Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-30452 September 30, 1982
MERCURY DRUG CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
NARDO DAYAO, ET AL., respondents,
Caparas & Ilagan for petitioner.
Gerardo P. Cabo Chan and Elias Banzali for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations dated March 30, 1968 in Case No. 1926-V and the Resolution of the Court en
banc dated July 6, 1968 denying two separate motions for reconsideration filed by
petitioners and respondents.
The factual background of Case No. 1926-V is summarized by the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations as follows:
This is a verified petition dated March 17, 1964 which was subsequently amended on
July 31, 1964 filed by Nardo Dayao and 70 others against Mercury Drug Co., Inc.,
and/or Mariano Que, President & General Manager, and Mercury Drug Co., Inc.,
Employees Association praying, with respect to respondent corporation and its
president and general manager: 1) payment of their unpaid back wages for work done
on Sundays and legal holidays plus 25c/c additional compensation from date of their
employment up to June 30, 1962; 2) payment of extra compensation on work done at
night; 3) reinstatement of Januario Referente and Oscar Echalar to their former
positions with back salaries; and, as against the respondent union, for its
disestablishment and the refund of all monies it had collected from petitioners.
In separate motions, respondent management and respondent union move to dismiss,
the first on the ground that:
I. The petition states no cause of action.
II. This Court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the claims of petitioners Januario
Referente and Oscar Echalar.
III. There is another action pending between the same parties, namely, Mercury Drug
Co., Inc., and/or Mariano Que and Nardo Dayao.
while on the other hand, the second alleges that this Court has no jurisdiction over the
acts complained of against the respondent union.
For reasons stated in the Order dated March 24, 1965, two Court resolved the motions
to dismiss, as follows:
1. Ground No. 1 of management's motion to dismiss was denied for lack of merit.
2. Its second ground was found meritorious and, accordingly Januario Referente and
Oscar Echalar were dropped as party petitioners in this case.
3. The third ground was denied, holding that there still exists the employer- employee
relationship between Nardo Dayao and the management.
4. With respect to the fourth ground, the Court held that on the basis of section 7-A of
C.A. No. 444, as amended by R.A. No. 1993, 'it can be safely said that,
counting backward the three (3) year prescriptive period from the date of the filing of the
instant petition - March 20, 1964 - all-of petitioners' claims have not yet prescribed.'
5. In so far as respondent union's motion is concerned, the Court held that 'petitioners'
cause of action against the respondent Association should be dismissed without
prejudice to the refiling of the same as an unfair labor practice case.'
Only the respondent management moved to reconsider the Order of March 24, 1965 but
the same was denied by the Court en banc in a resolution dated August 26, 1965.
Respondent submitted an answer to the amended petition which was subsequently
amended on January 6, 1966, containing some admissions and some denials of the
material averments of the amended petition. By way of affirmative and special
defenses,, respondents alleged that petitioners have no cause of action against Mariano
Que because their employer respondent Mercury Drug Company, Inc., an existing
corporation which has a separate and distinct personality from its incorporators
stockholders and/or officer, that the company being a service enterprise is excluded
from the coverage of the Eight Hour Labor Law, as amended; that no court has the
power to set wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment to the extent of disregarding an agreement thereon between the
respondent company and the petitioners, and of fixing night differential wages; that the
petitioners were fully paid for services rendered under the terms and conditions of the
individual contracts of employment; that the petition having been verified by only three
of the petitioners without showing that the others authorized the inclusion of their names
as petitioners does not confer jurisdiction to this Court; that there is no employer-
employee relationship between management and petitioner Nardo Dayao and that his
claim has been released and/or barred by another action and that petitioners' claims
accuring before March 20, 1961 have prescribed." (Annex "P", pp. 110-112, rollo).
After hearing on the merits, the respondent court rendered its decision. The dispositive
portion of the March 30, 1968 decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolves that:
1. The claim of the petitioners for payment of back wages correspoding to the first four
hours work rendered on every other Sunday and first four hours on legal holidays
should be denied for lack of merit.
2. Respondent Mercury Drug Company, Inc.. is hereby ordered to pay the sixty- nine
(69) petitioners:
(a) An additional sum equivalent to 25% of their respective basic or regular salaries for
services rendered on Sundays and legal holidays during the period from March 20.
1961 up to June 30, 1962; and
(b) Another additional sum or premium equivalent to 25% of their respective basic or
regular salaries for nighttime services rendered from March 20, 1961 up to June 30,
1962.
3. Petitioners' petition to convert them to monthly employees should be, as it is hereby,
denied for lack of merit.
4. Respondent Mariano Que, being an officer and acted only as an agent in behalf of
the respondent corporation, should be absolved from the money claims of herein
petitioners whose employer, according to the pleadings and evidence, is the Mercury
Drug Company,, Inc.
To expedite the computation of the money award, the Chief Court Examiner or his
authorized representative is hereby directed to proceed to the office of the respondent
corporation at Bambang Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, the latter to make available to said
employee its records, like time records, payrolls and other pertinent papers, and
compute the money claims awarded in this decision and, upon the completion thereof,
to submit his report as soon as possible for further disposition of the Court.
Not satisfied with the decision, the respondents filed a motion for its reconsideration.
The motion for reconsideration, was however, denied by the Court en banc in its
Resolution dated July 6, 1968.
Petitioner Mercury Drug Company, Inc., assigned the following errors in this petition:
I
RESPONDENT CIR ERRED IN DECLARING THE CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT,
EXHIBITS "A" AND "B", NULL AND VOID AS BEING CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY
AND IN SUSTAINING, ACCORDINGLY, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' CLAIMS FOR 25%
SUNDAY AND LEGAL HOLIDAY PREMIUMS BECAUSE SUCH DECLARATION AND
AWARD ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, THUS INFRINGING
UPON THE CARDINAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER; AND ALSO BECAUSE THE
VALIDITY OF SAID t CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT HAS NOT BEEN RAISED.
II
RESPONDENT CIR ERRED IN SUSTAINING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' CLAIMS
FOR NIGHTTIME WORK PREMIUMS NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE DECLARED
POLICY ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FREEDOM EX. PRESSED IN REPUBLIC
ACT 875 AND THE EXPRESS PROHIBITION IN SECTION 7 OF SAID STATUTE, BUT
ALSO BECAUSE OF THE WAIVER OF SAID CLAIMS AND THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF
EVIDENCE THEREON.
III
RESPONDENT CIR ERRED IN MAKING AWARDS IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS WHO NEITHER GAVE EVIDENCE NOR EVEN APPEARED TO
SHOW THEIR INTEREST.
Three issues are discussed by the petitioner in its first assignment of error. The first
issue refers to its allegation that the respondent Court erred in declaring the contracts of
employment null and void and contrary to law. This allegation is premised upon the
following finding of the respondent court:
But the Court finds merit in the claim for the payment of additional compensation for
work done on Sundays and holidays. While an employer may compel his employees to
perform service on such days, the law nevertheless imposes upon him the obligation to
pay his employees at least 25% additional of their basic or regular salaries.
No person, firm or corporation, business establishment or place of center of labor shall
compel an employee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal holidays unless he is
paid an additional sum of at least twenty-five per centum of his regular remuneration:
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That this prohibition shall not apply to public utilities
performing some public service such as supplying gas, electricity, power, water, or
providing means of transportation or communication. (Section 4, C. A. No. 444)
(Emphasis supplied)
Although a service enterprise, respondent company's employees are within the
coverage of C. A. No. 444, as amended known as the Eight Hour Labor Law, for they do
not fall within the category or class of employees or laborers excluded from its
provisions. (Section 2, Ibid.)
The Court is not impressed by the argument that under the contracts of employment the
petitioners are not entitled to such claim for the reason that the same are contrary to
law. Payment of extra or additional pay for services rendered during Sundays and legal
holidays is mandated by law. Even assuming that the petitioners had agreed to work on
Sundays and legal holidays without any further consideration than their monthly
salaries, they are not barred nevertheless from claiming what is due them, because
such agreement is contrary to public policy and is declared nun and void by law.
Any agreement or contract between employer and the laborer or employee contrary to
the provisions of this Act shall be null and void ab initio.
Under the cited statutory provision, the petitioners are justified to receive additional
amount equivalent to 25% of their respective basic or regular salaries for work done on
Sundays and legal holidays for the period from March 20, 1961 to June 30, 1962.
(Decision, pp. 119-120, rollo)
From a perusal of the foregoing statements of the respondent court, it can be seen
readily that the petitioner-company based its arguments in its first assignment of error
on the wrong premise. The contracts of employment signed by the private respondents
are on a standard form, an example of which is that of private respondent Nardo Dayao
quoted hereunder:
Mercury Drug Co., Inc. 1580 Bambang, Manila
October 30, 1959
Mr. Nardo Dayao
1015 Sta. Catalina
Rizal Ave., Exten.
Dear Mr. Dayao:
You are hereby appointed as Checker, in the Checking Department of MERCURY
DRUG CO., INC., effective July 1, 1959 and you shall receive an annual compensation
the amount of Two Thousand four hundred pesos only (P2,400.00), that includes the
additional compensation for work on Sundays and legal holidays.
Your firm being a Service Enterprise, you will be required to perform work every day in a
year as follows:
8 Hours work on regular days and-all special Holidays that may be declared but with the
25% additional compensation;
4 Hours work on every other Sundays of the month;
For any work performed in excess of the hours as above mentioned, you shall be paid
25 % additional compensation per hour.
This appointment may be terminated without notice for cause and without cause upon
thirty days written notice.
This supersedes your appointment of July 1, 1959.
Very truly yours,
MERCURY DRUG CO., INC.
(Sgd.) MARIANO QUE General Manager
ACCEPTED WITH FULL CONFORMITY:
(Sgd.) NARDO DAYAO
(EXH. "A" and "l ")
(Decision, pp. 114-115, rollo)
These contracts were not declared by the respondent court null and void in their
entirety. The respondent court, on the basis of the conflicting evidence presented by the
parties, in effect: 1) rejected the theory of the petitioner company that the 25%
additional compensation claimed by the private respondents for the four-hour work they
rendered during Sundays and legal holidays provided in their contracts of employment
were covered by the private respondents' respective monthly salaries; 2) gave credence
to private respondents', (Nardo Dayao, Ernesto Talampas and Josias Federico)
testimonies that the 25% additional compensation was not included in the private
respondents' respective monthly salaries and 3) ruled that any agreement in a contract
of employment which would exclude the 25% additional compensation for work done
during Sundays and holidays is null and void as mandated by law.
On the second issue, the petitioner-company reiterated its stand that under the,-
respective contracts of employment of the private respondents, the subject 25 %
additional compensation had already been included in the latter's respective monthly
salaries. This contention is based on the testimony of its lone witness, Mr. Jacinto
Concepcion and pertinent exhibits. Thus:
Exhibit A shows that for the period of October 30, 1960, the annual compensation of
private respondent Nardo Dayao, including the additional compensation for the work he
renders during the first four (4) hours on every other Sunday and on the eight (8) Legal
Holidays at the time was P2,400.00 or P200.00 per month. These amounts did not
represent basic salary only, but they represented the basic daily wage of Nardo Dayao
considered to be in the amount of P7.36 x 305 ordinary working days at the time or in
the total amount of P2,144.80. So plus the amount of P156.40 which is the equivalent of
the Sunday and Legal Holiday rate at P9.20 basic rate of P7.36 plus 25% thereof or
P1.84) x 17, the latter figure representing 13 Sundays and 4 Legal Holidays of 8 hours
each. ...
xxx xxx xxx
That the required minimum 25% Sunday and Legal Holiday additional compensation
was paid to and received by the employees for the work they rendered on every other
Sunday and on the eight Legal Holidays for the period October, 1959 to June 30, 1962
is further corroborated by Exhibits 5, 6, 8, 9 and 9-A and the testimony of Mr. Jacinto
Concepcion thereon. (Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 24, 27).
The aforesaid computations were not given credence by the respondent court. In fact
the same computations were not even mentioned in the court's decision which shows
that the court found such computations incredible. The computations, supposedly
patterned after the WAS Interpretative Bulletin No. 2 of the Department Labor
demonstrated in Exhibits "6", "7", "8", "9", and "9-A", miserably failed to show the exact
and correct annual salary as stated in the respective contracts of employment of the
respondent employees. The figures arrived at in each case did not tally with the annual
salaries on to the employees' contracts of employment, the difference varying from
P1.20 to as much as P14.40 always against the interest of the employees. The
petitioner's defense consists of mathematical computations made after the filing of the
case in order to explain a clear attempt to make its employees work without the extra
compensation provided by law on Sundays and legal holidays.
In not giving weight to the evidence of the petitioner company, the respondent court
sustained the private respondents' evidence to the effect that their 25% additional
compensation for work done on Sundays and Legal Holidays were not included in their
respective monthly salaries. The private respondents presented evidence through the
testimonies of Nardo Dayao, Ernesto Talampas, and Josias Federico who are
themselves among the employees who filed the case for unfair labor practice in the
respondent court and are private respondents herein. The petitioner- company's
contention that the respondent court's conclusion on the issue of the 25% additional
compensation for work done on Sundays and legal holidays during the first four hours
that the private respondents had to work under their respective contracts of employment
was not supported by substantial evidence is, therefore, unfounded. Much less do We
find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent court in its
interpretation of the employment contract's provision on salaries. In view of the
controlling doctrine that a grave abuse of discretion must be shown in order to warrant
our disturbing the findings of the respondent court, the reversal of the court's endings on
this matter is unwarranted. (Sanchez vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 27 SCRA 490).
The last issue raised in the first assignment of error refers to a procedural matter. The
petitioner-company contends that ,-the question as to whether or not the contracts of
employment were null and void was not put in issue, hence, the respondent court
pursuant to the Rules of Court should have refrained from ruling that such contracts of
employment were null and void. In this connection We restate our finding that the
respondent court did not declare the contracts of employment null and void in their
entirety. Only the objectionable features violative of law were nullified. But even granting
that the Court of Industrial Relations declared the contracts of employment wholly void,
it could do so notwithstanding the procedural objection. In Sanchez u. Court of
Industrial Relations, supra, this Court speaking through then Justice, now Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando, stated:
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, petitioners appear to be oblivious of the statutory mandate that respondent
Court in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy and
in the exercise of any of its duties or power is to act 'according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall
not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence' informing its mind 'in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable.' Again, this Court has invariably accorded
the most hospitable scope to the breadth and amplitude with which such provision is
couched. So it has been from the earliest case decided in 1939 to a 1967 decision.
Two issues are raised in the second assignment of error by the petitioner-company. The
first hinges on the jurisdiction of the respondent court to award additional compensation
for nighttime work. Petitioner wants Us to re- examine Our rulings on the question of
nighttime work. It contends that the respondent court has no jurisdiction to award
additional compensation for nighttime work because of the declared policy on freedom
of collective bargaining expressed in Republic Act 875 and the express prohibition in
Section 7 of the said statute. A re- examination of the decisions on nighttime pay
differential was the focus of attention in Rheem of the Philippines, Inc. et al., v. Ferrer, et
al (19 SCRA 130). The earliest cases cited by the petitioner-company, Naric v. Naric
Workers Union L-12075, - May 29, 1959 and Philippine Engineers' Syndicate u.
Bautista, L-16440, February 29, 196.4, were discussed lengthily. Thus -
xxx xxx xxx
2. On the claim for night differentials, no extended discussion is necessary. To be read
as controlling here is Philippine Engineers' Syndicate, Inc. vs. Hon. Jose S. Bautista, et
al., L-16440, February 29, 1964, where this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice
Cesar Bengzon, declared
Only one issue is raised: whether or not upon the enactment of Republic Act 875, the
CIR lost its jurisdiction over claims for additional compensation for regular night work.
Petitioner says that this Act reduced the jurisdiction of respondent court and limited it to
specific cases which this Court has defined as: ... (1) when the labor dispute affects an
industry which is indispensable to the national interest and is so certified by the
President to the industrial court (Sec. 10, Republic Act 875); (2) when the controversy
refers to minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Law (Republic Act 602); (3) when it
involves hours of employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth Act
444) and (4) when it involves an unfair labor practice [Sec. 5(a), Republic Act 8751',
[Paflu, et al. vs. Tan, et al., 52 Off. Gaz, No. 13, 5836].
Petitioner insists that respondents' case falls in none of these categories because as
held in two previous cases, night work is not overtime but regular work; and that
respondent court's authority to try the case cannot be implied from its general
jurisdiction and broad powers' under Commonwealth Act 103 because Republic Act 875
precisely curbed such powers limiting them to certain specific litigations, beyond which it
is not permitted to act.
We believe petitioner to be in error. Its position collides with our ruling in the Naric case
[National Rice & Corn Corp. (NARIC) vs. NARIC Workers' Union, et al., G.R. No. L-
12075, May 29, 1959] where we held;
While it is true that this Court made the above comment in the aforementioned case, it
does not intend to convey the Idea that work done at night cannot also be an overtime
work. The comment only served to emphasize that the demand which the Shell
Company made upon its laborers is not merely overtime work but night work and so
there was need to differentiate night work from daytime work. In fact, the company
contended that there was no law that required the payment of additional compensation
for night work unlike an overtime work which is covered by Commonwealth Act No. 444
(Eight Hour Labor Law). And this Court in that case said that while there was no law
actually requiring payment of additional compensation for night work, the industrial court
has the power to determine the wages that night workers should receive under
Commonwealth Act No. 103, and so it justified the additional compensation in the Shell
case for 'hygienic, medical, moral, cultural and sociological reasons.
xxx xxx xxx
True, in Paflu, et al. vs. Tan, et al., supra, and in a series of cases thereafter, We held
that the broad powers conferred by Commonwealth Act 103 on the CIR may have been
curtailed by Republic Act 875 which limited them to the four categories therein
expressed in line with the public policy of allowing settlement of industrial disputes via
the collective bargaining process; but We find no cogent reason for concluding that a
suit of this nature for extra compensation for night work falls outside the domain of the
industrial court. Withal, the record does not show that the employer-employee relation
between the 64 respondents and the petitioner had ceased.
After the passage of Republic Act 875, this Court has not only upheld the industrial
court's assumption of jurisdiction over cases for salary differentials and overtime pay
[Chua Workers Union (NLU) vs. City Automotive Co., et al., G.R. No. L- 11655, April 29,
1959; Prisco vs. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-13806, May 23, 1960] or for payment of
additional compensation for work rendered on Sundays and holidays and for night work
[Nassco vs. Almin, et al., G.R. No. L9055, November 28, 1958; Detective & Protective
Bureau, Inc. vs. Felipe Guevara, et al., G.R. No. L-8738, May 31, 1957] but has also
supported such court's ruling that work performed at night should be paid more than
work done at daytime, and that if that work is done beyond the worker's regular hours of
duty, he should also be paid additional compensation for overtime work. [Naric vs. Naric
Workers' Union. et al., G. R No. L-12075, May 29, 1959, citing Shell Co. vs. National
Labor Union, 81 Phil. 315]. Besides, to hold that this case for extra compensation now
falls beyond the powers of the industrial court to decide, would amount to a further
curtailment of the jurisdiction of said court to an extent which may defeat the purpose of
the Magna Carta to the prejudice of labor.' [Luis Recato Dy, et al v-9. CIR, G.R. No. L-
17788, May 25,1962]"
The petitioner-company's arguments on the respondent court's alleged lack of
jurisdiction over additional compensation for work done at night by the respondents is
without merit.
The other issue raised in the second assignment of error is premised on the petitioner-
company's contention that the respondent court's ruling on the additional compensation
for nighttime work is not supported by substantial evidence.
This contention is untenable. Pertinent portions of the respondent court's decision read:
xxx xxx xxx
There is no serious disagreement between the petitioners and respondent management
on the facts recited above. The variance in the evidence is only with respect to the
money claims. Witnesses for petitioners declared they worked on regular days and on
every other Sunday and also during all holidays; that for services rendered on Sundays
and holidays they were not paid for the first four (4) hours and what they only received
was the overtime compensation corresponding to the number of hours after or in excess
of the first four hours; and that such payment is being indicated in the overtime pay for
work done in excess of eight hours on regular working days. It is also claimed that their
nighttime services could well be seen on their respective daily time
records. .. (Emphasis supplied) (p.116, rollo)
The respondent court's ruling on additional compensation for work done at night is,
therefore, not without evidence. Moreover, the petitioner-company did not deny that the
private respondents rendered nighttime work. In fact, no additional evidence was
necessary to prove that the private respondents were entitled to additional
compensation for whether or not they were entitled to the same is a question of law
which the respondent court answered correctly. The "waiver rule" is not applicable in the
case at bar. Additional compensation for nighttime work is founded on public policy,
hence the same cannot be waived. (Article 6, Civil Code). On this matter, We believe
that the respondent court acted according to justice and equity and the substantial
merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and should be
sustained.
The third assignment of error is likewise without merit. The fact that only three of the
private respondents testified in court does not adversely affect the interests of the other
respondents in the case. The ruling in Dimayuga V. Court of Industrial Relations (G.R.
No. L-0213, May 27, 1957) has been abandoned in later rulings of this Court. In
Philippine Land Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU) vs. Sy Indong Company Rice And Corn
Mill (11 SCRA 277) We had occasion to re-examine the ruling in Dimayuga We stated:
The latter reversed the decision of the trial Judge as regards the reinstatement with
backwages of ... upon the theory that this is not a class suit; that, consequently, it is
necessary and imperative that they should personally testify and prove the charges in
the complaint', and that, having failed to do so, the decision of the trial Judge in their
favor is untenable under the rule laid down in Dimayuga vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, G.R. No. L-0213 (May 27,1957).
We do not share the view taken in the resolution appealed from. As the trial Judge
correctly said, in Ms dissent from said resolution,:
xxx xxx xxx
In the case of Sanchez v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra, this Court stated:
To the reproach against the challenged order in the brief of petitioners in view of only
two of the seven claimants testifying, a statement by this Court in Ormoc Sugar Co.,
Inc. vs. OSCO Workers Fraternity Labor Union would suffice by way of refutation. Thus:
"This Court fully agrees with the respondent that quality and not quantity of witnesses
should be the primordial consideration in the appraisal of evidence.' Barely eight days
later, in another decision, the above statement was given concrete expression. Thus:
'The bases of the awards were not only the respective affidavits of the claimants but the
testimonies of 24 witnesses (because 6 were not given credence by the court below)
who Identified the said 239 claimants. The contention of petitions on this point is
therefore unfounded Moveover in Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU) v. Sy
Indong company Rice & Corn Mill, this Court, through the present Chief Justice rejected
as untenable the theory of the Court of Industrial Relations concerning the imperative
needs of all the claimants to testify personality and prove their charges in the complaint.
As tersely put: 'We do not share the view taken in the resolution appealed from.
The petitioner's contention that its employees fully understood what they signed when
they entered into the contracts of employment and that they should be bound by their
voluntary commitments is anachronistic in this time and age.
The Mercury Drug Co., Inc., maintains a chain of drugstores that are open every day of
the week and, for some stores, up to very late at night because of the nature of the
pharmaceutical retail business. The respondents knew that they had to work Sundays
and holidays and at night, not as exceptions to the rule but as part of the regular course
of employment. Presented with contracts setting their compensation on an annual basis
with an express waiver of extra compensation for work on Sundays and holidays, the
workers did not have much choice. The private respondents were at a disadvantage
insofar as the contractual relationship was concerned. Workers in our country do not
have the luxury or freedom of declining job openings or filing resignations even when
some terms and conditions of employment are not only onerous and inequitous but
illegal. It is precisely because of this situation that the framers of the Constitution
embodied the provisions on social justice (Section 6, Article 11) and protection to labor
(Section 9, Article I I) in the Declaration of Principles And State Policies.
It is pursuant to these constitutional mandates that the courts are ever vigilant to protect
the rights of workers who are placed in contractually disadvantageous positions and
who sign waivers or provisions contrary to law and public policy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. The decision and resolution appealed
from are affirmed with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Relova,
JJ.,concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1309 July 26, 1948
THE SHELL COMPANY OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, LIMITED, recurrente,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR UNION, recurrida.
Sres. Ross, Selph, Carrascoso y Janda en representacion de la recurrente.
Sres. Paguia y Villanueva en representacion de la recurrida.
BRIONES, J.:
Actuando sobre una peticion de la entidad obrera llamada "National Labor Union," la
Corte de Relaciones Industriales ha dictado una decision en la que, entre otras cosas,
se obliga a la firma petrolera "The Shell Company of Philippine Islands, Limited" a
pagar a sus obreros que trabajan de noche (desde que se pone el sol hasta que se
levanta al dia siguiente) una compensacion adicional de 50% sobre sus salarios
regulares si trabajasen de dia. Parece que la comania tiene necesidad del servicio
nocturno de un determinado numero de obreros, pues los aviones procedentes del
extranjero suelen aterrizar y despegarse de noche, siendo por esto necesario el que se
hagan faenas de noche para el suministro de gasolina y lubricantes, y para otros
menesteres. La compania petrolera se ha excepcionado contra dicha decision de ahi el
presente recurso de certiorari para que la revoquemos.
La compania recurrente alega y arguye que no solo no existe ninguna disposicion legal
que faculte a la Corte de Relaciones Industriales para ordenar el pago de
compensacion adicional a obreros que trabajan de noche, sino que, por el contrario, la
ley del Commonwealth No. 444 exime al patrono de semejante obligacion toda vez que
en dicha ley se proveen los casos en que es compulsorio el pago de "overtime"
(compensacion adicional), y entre tales casos no figura el trabajo de noche.
Por su parte, la union obrera recurrida sostiene que la facultad que se discute forma
parte de los poderes amplios y efectivos que la ley del Commonwealth No. 103 la
carta organica del Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales otorga a dicho tribunal; y que
la ley No. 444 del Commonwealth que se invoca no tiene ninguna aplication al presente
caso, pues la misma es de alcance forzosamente limitado, refiriendose particular y
exclusivamente a la jornada maxima de trabajo contidiano permitida en los
establecimientos industriales la jornada de 8 horas.
Nuestra conclusion es que la union obrera recurrida tiene la razon de su parte. Para
una clara y cabal elucidacion de los puntos discutidos, estmamos conveniente, aun a
riesgo de alargar esta ponencia, transcribir lasdisposiciones legales pertinentes que
son los articulos 1, 4 y 13 de la ley del Commonwealth No. 103. Helas aqui:
SECTION 1. The Judge: his appointment, qualifications, compensation, tenure.
There is hereby created a Court of Industrial Relations, which shall have jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question,
matter, controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers and
employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the
relation between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of this Act.
The Court shall keep a record of all its proceedings and shall be presided over by a
Judge to be appointed by the President of the Philippines with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly. The Judge of the Court shall
hold office during good behavior until he reaches the age of seventy years, or becomes
incapacitated to discharge the duties of his office. His qualifications shall be the same
as those provided in the Constitution for members of the Supreme Court and he shall
receive an annual compensation of ten thousand pesos and shall be entitled to traveling
expenses and per diems when performing official duties outside of the City of Manila.
The Department of Justice shall have executive supervision over the Court.
SEC. 4. Strikes and lockouts. The Court shall take cognizance for purpose of
prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising form differences as regards wages,
shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment,
between employers and employees or laborers and between landlords and tenants or
farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants or farm-
laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted
to the Court by the Secretary of Labor, or by any or both of the parties to the
controversy and certified by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealt
with by the Court for the sake of public interest. In all such cases, the Secretary of Labor
or the party or parties submitting the disputes, shall clearly and specifically state in
writing the questions to be decided. Upon the submission of such a controversy or
question by the Secretary of Labor, his intervention therein as authorized by law, shall
cease.
The Court shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor
to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. If
any agreement as to the whole or any part of the dispute is arrived at by the parties, a
memorandum of its terms shall be made in writing, signed and acknowledged by the
parties thereto before the Judge of the Court or any official acting in his behalf and
authorized to administer oaths or acknowledgments, or, before a notary public. The
memorandum shall be filed in the office of the Clerk of the Court, and, unless otherwise
ordered by the Court, shall, as between the parties to the agreement, have the same
effect as, and be deemed to be, a decision or award.
SEC. 13. Character of the award. In making an award, order or decision, under the
provisions of section four of this Act, the Court shall not be restricted to the specific relief
claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but
may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which my be
deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of setting the dispute or of preventing
further industrial or agricultural disputes.
Resulta evidente de las disposiciones transcritas lo siguiente: (a) que cuando surge una
disputa entre el principal y el empleado u obrero, vgr. sobre cuestion de salarios, la
Corte de Relaciones Industriales tiene jurisdiccion en todo el territorio de Filipinas para
considerar, investigar y resolver dicha disputa, fijando los salarios que estime justos y
razonables; (b) que para los efectos de prevencion, arbitraje, decision y arreglo, el
mismo Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales tien igualmente jurisdiccion para conocer de
cualquier disputa industrial o agricola resultante de cualesquier diferencias
respecto de los salarios, participaciones o compensaciones, horas de trabajo,
condiciones del empleo o de la aparceria entre los patronos y los empleados u obreros
y entre los propietarios y los terratenientes u obreros agricolas previo el cumplimiento
de ciertos requisitos y condiciones, cuando se viere que dicha disputa ocasiona o
puede ocasionar una huelga; (c) que en el ejercicio de sus facultades arriba
especificadas, el Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales no queda limitado, al decidir la
disputa, a conceder el remedio o remedios solicitados por las partes en la controversia,
sino que puede incluir en la orden or decision cualquier materia o determinacion para el
proposito de arreglar la disputa o de prevenir ulteriores controversias industriales o
agricolas.
En el caso nos ocupa existe indudablemente una dispunta industrial. Mientras la
empresa, la compania Shell, no esta dispuesta a pagar a sus obreros de noche
mayores salarios que los obreros de ida, la "NationalLabor Union", a la cual estan
afiliados los trabajadoresde la Shell, reclama otro tipo de salarios para el servicio
nocturno un 50% mas. En esto consiste la disputa, el litigio industrial. Ahora bien:
que ha hecho la Corte de Relaciones Industriales, despues de sometido el conflicto a
su jurisdiccion? Pues precisamente lo que manda la citada ley No. 103 del
Commonwealth, carta organica de su creacion y funcionamiento, a saber: considerar,
investigar y enjuiciar la disputa, resolviedola despues en el sentido en que la ha
resuelto, es decir, remunerando el trabajo de noche con un 50% mas de los salarios de
dia. Y esto es perfectamente legal tanto dentro del alcance del articulo 1 de la referida
ley No. 103 que faculta a la Corte de Relaciones Industriales para decidir cualquier
disputa sobre salarios y compensaciones en la forma que estime razonable y
conveniente, como dentro del marco del articulo 4 de la misma ley que autoriza a dicho
tribunal para enjuiciar y decidir cualquier pleito o controversia industrial o agricola
determine el estallido de una huelga o tienda a causarla. Mas todavia: lo hecho por el
Trbunal de Relaciones Industriales en el presente caso es asimismo legal dentro del
marco del articulo 13 de la misma ley No. 103, articulo que, como queda visto, no solo
faculta a dicho tribunal a conceder el remedio que recabanlas partes, sino inclusive a ir
mas alla, esto es, a otorgar remedios no expresamente solicitados, siempre que los
mismos se encamienen a resolver de una vez la disputa o a prevenir el estallido de
ulteriores disputas o huelgas.
Es evidente que con estos amplios poderes el Estadose ha propuesto equipar al
Tribunal de Relaciones Industriales hasta el maximum posible de utilidad y eficacia,
haciendo del mismo no una simple agencia academica, sino verdaderamente activa,
dinamica y eficiente en una palabra, la maquinaria oficial por excelencia en la
formidable y espinosa tarea de resolver los conflictos industriales, yagricolas de cierta
clase, previniendo y evitando de esta manera esos paros y huelgas que tanto afligen y
danan no solo a las empresas y a los obreros, sino, en general, a toda la comunidad.
En su opinion concurrente dictada en el caso autoritativo de Ang Tibay contra Tribunal
de Relaciones Industriales1 (R.G. No. 46496), el Magistado Laurel ha expresado muy
acertadamente la idea fundamental que subraya la creacion de dicho tribunal, con el
siguiente pronunciamiento:
In Commonwealth Act No. 103, and by it, our government no longer performs the role of
mere mediator or intervenor but that of supreme arbiter. (Las cursivas son nuestras.).
La recurrente arguye, sin embargo, que si bien es verdad que en caso de disputa el
Tribunal de relaciiones Industriales tiene, en virtud de su ley organica, el poder de fijar
los salarios, tal poder no es absoluto, sino que esta sujeto a ciertas restricciones y
cortapizas, provistas en la ley comunmente conocida por ley sobre la jornada de ocho
horas, la ley del Commonwealth No. 444, cuyos articulos pertinentes se transacriben
integramente a continuacion:
SECTION 1. The legal working day for any person employed by another shall be of not
more than eight hours daily. When the work is not continuous, the time during which the
laborer is not working and can leave his working place and can rest completely shall not
be counted.
SEC. 3. Work may be performed beyond eight hours a day in case of actual or
impending emergencies caused by serious accidents, fire, flood, typhoon, earthquake,
epidemic, or other disaster or calamity in order to prevent loss to life and property or
imminent danger to public safety; or in case urgent work to be performed on the
machines, equipment, or installations in order to avoid a serious loss which the
employer would otherwise suffer, or some other just cause of a similar nature; but in all
such cases the laborers and employees shall be entitled to receive compensation for
the overtime work performed at the same rate as their regular wages or salary, plus at
least twenty-five per centum additional.
In case of national emergency the government is empowered to establish rules and
regulations for the operation of the plants and factories and to determine the wages to
be paid the laborers.
SEC. 4. No person, firm, or corporation, business establishment or place or center of
labor shall compel an employee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal holidays,
unless he is paid an additional sum of at least twenty-five per centum of his regular
remuneration: Provided however, That this prohibition shall not apply to public utilities
performing some public service such as supplying gas, electricity, power, water, or
providing means of transportation or communication.
Como quiera argumentanlos abogados de la recurrente que en estos articulos se
especifican los casos en que se autoriza el pago de compensacion extra o adicional y
son solo, a saber: (a) en caso de "overtime" o trabajo en exceso de las horas regulares
por razones imperiosasde urgencia con motivo de algun desastre o accidente, o para
evitar perdidas o repararlas; (b) en caso de trabajo por los domingos y fiestas; (c) en
caso de emergencia, y nada hay que se refiera al trabajo de noche; luego la orden de
que se trata es ilegal, pues no esta autorizada por la ley. "In the absence recalcan
los abogados de la recurrente legislation authorizing the payment of extra
compensation for work done at night, the Court of Industrial Relations ha no power or
authority to order the petitioner company to pay extra compensation for work done by its
laborers at night. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where, as inthe case at bar,
statute expressly specifies the cases where payment of extra compensation may be
demanded, extra compensation may be allowed in those cases only, and in no others.
The provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 444 cannot be enlarged by implication or
otherwise. Expressum facit cessare tacitum.
La argumentacion es erronea. La Ley No. 444 no es aplicable al presente caso, siendo
evidente que la misma tiene un objeto especifico, a saber: (a) fijar en 8 horas la jornada
maxima de trabajo; (b) senalar ciertos casos excepcionales en que se puede autorizar
el trabajo fuera de dicha jornada; (c) proveer un sobresueldo, que no debe ser menor
de 25% del salario regular, para el "overtime" o trabajo en exceso de las 8 horas.
En el caso de Manila Electric, solicitante-apelante, contra The Public Utities Employees'
Association,2 apelada, L-1206 (45 Off. Gaz., 1760), esta Corte ha declarado que la
facultad conferida por el articulo 1 de la ley del Commonwealth No. 103 al Tribunal de
relaciones Industriales para enjuciar y decidir pleitos y controversias industriales entre
el capital y el trabajo, que incluye la de fijar salarios y compnsaciones de empleados y
obreros, ha quedado restringida por el articulo 4 de la ley Commonwealth No. 444, que
al mismo tiempo que limita a un 25% del salario o compensacion regular del obrero el
minimum de la compensacion adicional que el tribunal puede conceder por trabajos en
los Domingos y fiestas oficiales, exime del pago de dicha compensacion adicional a las
entidades de utilidad publica que prestan algun servicio publico, como las que
suministran gas, electricidad, fuerza mortriz, agua, o proveen medios de transporte o
communicacion. Tal restriccion viene a ser una excepcion de la facultad general del
tribunal para fijar, en casos de disputa, los salarios y compensaciones que deben pagar
los patronos a los empleados y obreros; y como quiera que dicho articulo 4 se refiere
solamente a salario o compensacion por trabajos durante los dias de Domingo y fiestas
oficiales, es obvio que no puede referirse a salario o compensacion adicional por
trabajos fuera de lajornada de ocho horas que generalmente se realizan desde
primeras horas de la manana a ultimas horas de la tarde, pues una cosa es trabajar en
dias de Domingo y fiestas oficiales, y otra cosa bien distinta es trabajar de noche of
fuera de la jornada de ocho horas en dias laborables. Aplicando la maxima legal
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius," se puede sostener, sin temor de equivocarse,
que una ley que provee una excepcion especifica a sus disposiciones generales, como
la compensacion adicional por trabajos en dias de Domingo y fiestas oficiales, excluye
cualquiera otra, como la compensacion adicional por trabajos de noche en dias
laborables."Another case in which this maxim may almost invariably by followed is that
of statute which makes certain specific exceptions to its general provisions. Here
wemay safely assume that all other exceptions were intended to be excluded." (Wabash
R. Co.vs. United States, 178 Fed., 5, 101 C. C. A. 133; Cella Commision Co. vs.
Bohlinger, 147 Fed., 419; 78 C. C. A. 467; Kunkalman vs. Gibson, 171 Ind., 503; 84
N.E. 985; Hering vs. Clement, 133 App. Div., 293; 117 N.Y., Supp. 747.).
El trabajo denoche que la compania Shell exige de sus obreros no es talmente un
"overtime", en el sentido en que se emplea esta palabra en la Le No. 444, sino que es
una jornada completa de trabajo, tambien de 8 horas: solo que, en vez de realizarse de
dia, se hace de noche. Dicho en otras palabras, el trabajo de noche de que aqui se
trata no es solamente unexceso, prolongacion u "overtime" del trabajo regular de dia,
sino que es otro tipo de trabajo, absolutamente independiente de la jornada diurna. Por
eso hay dos turnos: el turno de obreros que trabajan de dia; y el turno de los que
trabajan de noche. Asi que no es extrano que el legislador no haya incluido este tipo de
trabajo entre los casos de "overtime" senalados en la referida ley No. 444.
La cuestion que, a nuestro juicio, se debe determinar es si entre las facultades
generales de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales que estan admitidas sin dipusta, esta
la de considerar la jornada de noche como una jornada completa de trabajo; la de
estimarla como mas gravosa que la jornada de dia; y consiguientemente, la de proveer
y ordenar que se remunere con un 50% mas de los salarios regulares diurnos. Nuestra
contestacion es afirmativa: todo esto se halla comprendido entre los poderes generales
de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales. Si este tribunal tiene, en casos de disputa, el
poder de fijar los salarios que estime justos y razonables para el trabajo de dia, no hay
razon por que no ha de tener el mismo poder con respecto a los salarios de noche; es
tan trabajo lo uno como lo otro. Y con respecto ala apreciacion de que el trabajo de
noche es mas pesado y oneroso que el de dia y, por tanto, merece mayor
remuneracion, tampoco hay motivospara revocarla o alterarla. No hay argumento
posible contra el hecho universal de que el trabajo regular, normal y ordinario es el de
dia, y que el trabajo de noche es muy exceptional y justificado solo por ciertos motivos
imperativamente inevitables. Por algo la humanidad ha trabajadosiempre de dia.
Razones de higiene, de medicina, de moral, de cultura, de sociologia, establecen de
consuno que el trabajo de nocho tiene muchos inconvenientes, y cuando no hay mas
remedio que hacerlo es solo justo que se remunero mejor que de ordinario para resarcir
hasa cierto punto al obrero de tales inconvenientes. Es indudable que el trabajo de
noche no solo a la larga afecta a la salud del trabajador, sino que le priva a este de
ciertas cosas que hacen relativamente agradable la vida, como, vgr., un reposo
completo e ininterrumpido y ciertos ratos de solaz, ocio o expansion espiritual y cultural
que podria tener al terminar el trabajo por la tarde y durante las primeras horas de la
noche. Se dice que el obrero puede descansar de dia despues de haber trabajado toda
la noche; pero puede acaso el reposo de dia dar al cuerpo aquel tonico y aquel efecto
reparador completo que solo puede proporcionar el reposo natural de noche? Se dice
tambien que algunos prefieren trabajar de noche bajo nuestro clima abrasador,
evitando asi el calor del dia. Mucho tememos, sin embargo, que esto sea mejor hablado
que praticado. Creemos que desde tiempo inmemorial la regla universal es que el
hombre trabja de noche mas por necesidad irremediable que por placentera
conveniencia.
A la opinion vulgar, universal, hay que sumar la opinionpericial, el criterio especialista.
La opinion de los tratadistas y expertos milita decididamente en favor de la tesis de que
el trabajo de noche es mas duro y oneroso que el trabajo de dia, considerandose por
esto con marcada repugnancia y compeliendo consiguientemente a las gerencias
capitalisticas a establecer una escala mas alta de salarios como incentivo a los obreros
para aceptarlo. Se podrian citar virias autoridades, pero para no extender demasiado
esta ponencia optamos por transcriber solamente algunas, a saber:
. . . Then, it must be remembered that it is distinctly unphysiological to turn the night into
day and deprive the body of the beneficial effects of sunshine. The human organism
revolts against this procedure. Added to artificial lighting are reversed and unnatural
times of eating, resting, and sleeping. Much of the inferiority of nightwork can doubtless
be traced to the failure of the workers to secure proper rest and sleep, by day. Because
of inability or the lack of opportunity to sleep, nightworkers often spend their days in
performing domestic duties, joining the family in the midday meal, 'tinkering about the
place', watching the baseball game, attending the theater or taking a ride in the car. It is
not strange that nightworkers tend to be less efficient than dayworkers and lose more
time. . . (The Management of Labor Relations, by Watkins & Dodd, page 524.).
Nightwork. Nightwork has gained a measure of prominence in the modern industrial
system in connection with continuous industries, that is, industries in which the nature of
the processes makes it necessary to keep machinery and equipment in constant
operation. Even in continuous industries the tendency is definitely in the direction of
FOUR shifts of 6 hours each, with provision for an automatic change of shift for all
workers at stated intervals. Some discussion has taken place with regard to the lengths
of the period any workers should be allowed to remain on the night shift. A weekly
change of shifts is common, specially where three or four shifts are in operation; in other
cases the change is made fortnightly or monthly; in still other instances, no alternation is
provided for, the workers remaining on day or nightwork permanently, except where
temporary changes are made for individual convenience.
There is sharp difference of opinion concerning the relative merits of these systems.
Advocates of the weekly change of shifts contend that the strain of nightwork and the
difficulty of getting adequate sleep during the day make it unwise for workers to remain
on the"graveyard" shift for more than a week at a time. Opponents urge that repeated
changes make it more difficult to settle down to either kind of shift and that after the first
week nightwork becomes less trying while the ability to sleep by day increases. Workers
themselves react in various ways to the different systems. This much, however, is
certain: Few persons react favorably to nightwork, whether the shift be continuous or
alternating. Outside of continuous industries, nightwork can scarcely be justified, and,
even in these, it presents serious disadvantages which must be recognized in planing
for industrial efficiency, stabilization of the working force, the promotion of industrial
good-will, and the conservation of the health and vitality of the workers.
Nightwork cannot be regarded as desirable, either from the point of view of the
employer or of the wage earner. It is uneconomical unless overhead costs are unusually
heavy. Frequently the scale of wages is higher as an inducement to employees to
accept employment on the night shift, and the rate of production is generally lower.
(Management of Labor Relations, by Watkins & Dodd, pp. 522-524; emphasis ours.)
. . . The lack of sunlight tends to produce anemia and tuberculosis and to predispose to
other ills. Nightwork brings increased liability to eyestrain and accident. Serious moral
dangers also are likely to result from the necessity of traveling the streets alone at night,
and from the interference with normal home life. From an economic point of view,
moreover, the investigations showed that nightwork was unprofitable, being inferior to
day work both in quality and in quantity. Wherever it had been abolished, in the long run
the efficiency both of the management and of the workers was raised. Furthermore, it
was found that nightwork laws are a valuable aid in enforcing acts fixing the maximum
period of employment. (Principles of Labor Legislation, by Commons and Andrews, 4th
Revised Edition, p. 142.)
Special regulation of nightwork for adult men is a comparatively recent development.
Some European countries have adopted laws placing special limitations on hours of
nightwork for men, and others prohibit such work except in continuous processes.
(Principles of Labor legislation, 4th Revised Edition by Common & Andrews, p. 147.)
Nightwork has almost invariably been looked upon with disfavor by students of the
problem because of the excessive strain involved, especially for women and young
persons, the large amount of lost time consequent upon exhaustion of the workers, the
additional strain and responsibility upon the executive staff, the tendency of excessively
fatigued workers to "keep going" on artificial stimulants, the general curtailment of time
for rest, leisure, and cultural improvement, and the fact that night workers, although
precluded to an extent from the activities of day life, do attempt to enter into these
activities, with resultant impairment of physical well-being. It is not contended, of course,
that nightwork could be abolished in the continuous-process industries, but it is possible
to put such industries upon a three- or four-shifts basis, and to prohibit nightwork for
women and children. (Labor's Progress and Problems, Vol. I, p. 464, by Professors
Millis and Montgomery.)
Nightwork. Civilized peoples are beginning to recognize the fact that except in cases
of necessity or in periods of great emergency, nightwork is socially undesirable. Under
our modern industrial system, however, nightwork has greatly aided the production of
commodities, and has offered a significant method of cutting down the ever-increasing
overhead costs of industry. This result has led employers to believe that such work is
necessary and profitable. Here again one meets a conflict of economic and social
interests. Under these circumstances it is necessary to discover whether nightwork has
deleterious effects upon the health of laborers and tends to reduce the ultimate supply
of efficient labor. If it can proved that nightwork affects adversely both the quality and
quantity of productive labor, its discontinuance will undoubtedly be sanctioned by
employers. From a social point of view, even a relatively high degree of efficiency in
night operations must be forfeited if it is purchased with rapid exhaustion of the health
and energy of the workers. From an economic point of view, nightwork may be
necessary if the employer is to meet the demand for his product, or if he is to maintain
his market in the face of increasing competition or mounting variable production costs.
Industrial experience has shown that the possession of extra-ordinary physical strength
and self-control facilitates the reversal of the ordinary routine of day work and night rest,
with the little or no unfavorable effect on health and efficiency. Unusual vitality and self-
control, however, are not common possessions. It has been found that the most serious
obstacle to a reversal of the routine is the lack of self-discipline. Many night workers
enter into the numerous activities of day life that preclude sleep, and continue to attempt
to do their work at night. Evidence gathered by the British Health of Munition Workers'
Committee places permanent night workers, whether judged on the basis of output or
loss of time, in a very unfavorable positions as compared with day workers.
Systems of nightwork differ. There is the continuous system, in which employees labor
by night and do not attend the establishment at all by day, and the discontinuous
system, in which the workers change to the day turn at regular intervals, usually every
other week. There are, of course, minor variations in these systems, depending upon
the nature of the industry and the wishes of management. Such bodies as the British
Health Munition Workers' Committee have given us valuable conclusions concerning
the effect of nightwork. Continuous nightwork is definitely less productive than the
discontinuous system. The output of the continuous day shift does not make up for this
loss in production.
There is, moreover, a marked difference between the rates of output of night and day
shifts on the discontinuous plan. In each case investigated the inferiority of night labor
was definitely established. This inferiority is evidently the result of the night worker's
failure to secure proper amounts of sleep and rest during the day. The system of
continuous shifts, especially for women, is regarded by all investigators as undesirable.
Women on continuous nightwork are likely to perform domestic duties, and this added
strain undoubtedly accounts for the poorer results of their industrial activities. The
tendency to devote to amusement and other things the time that should be spent in rest
and sleep is certainly as common among men as among women workers and accounts
largely for the loss of efficiency and time on the part of both sexes in nightwork.
The case against nightwork, then, may be said to rest upon several grounds. In the first
place, there are the remotely injurious effects of permanent nightwork manifested in the
later years of the worker's life. Of more immediate importance to the average worker is
the disarrangement of his social life, including the recreational activities of his leisure
hours and the ordinary associations of normal family relations. From an economic point
of view, nightwork is to be discouraged because of its adverse effect upon efficiency and
output. A moral argument against nightwork in the case of women is that the night shift
forces the workers to go to and from the factory in darkness. Recent experiences of
industrial nations have added much to the evidence against the continuation of
nightwork, except in extraordinary circumstances and unavoidable emergencies. The
immediate prohibition of nightwork for all laborers is hardly practicable; its
discontinuance in the case of women employees is unquestionably desirable. 'The night
was made for rest and sleep and not for work' is a common saying among wage-earning
people, and many of them dream of an industrial order in which there will be no night
shift. (Labor Problems, 3rd Edition, pp. 325-328, by Watkins & Dodd.).
En meritos de lo expuesto, se deniega el recurso de certiorari interpuesto y se confirma
la sentencia del Tribunal De Reclaciones Industriales, con costas a cargo de a
recurrente. Asi se ordena.
Paras, Pres. Interino, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Padilla and Tuason, MM., estan
conformes.

ROMERO, J.:
The private respondent began working for Seaborne Carriers Corporation (Seaborne)
on April 8, 1983 as Tug Master with a monthly salary of P2,475.00. On September 15,
1987, the tugboat he was manning met an accident. Half of the cost of repairs totalling
P5,000.00 was shouldered by Seaborne. Private respondent was required to pay for the
other half, and an initial salary deduction of P250.00 was actually made by Seaborne.
On September 24, 1987, he sought permission to go on leave of absence to ask from
the Department of Labor and Employment if such deduction was legal, but this request
was not granted. Instead, he was asked by petitioner Gatan, Seaborne's president and
manager, to tender his resignation. When he refused to resign, as he had not yet
received any separation pay, he was dismissed.
A complaint was then filed by the private respondent against Seaborne for illegal
dismissal, illegal deduction, and unpaid wages, which was later amended to include
petitioner Gatan as party-respondent and to embrace claims for overtime pay, holiday
pay, 13th month pay, sick leave pay, damages, and attorney's fees.
Labor Arbiter Eduardo G. Magno rendered judgment on August 5, 1988, the dispositive
portion of which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of the complainant
as illegal. Respondent is hereby ordered to reinstate complainant to his former position
without loss of seniority rights but without backwages. Backwages will lie upon refusal of
respondent to reinstate complainant. However, respondent is hereby ordered to pay
complainant the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (P250.00) Pesos representing the
amount illegally deducted from complainant.
SO ORDERED.
The private respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission which, in
a decision promulgated on March 21, 1989, modified the labor arbiter's ruling, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED, ordering the
respondents to reinstate complainant to his former position, without loss of seniority
right and other privileges, with full backwages from the date his salary is (sic) withheld
from him until his actual reinstatement, and to pay complainant his holiday pay, 13th
month pay, service incentive leave benefits for 1987 and 1988, plus the amount illegally
deducted from his salary, and attorney's fees of 10% of the total amount herein
awarded.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners' first and second motions for reconsideration were both denied by the public
respondent for lack of merit.
In this petition, the petitioners are asking the Court to set aside and nullify the NLRC's
decision dated March 21, 1989, and the resolutions denying their motions for
reconsideration, on the following grounds: (a) the NLRC erred in concluding that the
private respondent is entitled to service incentive leave benefits as well as holiday and
13th month pay; and (b) the NLRC erred in holding petitioner Jerry Ronaldo Gatan
personally liable, with the petitioner corporation, for the payment of backwages, holiday
pay, 13th month pay, service incentive leave benefits, and attorney's fees.
Having limited the issues to these two questions, the other portions of the challenged
decision are deemed admitted by the petitioners. Hence, we will no longer dwell on the
issue of dismissal, reinstatement, award of backwages and attorney's fees, and
reimbursement of the amount illegally deducted from the private respondent's salary.
The petitioners aver that the award to private respondent should not have included
service incentive pay because it was never sought in the complaint and the private
respondent is already enjoying vacation leave benefits, which bars the employee from
entitlement to the yearly service incentive leave benefit mandated by Article 95 of the
Labor Code.
With regard to the award of 13th month pay and holiday pay, the petitioners allege that
the private respondent failed to prove or establish that he is entitled to the same, and
that he did not specify which holiday or what year he was not paid said benefits.
These arguments are untenable.
The private respondent's allegation of non-payment of these benefits, to which he is by
law entitled, is a negative allegation which need not be supported by evidence unless it
is an essential part of the cause of action. 1 It must be noted that the main cause of
action of the private respondent is his illegal dismissal, and the claim for the monetary
benefits is but an incident of the protest against such dismissal. Thus, the burden of
proving that payment of said benefits has been made rests upon the party who will
suffer if no evidence at all is presented by either party, that is, the petitioners as private
respondent's employer.
This brings us to the second issue raised by the petitioners: Should Jerry Ronaldo
Gatan, as president and general manager of Seaborne be held responsible to the
private respondent for the payment of backwages and other monetary benefits awarded
by the NLRC?
The petitioners rely on the case of Garcia v. NLRC, et al., 2 where the personal liability of
corporate officers to dismissed employees was made to depend on whether such
officers acted with evident malice and bad faith. They argue that the assailed decision
did not make any finding that Jerry Gatan acted maliciously or in bad faith in terminating
the services of private respondent.
This contention is meritorious.
All that the evidence shows is that petitioner Gatan ordered the private respondent to
resign and dismissed him when he failed to do so without considering the reason for
such refusal, which is the non-payment of his separation pay. There is nothing on record
which would prove the insinuation that Jerry Gatan sanctioned the deduction of P250.00
from private respondent's salary, as well as the denial of the latter's request for leave of
absence.
These factors are simply not sufficient to convince this Court that petitioner Gatan acted
with malice and in bad faith in the termination of private respondent's employment. In
this regard only, the assailed decision dated
March 21, 1989 should be accordingly modified.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the liability of
petitioner Seaborne Carriers Corporation to private respondent is hereby affirmed.
Petitioner Jerry Ronaldo Gatan is, however, exempted from said liability for lack of
material proof on his culpability. Let the records of this case be remanded to the public
respondent for immediate execution of judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., are on leave.