TORTS MIDTERM REVIEWER

Atty. Abaos definition: A tort is an act which causes damage to another person. [Therefore, under
his definition, a tort encompasses a broader concept than a quasi-delict; it also includes breach of
contract and crimes]
I. INTRODUCTION: TORTS AND DAMAGES

The tort is the cause, while the effect is manifested in damages.

1. Classes of Torts

Art. 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do.

Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

Classes of Actions

Law; 1. Quasi-Delict: based on negligence

Contracts; 2. Breach of Contract: based on the existence of a contract
Quasi-contracts; 3. Torts in Human Relations: based on intentional acts of the tort-feasor
Acts or omissions punished by law; and (5) Quasi-delicts. 4. Crime: based on a violation of a penal statute

Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly 2. Twofold Meaning of Damages
determined in this Code or in special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by
the precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what has not been 1. Damages as the loss, prejudice, or injury resulting from the act of a
foreseen, by the provisions of this Book.
person; and
2. Damages as compensation for such loss, prejudice, or injury
Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. 3. Culpa Aquiliana/Contractual/Criminal

Problem: A bus falls off a cliff due to the drivers fault. What actions may be filed
Art. 1160. Obligations derived from quasi-contracts shall be subject to the provisions by the heirs of the passengers who died in the accident?
of Chapter 1, Title XVII, of this Book.

Answer: Three actions may be filed based on culpa aquiliana, culpa contractual,
Art. 1161. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the
penal laws, subject to the provisions of Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions and culpa criminal. The distinctions among the three are as follows:
of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book,
regulating damages. CULPA AQUILIANA CULPA CRIMINAL
CONTRACTUAL PROSECUTION
OBJECT Complaint is against Violation of Criminal negligence
Art. 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions negligence contract of
of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, and by special laws. carriage
ACTION Damages for quasi- Breach of contract Criminal prosecution,
Tort A civil wrong, other than breach of contract for which the court will provide a remedy in the delict with damages which includes civil
form of an action for damages (Jarencios definition)
 liability under art. 100
of the RPC
AGAINST Driver, bus company, Employer bus Driver
or both company
QUANTU Preponderance of Preponderance of Proof beyond
M OF evidence evidence reasonable doubt
EVIDENCE *once the driver is
proven negligent,
employer is
Note: You can file more than one of these cases. You can file any or all, depending on the
presumed negligent
circumstances. The only limitation is against double recovery. (See Imson case).
(rebuttable
presumption)
DEFENSE Exercise of ordinary Exercise of If the driver cannot pay
S diligence on the part extraordinary the cicil damages, the CASES
of the driver; diligence (in employer is subsidiarily
Exercise of diligence contract of liable. The employer
in the selection and carriage, the does not have any
Cancio v. Isip
supervision of the diligence required defense in the case.
driver on the part of of the common The negligence of the
the employer carrier is employee is conclusive
extraordinary) as to the employer for Cancio filed 3 counts of violation of BP22 against Isip, who had issued 3 bad checks. The case was
purposes of subsidiary dismissed. Subsequently, 3 cases for estafa were filed. The case was dismissed again. Cancio then
filed a civil case for collection of sum of money to recover the value of the 3 checks from Isip. Isip
liability
moved to dismiss on the ground that the action is barred by res judicata and that Cancio was guilty of
forum shopping.

ISSUES:

Whether the civil action for collection is barred by res judicata.

Whether there was forum shopping.

HELD: No to both.

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities:

ex delicto under Art. 100 of the RPC; and
independent civil liabilities such as:
those not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, such as culpa contractual,
violations of Articles 31, 32, and 34 of the Civil Code, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code;
where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal
action (ex: Art. 33 of the Civil Code)
Either may be enforced against the offender, but the offended party cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission or under both causes. Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, civil liability
ex delicto is deemed instituted with the criminal action, but the offended party may file the separate
civil action before the prosecution starts to present evidence. However, the independent civil actions
may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal
action.
In this case, the basis of the complaint is culpa contractual. It is an independent civil action which is
based on Isips breach of a contractual obligation. This may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings, regardless of the result of the latter. There is no res judicata because there is no identity
of causes of action.
Imson v. CA
This case arose from a vehicular collision involving Imsons car and a truck registered under the
names of FNCB and Holiday Hills. The collision seriously injured Imson and totally wrecked his car.
Imson filed a complaint for damages against:
the owners of the truck
the truck driver
the beneficial owners of the truck
the truck insurer
All the defendants, except the insurer, defaulted. Imson and the insurer entered into a compromise,
whereby the insurer paid him 70K in full settlement of his claims against the insurer. The RTC thus
dismissed the claim against the insurer.
Holiday Hills, as owner of the truck, then moved to dismiss the case against all the other defendants
on the ground that they were all indispensable parties under a common cause of action. It argued
that the dismissal of the case against the insurer must result in the dismissal of the case against all of
them.
ISSUE: Whether the action should be dismissed as against the other defendants.
HELD: No. The action should not be dismissed against the other defendants because there is no
identity in the causes of action against them.
The rule is where the complaint alleges a common cause of action against defendants who are all
indispensable parties to the case, its dismissal against any one of them by virtue of a compromise
agreement with the plaintiff results in a dismissal of the case against the others, including those in
default. For this doctrine to apply, however, the requisites are:
there must be a common cause of action; and
all defendants are indispensable parties.
This doctrine is NOT applicable in this case because there is no identity of cause of action. The causes
of action against each of the defendants are different. They are as follows:
against the driver: quasi-delict under 2176

against the owners of the truck: quasi-delict under 2180 (vicarious liability)

against the insurance company: contract (third party liability clause of its insurance contract with the
owners of the truck allows the third party to collect directly from the insurer even if there is really not
contractual relationship between them).

Moreover, the defendants are not all indispensable parties. The truck driver is the only one who is
indispensable. All the others are merely necessary or proper parties. II. QUASI-DELICT

BLTB v. CA 1. Elements

Quasi-delict is different from criminal negligence; it is an independent source of obligation.
Aboitiz Shipping v. CA
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

The elements of a quasi-delict are:

A common carrier is bound to observe extraordinary diligence. If a passenger dies or is injured in the
course of the voyage, there is a presumption of fault or negligence. This gives rise to an action for
breach of contract of carriage.
Fault or Negligence

Damage
Dangwa Transport v. CA
Causal connection between the negligence and the damage
In an action based on contact of carriage, the court need not make an express finding or fault or
negligence in order to hold the carrier liable. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the
express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and to observe extraordinary
diligence. Any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or Problem: X was driving a car when he ran over a stone. The stone hit a pedestrian on the head. The
negligence of the carrier. pedestrian died. Is X liable for quasi-delict?

Answer: No, because there was no negligence on the part of X.

Problem: A suppliers employees went on strike, as a result of which the supplier failed to deliver his
goods to his client. Can the client sue the supplier for quasi-delict?
Answer: No. Although there was damage, there was no negligence. [Client should sue based on
breach of contract instead]
CASES:
Andamo v. IAC
Emmanual and Natividad Andamo owned a parcel of land adjacent to that of the Missionaries of Our
Lady of La Sallette. Within the land or Our Lady, waterpaths and an artificial lake were constructed,
allegedly inundating and eroding the Andamos land. This caused a young man to drown, damaged
the Andamos crops and fences, and endangered their lives. The Andamos instituted a criminal action
against the officers and directors of Our Lady for destruction by means of inundation under Art. 324
of the RPC. Subsequently, they filed a civil case for damages against the respondents. Upon motion of
respondents, the civil case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, since the criminal case instituted
ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. This was based on the provision of the Rules of Court
which provides that criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted
separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action cannot be instituted
until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.
ISSUE: Whether the civil action should have been dismissed.
HELD: No. The civil action should not have been dismissed since it was based, not on crime, but on
quasi-delict.
All the elements of a quasi-delict are present:
damages suffered by the plaintiff;
fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and
connection of the cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff.
In this case, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent are alleged to have inundated the
land of petitioners. This was caused by the failure of the defendant to install drainage pipes that could
have prevented the inundation. There is therefore a causal connection between the act of building the
waterpaths without providing for an adequate drainage system and the damage sustained by the
petitioners.
Article 2176 covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender
in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores and would only be entitled
to the bigger award of the two.
FGU Insurance v. CA
A car owned by Soriano and being driven by Jacildone collided with another car owned by Filcar and
rented and driven by Dahl-Jensen, a foreigner. FGU Insurance Corp., Sorianos insurer, paid Sorian
25K for the damage. By way of subrogation, FGU sued Dahl-Jensen, Filcar, and Fortune Insurance
(insurer of Filcar) for quasi-delict. The case was dismissed by the RTC on the ground of failure of FGU
to substantiate the claim for subrogation. The CA affirmed by based on another ground: only the fault
or negligence of Dahl-Jensen (who was dropped from the complaint because summons could not be
served on him) was sufficiently proved but not that of Filcar. There was therefore no cause of action
against Filcar for quasi-delict.
ISSUE: Whether the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for damages suffered by third persons
although the vehicle is leased to another.
HELD: No. Filcar is not liable. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must
concur:
damages suffered by the plaintiff;

fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and ISSUE: Whether Equitable is liable.

connection of the cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff.

HELD: Equitable is liable.

In this case, petitioner failed to prove the fault or negligence of Filcar. The negligence was solely
attributable to Dahl-Jensen, thus making the damage his personal liability. Filcar had not participation
It is liable because it was the registered owner at the time of the accident. The registered owner is
therein. Article 2180 on vicarious liability of owners of motor vehicles is not applicable since there is
the lawful operator insofar as third persons are concerned and consequently, it is directly and
no employer-employee relationship between Filcar and Dahl-Jensen.
primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the
owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer
being considered as merely its agent. The same principle applies even if the registered owner of
any vehicle does not use it for public service.
Equitable Lease v. Suyom

This is not inconsistent with the earlier FGU case, wherein the owner of the vehicle was absolved from
A road tractor driven by Raul Tutor slammed into a house/tindahan. Three persons were pinned to
liability because of the absence of the vinculum juris of an employer-employee relationship between
death under the engine of the tractor; four were injured. Tutor was charged with and convicted of
the owner and the driver.
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries.

In the present case, though in fact, there is no employer-employee relationship between Equitable
Since the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration of the vehicle showed the registered owner to
and Tutor, the law deems the registered owner to be the employer of the driver, and the actual
be Equitable Leasing/leased to Edwin Lim, respondents filed a complaint for damages against
operator is deemed to be the owners agent. Again, under law, Equitable is the owner, Ecatine is
Equitable, Tutor, and Ecatine [seems to be a corporation of Edwin Lim]. Tutor, Lim, and Ecatine were
Equitables agent, Tutor is Equitables employee.
subsequently dropped from the complaint because they could not be found.

The failure of Equitable and/or Ecatine to register the sale with the LTO should not prejudice
Equitable, in its answer, raised the defense that the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine and that
respondents, who have the legal right to rely on the legal principle that the registered vehicle owner
Equitable was no longer in possession and control thereof at the time of the incident. It also claimed
is liable for the damages caused by the negligence of the driver.
that Tutor was an employee of Ecatine, not Equitable.

2. No Double Recovery Rule

It seems that Equitable and Lim had a finance lease agreement whereby Equitable would remain the
registered owner until the vehicle was fully paid by Lim. In this case, the vehicle was fully paid and a
deed of sale had already been executed. However, there was failure to register the deed of sale with
the LTO.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.

The RTC and CA found Equitable to be liable.

Broader concept of Civil Liability Answer: No, this would violate the principle of res judicata. The victim had the opportunity to present
evidence in the criminal case. If he files another case, he will be merely presenting the same
evidence.

A single act can give rise to two kinds of liability civil liability for quasi-delict and liability for crime.
Under the liability for crime, the defendant has two kinds of liability criminal liability and civil
liability. This is illustrated by the following diagram: CASES:

Civil liability Jarantilla v. CA

| Jose Kuan Sing was crossing the street when he was sideswiped by a Volkswagen Beetle driven by
Edgar Jarantilla.
|

Sing instituted a criminal action against Jarantilla for serious physical injuries through reckless
Quasi-Delict imprudence. Sing intervened in the prosecution through a private prosecutor and did not reserve his
right to institute a separate civil action. Jarantilla was acquitted because of reasonable doubt.
Crime

Sing subsequently instituted a civil action for damages involving the same subject matter and act
complained of as in the criminal case.

| The trial court found in favor of Sing and awarded actual and moral damages, attorneys fees, and
costs. The CA affirmed.

Criminal liability
ISSUE : Whether Sing could have filed the separate civil action despite Jarantillas acquittal in the
Civil liability criminal action.

Problem: X filed a claim for 100K in damages in an action for quasi-delict. The judge awarded 50K. HELD: Yes, the civil action was properly filed.
Can X filed a criminal action to recover the remaining 50K?

The same act or omission (in this case, the negligent sideswiping of private respondent) can create
two kinds of liability on the part of the offender: civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi
delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort,
either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the Article 2177 provides that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages the defendant. In this case, there were two separate acts or omissions.
under both types of liability.

III. NEGLIGENCE
The only instance where a civil action cannot be instituted after the dismissal of the criminal case is
where such dismissal was accompanied by a statement of the court declaring that the act complained
of never happened.
1. Concept of Negligence

Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence
Atlantic Gulf and Pacific v. CA which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances
of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the
provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

This is a resolution of a MR.

The Castillos filed an action for damages against AG&P alleging that the latters operations on the If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
formers property caused the soil to become infertile, salty, unproductive and unsuitable for performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
agriculture. The Castillos also averred that AG&Ps heavy equipment was parked on the formers land
without rental having been paid.

Negligence Want of care required by the nature of the obligation and the circumstances of the
persons, time, and place.
The trial court granted damages for both the damage to the land and rentals for the same
property.

CASES

ISSUE: Whether the grant of the damages amounts to double recovery.

Citytrust v. IAC

HELD: It does not amount to double recovery.

It is clearly apparent that AG&P was guilty of two culpable transgressions on the property rights
of the Castillos, that is, for the ruination of the agricultural fertility or utility of the soil of their
property and, further, for the unauthorized use of said property as a dump site or depot for
petitioner's heavy equipment and trucks. Damages were correctly awarded for the destruction of the
land and for the reasonable value for the use of the premises.
Emme Herrero issued several postdated checks from her account with Citytrust. She deposited cash in
order to cover the checks. However, in filling up the deposit slip, she omitted a zero and wrote
2900823 instead of 29000823. Her checks were dishonored.
Herrero filed a complaint for damages against Citytrust. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The
CA reversed and awarded nominal and temperate damages and attorneys fees.

ISSUE: Whether Citytrust is liable for damages.
HELD: Citytrust is liable.
Banking is a business affected with public interest and because of the nature of its functions, the bank
is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in
mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.
Even if the account number were erroneous, Herreros name was clearly written on the deposit slip.
The teller should have noticed that there were only seven numbers instead of eight. Besides, the use
of numbers is simply for the convenience of the bank and the depositors name should still be
controlling.
In fact, there were other instances where Herrero put down the wrong account number but the
deposits were still properly made. This indicates that there are ways and means whereby
deposits with erroneous account numbers can still be credited to the proper account. It is
the banks obligation to see to it that all funds invested with it are properly accounted for and duly
posted in its ledgers.
The CA, however, erred in awarding nominal and temperate damages concurrently; the two are
incompatible. Nominal damages are merely to recognize the violation of a right and not to indemnify.
Temperate damages are designed to indemnify one for pecuniary loss the amount of which cannot be
proved with reasonable certainty. Only nominal damages are warranted in this case.
Reyes v. CA, FEBTC
Reyes and Puyat-Reyes, as Philippine Racing Club representatives, were to attend a racing conference
in Sydney. In order to pay for the conference fees, they sent the clubs cashier to FEBTC to apply for a
foreign exchange demand draft for AU$1610, payable to the conference organizer.
The application was denied at first because FEBTC did not have an account in any Sydney bank.
However, a roundabout way was found whereby the remittance of the money could be achieved.
FEBTC would draw a demand draft against Westpac Bank in Sydney and the latter would reimburse
itself from FEBTCs account in Westpac NY. This arrangement has been resorted to since the 1960s
and there has never been a problem.
When the conference organizer presented the demand draft, it was dishonored. However, FEBTCs
account in Westpac NY had been debited. In response to the organizers complaint of the dishonor,
FEBTC informed Westpac Sydney to reimburse itself from FEBTCs Westpac NY account. FEBTC also
instructed Westpac NY to honor the claim for reimbursement. Despite this, the draft was dishonored a
second time.
When the Puyats arrived in Sydney to register [they arrived separately], they were denied because
the drafts had been dishonored twice. This allegedly caused them much humiliation, shock, trembling
legs, etc. However, after agreeing to pay in cash, they were admitted to the conference.
Upon getting back to Manila, the Puyats filed a complaint for damages against FEBTC claiming that as
a result of the dishonor, they were exposed to unnecessary shock, social humiliation, and deep mental
anguish in a foreign country, and in the presence of an international audience.
ISSUE: Whether FEBTC is liable for damages.
HELD: It is not liable.
The degree of diligence required of FEBTC, in this case, is that degree of diligence expected of an
ordinary prudent person under the circumstances obtaining. The rule that a bank, due to the nature
of its relationship with the client, must exercise extraordinary diligence applies only when the bank is
acting in its fiduciary capacity, as was seen in the Citytrust case. In the present circumstance, the
relationship between FEBTC and the Puyats was merely that of seller and buyer, with the subject
matter being a demand draft.
That ordinary diligence was observed is evident from the numerous follow ups that FEBTC undertook
in order to get the demand draft paid. It did all that it could have reasonably done. The reason the
demand draft was dishonored was because Westpac Sydney mistakenly read FEBTCs cable message
to it [a 1 was read as a 7]. As a result, Westpac Sydney did not recognize the cable message as a
request for a demand draft.
Adzuara v. CA
Adzuara, a law student, was driving his Galant along QC Ave.; in the car with him were his two
friends. He collided with a Corona driven by Martinez. It appears that Martinez was executing a U-turn
when Adzuara suddenly rammed the side of his car. The Corona was flung 20 meters from the point of
impact and it landed atop the center island of QC Ave. Martinez filed a complaint for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with less serious physical injuries [Martinezs daughter
was confined]. The right to institute a separate civil action was reserved.
The RTC found Adzuara guilty after the following facts were established:
Adzuara was going much faster than the 40 kph. he claimed. This is evident from the damage to the
Corona and from the distance it was flung.
Adzuara had a red light. Martinez had a green light.
Adzuara did not stop at the last clear chance when he saw that Martinez had almost completely
negotiated the U-turn.
ISSUE: Whether Adzuara is guilty of negligence.
HELD: Guilty.
The facts found by the lower court warrant such a finding.
Negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or
comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the
parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require.
What degree of care and vigilance then did the circumstances require? At half past 1:00 o'clock in the
morning along an almost deserted avenue, ordinary care and vigilance would suffice. This may consist
of keeping a watchful eye on the road ahead and observing the traffic rules on speed, right of way
and traffic light. The claim of petitioner that Martinez made a swift U-turn which caused the collision is
not credible since a U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning,
compared to running straight ahead. Nonetheless, no evidence was presented showing skid marks
caused by the car driven by Martinez if only to demonstrate that he was driving at a fast clip in
negotiating the U-turn. On the other hand, the speed at which petitioner drove his car appears to be
the prime cause for his inability to stop his car and avoid the collision. His assertion that he drove at
the speed of 40 kph. is belied by Martinez who testified that when he looked at the opposite lane for
any oncoming cars, e saw none; then a few seconds later, he was hit by Adzuara's car. The extent of
the damage on the car of Martinez and the position of the cars after the impact further confirm the
finding that petitioner went beyond the speed limit required by law and by the circumstances.
Picart v. Smith
The test for determining negligence: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom the
negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the
course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or
to take precaution against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition of this provision, is the
constitutive fact in negligence.
2. Negligence as Proximate Cause
Proximate Cause that cause which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an
efficient supervening cause, produces the injury and without which the injury would not have
occurred.
Subido v. CA
This case involves an accident between a truck [or bus] belonging to Laguna Tayabas Bus Company
(LTB) and driven by Mudales and a truck owned by Sabido and driven by Lagunda.
The two vehicles were going in opposite directions when they met at a curve in the road. Custodio, a
passenger of LTB was hanging [sabit] on the left side of the vehicle. He died after being sideswiped by
Sabidos truck.
The CFI held the vehicle owners and the drivers solidarily liable. LTB and its driver were liable for
violating the contract of carriage; Sabido and his driver were liable for quasi-delict.
ISSUE: Whether Sabido and his driver were guilty of negligence; whether they should be held
solidarily liable with LTB.
HELD: They are both guilty of contributory negligence.
Though LTB and its driver were guilty of negligence for allowing Custodio to hang from the left side of
the bus, Sabido and his driver were guilty of contributory negligence because the truck was running
at a considerable speed, despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being
close to its right side of the road, said truck was driven on its middle portion and so near the
passenger bus coming from the opposite direction as to sideswipe a passenger riding on its running
board.
Though the negligence of LTB and its driver are independent from the negligence of Sabido and his
driver, both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Custodio. In fact, the
negligence of the first two would not have produced this result without the negligence of Sabido and
his driver. What is more, Sabidos drivers negligence was the last, in point of time, for Custodio was
on the running board of the carrier's bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from the opposite
direction, so that, in this sense, Sabidos truck had the last clear chance.
Even though LTBs liability arises from breach of contract and Sabidos arises from quasi-delict, they
are solidarily liable because the rule is that where both negligent acts, in combination, are the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the
whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the
same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor.
Ridjo Tape v. CA
Petitioners were being charged by MERALCO P415,317.66 for allegedly unregistered electric
consumption (URE) for the period of November 1990 to February 1991. MERALCO justified its demand
on the ground that the URE was due to defects of the electric meter. When petitioners refused to pay,
MERALCO notified them of disconnection which prompted petitioners to file for preliminary injunction
and/or TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER which was granted.
ON July 1992, petitioners received another demand letter, this time requiring them to pay P89,710.58
for URE from July 1991 to April 1992, the deficiency again due to the defective meter. Petitioners
again filed for the consolidation of the two cases, and after trial, the injunction was made permanent.
CA reversed the decision of RTC
ISSUE: Whether petitioners should be made to pay the said amounts for their unregistered electric
consumption during the said periods which was due to the defects of the electric meter
HELD: No.
MERALCOs failure to make the necessary repairs and replacement of the defective electric meter
installed within the premises of petitioners was obviously the proximate cause of the instant dispute
between the parties. Indeed, if an unusual electric consumption was not reflected in the statements of
account of petitioners, MERALCO, considering its technical knowledge and vast experience in providing
electric service, could have easily verified any possible error in the meter reading. In the absence of
such a mistake, the electric meters themselves should be inspected for possible defects or
breakdowns and forthwith repaired and, if necessary, replaced. Furthermore, if MERALCO discovered
that contraptions or illegal devices were installed which would alter the result of the meter reading,
then it should have filed the appropriate criminal complaint against petitioners.

Notice of a defect need not be direct and express; it is enough that the same had existed
for such a length of time that it is reasonable to presume that it had been detected, and the
presence of a conspicuous defect which has existed for a considerable length of time will
create a presumption of constructive notice thereof. Hence, MERALCO's failure to discover
the defect, if any, considering the length of time, amounts to inexcusable negligence.
Furthermore, that as a public utility, MERALCO has the obligation to discharge its functions with
utmost care and diligence
The liability of petitioners for consumed but unrecorded electricity must therefore be limited by reason
of MERALCOs negligence- only the estimated consumption on a three-month average before the
controversial period (P168,342.75).
Ermitano v. CA, BPI
Luis Ermitano was a credit cardholder together with his wife Manuelita who had an extension, in BPI
with a credit limit of 10,000 which they often exceeded and BPI never seemed to have minded for the
past 2 years.
Manuelitas bag one day was snatched, and that night she informed by telephone BPI of the loss. This
was followed by a letter the next day, surrendering her husbands card as well, stating that she shall
not be responsible for any and all charges incurred after August 29,1989 (the day of loss), and sought
for replacement cards instead.
However in their monthly billing statement the thief went on some kind of a shopping spree
amounting to 3,ooo (thats double a social sin for you!) So she wrote again disclaiming responsibility.
BPI pointed out the stipulation in the contract they had signed stated
"In the event the card is lost or stolen, the cardholder agrees to immediately report its loss or theft in
writing to BECC ... purchases made/incurred arising from the use of the lost/stolen card shall be for
the exclusive account of the cardholder and the cardholder continues to be liable for the purchases
made through the use of the lost/stolen BPI Express Card until after such notice has been given to
BECC and the latter has communicated such loss/theft to its member establishments."
Luis threatened that such was a contract of adhesion and that theyd sue for damages if BPI still
insisted on having them pay when they already complied with the requirement of notifying them on
time and should thus be absolved from any liability.
Despite their refusal to pay, their cards were still renewed and some time in 1991, when Luis was
paying for gas, lo and behold his card was dishonored! BPI informed them that they had exceeded
their credit limit and because inclusive in their monthly bill, the unauthorized payments from his lost
card were still carried over.
So Luis sued, and won, CA reversed
ISSUE: Whether petitioners should be liable for the unauthorized payments in their credit card until
such a time the bank had been able to notify all its member establishments even when they had
already exercised due diligence in complying promptly with the requirement of notifying BPI of the
theft.
HELD: No.
Prompt notice by the cardholder to the credit card company of the loss or theft of his card
should be enough to relieve the former of any liability occasioned by the unauthorized use
of his lost or stolen card.
The questioned stipulation in this case, which still requires the cardholder to wait until the credit card
company has notified all its member-establishments, puts the cardholder at the mercy of the credit
card company which may delay indefinitely the notification of its members to minimize if not to
eliminate the possibility of incurring any loss from unauthorized purchases. Or, as in this case, the
credit card company may for some reason fail to promptly notify its members through absolutely no
fault of the cardholder. To require the cardholder to still pay for unauthorized purchases after he has
given prompt notice of the loss or theft of his card to the credit card company would simply be unfair
and unjust.
Benguet Electric v CA
Jose Bernardo managed a stall at the Baguio City meat market. On 14 January 1985 at around 7:50
in the morning, Jose together with other meat vendors went out of their stalls to meet a jeepney
loaded with slaughtered pigs in order to select the meat they would sell for the day. Jose was the very
first to reach the parked jeepney. Grasping the handlebars at the rear entrance of the vehicle, and as
he was about to raise his right foot to get inside, Jose suddenly stiffened and trembled as though
suffering from an epileptic seizure. Romeo Pimienta who saw Jose thought he was merely joking but
noticed almost in disbelief that he was already turning black. In no time the other vendors rushed to
Jose and they discovered that the antenna of the jeepney bearing the pigs had gotten entangled with
an open electric wire at the top of the roof of a meat stall. Pimienta quickly got hold of a broom and
pried the antenna loose from the open wire. But shortly after, Jose released his hold on the
handlebars of the jeep only to slump to the ground.
His spouse and children filed a claim against BENECO, who then in turn filed a third party complaint
against the owner of the jeep, who according to BENECO was the proximate, if not, sole cause of the
death
ISSUE: Whether BENECO was negligent.
HELD: Yes.
There is no question that as an electric cooperative holding the exclusive franchise in supplying
electric power to the towns of Benguet province, its primordial concern is not only to distribute
electricity to its subscribers but also to ensure the safety of the public by the proper maintenance and
upkeep of its facilities.
It is clear to then that BENECO was grossly negligent in leaving unprotected and uninsulated the
splicing point between the service drop line and the service entrance conductor, which connection was
only eight (8) feet from the ground level, in violation of the Philippine Electrical Code. By leaving an
open live wire unattended for years, BENECO demonstrated its utter disregard for the safety of the
public. Indeed, Jose Bernardo's death was an accident that was bound to happen in view of the gross
negligence of BENECO.
BENECO theorizes in its defense that the death of Jose Bernardo could be attributed to the negligence
of Canave, Jr., in parking his jeepney so close to the market stall which was neither a parking area nor
a loading area, with his antenna so high as to get entangled with an open wire above the Dimasupil
store. But this line of defense must be discarded.
Canave's act of parking in an area not customarily used for that purpose was by no means the
independent negligent act adverted to by BENECO in citing Manila Electric Co. v. Ronquillo. Canave
was well within his right to park the vehicle in the said area where there was no showing that any
municipal law or ordinance was violated nor that there was any foreseeable danger posed by his act.
One thing however is sure, no accident would have happened had BENECO installed the connections
in accordance with the prescribed vertical clearance of fifteen (15) feet.
St. Marys v. Carpitanos
St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A
facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were
studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group.
On the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep
owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. The jeep was
driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter
drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.
Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident.
The parents claimed damages from the school, and won.
ISSUE: Whether St. Marys should be liable for the death of a student as a result of a car accident in
an authorized school activity

HELD: No.
The Court of Appeals mistakenly held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos under Articles 218[7] and 219[8] of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was
negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor students in
the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and
teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental
authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special
parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of
the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered
as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must
have a causal connection to the accident.
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause
of the death of the victim.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted the
documentary exhibits establishing that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II
but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the
jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, the grandson, who had possession
and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive
the jeep at the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily.
The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors
parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
3. Proof of Negligence
Food Terminal Incorporated vs. CA. and Basic Foods Corp.
Food Terminal Incorporated (FTI) is engaged in the business of warehousing storage of goods or
merchandise for compensation at its refrigerated warehouse in Taguig, Metro Manila. Basic Foods is
engaged in the production of food and allied products.
In its manufacture of food, Basic Foods uses Red Star compressed yeast, which requires storage in a
refrigerated space to avoid spoilage. It deposited 1,770 cartons of yeast with FTI for cold storage. 383
cartons worth P161k were damaged, allegedly because of FTIs failure to maintain the proper
temperature.
FTI claims that it exercised utmost diligence; that any damage sustained was due to the fault of Basic
Foods; that under the contract, FTI would not be liable for damage to goods beyond its reasonable
control; and that Basic Foods was estopped from filing the action because it acknowledged receipt of
the yeast in good order.
The RTC dismissed; the CA held that there was negligence.
ISSUE: Whether FTI was guilty of negligence in the storage of Basic Foods yeast.
 moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages may be recovered only where (a) the mishap results
in the death of a passenger; and (b) it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith
HELD: FTI was negligent. even if death does not result. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment of negligence. It
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of
known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.

In the first place, the issue is factual, thus, the ruling of the Court of Appeals is binding on the parties
and may not be reviewed on appeal via certiorari.
In this case, what happened was attributable to the fault of Morris and Whittier, since they failed to
check in on time. SAS could not be faulted for not entertaining their tickets and papers for processing,
since the checking in of passengers for the flight was finished. There was no fraud or bad faith as
In the second place, petitioner practically admitted that it failed to maintain the agreed temperature would justify an award of moral damages.
of the cold storage area at 2 to 4 degrees centigrade at all times, and this caused the deterioration of
the yeast stored therein. Nonetheless, petitioner claimed that temperature was not the sole cause for
the deterioration of respondent's goods. Since negligence has been established, petitioner's liability
for damages is inescapable. 4. Presumption of Negligence

Morris v. CA The plaintiff may invoke the following principles in order to impute presumed negligence on the
defendant:

Morris and Whittier were American citizens employed in the Philippines. They were booked as first-
class passengers on a 3:50 pm Scandinavian Airline System (SAS) flight from Manila to Tokyo. On the res ipsa loquitur
day of departure, Morris and Whittier checked in at the airport at 3:10 pm. However, they were told
that they could not be accommodated on the plane because their seats had been given to other respondeat superior
passengers. Apparently, the economy class of the flight had been overbooked and the seats of the
violation of traffic rules
first class passengers who had not checked in at least 40 minutes before departure time were given
to economy class passengers. Morris and Whittier filed a claim against SAS for moral and exemplary
dangerous weapons and substances
damages.

In these cases, there is no need for the plaintiff to show that the defendant was negligent. There is a
ISSUE: Whether Morris and Whittier are entitled to moral and exemplary damages.
rebuttable presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant. It is incumbent upon the
defendant to prove that he exercised the degree of care required by the circumstances. If he fails to
prove this, he shall be liable for damages.

HELD: No, they are not.

a. Res ipsa loquitur

In awarding damages for breach of contract of carriage, the breach must be wanton and deliberately
injurious, or the one responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. Where in breaching
the contract of carriage, the defendant airline is not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith,
Statement of the rule: Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to
liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the breach of obligation
be under the management of defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the
which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. Such liability does not include
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation by defendant, that
the accident arose from want of care.
Elements:
the thing which caused the injury is under the exclusive control of the defendant;
ordinarily, such event will not happen unless there is negligence;
defendant fails to give an explanation for the happening of the event.
CASES:
Africa v. Caltex
A fire broke out at a Catex station in Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank
truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the
hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses.
The owners of the burned properties filed a complaint for damages against Caltex, as the owner of the
station, and Boquiren, as the agent in charge of operation.
ISSUE: Whether Caltex was negligent under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
HELD: Caltex was negligent.
First of all, it was necessary to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because certain reports made
by officers of the police and fire departments were ruled to be inadmissible in evidence for being
hearsay.
Res ipsa loquitur is a rule to the effect that Where the thing which caused the injury complained of
is shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation by defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care.
The rule applies in this case. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees,
was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring
houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were appellees and their
employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference
that the incident happened because of want of care.
The station is in a very busy district and pedestrians often pass through or mill around the premises.
Aside from this, it is used as a carbarn for around ten taxicabs owned by Boquiren. Also, there is a
store located around one meter from the hole of the underground tank. At this store, people hang out
and possibly smoke cigarettes. It was even alleged that the fire was caused by a match which came
into contract with the dense fumes.
Furthermore, the concrete walls adjoining the neighborhood are only 2 meters high at most and
cannot prevent the flames from leaping over it in case of fire.
Another issue was whether Caltex should be liable as the principal of Boquiren. It was held that Caltex
was liable because there was an agency relationship and Boquiren was not an independent contractor.
Caltex owned the station and exercised control over it.
Batiquin v. CA
 Reyes v. Sisters of Mercy

Dr. Batiquin performed a Caesarean section on Mrs. Villegas. After the delivery of her baby, Mrs.
Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and fever. When, despite taking medication prescribed by Dr.
Batiquin, she still did not get well, Mrs. Villegas consulted another doctor, Doctor Kho. Doctro Kho
suggested that they open her up again. During surgery, Doctor Kho found lots of pus and several
cysts in Mrs. Villegass ovaries. She then discovered a piece of rubber which seemed like a part of a
rubber glove or a rubber drain stuck near Mrs. Villegass uterus. This rubber glove was the cause of
the infection of Mrs. Villegass internal organs. After it was taken out, Mrs. Villegas regained her
health.
Jorge Reyes had been suffering from recurring fever with chills for around 5 days. Home medication
afforded him no relief so he went to Mercy Community Clinic. Because typhoid was common at the
time, the Widal Test was performed. Jorge came out positive for typhoid. Dr. Blanes ordered that
Jorge be tested for compatibility with chloromycetin, an antibiotic. Nurse Pagente administered the
test. As there was no adverse reaction, Dr. Blanes administered 500 mg of the antibiotic. Another
dose was given 3 hours later. Subsequently, Jorge developed high fever and experienced vomiting and
convulsions. He then turned blue due to deficiency in oxygen cyanosis

Mrs. Villegas filed an action for damages against Dr. Batiquin.

and died. The cause of death was stated to be ventricular arrhythmia secondary to hyperpyrexia
and typhoid fever.

ISSUE: Whether Mrs. Villegas is entitled to damages.

ISSUE: Whether the Sisters of Mercy Hospital/the doctors were negligent.

HELD: Yes. The rule of res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself) is applicable in this case. Under HELD: Not negligent.
this doctrine, the happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces
substantial evidence that the injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under the exclusive
control and management of the defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary
course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in this case.
as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence
may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
The doctrine can be invoked only when, under the circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not
readily available. Though expert testimony is usually needed to prove malpractice, where common knowledge and
experience teach that the injury would not have occurred if due care had been exercised, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur can be invoked to establish negligence. The elements of res ipsa loquitur are:

In this case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. First, the entire proceedings of
the caesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. Mrs. Villegas did not have any
direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into her the accident will not normally occur unless someone is negligent;
body, which could not have occurred unless through the intervention of negligence. Second, since
aside from the caesarean section, Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the the instrumentality which caused the injury was under the control of the person in charge; and
piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only have been a by-
product of the caesarean section performed by Dr. Batiquin. Dr. Batiquin failed to overcome the the injury was not due to the voluntary act of the person injured.
presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. She is therefore
liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in Villegass abdomen and for all the adverse
effects thereof.
In this case, Jorges death was not unusual because he had been suffering from fever and chills 5
days prior to admission. Furthermore, as to the charge of misdiagnosis, res ipsa loquitur cannot apply
to suits involving the merits of a diagnosis.
b. respondeat superior
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of
each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in Articles
1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of
the passengers is further set forth in Articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or wilful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have
acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Respondeat superior means let the employer/principal be responsible
Under this principle, if the negligence of the employee has been proved, there is no need to prove the
negligence of the employer. The employer is already presumed negligent in the hiring and/or
supervision of the employee. This presumption is, however, rebuttable and not conclusive.
As will be shown in the following cases, the doctrine of respondeat superior is applicable not only to
common carriers but to other instances where an employee or agent, not necessarily of a common
carrier, is negligent.
CASES:
City of Manila v. IAC
Vivencio Sto. Domingo died in 1971 and was buried in a lot in the North Cemetery. The lot was leased
to his widow Irene Sto. Domingo until 2021. However, apart from the receipt issued by the city for the
rental of the lot, there were no other records stating the term of the lease. In 1978, the Mayor of
Manila, believed in good faith that the lease in favor of Irene Sto. Domingo was covered by
Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1975 which provided for the lease of the burial lots only for a
period of 5 years. Thinking that the lease in favor of Sto. Domingo had already terminated by this
time, the mayor certified that the lot in which Vivencio was buried was ready for exhumation. In
accordance with this certification, the authorities of the North Cemetery exhumed the remains of
Vivencio and put them in a bag which was then stored inside a bodega. The lot was then leased to
another party. During All Saints Day, Irene Sto. Domingo and her family were shocked to find that the
lot no longer had the stone marker which they placed on the tomb. When she asked what happened
to the remains of her husband, she was told to look for them in the bodega. Aggrieved, Irene Sto.
Domingo filed a claim for damages against the City of Manila, the city health officer, and the person in
charge of the cemetery.
ISSUE: Whether the City of Manila is liable to Sto. Domingo. A complaint for damages was filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena on the ground of quasi-delict
this was decided in favor of Calalas [this is not the case were studying].

HELD: Yes. With respect to proprietary functions, a municipal corporation can be held liable to third
persons ex contractu or ex delicto. The superior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence or Sunga subsequently filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging breach of contract of
want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or line of his employment, by which another, who is carriage. Calalas filed a third-party complaint against against Salva [this is the case were studying].
free from contributory fault is injured. Maintenance of cemeteries is recognized as a municipal activity
of a proprietary character.

The RTC absolved Calalas in the breach of contract case and held Salva liable as third party
defendant. Its ruling was based on the ruling in the quasi-delict case.
Hence, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, petitioner City of Manila is liable for the tortious act
committed by its agents who failed to verify and check the duration of the contract of lease. The
contention of the petitioner-city that the lease is covered by Administrative Order No. 5, series of
1975 for five (5) years only beginning from June 6, 1971 is not meritorious for the said administrative The CA reversed and held that the Sungas cause of action was based on breach of contract and not
order covers new leases. When subject lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for quasi-delict.
exhumation, the lease contract for fifty (50) years was still in full force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether Calalas is guilty of violating the contract of carriage.

The City of Manila is ordered to give Sto. Domingo the right to use a burial lot in the North Cemetery
corresponding to the unexpired term of the fully paid lease sued upon, to search for the remains of
the late Vivencio Domingo, and to bury the same in a substitute lot to be chosen by the Sto.
Domingos. Moreover, moral and exemplary damages are awarded. HELD: Calalas is guilty.

Calalas v. CA and Jujeurche Sunga and Salva The RTC was wrong in deciding the breach of contract [BOC] case on the basis of the quasi-delict
[QD] case.

Eliza Jujeurche Salva was a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University
in Dumaguete City. One morning, Sunga rode a jeep owned and operated by Calalas, but, since it was Firstly, Sunga was not a party to the QD case and cannot be bound by its ruling.
already full, she was given by the conductor an extension seat, a wooden stool at the back of the
door at the rear end of the vehicle.

Along the route, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the
vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven
by Verena and owned by Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was
injured. Because of her injury, she decided not to pursue her Physical Education major as, in her
words, her left leg has a defect already.
Secondly, the issues or causes of action in both cases are different. The QD case is premised on the
negligence of the tortfeasor. The BOC case is premised upon the negligence of the carrier in the
performance of the contractual obligation.
Sungas complaint was based on BOC. It does not matter that a third persons act was the proximate
cause of the injury. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only to QD. In BOC, it is sufficient to
show that there is a contractual relation between the parties and the common carrier failed to
transmit the passenger safely.
Articles 1733, 1755, and 1756 provide that a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence
and that in case of death or injury to passengers, the presumption is that the carrier acted
negligently.
In this case, it is clear that the presumption of negligence has not been overcome. When the jeep
stopped to unload, its rear was protruding around two meters into the highway. Also, it was
overloaded, hence the employment of the extension seat. There is no fortuitous event because the
dangers could have been foreseen and avoided.
* moral damages awarded by the CA were deleted because they are generally not available in cases
of BOC of carriage. The exceptions are death of the passenger and bad faith of fraud of the carrier.
Pestano v. Sumayang
Sumayang and Romagos were riding a motorcycle along a highway in Cebu. As they were about to
turn left at a junction, they were hit by a passenger bus driven by Pestano and owned by Metro Cebu
Autobus Corp. The bus had tried to overtake them, but it hit them instead. Both Sumayang and
Romagos died in the accident. Criminal charges were instituted against Pestano. The heirs of
Sumayang also filed a civil action for damages against Pestano (as driver of the bus), Metro Cebu (as
owner of the bus), and the insurer of Metro Cebu.
The lower court and the CA found Pestano and Metro Cebu guilty of negligence. Pestano was negligent
in trying to overtake the victims motorcycle at the junction, while Metro Cebu was negligent in
allowing the bus to ply its route despite its defective speedometer.
ISSUE: Whether Pestano and Metro Cebu are guilty of negligence.
HELD: Yes. The vehicular collision was caused by Pestanos negligence when he attempted to
overtake the motorcycle. As a professional driver operating a public transport bus, he should have
anticipated that overtaking at a junction was a perilous maneuver, and he should have thus exercised
extreme caution.
Metro Cebu is also guilty of negligence. Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code, owners and
managers are responsible for damages caused by their employees. When an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or an employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in
the selection or in the supervision of that employee. This presumption may be overcome only by
satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and the supervision of its employee. In this case, Metro Cebu showed laxity in
the operation of its business and in the supervision of its employees when it allowed Pestano to ply his
route with a defective speedometer. It was remiss in the supervision of its employees and the proper
care of its vehicles. It had thus failed to conduct its business with the diligence required by law.
c. Violation of traffic rules