LUISA KHO MONTAER, ALEJANDRO MONTAER, G.R. No.

174975
JR., LILLIBETH MONTAER-BARRIOS, AND
RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAER-DALUPAN,

Petitioners,

Present:

- versus -

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,

SHARIA DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARIA CORONA,

JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING
DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S.
MONTAER, AZCUNA, and

Respondents. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

Promulgated:

JANUARY 20, 2009

PUNO, C.J.:
 This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Orders of the Sharia District Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial District, Marawi City, dated August 22, 2006 1[1]
and September 21, 2006.2[2]

On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montaer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City. 3[3] Petitioners
Alejandro Montaer, Jr., Lillibeth Montaer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montaer-Dalupan are their children.4[4] On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died.5[5]

On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S. Montaer, both Muslims, filed a Complaint for the judicial partition of properties
before the Sharia District Court.6[6] The said complaint was entitled Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro Montaer,
Sr., Luisa Kho Montaer, Lillibeth K. Montaer, Alejandro Kho Montaer, Jr., and Rhodora Eleanor K. Montaer, and docketed as Special Civil Action No. 7-05. 7[7] In the said complaint,
private respondents made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of
the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montaer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and a list of the
properties comprising the estate of the decedent.8[8] Private respondents prayed for the Sharia District Court to order, among others, the following: (1) the partition of the estate of
the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent.9[9]

Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the Sharia District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montaer,
Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees; and (3) private respondents complaint is barred by prescription, as it
seeks to establish filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and the decedent, pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.10[10]

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
On November 22, 2005, the Sharia District Court dismissed the private respondents complaint. The district court held that Alejandro Montaer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its
jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims.11[11]

On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 12[12] On December 28, 2005, petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration, alleging that the motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing. 13[13] On January 17, 2006, the Sharia District Court denied petitioners opposition. 14[14]
Despite finding that the said motion for reconsideration lacked notice of hearing, the district court held that such defect was cured as petitioners were notified of the existence of the
pleading, and it took cognizance of the said motion.15[15] The Sharia District Court also reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration.16[16]

In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Sharia District Court reconsidered its order of dismissal dated November 22, 2005. 17[17] The district court allowed
private respondents to adduce further evidence.18[18] In its second assailed order dated September 21, 2006, the Sharia District Court ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the
merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial conference.19[19]

Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following issues:

I.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY LACKS JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONERS WHO ARE ROMAN CATHOLICS AND NON-
MUSLIMS.

II.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATES AND PROPERTIES OF THE LATE
ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. WHICH IS NOT A NATURAL OR JURIDICAL PERSON WITH CAPACITY TO BE SUED.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
 III.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AGAINST
PETITIONERS DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF THE FILING AND DOCKETING FEES.

IV.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN
IT DENIED THE OPPOSITION OF PETITIONERS AND THEN GRANTED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS LILING
DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF A NOTICE OF HEARING.

V.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN
IT SET SPL. CIVIL ACTION 7-05 FOR TRIAL EVEN IF THE COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS THAT RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER SEEKS
RECOGNITION FROM ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. WHICH CAUSE OF ACTION PRESCRIBED UPON THE DEATH OF ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. ON
MAY 26, 1995.

In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private respondents stress that the Sharia District Court must be given the opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the
decedent is a Muslim in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction.20[20]

Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims

Petitioners first argument, regarding the Sharia District Courts jurisdiction, is dependent on a question of fact, whether the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim. Inherent in this
argument is the premise that there has already been a determination resolving such a question of fact. It bears emphasis, however, that the assailed orders did not determine
whether the decedent is a Muslim. The assailed orders did, however, set a hearing for the purpose of resolving this issue.

Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that the Sharia District Courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims:

ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:

xxxx

(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or
appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property.

20
The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition. 21[21] The designation given
by parties to their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to the said designation. Rather than rely on a falsa descriptio or defective caption, courts
are guided by the substantive averments of the pleadings.22[22]

Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Sharia District Court as a Complaint for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
Muslim,23[23] such as the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal
heirs, so far as known to the private respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the decedent, which are the very properties sought to be settled before a probate court.
Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the private respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the decedent. 24[24] These include the following:
(1) the prayer for the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for the appointment of an administrator of the said estate.

We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have jurisdiction over the case because of an allegation in their answer with a motion
to dismiss that Montaer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its subject matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an answer 25[25]
or a motion to dismiss.26[26] Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant27[27] or result in having a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly
delayed by simple stratagem.28[28] Indeed, the defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of fact does not render the court to lose or be deprived of its
jurisdiction.29[29]

The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss.30[30] In the case at bar, the Sharia District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners
raised as a defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Sharia District Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has
jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Sharia District Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim,
the district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Special Proceedings

The underlying assumption in petitioners second argument, that the proceeding before the Sharia District Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests
on an erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the Sharia District Court, where the parties
were designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil action. We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the
issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a
special proceeding as a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim. 31[31] In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the
applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedents heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to
participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent. 32[32] Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death and, subsequently,
for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montaer to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.

Petitioners argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in a civil action 33[33] applies to a special proceeding such as the
settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of
a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong 34[34] necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant. 35[35] On the other hand, a special proceeding, by which
a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact, 36[36] has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite
adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement
of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate,37[37] pay its liabilities,38[38] and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.39[39]

Docket Fees

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
Petitioners third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for non-payment of docket fees, is untenable. Petitioners point to private respondents petition in the proceeding
before the court a quo, which contains an allegation estimating the decedents estate as the basis for the conclusion that what private respondents paid as docket fees was
insufficient. Petitioners argument essentially involves two aspects: (1) whether the clerk of court correctly assessed the docket fees; and (2) whether private respondents paid the
correct assessment of the docket fees.

Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.40[40] If the party filing the case paid
less than the correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment lies with the
same clerk of court.41[41] In such a case, the lower court concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a partys reliance on the clerk of courts insufficient assessment
of the docket fees.42[42] As every citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance
with law, the party filing the case cannot be penalized with the clerk of courts insufficient assessment.43[43] However, the party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency.44[44]

In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of courts assessment of the docket fees. Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can be no
determination of whether private respondents correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of courts assessment.

Exception to Notice of Hearing

Petitioners fourth argument, that private respondents motion for reconsideration before the Sharia District Court is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the
unique circumstances in the present case constitute an exception to this requirement. The Rules require every written motion to be set for hearing by the applicant and to address
the notice of hearing to all parties concerned.45[45] The Rules also provide that no written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof. 46
[46] However, the Rules allow a liberal construction of its provisions in order to promote [the] objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.47[47] Moreover, this Court has upheld a liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice of hearing in cases where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure
or miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals
contained therein.48[48] In these exceptional cases, the Court considers that no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities, and for this reason, cases should, as much as
possible, be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities.49[49]

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
 The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Sharia District Court of an opportunity to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the
estate of a decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to control its process to ensure conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a
situation simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a miscarriage of justice.

In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, because the rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an
exception to the rules on notice of hearing is where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were not affected. 50[50] The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with
procedural due process,51[51] for the court to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within which to file a reply or
opposition.52[52] In probate proceedings, what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard. 53[53] In
the case at bar, as evident from the Sharia District Courts order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners counsel received a copy of the motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners
were certainly not denied an opportunity to study the arguments in the said motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Sharia District Court reset the hearing for the
motion for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to the said motion in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the
purpose for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural process, was duly observed.

Prescription and Filiation

Petitioners fifth argument is premature. Again, the Sharia District Court has not yet determined whether it has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In the event that a
special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be
raised and settled in the said proceeding.54[54] The court, in its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent. 55[55] In the case at bar, the
determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the Sharia District Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Sharia District Court, dated August 22, 2006 and September 21, 2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost
against petitioners.

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
 SO ORDERED.

HEIRS OF TEOFILO GABATAN, namely: LOLITA G.R. No. 150206

GABATAN, POMPEYO GABATAN, PEREGRINO
GABATAN, REYNALDO GABATAN, NILA
GABATAN and JESUS JABINIS, RIORITA
GABATAN TUMALA and FREIRA GABATAN,
Present:
Petitioners,

PUNO, C.J.,*
-versus-
YNARES-SANTIAGO,**

CARPIO,***
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES
EVERO PACANA, CORONA,

Respondents. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

BRION,**** JJ.

Promulgated:

*
**
***
****
 March 13, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in the instant petition for review on certiorari are the Decision 56[1] dated April 28, 2000, and Resolution 57[2] dated September 12, 2001
of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 52273. The challenged Decision affirmed the decision 58[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19,
dated October 20, 1995 in Civil Case No. 89-092, an action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession, thereat commenced by respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana
against petitioners, heirs of Teofilo Gabatan, Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado.

Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land, identified as Lot 3095 C-5 and situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was
declared for taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint before the RTC, respondent alleged that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the same from
her deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero (Hermogena). Respondent further claimed that her mother, Hermogena, is the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana
Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilos wife, Rita Gabatan, for
administration. It was also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the return of the land but to no avail. After Hermogenas death, respondent also did the same but
petitioners refused to heed the numerous demands to surrender the subject property. According to respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died, petitioners Jesus Jabinis and Catalino
Acantilado took possession of the disputed land despite respondents demands for them to vacate the same.

56
57
58
 In their answer, petitioners denied that respondents mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the
rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters,
namely: Teofilo (petitioners predecessor-in-interest), Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual,
physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements
thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including respondent. Petitioners clarified that Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado have no interest in the subject land; the former is
merely the husband of Teofilos daughter while the latter is just a caretaker. Petitioners added that a similar case was previously filed by respondent against Teofilos wife, Rita Vda.
de Gabatan, on February 21, 1978, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840 but the case was dismissed on May 3, 1983 for lack of interest. Finally, petitioners contended that the complaint
lacks or states no cause of action or, if there was any, the same has long prescribed and/or has been barred by laches.

On June 20, 1989, the complaint was amended wherein the heirs of Teofilo were individually named, to wit: Lolita Gabatan, Pompeyo Gabatan, Peregrino Gabatan,
Reynaldo Gabatan, Nila Gabatan and Jesus Jabinis, Riorita Gabatan Tumal and Freira Gabatan.

On July 30, 1990, petitioners filed an amended answer, additionally alleging that the disputed land was already covered by OCT No. P-3316 in the name of the heirs of
Juan Gabatan represented by petitioner Riorita Gabatan (Teofilos daughter).

On October 20, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, declaring the plaintiff the owner of Lot No. 3095 C-5
situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City; and ordering the defendants represented by Riorita Gabatan Tumala to RECONVEY Original Certificate of
Title No. P-3316 in favor of plaintiff Lourdes Evero Pacana, free of any encumbrance; ordering the defendants to pay P10,000.00 by way of moral damages;
P10,000.00 as Attorneys fees; and P2,000.00 for litigation expenses.

SO ORDERED.59[4]

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA whereat their recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 52273.

59
 On April 28, 2000, the CA rendered the herein challenged Decision affirming that of the RTC. Dispositively, the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned decision of the lower court dated October 20, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against
appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Discounting petitioners argument that respondent is not related to Juan Gabatan, the CA declared that respondents claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently
established during trial. Thus, the CA echoed a long line of jurisprudence that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight and are not disturbed except for cogent
reasons, such as when the findings of fact are not supported by evidence.

The CA likewise gave weight to the Deed of Absolute Sale 60[5] executed by Macaria Gabatan de Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan, wherein
Hermogena was identified as an heir of Juan Gabatan:

x x x HERMOGENA GABATAN, of legal age, married, Filipino citizen and presently residing at Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, as Heir of the
deceased, JUAN GABATAN; x x x.

To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing such declaration which was signed by Teofilo and the latters nearest relatives by consanguinity, is a
tangible proof that they acknowledged Hermogenas status as the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Applying Section 38, Rule 130 61[6] of the Rules of Court on the declaration against
interest, the CA ruled that petitioners could not deny that even their very own father, Teofilo formally recognized Hermogenas right to heirship from Juan Gabatan which ultimately
passed on to respondent.

60
61
 As to the issue of prescription, the CA ruled that petitioners possession of the disputed property could not ripen into acquisitive prescription because their predecessor-in-
interest, Teofilo, never held the property in the concept of an owner.

Aggrieved, petitioners are now with this Court via the present recourse principally contending that the CA committed the following reversible errors:

FIRST ERROR:The lower court erred in not declaring that Juan Gabatan died single and without issue;

SECOND ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring the plaintiff-appellee (respondent) as the sole and surviving heir of Juan Gabatan, the only child of a
certain Hermogena Clareto GABATAN;

THIRD ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring that a certain Hermogena Clareto GABATAN is the child and sole heir of Juan Gabatan;

FOURTH ERROR: The lower court erred in failing to appreciate by preponderance of evidence in favor of the defendants-appellants (petitioners) claim that
they and the heirs of Justa and Macaria both surnamed Gabatan are the sole and surviving heirs of Juan Gabatan and, therefore, entitled to inherit the land
subject matter hereof;

FIFTH ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that the cause of action of plaintiff-appellee (respondent) if any, has been barred by laches and/or
prescription.62[7]

Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we must pass upon certain preliminary matters.

In general, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Questions of fact cannot be the subject of this
particular mode of appeal, for this Court is not a trier of facts.63[8] It is not our function to examine and evaluate the probative value of the evidence presented before the concerned
tribunal upon which its impugned decision or resolution is based.64[9]

62
63
64
 However, there are established exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of the findings of fact by the lower courts, such as (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when
the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.65[10]

Moreover, our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned.
Thus, the Court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but
affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid
dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue
submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (f) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent. 66[11]

In the light of the foregoing established doctrines, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the case.

The respondents main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of ownership and possession of property. It is undisputed that the subject property, Lot 3095 C-5,
was owned by the deceased Juan Gabatan, during his lifetime.67[12] Before us are two contending parties, both insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent.

65
66
67
 Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary
suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled
that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong
while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made
only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.68[13]

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera,69[14] this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action.
This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals70[15] where the Court held:

xxx where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-
appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to
inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-
appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his
only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it
being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the
presentation of the project of partition.

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes,71[16] the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be
ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang,72[17] this Court held
that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedents estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery
of property.

68
69
70
71
72
 However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,73[18] where the Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a proceeding for
annulment of title to determine the status of the party therein as heirs, to wit:

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it,
under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as
heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the
fact that the parties to the civil case subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed
jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to administration proceedings
since a determination of petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners ( Vide Pereira v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 154 [1989];
Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 [1955]), the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and
render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, x x x. (emphasis supplied)

Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more
practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the
parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the
RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered judgment thereon.

We GRANT the petition.

After a meticulous review of the records of this case, we find insufficient and questionable the basis of the RTC in conferring upon respondent the status of sole heir of Juan
Gabatan.

Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to possession and ownership of the property, pinned her claim entirely on her alleged status as sole heir of Juan Gabatan. It was
incumbent upon her to present preponderant evidence in support of her complaint.

73
 Under the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.

ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.

ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Here, two conflicting birth certificates74[19] of respondent were presented at the RTC. Respondent, during her direct testimony, presented and identified a purported certified
true copy of her typewritten birth certificate which indicated that her mothers maiden name was Hermogena Clarito Gabatan. Petitioners, on the other hand, presented a certified
true copy of respondents handwritten birth certificate which differed from the copy presented by respondent. Among the differences was respondents mothers full maiden name
which was indicated as Hermogena Calarito in the handwritten birth certificate.

In resolving this particular issue, the trial court ruled in this wise:

The parties are trying to outdo with (sic) each other by presenting two conflicting Certificate (sic) of Live Birth of plaintiff herein, Lourdes Evero Pacana,
which are Exhibit A for the plaintiff and Exhibit 1 for the defendants. Which of this (sic) is genuine, and which is falsified. These (sic) issue is crucial and requires
serious scrutiny. The Court is of the observation that Exhibit A for the plaintiff which is a certified true copy is in due form and bears the as is and where is rule. It
has the impression of the original certificate. The forms (sic) is an old one used in the 1950s. Her mothers maiden name appearing thereof is Hermogina (sic)
Clarito Gabatan. While Exhibit 1, the entries found thereof (sic) is handwritten which is very unusual and of dubious source. The form used is of latest vintage. The
entry on the space for mothers maiden name is Hermogena Calarito. There seems to be an apparent attempt to thwart plaintiffs mother filiation with the omission
of the surname Gabatan. Considering these circumstances alone the Court is inclined to believe that Exhibit A for the plaintiff is far more genuine and authentic
certificate of live birth.75[20]

Having carefully examined the questioned birth certificates, we simply cannot agree with the above-quoted findings of the trial court. To begin with, Exhibit A, as the trial
court noted, was an original typewritten document, not a mere photocopy or facsimile. It uses a form of 1950s vintage 76[21] but this Court is unable to concur in the trial courts finding

74
75
76
that Exhibit 177[22] was of a later vintage than Exhibit A which was one of the trial courts bases for doubting the authenticity of Exhibit 1. On the contrary, the printed notation on the
upper left hand corner of Exhibit 1 states Municipal Form No. 102 (Revised, January 1945) which makes it an older form than Exhibit A. Thus, the trial courts finding regarding which
form was of more recent vintage was manifestly contradicted by the evidence on record. No actual signature appears on Exhibit A except that of a certain Maximo P. Noriga, Deputy
Local Civil Registrar of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City, who purportedly certified on July 6, 1977 that Exhibit A was a true copy of respondents birth
certificate. The names of the attendant at birth (Petra Sambaan) and the local civil registrar (J.L. Rivera) in 1950 were typewritten with the notation (Sgd.) also merely typewritten
beside their names. The words A certified true copy: July 6, 1977 above the signature of Maximo P. Noriga on Exhibit A appear to be inscribed by the same typewriter as the very
entries in Exhibit A. It would seem that Exhibit A and the information stated therein were prepared and entered only in 1977. Significantly, Maximo P. Noriga was never presented as
a witness to identify Exhibit A. Said document and the signature of Maximo P. Noriga therein were identified by respondent herself whose self-serving testimony cannot be deemed
sufficient authentication of her birth certificate.

We cannot subscribe to the trial courts view that since the entries in Exhibit 1 were handwritten, Exhibit 1 was the one of dubious credibility. Verily, the certified true copies
of the handwritten birth certificate of respondent (petitioners Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly authenticated by two competent witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal (Ms. Vidal), Assistant
Registration Officer of the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City and Maribeth E. Cacho (Ms. Cacho), Archivist of the National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa,
Manila. Both witnesses testified that: (a) as part of their official duties they have custody of birth records in their respective offices, 78[23] and (b) the certified true copy of respondents
handwritten birth certificate is a faithful reproduction of the original birth certificate registered in their respective offices.79[24] Ms. Vidal, during her testimony, even brought the original
of the handwritten birth certificate before the trial court and respondents counsel confirmed that the certified true copy (which was eventually marked as Exhibit 1) was a faithful
reproduction of the original.80[25] Ms. Vidal likewise categorically testified that no other copy of respondents birth certificate exists in their records except the handwritten birth
certificate.81[26] Ms. Cacho, in turn, testified that the original of respondents handwritten birth certificate found in the records of the NSO Manila (from which Exhibit 8 was
photocopied) was the one officially transmitted to their office by the Local Civil Registry Office of Cagayan de Oro. 82[27] Both Ms. Vidal and Ms. Cacho testified and brought their
respective offices copies of respondents birth certificate in compliance with subpoenas issued by the trial court and there is no showing that they were motivated by ill will or bias in
giving their testimonies. Thus, between respondents Exhibit A and petitioners Exhibits 1 and 8, the latter documents deserve to be given greater probative weight.

77
78
79
80
81
82
 Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth certificate presented by respondent (Exhibit A) is a reliable document, the same on its face is insufficient to
prove respondents filiation to her alleged grandfather, Juan Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had been credible and authentic, would have proven was that respondents mother was a
certain Hermogena Clarito Gabatan. It does not prove that same Hermogena Clarito Gabatan is the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Even the CA held that the conflicting certificates of
live birth of respondent submitted by the parties only proved the filiation of respondent to Hermogena.83[28]

It was absolutely crucial to respondents cause of action that she convincingly proves the filiation of her mother to Juan Gabatan. To reiterate, to prove the relationship of
respondents mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a
final judgment. In the absence of these, respondent should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Only in the
absence of these two classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules of Court of her mothers relationship to Juan Gabatan.

However, respondents mothers (Hermogenas) birth certificate, which would have been the best evidence of Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered
as evidence at the RTC. Neither did respondent present any authentic document or final judgment categorically evidencing Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan.

Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who testified that they personally knew
Hermogena (respondents mother) and/or Juan Gabatan, that they knew Juan Gabatan was married to Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena was the child of Juan and Laureana.
However, none of these witnesses had personal knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the fact of birth of Hermogena to Juan and Laureana. They were not yet
born or were very young when Juan supposedly married Laureana or when Hermogena was born and they all admitted that none of them were present at Juan and Laureanas
wedding or Hermogenas birth. These witnesses based their testimony on what they had been told by, or heard from, others as young children. Their testimonies were, in a word,
hearsay.

Other circumstances prevent us from giving full faith to respondents witnesses testimonies. The records would show that they cannot be said to be credible and impartial
witnesses. Frisco Lawan testified that he was the son of Laureana by a man other than Juan Gabatan and was admittedly not at all related to Juan Gabatan. 84[29] His testimony
regarding the relationships within the Gabatan family is hardly reliable. As for Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who are children of Justa Gabatan Nagac, 85[30]

83
84
85
this Court is wary of according probative weight to their testimonies since respondent admitted during her cross-examination that her (respondents) husband is the son of Felicisima
Nagac Pacana.86[31] In other words, although these witnesses are indeed blood relatives of petitioners, they are also the mother and the aunt of respondents husband. They cannot
be said to be entirely disinterested in the outcome of the case.

Aside from the testimonies of respondents witnesses, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily on a photocopy of a Deed of Absolute Sale 87[32] (Exhibit H) presented by
respondent and which appeared to be signed by the siblings and the heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan. In this document involving the sale of a lot different from Lot 3095 C-5,
Hermogena Gabatan as heir of the deceased Juan Gabatan was indicated as one of the vendors. The RTC deemed the statement therein as an affirmation or recognition by Teofilo
Gabatan, petitioners predecessor in interest, that Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. 88[33] The CA considered the same statement as a declaration against interest
on the part of Teofilo Gabatan.89[34]

However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its contents and the signatures therein, as competent evidence was vigorously and repeatedly objected to
by petitioners counsel for being a mere photocopy and not being properly authenticated. 90[35] After a close scrutiny of the said photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale, this Court
cannot uphold the admissibility of the same.

Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. 91[36]
Although the best evidence rule admits of exceptions and there are instances where the presentation of secondary evidence would be allowed, such as when the original is lost or
the original is a public record, the basis for the presentation of secondary evidence must still be established. Thus, in Department of Education Culture and Sports v. Del Rosario,92

86
87
88
89
90
91
92
[37] we held that a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court
proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original instrument.

In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima Nagac Pacana (who identified the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly shows that
she gave no testimony regarding the whereabouts of the original, whether it was lost or whether it was recorded in any public office.

There is an ostensible attempt to pass off Exhibit H as an admissible public document. For this, respondent relied on the stamped notation on the photocopy of the deed
that it is a certified true xerox copy and said notation was signed by a certain Honesto P. Velez, Sr., Assessment Officer, who seems to be an officer in the local assessors office.
Regarding the authentication of public documents, the Rules of Court 93[38] provide that the record of public documents, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy. 94[39] The attestation of the certifying officer must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.95[40]

To begin with, no proof whatsoever was presented by respondent that an original of Exhibit H was registered or exists in the records of the local assessors office.
Furthermore, the stamped certification of Honesto P. Velez is insufficient authentication of Exhibit H since Velezs certification did not state that Exhibit H was a true copy from the
original. Even worse, Velez was not presented as a witness to attest that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original. Indeed, it is highly doubtful that Velez could have made such an
attestation since the assessors office is not the official repository of original notarized deeds of sale and could not have been the legal custodian contemplated in the rules.

It is the notary public who is mandated by law to keep an original of the Deed of Absolute Sale in his notarial register and to forward the same to the proper court. It is the
notary public or the proper court that has custody of his notarial register that could have produced the original or a certified true copy thereof. Instead, the Deed of Absolute Sale was
identified by Felicisima Nagac Pacana who, despite appearing to be a signatory thereto, is not a disinterested witness and as can be gleaned from her testimony, she had no
personal knowledge of the preparation of the alleged certified true copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale. She did not even know who secured a copy of Exhibit H from the assessors

93
94
95
office.96[41] To be sure, the roundabout and defective manner of authentication of Exhibit H renders it inadmissible for the purpose it was offered, i.e. as proof that Teofilo Gabatan
acknowledged or admitted the status of Hermogena Gabatan as heir of Juan Gabatan.

Even if we are to overlook the lack of proper authentication of Exhibit H and consider the same admissible, it still nonetheless would have only provided proof that a certain
Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit H does not show the filiation of respondent to either Hermogena Gabatan or Juan Gabatan. As discussed above, the
only document that respondent produced to demonstrate her filiation to Hermogena Gabatan (respondents Exhibit A) was successfully put in doubt by contrary evidence presented
by petitioners.

As for the issue of laches, we are inclined to likewise rule against respondent. According to respondents own testimony,97[42] Juan Gabatan died sometime in 1933 and
thus, the cause of action of the heirs of Juan Gabatan to recover the decedents property from third parties or to quiet title to their inheritance accrued in 1933. Yet, respondent and/or
her mother Hermogena, if they were truly the legal heirs of Juan Gabatan, did not assert their rights as such. It is only in 1978 that respondent filed her first complaint to recover the
subject property, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840, against Rita Gabatan, the widow of Teofilo Gabatan. 98[43] However, that case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to
prosecute.99[44] Again, respondent waited until 1989 to refile her cause of action, i.e. the present case.100[45] She claimed that she waited until the death of Rita Gabatan to refile her
case out of respect because Rita was then already old.101[46]

We cannot accept respondents flimsy reason. It is precisely because Rita Gabatan and her contemporaries (who might have personal knowledge of the matters litigated in
this case) were advancing in age and might soon expire that respondent should have exerted every effort to preserve valuable evidence and speedily litigate her claim. As we held in
Republic of the Philippines v. Agunoy: Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, the law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights[O]ne may not sleep on a right
while expecting to preserve it in its pristine purity.102[47]

96
97
98
99
100
101
 All in all, this Court finds that respondent dismally failed to substantiate, with convincing, credible and independently verifiable proof, her assertion that she is the sole heir of
Juan Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property under litigation. Aggravating the weakness of her evidence were the circumstances that (a) she did not come to court with clean
hands for she presented a tampered/altered, if not outright spurious, copy of her certificate of live birth and (b) she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her own cause of action.
If the Court cannot now affirm her claim, respondent has her own self to blame.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 52273, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 89-
092, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint and amended complaint in Civil Case No. 89-092 are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 164108 May 8, 2009

ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA
CAMPOS BENEDICTO, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix
Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.1 At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first,
Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second,
Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the
plaintiffs therein.2

On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6,
Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of
the decedent to be P5 Million, "net of liabilities."3 On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased
husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor.4 In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and
Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband.5 In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two

102
pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.6 Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases as P136,045,772.50 for
Civil Case No. 95-9137 and P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and
appraisal report pertaining to the estate.8

On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,9 praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her
husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by
private respondent of the required inventory of the decedents estate.10 Petitioners also filed other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private
respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules
of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of
Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases
they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.

On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision12 dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow
petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate
proceedings before other courts.

Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto
Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special
Proceedings.13

To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished "copies of all processes and orders
issued" by the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said court.14 Second, they prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the
submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same.15 Third, petitioners moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the
administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other
parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate.16

The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1
of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the language of Section 1, Rule 19
does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be actual
and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."17

Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of
deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court,18 not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the absence
of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings."

We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a
contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.

Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the
RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule
19, it would not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.

In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested persons" or "any persons interested in the estate" to participate in varying capacities in the testate or
intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of "any person interested" to oppose the issuance of
letters testamentary and to file a petition for administration;" (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of administration to the
known heirs, creditors, and "to any other persons believed to have interest in the estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a "person interested in the estate" to petition for the
allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or
conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedents title or interest therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the
examination and allowance of the Administrators account "to persons interested;" (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested"
before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the
estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.

Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of
the notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and published by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice. 19
However, it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil
actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86.20 These actions, being as they are civil, survive the
death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as
represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case21 was already pending review before this Court at the time of
Benedictos death.

Evidently, the merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims
for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in
the intestate proceedings?

Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,22 and it does provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts therein is in order.
Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and damages against respondents, and during a hearing of the case, learned that the same trial court was hearing the intestate
proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late
husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be
increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance of the
pending civil case, the administrator moved to close the intestate proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial
court refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil case, and the Court affirmed such action.

If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to their desire to protect their interests it appearing that the property in litigation is
involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left subject of administration and distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case
because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of
the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its existence because of the
close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.

Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the reason that there
is no rule or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until after the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be
entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to
recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator." What practical value would this provision have if
the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle
the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another
person should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to
hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x23 (Emphasis supplied) [Citations omitted]

It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind
such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for a decision on their
action."24

Petitioners interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not
just creditors, but also "any person interested" or "persons interested in the estate" various specified capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a
contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the
decedent would have already been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced against it.

In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or
intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to
intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief
sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under this standard that we
assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.

The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator
of the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the developments in the intestate proceedings, including the
status of the assets of the estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the right, under
Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.

At the same time, the fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate and contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of
respondents submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether
contingent or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would mandate
the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate
proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases.

Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern of petitioners to
be apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,25 the Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC
judge, praying that they be allowed access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the
provision stating that "the records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested person x x x." The Court ruled that
petitioners were "interested persons" entitled to access the court records in the intestate proceedings. We said:

Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records tomonitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the
estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual accountingappears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints
for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135,
Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x26

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court processes
and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly
satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will
be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are
preserved.1awphi1

Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such
notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account
of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise
encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has
acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the
estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and
that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under
oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.

Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from
appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of
administration. We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not
the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections
enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the estate.

Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82.
While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to
seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence or good faith of
the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.

All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the
Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and
rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Rule 73
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,

vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 275, Las Pias City are AFFIRMED in toto.2

The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseos common-law wife and daughter.
The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and
Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).

Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at
the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage
to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the
decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged
that Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value,
Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late fathers estate.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the time of his
death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedents estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Pias
City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseos estate.

In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the
petition was properly laid in Las Pias City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseos last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of
the RTC decision reads:

Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the
decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00 to be posted by
her.9

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the
findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No.
26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate,
the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Pias City. The petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the
Court of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.

The Issues

The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIAS;

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO
PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION.12

The Courts Ruling

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent
resides at the time of his death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73
of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the
terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a persons
actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.19

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was
properly laid in Las Pias City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason,
the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseos Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate
should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedents residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on
the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death
in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the
ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners
position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners submission that the lower courts findings arose
from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon
this Court.21

Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelias marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no
marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code,
and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Nial, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to
file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:

Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death
of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike
voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. 24

It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly
or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25

Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such
marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of
the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.

Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseos marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine whether or not the decedents marriage to Amelia is void for being
bigamous.

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of
Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent
evidence of marriage and the certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries
therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the
National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and
Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond,
or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next
of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of
kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted
to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in
estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees. 28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence
on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt
to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on
her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied. 29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseos estate as
one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution,
arc AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159507 April 19, 2006

ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC MASCRINAS, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated May 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 69553. The assailed decision directed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, to vacate and set aside its Orders dated
September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 in Civil Case No. R-3172, and enjoined the presiding judge2 thereof from conducting further proceedings in said case, except to dismiss
the complaint filed therewith on ground of improper venue. The petition also seeks to reverse and set aside the appellate court's Resolution dated August 14, 2003 denying the
motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country Manager,
and Dominic Mascrinas, Head of Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. The case was raffled to Branch 25 of the said court.

The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) "is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon,
Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines." On the other hand, defendant (herein respondent AMEX, Inc.) "is a corporation doing business in the Philippines and engaged in providing
credit and other credit facilities and allied services with office address at 4th floor, ACE Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City." The other defendants (herein
respondents Fish and Mascrinas) are officers of respondent AMEX, and may be served with summons and other court processes at their office address.

The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The first
dishonor happened when petitioner Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the United States some time in April 2000. The second dishonor
occurred when petitioner Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was there with other delegates from the Philippines to
attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka.

The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from respondents' unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay
its balance covering the period of March 2000. Petitioner Saludo denied having received the corresponding statement of account. Further, he was allegedly wrongfully charged for
late payment in June 2000. Subsequently, his credit card and its supplementary cards were canceled by respondents on July 20, 2000.
Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political and professional standing
as a result of respondents' acts which were committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged
to pay him, jointly and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the complaint. Further, they raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue. On the
latter, respondents averred that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. They alleged
that respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident thereof as evidenced by
the fact that his community tax certificate, which was presented when he executed the complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. To
buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint a quo.

Thereafter, respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case for Pre-Trial) and Motion for Preliminary Hearing (on Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue) to which
petitioner Saludo filed his Comments and/or Objections to the Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue. He asserted that any allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was
baseless and unfounded considering that he was the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. He urged the court a quo to take judicial notice
of this particular fact. As a member of Congress, he possessed all the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution including that of being a resident of his district. He was also a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever since his admission to the Bar. His community tax certificate was issued at Pasay
City only because he has an office thereat and the office messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any event, the community tax certificate is not determinative of one's
residence.

In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo denied the affirmative defenses interposed by respondents. It found the allegations of the complaint sufficient to constitute a
cause of action against respondents. The court a quo likewise denied respondents' affirmative defense that venue was improperly laid. It reasoned, thus:

x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was and still is, the incumbent Congressman of the Lone District of Southern Leyte with residence at Ichon,
Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is enough to dispell any and all doubts about his actual residence. As a high-ranking government official of the province, his residence there can be
taken judicial notice of. As such his personal, actual and physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode can never be in some other place but in Ichon, Macrohon,
Southern Leyte. It is correctly stated by the plaintiff, citing the case of Core v. Core, 100 Phil. 321 that, "residence, for purposes of fixing venue of an action, is synonymous with
domicile. This is defined as the permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on the facts and circumstances,
in the sense that they disclose intent. A person can have but one domicile at a time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. Venue could be at place of his residence. (Masa v. Mison, 200 SCRA 715 [1991])3

Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied the same in the Order dated January 2, 2002. They then filed with the appellate court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge of the court a quo in issuing the September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 Orders.
Upon respondents' posting of a bond, the appellate court issued on March 14, 2002 a temporary restraining order which enjoined the presiding judge of the court a quo from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. R-3172.

On May 22, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting respondents' petition for certiorari as it found that venue was improperly laid. It directed the court a quo
to vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002, and enjoined the presiding judge thereof from further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss
the complaint.

The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo against respondents is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said rule on venue of
personal actions basically provides that personal actions may be commenced and tried where plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, at the election of plaintiff.

Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court, because not one of the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte. Specifically, it declared that
petitioner Saludo was not a resident thereof. The appellate court pronounced that, for purposes of venue, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or
his actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.4

The appellate court quoted the following discussion in Koh v. Court of Appeals5 where the Court distinguished the terms "residence" and "domicile" in this wise:
x x x [T]he term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is [an] established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the
relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases
where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.

xxxx

"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is
residence coupled with intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute
domicile."6 (Italicized for emphasis)

In holding that petitioner Saludo is not a resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, the appellate court referred to his community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint's
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, which was issued at Pasay City. Similarly, it referred to the same community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint for
deportation filed against respondents Fish and Mascrinas. Under Republic Act No. 7160,7 the community tax certificate shall be paid in the place of residence of the individual, or in
the place where the principal office of the juridical entity is located.8 It also pointed out that petitioner Saludo's law office, which was also representing him in the present case, is in
Pasay City. The foregoing circumstances were considered by the appellate court as judicial admissions of petitioner Saludo which are conclusive upon him and no longer required
proof.

The appellate court chided the court a quo for stating that as incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte, judicial notice could be taken of the fact of petitioner
Saludo's residence thereat. No evidence had yet been adduced that petitioner Saludo was then the congressman of Southern Leyte and actual resident of Ichon, Macrohon of the
said province.

The appellate court held that, based on his complaint, petitioner Saludo was actually residing in Pasay City. It faulted him for filing his complaint with the court a quo when the said
venue is inconvenient to the parties to the case. It opined that under the rules, the possible choices of venue are Pasay City or Makati City, or any place in the National Capital
Judicial Region, at the option of petitioner Saludo.

It stressed that while the choice of venue is given to plaintiff, said choice is not left to his caprice and cannot deprive a defendant of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of
Court.9 Further, fundamental in the law governing venue of actions that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed by the rules to attain the greatest possible
convenience to the party litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them - i.e., to both plaintiff and defendant, not only to one or the other - of the courts of
justice.10

The appellate court concluded that the court a quo should have given due course to respondents' affirmative defense of improper venue in order to avoid any suspicion that
petitioner Saludo's motive in filing his complaint with the court a quo was only to vex and unduly inconvenience respondents or even to wield influence in the outcome of the case,
petitioner Saludo being a powerful and influential figure in the said province. The latter circumstance could be regarded as a "specie of forum shopping" akin to that in Investors
Finance Corp. v. Ebarle11 where the Court mentioned that the filing of the civil action before the court in Pagadian City "was a specie of forum shopping" considering that plaintiff
therein was an influential person in the locality.

The decretal portion of the assailed Decision dated May 22, 2003 of the appellate court reads:

UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the challenged orders must be, as they hereby are, VACATED and SET ASIDE and the respondent judge, or any one acting in
his place or stead, is instructed and enjoined to desist from further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss it. The temporary restraining order earlier issued is hereby converted
into a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the posting this time by petitioners [herein respondents], within five (5) days from receipt of this decision, of a bond in the amount of Five
Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), to answer for all damages that private respondent [herein petitioner] may sustain by reason of the issuance of such injunction should the Court finally
decide that petitioners are not entitled thereto. Private respondent, if he so minded, may refile his case for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City or Pasay City, or
any of the Regional Trial Courts of the National Capital Judicial Region. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision but the appellate court, in the Resolution dated August 14, 2003, denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, he
filed the instant petition for review with the Court alleging that:

The Court of Appeals, (Special Fourth Division), in promulgating the afore-mentioned Decision and Resolution, has decided a question of substance in a way probably not in accord
with law or with applicable decisions of this Honorable Court.

(a) the Court of Appeals erred in not taking judicial notice of the undisputed fact that herein petitioner is the incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte
and as such, he is a residence (sic) of said district;

(b) the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis of improper venue due to the alleged judicial admission of herein petitioner;

(c) the Court of Appeals in dismissing the complaint ignored applicable decisions of this Honorable Court; and1avvphil.net

(d) the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that herein petitioner violated the rules on venue, and even speculated that herein petitioner's motive in filing the complaint in
Maasin City was only to vex the respondents.13

In gist, the sole substantive issue for the Court's resolution is whether the appellate court committed reversible error in holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo in
Civil Case No. R-3172 because not one of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff therein, was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint.

The petition is meritorious.

Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is a personal action. As such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which
reads:

SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but not to plaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.14 The rule on
venue, like other procedural rules, is designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice, or the impartial and evenhanded determination of every action and proceeding.15
The option of plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the RTC is either the place where defendant resides or may be found, or the place where plaintiff resides. If plaintiff opts for
the latter, he is limited to that place.16

Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint with the court a quo which is in Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He alleged in his complaint that he was
a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte to comply with the residency requirement of the rule.

However, the appellate court, adopting respondents' theory, made the finding that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint. It
hinged the said finding mainly on the fact that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate, indicated in his complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was
issued at Pasay City. That his law office is in Pasay City was also taken by the appellate court as negating petitioner Saludo's claim of residence in Southern Leyte.

The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and consequently
holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo. In Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento,17 the Court had the occasion to explain at length the meaning of the term
"resides" for purposes of venue, thus:

In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as employed in the rule on venue on personal actions filed with the courts of first instance means the place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning.
"It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the
greatest convenience possible to the parties-litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is, likewise, undeniable that the term
domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more
permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the
Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.

"This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October, 1954, reversing its previous stand in Larena v. Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36, and Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, that
-

'There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is
residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places
of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.' (Italicized for emphasis)

"We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words 'resides or may be found,' and not 'is
domiciled,' thus:

'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of
the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.' (Italicized for emphasis)

"Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully convinced that private respondent Coloma's protestations of domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his
manifested intention to return there after the retirement of his wife from government service to justify his bringing of an action for damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos
Norte, is entirely of no moment since what is of paramount importance is where he actually resided or where he may be found at the time he brought the action, to comply
substantially with the requirements of Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Court, on venue of personal actions." (Koh v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 304-305.)

The same construction of the word "resides" as used in Section 1, Rule 73, of the Revised Rules of Court, was enunciated in Fule v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. L-40502) and
Fule v. Hon. Ernani C. Pao, et al. (G.R. No. L-42670), decided on November 29, 1976. Thus, this Court, in the aforecited cases, stated:

"2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term 'resides' mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down
the doctrinal rule that the term 'resides' connotes ex vi termini 'actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal residence or domicile.' This term 'resides,' like the terms 'residing' and
'residence' is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purposes of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules -
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature - residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word 'domicile' still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms 'residence' and 'domicile' but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term 'inhabitant.' In other words, 'resides' should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary."18

There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the congressman or the representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo.
Even the appellate court admits this fact as it states that "it may be conceded that private respondent ever so often travels to Maasin City, Southern Leyte, because he is its
representative in the lower house."19

As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo was correctly deemed by the court a quo as possessing the requirements for the said position, 20 including that he
was then a resident of the district which he was representing, i.e., Southern Leyte. Significantly, for purposes of election law, the term "residence" is synonymous with "domicile,"
thus:
x x x [T]he Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term "residence," as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. x x x21

It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is more stringent in that it is equated with the term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose, the
term "residence" imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."22 When parsed,
therefore, the term "residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. As the Court elucidated, "the place where a party actually or constructively has a permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law." 23

On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus, it is understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and
also an intention to make it one's domicile."24

Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to
election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in another manner, Southern Leyte, as the
domicile of petitioner Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is understood in its popular sense. This is because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled
with the intention to remain for an unlimited time."

Reliance by the appellate court on Koh v. Court of Appeals25 is misplaced. Contrary to its holding,26 the facts of the present case are not similar to the facts therein. In Koh, the
complaint was filed with the Court of First Instance in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by plaintiff who admitted that he was a resident of Kamias, Quezon City. Save for the fact that he
grew up in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte and that he manifested the intent to return there after retirement, plaintiff therein had not established that he was actually a resident therein at
the time of the filing of his complaint. Neither did he establish that he had his domicile therein because although he manifested the intent to go back there after retirement, the
element of personal presence in that place was lacking. To reiterate, domicile or residence, as the terms are taken as synonyms, imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."27

In contrast, petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Absent any evidence to the
contrary, he is deemed to possess the qualifications for the said position, including that he was a resident therein. And following the definition of the term "residence" for purposes of
election law, petitioner Saludo not only had the intention to reside in Southern Leyte, but he also had personal presence therein, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
The latter element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant in Southern Leyte, was sufficient for petitioner Saludo to be considered a resident therein for purposes of venue.

The following ratiocination of the court a quo is apt:

Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city
residence. (Quetulio v. Ruiz, S.C. Off. Gaz. 156, Commentaries and Jurisprudence in Civil Law, Vol. 1, page 211, Tolentino). Residence is acquired by living in a place; on the other
hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay
there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other place.

Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he would have his domicile in Quezon City. If he also has a house for vacation purposes in the City of Baguio, and
another house in connection with his business in the City of Manila, he would have residence in all three places (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on Civil Law, Vol. 1,
Page 212, 1990 Edition) so that one[']s legal residence or domicile can also be his actual, personal or physical residence or habitation or place of abode if he stays there with
intention to stay there permanently.

In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of exercising his profession or doing business and also a house in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for
doing business and/or for election or political purposes where he also lives or stays physically, personally and actually then he can have residences in these two places. Because it
would then be preposterous to acknowledge and recognize plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as congressman of Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as actually, personally
and physically residing thereat, when such residence is required by law.28
The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City is of no moment because granting arguendo that he could be considered a resident therein,
the same does not preclude his having a residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he
may have numerous places of residence.29

That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint was admitted as a fact by the court a quo.
In this connection, it consequently held that, as such, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was the representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court
a quo cannot be faulted for doing so because courts are allowed "to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions." 30 Courts are likewise bound to take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the law in force in the
Philippines, 31 including its Constitution.

The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been explained as those facts that are "so commonly known in the community as to make it
unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known to as to make it indisputable among reasonable men." 32 Moreover, "though usually facts of 'common knowledge' will be
generally known throughout the country, it is sufficient as a basis for judicial notice that they be known in the local community where the trial court sits." 33 Certainly, the fact of
petitioner Saludo being the duly elected representative of Southern Leyte at the time could be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo, the same being a matter of
common knowledge in the community where it sits.

Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution, one of
the qualifications of a congressman or representative to the House of Representatives is having a residence in the district in which he shall be elected.

In fine, petitioner Saludo's act of filing his complaint with the court a quo cannot be characterized as a "specie of forum-shopping" or capricious on his part because, under the rules,
as plaintiff, he is precisely given this option.

Finally, respondents' claim that the instant petition for review was not properly verified by petitioner Saludo deserves scant consideration.

Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading.

Petitioner Saludo's verification and certification of non-forum shopping states that he has "read the contents thereof [referring to the petition] and the same are true and correct of my
own personal knowledge and belief and on the basis of the records at hand." The same clearly constitutes substantial compliance with the above requirements of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 22, 2003 and Resolution dated August 14, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
69553 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof,
in Civil Case No. R-3172 are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, G.R. No. 174489

SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR,

ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN,

ROSIE M. MATEO, Present:

NENITA A. PACHECO,

VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

and RAFAEL TITCO, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

Petitioners, BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO, and

- versus - VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

LORENZO LAXA, Promulgated:

Respondent. April 11, 2012

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
 DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly establish that the decedent was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the
state is duty-bound to give full effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute his estate in the manner provided in his will so long as it is legally tenable.103[1]

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari104[2] of the June 15, 2006 Decision105[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 which reversed the September 30, 2003
Decision106[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Guagua, Pampanga in Special Proceedings No. G-1186. The assailed CA Decision granted the petition for probate of the notarial will of
Paciencia Regala (Paciencia), to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to be impressed with merit, the decision in SP. PROC. NO. G-1186 dated 30 September 2003, is hereby SET
ASIDE and a new one entered GRANTING the petition for the probate of the will of PACIENCIA REGALA.

SO ORDERED.107[5]

Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA Resolution108[6] which denied the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.

103
104
105
106
107
108
 Petitioners call us to reverse the CAs assailed Decision and instead affirm the Decision of the RTC which disallowed the notarial will of Paciencia.

Factual Antecedents

Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala109[7] (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13,
1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses
that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 3110[8] and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.111[9]

The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three attested to the Wills due execution by
affixing their signatures below its attestation clause112[10] and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof, 113[11] in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as
notary public.

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and
Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:

xxxx

Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me since then up to the present by the spouses LORENZO LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA, I hereby BEQUEATH,
CONVEY and GIVE all my properties enumerated in parcels 1 to 5 unto the spouses LORENZO R. LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA and their children, LUNA LORELLA LAXA and

109
110
111
112
113
 KATHERINE LAXA, and the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa both of legal age, Filipinos, presently residing at Barrio Sta. Monica, [Sasmuan], Pampanga and their
children, LUNA LORELLA and KATHERINE ROSS LAXA, who are still not of legal age and living with their parents who would decide to bequeath since they are the children of the
spouses;

xxxx

[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered aside from the properties mentioned in this last will and testament, I am also bequeathing and giving the same
to the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa and their two children and I also command them to offer masses yearly for the repose of my soul and that of D[]a Nicomeda
Regala, Epifania Regala and their spouses and with respect to the fishpond situated at San Antonio, I likewise command to fulfill the wishes of D[]a Nicomeda Regala in accordance
with her testament as stated in my testament. x x x114[12]

The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo is Paciencias nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated
Paciencia as his own mother.115[13] Paciencia lived with Lorenzos family in Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she who raised and cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after the execution of the Will
or on September 19, 1981, Paciencia left for the United States of America (USA). There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on January 4, 1996.

In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.

More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition 116[14] with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the
issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor, docketed as Special Proceedings No. G-1186.

There being no opposition to the petition after its due publication, the RTC issued an Order on June 13, 2000 117[15] allowing Lorenzo to present evidence on June 22, 2000. On said date, Dra.
Limpin testified that she was one of the instrumental witnesses in the execution of the last will and testament of Paciencia on September 13, 1981. 118[16] The Will was executed in her fathers (Judge

114
115
116
117
Limpin) home office, in her presence and of two other witnesses, Francisco and Faustino. 119[17] Dra. Limpin positively identified the Will and her signatures on all its four pages. 120[18] She likewise
positively identified the signature of her father appearing thereon. 121[19] Questioned by the prosecutor regarding Judge Limpins present mental fitness, Dra. Limpin testified that her father had a stroke in
1991 and had to undergo brain surgery.122[20] The judge can walk but can no longer talk and remember her name. Because of this, Dra. Limpin stated that her father can no longer testify in court.123[21]

The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition 124[22] to Lorenzos petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencias Will belong
to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.125[23]

Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now joined by petitioners Sebastian M. Baltazar, Virgilio Regala, Jr., Nenita A. Pacheco, Felix B. Flores, Rafael Titco, Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie)
and Antonio L. Mangalindan filed a Supplemental Opposition 126[24] contending that Paciencias Will was null and void because ownership of the properties had not been transferred and/or titled to
Paciencia before her death pursuant to Article 1049, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.127[25] Petitioners also opposed the issuance of Letters of Administration in Lorenzos favor arguing that Lorenzo was
disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a citizen and resident of the USA.128[26] Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.129[27]

118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
 Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended Opposition 130[28] asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencias Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed
and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or
influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of
Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will. Simultaneously,
petitioners filed an Opposition and Recommendation131[29] reiterating their opposition to the appointment of Lorenzo as administrator of the properties and requesting for the appointment of Antonio in
his stead.

On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order 132[30] denying the requests of both Lorenzo and Antonio to be appointed administrator since the former is a citizen and resident of the USA
while the latters claim as a co-owner of the properties subject of the Will has not yet been established.

Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the Will continued. Dra. Limpin was recalled for cross-examination by the petitioners. She testified as to the age of her father at the
time the latter notarized the Will of Paciencia; the living arrangements of Paciencia at the time of the execution of the Will; and the lack of photographs when the event took place. 133[31]

Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado (Monico) also took the witness stand. Monico, son of Faustino, testified on his fathers condition. According to him his father can no
longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. A medical certificate was presented to the court to support this allegation. 134[32]

130
131
132
133
134
 For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure for the USA in April 1980, he lived in Sasmuan, Pampanga with his family and his aunt, Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia went to
the USA and lived with him and his family until her death in January 1996; the relationship between him and Paciencia was like that of a mother and child since Paciencia took care of him since birth
and took him in as an adopted son; Paciencia was a spinster without children, and without brothers and sisters; at the time of Paciencias death, she did not suffer from any mental disorder and was of
sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute; the Will was in the custody of Judge Limpin and was only given to him after Paciencias death through Faustino; and he was already residing in the USA when
the Will was executed.135[33] Lorenzo positively identified the signature of Paciencia in three different documents and in the Will itself and stated that he was familiar with Paciencias signature because
he accompanied her in her transactions.136[34] Further, Lorenzo belied and denied having used force, intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in the
Philippines when the same was executed.137[35] On cross-examination, Lorenzo clarified that Paciencia informed him about the Will shortly after her arrival in the USA but that he saw a copy of the Will
only after her death.138[36]

As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as he already died on May 21, 2000.

For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins.139[37] She claimed to have helped in the household chores in the house of Paciencia thereby allowing her to
stay therein from morning until evening and that during the period of her service in the said household, Lorenzos wife and his children were staying in the same house. 140[38] She served in the said
household from 1980 until Paciencias departure for the USA on September 19, 1981.141[39]

135
136
137
138
139
140
141
 On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino bring something for Paciencia to sign at the latters house. 142[40] Rosie admitted, though, that she did not see what that
something was as same was placed inside an envelope. 143[41] However, she remembered Paciencia instructing Faustino to first look for money before she signs them. 144[42] A few days after or on
September 16, 1981, Paciencia went to the house of Antonios mother and brought with her the said envelope. 145[43] Upon going home, however, the envelope was no longer with Paciencia. 146[44]
Rosie further testified that Paciencia was referred to as magulyan or forgetful because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later. 147[45] On cross
examination, it was established that Rosie was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia was magulyan was based on her personal assessment,148[46] and that it was
Antonio who requested her to testify in court.149[47]

In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was his aunt. 150[48] He identified the Will and testified that he had seen the said document before because Paciencia brought the same
to his mothers house and showed it to him along with another document on September 16, 1981. 151[49] Antonio alleged that when the documents were shown to him, the same were still unsigned. 152
[50] According to him, Paciencia thought that the documents pertained to a lease of one of her rice lands, 153[51] and it was he who explained that the documents were actually a special power of
attorney to lease and sell her fishpond and other properties upon her departure for the USA, and a Will which would transfer her properties to Lorenzo and his family upon her death. 154[52] Upon hearing
this, Paciencia allegedly uttered the following words: Why will I never [return], why will I sell all my properties? Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only [son] of God? I have other relatives [who should] benefit

142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
from my properties. Why should I die already? 155[53] Thereafter, Antonio advised Paciencia not to sign the documents if she does not want to, to which the latter purportedly replied, I know nothing
about those, throw them away or it is up to you. The more I will not sign them.156[54] After which, Paciencia left the documents with Antonio. Antonio kept the unsigned documents

and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18, 1981.157[55]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision158[56] denying the petition thus:

WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition dated April 24, 2000; and (b) disallows the notarized will dated September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala.

SO ORDERED.159[57]

The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of
mind to have testamentary capacity.160[58]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

155
156
157
158
159
160
 On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree with the RTCs conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound
mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that the state of being magulyan does not make a person mentally unsound so [as] to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will. 161[59] Moreover, the
oppositors in the probate proceedings were not able to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound mind. Further, no concrete circumstances or events were given to prove the allegation
that Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the Will.162[60]

Petitioners moved for reconsideration163[61] but the motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution164[62] dated August 31, 2006.

Hence, this petition.

Issues

Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari ascribing upon the CA the following errors:

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE PROBATE OF PACIENCIAS WILL DESPITE RESPONDENTS UTTER FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 11, RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT;

II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD;

III.

161
162
163
164
 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE THAT PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND AT THE
TIME THE WILL WAS ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED165[63]

The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for probate.

Our Ruling

We deny the petition.

Faithful compliance with the formalities

laid down by law is apparent from the face of the Will.

Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a

Will in probate proceedings.166[64] This is expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Rule 75
PRODUCTION OF WILL. ALLOWANCE OF WILL NECESSARY.

165
166
 Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. No will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court.
Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. 167[65] These
formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except
the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some
other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof
in the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file
another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.

Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the
notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the
presence of one another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of
Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners.

167
 Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was magulyan or forgetful so much so that it effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity. They likewise claimed in their
Motion for Reconsideration168[66] filed with the CA that Paciencia was not only magulyan but was actually suffering from paranoia.169[67]

We are not convinced.

We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will.170[68] Forgetfulness is
not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states:

Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or
unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act.

In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencias forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound
mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpins testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge
Limpins house and voluntarily executed the Will. The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testators mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and
intelligent.171[69] More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. Article 800 of the New Civil
Code states:

Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator,
one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid
interval.

168
169
170
171
 Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound
mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CAs finding that petitioners
failed to discharge such burden.

Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of her bounty and the character of the testamentary act. As aptly pointed out
by the CA:

A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document she executed. She specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed
upon her death. She was well aware of how she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties she is bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his two
(2) children. A third child was born after the execution of the will and was not included therein as devisee.172[70]

Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence and pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as
basis to deny the probate of a will.

An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator or testatrix to execute the document that will distribute his/her earthly possessions upon his/her death. Petitioners
claim that Paciencia was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by
Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; and that assuming Paciencias signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery. These are grounded on the alleged conversation
between Paciencia and Antonio on September 16, 1981 wherein the former purportedly repudiated the Will and left it unsigned.

We are not persuaded.

172
 We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated Lorenzo as her own son and that love even extended to Lorenzos wife and children. This kind of relationship is
not unusual. It is in fact not unheard of in our culture for old maids or spinsters to care for and raise their nephews and nieces and treat them as their own children. Such is a prevalent and accepted
cultural practice that has resulted in many family discords between those favored by the testamentary disposition of a testator and those who stand to benefit in case of intestacy.

In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencias relationship with Lorenzo and his family is different from her relationship with petitioners. The very fact that she cared for
and raised Lorenzo and lived with him both here and abroad, even if the latter was already married and already has children, highlights the special bond between them. This unquestioned relationship
between Paciencia and the devisees tends to support the authenticity of the said document as against petitioners allegations of duress, influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence,
pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside from being factual in nature, are not supported by concrete, substantial and credible evidence on record. It is worth stressing that bare arguments, no matter
how forceful, if not based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the Court to uphold said allegations.173[71] Furthermore, a purported will is not [to be] denied legalization on
dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a will has been duly executed in fact, whether x x x it will be probated would have
to depend largely on the attitude of those interested in [the estate of the deceased].174[72]

Court should be convinced by the evidence presented before it that the Will was duly executed.

Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencias Will on the ground that Section 11 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was not complied with. It provides:

RULE 76
ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will contested. If the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the notary in the case of wills
executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them
must be satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some of such witnesses are present in the Philippines but outside the province where the will has been filed, their deposition must
be taken. If any or all of them testify against the due execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may nevertheless,
be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law.

If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3) witnesses who know the handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the
signature are in the handwriting of the testator; in the absence of any competent witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (Emphasis
supplied.)

173
174
 They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public should have been presented in court since all but one witness, Francisco, are still living.

We cannot agree with petitioners.

We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before the court was satisfactorily explained during the probate proceedings. As testified to by his son, Faustino
had a heart attack, was already bedridden and could no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. To prove this, said witness presented the corresponding medical certificate. For her part,
Dra. Limpin testified that her father, Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. At that time, Judge Limpin could no longer talk and could not even remember his
daughters name so that Dra. Limpin stated that given such condition, her father could no longer testify. It is well to note that at that point, despite ample opportunity, petitioners neither interposed any
objections to the testimonies of said witnesses nor challenged the same on cross examination. We thus hold that for all intents and purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the
incapacity and failure of the said subscribing witness and of the notary public to testify in court. Because of this the probate of Paciencias Will may be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpins testimony
proving her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her handwriting. It is an established rule that [a] testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses
declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced
by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law.175[73]

Moreover, it bears stressing that [i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of the parties as regards the authenticity and due execution of the will x x x in question, it is the mandate of the law that
it is the evidence before the court and/or [evidence that] ought to be before it that is controlling. 176[74] The very existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed [testatrix] has willed
that [her] estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected
thereby.177[75] This, coupled with Lorenzos established relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as opposed to the total lack of evidence presented by
petitioners apart from their self-serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of the authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.

175
176
177
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 15, 2006 and the Resolution dated August 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 115181. March 31, 2000]

MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO, ANTONIO AVELINO, JR., TRACY AVELINO, PATRICK
MICHAEL AVELINO and MARK ANTHONY AVELINO, respondents. Sdaa miso

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 as well as its Resolution dated April 28,
1994 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, in Sp. Proc. No. Q-91-10441
converting petitioner's petition for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition.

Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent Angelina Avelino.

The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony all surnamed Avelino are likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an American, is the
second wife of Avelino, Sr. The other private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.

The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, docketed as SP Proc. No. Q-91-10441, a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on April 10, 1989. She asked that she be appointed the administrator of the estate.

On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by filing a motion to convert the said judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition which petitioner duly
opposed.

On February 16, 1993, public respondent judge issued the assailed Order which reads:

"Acting on the Motion to Convert Proceedings to Action for Judicial Partition, considering that the petitioner is the only heir not amenable to a simple partition, and
all the other compulsory heirs manifested their desire for an expeditious settlement of the estate of the deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr., the same is granted.

"WHEREFORE, the petition is converted into judicial partition of the estate of deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr. The parties are directed to submit a complete
inventory of all the real and personal properties left by the deceased. Set the hearing of the judicial partition on APRIL 13, 1993, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
Notify all the parties and their counsel of this assignment.

"SO ORDERED."178[1]

On March 17, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated June 16, 1993.

178
On July 23, 1993, Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, in granting private respondents' motion to convert the judicial proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial
partition. Her petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31574. Sdaad

On February 18, 1994, the respondent appellate court rendered the assailed decision, stating that the "petition is DENIED DUE COURSE" and accordingly dismissed."179[2]

On March 1, 1994, petitioner duly moved for reconsideration, but it was denied on April 28, 1994.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner assigns the following errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT PARTITION IS PROPER UNDER THE PREMISES.

ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE THE PROPER REMEDY PENDING THE DETERMINATION OF THE CHARACTER AND EXTENT OF THE DECEDENT'S
ESTATE.180[3]

For resolution, we find that given the circumstances in this case, the sole issue here is whether respondent appellate court committed an error of law and gravely abused its
discretion in upholding the trial court's finding that a partition is proper.

Petitioner submits that: First, no partition of the estate is possible in the instant case as no determination has yet been made of the character and extent of the decedent's estate.
She points to the Court's ruling in Arcilles v. Montejo, 26 SCRA 197 (1969), where we held that when the existence of other properties of the decedent is a matter still to be reckoned
with, administration proceedings are the proper mode of resolving the same.181[4] In addition, petitioner contends that the estate is in danger of being depleted for want of an
administrator to manage and attend to it.

Second, petitioner insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for conversion of a motion for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. The
conversion of the motion was, thus, procedurally inappropriate and should be struck down for lack of legal basis.

When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by
the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6 of
Rule 78.182[5] The exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 74183[6] which provide:

"SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age or the minors are
represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate
among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an
ordinary action of partition.. Scs daad

179
180
181
182
183
 "SEC. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value.- Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does
not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact if made to appear to the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested person
and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and after such other notice to interested persons as
the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of
the will, if any there be, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate and to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of
such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own right, if they are lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians
or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so
awarded to them respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or
rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall be recorded in the
proper register's office."

The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased at the moment of the latter's death.184[7] Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows heirs to
divide the estate among themselves without need of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a person dies without leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to
submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court.185[8]

We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this case "the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age."186[9] With this finding, it is our view that Section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court should apply.

In a last-ditch effort to justify the need for an administrator, petitioner insists that there is nothing to partition yet, as the nature and character of the estate have yet to be determined.
We find, however, that a complete inventory of the estate may be done during the partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts. Hence, the Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error when it ruled that the lower court did not err in converting petitioner's action for letters of administration into an action for judicial partition. Sup rema

Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order of the trial court converting an action for letters of administration to one for judicial partition has no basis in the Rules of
Court, hence procedurally infirm. The basis for the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition
of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case. We have held that where the more expeditious
remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings. 187[10] The trial court appropriately
converted petitioner's action for letters of administration into a suit for judicial partition, upon motion of the private respondents. No reversible error may be attributed to the Court of
Appeals when it found the trial court's action procedurally in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals is CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

184
185
186
187
SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO G.R. No. 161220

and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO

substituted by their heirs, namely:

Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and

Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and

SPOUSES RENATO C. BENATIRO and Present:

ROSIE M. BENATIRO,

Respondents,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

- versus - Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS, CHICO-NAZARIO

namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, NACHURA, and

Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, REYES, JJ.

Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos,

represented by their attorney-in-fact,

Salud Cuyos,

Promulgated:

Respondents. July 30, 2008

x----------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners seeking to annul the Decision 188[1] dated July 18, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its
Resolution189[2] dated November 13, 2003 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 65630.190[3]

188
189
190
 Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with nine children, namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. On August
28, 1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu covered by Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730, 000731, 000732, all under the name of
Agatona Arrogante.

On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria) represented by Atty. Victor Elliot Lepiten (Atty. Lepiten), filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Cebu, Branch XI, a petition191[4] for Letters of Administration, docketed as Special Proceeding (SP) No. 24-BN entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Evaristo Cuyos, Gloria Cuyos-
Talian, petitioner. The petition was opposed by Glorias brother, Francisco, who was represented by Atty. Jesus Yray (Atty. Yray).

In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties together with their respective counsels appeared. Both counsels manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle their case.
The trial court on even date issued an Order192[5] appointing Gloria as administratrix of the estate. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, letters of administration of the estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos and including the undivided half accruing to his spouse Agatona Arrogante who recently died is hereby issued in favor of Mrs.
Gloria Cuyos Talian who may qualify as such administratrix after posting a nominal bond of P1,000.00.193[6]

Subsequently, in the Order194[7] dated December 12, 1975, the CFI stated that when the Intestate Estate hearing was called on that date, respondent Gloria and her brother, oppositor Francisco,
together with their respective counsels, appeared; that Atty. Yray, Franciscos counsel, manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle the case amicably; that both counsels suggested that
the Clerk of Court, Atty. Andres C. Taneo (Atty. Taneo), be appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of partition for the approval of the court. In the
same Order, the Court of First Instance (CFI) appointed Atty. Taneo and ordered him to make a project of partition within 30 days from December 12, 1975 for submission and approval of the court.

191
192
193
194
 In his Commissioner's Report195[8] dated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to cause their appearance on February 28 and 29,
1976 in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located, for a conference or meeting to arrive at an agreement; that out of the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos
failed to attend; that per return of the service, these three heirs could not be located in their respective given addresses; that since some of the heirs present resided outside the province of Cebu, they
decided to go ahead with the scheduled meeting.

Atty. Taneo declared in his Report that the heirs who were present:

1. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the time that Francisco Cuyos, one of the heirs, was administering the properties of the estate (without
appointment from the Court) as having been properly and duly accounted for.

2. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the administration of Gloria Cuyos Talian, (duly appointed by the Court) also one of the heirs as having
been properly and duly accounted for.

3. Agreed to consider all motions filed in this proceedings demanding an accounting from Francisco Cuyos and Gloria Cuyos Talian, as having been withdrawn.

4. Agreed not to partition the properties of the estate but instead agreed to first sell it for the sum of P40,000.00 subject to the condition that should any of the heirs would be in a
position to buy the properties of the estate, the rest of the eight (8) heirs will just receive only Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) each.

5. Agreed to equally divide the administration expenses to be deducted from their respective share of P4,000.00.196[9]

The Report further stated that Columba Cuyos-Benatiro (Columba), one of the heirs, informed all those present in the conference of her desire to buy the properties of the estate, to which
everybody present agreed, and considered her the buyer. Atty. Taneo explained that the delay in the submission of the Report was due to the request of respondent Gloria that she be given enough time to
make some consultations on what was already agreed upon by the majority of the heirs; that it was only on July 11, 1976 that the letter of respondent Gloria was handed to Atty. Taneo, with the information
that respondent Gloria was amenable to what had been agreed upon, provided she be given the sum of P5,570.00 as her share of the estate, since one of properties of the estate was mortgaged to her in
order to defray their father's hospitalization.

195
196
 Quoting the Commissioners Report, the CFI issued the assailed Order197[10] dated December 16, 1976, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the terms and conditions agreed upon by the heirs to be in order, the same being not contrary to law, said compromise agreement as embodied in the report of
the commissioner is hereby approved. The Court hereby orders the Administratrix to execute the deed of sale covering all the properties of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos
Benatiro after the payment to her of the sum of P36,000.00. The said sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and administration expenses and the estate
taxes shall have been paid for, the remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally among the heirs. 198[11]

The CFI disapproved the claim of respondent Gloria for the sum of P5,570.00, as the same had been allegedly disregarded by the heirs present during the conference.

In an Order199[12] dated January 11, 1978, the CFI appointed Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the new administrator of the estate, purportedly on the basis of the motion to relieve respondent Gloria, as it
appeared that she was already residing in Central Luzon and her absence was detrimental to the early termination of the proceedings.

On May 25, 1979, administrator Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale200[13] over the six parcels of land constituting the intestate estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos in favor of Columba for a
consideration of the sum of P36,000.00.

Sometime in February 1998, the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact,
Salud Cuyos (respondents), allegedly learned that Tax Declaration Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730, 000731 and 000732, which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were
canceled and new Tax Declaration Nos., namely, 20-14129, 20-14130, 20-141131, 20-14132, 2014133 and 20-14134, were issued in Columbas name; and that later on, Original Certificates of Titles
covering the estate of Evaristo Cuyos were issued in favor of Columba; that some of these parcels of land were subsequently transferred to the names of spouses Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie M.
Benatiro, son and daughter-in-law, respectively, of petitioners Gorgonio and Columba, for which transfer certificates of title were subsequently issued; that they subsequently discovered the existence of the
assailed CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 25, 1979.

197
198
199
200
 Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner Gorgonio Benatiro before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) of the Department of Justice, which on June 13, 2000
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.201[14]

Salud Cuyos brought the matter for conciliation and mediation at the barangay level, but was unsuccessful.202[15]

On July 16, 2001, Salud Cuyos, for herself and in representation203[16] of the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano,204[17] and Enrique, filed with the CA a petition for
annulment of the Order dated December 16, 1976 of the CFI of Cebu, Branch XI, in SP No. 24-BN under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. They alleged that the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 was null and
void and of no effect, the same being based on a Commissioner's Report, which was patently false and irregular; that such report practically deprived them of due process in claiming their share of their
father's estate; that Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares executed an affidavit, as well as the unnotarized statement of Gloria stating that no meeting ever took place for the purpose of discussing how to dispose of the
estate of their parents and that they never received any payment from the supposed sale of their share in the inheritance; that the report was done in close confederacy with their co-heir Columba, who stood
to be benefited by the Commissioner's recommendation, should the same be approved by the probate court; that since the report was a falsity, any order proceeding therefrom was invalid; that the issuance
of the certificates of titles in favor of respondents were tainted with fraud and irregularity, since the CFI which issued the assailed order did not appear to have been furnished a copy of the Deed of Absolute
Sale; that the CFI was not in custodia legis of the consideration of the sale, as directed in its Order so that it could divide the remainder of the consideration equally among the heirs after paying all the
administration expenses and estate taxes; that the intestate case had not yet been terminated as the last order found relative to the case was the appointment of Lope as administrator vice Gloria; that they
never received their corresponding share in the inheritance; and that the act of petitioners in manifest connivance with administrator Lope amounted to a denial of their right to the property without due
process of law, thus, clearly showing that extrinsic fraud caused them to be deprived of their property.

Herein petitioners contend that respondents' allegation that they discovered the assailed order dated December 16, 1976 only in February 1998 was preposterous, as respondents were represented by
counsel in the intestate proceedings; thus, notice of Order to counsel was notice to client; that this was only a ploy so that they could claim that they filed the petition for annulment within the statutory period of
four (4) years; that they have been in possession of the six parcels of land since May 25, 1979 when the same was sold to them pursuant to the assailed Order in the intestate proceedings; that no extrinsic

201
202
203
204
fraud attended the issuance of the assailed order; that Numeriano executed an affidavit in which he attested to having received his share of the sale proceeds on May 18, 1988; that respondents were
estopped from assailing the Order dated December 16, 1976, as it had already attained the status of finality.

On July 18, 2003, the CA granted the petition and annulled the CFI order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING REASONS, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu Branch XI dated
December 16, 1976 as well as the Certificates of Title issued in the name of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro and the subsequent transfer of these Titles in the name of spouses Renato and
Rosie Benatiro are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Further, SP Proc. Case No. 24-BN is hereby ordered reopened and proceedings thereon be continued.205[18]

The CA declared that the ultimate fact that was needed to be established was the veracity and truthfulness of the Commissioners Report, which was used by the trial court as its basis for issuing the
assailed Order. The CA held that to arrive at an agreement, there was a need for all the concerned parties to be present in the conference; however, such was not the scenario since in their separate sworn
statements, the compulsory heirs of the decedent attested to the fact that no meeting or conference ever happened among them; that although under Section 3(m), Rule 133 on the Rules of Evidence, there is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of an official duty, the same may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence to prove the contrary.

The CA noted some particulars that led it to conclude that the conference was not held accordingly, to wit: (1) the Commissioners Report never mentioned the names of the heirs who were present in the
alleged conference but only the names of those who were absent, when the names of those who were present were equally essential, if not even more important, than the names of those who were absent; (2)
the Report also failed to include any proof of conformity to the agreement from the attendees, such as letting them sign the report to signify their consent as regards the agreed mechanisms for the estates
settlement; (3) there was lack or absence of physical evidence attached to the report indicating that the respondents were indeed properly notified about the scheduled conference. The CA then concluded that due
to the absence of the respondents' consent, the legal existence of the compromise agreement did not stand on a firm ground.

The CA further observed that although it appeared that notice of the report was given to Atty. Lepiten and Atty. Yray, lawyers of Gloria and Francisco Cuyos, respectively, the same cannot be taken as
notice to the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos; that a lawyers authority to compromise cannot be simply presumed, since what was required was the special authority to compromise on behalf of his client; that a
compromise agreement entered into by a person not duly authorized to do so by the principal is void and has no legal effect, citing Quiban v. Butalid;206[19] that being a void compromise agreement, the assailed
Order had no legal effect.

205
206
 Thus, the CA ruled that the Certificates of Titles obtained by herein petitioners were procured fraudulently; that the initial transfer of the properties to Columba Cuyos-Benatiro by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Lope Cuyos was clearly defective, since the compromise agreement which served as the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale was void and had no legal effect.

The CA elaborated that there was no showing that Columba paid the sum of P36,000.00 to the administrator as consideration for the sale, except for the testimony of Numeriano Cuyos admitting
that he received his share of the proceeds but without indicating the exact amount that he received; that even so, such alleged payment was incomplete and was not in compliance with the trial courts order
for the administratix to execute the deed of sale covering all properties of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro after the payment to the administratrix of the sum of P36,000.00; that said sum of
money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally
among the heirs.

Moreover, the CA found that the copy of the Deed of Sale was not even furnished the trial court nor was said money placed under custodia legis as agreed upon; that the Certification dated
December 9, 1998 issued by the Clerk of Court of Cebu indicated that the case had not yet been terminated and that the last Order in the special proceeding was the appointment of Lope Cuyos as the new
administrator of the estate; thus, the transfer of the parcels of land, which included the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, cancellation of Tax Declarations and the issuance of new Tax Declarations and
Transfer Certificates of Title, all in favor of petitioners, were tainted with fraud. Consequently, the CA concluded that the compromise agreement, the certificates of title and the transfers made by petitioners
through fraud cannot be made a legal basis of their ownership over the properties, since to do so would result in enriching them at the expense of the respondents; and that it was also evident that the fraud
attendant in this case was one of extrinsic fraud, since respondents were denied the opportunity to fully litigate their case because of the scheme utilized by petitioners to assert their claim.

Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:

Whether or not annulment of order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court was a proper remedy where the aggrieved party had other appropriate remedies, such as new trial,
appeal, or petition for relief, which they failed to take through their own fault.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts when it annulled the 24 year old Commissioner's Report of the Clerk of Court - an official act which enjoys a
strong presumption of regularity - based merely on belated allegations of irregularities in the performance of said official act.
Whether or not upon the facts as found by the Court of Appeals in this case, extrinsic fraud existed which is a sufficient ground to annul the lower court's order under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court. 207[20]

207
 Subsequent to the filing of their petition, petitioners filed a Manifestation that they were in possession of affidavits of waiver and desistance executed by the heirs of Lope Cuyos208[21] and
respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares209[22] on February 17, 2004 and December 17, 2004, respectively. In both affidavits, the affiants stated that they had no more interest in prosecuting/defending the
case involving the settlement of the estate, since the subject estate properties had been bought by their late sister Columba, and they had already received their share of the purchase price. Another heir,
respondent Numeriano Cuyos, had also earlier executed an Affidavit210[23] dated December 13, 2001, stating that the subject estate was sold to Columba and that she had already received her share of the
purchase price on May 18, 1988. In addition, Numeriano had issued a certification211[24] dated May 18, 1988, which was not refuted by any of the parties, that he had already received P4,000.00 in payment
of his share, which could be the reason why he refused to sign the Special Power of Attorney supposedly in favor of Salud Cuyos for the filing of the petition with the CA.

The issue for resolution is whether the CA committed a reversible error in annulling the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved the Commissioners Report embodying the alleged
compromise agreement entered into by the heirs of Evaristo and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos.

We rule in the negative.

The remedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in character212[25] and will not so easily and readily lend itself to abuse by parties aggrieved by final judgments. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47
impose strict conditions for recourse to it, viz.:

Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for
which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

Section 2. Grounds for annulment. The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.

208
209
210
211
212
 Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that annulment of a final judgment or order of an RTC may be based "only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction,"
jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as additional .ground therefor.213[26]

An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character.214[27] Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing
party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party.215[28] Fraud is regarded as
extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured.
The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. 216[29]

While we find that the CA correctly annulled the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, we find that it should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty.
Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed order is void for lack of due process.

Clerk of Court Taneo was appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the heirs and to prepare the project of partition for submission and approval of the court. Thus, it was incumbent
upon Atty. Taneo to set a time and place for the first meeting of the heirs. In his Commissioners Report, Atty. Taneo stated that he caused the appearance of all the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante
Cuyos in the place, where the subject properties were located for settlement, by sending them subpoenae supplemented by telegrams for them to attend the conference scheduled on February 28 to 29, 1976. It
was also alleged that out of the nine heirs, only six attended the conference; however, as the CA aptly found, the Commissioner did not state the names of those present, but only those heirs who failed to attend
the conference, namely: respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique who, as stated in the Report, based on the return of service, could not be located in their respective given addresses.

However, there is nothing in the records that would establish that the alleged subpoenae, supplemented by telegrams, for the heirs to appear in the scheduled conference were indeed sent to the heirs.
In fact, respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, one of the heirs, who was presumably present in the conference, as she was not mentioned as among those absent, had executed an affidavit 217[30] dated
December 8, 1998 attesting, to the fact that she was not called to a meeting nor was there any telegram or notice of any meeting received by her. While Patrocenia had executed on December 17, 2004 an

213
214
215
216
217
Affidavit of Waiver and Desistance218[31] regarding this case, it was only for the reason that the subject estate properties had been bought by their late sister Columba, and that she had already received her
corresponding share of the purchase price, but there was nothing in the affidavit that retracted her previous statement that she was not called to a meeting. Respondent Gloria also made an unnotarized
statement219[32] that there was no meeting held. Thus, the veracity of Atty. Taneos holding of a conference with the heirs was doubtful.

Moreover, there was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened for the purpose of arriving at an agreement regarding the estate properties, since they were not even required to sign anything
to show their attendance of the alleged meeting. In fact, the Commissioner's Report, which embodied the alleged agreement of the heirs, did not bear the signatures of the alleged attendees to show their consent
and conformity thereto.

It bears stressing that the purpose of the conference was for the heirs to arrive at a compromise agreement over the estate of Evaristo Cuyos. Thus, it was imperative that all the heirs must be present in
the conference and be heard to afford them the opportunity to protect their interests. Considering that no separate instrument of conveyance was executed among the heirs embodying their alleged agreement, it
was necessary that the Report be signed by the heirs to prove that a conference among the heirs was indeed held, and that they conformed to the agreement stated in the Report.

Petitioners point out that the Commissioner was an officer of the court and a disinterested party and that, under Rule 133, Section 3(m) of the Rules on Evidence, there is a presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed.

While, under the general rule, it is to be presumed that everything done by an officer in connection with the performance of an official act in the line of his duty was legally done, such presumption may be
overcome by evidence to the contrary. We find the instances mentioned by the CA, such as absence of the names of the persons present in the conference, absence of the signatures of the heirs in the
Commissioner's Report, as well as absence of evidence showing that respondents were notified of the conference, to be competent proofs of irregularity that rebut the presumption.

Thus, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in ruling that the conference was not held accordingly and in annulling the assailed order of the CFI.

218
219
 Petitioners attached a Certification220[33] dated August 7, 2003 issued by the Officer In Charge (OIC), Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC, Branch 11, to show that copies of the Commissioners Report
were sent to all the heirs, except Salud and Enrique, as well as to Attys. Lepiten and Yray as enumerated in the Notice found at the lower portion of the Report with the accompanying registry receipts.221[34]

In Cua v. Vargas,222[35] in which the issue was whether heirs were deemed constructively notified of and bound by an extra-judicial settlement and partition of the estate, regardless of their failure to
participate therein, when the extra-judicial settlement and partition has been duly published, we held:

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice
of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed
upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been
executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.

The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact
of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this
connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of
the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they
are concerned223[36] (Emphasis supplied)

Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what matters is whether the heirs were indeed notified before the compromise agreement was arrived at, which was not established, and not
whether they were notified of the Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged agreement afterwards.

We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a hearing to validate the Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the absence of the signatures
of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the Report despite the statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs attended the conference, thus, effectively depriving the other heirs of
their chance to be heard. The CFI's action was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. We find that the assailed Order
dated December 16, 1976, which approved a void Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.

220
221
222
223
 We are not persuaded by petitioners contentions that all the parties in the intestate estate proceedings in the trial court were duly represented by respective counsels, namely, Atty. Lepiten for
petitioners-heirs and Atty. Yray for the oppositors-heirs; that when the heirs agreed to settle the case amicably, they manifested such intention through their lawyers, as stated in the Order dated January 30,
1973; that an heir in the settlement of the estate of a deceased person need not hire his own lawyer, because his interest in the estate is represented by the judicial administrator who retains the services of a
counsel; that a judicial administrator is the legal representative not only of the estate but also of the heirs, legatees, and creditors whose interest he represents; that when the trial court issued the assailed
Order dated December 16, 1976 approving the Commissioner's Report, the parties lawyers were duly served said copies of the Order on December 21, 1976 as shown by the Certification 224[37] dated
August 7, 2003 of the RTC OIC, Clerk of Court; that notices to lawyers should be considered notices to the clients, since, if a party is represented by counsel, service of notices of orders and pleadings shall
be made upon the lawyer; that upon receipt of such order by counsels, any one of the respondents could have taken the appropriate remedy such as a motion for reconsideration, a motion for new trial or a
petition for relief under Rule 38 at the proper time, but they failed to do so without giving any cogent reason for such failure.

While the trial court's order approving the Commissioners Report was received by Attys. Yray and Lepiten, they were the lawyers of Gloria and Francisco, respectively, but not the lawyers of the
other heirs. As can be seen from the pleadings filed before the probate court, Atty. Lepiten was Glorias counsel when she filed her Petition for letters of administration, while Atty. Yray was Franciscos lawyer
when he filed his opposition to the petition for letters of administration and his Motion to Order administrarix Gloria to render an accounting and for the partition of the estate. Thus, the other heirs who were not
represented by counsel were not given any notice of the judgment approving the compromise. It was only sometime in February 1998 that respondents learned that the tax declarations covering the parcels
of land, which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were canceled; and new Tax Declarations were issued in Columbas name, and Original Certificates of Titles were subsequently
issued in favor of Columba. Thus, they could not have taken an appeal or other remedies.

Considering that the assailed Order is a void judgment for lack of due process of law, it is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or of any obligation.225[38]

In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,226[39] we stated the consequences of a void judgment, thus:

A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while admittedly, the petitioner in the case at bar failed to appeal timely the aforementioned decision of the Municipal Trial
Court of Naic, Cavite, it cannot be deemed to have become final and executory. In contemplation of law, that void decision is deemed non-existent. Thus, there was no effective or
operative judgment to appeal from. In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System vs. Sison, this Court held that:

224
225
226
 x x x [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is
sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect,
impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves
regarded as invalid. In other words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties
litigants in the same position they were in before the trial.

Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no
legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void: "x x x it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight,
or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.227[40] (Emphasis supplied)

The CFI's order being null and void, it may be assailed anytime, collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless
barred by laches.228[41] Consequently, the compromise agreement and the Order approving it must be declared null and void and set aside.

We find no merit in petitioners' claim that respondents are barred from assailing the judgment after the lapse of 24 years from its finality on ground of laches and estoppel.

Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that an action for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed within four years from its discovery and, if based on lack of
jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.

The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been
done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.229[42]

227
228
229
 There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances.230[43] The question of laches is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is the better rule that
courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to be so, a manifest wrong or injustice would result.231[44]

In this case, respondents learned of the assailed order only sometime in February 1998 and filed the petition for annulment of judgment in 2001. Moreover, we find that respondents' right to due process
is the paramount consideration in annulling the assailed order. It bears stressing that an action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe.232[45]

Finally, considering that the assailed CFI judgment is void, it has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Hence, the execution of the
Deed of Sale by Lope in favor of Columba pursuant to said void judgment, the issuance of titles pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent transfers are void ab initio. No reversible error was thus
committed by the CA in annulling the judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 18, 2003 and Resolution dated November 13, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch
XI, Cebu and the Heirs of Evaristo Cuyos are DIRECTED to proceed with SP Proceedings Case No. 24-BN for the settlement of the Estate of Evaristo Cuyos.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 204029 June 4, 2014

230
231
232
AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her heirs, except Emelinda R. Gualvez] and SALVADOR A. OROSCO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the CITY ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Decision1 and Resolution2 dated March 30, 2012 and September 25, 2012, respectively, of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93035, which reversed and set aside the Decision dated January 20, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4 in Legazpi City, in Civil
Case No. 10407.

The antecedent facts may be summarized as follows:

On October 26, 2004, petitioners Avelina Abarientos Rebusquillo (Avelina) and Salvador Orosco (Salvador) filed a Complaint for annulment and revocation of an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication dated December 4, 2001 and a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 6, 2002 before the court a quo. In it, petitioners alleged that Avelina was one of the children of
Eulalio Abarientos (Eulalio) and Victoria Villareal (Victoria). Eulalio died intestate on July 3, 1964, survived by his wife Victoria, six legitimate children, and one illegitimate child,
namely: (1) Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquillo, petitioner in this case; (2) Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco, the mother of petitioner Salvador; (3) Rosalino Abarientos; (4) Juan Abarientos;
(5) Feliciano Abarientos; (6) Abraham Abarientos; and (7) Carlos Abarientos. His wife Victoria eventually died intestate on June 30, 1983.

On his death, Eulalio left behind an untitled parcel of land in Legazpi City consisting of two thousand eight hundred sixty-nine(2,869) square meters, more or less, which was
covered by Tax Declaration ARP No. (TD) 0141.

In 2001, Avelina was supposedly made to sign two (2) documents by her daughter Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualvez (Emelinda) and her son-in-law Domingo Gualvez (Domingo),
respondents in this case, on the pretext that the documents were needed to facilitate the titling of the lot. It was only in 2003, so petitioners claim, that Avelina realized that what she
signed was an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents.

As respondents purportedly ignored her when she tried to talk to them, Avelina sought the intervention of the RTC to declare null and void the two (2) documents in order to reinstate
TD0141 and so correct the injustice done to the other heirs of Eulalio.

In their answer, respondents admitted that the execution of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Sale was intended to facilitate the titling of the subject property.
Paragraph 9 of their Answer reads:

Sometime in the year 2001, [petitioner] Avelina together with the other heirs of Eulalio Abarientos brought out the idea to [respondent] Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualvez to have the
property described in paragraph 8 of the complaint registered under the Torrens System of Registration. To facilitate the titling of the property, so that the same could be attractive to
prospective buyers, it was agreed that the propertys tax declaration could be transferred to [respondents] Spouses [Emelinda] R. Gualvez and Domingo Gualvez who will spend all
the cost of titling subject to reimbursement by all other heirs in case the property is sold; That it was agreed that all the heirs will be given their corresponding shares on the property;
That pursuant to said purpose Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquillo with the knowledge and consent of the other heirs signed and executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of [respondents] Gualvez. In fact, [petitioner] Avelina Rebusquillo was given an advance sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) by [respondent]
spouses and all the delinquent taxes paid by [respondents].3

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated January 20, 2009 annulling the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Avelina on the grounds that
(1) with regard to the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, she was not the sole heir of her parents and was not therefore solely entitled to their estate; and (2) in the case of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, Avelina did not really intend to sell her share in the property as it was only executed to facilitate the titling of such property. The dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

 1. The subject Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the Estate of the Deceased Spouses Eulalio Abarientos and Victoria Villareal, dated December 4, 2001 as well as the subject
Deed of Absolute Sale, notarized on February 6, 2002, covering the property described in par. 8 of the Amended Complaint are hereby ordered ANNULLED;

2. That defendant City Assessors Officer of Legazpi City is hereby ordered to CANCEL the Tax Declaration in the name of private [respondents] spouses Gualvez under
ARP No. 4143 and to REINSTATE the Tax Declaration under ARP No. 0141 in the name of Eulalio Abarientos;

3. By way of restitution, [petitioner] Avelina Abarientos Rebusquillo is hereby ordered to return or refund to [respondents] spouses Domingo Gualvez and Emelinda Gualvez,
the P50,000.00 given by the latter spouses to the former.4

Assailing the trial courts decision, respondents interposed an appeal with the CA arguing that the Deed of Sale cannot be annulled being a public document that has for its object
the creation and transmission of real rights over the immovable subject property. The fact that Avelinas testimony was not offered in evidence, so respondents argued, the signature
on the adverted deed remains as concrete proof of her agreement to its terms. Lastly, respondents contended that the Complaint filed by petitioners Avelina and Salvador before the
RTC is not the proper remedy provided by law for those compulsory heirs unlawfully deprived of their inheritance.

Pending the resolution of respondents appeal, Avelina died intestate on September 1, 2009 leaving behind several living heirs5 including respondent Emelinda.

In its Decision dated March 30, 2012, the appellate court granted the appeal and reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC. The CA held that the RTC erred in annulling the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication simply on petitioners allegation of the existence of the heirs of Eulalio, considering that issues on heirship must be made in administration or intestate
proceedings, not in an ordinary civil action. Further, the appellate court observed that the Deed of Absolute Sale cannot be nullified as it is a notarized document that has in its favor
the presumption of regularity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.

Aggrieved by the CAs Decision, petitioner Avelina, as substituted by her heirs except respondent Emelinda, and petitioner Salvador are now before this Court ascribing reversible
error on the part of the appellate court.

We find merit in the instant petition.

It has indeed been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, not in an independent civil action. However, this Court had likewise held that recourse
to administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a good and compelling reason for such recourse.6 Hence, the Court had allowed exceptions to
the rule requiring administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently
rendered judgment upon the issues it defined during the pre-trial.7 In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,8 this Court held:

In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugals estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication
under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he
did, he failed to name an executor therein.

Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land to still subject it, under the circumstances of the
case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate
with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case - subject of the present case, could and had
already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to administration proceedings since a determination of
petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and
render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial x x x. (emphasis supplied)
Similar to Portugal, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as the inheritance from Eulalio. It would be more
practical, as Portugal teaches, to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of petitioner Avelina as sole heir of Eulalio, especially in light of the
fact that respondents spouses Gualvez admitted in court that they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador was one of the
other living heirs with rights over the subject land. As confirmed by the RTC in its Decision, respondents have stipulated and have thereby admitted the veracity of the following facts
during the pre-trial:

IV UNCONTROVERTED FACTS: (Based on the stipulation of facts in the Pre-Trial Order)

A. x x x

B. [Petitioners] and private [respondents] spouses Gualvez admitted the following facts:

1. Identity of the parties;

2. Capacity of the [petitioners] and private [respondents] to sue and be sued;

3. [Petitioner] Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquilllo is not the only surviving heir of deceased spouses Eulalio and Victoria Abarientos;

4. Petitioner Salvador Orosco is a co-owner/possessor of a portion of the subject property;

5. Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco is the sister of Avelina Abarientos;

6. [Respondent] Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualves is a daughter of [petitioner] Avelina A. Rebusquillo;

7. [Petitioner] Avelina Rebusquillo was born on Nov. 10, 1923;

8. The existence of Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of Estate of the Deceased and Deed of Absolute Sale executed by [petitioner] Avelina A. Rebusquillo on the subject
property.9 (emphasis supplied)

In light of the admission of respondents spouses Gualvez, it is with more reason that a resort to special proceeding will be but an unnecessary superfluity. Accordingly, the court a
quo had properly rendered judgment on the validity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Avelina. As pointed out by the trial court, an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only
proper when the affiant is the sole heir of the decedent. The second sentence of Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is patently clear that self-adjudication is only warranted
when there is only one heir:

Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. x x x If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the
office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)

As admitted by respondents, Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio. In fact, as admitted by respondents, petitioner Salvador is one of the co-heirs by right of representation of his
mother. Without a doubt, Avelina had perjured herself when she declared in the affidavit that she is "the only daughter and sole heir of spouses EULALIO ABARIENTOS AND
VICTORIA VILLAREAL."10 The falsity of this claim renders her act of adjudicating to herself the inheritance left by her father invalid. The RTC did not, therefore, err in granting
Avelinas prayer to declare the affidavit null and void and so correct the wrong she has committed.

In like manner, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Avelina in favor of respondents was correctly nullified and voided by the RTC. Avelina was not in the right position to sell and
transfer the absolute ownership of the subject property to respondents. As she was not the sole heir of Eulalio and her Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is void, the subject property is still
subject to partition. Avelina, in fine, did not have the absolute ownership of the subject property but only an aliquot portion. What she could have transferred to respondents was only
the ownership of such aliquot portion. It is apparent from the admissions of respondents and the records of this case that Avelina had no intention to transfer the ownership, of
whatever extent, over the property to respondents. Hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale is nothing more than a simulated contract.

The Civil Code provides:

Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when the parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter, when the parties conceal their
true agreement. (emphasis supplied)

Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their real agreement.

In Heirs of Policronio Ureta Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato Ureta,11 this Court explained the concept of the simulation of contracts:

In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by it. The main characteristic of an absolute simulation is
that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal effect or in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or
fictitious contract is void, and the parties may recover from each other what they may have given under the contract. However, if the parties state a false cause in the contract to
conceal their real agreement, the contract is relatively simulated and the parties are still bound by their real agreement. Hence, where the essential requisites of a contract are
present and the simulation refers only to the content or terms of the contract, the agreement is absolutely binding and enforceable between the parties and their successors in
interest. (emphasis supplied)

In the present case, the true intention of the parties in the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale is immediately apparent from respondents very own Answer to petitioners
Complaint. As respondents themselves acknowledge, the purpose of the Deed of Absolute Sale was simply to "facilitate the titling of the [subject] property," not to transfer the
ownership of the lot to them. Furthermore, respondents concede that petitioner Salvador remains in possession of the property and that there is no indication that respondents ever
took possession of the subject property after its supposed purchase. Such failure to take exclusive possession of the subject property or, in the alternative, to collect rentals from its
possessor, is contrary to the principle of ownership and is a clear badge of simulation that renders the whole transaction void.12

Contrary to the appellate courts opinion, the fact that the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale was reduced to writing and notarized does not accord it the quality of incontrovertibility
otherwise provided by the parole evidence rule. The form of a contract does not make an otherwise simulated and invalid act valid. The rule on parole evidence is not, as it were,
ironclad. Sec. 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides the exceptions:

Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. x x x

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;

(c) The validity of the written agreement; or

(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.

The term "agreement" includes wills. (emphasis supplied)

The failure of the Deed of Absolute Sale to express the true intent and agreement of the contracting parties was clearly put in issue in the present case. Again, respondents
themselves admit in their Answer that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale were only executed to facilitate the titling of the property. The RTC is, therefore,
justified to apply the exceptions provided in the second paragraph of Sec. 9, Rule 130 to ascertain the true intent of the parties, which shall prevail over the letter of the document.
That said, considering that the Deed of Absolute Sale has been shown to be void for being absolutely simulated, petitioners are not precluded from presenting evidence to modify,
explain or add to the terms of the written agreement.13

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 30, 2012 and the Resolution dated September 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
93035 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated January 20, 2009 in Civil Case No. 10407 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 4 in Legazpi City is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 122880 April 12, 2006

FELIX AZUELA, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO substituted by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will, purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo (decedent), who died on 16 December 1982 at the age of 80. In refusing to give
legal recognition to the due execution of this document, the Court is provided the opportunity to assert a few important doctrinal rules in the execution of notarial wills, all self-evident
in view of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.

A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the
instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any
one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.

There is a distinct and consequential reason the Civil Code provides a comprehensive catalog of imperatives for the proper execution of a notarial will. Full and faithful compliance
with all the detailed requisites under Article 805 of the Code leave little room for doubt as to the validity in the due execution of the notarial will. Article 806 likewise imposes another
safeguard to the validity of notarial wills that they be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. A notarial will executed with indifference to these two
codal provisions opens itself to nagging questions as to its legitimacy.

The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate
the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent.

The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino, read in full:

HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO

SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN:

AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St., Sampaloc, Manila, pitongput siyam (79) na gulang, nasa hustong pagi-isip, pag-unawa at memoria ay nag-hahayag
na ito na ang aking huling habilin at testamento, at binabali wala ko lahat ang naunang ginawang habilin o testamento:
Una-Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa Sementerio del Norte, La Loma sang-ayong sa kaugalian at patakaran ng simbahang katoliko at ang taga-pag-ingat (Executor) ng habiling
ito ay magtatayo ng bantayog upang silbing ala-ala sa akin ng aking pamilya at kaibigan;

Pangalawa-Aking ipinagkakaloob at isinasalin ang lahat ng karapatan sa aking pamangkin na si Felix Azuela, na siyang nag-alaga sa akin sa mahabang panahon, yaong mga
bahay na nakatirik sa lote numero 28, Block 24 at nakapangalan sa Pechaten Korporasyon, ganoon din ibinibigay ko ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay na nakatirik sa inoopahan
kong lote, numero 43, Block 24 na pag-aari ng Pechaten Corporation. Ipinagkakaloob kong buong buo ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay at lupa na nasa 500 San Diego St., Lot 42,
Block 24, Sampaloc, Manila kay Felix Azuela at ang pagkakaloob kong ito ay walang pasubalit at kondiciones;

Pangatlo- Na ninunumbrahan ko si VART PAGUE na siyang nagpapatupad ng huling habiling ito at kagustuhan ko rin na hindi na kailanman siyang mag-lagak ng piyansiya.

Aking nilagdaan ang Huling Habilin na ito dito sa Maynila ika 10 ng Hunyo, 1981.

(Sgd.)
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
(Tagapagmana)

PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI

Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng ____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia E. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayon ika-10
ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon, sa harap ng lahat at bawat sa amin, at
kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat
at bawat dahon ng kasulatan ito.

EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
address: 500 San Diego St.
Sampaloc, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-7717-37
Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981.

QUIRINO AGRAVA
address: 1228-Int. 3, Kahilum
Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-458365
Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981

LAMBERTO C. LEAO
address: Avenue 2, Blcok 7,
Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.MA., Cavite Res.
Cert. No. A-768277 issued at Carmona, Cavite on Feb. 7, 1981

JUANITO ESTRERA
address: City Court Compound,
City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829
Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981.

Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10, 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.

(Sgd.)
PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA
Doc. No. 1232 ; NOTARIO PUBLIKO
Page No. 86 ; Until Dec. 31, 1981
Book No. 43 ; PTR-152041-1/2/81-Manila
Series of 1981 TAN # 1437-977-81

The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause.

The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent, namely: petitioner himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided
abroad. Petitioner prayed that the will be allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart Prague.

The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent. 2 Geralda Castillo
claimed that the will is a forgery, and that the true purpose of its emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in several court cases filed by oppositor against petitioner,
particularly for forcible entry and usurpation of real property, all centering on petitioners right to occupy the properties of the decedent.3 It also asserted that contrary to the
representations of petitioner, the decedent was actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs, namely her grandchildren, who were then residing abroad. Per records, it was subsequently
alleged that decedent was the widow of Bonifacio Igsolo, who died in 1965,4 and the mother of a legitimate child, Asuncion E. Igsolo, who predeceased her mother by three (3)
months.5

Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that decedents signature did not appear on the second
page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. These twin arguments are among the central matters to this petition.

After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order dated 10 August 1992.6 The RTC favorably took into account the testimony of the three (3) witnesses to the will,
Quirino Agrava, Lamberto Leano, and Juanito Estrada. The RTC also called to fore "the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will x x x with the end in
view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes;"7 and from this perspective, rebutted oppositors arguments that the will was not properly executed and
attested to in accordance with law.

After a careful examination of the will and consideration of the testimonies of the subscribing and attesting witnesses, and having in mind the modern tendency in respect to the
formalities in the execution of a will, i.e., the liberalization of the interpretation of the law on the formal requirements of a will with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom
in expressing his last wishes, this Court is persuaded to rule that the will in question is authentic and had been executed by the testatrix in accordance with law.

On the issue of lack of acknowledgement, this Court has noted that at the end of the will after the signature of the testatrix, the following statement is made under the sub-title,
"Patunay Ng Mga Saksi":

"Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng _____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia N. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayong ika-
10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon, sa harap ng lahat at bawat sa amin, at
kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat
at bawat dahon ng kasulatan ito."

The aforequoted declaration comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgement and is considered by this Court as a substantial compliance with the requirements of the
law.

On the oppositors contention that the attestation clause was not signed by the subscribing witnesses at the bottom thereof, this Court is of the view that the signing by the
subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfies
the purpose of identification and attestation of the will.

With regard to the oppositors argument that the will was not numbered correlatively in letters placed on upper part of each page and that the attestation did not state the number of
pages thereof, it is worthy to note that the will is composed of only two pages. The first page contains the entire text of the testamentary dispositions, and the second page contains
the last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgement. Such being so, the defects are not of a serious nature as to invalidate the will. For the same reason, the failure of the
testatrix to affix her signature on the left margin of the second page, which contains only the last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgment is not a fatal defect.
As regards the oppositors assertion that the signature of the testatrix on the will is a forgery, the testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses to the will are convincing enough to
establish the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix and the due execution of the will.8

The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo, who had substituted his since deceased mother-in-law, Geralda Castillo. In a Decision dated 17 August 1995,
the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate.9 The Court of Appeals noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of
pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate.10

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that "the number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause" is merely directory,
rather than mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as "the substantial compliance rule."11

The solution to this case calls for the application of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, which we replicate in full.

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last,
on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person
to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another
with the office of the Clerk of Court.

The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect, the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages of the will. But an examination of the will itself
reveals several more deficiencies.

As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages of the will.12 There was an incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having
been allotted for the insertion of the number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in; hence, the requisite was left uncomplied with.

The Court of Appeals pounced on this defect in reversing the trial court, citing in the process Uy Coque v. Navas L. Sioca13 and In re: Will of Andrada.14 In Uy Coque, the Court noted
that among the defects of the will in question was the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages contained in the will.15 In ruling that the will could not be admitted
to probate, the Court made the following consideration which remains highly relevant to this day: "The purpose of requiring the number of sheets to be stated in the attestation
clause is obvious; the document might easily be so prepared that the removal of a sheet would completely change the testamentary dispositions of the will and in the
absence of a statement of the total number of sheets such removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the numbers at the top of the following
sheets or pages. If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets is stated in the attestation clause the falsification of the document will involve the inserting of new pages and the
forging of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the margin, a matter attended with much greater difficulty."16

The case of In re Will of Andrada concerned a will the attestation clause of which failed to state the number of sheets or pages used. This consideration alone was sufficient for the
Court to declare "unanim[ity] upon the point that the defect pointed out in the attesting clause is fatal."17 It was further observed that "it cannot be denied that the x x x requirement
affords additional security against the danger that the will may be tampered with; and as the Legislature has seen fit to prescribe this requirement, it must be considered material." 18
Against these cited cases, petitioner cites Singson v. Florentino19 and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal,20 wherein the Court allowed probate to the wills concerned therein despite the fact that
the attestation clause did not state the number of pages of the will. Yet the appellate court itself considered the import of these two cases, and made the following distinction which
petitioner is unable to rebut, and which we adopt with approval:

Even a cursory examination of the Will (Exhibit "D"), will readily show that the attestation does not state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. Hence, the Will is
void and undeserving of probate.

We are not impervious of the Decisions of the Supreme Court in "Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., 92 Phil. 161 and Apolonio [Taboada] versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et
al., 118 SCRA 195," to the effect that a will may still be valid even if the attestation does not contain the number of pages used upon which the Will is written. However, the Decisions
of the Supreme Court are not applicable in the aforementioned appeal at bench. This is so because, in the case of "Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., supra," although
the attestation in the subject Will did not state the number of pages used in the will, however, the same was found in the last part of the body of the Will:

"x x x

The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, which requires that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets
upon which the will is written, which requirement has been held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or omission of some of the pages of
the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be bequeathed (In re Will of Andrada, 42 Phil. 180; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Gumban vs.
Gorcho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must contain
a statement of the number of sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be
supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of the will itself. But here the situation is different. While the attestation clause does not state the number of
sheets or pages upon which the will is written, however, the last part of the body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight pages, which circumstance in our
opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and places it within the realm of similar cases where a broad and more liberal view has been adopted to prevent the will of
the testator from being defeated by purely technical considerations." (page 165-165, supra) (Underscoring supplied)

In "Apolonio Tabaoda versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al." supra, the notarial acknowledgement in the Will states the number of pages used in the:

"x x x

We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it
not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental
witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental
witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states
that "this Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this page" (pages 200-201, supra) (Underscoring supplied).

However, in the appeal at bench, the number of pages used in the will is not stated in any part of the Will. The will does not even contain any notarial acknowledgment wherein the
number of pages of the will should be stated.21

Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, at a time when the statutory provision governing the formal requirement of wills was
Section

618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.22 Reliance on these cases remains apropos, considering that the requirement that the attestation state the number of pages of the will is extant
from Section 618.23 However, the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950 did put in force a rule of interpretation of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause is
concerned, that may vary from the philosophy that governed these two cases. Article 809 of the Civil Code states: "In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and
improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in
fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of article 805."

In the same vein, petitioner cites the report of the Civil Code Commission, which stated that "the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the [law] on
[wills] in this project consists in the [liberalization] of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more [freedom] in [expressing] his last wishes. This
objective is in accord with the [modern tendency] in respect to the formalities in the execution of wills." 24 However, petitioner conveniently omits the qualification offered by the Code
Commission in the very same paragraph he cites from their report, that such liberalization be "but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and
the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator."25

Caneda v. Court of Appeals26 features an extensive discussion made by Justice Regalado, speaking for the Court on the conflicting views on the manner of interpretation of the legal
formalities required in the execution of the attestation clause in wills.27 Uy Coque and Andrada are cited therein, along with several other cases, as examples of the application of the
rule of strict construction.28 However, the Code Commission opted to recommend a more liberal construction through the "substantial compliance rule" under Article 809. A cautionary
note was struck though by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as to how Article 809 should be applied:

x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the
signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or
even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the
presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings.29 (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court of Appeals did cite these comments by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in its assailed decision, considering that the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation
clause is one of the defects which cannot be simply disregarded. In Caneda itself, the Court refused to allow the probate of a will whose attestation clause failed to state that the
witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other,30 the other omission cited by Justice J.B.L. Reyes which to his
estimation cannot be lightly disregarded.

Caneda suggested: "[I]t may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to
extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied
except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself."31 Thus, a failure by the attestation clause to state that the testator
signed every page can be liberally construed, since that fact can be checked by a visual examination; while a failure by the attestation clause to state that the witnesses signed in
one anothers presence should be considered a fatal flaw since the attestation is the only textual guarantee of compliance.32

The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause
to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or
decrease in the pages.33 The failure to state the number of pages equates with the absence of an averment on the part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many pages
consisted the will, the execution of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to. Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance with this requirement if the will
states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the situation in Singson and Taboada. However, in this case, there could have been no substantial compliance with
the requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will.

At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to comply with the formal requirements as enumerated under Article 805. Whatever the inclinations of the members of
the Code Commission in incorporating Article 805, the fact remains that they saw fit to prescribe substantially the same formal requisites as enumerated in Section 618 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, convinced that these remained effective safeguards against the forgery or intercalation of notarial wills.34 Compliance with these requirements, however picayune
in impression, affords the public a high degree of comfort that the testator himself or herself had decided to convey property post mortem in the manner established in the will.35 The
transcendent legislative intent, even as expressed in the cited comments of the Code Commission, is for the fruition of the testators incontestable desires, and not for
the indulgent admission of wills to probate.

The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals. However, an examination of the will itself reveals a couple of even more critical defects that should necessarily lead
to its rejection.

For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will,
they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause which after all consists of their averments before the notary public.

Cagro v. Cagro36 is material on this point. As in this case, "the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page
containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin."37 While three (3) Justices38 considered the signature requirement had been substantially complied with, a
majority of six (6), speaking through Chief Justice Paras, ruled that the attestation clause had not been duly signed, rendering the will fatally defective.
There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by
the witnesses on the left-hand margin.

We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will" required by law to
be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the
omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation.

The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the
attestation clause. This is untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an
attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in
the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.39

The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the
requisite that the will be "attested and subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]." The respective intents behind these two classes of signature are distinct from each other. The
signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the
signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate
and apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page
containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were
directed towards a wholly different avowal.

The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in this case signed the attestation clause itself, but not the left-hand margin of the page containing such clause.
Without diminishing the value of the instrumental witnesses signatures on each and every page, the fact must be noted that it is the attestation clause which contains the utterances
reduced into writing of the testamentary witnesses themselves. It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of
the testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.

Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the instrumental witnesses, as they failed to sign the attestation clause.

Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this petition should also hinge. The requirement under Article 806 that "every will must be acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the witnesses" has also not been complied with. The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from the
other requirements under Article 805 and entrusted into a separate provision, Article 806. The non-observance of Article 806 in this case is equally as critical as the other cited flaws
in compliance with Article 805, and should be treated as of equivalent import.

In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote "Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila."40 By no
manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent
officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed.41 It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has
attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.

It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that
before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.42 Ordinarily, the language of the jurat should avow that the document was subscribed and sworn before
the notary public, while in this case, the notary public averred that he himself "signed and notarized" the document. Possibly though, the word "ninotario" or "notarized" encompasses
the signing of and swearing in of the executors of the document, which in this case would involve the decedent and the instrumental witnesses.

Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be
"acknowledged", and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses
executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made
beyond the free consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless act.43 The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to
declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus
allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further
degree of assurance that the testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the will.

It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-evident as it is under Article 806. A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.

There are two other requirements under Article 805 which were not fully satisfied by the will in question. We need not discuss them at length, as they are no longer material to the

disposition of this case. The provision requires that the testator and the instrumental witnesses sign each and every page of the will on the left margin, except the last; and that all
the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. In this case, the decedent, unlike the witnesses, failed to sign both pages of the will on
the left margin, her only signature appearing at the so-called "logical end"44 of the will on its first page. Also, the will itself is not numbered correlatively in letters on each page, but
instead numbered with Arabic numerals. There is a line of thought that has disabused the notion that these two requirements be construed as mandatory.45 Taken in isolation, these
omissions, by themselves, may not be sufficient to deny probate to a will. Yet even as these omissions are not decisive to the adjudication of this case, they need not be dwelt on,
though indicative as they may be of a general lack of due regard for the requirements under Article 805 by whoever executed the will.

All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers from makes the probate denial inexorable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

UY KIAO ENG,
G.R. No. 176831
Petitioner,

Present:

CORONA, J.,

Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
- versus -
NACHURA,

PERALTA, and

MENDOZA, JJ.
 Promulgated:

NIXON LEE,

Respondent. January 15, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the August 23, 2006 Amended Decision233[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 91725 and the February 23, 2007 Resolution,234[2] denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

233
234
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.

Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a holographic will, which is now in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent
Nixon Lee filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 01100939, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel
petitioner to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Allegedly, respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate
the patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason.235[3]

In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner traversed the allegations in the complaint and posited that the same be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, for lack of cause of
action, and for non-compliance with a condition precedent for the filing thereof. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its
whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will were given to respondent and to his siblings. As a matter of fact, respondent was able to introduce, as an exhibit,
a copy of the will in Civil Case No. 224-V-00 before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Petitioner further contended that respondent should have first exerted earnest efforts to amicably
settle the controversy with her before he filed the suit.236[4]

The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondents evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody
the original holographic will. Importantly, she asserted that the pieces of documentary evidence presented, aside from being hearsay, were all immaterial and irrelevant to the issue
involved in the petitionthey did not prove or disprove that she unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoined as a duty resulting from an office,
trust or station, for the court to issue the writ of mandamus.237[5]

235
236
237
The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. 238[6] In its February 4, 2005 Order,239[7] however, it granted the same on petitioners motion for reconsideration. Respondents
motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied on September 20, 2005.240[8] Hence, the petition was dismissed.

Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. On April 26, 2006, the CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. It ruled that the writ of mandamus would issue
only in instances when no other remedy would be available and sufficient to afford redress. Under Rule 76, in an action for the settlement of the estate of his deceased father,
respondent could ask for the presentation or production and for the approval or probate of the holographic will. The CA further ruled that respondent, in the proceedings before the
trial court, failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that his mother had in her custody the original copy of the will. 241[9]

Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court, in the assailed August 23, 2006 Amended Decision, 242[10] granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ,
and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorneys fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her
possession the holographic will.

Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate court denied this motion in the further assailed February 23, 2007 Resolution.243[11]

Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial
evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.244[12]

238
239
240
241
242
243
244
The Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the writ.

The first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be
specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the respondent.245[13]

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board,
or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or
from operation of law.246[14] This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the
performance of duties in which the public has no interest. 247[15] The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a
public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. 248[16] As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation,
board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.249[17]

245
246
247
248
249
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to
which he is not entitled by law.250[18] Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a
mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. 251[19] As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a]
that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is
entitled.252[20] On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.253[21]

Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. 254[22] Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely
private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. 255[23] The writ is not appropriate to
enforce a private right against an individual. 256[24] The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues
only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ.257[25] To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of
private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.258[26]

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the
remedy of mandamus being invoked.259[27] In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to

250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
afford relief.260[28] Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. 261[29] Indeed, the grant
of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved herethe production of the original holographic willis in the nature of a public or a
private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not
prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. Rule 76, Section 1 relevantly provides:

Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may,
at any time, after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or
destroyed.

An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the production of the original holographic will. Thus

SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.The person who has custody of a will shall, within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver
the will to the court having jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.

SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.A person named as executor in a will shall within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death
of the testator, or within twenty (20) days after he knows that he is named executor if he obtained such knowledge after the death of the testator, present such will
to the court having jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court in any other manner, and shall, within such period, signify to the court in writing his
acceptance of the trust or his refusal to accept it.

SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect.A person who neglects any of the duties required in the two last preceding sections without
excuse satisfactory to the court shall be fined not exceeding two thousand pesos.

SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed.A person having custody of a will after the death of the testator who neglects without reasonable cause to
deliver the same, when ordered so to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison and there kept until he delivers the will. 262[30]

259
260
261
 There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice
it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 23, 2006 Amended Decision and the February 23, 2007 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91725 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 01100939 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Cynthia Alaban vs. et. al vs. CA

G.R. No. 156021, September 23, 2005

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

262
This is a petition for review of the Resolutions[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69221,[2] dismissing petitioners petition for annulment of judgment.

On 8 November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition, docketed as SP Proc. No. 00-135, for the probate of the Last Will and Testament[3] of the
late Soledad Provido Elevencionado (decedent), who died on 26 October 2000 in Janiuay, Iloilo.[4] Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her
will. On 30 May 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, in P.D. Monfort North, Dumangas, Iloilo, rendered its Decision,[5] allowing the probate of the will of the decedent
and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.[6]

More than four (4) months later, or on 4 October 2001, herein petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings. [7] Likewise, they filed an opposition to the
allowance of the will of the decedent, as well as the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent,[8] claiming that they are the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners claimed
that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs. Moreover, they
alleged that the will could not have been probated because: (1) the signature of the decedent was forged; (2) the will was not executed in accordance with law, that is, the witnesses
failed to sign below the attestation clause; (3) the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will; (4) the will was executed by force and under duress and
improper pressure; (5) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of affixing of her signature; and (6) she did not know the properties to be disposed of, having included
in the will properties which no longer belonged to her. Petitioners prayed that the letters testamentary issued to respondent be withdrawn and the estate of the decedent disposed of
under intestate succession.[9]

On 11 January 2002, the RTC issued an Order[10] denying petitioners motion for being unmeritorious. Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, the RTC held that petitioners were deemed
notified of the hearing by publication and that the deficiency in the payment of docket fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal of the petition. It merely required respondent to
pay the deficiency.[11] Moreover, the RTCs Decision was already final and executory even before petitioners filing of the motion to reopen.[12]

Petitioners thereafter filed a petition[13] with an application for preliminary injunction with the CA, seeking the annulment of the RTCs Decision dated 30 May 2001 and Order dated
11 January 2002. They claimed that after the death of the decedent, petitioners, together with respondent, held several conferences to discuss the matter of dividing the estate of the
decedent, with respondent agreeing to a one-sixth (1/6) portion as his share. Petitioners allegedly drafted a compromise agreement to implement the division of the estate. Despite
receipt of the agreement, respondent refused to sign and return the same. Petitioners opined that respondent feigned interest in participating in the compromise agreement so that
they would not suspect his intention to secure the probate of the will.[14] They claimed that they learnt of the probate proceedings only in July of 2001, as a result of which they filed
their motion to reopen the proceedings and admit their opposition to the probate of the will only on 4 October 2001. They argued that the RTC Decision should be annulled and set
aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC.[15]
In its Resolution[16] promulgated on 28 February 2002, the CA dismissed the petition. It found that there was no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies through no fault of their own.[17] Moreover, the CA declared as baseless petitioners
claim that the proceedings in the RTC was attended by extrinsic fraud. Neither was there any showing that they availed of this ground in a motion for new trial or petition for relief
from judgment in the RTC, the CA added.[18] Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Resolution, but the same was denied by the CA for lack of merit.[19]

Petitioners now come to this Court, asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed their petition for the alleged failure
to show that they have not availed of or resorted to the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment or other remedies through no fault of their own, and held that
petitioners were not denied their day in court during the proceedings before the RTC.[20] In addition, they assert that this Court has yet to decide a case involving Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court and, therefore, the instant petition should be given due course for the guidance of the bench and bar.[21]

For his part, respondent claims that petitioners were in a position to avail of the remedies provided in Rules 37 and 38, as they in fact did when they filed a motion for new trial. [22]
Moreover, they could have resorted to a petition for relief from judgment since they learned of the RTCs judgment only three and a half months after its promulgation.[23]
Respondent likewise maintains that no extrinsic fraud exists to warrant the annulment of the RTCs Decision, since there was no showing that they were denied their day in court.
Petitioners were not made parties to the probate proceedings because the decedent did not institute them as her heirs.[24] Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are heirs of
the decedent, lack of notice to them is not a fatal defect since personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite. [25] Finally,
respondent charges petitioners of forumshopping, since the latter have a pending suit involving the same issues as those in SP No. 00-135, that is SP No. 1181[26] filed before
Branch 23, RTC of General Santos City and subsequently pending on appeal before the CA in CA-G.R. No.74924.[27]

It appears that one of the petitioners herein, Dolores M. Flores (Flores), who is a niece of the decedent, filed a petition for letters of administration with the RTC of General
Santos City, claiming that the decedent died intestate without any issue, survived by five groups of collateral heirs. Flores, armed with a Special Power of Attorney from most of the
other petitioners, prayed for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the decedent. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, stating that the
probate court in Janiuay, Iloilo has jurisdiction since the venue for a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is the place where the decedent died. This is also in
accordance with the rule that the first court acquiring jurisdiction shall continue hearing the case to the exclusion of other courts, the RTC added.[28] On 9 January 2002, Flores filed
a Notice of Appeal [29] and on 28 January 2002, the case was ordered forwarded to the CA.[30]
 Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the decision sought to be annulled was rendered and, thus, they could not have availed of the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the CA. They aver that respondents offer of a false
compromise and his failure to notify them of the probate of the will constitute extrinsic fraud that necessitates the annulment of the RTCs judgment.[31]

The petition is devoid of merit.

Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new trial on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The same
Rule permits the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the grounds of excessive award of damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision or final order, or that the
decision or final order is contrary to law.[32] Both motions should be filed within the period for taking an appeal, or fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order.

Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted to when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter
taken, against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Said party may file a petition in the same court and in the same case to set aside the
judgment, order or proceeding. It must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and within six (6) months after entry thereof.[33]

A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are remedies available only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed
judgment is rendered.[34] In fact, it has been held that a person who was never a party to the case, or even summoned to appear therein, cannot avail of a petition for relief from
judgment.[35]

However, petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties to the probate proceedings.

Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed.[36] Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province,[37] as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.[38] Thus, it has been held that a
proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in
the settlement of the estate of the decedent.[39]

Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. [40] Thus,
even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.

As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. In fact,
petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings. However,
the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, long after the Decision became final and executory.

Conceding that petitioners became aware of the Decision after it had become final, they could have still filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of their motion to
reopen. Petitioners claim that they learned of the Decision only on 4 October 2001, or almost four (4) months from the time the Decision had attained finality. But they failed to avail
of the remedy.
 For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available to them, petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment;
otherwise, they would benefit from their own inaction or negligence.[41]

Even casting aside the procedural requisite, the petition for annulment of judgment must still fail for failure to comply with the substantive requisites, as the appellate court ruled.

An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.[42] The purpose of such action is
to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner,[43] and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of
jurisdiction or denial of due process.[44] A person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove his allegation that the
judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.[45]

An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character.[46] Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a
party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.[47]

To sustain their allegation of extrinsic fraud, petitioners assert that as a result of respondents deliberate omission or concealment of their names, ages and residences as the other
heirs of the decedent in his petition for allowance of the will, they were not notified of the proceedings, and thus they were denied their day in court. In addition, they claim that
respondents offer of a false compromise even before the filing of the petition prevented them from appearing and opposing the petition for probate.
The Court is not convinced.

According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.[48] A perusal of the will shows that respondent was
instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs[49] who are entitled to be notified of the
probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same.

Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the
heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite.[50]

The non-inclusion of petitioners names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were
not denied their day in court, as they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before the probate court.

One other vital point is the issue of forum-shopping against petitioners. Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits in different courts, either simultaneously or
successively, involving the same parties, to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially same reliefs,[51] on the supposition that
one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.[52] Obviously, the parties in the instant case, as well as in the appealed case before the CA, are the same. Both cases
deal with the existence and validity of the alleged will of the decedent, with petitioners anchoring their cause on the state of intestacy. In the probate proceedings, petitioners position
has always been that the decedent left no will and if she did, the will does not comply with the requisites of a valid will. Indeed, that position is the bedrock of their present petition. Of
course, respondent maintains the contrary stance. On the other hand, in the petition for letters of administration, petitioner Flores prayed for her appointment as administratrix of the
estate on the theory that the decedent died intestate. The petition was dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and it is this order of dismissal which is the subject of review in
CA-G.R. No. 74924. Clearly, therefore, there is forum-shopping.

Moreover, petitioners failed to inform the Court of the said pending case in their certification against forum- shopping. Neither have they done so at any time thereafter. The
Court notes that even in the petition for annulment of judgment, petitioners failed to inform the CA of the pendency of their appeal in CA-G.R. No. 74924, even though the notice of
appeal was filed way before the petition for annulment of judgment was instituted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE G.R. No. 169144

PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL

OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH
PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT
OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR,

MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and

BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS,
Petitioners, Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - NACHURA,

ABAD,

MENDOZA, and
 SERENO,* JJ.

ERNESTO PALAGANAS,

Respondent. Promulgated:

January 26, 2011

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by a foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of execution.

The Facts and the Case

On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and
testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the
U.S.

*
 On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the
probate of Rupertas will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate. 263[1] On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and
Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Rupertas will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where
she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Rupertas will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and
without the testators full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.

Meantime, since Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion with
the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not Rupertas
U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in the Philippines.

On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order: 264[2] (a) admitting to probate Rupertas last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of
Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.

Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), 265[3] arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen
in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.

263
264
265
On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision, 266[4] affirming the assailed order of the RTC, 267[5] holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent
Ernestos submission of the authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different
from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and
Benjamin came to this Court.

The Issue Presented

The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and
allowed in the country where it was executed.

The Courts Ruling

Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad must first be probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it can be
probated here. This, they claim, ensures prior compliance with the legal formalities of the country of its execution. They insist that local courts can only allow probate of such wills if
the proponent proves that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under its laws, (c) the probate court
has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law on probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance with the same, and (e) the legal requirements for the valid
execution of a will.

But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their
execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if
made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.268[6]

266
267
268
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has
an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other
person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession
or not, or is lost or destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and
residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom
letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his
residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. 269[7] The rules do
not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.

In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the
reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is
presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies
only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its
jurisdiction over the matter can be established.

Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them
outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court.270[8]

Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial ruling that the court can take cognizance of the petition for probate of Rupertas will and that, in the
meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special administrator of the estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of the due execution of the will, i.e. the testators state of mind

269
270
at the time of the execution and compliance with the formalities required of wills by the laws of California. This explains the trial courts directive for Ernesto to submit the duly
authenticated copy of Rupertas will and the certified copies of the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 129505. January 31, 2000]

OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs. PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 133359. January 31, 2000]

OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in his Official Capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati, Branch
61, and PACITA PHILLIPS as the alleged executrix of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, respondents. Scmis

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Thirteenth and the Special Eighth Divisions of the Court of Appeals which ruled that petitioner has no right to
intervene in the settlement of the estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos. The cases were consolidated considering that they involve the same parties and some of the issues raised are the
same.

The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows:

On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for probate of his will271[1] in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos
Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the custody of the named
executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the will272[2] was annexed to the petition for probate.

On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch 61 issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will. The order reads:

271
272
 On 03 August 1995, the Court issued an Order setting the hearing of the petition on 12 September 1995, at 8:30 oclock in the morning, copies of which were
served to Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. and Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips (Officers Return, dated 04 September 1995 attached to the records). When the
case was called for hearing on the date set, no oppositor appeared nor any written opposition was ever filed and on motion of petitioner, he was allowed to adduce
his evidence in support of the petition.

Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was placed on the witness stand and was directly examined by the Court through "free wheeling" questions
and answers to give this Court a basis to determine the state of mind of the petitioner when he executed the subject will. After the examination, the Court is
convinced that petitioner is of sound and disposing mind and not acting on duress, menace and undue influence or fraud, and that petitioner signed his Last Will
and Testament on his own free and voluntary will and that he was neither forced nor influenced by any other person in signing it. Mis sc

Furthermore, it appears from the petition and the evidence adduced that petitioner in his lifetime, executed his Last Will and Testament (Exhs. "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-
4", "A-5") at his residence situated at 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City; said Last Will and Testament was signed in the presence of his
three (3) witnesses, namely, to wit: Dr. Elpidio Valencia (Exhs. "A-6", "A-7", "A-8", "A-16", "A-16-A"), Atty. Edward J. Berenguer (Exhs. "A-3", "A-3-A", "A-9", "A-10",
& "A-11"), and Atty. Victoria C. delos Reyes (Exhs. "A-12", "A-13", "A-14", "A-17", & "A-18"), who in turn, in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each
and all of the witnesses signed the said Last Will and Testament and duly notarized before Notary Public Anna Melissa L. Rosario (Exh. "A-15"); on the actual
execution of the Last Will and Testament, pictures were taken (Exhs. "B" to "B-3").

Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc., with address at No. 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been
named as sole legatee and devisee of petitioners properties, real and personal, approximately valued at not less than P2 million, Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips
was designated as executor and to serve as such without a bond.

From the foregoing facts, the Court finds that the petitioner has substantially established the material allegations contained in his petition. The Last Will and
Testament having been executed and attested as required by law; that testator at the time of the execution of the will was of sane mind and/or not mentally
incapable to make a Will; nor was it executed under duress or under the influence of fear or threats; that it was in writing and executed in the language known and
understood by the testator duly subscribed thereof and attested and subscribed by three (3) credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of another; that
the testator and all the attesting witnesses signed the Last Will and Testament freely and voluntarily and that the testator has intended that the instrument should
be his Will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.

WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the petitioner (testator himself) the petition for the allowance of the Last Will and Testament of Arturo de Santos is hereby
APPROVED and ALLOWED.

Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.

On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testators sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was
the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order
allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration in his name. Mis spped

On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the designated executrix of the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61. Later,
however, private respondent moved to withdraw her motion. This was granted, while petitioner was required to file a memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that said
court (Branch 61) still had jurisdiction to allow his intervention.273[3]

Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996. On the other hand, private respondent, who earlier withdrew her motion for the issuance of letters testamentary in
Branch 61, refiled a petition for the same purpose with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and assigned to Branch 65.

273
Upon private respondents motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order, dated June 28, 1996, appointing her as special administrator of Dr. De Santoss
estate.

On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and to set aside the appointment of private respondent as special administrator. He reiterated that he was
the sole and full blooded nephew and nearest of kin of the testator; that he came to know of the existence of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 only by accident; that the probate proceedings in
Sp. Proc. No. M-4223 before Branch 61 of the same court was still pending; that private respondent misdeclared the true worth of the testators estate; that private respondent was
not fit to be the special administrator of the estate; and that petitioner should be given letters of administration for the estate of Dr. De Santos.

On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 61, on the ground that "[it] is related to the case before Judge Gorospe of RTC
Branch 61 . . ."

It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge Gorospe had denied on August 26, 1996 petitioners motion for intervention. Petitioner brought this matter to the Court of
Appeals which, in a decision274[4] promulgated on February 13, 1998, upheld the denial of petitioners motion for intervention.

Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September 4, 1996, returning the records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 65 on the ground that there was a pending case
involving the Estate of Decedent Arturo de Santos pending before said court. The order reads: Spped

Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch 65, this Court, transferring this case to this Branch 61 on the ground that this case is related with a case
before this Court, let this case be returned to Branch 65 with the information that there is no related case involving the ESTATE OF DECEDENT ARTURO DE
SANTOS pending before this Branch.

There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as petitioner under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court for the Allowance of his will during his lifetime docketed
as SP. PROC. NO. M-4223 which was already decided on 16 February 1996 and has become final.

It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it became final, herein Petitioner Pacita de los Reyes Phillips filed a MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
LETTERS TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently withdrawn after this Court, during the hearing, already ruled that the motion could not be admitted as the
subject matter involves a separate case under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and movant withdrew her motion and filed this case (No. 4343).

Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION FOR INTERVENTION before Case No. M-4223 and this motion was already DENIED in the order (Branch 61) of 26
August 1996 likewise for the same grounds that the matter is for a separate case to be filed under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court and cannot be included in this
case filed under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.

It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that consolidation of cases must be approved by the Presiding Judges of the affected Branches.

Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996,275[5] Judge Abad Santos appeared firm in his position that " . . . it would be improper for (Branch 65) to hear and resolve the
petition (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343)," considering that the probate proceedings were commenced with Branch 61. He thus ordered the transfer of the records back to the latter branch.
However, he later recalled his decision and took cognizance of the case "to expedite the proceedings." Thus, in his Order, dated October 21, 1996, he stated:

Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of Branch 61 to continue hearing this case notwithstanding the fact that said branch began the
probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased and must therefore continue to exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others, until the entire estate of the
testator had been partitioned and distributed as per Order dated 23 September 1996, this branch (Regional Trial Court Branch 65) shall take cognizance of the
petition if only to expedite the proceedings, and under the concept that the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is but one court. Jo spped

274
275
 Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the Chief justice and the Office of the Court Administrator, of the Supreme Court; the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.;
Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips, Petitioner; and Octavio de Santos Maloles, Intervenor.

On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioners motion for intervention. Private respondent moved for a reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court.
She then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, on February 26, 1997, rendered a decision276[6] setting aside the trial courts order on the ground that petitioner
had not shown any right or interest to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.

Hence, these petitions which raise the following issues:

1.Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings upon its issuance of an
order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos

2. Whether or not the Honorable (Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 65) acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by
(private) respondent.

3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters
testamentary filed by the respondent.

4. Whether or not (private) respondent is guilty of forum shopping in filing her petition for issuance of letters testamentary with the Regional Trial Court -
Makati, Branch 65 knowing fully well that the probate proceedings involving the same testate estate of the decedent is still pending with the Regional Trial Court -
Makati, Branch 61. Spped jo

First. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of RTC-Makati did not terminate upon the issuance of the order allowing the will of Dr. De Santos. Citing the
cases of Santiesteban v. Santiesteban277[7] and Tagle v. Manalo,278[8] he argues that the proceedings must continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees,
and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, 1 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, petitioner contends that Branch 65 could not lawfully act upon private respondents petition
for issuance of letters testamentary.

The contention has no merit.

In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind,
freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.279[9]

Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters
testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the
will of a living testator under the principle of ambulatory nature of wills. 280[10]

276
277
278
279
280
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It provides:

Civil Code, Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court for the allowance of wills after the testators death shall govern. Miso

The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.

Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

Rule 76, 1 likewise provides:

Sec. 1 Who may petition for the allowance of will. - Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time
after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for the allowance of his will.

The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of testator has been explained by the Code Commission thus:

Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the testamentary capacity of the testator or the formalities adopted in the execution of wills. There are
relatively few cases concerning the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions. It is far easier for the courts to determine the mental condition of a testator during
his lifetime than after his death. Fraud, intimidation and undue influence are minimized. Furthermore, if a will does not comply with the requirements prescribed by
law, the same may be corrected at once. The probate during the testators life, therefore, will lessen the number of contest upon wills. Once a will is probated
during the lifetime of the testator, the only questions that may remain for the courts to decide after the testators death will refer to the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary dispositions. It is possible, of course, that even when the testator himself asks for the allowance of the will, he may be acting under duress or undue
influence, but these are rare cases.

After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should he
make a new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he should die before he has had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate
proceeding after the testators death would be in order.281[11]

Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant
to Rule 73, 12 of the Rules of Court. There is, therefore, no basis for the ruling of Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 of RTC-Makati that -Nex old

Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati having begun the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased, it continues and shall continue to exercise
said jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. It should be noted that probate proceedings do not cease upon the allowance or disallowance of a will but continues
up to such time that the entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed.

The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the testator meant merely that the partition and distribution of the estate was to be suspended until the
latters death. In other words, the petitioner, instead of filing a new petition for the issuance of letters testamentary, should have simply filed a manifestation for the
same purpose in the probate court.282[12]

281
282
Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule 73, 1 which states:

Where estate of deceased persons settled. - If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall
be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. In Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, it was held:283[13]

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of the state," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes." It
could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters. Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed was
fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the
power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural
law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something
essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. Mani kx

Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila)
belongs to the regional trial courts under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. The different branches comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions independent of
and incompatible with each other.284[14]

It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of the same
court from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator after his death. As held in the leading case of Bacalso v. Ramolote:285[15]

The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu under the Fourteenth Judicial District, are a coordinate and co-equal courts, and the totality of which is
only one Court of First Instance. The jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges. And when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not
attach to the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or proceedings continue by and before another branch or judge. It is
for this reason that Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly grants to the Secretary of Justice, the administrative right or power to apportion the cases among the
different branches, both for the convenience of the parties and for the coordination of the work by the different branches of the same court. The apportionment and
distribution of cases does not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction attaches and continues to be vested in the Court of First Instance of the
province, and the trials may be held by any branch or judge of the court.

Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.

283
284
285
Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by private respondent. He argues that, as the nearest next of kin
and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct. In ruling that petitioner has no right to intervene in the proceedings before Branch 65 of RTC-Makati City,
the Court of Appeals held:

The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only
and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which has already been
probated and disposes of all his properties the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the decedents estate is, therefore, not
direct or immediate. Maniks

His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as
far as the records show, not supported by evidence.

. . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct interest in the estate or the will, and the private respondent has none. Moreover, the ground cited in the
private respondents opposition, that the petitioner has deliberately misdeclared the truth worth and value of the estate, is not relevant to the question of her
competency to act as executor. Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court requires only an allegation of the probable value and character of the property of the
estate. The true value can be determined later on in the course of the settlement of the estate.286[16]

Rule 79, 1 provides:

Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for administration. - Any person interested in a will may state in writing the grounds why
letters testamentary should not issue to the persons named therein as executors, or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the
sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the same time, be filed for letters of administration with the will annexed.

Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent.287[17]

Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has
no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:

One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. Manikan

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.

Compulsory heirs are limited to the testators -

(1)Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

286
287
 (5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.288[18]

Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the testators will.

Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an
executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator. As we stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson:289[19]

The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is
natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment
of this right may be considered a curtailment of the right to dispose.

Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the court appoint other persons to administer the estate.290[20] None of these
circumstances is present in this case.

Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum shopping when she filed the petition for issuance of letters testamentary (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343) while the
probate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were still pending. According to petitioner, there is identity of parties, rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two actions which are
founded on the same facts, and a judgment in either will result in res judicata in the other.

This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for probate was filed by Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for the purpose of authenticating his will. Upon the allowance of
his will, the proceedings were terminated. Oldmis o

On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed by private respondent, as executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the purpose of securing authority
from the Court to administer the estate and put into effect the will of the testator. The estate settlement proceedings commenced by the filing of the petition terminates upon the
distribution and delivery of the legacies and devises to the persons named in the will. Clearly, there is no identity between the two petitions, nor was the latter filed during the
pendency of the former. There was, consequently, no forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,

vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

288
289
290
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 275, Las Pias City are AFFIRMED in toto.2

The Facts

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseos common-law wife and daughter.
The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and
Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).

Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at
the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage
to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the
decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged
that Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value,
Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late fathers estate.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the time of his
death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedents estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Pias
City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseos estate.

In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the
petition was properly laid in Las Pias City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseos last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of
the RTC decision reads:

Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the
decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00 to be posted by
her.9

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the
findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No.
26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate,
the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Pias City. The petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the
Court of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.

The Issues

The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIAS;
 II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO
PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION.12

The Courts Ruling

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent
resides at the time of his death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73
of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the
terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a persons
actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.19

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was
properly laid in Las Pias City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason,
the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseos Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate
should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedents residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on
the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death
in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the
ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners
position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners submission that the lower courts findings arose
from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon
this Court.21

Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelias marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no
marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code,
and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Nial, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to
file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death
of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike
voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. 24

It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly
or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25

Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such
marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of
the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.

Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseos marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine whether or not the decedents marriage to Amelia is void for being
bigamous.

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of
Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent
evidence of marriage and the certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries
therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the
National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and
Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond,
or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next
of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of
kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted
to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
 (c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in
estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees. 28

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence
on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt
to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on
her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied. 29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseos estate as
one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution,
arc AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.