RULE 8

1. Ledda v. BPI
GR No. 200868 November 12, 2012 Carpio, J.
Facts: Anita Ledda was issued a pre-approved BPI credit card on July 1, 2005 together with
the Terms and Conditions governing its use. She used the card for various purchases.
However, Ledda, later on, defaulted on her payments amounting to P548, 143.73 and other
penalties per BPIs Statement of Account dated September 9, 2007. For failure to pay
despite demands, BPI filed an action for collection of sum of money with the RTC Makati
City which ruled in its favor.
CA affirmed the RTC and rejected Leddas argument that the Terms and Conditions of the
credit card is an actionable document contemplated in Section 7, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. It ruled that that BPIs cause of action is based on "Leddas availment of
the banks credit facilities through the use of her credit/plastic cards, coupled with her refusal
to pay BPIs outstanding credit for the cost of the goods, services and cash advances
despite lawful demands."
Issue: WON the CA erred in holding that the Terms and Conditions on the issuance and use
of the credit card is not an actionable document.
Held: No. Section 7, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
SEC. 7. Action or defense based on document. Whenever an action or defense is based
upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document
shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the
pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may
with like effect be set forth in the pleading.
BPIs cause of action in its collection of sum of money against Ledda is primarily based on:
(1) the acceptance of the BPI credit card; (2) usage of the BPI credit card to purchase, avail
services and secure cash advances; and (3) non-payment of the amount due for such credit
card transactions, despite demands. It is not based only the Terms and Conditions
accompanying the issuance of the BPI credit card in favor of Ledda. Therefore, the
Terms and Conditions governing the use of the BPI credit card is not an actionable
document. As such, it is not required by the Rules to be set forth in and attached to the
complaint.

2. HIBBERD v. ROHDE & MCMILLIAN

G.R. No. 8418 December 9, 1915 Trent, J.

Facts: McMillian was in the retail liquor business and secured a stock of merchandize worth
P1, 200 from Brand & Hibberd, and sold it. The firm filed a case for estafa against McMillian
alleging that they delivered the merchandize on him on deposit only. Rohde, as a practicing
lawyer, took the defense and testified that he was well acquainted with the nature of the
transaction between the firm and McMillian. However, Rohde agreed to sign the following
note with the firm if the latter would withdraw the estafa case.
Baguio, Benget, April 27th, 1911

For value received, we the undersigned parties, jointly and severally agree to pay to the firm of Brand
& Hibberd, of the city of Baguio, P.J., tewelve hundred pesos Philipine currenct in monthly installments
of one hundred pesos per month, beginning with the first day of June 1911.
W.M.J. Rohde, D.J. McMillian

It was found that Rohde this did because McMillian, who was in confinement pending trial,
was already sick and would not want to endanger further his health. It was also found that
the consideration of the note was the compromise of the estafa case. Rohdes did not enter
his verified specific denial of the genuineness and due execution of the note, the plaintiff
claims that his special defense of illegality of consideration is cut off by Section 103 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
Issue: WON Rohde was barred from questioning the legality of the note for not having
verified specific denial of its genuineness and due execution.
Held: No. By the admission of the genuineness and due execution of an instrument is meant
that the party whose signature it bears admits it and that any formal requisites required by
law which it lacks are waved by him. Hence such defense as that the signature is a forgery
or that it was unauthorized that the party charged signed the instrument in some other
capacity that that alleged in the pleading setting it out; or that it was never delivered are cut
off by the admission of its genuineness and due execution.
However, we have held that Section 103 is not applicable to the indorsement on a
promissory note in a suit against the maker nor against the heirs of decedent who signed a
document declared upon. Under statutes similar to our own it has been held that the
admission of the genuineness and due execution of the instrument does not bar the defense
of want of consideration. To so interpret section 103 as to prohibit such a defense as
illegality of consideration, which is clearly a defense of new matter, would pro tanto repeal
the second paragraph of Section 94, which permits a defendant to answer by "A statement
of any new matter constituting a defense or counterclaim.

3. BOUGH v. CANTIVEROS and HANOPOL

G.R. No. 13300 September 29, 1919 Malcolm, J.

Facts: Matilde Cantiveros owned 60 parcels of land worth P30, 000. separation in Carigara,
Leyte. Living with her was Basilia, who was married to Gustavus Bough who was already
regarded with great confidence. Gustavus brought a story to Matilde that her husband, Jose
Vasquez, was in town and might contest the contract for the separation of their conjugal
property. As a result, she was induced to sign a fictitious contract of sale (Exhibit A) of all her
property to Basilia for P10, 000. The document was notarized but no evidence presented
that a sum passed between the parties. As assurance that the Boughs would not take
advantage of the contract, they executed a deed of donation (Exhibit 1) of all the properties
in Exhibit A, to be effective in case of their death and their children before the death of
Cantiveros. Cantiveros remain in possession of the property. An action was brought upon the
written instrument which was attached in the complaint. However, its genuineness and due
execution were not specifically denied under oath in the answer.
Issue: WON the lower court erred in permitting the defendants, over objections of the
plaintiffs, to present evidence tending to impugn the genuineness and due execution of the
Exhibit A and in admitting them to show the circumstances under which it was executed.
Held: No. Failure to file an affidavit denying the genuineness and due execution of the
document does not estop him from controverting it by evidence of fraud, mistake,
compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel, and want of consideration. We hold
that although the defendants could properly set up the defenses of fraud and want of
consideration.
4. ACABAL v. ACABAL
G.R. No. 148376 March 31, 2005 Gutierrez, J.

Facts: Villaner Acabal executed on April 19, 1990 a deed conveying the property in favor of
Leonardo Acabal, his nephew. Villaner later on claimed that what he executed was captioned
as Lease Contract as witnessed by two employees of Judge Villegas of Bais City.
Thereafter, Villaner filed a complaint for annulment of the Deed of Sale before the RTC
Dumaguete against Leonardo and Ramon Nicolas, to whom Leonardo conveyed the
property. Leonardo asserts that what was executed was a Deed of Absolute Sale for a
consideration of P10, 000 which he already paid; that as he became the owner of the
property, he validly transferred it to Nicolas on May 19, 1990. Carmelo Cadalin, who
prepared the deed and appeared as one of the witnesses, corroborated Leonardos claim.
The RTC ruled in favor of Leonardo. However, the CA reversed the RTC decision holding
that the deed was simulated and fictitious. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Leonardo argued that the CA erred when it failed to apply Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court as Villaner failed to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the deed.
Issue: WON the CA committed a reversible error in law when it ruled that Section 8, Rule 8
of the Rules of Court is not applicable, contrary to the ruling of the lower court.
Held: No. The failure to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document
does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake,
compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel, and want of consideration.

5. TORIBIO v. HON. BIDIN, RAMOS and CAMACHO

G.R. No. L-57821 January 17, 1985 Gutierrez, J.

Facts: Justa Francisco, received a portion Lot 1943-B upon her parents death. Justa died
and was survived by her 8 children. Her children, Eufremia, Alonzo, Petrona and Rafael sold
their pro indiviso shares to Ramon Ledesma. Meanwhile, Dionisio sold his share to Juanito
Camacho. The other heirs, Segundino, Eusebia and Olegario, alleging that they did not
dispose their shares against respondents, filed a case against for the recovery of hereditary
rights. Respondents answered that the shares had likewise been sold to Dionisio Toribio,
their brother, who, in turn, sold the same to Juanito Camacho and Dalmacio Ramos. The
alleged sales were evidenced by deeds of sale, the xerox copies of which were appended to
and made an integral part of the partition agreement between the respondents and also a
xerox copy of the respondents' transfer certificates of title. During trial, counsel for the
private respondents objected when Eusebia Toribio was asked whether she executed any
sale of her shares, raising the proper mode of contesting the genuineness of an actionable
document pursuant to Sections 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners
filed a constancia with a motion for reconsideration stating that the documents submitted by
the respondents alleging the sales were merely evidentiary in nature, not a cause of action
or defense, the due execution and genuineness of which they had to prove. They alleged
that the subject of litigation was the hereditary shares, and argued that a simple specific
denial without oath is sufficient. The motion was denied by the CFI. Hence this petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue: a) WON the deeds of sale are merely evidentiary in nature or the very foundation of
their defense which must be denied under oath by the petitioner; b) WON the genuineness
and due execution of the deeds evidencing the two transactions have to be denied under
oath.
Held: a) It is an indispensable part of their defense to the allegation that the petitioners had
never disposed of their property. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving
the statement of the cause of action or defense insufficient.
b) Yes. In the case at bar, we have a situation where the defendant presented a document in
his defense, a document to which the plaintiff is a party but to which defendant is not. The
proper procedure was for the petitioners to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and
due execution of the questioned deeds of sale and to set forth what they claim to be the
facts. However, the oversight or negligence of petitioners' counsel in not properly drafting a
reply to the answer and an answer to the counter claim is not necessarily fatal to their cause.
The petitioners' counsel was obviously lulled into complacency by two factors. First, the
plaintiffs, now petitioners, had already stated under oath that they never sold, transferred, or
disposed of their shares in the inheritance to others. Second, the usual procedure is for a
defendant to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of
documents set forth in and annexed to the complaint. Somehow, it skipped counsel's
attention that Sections 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court refer to either an action or
a defense based upon a written instrument or document. It applies to both plaintiffs
and defendants.
6.