a motor vehicle
231
results in the death of a person, as in this case, the accused shall be punished with the
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, i.e., two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law,51 the minimum of said penalty should be taken from arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to
two (2) years and four (4) months. Consequently, the Court finds a need to modify the
penalty to be imposed on Rogelio and thus, sentences him to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years of prision correccional in its minimum, as minimum, to six years
of prision correccional in its maximum, as maximum.

As a final note, the Court clarifies that the order for the payment of moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00for the death of Dionesio, Sr.should be, properly speaking,
denominated as one for the payment of civil indemnity as they were not awarded under
the parameters of the Civil Code relevant thereto,52but was one given without need of
proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of [the accuseds]
responsibility for it.53 This is a palpable legal error which the Court should correct if only
for terminological propriety. With the private complainant not herein impleaded, the rest of
the RTCs July 31, 2006 Decision with respect to the civil liabilities awarded should remain
undisturbed. Note that, in line with existing jurisprudence, interest at the rate of six percent G.R. No. 212932, January 21, 2015
(6) per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of
judgment until fully paid.54chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarychanrobleslaw PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARNEL BALUTE Y
VILLANUEVA, Accused-Appellant.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 18, 2009 and the
Resolution dated January 26, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. R ES OLUTION
00427-MIN, finding petitioner Rogelio J. Gonzaga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the Revised
Penal Code are hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant ArnelBalutey Villanueva
(Balute)assailing the Decision2 dated February 3, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
(a Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prision CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05649 which affirmed the Decision3 dated June 11, 2012 of the
) correccional in its minimum, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional in its Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 03-211951, finding
maximum, as maximum; and Baluteguilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Robbery with
(b The award of P50,000.00 for the death of Dionesio Inguito, Sr. in favor of his heirs is Homicide.cralawred
) denominated as civil indemnity,instead of moral damages.
(c) All monetary awards for damages shall bear interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per The Facts
annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
On November 22, 2002, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Balute of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294(1)4 of the
SO ORDERED. Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, the accusatory portion of which
reads:5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Crim. Case No. 03-211951

232

That on or about March 22, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring and confederating together with one whose true name, real identity and present
whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping each other, with intent to gain and by
means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by then and there poking a gun at one
SPO1 RAYMUNDO B. MANAOIS, forcibly grabbing and snatching his Nokia 3210
cellular phone, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry
away the same valued at P6,000.00 against his will, to the damage and prejudice of the said
SPO1 RAYMUNDO B. MANAOIS in the aforesaid amount of P6,000.00 Philippine
Currency; thereafter shooting said SPO1 RAYMUNDO B. MANAOIS with an unknown
caliber firearm, hitting him at the back, and as a result thereof, he sustained mortal gunshot
wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
According to the prosecution, at around 8 oclock in the evening of March 22, 2002, SPO1
Raymundo B. Manaois (SPO1 Manaois) was on board his owner-type jeepney with his
wife Cristita and daughter Blesilda, and was traversing Road 10, Tondo, Manila. While the
vehicle was on a stop position at a lighted area due to heavy traffic, two (2) male persons,
later on identified as Balute and a certain Leo Blaster (Blaster), suddenly appeared on
either side of the jeepney, with Balute poking a gun at the side of SPO1 Manaois and
saying putangina, ilabas mo! Thereafter, Balute grabbed SPO1 Manaoiss mobile phone
from the latters chest pocket and shot him at the left side of his torso. SPO1 Manaois
reacted by drawing his own firearm and alighting from his vehicle, but he was unable to
fire at the assailants as he fell to the ground. He was taken to Mary Johnston Hospital
where he died despite undergoing surgical operation and medical
intervention.6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In his defense, Balute denied having any knowledge of the charges against him. He
maintained, inter alia, that on March 22, 2002, he was at the shop of a certain Leticia Nicol
(Nicol) wherein he worked as a pedicab welder from 8:00 oclock in the morning until
10:00 oclock in the evening, and did not notice any untoward incident that day as he was
busy working the entire time. Nicol corroborated Balutes story, and imputed liability on
Blaster and a certain Intoy.7chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The RTC Ruling
8
In a Decision dated June 11, 2012, the RTC found Balute guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide with the aggravating circumstance of treachery,
and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole, in lieu of the death penalty, as well as ordered him to pay the heirs of
SPO1 Manaois the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P6,000.00 as compensatory
damages for the value of the stolen mobile phone, and P50,000.00 as moral damages, with
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum (p.a.) from the filing of the
Information.9chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It found that the prosecution was able to establish the existence of all the elements of
Robbery with Homicide, as it proved that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaoiss side,
took his mobile phone, and shot him, resulting in the latters death. In this relation, the RTC
gave credence to Cristita and Blesildas positive identification of Balute as the assailant, as
compared to the latters mere denial and alibi.10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Aggrieved, Balute appealed to the CA.cralawred
The CA Ruling
In a Decision11 dated February 3, 2014, the CA affirmed Balutes conviction with
modification in that: (a) the aggravating circumstance of treachery was no longer
considered as the prosecution failed to allege the same in the Information;12(b) the civil
indemnity was increased to P75,000.00 in view of existing jurisprudence;(c) the P6,000.00
compensatory damages, representing the value of the mobile phone, was deleted in the
absence of competent proof of its value, and in lieu thereof, actual damages in the
aggregate amount of P140,413.53 representing SPO1 Manaoiss hospital and funeral
expenses was awarded to his heirs; and (d) all the monetary awards for damages are with
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) p.a. from the date of finality of the CA Decision until
fully paid.13chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Hence, the instant appeal.cralawred
The Issue Before the Court
The lone issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Balutes
conviction for Robbery with Homicide.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
It must be stressed that in criminal cases, factual findings of the trial court are generally
accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported
by substantial evidence on record. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the
trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that the Court will re-calibrate and
evaluate the factual findings of the court below.14 Guided by the foregoing principle, the
Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the RTCs factual findings, as affirmed by the CA.
233
In People v. Ibaez,15 the Court exhaustively explained that [a] special complex crime of
robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on
the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the
prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property
belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation
against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of
homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude that
the robbery is the main purpose, and [the] objective of the malefactor and the killing is
merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life
but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.16 Homicide is said to have
been committed by reason or on occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed: (a)
to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the
culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to
eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime.17chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Court also awards exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 in favor of the heirs of
SPO1 Manaois due to the highly reprehensible and/or outrageous conduct of Balute in
committing the aforesaid crime.21chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarychanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated February 3, 2014 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05649 finding accused-appellant
ArnelBalutey Villanueva GUILTY beyond reasonable doubtof the crime of Robbery with
Homicide defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that he is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and is ordered to pay the
heirs of SPO1 Raymundo B. Manaois the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P140,413.53 as actual damages, and P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent(6%) per annum from
the finality of judgment until full payment.

In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTCs finding that the prosecution was able SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
to establish the fact that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the latters mobile
phone, and thereafter, shot him, resulting in his death despite surgical and medical
intervention. This is buttressed by Cristita and Blesildas positive identification of Balute as
the one who committed the crime as opposed to the latters denial and alibi which was
correctly considered by both the RTC and the CA as weak and self-serving, as it is well-
settled that alibi and denial are outweighed by positive identification that is categorical,
consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the [eyewitnesses] testifying on the
matter.18 This is especially true when the eyewitnesses are the relatives of the victim
such as Cristita and Blesilda who are the wife and daughter of SPO1 Manaois, respectively
since [t]he natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victim, in securing the
conviction of the guilty would actually deter them from implicating persons other than the
true culprits.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In sum, the RTC and the CA correctly convicted Balute of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide as defined and penalized under Article 294(1) of the RPC, as amended.
However, the Court deems it appropriate to adjust the award of moral damages from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 in order to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.20 Further, the

234