Philippine Journalist, Inc.

Vs Journal Employees Union (JEU), for its

union member, Michael Alfante
G.R. No. 192601, June 03, 2013

The coverage of the term legal dependent as used in a stipulation in

a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) granting funeral or bereavement
benefit to a regular employee for the death of a legal dependent, if the CBA
is silent about it, is to be construed as similar to the meaning that
contemporaneous social legislations have set. This is because the terms of
such social legislations are deemed incorporated in or adopted by the CBA.

The nature and force of a CBA are delineated in Honda Phils., Inc. v.
Samahan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Honda:

A collective bargaining agreement (CBA) refers to the negotiated contract

between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning
wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in
a bargaining unit. As in all contracts, the parties in a CBA may establish
such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and
unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties and compliance
therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.
Accordingly, the stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions of the CBA,
being the law between the parties, must be complied with by them. 21 The
literal meaning of the stipulations of the CBA, as with every other contract,
control if they are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties.22

Here, a conflict has arisen regarding the interpretation of the term legal
dependent in connection with the grant of funeral and bereavement
aid to a regular employee under Section 4, Article XIII of the CBA, which
stipulates as follows:

SECTION 4. Funeral/Bereavement Aid. The COMPANY agrees to grant a

funeral/bereavement aid in the following instances:
a. Death of a regular employee in line of duty P50,000
b. Death of a regular employee not in line of duty P40,000
c. Death of legal dependent of a regular employee P15,000.
Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Maria Ruby M. Rivera

G.R. No. 20170, June 13, 2013

The Philippine Supreme Court emphasized that the first notice required by
the twin-notice rule in dismissals must not be a mere general description of
the charges against the employee but must specify the facts that will serve
as the grounds for termination of the engagement of the worker.

This case arose when Rivera, Unilevers Area Activation Executive

for Area 9 South in the cities of Cotabato and Davao, was found to be
diverting company funds from the projects they were intended for.

This prompted Unilever to issue a show-cause notice to Rivera,

asking her to explain the following charges: (a) Conversion and
Misappropriation of Resources, (b) Breach of Fiduciary Trust, (c) Policy
Breaches and (d) Integrity Issues. Rivera, through email, admitted the fund
diversions, but explained the diverted funds were all utilized in the
companys promotional ventures in her area of coverage.

Nonetheless, Unilever found Rivera guilty of serious breach of its

Code of Business Principles and accordingly terminated her employment.

Rivera filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal and other monetary

claims against Unilever. The Labor Arbiter dismissed her complaint. On
appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed Riveras
just dismissal but also found Unilever guilty of violating the twin-notice
requirement in Labor cases. NLRC ordered Unilever to pay Rivera nominal
damages, retirement benefits and separation pay. On Unilevers motion for
reconsideration, the NLRC modified its earlier ruling by deleting the award
of separation pay and reducing nominal damages.

Unilever elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed

the NLRC resolution but reinstated the award for separation pay as a
measure of social justice.

In resolving the issue whether Unilever complied with the twin-notice

requirement, the Supreme Court relied on the case of King of Kings
Transport, Inc. v. Mamac (553 Phil. 108 [2007]). This case held that the first
notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances
that will serve as basis for the charge against the employee. A general
description of the charge will not suffice. Further, the first notice should
specifically mention which company rules, if any, were violated and/or
which among the grounds under Art. 282 are being charged against the
employees.

In this case, Unilever was not direct and specific in its first notice to
Rivera. The words Unilever used were couched in general terms and were
in no way informative of the charges against her that may result in her
dismissal from employment. The Court concluded that there was a violation
of her right to statutory due process warranting the payment of indemnity in
the form of nominal damages.

Another issue dealt with by the High Court in this case was whether
or not a validly dismissed employee is entitled to an award of separation
pay.

The Supreme Court reiterated that as a general rule, an employee

who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under
Article 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay.

In exceptional cases, however, separation pay may be granted to a

legally dismissed employee as an act of social justice or on equitable
grounds, provided the employee is validly dismissed for causes other
than: (a) serious misconduct, (b) any of the other grounds under Article 282
of the Labor Code or (c) those reflecting on his moral character.

In this case, Rivera was dismissed from work because she

intentionally circumvented a strict company policy. Hence, she is not
entitled to a separation pay.

MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING INC./MAERSK SERVICES LTD., AND/OR MR. JEROME DELOS
ANGELES VS. NELSON E. MESINA

G.R. No. 200837, June 5, 2013

It is well to note that in resolving disputes on disability benefits, the

fundamental consideration has been that the POEA-SEC was designed
primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of
their employment on board ocean-going vessels. As such, its provisions
must be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in their favor
because only then can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect. 22

Under Section 20.1.4.123 of the parties AMOSUP/IMEC-CPA for 2004, the

respondent shall be entitled to compensation if he suffers permanent
disability as a result of a work-related illness while serving on board. The
provision further states that the determination of whether an illness is work-
related shall be made in accordance with Philippine laws on employees
compensation.24

The 2000 POEA-SEC25 defines "work-related illness" as "any sickness

resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed
under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein
satisfied."26

In interpreting the said definition, the Court has held that for disability to be
compensable under Section 20(B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, 27 it is not
sufficient to establish that the seafarers illness or injury has rendered him
permanently or partially disabled; it must also be shown that there is a
causal connection between the seafarers illness or injury and the work for
which he had been contracted.28

The Court has likewise ruled that the list of illnesses/diseases in Section
32-A does not preclude other illnesses/diseases not so listed from being
compensable. The POEA-SEC cannot be presumed to contain all the
possible injuries that render a seafarer unfit for further sea duties. 29 This is
in view of Section 20(B)(4) of the POEA-SEC which states that "those
illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed
as work-related."

Concomitant with such presumption is the burden placed upon the claimant
to present substantial evidence that his working conditions caused or at
least increased the risk of contracting the disease. 30 Substantial evidence
consists of such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion that there is a causal connection
between the nature of his employment and his illness, or that the risk of
contracting the illness was increased by his working conditions. 31 Only a
reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation is required
to establish compensability of a non-occupational disease. 32

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

(B) COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is
entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is
declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been
assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this
period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post employment
medical examination by a company-designated physician within three
working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to
do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period
is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the
mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to
claim the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third

doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The
third doctors decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

4. Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably

presumed as work related.

5. Upon sign-off of the seafarer from the vessel for medical treatment, the
employer shall bear the full cost of repatriation in the event the seafarer is
declared (1) fit for repatriation; or (2) fit to work but the employer is unable
to find employment for the seafarer on board his former vessel or another
vessel of the employer despite earnest efforts.

6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by

either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance
with the schedule of benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be
governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time
the illness or disease was contracted.
PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC. v. LEANDRO LEGASPI
G.R. No. 202791, June 10, 2013
Finality of NLRCs decisions, resolutions and orders; Petition for
Certiorari. Section 14, Rule VII of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure
provides that decisions, resolutions or orders of the NLRC shall become
final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the
parties, and entry of judgment shall be made upon the expiration of the said
period. In St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, however, it was ruled that
judicial review of decisions of the NLRC may be sought via a petition for
certiorari before the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and under
Section 4 thereof, petitioners are allowed sixty (60) days from notice of the
assailed order or resolution within which to file the petition. Hence, in cases
where a petition for certiorari is filed after the expiration of the 10-day
period under the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure but within the 60-day
period under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the CA can grant the petition
and modify, nullify and reverse a decision or resolution of the NLRC.
Accordingly, in this case, although the petition for certiorari was not filed
within the 10-day period, petitioner timely filed it before the CA within the
60-day reglementary period under Rule 65. It has, thus, been held that the
CAs review of the decisions or resolutions of the NLRC under Rule 65,
particularly those which have already been executed, does not affect their
statutory finality.

In Leonis Navigation, after the NLRC resolution awarding disability benefits

became final and executory, the employer paid the monetary award to the
employee. The CA dismissed the employers petition for certiorari, ruling
that the final and executory decisions or resolutions of the NLRC rendered
appeals to superior courts moot and academic. This Court disagreed with
the CA and held that final and executed decisions of the NLRC did not
prevent the CA from reviewing the same under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. It was further ruled that the employee was estopped from claiming
that the case was closed and terminated, considering that the employees
Acknowledgment Receipt stated that such was without prejudice to the final
outcome of the petition for certiorari pending before the CA.

UNIVAC DEVELOPMENT, INC. VS WILLIAM M. SORIANO,

G.R. No. 182072, June 28, 2013

It was held by the Supreme Court that; Under Article 223 of the Labor
Code, the decision of the NLRC becomes final and executory after the
lapse of ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties. However, the
adverse party is not precluded from assailing the decision via petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA and then to
this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45.Thus, contrary to the
contention of petitioner, there is no violation of the doctrine of immutability
of judgment when respondent elevated the matter to the CA which the latter
consequently granted.

The power of the CA to review NLRC decisions has already been

thoroughly explained and clarified by the Court in several cases,

The power of the Court of Appeals to review NLRC decisions via Rule 65 or
Petition for Certiorari has been settled as early as in our decision in St.
Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission. This
Court held that the proper vehicle for such review was a Special Civil Action
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and that this action
should be filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine
of the hierarchy of courts. Moreover, it is already settled that under Section
9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902[10]
(An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, amending for
the purpose of Section Nine of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended,
known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the Court of Appeals
pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over Petitions
for Certiorari is specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence, if
and when necessary, to resolve factual issues.

CONCRETE SOLUTIONS, INC. / PRIMARY STRUCTURES

CORPORATION vs. ARTHUR CABUSAS

G.R. No. 177812, 19 June 2013

It is well settled that in termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon
the employer to show that the dismissal was for a just and valid cause, and
failure to discharge the same would mean that the dismissal is not justified
and, therefore, illegal. In this case, petitioners claim that respondent was
validly dismissed as he abandoned his work as shown by the following
circumstances, to wit: He did not go back to work on May 6, 2001, i.e, after
his preventive suspension expired on May 5, 2001; he did not report to
work despite receipt of the telegram on May 25, 2001 stating that "he was
absent without official leave since May 5, 2001, and to notify CSI as soon
as possible," but instead , through his lawyer, sent a letter asking for a copy
of the result of the investigation; despite not being given the result of the
investigation, respondent still did not bother to report back to work; and the
complaint he filed with the LA did not pray for reinstatement.

To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur, to wit: (1) the

failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and
(2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the
second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by
some overt acts.31 Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly
be presumed from certain equivocal acts. To be a valid cause for dismissal
for abandonment, there must be clear proof of deliberate and unjustified
intent to sever the employer-employee relationship. 33 Clearly, the operative
act is still the employee's ultimate act of putting an end to his employment

CENTURY IRON WORKS, INC. and BENITO CHUA VS. ELETO B.

BANAS
G.R. No. 184116, June 19, 2013

Issue 1:
Since Baas was an ordinary rank-
and-file employee, his termination
on the ground of loss of confidence
was illegal

Since Baas did not occupy a position of trust and confidence nor was he
routinely in charge with the care and custody of Century Irons money or
property, his termination on the ground of loss of confidence was
misplaced.

We point out in this respect that loss of confidence applies to: (1)
employees occupying positions of trust and confidence, the managerial
employees; and (2) employees who are routinely charged with the care and
custody of the employers money or property which may include rank-and-
file employees. Examples of rank-and-file employees who may be
dismissed for loss of confidence are cashiers, auditors, property
custodians, or those who, in the normal routine exercise of their functions,
regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.38 Thus, the
phrasing of the petitioners second assignment of error is inaccurate
because a rank-and-file employee who is routinely charged with the care
and custody of the employers money or property may be dismissed on the
ground of loss of confidence.

Issue 2:

Baas was grossly and habitually

neglectful of his duties

With respect to Century Irons assertion that Baas was grossly and
habitually neglectful of his duties, the CA erred in ruling that the NLRC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in concluding that the dismissal was
illegal. The NLRCs finding that there was illegal dismissal on the ground of
gross and habitual neglect of duties is not supported by the evidence on
record. It believed in Baas bare and unsubstantiated denial that he was
not grossly and habitually neglectful of his duties when the record is replete
with pieces of evidence showing the contrary. Consequently, the NLRC
capriciously and whimsically exercised its judgment by failing to consider all
material evidence presented to it by the petitioners and in giving credence
to Baas claim which is unsupported by the evidence on record. 39
Baas self-serving and unsubstantiated denials cannot defeat the concrete
and overwhelming evidence submitted by the petitioners. The evidence on
record shows that Baas committed numerous infractions in his one year
and eleven-month stay in Century Iron. On October 27, 2000, Century Iron
gave Baas a warning for failing to check the right quantity of materials
subject of his inventory.40 On December 29, 2000, Baas went
undertime.41 On January 2, 2001, Baas incurred an absence without
asking for prior leave.42 On August 11, 2001, he was warned for failure to
implement proper warehousing and housekeeping procedures. 43 On August
21, 2001, he failed to ensure sufficient supplies of oxygen-acetylene gases
during business hours.44 On November 15, 2001, Baas was again warned
for failing to secure prior permission before going on leave. 45 In May 2002,
Century Irons accounting department found out that Baas made double
and wrong entries in his inventory.46

Article 282 of the Labor Code provides that one of the just causes for
terminating an employment is the employees gross and habitual neglect of
his duties. This cause includes gross inefficiency, negligence and
carelessness.47 "Gross negligence connotes want or absence of or failure
to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces
a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to
avoid them. Fraud and willful neglect of duties imply bad faith of the
employee in failing to perform his job, to the detriment of the employer and
the latters business. Habitual neglect, on the other hand, implies repeated
failure to perform one's duties for a period of time, depending upon the
circumstances."48

To our mind, such numerous infractions are sufficient to hold him grossly
and habitually negligent.1wphi1 His repeated negligence is not tolerable.
The totality of infractions or the number of violations he committed during
his employment merits his dismissal. Moreover, gross and habitual
negligence includes unauthorized absences and tardiness, 49 as well as
gross inefficiency, negligence and carelessness. 50 As pronounced in Valiao
v. Court of Appeals,51 "fitness for continued employment cannot be
compartmentalized into tight little cubicles of aspects of character, conduct,
and ability separate and independent of each other."
Besides, the determination of who to keep in employment and who to
dismiss for cause is one of Century Iron's prerogatives. Time and again, we
have recognized that the employer has the right to regulate, according to its
discretion and best judgment, ell aspects of employment, including work
assignment, working methods, processes to be followed, working
regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and
the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers.52 It would be the height of
injustice if we force an employer to retain the services of an employee who
does not value his work.

MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES SALARIED EMPLOYEES UNION

(MMPSEU) VS. MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 175773, June 17, 2013

It is well to note at this point that the CBA constitutes a contract between
the parties and as such, it should be strictly construed for the purpose of
limiting the amount of the employers liability. The terms of the subject
provision are clear and provide no room for any other interpretation. As
there is no ambiguity, the terms must be taken in their plain, ordinary and
popular sense. Consequently, MMPSEU cannot rely on the rule that a
contract of insurance is to be liberally construed in favor of the insured.
Neither can it rely on the theory that any doubt must be resolved in favour
of Labor. (Art 4 of The Labor Code)

St. Joseph Academy of Valenzuela Faculty Association, (SJAV) FUR

CHAPTER-TCUP VS. ST. Joseph Academy of Valenzuela and
Damaso D. Lopez
G. R. no. 182957, Junes 13, 2013

R.A. no. 7836 provides that no person shall engage in teaching and/or act
as professional teacher unless he is a duly registered professional teacher,
and a holder of a valid certificate of registration and a valid professional
license or a holder of valid temporary/special permit. Aside from the finding
that there was no illegal dismissal, the non-licensees cannot be reinstated
since they do not possess the necessary qualification.

The Court finds that CA did not commit an error in deleting the award of
backwages, as payment of backwages and other benefits is justified only if
the employee was illegally dismissed.

Nevertheless, the Court, in exceptional cases, has granted financial

assistance to legally dismissed emploees as an act of social justice or
based on a equity so long as the dismissal was not serious misconduct,
does not reflect on the employees moral character, or would involve moral
turpitude. In Nissan Motor Philippines, Inc. v. Angelo, the Court ruled that,
inspired by compassionate and social justice, it has in the past awarded
financial assistance to dismissed employees when circumstances
warranted such an award. Meanwhile, inPharmacia and Upjohn, Inc. v.
Albayda, Jr., the Court held that an award to the employee of separation
pay by way of financial assistance, equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay
for every year of service, is equitable. The Court, in Pharmacia, noted,
among others, that although the employees actions constituted a valid
ground to terminate his services, the same is not so reprehensible as to
warrant complete disregard of his long years of service.

Similarly in this case, the dismissal of the 13 non-licensees was due to their
failure to possess teaching licenses. It was not due to any serious
misconduct or infraction reflecting their moral character. Records also bear
that they have been in the employ of SJAV from five (5) to nine (9) years,
and as observed by the SOLE, SJAV has not shown any dissatisfaction
with their teaching services, otherwise, x x x, it would not have kept them
under its employ for such quite a period of time. This being the case, the
Court, in keeping with equity and social justice, grants the award of
financial assistance to the 13 non-licensees equivalent to one-half (1/2)
months pay for every year of service rendered with SJAV.

JAIME N. GAPAYAO, VS.ROSARIO FULO, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

and SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION

G.R. No. 193493, June 13, 2013

Farm workers may be considered regular seasonal employees.

Article 280 of the Labor Code states:

Article 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written

agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the
work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment
is for the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the

preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at
least one year of service whether such service is continuous or broken,
shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which
he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually
exists.

Jurisprudence has identified the three types of employees mentioned in the

provision: (1) regular employees or those who have been engaged to
perform activities that are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer; (2) project employees or those whose
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the
completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of their
engagement, or those whose work or service is seasonal in nature and is
performed for the duration of the season; and (3) casual employees or
those who are neither regular nor project employees. 55

Farm workers generally fall under the definition of seasonal employees. We

have consistently held that seasonal employees may be considered as
regular employees.56 Regular seasonal employees are those called to work
from time to time. The nature of their relationship with the employer is such
that during the off season, they are temporarily laid off; but reemployed
during the summer season or when their services may be needed. 57 They
are in regular employment because of the nature of their job,and not
because of the length of time they have worked. 58

The rule, however, is not absolute. In Hacienda Fatima v. National

Federation of Sugarcane Workers-Food & General Trade, the Court
held that seasonal workers who have worked for one season only may not
be considered regular employees. Similarly, in Mercado, Sr. v. NLRC, 6it
was held that when seasonal employees are free to contract their services
with other farm owners, then the former are not regular employees.

For regular employees to be considered as such, the primary standard

used is the reasonable connection between the particular activity they
perform and the usual trade or business of the employer. This test has
been explained thoroughly in De Leon v. NLRC, viz:

The primary standard, therefore, of determining a regular employment is

the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the
employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. The
test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by
considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme
of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has
been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not
continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and
continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity
if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the
employment is also considered regular, but only with respect to such
activity and while such activity exists.
ALPS TRANSPORTATION and/or ALFREDO E. PEREZ VS. ELPIDIO M.
RODRIGUEZ.

G.R. No. 186732, June 13, 2013

It was held by the Supreme Court, for a dismissal to be valid, the rule is
that the employer must comply with both substantive and procedural due
process requirements. Substantive due process requires that the dismissal
must be pursuant to either a just or an authorized cause under the Labor
Code. Procedural due process, on the other hand, mandates that the
employer must observe the twin requirements of notice and hearing before
a dismissal can be effected.

Evidence must, therefore, be substantial and not based on mere surmises

or conjectures for to allow an employer to terminate the employment of a
worker based on mere allegations places the latter in an uncertain situation
and at the sole mercy of the employer. An accusation that is not
substantiated will not ripen into a holding that there is just cause for
dismissal. A mere accusation of wrongdoing or a mere pronouncement of
lack of confidence is not sufficient cause for a valid dismissal of an
employee. Thus, the failure of the petitioners to convincingly show that the
respondent misappropriated the bus fares renders the dismissal to be
without a valid cause. If doubt exists between the evidence presented by
the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor
of the latter.

Turning to the issue of procedural due process, both parties agree that
Rodriguez was not given a written notice specifying the grounds for his
termination and giving him a reasonable opportunity to explain his side.

As to the contention of ALPS that Rodriguez is an employee of Contact

Tours, the presumption is that a contractor is a Labor-only contractor unless
he overcomes the burden of proving that it has substantial capital,
investment, tools, and the like. While ALPS Transportation is not the
contractor itself, since it is invoking Contact Tours status as a legitimate job
contractor in order to avoid liability, it bears the burden of proving that
Contact Tours is an independent contractor.
However, aside from making bare assertions and offering the Kasunduan
between Rodriguez and Contact Tours in evidence, ALPS Transportation
has failed to present any proof to substantiate the former's status as a
legitimate job contractor. Hence, the legal presumption that Contact Tours
is a labor-only contractor has not been overcome.

As a labor-only contractor, therefore, Contact Tours is deemed to be an

agent of ALPS Transportation. Thus, the latter is responsible to Contact
Tours' employees in the same manner and to the same extent as if they
were directly employed by the bus company.

Finally, since ALPS Transportation is a sole proprietorship owned by Perez,

it is he who must be held liable for the payment of backwages to
Rodriguez. A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality
separate and distinct from that of the owner of the enterprise. Thus, the
owner has unlimited personal liability for all the debts and obligations of the
business, and it is against him that a decision for illegal dismissal is to be
enforced.
SURIGAO DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. AND/OR
DANNY Z. ESCALANTE VS. TEOFILO GONZAGA,

G.R. No.187722, June 10, 2013

A. Cause of termination.

In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show

that the dismissal is for a valid cause. Failing in which, the law considers
the matter a case of illegal dismissal. In this relation, the quantum of proof
which the employer must discharge is substantial evidence which, as
defined in case law, means that amount of relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if
other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.

Applying the foregoing principles to this case, the Court finds that
petitioners were able to prove, by substantial evidence, that there lies a
valid cause to terminate Gonzagas employment.

The Court concurs with the NLRCs finding that petitioners evidence
which consists of the Collection Report, the Summaries, and the
September 15, 2003 Audit Report with attached Cash Flow Summary
adequately supports the conclusion that Gonzaga misappropriated the
funds of the cooperative. The data indicated therein show gaping
discrepancies between Gonzagas collections and remittances, of which he
was accountable for. In this accord, the burden of evidence shifted to
Gonzaga to prove that the reflected shortage was not attributable to him.
However, despite being allowed to peruse the bills and receipts on record
together with the assistance of an accountant and a counsel during the
investigation proceedings, Gonzaga could not reconcile the amounts of his
collections and remittances and, instead, merely interposed bare and
general denials.
B. Termination procedure; statutory compliance.

The statutory procedure for terminating an employee is found in Section 2

(III), Rule XXIII, and Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code (Omnibus Rules) which states:

SEC. 2. Standards of due process: requirements of notice. In all cases of

termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be
substantiallyobserved:

For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article

282 of the Labor Code:

(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or

grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity
within which to explain his side.

(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the
assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the
charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.

(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that

upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination.

C. Company procedure; consequences of breach.

Jurisprudence dictates that it is not enough that the employee is given

an ample opportunity to be heard if company rules or practices require a
formal hearing or conference. In such instance, the requirement of a formal
hearing and conference becomes mandatory. In Perez v. Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Company, the Court laid down the following
principles in dismissing employees:

(a) ample opportunity to be heard means any meaningful opportunity

(verbal or written) given to the employee to answer the charges against him
and submit evidence in support of his defense, whether in a hearing,
conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way.

(b) A formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only

when requested by the employee in writing or substantial evidentiary
disputes exists or a company rule or practice requires it, or when similar
circumstances justify it.

(c) The ample opportunity to be heard standard in the Labor Code

prevails over the hearing and conference requirement in the implementing
rules and regulations.

The rationale behind this mandatory characterization is premised on the

fact that company rules and regulations which regulate the procedure and
requirements for termination, are generally binding on the employer. Thus,
as pronounced in Suico v. NLRC, et al.

Company policies or practices are binding on the parties. Some can ripen
into an obligation on the part of the employer, such as those which confer
benefits on employees or regulate the procedures and requirements for
their termination.