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CASE NO.

1
G.R. No. 127692 March 10, 2004
FORTUNATO GOMEZ and AURORA GOMEZ, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ADOLFO TROCINO and MARIANO TROCINO, respondents.

FACTS: Sometime in 1975, the spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino mortgaged two
parcels of land. The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed. The respondent spouses
Trocino sold the property to petitioner’s spouses who in turn, redeemed the lands from
mortgagee. The spouses Trocino, however, refused to convey ownership of the properties
to petitioners; hence, spouses Gomez sued spouses Trocino for delivery of titles. The
husband Trocino died before the suit was filed, thus his children Adolfo and Mariano
impleaded in the suit. Summons was served and it was only received by Caridad Trocino
in behalf of the children. The RTC rendered judgment against the spouses Trocino and
the heirs.Adolfo and Mariano Trocino petitioned for the annulment of the judgment of the
RTC with the CA alleging that no jurisdiction was acquired over them. At that time Adolfo
Trocino was already residing in Ohio, U.S.A and Mariano Trocino was in Talibon, Bohol.
And both were not found in Cebu City at the time summons were served.

ISSUE:

1. What was the nature of the complaint, upon which the manner of the service of
summons should be based?
2. Was there a valid service of summons?
3. If personal service were impossible to comply what should have been done?

RULING:

1. The action was an action in personam, while it is a real action because it affects
title or possession of the land, it does not automatically follow that the action is one in
rem. But it is an action against a person on the basis of the personal liability of non
delivery of the titles. Thus, personal service of summons upon the private respondents is
essential in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person.

2. There was no valid summons. In actions in personam, summons on the defendant
must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to
receive it, by tendering it to him. This is specifically provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court. In substituted service, it is mandated that the fact of impossibility of
personal service should be explained in the proof of service.

When the defendant in an action in personam is a non-resident who does not
voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons
within the State is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over his person. This cannot
be done if the defendant is not physically present in the country, and thus, the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide
the case against him. An exception was accorded in Gemperle vs. Schenker wherein
service of summons through the non-resident’s wife, who was a resident of the
Philippines, was held valid, as the latter was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a
prior civil case filed by the non-resident, and the second case was merely an offshoot of
the first case.

The manner of summons must be distinguished Adolfo Trocino being a non-
resident, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and validly try and decide
the case against him. The action being in personam. On the other hand, Mariano Trocino
has been in Talibon, Bohol not in Cebu City to validly acquire jurisdiction over his person,
summons must be served on him personally, or through substituted service, upon

showing of impossibility of personal service. Such impossibility, and why efforts exerted
towards personal service failed, should be explained in the proof of service. The
pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated
in the proof of service or Officer’s Return. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent
proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.

3. Moreover, inasmuch as the sheriff’s return failed to state the facts and
circumstances showing the impossibility of personal service of summons upon
respondents within a reasonable time, petitioners should have sought the issuance of an
alias summons. Under Section 5, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, alias summons may be
issued when the original summons is returned without being served on any or all of the
defendants. Petitioners, however, did not do so, and they should now bear the
consequences of their lack of diligence.

CASE 2
REBOLLIDO, ET AL VS. HONORABLE CA AND PESICO INC.,
G.R. NO. 81123
FEBRUARY 28, 1989

FACTS: Petitioners filed a civil case for damages against Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of
the Philippines Inc. and Alberto Lava before the RTC, involving a vehicular accident. On
September 21,1984, the sheriff of the lower court served the summons addressed to the
defendants. It was received by one Nanette Sison who represented herself to be the
authorized person receiving court processes as she was the secretary of the legal
department of Pepsi Cola.

The RTC heard the case ex-parte and adjudged the defendants jointly and severally liable
for damages. PEPSICO Inc., a foreign corporation organized under the State of Delaware,
USA, held offices here for the purpose of settling Pepsi Cola’s debts, liabilities and
obligations, opposed the motion for execution filed by the petitioners, and moved to
vacate the judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to invalidity of the service
of summons to a mere clerk.

The lower court denied the motion, holding that there was proper service of summons
because the defendant continued its existence for 3 years from the date of dissolution.

The CA ruled that there was no valid service of summons, and that the service of
summons should be made upon the private respondent itself in accordance with Section
14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. It remanded the case to the lower court and ordered
that the private respondent be summoned and be given its day in court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Pepsi Cola, the dissolved corporation, is the real party in interest to
whom summons should be served in the civil case for damages;
2. Whether or not there was valid service of summons through Nanette Sison,
allegedly the secretary of the legal department of Pepsi Cola.

HELD:

1. YES. For purposes of valid summons, the dissolved Pepsi Cola was the real party in
interest-defendant in the civil case filed by the petitioners not only because it is
the registered owner of the truck involved but also because, when the cause of
action accrued, Pepsi Cola still existed as a corporation and was the party involved
in the acts violative of the legal right of another. The law provides that a
corporation whose corporate term has ceased can still be made a party to a suit. It

shall be continued as a body corporate for three (3) years after the time when it
would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits
by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and
convey its property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of
continuing the business for which it was established. The right of action of the
petitioners against Pepsi Cola and its driver arose not at the time when the
complaint was filed but when the acts or omission constituting the cause of action
accrued.

2. YES. There was a valid service of summons to bind Pepsi Cola. Whomsoever Miss
Sison was acting for in receiving the summons there is no question that the notice
of the action was promptly delivered either to Pepsi Cola or PEPSICO with whom
she is admittedly connected. We rule, as in G & G Trading Corporation v. Court of
Appeals (supra), that there was substantial compliance with Section 13, Rule 14
because the purpose of notice was satisfied.

At the time of the issuance and receipt of the summons, Pepsi Cola was already
dissolved. The Court is of the opinion that service is allowed in such a situation.
Since our law recognizes the liability of a dissolved corporation to an aggrieved
creditor, it is but logical for the law to allow service of process upon a dissolved
corporation. Otherwise, substantive rights would be lost by the mere lack of
explicit technical rules. The Rules of Court on service of summons upon a private
domestic corporation is also applicable to a corporation which is no longer a going
concern. Service upon a dissolved corporation may be made through any of the
persons enumerated in Section 13, Rule 14.

The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive
prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be
served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will
know what to do with the legal papers served on him. In other words, 'to bring
home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action.

CASE 3
SPS. VENTURANZA VS. HONORABLE CA, ET AL
G.R. NO. 77760 DECEMBER 11, 1987

FACTS: Plaintiff Nieves Y. Senoran (now private respondent) filed a complaint against
spouses Violeta S. Venturanza and Romy Venturanza (now petitioners) with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, for collection of sums of money in the aggregate
amount of P9,711.50, representing several loans evidenced by promissory notes which
had become due and demandable but unpaid despite repeated demands. On June 10,
1985, summons was issued against the petitioners on Augusto Soan, father of petitioner
Violeta S. Venturanza, at 3412 B.A. Tan Street. Barrio Obrero Tondo, Manila, the address
of petitioners stated in the complaint. The court a quo rendered a decision ordering
Venturanza to pay jointly and severally the private respondent.

On September 22, 1985, petitioners filed a "Motion to Set Aside Decision and to Declare
Past Proceedings Null and Void for Lack of Jurisdiction," alleging that there had been no
proper and valid service of summons upon them and that the court a quo never acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners, considering that the address where the
summons was served is the residence of Violeta S. Venturanza's father, Augusto Soan,
and not the residence or dwelling house of the petitioners. The telephone directory of the
Asian Development Bank where defendant is employed, also indicates that the
defendant is a resident of Tondo, Manila.

The court a quo denied the motion for lack of merit since the defendant’s motion that
they have been residing at Aurora St., Pasay City since April 1985, was not supported by
any other competent evidence.

On appeal to RTC, decision by the MeTC was affirmed with slight modification as to the
amount of damages. On a petition for review, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision.
Hence this petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. WON Metropolitan Trial Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioners when the summons was served upon Augusto Soan, father of petitioner
Violeta S. Venturanza at 3412 B.A. Tan St., Bo. Obrero Tondo, Manila, which address
is no longer the residence nor the place of business of petitioners.

2. Whether or not the provisions of Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court was
legally complied with by the Sheriff in serving the summons upon the father of one
of the petitioners.

HELD:

1. No. The MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners. The
action for collection of sum of money, being an action in personam, requires the
personal service of summons on the defendants to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. It was admitted by Venturanza that they were actual
residents of Tondo, Manila in 1984 , but transferred in April 1985 to Pasay City.
There was also an affidavit of Augusto Soan stating that he never told the
sheriff that the defendants were residing in his house at Tondo, Manila, sufficiently
negating the conclusion of the court a quo.

2. No. It is only when a defendant cannot be personally served with summons within
a reasonable time that a substituted service may be availed of, the same to be
effected in the following manner: a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendants' dwelling house or residence, with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or
regular place of business, with some competent person in charge thereof. For a
substituted service to be valid, summons served at the defendant's residence must
be served at his residence at the time of such service and not at his former place
of residence.

It is required by law that an effort or attempt should first be made to personally
serve the summons and after this has failed, a substituted service may be caused
upon the defendant, and the same must be reflected in the proof of service. Upon
careful examination of the sheriff 's Return in this case, which purports to serve as
proof that summons had been served upon the defendants, together with a copy of
the complaint, through Augusto Soan, no statement is made that an effort or
attempt was exerted to personally serve the summons on the defendants and that
the same had failed. In fact, said Return does not even indicate the address of the
defendants to whom summons was supposed to have been served. The
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by the sheriff is
not applicable in this case where it is patent that the sheriff's return is defective.

CASE NO.4
FILOMENA DOMAGAS vs. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN
G.R. No. 158407. January 17, 2005

FACTS:
On February 19, 1999, petitioner Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible
entry against respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan. The
petitioner alleged in her complaint that she was the registered owner of a parcel of land
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-30980, situated in Barangay Buenlag,
Calasiao, Pangasinan, and with an area of 827 square meters of which petitioner was
deprived of a 68-square meter portion of her property along the boundary line. The MTC
rendered the decision in favour of the petitioner.

The respondent failed to appeal the decision. Consequently, a writ of execution
was issued. Then, the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC
of Dagupan City for the annulment of the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879, on
the ground that due to the Sheriffs failure to serve the complaint and summons on her
because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person.
The respondent alleged therein that the service of the complaint and summons through
substituted service on her brother, Oscar Layno, was improper because he was merely
visiting her house in Barangay Buenlag and was not a resident nor an occupant of the
house being leased to Eduardo Gonzales. Judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff Jensen
and against defendant Domagas declaring the previous decision of the MTC of Calasiao,
as null and void, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff and the subject
matter. The trial court declared that there was no valid service of the complaint and
summons on the respondent Jensen the defendant in Civil Case No. 879, considering that
she left the Philippines on February 17, 1999 for Oslo, Norway, and her brother Oscar
Layno was never authorized to receive the said complaint and summons for and in her
behalf.

The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which rendered judgment affirming
the appealed decision of the RTC with modifications. The CA ruled that the complaint in
Civil Case No. 879 was one for ejectment, which is an action quasi in rem. The appellate
court ruled that since the defendant therein was temporarily out of the country, the
summons and the complaint should have been served via extraterritorial service under
Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which likewise requires
prior leave of court. Considering that there was no prior leave of court and none of the
modes of service prescribed by the Rules of Court was followed by the petitioner, the CA
concluded that there was really no valid service of summons and complaint upon the
respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879. Hence, the petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent was validly served with summons and the
complaint by substituted sevice.

HELD: No. There is no showing that as of April 5, 1999, the house where the Sheriff
found Oscar Layno was the latter’s residence or that of the respondent herein. Neither is
there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence of the
respondent was on the said date. It turned out that the occupant of the house was a
lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the
rentals from him. The service of the summons on a person at a place where he was a
visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence or place or abode, where he
has another place at which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return.

The Voters Registration Record of Oscar Layno wherein he declared that he was a
resident of the same barangay cannot prevail over the Contract of Lease the respondent
had executed in favor of Eduardo Gonzales showing that the latter had resided and

the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. A. 1993. denied respondents motion for execution against petitioner and ordered that petitioner be furnished the said Decision . Velayo-Fong (petitioner). the RTC in its Order. 2006 FACTS: On August 9. Hence. petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default claiming that she was prevented from filing a responsive pleading and defending herself against respondents complaint because of fraud. 155488 December 6. Metro Manila. SPOUSES RAYMOND and MARIA HEDY VELAYO G. by substituted service. Respondents pray that actual and moral damages. NO. Maria Hedy Velayo (respondents) filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with prayer for preliminary attachment against Erlinda R. the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.occupied the house of the respondent as lessee and the affidavit of Eduardo Gonzales that Oscar Layno was not residing in the said house on during the said service of complaint and summons.) and Roberto R. a resident of 1860 Alamoana Boulevard. Then. the RTC granted the said motion. and her co-defendants maliciously instituted a criminal complaint before the NBI and a petition before the SEC which prevented the respondents from leaving the country and paralyzed the latters business transactions. (Rodolfo Jr. declared petitioner and her co-defendant in default for failure to file an answer and ordered the ex- parte presentation of respondents evidence. In its Order dated May 29. In its Order dated September 13. Q-93-17133 is anchored on the claim that petitioner. not at her two (2) given addresses. respondents filed a Motion for Execution but the petitioner filed an Opposition to Motion for Execution contending that she has not yet received the Decision and it is not yet final and executory as against her. plus attorneys fees. The Process Server submitted the Officers Return stating that he was able to personally serve upon defendant Erlinda Velayo the copy of summons together with the thereto attached copy of the complaint. Makati. that there was no evident reason for the Process Server to make a false narration regarding the service of summons to defaulting defendant in the Officers Return. then. In sum. 5 ERLINDA R. respondents filed an Urgent Motion praying that the summons addressed to petitioner be served to her at two condominiums in Pasay City and in Makati. Upon ex-parte motions of respondents. Honolulu.In its Order. accident or mistake. Before respondents application for a writ of preliminary attachment can be acted upon by the RTC. 1999. no summons was served upon her. as such. Jr. the RTC denied petitioners Motion ruling that the presumption of regularity in the discharge of the function of the Process Server was not sufficiently overcome by petitioners allegation to the contrary. that she has valid and meritorious defenses to refute respondents material allegations. the RTC. Raymond Velayo (Raymond) and his wife. right in the presence of lobby counter personnel by the name of Ms. Thereafter. VELAYO-FONG vs. Zulueta. USA. Respondents opposed said Motion. Hawaii. Velayo (Roberto). Raymond is the half-brother of petitioner and her co-defendants. that contrary to the Officers Return. but said defendant refused to sign in receipt thereof. Velayo. 1995. 879 on April 5. Rodolfo R. Respondents’ cause of action in Civil Case No. The RTC rendered its Decision in respondents favour.R. 879 is null and void. be awarded in their favor. but at the lobby of Intercontinental Hotel. the respondent was not validly served with summons and the complaint in Civil Case No. 1993. finding that the Decision and the Order were indeed not furnished or served upon petitioner. CASE NO.

and Order. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. Petitioners bare allegation that the statement in the Officers Return that she was personally served summons is inaccurate is not sufficient. alleging that the defendants committed professional fault. Petitioner has not shown that she has a meritorious defense. Such allegation is a conclusion rather than a statement of facts showing a meritorious defense. To overcome the presumption of regularity of performance of official functions in favor of such Officers Return. 1996. Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA questioning the propriety and validity of the service of summons made upon her. accident. . Petitioner contented herself with stating in her affidavit of merit that the cases against respondent Raymond were filed at the instance of her father. The CA rendered its Decision affirming the Decision and Order of the RTC. No. Hence. the party seeking to have the order of default lifted must first show that her failure to file an answer or any other responsive pleading was due to fraud. Dr. Whether or not RTC should have set aside the order of default. While indeed default orders are not viewed with favor. Except for her bare unsupported allegation that the summons were only thrown to her at the elevator. Yes. In this case. finally received the Decision and the Order. Between the claim of non-receipt of summons by a party against the assertion of an official whose duty is to send notices. 2. Palma filed with the RTC an action for damages against the Philippine Heart Center. ISSUES: 1. On May 23. No. petitioner. Petitioner’s argument that the RTC should have set aside the order of default and applied the liberal interpretation of rules with a view of affording parties their day in court is not tenable. Dr. CASE NO. The action instituted by respondents affect the parties alone. In the present case. HELD: 1. the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. personal service of summons upon the defendants is essential in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons. the latter assertion is fortified by the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. Whether or not the petitioner was not validly served with summons. 165273 March 10. Petitioner having been unable to come forward with the requisite quantum of proof to the contrary. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied it. mistake or excusable neglect. The RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution against petitioners co-defendant. Giron. petitioner did not present any competent evidence to justify the setting aside of the order of default. The affidavit failed to controvert the facts allegedby the respondents. Galvez G. As such.R. 2. through her counsel. the presumption of regularity of performance on the part of the process server stands. A process server’s certificate of service is prima facie evidence of the facts as set out in the certificate. Thus. 2003. accident. Cruz. 2010 Facts: On July 28. petitioner failed to show that her failure to file an answer was due to fraud. mistake. it is an action in personam. not the whole world. 6 Palma vs. or excusable neglect and then she must show that she has a valid and meritorious defense. the evidence against it must be clear and convincing.

as respondent Agudo was out of the country and the Answer was already due. together with a copy of the amended complaint and its annexes. the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either . Whether or not a petition for certiorari under 65 is proper 2. 2. Rule 14 was not exclusive and maybe effected by other modes of service. speedy and adequate remedy. 16. or plain. or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal. Later. RTC found that while summons was served at Agudo’s house and received by her husband. Two weeks later. A petition for certiorari is proper when any tribunal. were served upon Agudo thru her husband Alfredo. one of which is respondent Agudo. such service did not qualify as a valid service of summons on her as she was out of the country at the time it was served. Rule 41 of the Rules of CivPro states that where a judgment or final order is not appealable. Palma filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint. Agudo’s counsel filed a Notice of Appearance and Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer stating that he was just engaged by Alfredo Agudo. that the service of summons under Sec.negligence and omission for having removed her right ovary against her will. Agudo filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her as she was not property served with summons since she was temporarily out of the country. Palma was doubtful and uncertain that the same was hers as the label therein pertained that of somebody else. the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Issues: 1. RTC granted Agudo’s MTD. counsel again filed a Motion for Another Extension of Time to File Answer. and losing the same and the tissues extracted from her during her surgery. 1. who received and signed the same since Agudo was out of the country. Whether or not there was a valid service of summons on Agudo Held: 1. In civil cases. The RTC’s process server submitted his return of summons stating that the alias summons. Palma thus filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65. praying for inclusion of some nurses. arguing that a substituted service of summons on Agudo’s husband was valid and binding on her. Sec. Palma filed her Opposition to the MTD. Two weeks later. and that although the specimens were subsequently found. board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. stating that the draft answer was finished but would be sent to Agudo for clarification/verification before the Phil. Consulate in Ireland.

INCORPORATED. upon the motion of the respondent. he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. 1999. in the service of summons.250 for two years starting November 7. Petitioners ought to be guided by Rule 15. and object thereto. petitioners appealed MTC’s decision to the RTC but the latter court AFFIRMED the decision of the court a quo. In this regard. Section 2. As a general rule. 1997 up to November 7. 150859 March 28. defendants appeared but because they failed to file their answer to the complaint. respondent filed a case for sum of money and damages in the Municipal Trial Court of Bocaue. MTC ruled in favor of the respondent thereby ordering the petitioners to pay jointly and severally the amount owed plus corresponding interests. LEOPOLDO ROSETE.by the service of summons or by the latter’s voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of the former.R. respondent." Moreover. 2000. a notice is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion. Sometime in November 7. Rule 14 of the Rules of Court CASE NO. he must do so seasonably by motion. summons and copies of the complaint were served on the petitioners and the case was set for hearing by the MTC on September 29. if any. Summons were thereafter served and the case was set for hearing on September 29. ISSUE. thus service of summons on her is governed by Sec. Unhappy of the decision. WHETHER OR NOT THE JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT IS VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONERS WHO WERE NOT SERVED WITH SUMMONS PROPERLY and should thereby be dismissed HELD. The petitioners appeared before the court on the scheduled hearing. 2000. 1997. which provides that "[a]ll motions shall be in writing exceptthose made in open court or in the course of a hearing or trial. Principles of natural justice demand that his right should . with the exception of motions which the court might act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. Petitioners signed a promissory note binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the loan in monthly amortizations of P6. every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. Petitioners thereafter elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on a petition for review. Agudo was a Filipino resident temporarily out of the country at the time of the service of summons. as evidenced by their signatures in the minutes. Their voluntary appearance cured the defect. 7 G. FACTS. When a defendant voluntarily appears. As the records would show. the lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. Petitioner. BALIKATAN KILUSANG BAYAN SA PANANALAPI. 2000. On the scheduled hearing. Leopoldo Rosete. 16. vs. Felina Victoria and Cristeta dela Cruz as co-makers. the court declared them in default and thereafter allowed the presentation of respondent’s evidence ex-parte on October 6.000 with the other petitioners Edgardo Santos. The CA dismissed the petition. petitioners should be reminded of the provision in the Rules of Court that a defendant’s voluntary appearance in an action shall be equivalent to service of summons. petitioner Florentino Gonzales obtained a loan of P150. Further. No. When petitioner Gonzales failed to pay despite repeated written demands. 2005 FLORENTINO GONZALES. EDGARDO SANTOS. If he does not wish to waive this defense. FELINA VICTORIA and CRISTETA DELA CRUZ.

By their presence. and assuming in gratia argumenti that the statutory norms on service of summons have not been strictly complied with. For failure of petitioners to submit the corresponding answer. granted private respondent’s motion for execution pending appeal on account of petitioners' failure to post a supersedeas bond. to reiterate. still. Even then. Bulacan. petitioners' counsel moved to re-examine the impugned decision and posed a subsequent bid on appeal to impede immediate execution. Indeed. judgment was rendered pursuant to the rules on summary procedure. JR. FACTS: This is a suit for desahucio (an action for eviction/ejectment) initiated by herein private respondent against petitioners to which the court of origin ordered petitioners to vacate the lot in question. 1993. 73531. and Ricardo delos Santos in Talampas. NICOLAS DELOS SANTOS and RICARDO DELOS SANTOS. CASE NO. vs. it would appear that the recourse pursued by petitioners could elicit a favorable response from the court in as much as the proof of service of the summons upon petitioners does not indicate impossibility of personal service. Petitioners' mental distress started when private respondent. DOLORES DELOS SANTOS. Nicolas. HON. petitioners sought to reconsider on the principal thesis that they were never served notice of the conciliation meeting at the barangay level. Upon appeal. Moreover. JUDGE CAMILO MONTESA. does not appear to be the situation here. the motion to declare petitioners in default was. Upon learning of said decision. Summons was served through the mother of petitioners when the process server was unable to locate Dolores.R. Bustos. the Regional Trial Court presided over by herein respondent judge.not be affected without an opportunity to be heard. and JUANA DELOS SANTOS. In this case. petitioners. Petitioners were not without such opportunity to contest the motion for and the order of default then and there at the trial court. They insist that private respondent was referring to a different piece of realty because petitioners actually occupied a different lot owned by Nicolas delos Santos. April 6. respondents. WHEREFORE. who supposedly owns a lot a portion of which petitioners entered and occupied. as well as the summons. ISSUE: WON the service of summons was strictly complied with HELD: At first blush. The assailed decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Municipal Trial Court of Bocaue. No. Such. 8 G. made in open court and in their presence. lodged the complaint geared towards petitioners' eviction. any defect in form and in the manner of effecting service thereof were nonetheless erased when petitioners' counsel moved to re-examine the impugned decision and posed a subsequent bid on appeal to impede immediate execution. Bulacan are hereby AFFIRMED. Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court since any mode of appearance in court by a defendant or his lawyer is equivalent to service of . such demeanor is tantamount to voluntary submission to the competencia of the court within the purview of Section 23. What the law really eschews is not the lack of previous notice of hearing but the lack of opportunity to be heard. the instant petition is DENIED. a condition precedent for resorting to substituted service. notice to them is fairly constituted. however.

159139 June 15. Petitioners. the question of using the subject ACMs for the ARMM elections is dependent solely on the discretion of the owner. G. INC. 2005.26 a month. technical and legal requirements. that the ARMM elections are slated to be held on August 8. that these machines would deteriorate and become obsolete if they remain idle and unused. which were previously delivered by private respondents. MEGA PACIFIC eSOLUTIONS. "with its quality assurance that it would be fit for use in the elections.991 ACMs." who purportedly supervised all stages of the software development for the creation of the final version to be used in the ACMs." dated December 9. vs. 9. consequently. have unanimously confirmed that this undertaking is in line with the internationally accepted standards for software life cycle processes.summons. Inc. Petitioners assert that there is no longer any live case or controversy to speak of an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination.355. there are in Comelec’s custody at present 1. They argue that the instant Motion is merely a subterfuge on the poll body’s part to resurrect a lost case via a request for an advisory opinion." Private respondents contend that since the subject ACMs have already been delivered to. at "storage expenses of P329.24 annually. particularly the mandatory financial. that. that they are now being stored in the Comelec Maxilite Warehouse along UN Avenue. but also with inexplicable haste and reckless disregard of its own bidding rules and procedures. by way of its Resolution No.460. petitioners further argue that permitting Comelec to use the ACMs would nevertheless allow it to do indirectly what it was not permitted by this Court to do directly. the present Motion claims. Respondents. 6074. without prejudice to Mega Pacific eSolutions.’s claim for damages in the case pending before the RTC of Makati. 2005 Elections in the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). not merely conjectural or anticipatory. FACTS: Before us is the Commission on Election’s "Most Respectful Motion for Leave to Use the Automated Counting Machines in the Custody of the Commission on Elections for use in the August 8. Notwithstanding our Decision and Resolution. the Republic of the Philippines. absent any indication that the appearance of counsel for petitioner was precisely to protest the jurisdiction of the court over the person of defendant. Assuming arguendo that the present Motion might somehow be justified by the government’s fiscal difficulties. and are mandated by RA 9333 to be automated. as far as private respondents are concerned. 2004. .979. and MEGA PACIFIC CONSORTIUM. inter alia. and that. it awarded the Contract for the supply of automated counting machines (ACMs) to private respondents.R. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. No. 2005 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES. Recall that our previous Decision declared COMELEC to have acted with grave abuse of discretion when. on the other hand. It did so. paid for and used by Comelec. that considering its present fiscal difficulties. that the government has no available funds to finance the automation of those elections. obtaining a special appropriation for the purpose is unlikely. or P3. and that Comelec’s allegations in its Motion do not amount to an actual case or controversy that would require this Court to render a decision or resolution in the legitimate exercise of its judicial power. not only in clear violation of law and jurisprudence. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS. CASE NO.. The Motion alleges that "information technology experts. the Republic of the Philippines is now their owner.

granting it would have the effect of illegally reversing and subverting our final Decision. Thomas H. The Motion has not at all demonstrated that technical requirements have been addressed from the time our Decision was issued up to now. these elections are important. any supervening factual or legal circumstances to justify its Motion.. . 2001 FACTS: PH Credit Corp. financial and technical obstacles could be overcome or set aside.R. Indeed. 2004 -. No.an inescapable and immutable fact from which spring equally ineludible consequences -. for sum of money with the RTC. although it professes utmost respect for the finality of our Decision of January 13. the Motion cannot be granted because it is vague. On appeal. COMELEC has simply filed the present Motion asking permission to do what it has precisely been prohibited from doing under our final and executory Decision. CASE NO. The three motions filed by respondent were directed at the acts of execution against his personal properties but respondent realized after that he was being made to answer on the entire liability as a solidary debtor and filed his Omnibus Motion questioning the Writ of Possession and all incident orders and proceedings relevant thereto. Apparently. In fact. the judge declared the previous decision being null and void. Van Sebille and Federico C. Lim. However. it does not contain enough details to enable this Court to act appropriately. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has been barred by the Omnibus Motion Rule in not questioning the joint and solidary nature of his liability in his motions. hence were declared in default. the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision declaring null and void the sale of Faralles properties and that their liability was merely joint and not solidary. still. Plainly stated. they failed to file their answer within the reglementary period. Note that the factual premises and the laws involved in the procurement and use of the ACMs have not changed. much less proven.ISSUE: Whether or not the motion must be denied. If law and jurisprudence bar it from using the subject ACMs during the last elections. But they cannot be more important than the 2004 national elections. without mentioning any specific manner in which the foregoing requirements have been satisfactorily met. Comelec has not even alleged. because his real property was levied and sold despite the previous sale of his personal property. Carlos Farrales. Petitioner filed for a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession and the same was granted. After the decision had become final and executory. Only at this point was he in a position to assert his objections to the auction sale of his real property and to put up the defense of joint liability among all the respondents. why should it even propose to use these machines in the forthcoming ARMM elections? True. Petitioner now claims that the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. our final Decision bars the grant of the present Motion. The court rendered decision ordering defendants being solidarily liable and to pay PH Credit Corp. The Supreme Court held that petitioner’s erred in arguing that respondent’s motions did not question respondent’s liability. This realization dawned on him. properties of defendant Farrales were levied and sold at public auction. After service of summons upon the defendants. Assuming arguendo that the foregoing formidable legal. HELD: No. filed a case against Pacific Lloyd Corp. HELD: YES. COMELEC is merely asking for leave to use the machines. 109648 November 22. 1O PH Credit Corporation vs CA G..

The Court of Appeals could only consider errors raised by petitioner which were limited to the trial court's orders. these objections could not have been deemed waived when he filed his three earlier Motions. Prior to his Omnibus Motion. The CA ruled against Delta. brought an action for a sum of money against Delta in the RTC where Delta was declared in default. ISSUES: 1. respondent was not yet being made to pay for the entire obligation. 11 DELTA MOTORS VS CA AND STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE. and ordered to pay State Investment its total outstanding obligation. No. the judgement of the trial court has did not become executory and has not yet attained finality.Whether or not the Omnibus Motion was valid. State Investment moved for service of the decision by way of publication and execution of the judgment. NO. either personally or by registered mail. To allow Delta's Omnibus Motion which it filed more than eight months from . INC.R. 121075 JULY 24. Delta raised the case to the Supreme Court. That the service by publication did not cure the fatal defect Thus. The issues raised in the Omnibus Motion could have been allowed during the pendency of said case by way of amendments to the petition. Whether or not the summons was validly served to Delta.N. Both Delta and State Investment filed for a motion for reconsideration but the same were denied. The Omnibus Motion Rule requires the movant to raise all available exceptions in a single opportunity to avoid multiple piecemeal objections. hence never became final and executory. 1. his objection to his being made solidarily liable with the other respondents was not yet available to him at the time he filed the Motions referred to by petitioner. which pertained to matters different from those covered by his Omnibus Motion. Not being available.. however. After the finality of the decision in said case. any attempt to introduce or revive the issue had become procedurally impermissible. State Investment appealed to the Supreme Court. HELD: The Court of Appels held that no records shows that a copy of the assailed judgment had been properly served on P. The writ of execution was issued and properties of Delta in Iloilo and Bacolod City were levied upon and sold. Delta filed an Omnibus Motion with the CA but the same was denied. The decision. During the pendency of the case. These were the only errors Delta argued extensively in its brief. 1997 FACTS: State Investment House. due to its earlier dissolution. the objections must have been available to the party at the time the Motion was filed. Delta had been taken over by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the meantime. 2. Inc. Thus. could not be served on Delta. thus rendering the decision null and void. But to apply that statutory norm. However. The Supreme Court held that if Delta intended such orders to be challenged in the CA case. which assumed DELTA's operation upon the latter's dissolution. 2. which the trial court granted. CASE NO. and if this course of action initially proved unavailing then Delta could and should have moved for reconsideration on that aspect. Delta then commenced a special civil action for certiorari with the CA insisting that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant since there was no valid/proper service of summons. G.B. it could have explicitly alleged them as sources of additional causes of action and prayed for the corresponding affirmative relief therefrom.

it would be erroneous to order the cancellation of a bond filed for the discharge of a writ of attachment. the rules mandate that every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.M. HELD: Yes the respondent judge made an erroneous order upon granting the motion for the withdrawal of cash deposit in favour of the plaintiff even before judgment is rendered. 2004 Attys. An administrative complaint was charged against the latter for granting the withdrawal of cash deposit in favour of the plaintiff even before judgement was rendered and for granting another Verified Motion for Reconsideration of the Order declaring plaintiff as non-suited. Paul and Fr. As long as the judgment remains unsatisfied. [38]-28457 entitled Star Paper Corporation vs. Leonardo Eleazar for Sum of Money with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment. respondent should have not acted upon said motion. 1996 . promulgation of the decision or long after finality of said case. For failure of the plaintiff to address the notice of hearing and for the lack of proof of service. Thereafter. 13 PROVIDENT INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES INC. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to the defendants and shall specify the time and date of the hearing. would result in abandonment of sound judicial process. 12 A. ARUGAY vs. Society of St. CASE NO. JULY 26. 119328. Furthermore. without notice to the defendants and despite failure of the plaintiff to set such litigious motion for hearing and contrary to existing laws and jurisprudence which was then granted by the respondent judge. ISSUE: WON the respondent judge’s granting of of the plaintiff’s motion for the withdrawal of cash deposit is a violation of the Rules of Court amounting to gross ignorance of the law/ procedure. DE LA CRUZ JR FACTS: The complainants are counsels for the defendants in Civil Case No. VILLANUEVA-FABELLA and WILMAR T. corruption. The rules on notice of hearing and proof of service should have been observed by both the plaintiff and the respondent judge. No. Judge Lee granted the defendants Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment. A printing machine was levied and delivered to the plaintiff’s warehouse instead of keeping the same in the custody of the sheriff. malice or bad faith which have not been convincingly shown in the instant case for the respondent judge corrected said error by reversing himself before the adverse party incurred any damage. CA AND MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE GR NO. CASE NO. However the latter’s poor judgment fell short of gross ignorance of the law/ procedure since the erroneous act should have been committed with fraud. LEE and Sheriff JUSTINIANO C. The motion and notice shall be served at least three days before the date of hearing and without proof of its service the court cannot act upon it. MTJ-04-1518 January 15. dishonesty. Their clients were served a copy of the complaint and a Writ of Attachment by Sheriff Dela Cruz based on the plaintiffs allegation that the defendants contracted a debt in bad faith with no intention of paying the same. VILMA HILDA D. Judge RALPH S. VS. an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Cash Deposit was filed.

1 million. It then filed an ex- parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession which was granted by the RTC.520. Niño. PARAÑAQUE asked the trial court "should [it] be [so] minded.520. Forthwith.FACTS: PARAÑAQUE filed Civil Case with the RTC of Makati for the expropriation of certain parcels of land located at Likod Ibayo. before transmittal of the entire records to the Court of Appeals. PARAÑAQUE manifested 11 that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case "after November 6.A. PARANAQUE was placed in possession of the lots. Metro Manila. It then ordered the issuance of a writ of execution upon PIRC's filing of a . PARAÑAQUE filed a manifestation calling the trial court's attention to the fact that up to said date. but PIRC refused to sell. Barangay Sto. It also set aside the previous order granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. Ninoy Aquino Avenue. The civil case was then returned to Branch 61 of RTC Makati presided by Judge Gorospe.00. Judge Gorospe. and even assuming otherwise. Parañaque. A day after. presided by Judge Mendiola. or fifteen percent (15%) of P54.800. Barangay Sto. .00 based on the fair market value stated in the tax declarations. was not a motion for execution pending appeal. upon PARAÑAQUE's motion. Branch 133 issued an order denying PARAÑAQUE's "prayer for reversal or second reconsideration contained in its Manifestation but granting PIRC's motion for the issuance of a writ implementing the order to vacate which the court deemed a motion for execution pending appeal. pursuant to Section 19 3 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. PIRC filed a motion for the issuance of a writ implementing the order to vacate and the appointment of a special sheriff. and on even date. Branch 133 of the RTC of Makati denied PARAÑAQUE's motion for reconsideration and directing PARAÑAQUE and its agents to vacate the lots and surrender possession to PIRC within five days from notice. which PARAÑAQUE pointed out. the record of the case had not been transmitted to the CA. no good reason was cited in the motion to justify its grant. being sequestered by the PCGG and involved in a case pending before the Sandiganbayan. 7160. These lots belonged to PIRC and were to be used as the site for a new municipal building. No. the RTC of Makati (Branch 133) gave PARAÑAQUE a period of five days from receipt of the order within which to file its Comment/Opposition to the motion. The RTC of Makati also granted PIRC’s motion for recognition and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction as the lots to be expropriated were in custodia legis. PARAÑAQUE deposited with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) the amount of P8. Jr. Niño. no longer could the court act on PIRC's motion for an order to vacate. Parañaque. PIRC filed an urgent ex parte motion for an order directing PARANAQUE to vacate the lots and surrender them to PIRC. Likod Ibayo. PIRC moved for reconsideration of the order of the RTC of Paranaque that PARANAQUE be ordered to vacate the lots on a number of grounds including lack of jurisdiction because the lots were also subject of an action pending before the Sandiganbayan. to reverse or reconsider its appealed order due to the supervening event of a Sandiganbayan denial of the PCGG motion for reconsideration of its decision lifting the sequestration. hereinafter LGC). 1993 with the perfection of [PARAÑAQUE's] appeal by the filing of its notice of appeal on 27 October 1993 before the 15-day period for appeal expired. Nevertheless. PARANAQUE filed a motion for reconsideration and on the other hand. PARAÑAQUE filed its Notice of Appeal from the order setting aside the grant of the writ of possession and the denial of the motion for reconsideration. The case was eventually assigned to Branch 133 of the RTC of Makati. Ninoy Aquino Avenue." Hence. inhibited himself and ordered the case re-raffled.800. PARAÑAQUE claimed that it offered to buy the property for P54. Branch 133 gave due course to PARANAQUE’s appeal and ordered the transmittal of the entire records of the civil case to the CA for further proceedings.

SC’s examination of PIRC's motion for the issuance of a writ implementing the order to vacate and the appointment of the special sheriff shows that it contained no notice of hearing to PARAÑAQUE. for the issuance of a writ implementing the order to vacate. RULING: 1. the trial court clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion. but before the transmittal of the record of the case to the CA. ISSUES: 1. as the filing of an appeal by a losing party does not automatically divest the adverse party of the right to ask for execution pending appeal. is not notice at all. The notice was a request directed to the Clerk of Court to submit the motion to the court for its consideration and approval immediately upon receipt thereof. dismissing the petition on the ground of forum shopping.Yes. a motion that does not contain a notice of hearing to the adverse party is nothing but a mere scrap of paper. PARAÑAQUE then filed with this Court a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition to annul the orders of the trial court. filed within the period to appeal. the former did. 2. Yes.bond of P1 million. Such a motion cannot be characterized as anything but a motion for execution pending appeal. with or without such comment/opposition. Yet. and not to the parties. A notice of hearing addressed to the Clerk of Court. . WON the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for a writ to implement the order to vacate. The SC referred the case to the CA. much more to bring it to the attention of the Presiding Judge. By overlooking the mandatory rule on notice to the adverse party in Section 2. PARANAQUE moved for reconsideration. WON the trial court had authority to act upon PIRC’s motion for the issuance of a writ implementing the order to vacate. PARAÑAQUE claims in its Memorandum dated 8 December 1995 that the said appeal remained undocketed "pending elevation by the trial court of the complete records to the Court of Appeals notwithstanding efforts made by Parañaque to expedite the appeal. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. PIRC had the right to file a motion for the execution of the order to vacate on or before 6 November 1993. It is settled that a court may take cognizance of a motion for execution pending appeal filed by a party within its period to appeal. and by according value to a mere scrap of paper by "curing" its fatal defect by means of the order to serve as notice to PARAÑAQUE. CA rendered its original decision. and pursuant to Section 2. such may be filed before the expiration of the period to appeal. hereby annulling the order of RTC and permanently enjoining the RTC from further acting in said case. There can be no question as to the trial court's authority to act upon PIRC's motion. and appointed a special sheriff to implement the writ by ejecting PARAÑAQUE from the subject property and placing PIRC in physical possession thereof. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. without prejudice to the final decision in the appeal. despite that. Thus. Worse. Accordingly. 43 The Clerk of Court did not even have the duty to accept it. the trial court's order giving due course to PARAÑAQUE's appeal and for the transmittal of the record of the case to the CA was inconsequential. and the trial court could validly act thereon even after the expiration of the period to appeal or perfection of the appeal. forthwith — on the date the motion was filed — he issued an order giving PARAÑAQUE five days from receipt of the order within which to file its comment/opposition to the motion. for. It was about 2 months before the RTFC transmitted to the CA the records of the case. after which the motion would be deemed submitted for resolution. the latter not only gave it undue attention. CA rendered its amended decision granting the petition for the certiorari and prohibition. 2. a positive duty imposed upon the movant.

8. Accordingly. TRINIDAD. or. Petitioners filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before respondent Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision dismissing the petition and denying the motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction and/or temporary restraining order. 1996] RAMON S. Sec. Petitioners filed a motion for additional time to file answer. Myrna D. hence. or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. they filed a motion for additional time to file answer on 24 February 1993. 118696. instead of entering a special appearance questioning the propriety of the service of summons. respondent FACTS: Private respondents Bertan Press and Antonio J.R. they are deemed to have waived any flaw in the court's jurisdiction arising from a defective service of summons. Mendoza before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. . The decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 18 October 1994 as well as its resolution of 20 January 1995 is AFFIRMED. RTC ruled in favour of private respondent. Secs. No. CASE NO. LIZA O. Orosa. Orosa. 15 . which was beyond the reglementary period. BERTOSO. MENDOZA. COURT OF APPEALS. the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court over petitioners. petitioner. CASE NO.The summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person. upon urgent ex-parte motion by private respondents the trial court declared petitioners in default for failure to answer within the reglementary period. Liza O. . Bertoso filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioners Ramon S. DESTURA and ALFREDO S. they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. OROSA. Costs against petitioners. vs. Consequently. Destura and Alfredo S. 14 [G. 7 and 8 provide - Sec. by tendering it to him. the trial court issued the corresponding summons to be served upon petitioners through their secretary and to Mendoza through his employee. if he refuses to receive it. ISSUE: whether or not there was a valid service of summons to acquire jurisdiction over the petitioners HELD: Jurisdiction was never acquired over them by the lower court. MYRNA D. DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Resultantly. Personal service of summons.however. To these must be added the palpable absence of any good reason to justify execution pending appeal. whatever defect there was in the mode of service of summons was deemed waived and the court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners by their voluntary submission thereto. service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. However. In effect. 7. Hence this petition.If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section.[1] A motion for reconsideration was filed but the same was likewise denied. Trinidad. BERTAN PRESS and ANTONIO J. Substituted service. September 3. OROSA. For. Jose S. JOSE S. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and at the same time filed their answer but the court denied the motion for reconsideration and expunged petitioners' answer from the records. the instant petition is DENIED.

PRIMETOWN PROPERTY G. With the failure of PPGI to redeem the property. the HLURB Arbiter refused to furnish it with such copies and thus prayed for the recall and setting aside of the implementation of the order. INC. SR.AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ. yet the latter proceeded with the public auction where Aguilar was declared the highest bidder. Burgos. the CA did not err in affirming the HLURB’s action.R. PPGI then appealed the decision to HLURB Board of Commissioners. in which the petitioner failed to dispute the authority of the said employee. Thereafter.82.** CALLEJO. After the granting of the writ of possession to Aguilar. PPGI further averred that despite its earnest efforts to secure copies of the aforementioned motion of Aguilar. Cebu City. (PPGI) covering a contract that PPGI should deliver a condominium unit on June 1998 to Aguilar.. HLURB then denied the said motion for reconsideration for lack of merit as it was already enforced and thus rendering it moot and academic..* . Region VII. Aguilar entered into a contract to sell with Primetown Property Group. When PPGI refused.versus . Burgos Street. Aguilar paid by installment the purchase price of the condominium unit in the total amount of P727. Respondents. Believing that PPGI would not be able to deliver the unit to her by June 1998. the sheriff executed a final deed of sale in favor of Aguilar. and where in fact one of its employees has received it. Bel-Air. 3301 in Makati Prime Citadel at P. now petitioner. Further. LYNDON D. she filed a complaint against PPGI for the rescission of the contract to sell and damages with the HLURB. HLURB then rendered its decision in favor or Aguilar. TINGA. motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 2005 FACTS: In 1996. which the latter affirmed and declared final and executory. No. Before the scheduled auction of the said condominium. The HLURB then issued a writ of execution ordering the ex-officio sheriff to execute its decision against PPGI with address at the Penthouse. and Promulgated: TERESA C. Makati City. No. 5007 P. Thus. Two years after the signing of the contract to sell. Inc. where her supposed condominium unit was to be located. J.party claim to the sheriff. Chairman. Aguilar saw that the construction of the building. Present: PUNO. JJ.921. AGUILAR. Based on the records of the HLURB and those of the respondent’s. Century Citadel. JUNTILLA. she demanded in writing the rescission of her contract to sell with PPGI and the refund of what she had paid. CHICO-NAZARIO. the motion for the issuance of the writ of possession is an ex parte motion and thus does not need a notice of hearing nor a hearing per se. PPGI then filed its petition for certiorari with the CA seeking the reversal of the decision of the HLURB in granting the writ of possession to Aguilar. as it is not a litigated motion but only a mode . CA then denied the PPGI’s. the principal office still remained at the old address provided by PPGI. Condominium Unit No. and serving it to the company’s address. June 8. this petition for review. Makati City. Petitioner.. in his capacity as HOUSING AND LAND USE ARBITER of HLURB. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the HLURB’s action in ordering the writ of possession when PPGI was not informed nor duly notified of the hearing on the motion for the issuance of the said writ thereby depriving PPGI with its constitutional right to due process HELD: No. 157801 GROUP. Teresa C. one of which is. had barely even started. Michael OPallick served a copy of his third. PPGI filed a motion for reconsideration with the contention that it was not served with a copy of the motion for the issuance for the writ of possession of Aguilar as it was served in its old office address. where the motions were served. which the latter declared for taxation purposes and has then filed a motion for a motion for a writ of possession to the HLURB. and HON. whose copy was served to the PPGI’s address. The sheriff then levied on the several propertiesof PPGI.

Having earned dividends. No. for brevity) was registered with the SEC on June.. petitioners. YOUNG. FELIX O. Maria Pan Nuy Go Tiong. PPGI. requested Gochan Realty to partition the shares of his late wife by cancelling the stock certificates in his name and issuing in lieu thereof.settled that the procedure in a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession being summary in nature provides a proceeding wherein relief is granted without an opportunity for the person against whom the relief is sought to be heard. at which time all the children had reached the age of majority. Sr. Thus. 16 [G. died. UY. and CECILIA GOCHAN-UY and MIGUEL C. On 16 March 1994. Alice died in 1955. vs. DAVID G. GOCHAN-HERNAEZ. Therefore.. GOCHAN.On 29 March 1994. CRISPO R. The issuance of a writ of possession is not a judgment on the merits. 1951. GOCHAN. Pedro Gochan. [respondents] Cecilia Gochan Uy and Miguel Uy filed a complaint with the SEC for issuance of shares of stock to the rightful owners. GOCHAN.R.Five days later (25 September). MAE GOCHAN-EFANN. mother of [herein respondents]. removal of officers and directors and damages against respondents. Tomasa Gochan. new stock certificates in the names of [herein respondents]. these stocks numbered 179 by 20 September 1979. RICHARD G. it is well. March 12. YOUNG-LLABAN.. John Young Jr. citing as reason. the INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOHN D. (2) the [respondents] [were] not the real parties-in-interest and ha[d] no capacity to sue. leaving the 50 shares to her husband.. A Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated as [sic] real properties of the corporation. there is no need for a hearing of such motion because it is not a litigated motion and that the court may act thereon causing no prejudice to the rights of the adverse party. for themselves and on behalf and for the benefit of FELIX GOCHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION. inherited 50 shares of stock in Gochan Realty from the former. respondent Gochan Realty refused.In 1962. [Respondents] opposed the said motion. MARY G. [herein petitioners] moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that: (1) the SEC ha[d] no jurisdiction over the nature of the action. GOCHAN. 2001] VIRGINIA O.. nullification of shares of stock. MERCEDES R. MARION R. YOUNG. MARIA MERCED R. herein [respondents] Richard Young. YOUNG SR. GOCHAN JR. Sr.On 8 February 1994. YOUNG JR. Mary Young Hsu and Alexander Thomas Young.On 21. Felix Gochan Sr. JOHN D. YOUNG as heirs of Alice Gochan. herein petitioner. the HLURB may grant the motion even in the absence of the judgment obligor.. their father John Sr. FELIX Y. respondents. YOUNG-HSU and ALEXANDER THOMAS G. GOCHAN III. ANGELINA R. John Young. CASE NO. ESTEBAN Y.to inform the party that the writ of execution has not yet been implemented. The writ of possession is but an implementation of the writ of execution. FACTS: Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation (Gochan Realty. and (3) [respondents] causes of action [were] barred by the Statute of Limitations. Esteban Gochan and Crispo Gochan as its incorporators. accounting. DOMINIC Y. [petitioners] filed a Motion for cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens.The motion was opposed by herein [respondents]. GOCHAN. Jane Young Llaban. the Regional Trial Court of Cebu adjudicated 6/14 of these shares to her children. On 17 October 1979. the right of first refusal granted to the remaining stockholders by the Articles of Incorporation. GOCHAN III. Sr. . Alice. David Young. with Felix Gochan. As the court puts it. GOCHAN. GOCHAN JR. [sic] John. reconveyance of property impressed with trust. leaving the shares to the [respondents]. 1990. GOCHAN. 131889.s daughter.. LOUISE Y. JANE G. ALFREDO R. MACTAN REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and FELIX GOCHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION.

No action shall be brought by stockholder in the right of a corporation unless the complainant was a stockholder at the time the questioned transaction occurred as well as at the time the action was filed and remains a stockholder during the pendency of the action. the SEC has no jurisdiction over a controversy wherein one of the parties involved is not or not yet a stockholder of the corporation. 201 SCRA 134]. it has been shown that said complainants ha[d] never been x x x stockholder[s] of record of FGSRC to confer them with the legal capacity to bring and maintain their action. Gochan and the late John D. Admittedly. Branch VIII. granted the motion to dismiss and ordered the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated upon the titles of the corporate lands. who are the children of the late Alice T. but they do not thereby become stockholders of the corporation. through its Hearing Officer. David G.s] shares of stocks form part of his estate which is the subject of Special Proceedings No. x x x.] to have been suffered by complainants as stockholders. Young. the SEC opined: In the instant case. Conformably. the injury [is] perceived[. Further.Conformably. [Young Sr. Young. The complainant heirs succeed to the estate of [the] deceased John D. the SEC. John D. Mary G. As complainants clearly claim[. Young. the case cannot be considered as an intra- corporate controversy within the jurisdiction of this Commission. However. Youngs Sr. Rule III of the Revised Rules of Procedure in the Securities and Exchange Commission provides: Section 5. 4 of the complaint]. CA. The complainant heirs base what they perceived to be their stockholders rights upon the fact of their succession to all the rights. until therefore the estate is settled and the payment of the debts of the deceased is accomplished. Young Llaban. Sr. Young. Moreover. actions for the recovery or protection of the property [such as the shares of stock in question] may be brought or defended not by the heirs but by the executor or administrator thereof. the complaint admits that complainants Richard G.. John D. by the express allegation of the complaint.On 9 December 1994. herein complainants bring this action as [a] derivative suit on their own behalf and on behalf of respondent FGSRC.] the Intestate Estate of John D. Jane G. Sr. which they are not.] as is alleged[. property and interest of their father. Complainants further contend that the alleged wrongful acts of the corporation and its directors constitute fraudulent devices or schemes which may be detrimental to the stockholders. Young. Young. Young. John D. 3694-CEB in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. their right to compel the corporation to register John D. [SEC vs. Derivative Suit. are suing in their own right and as heirs of and/or as the beneficial owners of the shares in the capital stock of FGSRC held in trust for them during his lifetime by the late John D. . the heirs cannot as a matter of right compel the delivery of the shares of stock to them and register such transfer in the books of the corporation to recognize them as stockholders. Sr. In its order. shares of stock in their names cannot go unchallenged because the devolution of property to the heirs by operation of law in succession is subject to just obligations of the deceased before such property passes to the heirs. [par. While their heirship is not disputed. has an interest in the subject matter of the instant case. Young. Sr. Again. Jr. Young. Section 5. Moreover. Young Hsu and Alexander Thomas G.

the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. B. is an indispensable party in the SEC case considering that the individual heirs shares are still in the decedent stockholders name. 77-79. because they were not yet stockholders of the corporation. RULING: 1. Rollo) [Respondents] moved for a reconsideration but the same was denied for being pro- forma. Petitioners further assert that.)Petitioners argue that Spouses Cecilia and Miguel Uy had no capacity or legal standing to bring the suit before the SEC on February 8. 19 SCRA 671.[5] ISSUES: A. among others. because the latter were no longer stockholders at the time. herein respondents then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals.[Petitioners]. On the other hand.The rule is in accord with well settled jurisprudence holding that a stockholder bringing a derivative action must have been [so] at the time the transaction or act complained of [took] place. the stocks had already been purchased by the corporation. thus. It also held that the intestate Estate of John Young Sr. contend that the appeal was 97 days late.that the purchase of her stocks by the . being allegedly a simple contract of sale cognizable by the regular courts. Otherwise stated. Cuaderno. the purchase by Gochan Realty of Cecilia Gochan Uys 210 shares does not come within the purview of an intra-corporate controversy. San Miguel Corporation vs. The appellate court further ruled that the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the titles of the corporate real estate was not justified. 1994. this Petition. 82. its filing tolled the appeal period. 19 Phil.Respondents] appealed to the SEC en banc. As a general rule.[4] Aggrieved. Moreover. (pp. The Court of Appeals ruled that the SEC had no jurisdiction over the case as far as the heirs of Alice Gochan were concerned. the SEC en banc ruled for the [petitioners. it upheld the capacity of Respondents Cecilia Gochan Uy and her spouse Miguel Uy. it declared that respondents Motion for Reconsideration before the SEC was not pro forma. Republic vs. proof of compliance with the requirement must be sufficiently established for the action to be given due course by this Commission. (Pascual vs. Whether or not the Spouses Uy have the personality to file an action before the SEC against Gochan Realty Corporation. on the other hand. Young Sr. was an indispensable party. Hence. On 3 March 1995. The failure to comply with this jurisdictional requirement on derivative action must necessarily result in the dismissal of the instant complaint. contending. Allegedly. beyond the 30-day period for appeals.[8] For purposes of resolving a motion to dismiss. that the SEC ha[d] jurisdiction over the case.] holding that the [respondents] motion for reconsideration did not interrupt the 30-day period for appeal because said motion was pro-forma. Cecilia Uys averment in the Complaint -. a jurisdictional requirement to the filing of the instant action. strict compliance with the terms thereof thus being a condition precedent. Whether or not the intestate estate of John D. Khan. 176 SCRA 462-463) The language of the rule is mandatory. Orozco.

In such instances. Although she was no longer registered as a stockholder in the corporate records as of the filing of the case before the SEC. the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. 2. whether intra-corporate or not. . which also deals with administrators. . the present controversy. the admitted allegations in the Complaint made her still a bona fide stockholder of Felix Gochan & Sons Realty Corporation (FGSRC). it cannot create. is not an indispensable party. do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. Executor or administrator may bring or defend actions which survive. 3. suits for the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased may be brought only by the administrator or executor as approved by the court. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust. states: Sec. [14] The rules relative to this matter do not. in the name of the other heirs of Alice Gochan Young. was not properly represented. while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased. 2. actions for causes which survive. of 6/14th of the shares still registered under the name of John D. make any such categorical and confining statement. reads: Sec. an executor or administrator may bring or defend. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted. Cecilia remains a stockholder of the corporation in view of the nullity of the Contract of Sale. Section 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. the heirs cannot be expected to . Petitioners further claim that the Estate of John Young Sr. no final determination can be had without his estate being impleaded in the suit. Representatives as parties. a guardian. They claim that when the estate is under administration. an executor or administrator. which is cited by petitioner in support of their position. in the right of the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. [9]Thus. or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.corporation was null and void ab initio is deemed admitted. yet no administrator has been appointed. His estate is thus an indispensable party with respect to the cause of action dealing with the registration of the shares in the names of the heirs of Alice. Young Sr. The above-quoted rules. however.) Petitioners contend that the Intestate Estate of John D. It is elementary that a void contract produces no effect either against or in favor of anyone. Section 2 of Rule 87 of the same Rules. in view of RA 8799. It would be useful to point out at this juncture that one of the causes of action stated in the Complaint filed with the SEC refers to the registration. Since all the shares that belonged to Alice are still in his name. modify or extinguish the juridical relation to which it refers.Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity. is no longer cognizable by the SEC.For the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased. Young Sr. as between said parties. In any event. which transferred to regional trial courts the formers jurisdiction over cases involving intra-corporate disputes. as there is no showing that it stands to be benefited or injured by any court judgment.

The DECS Regional Office VII rendered a decision thru Asst. certiorari is the remedy to correct the errors of judgment which are grave and arbitrary and not mandamus. Young Sr. this Court has in previous instances[16] recognized the heirs as proper representatives of the decedent. even when there is already an administrator appointed by the court.R. Supt. and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated. HONORABLE SECRETARY RICARDO GLORIA (DECS). NO. Culture and Sports (DECS) a complaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct against petitioner. VS. CASE NO. we see nothing wrong with the fact that it was the heirs of John D. Said judgment was affirmed by the DECS Central Office. a teacher in Guibuangan Central School. Concillo declaring petitioner guilty of the offense charged and dismissed him from service.wait for the appointment of an administrator. This prompted the petitioner to file a petition for mandamus with the RTC of Cebu.Since the Rules do not specifically prohibit them from representing the deceased. Cebu. Herein respondent referred the motion for comment to the DECS Region VII who sustained the decision of Asst. who represented his estate in the case filed before the SEC. Hence. ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for mandamus filed by the petitioner. Concillo. petitioner filed a case with DCES Central Office a motion for review setting aside/modifying the decision of the DECS Region VII Director. so it denied the motion. 2001 GUALBERTO CASTRO. there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs as the proper representatives of the deceased. Filed with the Department of Education. RESPONDENT. then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased. the instant petition for review on certiorari. for having an illicit affair with the former’s wife. The trial court however dismissed petition on the ground of non exhaustion of administrative remedies and mandamus would be improper if appeal or some other equally adequate administrative remedy is available in the ordinary courts of law. The Rules are to be interpreted liberally in order to promote their objective of securing a just. . For the protection of the interests of the decedent. When no administrator has been appointed. Thus. Supt. Barili. Petitioner later on filed several Motion for Reconsiderations (MR) to incumbent DECS Secretary which were all overlooked. and since no administrator had as yet been appointed at the time of the institution of the Complaint with the SEC. [15] They cannot be interpreted in such a way as to unnecessarily put undue hardships on litigants. However. 17 G. 132174 AUGUST 20. as in this case. FACTS: One Porfirio Gutang Jr. It is clear that the penalty of dismissal from service was erroneously imposed upon the petitioner. speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. PETITIONER.

18 GR No. CASE NO. SPOUSES MA. vs. Truly. the resolution of this case hinges on whether or not the following is a question of law or a question of fact Is dismissal from the service the proper penalty for the offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct? It is settled that for a question to be one of law. BAUTISTA. Among these exceptions are: 1) When the question raised is purely legal. SPOUSES MA. It is settled that non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action. the litigant need not exhaust all administrative remedies before such judicial relief can be sought. But where the case involves only legal questions. HON. 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal. CORAZON D. Undoubtedly. There is a question of fact when the doubt or differences arise as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. Branch 172. 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention. and 10) in quo warranto proceedings. Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. ORETA and CANUTO ORETA. petitioner no longer disputes the administrative finding of his guilt for the offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct.] In the case at bench. respondents. the issue here is a pure question of law. There are instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately. We need only to look at the applicable law or rule and we will be able to determine whether the penalty of dismissal is in order. 2001 SPOUSES MA. the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel. petitioners. He is convinced that the proper penalty for the first offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is only suspension from the service. 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered. ARANZAZU D. . FLORO P. BAUTISTA and PABLO S. DIONISIO. 8) when strong public interest is involved. TIRONA and OSCAR TIRONA. It is settled and final insofar as he is concerned. a petition for mandamus is premature if there are administrative remedies available to petitioner. And the distinction is well known. ALEJO as Presiding Judge. JUANITO IGNACIO and LUIS NUEZ. The doctrine is not absolute. CRISTINA D. in the ultimate. which is one of the grounds allowed by the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. Metro Manila. 7) when there is no other plain. JR. Thus.HELD: Yes. 5) when the claim involved is small.. speedy and adequate remedy. SPOUSES MA. There is a question of law when the doubt or differences arise as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. 129313 October 10. and DEO S. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. PAZ D. BAUTISTA and CESAR BAUTISTA. What petitioner only impugns is the correctness of the penalty of dismissal from the service.

The contract was for 3 years and renewed for another 3 years. FACTS: Petitioner R&M entered into a contract of lease with Pioneer Realty. 19 GR. for the lease of a parcel of land and building in Makati City. The RTC affirmed the dismissal of the case against Ignacio and reversed that of Nuñez. Branch 82 dismissed the ejectment case against Ignacio. this time. 2001 R & M GENERAL MERCHANDISE. YES. Bautista. October 5. petitioner. WON there had been an infraction on the affidavit of non-forum-shopping requirements. However. stealth or strategy. the appeal of respondents and petitioners were properly consolidated. Months before the expiry of the five year contract. COURT OF APPEALS and LA PERLA INDUSTRIES. On appeal to RTC. Wherefore. Petitioner could not have been unaware that the possession of subject fishponds was in issue under the DARAB as they were parties therein. Petitioner even filed a complaint for specific performance in Quezon City for respondent to let them renew as what they claim to have been agreed upon by both parties orally. Prior to these suits. namely Branch 81 and 82. respondents. INC. Private respondent filed for unlawful detainer before the MeTC of Makati City which . MeTC Branch 81 ruled in favor of petitioner. petitioners sued private respondents. The pending suit under the DARAB bars the filing of the civil cases of the petitioners against respondent due following the concept and principle of litis pendentia that no party is allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter and cause of action. respondent and petitioner entered into a lease contract again. thereby ordering respondent Nuñez to vacate the said properties with damages and other fees. Later after the expiration of the renewed 3 years. CASE NO. The contract provides that in case a party do not wish to renew the contracrt anymore. the petition is denied.FACTS:On March 25. 144189. Respondent sent several demand letters but petitioner refused to vacate the premises. Later. Ignacio and Nuñez for ejectment in separate branches of MeTC of Valenzuela. Petituioner on their appeal regarding Ignacio’s case pointed out the errors of the lower court.. Pioneer was merged with respondent LA Perla who agreed to enter another lease contract with petitioner on the same property subject of the first lease. there is already a pending case in the Department of Agrarian Reform filed by respondents seeking for tenancy rights. No. vs. HELD: YES. Infraction on the affidavit of non-forum-shopping was present. petitioner sent a notice of non-renewal to respondent who claims to have an option to renew. Petitioners allege that respondents unlawfully entered there fishpond lots and occupied the same by means of force. ISSUE: WON the pendency of the suit filed by private respondents in the DAR proscribes the institution of the ejectment cases.. Respondents argued that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the case as no evidence of prior possession was presented by petitioners and the latter filed already the same case in the DARAB as it is an agrarian dispute. INC. for five years. 1996. Respondent Nuñez was alleged to have occupied a house belonging to Deo Dionisio and Ignacio on the house of Sps. a 45-day written notice must be accomplished.

20 (G. but was similarly dismissed. CASE NO. Hence. for violation of Art. causing the company’s operations and production severely paralyzed. nonetheless persisted with their illegal activities. 139068. is for recovery of possession. Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration but were denied by the NLRC. who filed with the management of Pinakamasarap Corporation (respondent company). Petitioners answered with motion to dismiss. Both parties filed a petition for certiorari. the Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to reinstate to their former positions. On petitioner’s motion. the petition. No. The Labor Arbiter declared the forfeiture/ loss of employment status of the union officers. Respondent claimed that petitioner union members & officers abandoned work and picketed. SY TIAN TIN. respondents. al .(c) that the judgement which may be rendered in one would amount to res judicata in the other. there must be (a) identity of the parties. They sought the ouster of Rolando Reyes. The complaint for specific performance in Quezon City prays for the renewal of the contract while the ejectment case herein. The requirements of litis pendentia do not exist between this case and the case filed by petitioner for specific performance in Quezon. The Resolution became final and executory. 282 of the Labor Code and their (CBA).. but ordered their reinstatement. both courts affirmed the decision. favored respondent. Among the supervening events was the hiring by respondent company of new regular employees in place of petitioners. Petitioners appeal to (NLRC). On appeal to the RTC and CA.(b) identity of the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for . PINAKAMASARAP CORPORATION. HELD: NO. Jan 16. NILO LETADA. respondent filed an appeal to the NLRC praying that the writ of execution be quashed. the Arbiter granted the motion and quashed the alias writ of execution. vs. claiming they left their workplace to testify at a barangay hearing with the permission of respondent company’s Assistant Manager. Thus. respondent Tan. the employees resumed their work. It alleged that there have been supervening events which rendered unjust the reinstatement of petitioners to their former positions. That. Respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practices (ULP) and damages against petitioners. although. Thereupon. For litis pendentia to apply. FACTS: The controversy stemmed from the petition of the union members of the Malayang Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Balanced Food (petitioner union). al. et.R. which uphold the illegality of the strike by petitioners. ISSUE: WON the case must be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia and forum- shopping. . petitioners. company’s Production and Assistant Manager. 2004) MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA BALANCED FOOD. et. Thus litis pendentia nor forum shopping does not apply.

COURT OF APPEALS. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. integration. Congress enacted R.A. 21 (G. should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. including the payment of their salaries. administration. 5 setting forth the guidelines and procedures in the implementation of Section 7 of R. SO ORDERED. the judgment of the court.A.R. 1988. the same court disregarded the doctrine of res judicata. SEC. On May 26. OF EDUCATION. No. the issue of whether petitioners should be reinstated to their former positions despite the finding that they have participated in an illegal strike or walkout may no longer be relitigated. CULTURE AND SPORTS ET. Clearly. . separation. allowances and other fringe benefits as well as those provided by local government. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari. No. CASE NO. there should be an end to litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject.The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the final and executory Decision of the NLRC. Secretary Quisumbing issued DECS Order No. WHEREFORE. Truly. The Labor Arbiter is ordered to implement the alias writ of execution with dispatch. Indeed. City of Legaspi The Court held that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or an opportunity for such trial has been given. It vests in the Department of Education. renaming. Culture and Sports (DECS) the establishment. Hence. the petition is GRANTED. HELD: The Court of Appeals declared that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it declared the strike illegal but ordered the reinstatement of petitioners. 412. ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it declared the strike illegal but ordered the reinstatement of petitioners. 124204. it modified the NLRC Decision reinstating them to the service by declaring that they have lost their employment status. converting the Cebu School of Arts &Trade into the Cebu State College of Science and Technology (CSCST) including Abellana National School and all other Schools in Cebu City. once it is fully and fairly adjudicated. 6655. No. this petition for review on certiorari. The CA upheld the illegality of the strike by petitioners. April 20. the Appellate Court modified what should otherwise have been an irreversible Decision. Applying the said doctrine. however. The NLRC remanded the case to the Arbiter for immediate implementation of the alias writ of execution. The assailed Decision and of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. MANALO. ET.AL FACTS: The Congress enacted Batas Pambansa Blg. In Stilianopulos vs. AL VS. as long as it remains unreversed. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. supervision and control of all public secondary schools and public secondary teachers and other school personnel. 2001) NORMA V. conversion. or the Free Public Secondary Education Act of 1988. 6655.

prohibition and/or injunction will not lie against the herein respondents. Res judicata means a matter adjudged.A. No. Respondent Bacalso filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata. Hence it dismissed the petitioner’s complaint. The MOA is based on R. entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the CSCST. Abucay and other CSCST faculty members filed with the RTC Cebu another petition for Declaration of Nullity of the MOA with preliminary injunction and restraining order. 1993. 5 for being issued not in accordance with law. On February 4. Cebu City. as well as the funding of its operation. failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to state a cause of action. However. 412. The CA also dismissed petitioner’s complaint. The trial court. janitor and other personnel of CSCST filed with the RTC Cebu a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of MOA with Preliminary Injunction. The Court further states that R.A. Bonilla and other superintendents of CSCST filed with the RTC. 1990. 6655 modified/ repealed BP 412. are valid and legitimate acts of the Secretary of Education. The appeal to the Supreme Court from one of these decisions was dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata is meritorious. a thing or matter settled by judgment. Corolarilly.A. a thing judicially acted upon or decided. registrar. On May 1992. as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose. Respondent insisted that the case repeated the very same issue already decided three times by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. facilities. Petitioners Manalo. On Oct. Plaintiff Romeo Reyes filed with the RTC Cebu a complaint for TRO enjoining defendants from enforcing or implementing DECS Order No. The MOA provided for the Transfer of the secondary education program of Abellana College of Arts and Trade (ACAT). It ruled that DECS orders implementing R. the trial court dismissed the complaint. librarian. HELD: Yes. questioning the validity of the MOA entered by DECS and CSCST. DECS. which dismissal had become final and executory. The Court finds respondent’s Motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata meritorious. this petition. and gradually phasing out its college offerings or integrating them into the main campus. likewise. Hence. the judgment in the first action is considered conclusive as to every matter offered and received therein. In res judicata. Blg. No. which is a special law. dismissed the petition.A. 6655. But again.P. 6655 which mandated the nationalization of public secondary schools and their transfer to the DECS. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal. its personnel. and other faculty members. a petition for the issuance of preliminary injunction restraining the DECS from continuing with the implementation of the rules and regulations separating the high schools from CSCST. The trial court finds that respondent’s motion to be meritorious. However. Res judicata is an absolute bar to a subsequent . and all other matters that could have been adjudged therein. It also argued that R. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court denied. the trial court dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 6655 is a general law which cannot supersede B.

the Court and the parties are bound by such final decision. HON. which will bar a subsequent action on the same subject matter. and a final judgment in one would constitute res judicata and thus. 1993 which the bank refused due to a restraining order issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). . of subject matter and of causes of action. The judgment of either court will constitute a bar to the other. Respondent averred that such refusal resulted to its prejudice and its joint venture partner. BUENAVENTURA. Rosa Mining Co. 22 G. CEB-11735 and in Civil Case No. All these requisites were present in this case. COURT OF APPEALS and SANTA ROSA MINING CO. petitioners. for the alleged violation of the same right. INC. It has been held that where a litigant sues the same party against whom the same action or actions. and an individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause.. 13562 were faculty members and personnel of the CSCST. 143556 March 16. (d) there must be between the first and second actions. vs. would cause the dismissal of the rest.R. No. Inc. identity of parties. It is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the parties over a subject fully and fairly adjudicated. it would result in the re- litigation of the same cause involving the same issues. there will be no end to litigation. otherwise. filed before the RTC Quezon City a complaint for sum of money and damages against petitioners Philippine Commercial International Bank alleging that it lost income opportunity from its joint venture with Sa Amin sa San Jose Panganiban. 2004 EQUITABLE PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK and RAFAEL B. They represented the same interest in both actions which referred to the nullity of the MOA. and the enforcement of the same relief are still pending. and its requisites are: (a) the former judgment or order must be final. WHEREFORE. 1993. parties. respondents. the defense of litis pendentia in one case is a bar to the other. the petition is hereby DENIED and the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.. CASE NO. "Under the principle of res judicata. there is substantial identity in the cause of action and relief sought. FACTS: Sta. Inc. Lota.. (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties. The parties in Civil Case No. Respondent alleged that it opened a savings account with the said bank and informed the latter of its intention to convert its account into a savings/current/time deposit account and sought to obtain checkbooks pursuant thereto on October 26. As observed by the appellate court. The order is conclusive on the validity of the Memorandum of Agreement. the bank manager was guilty of misrepresentation as verification with SEC showed that the bank received the SEC order on October 27.action for the same cause. Sa Amin. Respondent alleged that in refusing to issue checkbooks. If allowed. (b) the judgment or order must be one on the merits. and subject matter.

Q-95-25073 should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Q-95-25073 should be dismissed on the ground of res judicata. 6014. Q-95-25073. No. Rosa is guilty of forum shopping. 2. Issues: 1. it elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition and upheld the order of garnishment of the Daet court. the relief being founded on the same facts. At any rate. For a charge of forum shopping to prosper. Rosa is defending its right as a debtor in a collection case where petitioners are the intervenors. Due to conflicting claims. The respondent’s allegations would suffice to constitute a cause of action against petitioners. prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals. which seasonably set aside the order of default of the lower court and directed the latter to admit petitioners’ Answer and proceed to hear the case on the merits. (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari. Rosa is asserting its right as a depositor to file a damage suit against the defendant. Whether or not Civil Case No. The two proceedings are far from identical. There is no identity of parties since the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 33674 on the grounds that Sta. and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will. regardless of which party is successful.R. In Civil Case No. RTC denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss. now petitioner bank. Rosa is the plaintiff while petitioners are the defendants. Q-95-25073. 6014 as a forced intervenor when the Daet court ordered the continuation of garnishment of the funds despite the TRO and preliminary injunction issued earlier by the SEC. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration whereas Sta. Rosa filed a motion to declare petitioners in default for failure to file their Answer. in Civil Case No. Whether or not Civil Case No. while in Civil Case No. Later petitioners became involved in Civil Case No. Sta. On the other hand. RULING: 1. Neither is there identity of rights asserted or relief sought. Branch 39. 6014. there must exist between an action pending in one court and another action before another court: (a) identity of parties. 6014. the parties represented different interests in these cases. No. Sa Amin. Apparently. Rosa has lost all rights over the funds deposited under its Savings Account since the same had already been garnished by RTC. SP No. amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. Sa Amin. 2. is not a party in Civil Case No. Rosa was guilty of forum shopping because the amount involved in the case was also the issue filed in RTC Daet Camarines Sur and that the complaint stated no cause of action because as judgment debtor in Civil Case No. in favor of the judgment creditor. and 3. Petitioners not satisfied with CA’s decision elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. Q-95-25073. Sta. Sta. matters such as the propriety of refusal to release the funds by petitioners and . or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions. Whether or not Sta. RTC likewise denied the motion for reconsideration and granted petitioners motion to declare petitioners in default. Sta. That petitioners have a valid defense is another matter.Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss CA-G.

mental anguish. The Prosecutors issued a subpoena to Enrile with an order to submit his counter-affidavit to the letter- complaint. For a claim of res judicata to prosper. (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits. Going now to the crux of the petition. there is no identity of parties. as a ground for a motion to dismiss…must appear on the face of the complaint itself. HON. the DOJ headed by Franklin Drilon. Paragraph 14 of the complaint which states: xxx xxx xxx 14. 1991. are matters for trial. the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order. moral shock and social humiliation." . They allege good faith. Enrile argues that a cause of action has been sufficiently pleaded and that the defenses of good faith and performance of official duties are best disposed in a judicial hearing. the fourth requisite is absent. The malicious prosecution. Q-95-25073. On October 8. regularity in the performance of official duties and lack of ultimate facts constituting an actionable wrong. They require evidentiary proof and support that can be better threshed out not upon a motion to dismiss but in a full blown trial on the merits. thereby causing him extreme physical suffering. identity of parties. among others. Enrile filed a Petition for Summary Dismissal of the charge against him. between the two cases. 23 COURT OF APPEALS. 3. They claimed that there was no allegation of any actionable wrong constituting a violation of any of the legal rights of private respondent. ERIBERTO U. Instead of filing his counter-affidavit. G. respondent trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss and requiring petitioners to file their answer and to present evidence in support of their defenses in a full- blown trial inasmuch as the defense of good faith and immunity from suit does not appear to be indubitable. (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. HELD: The petition of Drilon’s group is granted. Hence this petition. Drilon’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. meaning that it must be determined from the allegations of the complaint and from none other. 1990. indeed. As stated earlier. serious anxiety.. 106922 April 20. In the present case. respondents. On the other hand. the actual date of receipt of the restraining order. JR. nay persecution. ROSARIO. CASE NO. the Team of Prosecutors filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on Information charging private respondent with the complex crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder. subject matter and causes of action. Regional Trial Court of Makati and JUAN PONCE ENRILE. and (4) there must be. The infirmity of the complaint in this regard is only too obvious to have escaped respondent judge's attention. Drilon’s group filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure of the Complaint to state a cause of action. subject matter and causes of action between Civil Case No. while the first three requisites may be present. would not yet go into the question of the absence of a cause of action as a ground to dismiss. 1990. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 66. Lack of cause of action. No. Drilon’s group contend that the complaint sets forth no cause of action against them. Res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds that a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. ISSUE: The main question in the instant petition is whether the allegations in the complaint sufficiently plead a cause of action to hold Drilon’s group liable for damages. On February 27. No. 2001 FACTS: After the unsuccessful December 1989 coup d’ etat. On October 9. 6014 and Civil Case No. These matters. Enrile then filed a complaint accusing the petitioners of bad faith in filing the information for rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder.R. of plaintiff for a non-existent crime had severely injured and besmirched plaintiff's name and reputation and forever stigmatized his stature as a public figure. requested for investigation of Juan Ponce Enrile for his alleged participation in the said coup.

and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. namely. Victoriano Baba and Gregorio Baba. The admission does not extend to conclusion or interpretations of law. represented by Attorney-in-fact VIRGINIA SUMALINOG. However. the hypothetical admission is limited to the "relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deductible therefrom. HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO BABA. ANTONIO BABA. BESTRA BABA. 138945. nor does it cover allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice. In the Drilon case. respondents. all surnamed Baba. 24 [G. 3537 is a conjugal property of spouses Raymundo Baba and Dorotea Inot. the withdrawal of the information and the subsequent re-filing of the same do not constitute an actionable wrong inasmuch as the filing or re-filing of an information lies within the discretion of the prosecutor who must act independently of the affected parties. namely. aid in any wise the complaint in setting forth a valid cause of action against the petitioners. as correctly pointed out by the petitioners. we fail to see any right of the Enrile supposedly violated by the petitioners. CRESENCIA BABA. No. we hold that the said allegations still fail to maintain a cause of action against Drilon’s group. a cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created. Victoriano and Gregorio sold said property to petitioner Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation (Gochan Realty) which thereafter entered into a joint venture agreement with Sta. notwithstanding the obvious insufficiency of the complaint against them. the rule admits of an exception. To reiterate. However. as in the case at bar. the aggrieved party may assail the order of denial on certiorari. CASE NO. It does not." Private respondent claims that an appeal or an original action for certiorari is not the proper remedy for a defendant whose motion to dismiss has been denied by the trial court for the reason that the order does not terminate the proceedings. In its decision affirming the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. for the development. therefore.R. vs. The remedy of a party whenever the complaint does not allege a cause of action is to set up this defense in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. 29 In the case at bar. Antonio and Petronila. Dorotea. FACTS: Lot No. Likewise. LUCIA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. Lucia Realty and Development Corporation Inc. where the denial of the motion to dismiss by the trial court was tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 2003] FELIX GOCHAN AND SONS REALTY CORPORATION and STA. 24 CASE NO. 1966. and PETRONILA BABA. Thus. Maricel. of said lot into a subdivision. After Raymundo died. On December 28. the appellate court sustained this contention. Respondents Bestra. filed a complaint for quieting of title and reconveyance with damages against petitioners with . A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. an extrajudicial settlement of his estate was executed among the heirs of Raymundo. Nowhere in the statute books is a prospective accused given the right to be notified beforehand of the filing of an information against him. nor finally dispose of the contentions of the parties. Dorotea Inot and his 2 children. August 19. Crecencia.petitioners. we also held that the denial by the trial court of the motion to dismiss of herein petitioners based on the same grounds as in the instant petition constituted grave abuse of discretion for the reason that "this (private respondent's baseless action) would unjustly compel the petitioners to needlessly go through a protracted trial and thereby unduly burden the court with one more futile and inconsequential case. However.is a mere conclusion of law and is not an averment or allegation of ultimate facts. MARICEL BABA. A wide breadth of discretion is granted in certiorari proceedings in the interest of substantial justice and to prevent a substantial wrong. (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right." 32 The appellate court therefore erred in not ruling that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion when the latter refused to dismiss the case as against herein petitioners.

The case involved a fraudulent sale and extrajudicial settlement of a lot executed without the knowledge and consent of some of the co- owners.the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City alleging that said transaction was fraudulent and is void because they never consented to the said sale and extrajudicial settlement. Applying Article 1410. 108991 March 20. ISSUE: WON respondents complaint is dismissible on the ground of prescription and laches. This is based on the principle “Nemo dat quod non habet” which means No one can give more than what he has.R. its elements must be proved positively. CASE NO. which led to the issuance of a certificate of title in the name of Gochan Realty. warranting presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or has declined to assert it. as in a motion for reconsideration. Assuming that the allegations in respondents complaint are true. Laches No. this petition. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of sale. Trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the parties’ pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred. What is essential only is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period. or where a defendant has been declared in default. CA reversed the decision. The latter denied the allegation and filed its answer raising as Special and affirmative defense and motion to dismiss on the ground that the action had prescribed. by exercising due diligence. The dismissal of the complaint on the ground of laches is premature. the dismissal of respondent’s complaint on the ground of prescription was erroneous. No. Laches is defined as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time. Laches is evidentiary in nature which could not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and cannot be resolved in a motion to dismiss. RULING: 1. or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense. B. was without their knowledge or consent. which is alleged by the petitioner that due to threat and intimidation employed during the Marcos regime caused them to sell the property to the respondent. Trial court denied the petition. RTC dismissed respondents’ complaint on the ground of prescription and laches. Hence. 3537. -Case remanded to RTC for trial and judgement on the merits. as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings. Though laches applies even to imprescriptible actions. Hence. A. and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss. or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits. their claim that the execution of the extrajudicial settlement and the deed of sale involving Lot No. On appeal. Hence the petition. to do that which. gives rise to an imprescriptible cause of action to declare said transactions inexistent on the ground of absence of legal capacity and consent. reconveyance and damages against herein respondent for the property in dispute. could or should have been done earlier. be otherwise sufficiently and . 25 G. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time. the court stated that a claim of prescription is unavailing where the assailed conveyance is void ab initio with respect to those who had no knowledge of the transaction. Re prescription: No. 2001 WILLIAM ALAIN MIAILHE vs. ISSUE: WON the petitioners action had prescribed HELD: Yes. or even if the defense has not been asserted at all. CA reversed the decision.

Rosa accuses Lota guilty of misrepresentation. Rosa asks for PHP9. INC.238. Sta. enjoining the officers of Sta. Sa Amin.. filed before the RTC of Quezon City Branch 222. 1998 is RESCINDED and AVOIDED. On November 28. October 22. The CA dismissed the petition and upheld the order of garnishment of the Daet court. the RTC of Quezon City denied herein petitioners’ motion to dismiss. GR No. petitioners filed a consolidated Motion to set aside the order of default and for reconsideration. BUENAVENTURA VS.satisfactorily apparent on the record.800. since the same has been garnished by RTC Branch 39. but also to Sta. Sta.00 cash. The next day. and directed the latter to admit petitioners’ Answer. Rosa filed a motion to declare petitioners in default for failure to file their Answer. 26 EQUITABLE PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK. Rosa lost all rights over the funds deposited under the Savings Account. and on October 26.. 2004 FACTS On September 19. 1996. CASE NO. 1995. and SANTA ROSA MINING CO. 1993. On October 21. On October 14. it informed the bank of its intention to convert its newly opened account into a savings/current/time deposit account. On March 5. Also. Sta. a complaint for sum of money and damages against petitioners Philippine Commercial International Bank (now Equitable-PCIB). 1998. Lota (Cubao Branch manager). HON. either in averments of the plaintiff’s complaint or otherwise established by the evidence. Sa Amin. seeking the annulment of the garnishment order issued by the Daet Court. 1995. COURT OF APPEALS. It stated that defiance of the garnishment order caused inconveniences not only to Sa Amin. Rosa. which was denied on June 26. 6014. 1996 for lack of merit. the order of the public respondent dated March 4. filed before the RTC Branch 39. 1995. prohibition and mandamus before the CA. 143556 March 16.35.389. 0453-52672-1 with PCIB Cubao by depositing a check amounting to PHP6. On November 7. 1995. which set aside the order of default of the lower court. and their refusal to release funds caused undue harm and prejudice to its stockholders. and social development projects of its joint venture partner. Rosa from withdrawing the funds deposited under Savings Account No. Petitioners refused to comply with order due to an earlier TRO issued by SEC. petitioners filed for a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal order. in favor of the judgment creditor.00 for total damages. since garnishment would indirectly benefit Sta. Petitioners elevated the matter to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari. which was also denied in an order dated March 4. Petitioners then filed for petition for Certiorari. Rafael B. Rosa was guilty of forum shopping. and Cynthia F. because the amount involved in this case is the same that was involved in Civil Case No. and RAFAEL B. Inc. sought to obtain checkbooks. petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Sta.. whereas Sta. On October 6. plus PHP100. Buenaventura (PCIB’s former President). Rosa opened Savings Account No. . Sta. Sta. and proceed to hear the case on the merits thus. 1996. Rosa. Rosa Mining Co. petitioners filed for Relief from the order of default. The bank refused to issue the checkbooks due to an alleged restraining order issued by SEC.071. that the complaint has no cause of action because as judgment debtor in the aforesaid civil case. 0453-52672-1.

with respect to the issue regarding the entitlement over the savings account. or already resolved adversely. are AFFIRMED. HELD 1. the test of sufficiency of the facts to constitute a cause of action is. Sta. admitting the facts alleged. The refusal of the petitioners to issue checkbooks and to release funds to Sta. simultaneously. Wherefore. and all raising substantially the same issues. or successively. the court can render a valid judgment. the parties represented different interests in these case. and may be entitled to relief. On October 22. there is no identity of parties because the plaintiff in Civil Case NO. Rosa has no cause of action against petitioners. whether or not. On October 21. NO. since the funds in doubt of release were already a subject of litigation in Civil Case No. Rosa is guilty of forum shopping. to wit: (a). respondent conveyed interest to convert said account into a savings/current/time deposit accounts. Rosa prejudiced the latter’s livelihood. Such restraining order was verified to have been received by PCIB only on October 27.ISSUES 1. but was denied allegedly due to a restraining order from SEC. . among other accusations of the respondent. Sta. by some other court. 2. Hence. is not a party in case at bar. and the same essential facts and circumstances. he must have repetitively availed of the several judicial remedies in different courts. the following factual allegations in the Complaint be deemed admitted. 0453-52672-1 was involved in both cases. and for the same cause/s. if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties. NO. Rosa opened a savings account with petitioner PCIB. and the same object. and releasing the funds after the denial of their petition for Certiorari. Rosa cannot file another case for claims of damages involving the same parties. (d). since the latter insisted on acting in good faith. Q-95-25073. must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled. as stated earlier. Sta. Whether or not res judicata is present. Whether or not Sta. 1993. Whether or not Sta. there is no identity of parties. Res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds that a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction. For a party to be guilty of forum shopping. 1993. 2. in which case its claim for damages would be deemed waived. 6014. were it not for the motion for reconsideration filed by SEC. Rosa sought to obtain checkbooks from petitioner bank. Sa Amin. causes of actions and reliefs prayed for are entirely different. the petition is DENIED. subject matter and causes of action between Civil Case No. 1993. the same cause of action. Also. 1999. While the deposit in Savings Account No. all substantially founded on the same transactions.m.. 6014. These allegations would suffice a to constitute a cause of action against petitioners. and that the petitioners may have a valid defense is another matter. The decisions of the Court of Appeals dated November 23. (b). at 1:45p. and Sta. In the cited case. and Civil Case No. in a different court. and (e). (c). 6014. 3. 3. Cubao Branch. If. either pending in. Rosa has established her cause of action.

The mortgage secured the obligation amounting to P250 million of Radiomarine Network. prompting the latter to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage. Hence. It was issued a Certificate of Sale. The Injunction Case . simultaneously or successively. and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court. doing business as Smartnet Philippines. (RMNI). but with different prayers (splitting causes of action. Cause of action is defined as "the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (Injunction Case) On March 15. 2006. to AUB. the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia).CASE NO. Inc. where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). While the Annulment Case was pending. (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer. On June 5." The cause of action in the earlier Annulment Case is the alleged nullity of the REM (due to its allegedly falsified or spurious nature) which is allegedly violative of Goodland’s right to the mortgaged property. There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts.R. the trial court acted favorably on petitioners’ motion and dismissed the Injunction Case with prejudice on the grounds of forum shopping and litis pendentia. 2011 FACTS: Respondent Goodland Company. 191388 March 9. GOODLAND COMPANY. Goodland filed on November 28. Ruling of the Court of Appeals1 (Injunction Case) Goodland appealed the same to the CA. the instant petition. Inc. Before AUB could consolidate its title. the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata). Common in these types of forum shopping is the identity of the cause of action in the different cases filed. INC. RMNI defaulted in the payment of its obligation to AUB. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company: Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer. and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action. 27 ASIA UNITED BANK Vs. G. Goodland then filed a Complaint for the annulment of the REM on the ground that the same was falsified and done in contravention of the parties’ verbal agreement (Annulment Case). 2006 another Complaint to annul the foreclosure sale and to enjoin the consolidation of title in favor of AUB (Injunction Case). HELD: Yes." The different ways by which forum shopping may be committed were explained in Chua v. which was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba on November 23. 2007. which ruled in favor of Goodland and ordered the reinstatement of the Injunction Case in the trial court. ISSUE: WON the successive filing of the Annulment and Injunction Cases constitute forum shopping. Goodland asserted the alleged falsified nature of the REM as basis for its prayer for injunction. the CA promulgated its assailed Decision. The mortgaged properties were sold in public auction to AUB as the highest bidder. all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances. 2009. No. It serves as the basis for the prayer for the nullification of the REM. (Goodland) executed a Third Party Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over two parcels of land in favor of petitioner Asia United Bank (AUB).

the club in practice has not been a corporation. (club). who. vs. who claims to be the club's duly elected president. 2001 FACTS: The respondent spouses Delfino and Helenda Raniel are members in good standing of the Luz Villaga Tennis Clud. partnership or association and its stockholders. there is still forum shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in the two cases are different. members. ASIS. as well as. No. YES. . i. at any rate. no intra-corporate relations can arise as between the respondent spouses and the club or any of its members. Whether or not the SEC has jurisdiction to try and hear the case 2.involves the same cause of action. claims to be its duly elected vice-president and legal counsel. Asis. so long as both cases raise substantially the same issues. The motion was denied by SEC. First we now resolve whether the dispute between the respondents and petitioners is a corporate matter within the exclusive competence of the SEC to decide. filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action. 142924 December 5. Issues:1. what is involved here is the third way of committing forum shopping. They then assert that. While the main relief sought in the Annulment Case (nullification of the REM) is ostensibly different from the main relief sought in the Injunction Case (nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and injunction against consolidation of title). motivated by their own personal agenda to make money from the club. partners.. or officers. the CA. Consequently. VESAGAS. but with different prayers. the SEC does not have the power or authority to inquire into the validity of the expulsion of the respondent spouses. it is not the correct forum to review the challenged act. in conspiracy with petitioner Wilfred D. Stretching their argument further. petitioners insist that since the club. the cause of action which serves as the basis for the said reliefs remains the same — the alleged nullity of the REM. inasmuch as it also invokes the nullity of the REM as the basis for the prayer for the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and for injunction against consolidation of title. Thus. without due process of law. They add that it was only the respondent spouses. the club has already ceased to be a corporate body. who surreptitiously caused its registration with the SEC. by their reckoning is not a corporation. summarily stripped them of their lawful membership. In order that the commission can take cognizance of a case. Vesagas. the controversy must pertain to any of the following relationship: a) between the corporation.e." HELD: 1. respondent spouses filed a Complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). They alleged that petitioner Teodoro B. petitioners put respondent spouses to task for their failure to implead the club as a necessary or indispensable party to the case. In conclusion. CASE NO. Therefore. Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it merely upheld the theoretical power of the SEC Hearing Officer to issue a subpoena and to cite a person in contempt (actually a non-issue of the petition) while it shunted away the issue of whether that hearing officer may hold a person in contempt for not obeying a subpoena where his residence is beyond fifty kilometers from the place of hearing and no transportation expense was tendered to him. petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the SEC lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. As previously held by the Court. Before the hearing. 28 TEODORO B. The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS and DELFINO RANIEL and HELENDA RANIEL G. Hence. and WILFRED D. the present course of action where petitioner alleged that since its (the Corporation) inception in the 1970's. Inc. in turn.R. Thereafter.

It is their addressee. SOFONIAS E. They were issued to the club's secretary. BUENA. 11. ALICIA ASTROLOGO. The other issue is with regard to the alleged oppressive subpoenas and orders issued by Hearing Officer Soller. PASCUAL G. TEMERAS. thus: "SEC. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately. ALECIA J. are likewise stripped of their power to issue subpoenas and contempt orders incidental to the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers. permit or license to operate is concerned. partnership. Purita Escobar. TISBE. CARULLO. DE LA TORRE. DE LOS REYES. vs. or association and the state as far as its franchise. the need to rule on the question of the extent of the contempt powers of an SEC hearing officer relative to his authority to issue subpoenas and orders to parties involved in intra-corporate cases. partners or associates themselves. COLEGADO. MILA G. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. 2005 . the remedy is to implead the non-party. the alleged failure of the respondents to implead the club as a necessary or indispensable party where the Petitioners contend that the original complaint should be dismissed for not including the club as one of the respondents therein. DAVID R. The enactment of RA 8799 mooted this issue as SEC hearing officers. TORIBIO C. LEBRADA A. The so-called oppressive subpoenas and orders were not directed to them. and d) among the stockholders. Purita Escobar. Petitioners' protestation has therefore no legal leg to stand on. LUIS B. Also. CARMELINO M. it taxes our credulity why the petitioners insist in raising this issue in the case at bar. and impugn their validity. c) between the corporation. CANUTO G. or potential witnesses therein has been rendered academic. now bereft of any power to resolve disputes. FELIX B. BUENA. claimed to be necessary or indispensable. in the action. Dismissal is not the remedy for non-joinder of parties. EVANGELISTA. MOISES CRUZ. does not necessarily place the dispute within the loop of jurisdiction of the SEC. LUZMINIDA QUINIQUINI. TABLADA. who can assail their alleged oppressiveness. At any rate. RAMOS. EVANGELISTA. directing her to appear before the Commission and bring certain documents of the club. . Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or relationship of the parties but also the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy. Elementary is the principle that only those who expect to be adversely affected by an order can complain against it.that were supposedly under her possession or control. purportedly without or in excess of authority. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for dismissal of an action.R." 2. EUSEBIA V. Petitioners. April 29. QUINTO. 29 NEMENCIO C. No. TRINIDAD LUMIQUED. & TEODORA C. In light of PD 902-A's repeal. SALVADOR I. RUFINO INFANTE. It is obvious that the petitioners are not the proper parties to assail the oppressiveness of the subpoenas or the orders. Under the Rules. CASE NO. SANTIAGO G. NICOLAS. The fact that the parties involved in the controversy are all stockholders or that the parties involved are the stockholders and the corporation. 157447.

the Complaint stated no cause of action. . an action for declaration of nullity of respondent’s certificates of title on the basis that OCT No. lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party. especially with regard to OCT No. RTC dismissed the case ruling that plaintiffs were not the lawful owners of the land subject of this case. instead of bolstering their case. through the Office of the Solicitor General. 670." While the former refers to a plaintiff’s general disability to sue. then OCT No. on 29 April 1996. the said plaintiffs do not have the legal standing to bring before this Court the instant complaint. 670 was fake and spurious and also Petitioners came by information that respondent was planning to evict them from the Subject Property. Since OCT No. or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case. During said hearing. 670 and all other titles emanating therefrom. Engineer Placido Naval. Two of the petitioners had actually received notices to vacate.Principle laid down by SC: Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights. or does not have the character or representation he claims. evidently states no cause of action. The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of personality to sue. Furthermore. the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party. On the other hand. such as on account of minority. whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint. a supposed expert on land registration laws. incompetence. 670 and all of respondent’s land titles derived therefrom. 1024 in favor of Isabel Manahan Santiago the mother of herein respondent. 670 was genuine and authentic on its face. The whole property covered by OCT No. the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue. 670 was issued pursuant to Decree No. Engineer Naval answered that a parcel of land titled illegally would revert to the State if the Torrens title was cancelled. on the other hand. indefeasible and conclusive against the petitioners and the whole world. Respondent filed his Answer with Prayer for Preliminary Hearing on the Affirmative Defenses. for they did not comply with PD 892. plaintiffs who are on the offensive and relying on their lone expert witness. Rodriguez of the trial court. Petitioners filed with the trial court.in-interest. the same not having been questioned by any party. He pointed out that any action against his certificates of title already prescribed. In response to questions from Honorable Judge Francisco C. and that it was the State. insanity. did not present any evidence but relied on all the pleadings and documents he had so far submitted to the trial court. Respondent. Only now that it is being questioned. Defendants title especially so with the mother title OCT 670 was entered and issued in 1913 or more than Eighty Three (83) years ago. hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. Facts: This case is about the complaint for the declaration of nullity of Original Certificate of Title No. The subject property is a vast tract of lands where the petitioners alleged that they occupied and possessed such parcels. that should file for the annulment or cancellation of the title. on the face thereof. Correspondingly. unwittingly sealed their fate. and thus. Respondent claimed that the petitioners had no legal capacity to file the Complaint. but sad to say. petitioners presented their lone witness. a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest. are incontrovertible. which was issued in 1913 or more than 83 years prior to the filing of the Complaint by the petitioners.

can be subject of prescription. Napoleon C. Petitioners Chan and Co. 30 SUI MAN HUI CHAN and GONZALO CO. the latter. respondents. it does arrive at the same conclusion as the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioners had no personality to file the said action. title and their Complaint was properly dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. CASE NO. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR D. 2004 FACTS: On March 30. Hence the reason of this petition. . MEDALLA. The complaint alleged that on November 14. and their Complaint should be dismissed for not stating a cause of action. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC. or interest in. HON. petitioners failed to pay the monthly rentals due on the leased premises. On July 17. In view of the dismissal of the case on this ground. 1988. private respondent Oscar Medalla filed a complaint before the RTC of Mandaluyong City for collection of a sum of money arising from breach of a contract of lease and damages. When Ramon Chan died. Held: No. Even as this Court agrees with the petitioners that their action was one for removal of a cloud on or quieting of title. According to Article 477 of the Civil Code. Baguio City. Despite several Statements of Accounts sent by Medalla. in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title. specifically where petitioners are in possession of subject land. petitioner Sui Man Hui Chan. the plaintiff. 1999. must have legal or equitable title to. Chan would use the leased premises as a restaurant named "Cypress Inn". Issue: 1. 147999 February 27. G. On various occasions. not being the parties-in-interest. 29 Abanao Street. the real property which is the subject matter of the action. the petitioners lacked the personality to file an action for removal of a cloud on. Medalla as lessor and Ramon Chan as lessee entered into a Lease Contract 3 over a hotel building located at No. continued to deal with private respondent Medalla in all transactions pertaining to the contract. who succeeded him as owner and lessor of the leased premises. without legal or equitable title to the Subject Property. the Subject Property so as to justify their right to file an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title. in his capacity as agent and general manager. The MR of the petitioner are likewise dismissed. Among his heirs is private respondent Oscar Medalla. or legitimate interest in. who continued to operate the restaurant. The contract was neither amended nor terminated after the death of the original parties but was continued by their respective successors-in-interest pursuant to the terms thereof. or quieting of. Whether an action for quieting of title. petitioners failed to pay the rentals due but. he was survived by his wife. Petitioners failed to establish in their Complaint that they had any legal or equitable title to. Napoleon Medalla died. No. Therefore. Petitioner Gonzalo Co was employed by Ramon Chan as the general manager of "Cypress Inn" and acted as his agent in all his dealings with Napoleon Medalla.R. petitioners vs. against petitioners Sui Man Hui Chan and Gonzalo Co. 1996. Whether or not the Petitioner has the capacity to sue 2. it is already unnecessary for this Court to address the issue of prescription of the action.

At any rate. of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered. acts which courts or judges have no power or authority in law to perform. Aggrieved by petitioners’ refusal to pay the amounts owing. Certiorari is not designed to correct erroneous findings and conclusions made by the court. however. . On July 19. Prefatorily. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed serious error in law in affirming the RTC Orders denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for reconsideration. was a successor-in-interest to the restaurant business of the late Ramon Chan. Thus.nonetheless. HELD: No. and vacate the leased premises. The Court of Appeals. we find no merit to petitioners’ contention that they are not real parties-in-interest since they are not parties nor signatories to the contract and hence should not have been impleaded as defendants. affirmed the RTC Orders.4 He further alleged that petitioner Chan. are clearly real parties-in-interest in the case.147. amounting to P610.901. of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Dissatisfied.80 by March 1999. Medalla then asked petitioners to settle the unpaid rentals. which had reached P4. In their Answer to the Complaint.11. but the latter still failed to pay the unpaid rentals. This alone warranted an outright dismissal of the motion for having been filed in contravention of the clear and explicit mandate of Section 1. and it cannot be the proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari. petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a special civil action of certiorari. Private respondent pointed to their continuous dealings with him in all transactions relating to the contract after the death of Ramon Chan and even after the expiration of the Contract of Lease. Under this section. private respondent Medalla instituted Civil Case No. petitioners vacated the premises but without paying their unpaid rentals and realty taxes. they are real parties-in-interest in the case filed by private respondent. MC99-666. together with petitioner Co. They alleged that the late Ramon Chan had paid all the rentals due up to March 15. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling. The function of a petition for certiorari is limited to keeping an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts. 1998. 1999. pay the unpaid real estate taxes. continued to use and occupy the leased premises. petitioners denied owing private respondent the amounts claimed by the latter. hence they are not the real parties-in-interest. Rule 16. The RTC denied petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss. The Court of Appeals stated that the grant or denial of a Motion to Dismiss is an interlocutory order. petitioners filed a Supplemental Answer with Motion to Dismiss alleging that they were neither parties nor privies to the Contract of Lease. Both continued to operate the business after the death of Ramon. Rule 16. It is undeniable that petitioner Chan is an heir of Ramon Chan and. He also found out that petitioners had not paid the realty taxes due on the leased premises since 1991. as the owner of the business and petitioner Co as the agent of petitioner Chan. it bears stressing that petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss was filed after an Answer had already been filed. 9 Here. On January 1999. it is resorted to only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Private respondent filed a Reply and Opposition to petitioners’ Supplemental Answer with Motion to Dismiss dated August 2. notwithstanding that they are not signatories to the Contract of Lease. a motion to dismiss shall be filed within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. Medalla then sent demand letters to petitioners.019. in clear contravention of the aforecited rule. the CA said. 1999. praying for the denial of the Motion to Dismiss for having been belatedly filed in direct contravention of Section 1. petitioners filed their Supplemental Answer with Motion to Dismiss almost two months after filing their Answer.

5. this petition for review. and ROWENA O. Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles against petitioners. ISSUE: WON the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an administrator. EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband ZALDY EVANGELISTA. VERONICA O. ORFINADA. 129008 January 13. are the real parties-in-interest. ALBERTO ORFINADA. petitioner Teodora and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent. Pending such proceeding. LOURDES P. No. The RTC denied the motion on the ground that respondents. but the CA discerned no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the public respondent judge when he denied petitioners motion to set affirmative defenses for hearing in view of its discretionary nature. ORFINADA. petitioner Teodora. as heirs. except improper venue. “Any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule. On November 14. 1995. by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement. RIOFERIO.000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. Petitioners appealed before the CA. On December 1. They also raised the defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings. respondent Esperanza. whom he married in 1960. ORFINADA. respondents discovered that on June 29. ALFONSO JAMES P.R. ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA. 2004 TEODORA A. respondents also filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim. Alfonso P. Orfinada. NANCY P. A motion for reconsideration was also denied. WHEREFORE. co- petitioners in this case. It must be stressed that the holding of a preliminary hearing on an affirmative defense lies in the discretion of the court. may be pleaded as an affirmative defense. 1995. Apart from the respondents. ALFONSO ORFINADA. COURT OF APPEALS. HELD: Yes. ORFINADA. the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour. Respondents also found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan of P700. 1995. died without a will leaving several personal and real properties. Petitioners filed their Answer interposing the defense that the property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to the properties originally belonging to the parents of Teodora and the titles thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them in his name. ORFINADA and ANGELO P. Petitioners vehemently fault the lower court for denying their motion to set the case for preliminary hearing on their affirmative defense that the proper party to bring the action is the estate of the decedent and not the respondents. respondents FACTS: On May 13. UNGOS. respondent Alfonso Clyde filed a Petition for Letters of Administration praying that letters of administration encompassing the estate of the decedent be issued upon him. the instant petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. He also left a widow. petitioners vs. Sec. Hence. They had seven children. 31 G. CHRISTOPHER P. Jr. CASE NO. and their children. assisted by her husband BEDA UNGOS. Petitioners moved for its reconsideration but was likewise denied. and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had . 1995. Rule 16 provides that. Corresponding certificate of titles were issued to them.

the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777. After some further exchange of opposition between petitioner and respondent. except improper venue. 5.No. the third being when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case. It denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. Assuming that it was expired. LAGUNA vs COURT OF APPEALS and JESUS GARCIA G. Therefore. this petition. and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated. the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. Even if there is an appointed administrator. Section 5. Petitioner reply to respondent and thereby respondent filed Motion for Preliminary Hearing as the Dismiss has been Filed" on the ground that complaint states no cause of action. the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property of the estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three exceptions. Pending the filing of administration proceedings. then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased.” The provision is clearly indicative of the optional character of the preliminary hearing. RULING: Yes. The Court of Appeals found out that MTC acted with serious abuse in discretion which is tantamount lack of excess of jurisdiction to issue a writ of execution pending appeal. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. Rule of the Rules of Court pertinently provides: Sec. CASE NO.been filed. The said petitioner alleged that there is no renewal of 25 years lease of contract however. Respondents filed a Notice of Hearing in RTC however petitioner filed Motion for execution pending appeal which was granted by presiding judge and enforce judgment. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. WHEREFORE. Rule 15 of Rules of Courts. with preliminary mandatory injunction in MTC Binan. Private respondent filed in Court of appeals for issuance of writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing that petitioner failed to furnish him a copy of the motion that contrary to Section 6. preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. the petition for review is DENIED. CA said that the error committed by the court . Laguna. Rule 15 of Rules of Court. Hence.Further. The lower court cannot likewise be faulted for recognizing the legal standing of the respondents as heirs to bring the suit. “the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.Any of the grounds for dismissal provides for in this Rule. and (2) when the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of and he is made a party defendant. 32 MUNICIPALITY OF BINAN. indicated thereof the "renewal for 25 years lease of contract”.R. . MTC render its judgment in favor to petitioner ordering respondent to vacate the premises. the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court acted in abuse of discretion for not complying the rules under Section 6. jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions: (1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit. In such instances. L-94733 FACTS: The petitioner herein filed a civil case against respondents for unlawful detainer.” Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced. private respondents opposed to petitioner contending that the 25 years lease of contract had not yet expired.

CASE NO. only the facts alleged in the complaint. L-27187..respondent Judge committed an error in conducting a preliminary hearing on the private respondent's affirmative defenses. It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action. the question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself. L-29098. ET AL. VICENTA UROTIA. Said court then issued an order. CFI issued a notice to the parties. Hence. on December 18. 1967. hence decided jointly.. Capital Insurance & Surety Co. On October 24. Counsel for the appellant received. The issue rather is: admitting them to be true. for failure to prosecute on the part of said appellant. failed to appear at said pre-trial. however. from the aforementioned mortgage. seeking a) to prevent the foreclosure of a mortgage on several parcels of land they claim to own in common with the defendants. appealed to the CFI of Manila. On July 2. for their truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion. 1967. must be raised as defenses and await the trial. Whether those allegations are true or not is beside the point. and d) the collection of certain sums of money allegedly due from the defendants. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. lack of cause of action The determination of sufficient of cause of action can be trace out only in allegation in the complaint and no other should be consider. No. as heir of JUANA BIBERA. 1962. of the said personal. vs. There were 24 defendants under the original complaint. 1971 ANTONIO MONTEJO and CONSOLACION BIBERA. advising them that the appealed case had then been docketed in said court. A case was filed for the collection of a sum of money before the City Court of Manila against defendants Arcellana and the Capital Insurance & Surety Co. the court dismissed the case for failure of the plaintiffs to comply with said order. . which was amended to include 20 additional defendants.R. plaintiffs Montejo and Bibera filed a complaint with the CFI of Leyte. Inc. c) the release.. defendants-appellees. L-27187 July 22.. Over two years later. b) to have said parcels of land partitioned among its co-owners.is correctible by ordinary appeal and the failure to state cause of action is not necessary in the case as ruled in "Heirs vs Genato". 33 G. directing the plaintiffs to exert efforts to cause said defendants to be summoned. that is. 1968. In other words. which would require evidence and therefore. the Court dismissed the appeal and the judgment appealed from revived. and no other should be considered. 17 defendants had not been summoned. More a year later. He. plaintiffs-appellants. People's Car Inc. a notice that a pre-trial would be held on January 4. …. The respondent Judge departed from this rule in conducting a hearing and in receiving evidence in support of private respondent's affirmative defense. (and 8 other cases consolidated herein) FACTS: The issues in these nine cases are substantially the same. Inc. the sufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint in order to sustain a dismissal on this ground. No extraneous matter may be considered nor facts not alleged. may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint? Stated otherwise. to determine sufficiency of the cause of action.

Six days before the trial. 29. On August 28. Boquer was declared in default. while Bandayrel and plaintiff Bolivar submitted a written "stipulation of facts and compromise agreement. Republic of the Philippines." The court rendered judgment in favor of Bolivar. plaintiff. 1969. often postponed mostly upon the same ground. the case was. both parties appeared before the court." L-30711.Plaintiffs then filed. After the issues were joined. Defendant filed. The same was several times reset for hearing. the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Maderazo. Thereupon. An action for the recovery of a sum of money against Antonio Buhat. on August 14. On this date. Over five (5) years later. before the Pasay City Court. L-29542. However. On January 23. Both parties were notified that the record of the case had been received by the latter court. However. set for hearing on December 8. 1967 to submit their amicable settlement or a negative manifestation. Bandayrel appealed to the CFI Instance of Manila. his answer with a counterclaim. which set the case for pre-trial on February 22. Said court dismissed the case. the . L-30744. their notice of appeal. to which plaintiff replied. Both parties submitted a motion stating that they are trying to settle the case amicably. which notified the parties that the appeal had been docketed with said court and that the period to file pleadings would commence from receipt of said notice. 1963. on August 3. the case was set for trial. The court granted them until Feb. which both parties moved again to be postponed for the same reason. The case having been dismissed upon the ground of prescription. was instituted in the Municipal Court of General Santos. counsel for the plaintiff-appellee manifested that the defendants have not submitted any proposed settlement terms and moved that the appeal be dismissed. An action to restrain the defendants "from performing any and all acts which will tend to prejudice" the alleged rights of plaintiff Pagadian Iron Mines over a given iron lode claim as well as to recover damages was filed before the CFI of Zamboanga. 1969. the same was cancelled upon motion of the parties who alleged that there are negotiations for amicable settlement. L-29454. After thirteen (13) postponements. the Judge stated that the court will approve the record on appeal. the court ordered the case dismissed "for failure to prosecute. Plaintiffs claim to have later amended the same "by inclusion of all parties in handwriting duly initialed" in the original Record on Appeal. which." A reconsideration of this order was later denied. 1967. 1966. . counsel for the defendants pointed out that its caption did not set forth the full names of all parties. However. plaintiff having done nothing in the meantime. 1967 with an answer to the counterclaim. 1967. on March 31. appeal bond and record on appeal. 1962. was dismissed for lack of cause of action. dismissed it upon the ground of failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the same for an unreasonable length of time. appealed to the Court of First Instance. She filed a complaint before the CFI of South Cotabato. Plaintiff Santos seeks to recover from defendant Taniongon the possession of a parcel of land. appealed to the CFI of Rizal. When the latter was considered for approval. The complaint for reconveyance filed by plaintiffs Gudmalin and Sabijon filed with the CFI of Zamboanga del Sur. on January 30. 1967. The hearing was reset to April 8. which was granted immediately. although without giving respondents the notice required in Section 7 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. the case had been pending for over six (6) years. Maderazo brought an action to recover a sum of money from defendant Lim Lian Khoan. L-30933. the case was ordered dismissed "for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time. An action for the recovery of a sum of money was filed before the City Court of Manila against defendants Bandayrel and Boquer. L-29373.

despite notice given to counsel for Olilang. 1966. 1969. about three (3) years. less than a year.R..INC. as Governor of the Land Authority. THE CAPITAL INSURANCE AND SURETY CO. L-29098. .. and even less than three (3) months. The said counsel alleged that his failure to appear at the pre-trial. Estrella. except appellant in L- 30711. he did not appear before the court on that date. defendant Capital Insurance & Surety Co. This motion was denied. with the CFI of Manila. INC. the orders appealed from in each one of these nine (9) cases are hereby affirmed. Petitioner Olilang filed a special civil action for certiorari. 1967. notice to the effect that a pre-trial would be held on January 4. having been rendered. Olilang's counsel filed a motion for Relief or Reconsideration upon the ground that.. advising them that the appealed case had then been docketed in said court. This dismissal shall have the effect of adjudication upon the merits. in making the memorandum of said hearing. in accordance with said provision of the Rules of Court. or to comply with these rules or any order of the court. the Court refused to disturb orders of dismissal for failure of the plaintiffs to prosecute for a period of four (4) years. Judgment for plaintiff People's Car Inc.. -versus- JOSE ARCELLANA. ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the action due to failure to prosecute is warranted. on September 7. as well as for failure of the plaintiffs to comply. which is the Government. it was held that the dismissal of an action pursuant to this rule rests upon the sound discretion of the court. L-31072." it "depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Defendants.. unless otherwise provided by court. Thus. WHEREFORE. “If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial..” Construing this provision. appellee initiated a case for the collection of a sum of money against defendants JOSE ARCELLANA and THECAPITAL INSURANCE and SURETY CO. On October 24. appealed to the Court of First instance of Manila. 1969. however. instead of February 6. over a year. with costs against the respective appellants. to annul and set aside a decision of respondent Conrado F. and THE CAPITAL INSURANCE AND SURETY CO. but. on September 2. INC. prohibition and mandamus. July 22. or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time." Thus. failed to appear at said pre-trial. Counsel for the appellant received.appeal was dismissed for failure of the plaintiffs to submit an amended record on appeal. after said lot had been allegedly sold to Olilang. the case was dismissed. He. Plaintiff-Appellee. and to require said Governor Estrella to allocate the disputed land to Olilang. Section 3 of Rule 17 reads. 1967. the herein appellant. as Defendant-Appellant. HELD: Yes.34 G. the latter issued a notice to the parties. to private respondent Nocon. As to what constitutes an "unreasonable length of time. 1967. Inc. CASE NO. 1968. for less than two (2) months.. FACTS: On April 20. with an order directing him to file a bill of particulars.. No. 1968. INC. The court issued an order setting the case for hearing on February 6.. on December 18. on January 4. his office secretary had erroneously made the corresponding entry for February 11. 1969. 1967. the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. approving the sale of a parcel of land.. 1971 PEOPLE'S CAR.

or to comply with these rules or any order of the court. If Atty. and that. Appellant was represented by the "Achacoso. Moreover. CASE NO.” As to what constitutes an "unreasonable length of time. or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time. 1940. 1967. in the absence of an order granting said motion for postponement. the Court forthwith ordered the appeal dismissed and the judgment appealed from revived. it was ruled that it "depends upon the circumstances of each particular case". . reads: “Failure to prosecute. for failure to prosecute on the part of said appellant. petitioner filed with the RTC of Paranaque City an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against her husband. or eight (8) days after the scheduled pre-trial. the CFI was correct in dismissing the appeal. Section 3 of Rule 17 of the present Rules of Court. the private respondent herein. Palomares had another case set for trial on January 4. that he had filed. a motion for postponement of said pre-trial upon such ground. the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. appellant's counsel was not justified in assuming that the motion would be granted. any of the three (3) members of the law firm could have and should have appeared at the pre-trial of the case at bar. Sabino P. 139337. although the motion was denied on December 29. unless otherwise provided by court. FACTS: On November 4. August 15. Jr." within the purview of the above-quoted provision. CARMINIA C. Hence. ROXAS. Palomares. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE ANTONIO F. ROXAS.was due to the fact that he then had to attend the trial of another case. on behalf of which Atty. 1968. 1968. -versus- HON. — If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial. which is a reproduction of Section 3 of Rule 30 of the Rules of Court effective July 1. notice of the order to this effect was not received by him until January 12. on December 27." Appellant’s late receipt of the Order denying his of Motion for Postponement which allegedly caused his non-appearance on the date of trial is insufficient to warrant a reversal of the order appealed from. and that "the burden of showing abuse of judicial discretion is upon appellant since every presumption is in favor of the correctness of the court's action. Ocampo and Simbulan" Law Firm. HELD: No. 1997. respondents. had appeared. 2001 MA. 1967. petitioner. that "the sound discretion of the court" in the determination of said question "will not be disturbed. in the absence of patent abuse". 35 GR No. The order appealed from was affirmed. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits. Motions for postponement are left to the sound discretion of the trial court and unless there be an abuse of such discretion the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion. ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI erred in dismissing the appeal based on the ground of failure to prosecute despite the fact that the reason the appellant failed to appear during pre-trial was because the Order for the denial of the Motion for Postponement was received by the latter’s counsel (8) days after the scheduled pre-trial.

On September 28. (2) to re-open hearing on the Motion for Support Pendente Lite. Guerrerro. and (3) to temporarily stay execution of the Orders dated May 19. Private respondent requested that before the omnibus motion is heard the May 19. through his new counsel. private respondent. How. and set the case for pre-trial for the declaration of nullity of marriage on June 15. Meanwhile. the petitioner filed a manifestation and motion praying the trial court to cite private respondent in contempt of court after the latter failed to comply with the said Order dated May 19. September 23. the respondent was again arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Bautista-Ricafort. 1998. he would be cited for contempt of court. 1998 and September 23. within five (5) days from his receipt hereof under pain of legal sanctions if he still fails to do so. The same complaint. 1998.with an application for support pendente lite for their four (4) minor children. private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari questioning the Orders of the trial court dated May 19. Alberto Diaz. 1998. 1998. 1998. 1998 Order. On September 23. the latter’s new counsel refused to proceed with the hearing of his omnibus motion. without prejudice. The case was raffled to Branch 257 of the RTC of Paranaque City presided by Judge Rolando C. 1998. 1998. 1998. 1998. 1998 Order be temporarily suspended. or about four (4) months later. 1998. On October 8. When the presiding judge did not grant that request of private respondent. September 23. 1998 declaring the proceedings on the application for support pendente lite terminated and deemed submitted for resolution. now docketed as Civil Case No. 1998. filed a counter-manifestation and a motion praying that the manner and mode of payment of his contribution to the expenses of his minor children be modified. on November 27. 97-0608. charging the private respondent guilty of Contempt of Court. The omnibus motion was set for hearing on October 2. 1998. through his counsel. Atty. 1998. By virtue of the arrest warrant for being found guilty of contempt of court. considering that summons has not yet been served and no responsive pleading has yet been filed. 1998 of the trial court. The trial court after pre-trial then issued its Order dated May 13. Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued another Order. 1998 and October 8. 1998 but he was released on the following day after the appellate court temporarily enjoined Judge Bautista-Ricafort from enforcing her November 27. Judge Bautista-Ricafort. Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued an Order giving private respondent ten (10) days to comply with the May 19. private respondent was arrested on December 14. After depositing with the clerk of court of the trial court the amount of . It was raffled in due course to Branch 260 of the RTC of Paranaque City presided by Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort. Rule 17. issued an Order granting the application for support pendente lite. otherwise. 1997. 1998. 1998 Order as well as her Orders dated May 19. 1998. When the temporary restraining order lapsed on March 11. pursuant to the provision of Section 1. filed an Omnibus Motion (1) applying to be authorized to discharge Atty. was re-filed on November 25. and October 8. On October 23. Francisco Ma. On May 19. The petitioner thereafter filed in the said RTC Branch 257 a Notice of Dismissal to dismiss the complaint. Atty. Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued an Order directing the private respondent to comply fully with the Order of this Court dated May 19. 1998. On July 22. 1998. of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Private respondent. Alberto Diaz as his counsel and to substitute him with the new counsel.

the private respondent is estopped in questioning the proceedings and orders of Judge Bautista-Ricafort. private respondent was released from custody. the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of private respondent. 2. In the case at bar. 97-0523 before the sala of Judge How upon her institution of a similar action in Civil Case No. upon her filing of a notice of dismissal. For the principle of res judicata to apply. 97-0523 which involves the same parties and issues. subject matter and causes of action. or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. 97-0523. the CA erred in holding the petitioner guilty of forum shopping. 97-0608 were not rendered null and void by the omission of a statement in the certificate of non-forum shopping regarding the prior filing and dismissal without prejudice of Civil Case No. Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure must be so interpreted and applied to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules or procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure considering that it was done before service of answer or any responsive pleading. ISSUE: 1. and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Forum shopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum. He tacitly acknowledged the validity of the proceedings and . On April 21. HELD: 1. No. Neither is there res judicata for the reason that the order of dismissal was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal without prejudice. 97 before the sala of Judge Bautista-Ricafort. and (4) the two actions involve identical parties. Whether or not the CA erred in holding the petitioner guilty of forum shopping for not having mentioned the prior filing and dismissal without prejudice of Civil Case No. The proceedings and orders issued by Judge Bautista-Ricafort in the application for support pendente lite(and the main complaint for annulment of marriage) in the re-filed case in Civil Case No. pursuant to Section 1. (3) the decision is final. the private respondent may question the validity of the proceedings and such decision by Judge Bautista-Ricafort. The appellate court nullified the Orders and the proceedings of the trial court for the reason that the certificate of non-forum shopping of the petitioner did not mention the prior filing of Civil Case No. Yes. (2) by a court of competent jurisdiction. in case the CA erred in holding the petitioner guilty of forum shopping. other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari. Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. there was no adverse decision against the petitioner in Civil Case No.support in arrears stated in the Orders of the trial court. declaring the proceedings/actions taken by respondent Judge on the matter of support pendente lite as NULL and VOID. The dismissal without prejudice of the complaint at the instance of the petitioner was pursuant to Section 1. Whether or not. 97-0523 before the sala of Judge How and the dismissal thereof without prejudice. The dismissal does not amount to litis pendencia nor to res judicata. 2. Section 5. 1999. without prejudice. It exists where the elements of litis pendencia are present. the following must be present: (1) a decision on the merits. There is no litis pendencia since the first case before Judge How was dismissed or withdrawn by the plaintiff (herein petitioner).

the PPA filed its Motion to Dismiss the said complaint based from the said grounds. i. Case No. 36 INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES. The Decision and Resolution dated April 21. 1998 in that he should be allowed to directly pay to the persons or entities to which payments of such expenses are intended in connection with the required support pendente lite of their minor children. But private respondent did not file such a motion based on either of said grounds. 1992 Facts:This case stemmed from the filing of the complaint for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction by the Sharp.000. Branch 260.000. May 19. THE HON. However. petitioner is also a resident of Paraaque where the family of her parents reside. Inc. the trial court dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. COURT OF APPEALS. and the Orders dated May 13. It is also too late for the private respondent to claim wrong venue in the RTC of Paranaque City as alleged proof of forum shopping. The petition for certiorari in the case at bar on the ground of alleged forum shopping in the trial court is premature for the reason that there is an adequate and speedy remedy available in the ordinary course of law to private respondent. so it is deemed waived. Inc. No. The said preliminary injunction was nullified by the Supreme Court on the ground that the Sharp was not a proper party and the petition was premature because it did not exhaust the administrative remedies available to the latter. ET AL. The same ground cannot be raised in a petition for certiorari before the appellate court while the main action in the trial court is still pending for the reason that such ground for a motion to dismiss can be raised before the trial court any time during the proceedings and is not barred by the filing of the answer to the complaint. But he did not.000.000. Razon. The herein Petitioner filed its Answer with Counterclaim against Sharp for its alleged unfounded and frivolous action wherein it had suffered injuries which would amount to more than P10. as in the case at bar. Thus. the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it granted the petition for certiorari filed by herein private respondent.R... Thereafter. 1999 respectively. 1998.the orders issued by the said trial judge by participating actively in the hearing on the application for support pendente lite and by praying for the modification of the Order of May 19. of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED. Inc. the CCTSI filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said order. the filing of this instant petition. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the posting by the Sharp of a bond issued by the Integrated Bonding and Insurance Co. 1999 and July 20. E.. which upheld the lower court’s decision. INC. G. it was appealed before the Court of Appeals.00. the Philippine Port Authority (PPA). in the sum of P10.00.. Where the ground is short of res judicata or litis pendencia. He should have raised that ground in his answer or in a motion to dismiss. not contended with the dismissal of the counterclaim. Besides. The trial court should have been given an opportunity to rule on the matter of alleged forum shopping in consonance with the hierarchy of courts. WON the Petitioner’s counterclaim is compulsory? . a motion to dismiss or a motion for reconsideration on the ground of either litis pendencia or res judicata and a hearing conducted thereon before the trial court. vs. ISSUE:1.. Hence. are REINSTATED. before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. but said motion was denied...e. and the International Container Terminal Services. 90530 dated October 7. 1998 and September 23. against the Secretary of Transportation and Communications. Branch 9. 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City. Thereafter.

without adjudication by the court of the complaint itself on which the counterclaim was based.R. the counterclaim would succeed only if the complaint did not. G. WON the dismissal of the Complaint on petitioner’s own motion operated to also dismiss the counterclaim questioning the complaint? HELD:1. without having to await for the return of the service of summonses. or is necessarily connected with. 2. 2000 Facts: This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Lan Shing Chin and Shin May Wan. and (3) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. COURT OF APPEALS. Thereafter. Secondly. For failing to object when it should have. Furthermore. the compulsory counterclaim was so intertwined with the complaint that it could not remain pending for independent adjudication by the court after the dismissal of the complaint which had provoked the counterclaim in the first place. 37 PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. Petitioner filed a motion for service of summons by publication against the three respondents which was granted by the court and the summonses and . ET AL. to keep its counterclaim alive. Tested by these requirements. Petitioner filed a Motion to Reinstate the Order of Attachment which was opposed by the Private Respondent Kho. As a consequence. Thus. Branch 139. 1990. The said promissory note was renewed once. However. The petitioner itself so denominated it. 125468 dated October 9. the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim. the dismissal of the complaint (on the petitioner’s own motion) operated to also dismiss the counterclaim questioning that complaint. (2) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. dismissing the complaint. Thus. it did not object to the dismissal of the private respondent’s complaint. however. it was denied by the court and ordered the court’s process server to immediately serve the summonses on the other respondents. 2. 1990. only Kho filed an answer to the said complaint. On February 27. During the hearing of the said motion. It is obvious from the very nature of the counterclaim that it could not remain pending for independent adjudication. that is. The Supreme Court consistently held that a counterclaim is compulsory where: (1) it arises out of. which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of summons which was granted by the trial court. however. There is no doubt that the same evidence needed to sustain it would also refute the cause of action alleged in the private respondent’s complaint. But the petitioner itself aborted that effort when it joined PPA in moving for the dismissal of Sharp’s complaint. only private respondent Kho served summons through substituted service considering that the whereabouts of the other defendants were unknown and the corporation had already ceased its operations. since the case was filed by the Petitioner. the summonses remained unserved. one and a half year. No. the court noted that there was no return of service of the summonses to New Cotton.. Thus. Yes. had the counterclaim not been dismissed with the dismissal of the complaint. This case stemmed from the Trial Court’s dismissal of the instant case for failure to prosecute. the petitioner’s counterclaim was clearly compulsory. Case No. the petitioner must now bear the consequences of its own negligence. and instead moving to dismiss the complaint from which the counterclaim derived its life. Kho moved for scheduling of pre-trial conference and thereafter trial. It was alleged by the former that the latter issued a Promissory Note for the said amount which would mature in 55 days. Yes. the petitioner could have introduced evidence to show that it was prejudiced by the filing of the complaint and the obtention of the writ of preliminary injunction by Sharp. Kho filed a manifestation with motion alerting the trial court that the trial had not yet commenced. The Court notes that the petitioner itself joined the PPA in moving for the dismissal of the complaint. the complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court which granted the writ and approved the attachment bond. On July 6. Again. or put passively. knowing that it was the basis of its own compulsory counterclaim. in other words. Private Respondents failed to pay the loans on their due dates.

On November 20. The present case involves as plaintiff/petitioner a prominent bank. 1990. Case No. respondent opposed any further postponements and undue delays and moved for the dismissal of the instant case." While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non-prosequitur. Then. Rule 17 of the Rules of Court on dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute. that employs a staff of lawyers and possesses significant resources. Hence.CA and FILIPINAS MANUFACTURERS BANK G. 1991. Petitioner's counsel inexplicably failed to secure the presence of witnesses when required. in light of the attendant circumstances. result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to present evidence and either in the plaintiff's being non-suited or of the defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex-parte judgment. 38 CONRADO CALALANG vs. 103185 . Undoubtedly. Thus. the real test for the exercise of such power is whether. failed to brief his substitute lawyer. "The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not. the case was set for pre-trial conference on August 13. as held by the trial court and concurred in by the appellate court. the petitioner’s counsel filed a motion for postponement of said scheduled hearings. it trifled with the right of respondent to speedy trial. laxity and truancy which the bank management could have very easily avoided or timely remedied. It cannot plead paucity of means. No. fortune and future depend. 1993. respondent Kho moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to prosecute which was denied by the court. The pre-trial conference took one year and seven months due to Petitioner’s filing of numerous motion for resetting of the said conference. again Petitioner filed an urgent motion to reset scheduled hearings wherein Kho did not object and was granted by the Court with stern warning that should petitioner fail to present its evidence on the scheduled date. the Appellate Court did not err in affirming the trial court’s ruling that the complaint ought to be dismissed was due to failure to prosecute. One's sympathy with the bank and its counsel could not avail against apparent complacency. the dismissal of petitioner's complaint is with prejudice and should have the effect of adjudication on the merits. to declare the dismissal in this case without prejudice would open the floodgate to possible circumvention of Section 3.R. Even before the trial began. the Supreme Court find that. Hence. failed to timely move for reconsideration. failed to appear during pre-trial and trial duly set. 15. plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. The Court upon finding no merit in the reasons for postponement issued an order dismissing the complaint. 1993. under the circumstances. For failure to diligently pursue its complaint. in the conduct of a litigation. if at all possible. however.a copy of the complaint were published in The Philippine Star. if not delinquency. in the present case. Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals but the said Decision was affirmed by the latter. 20 and 27. including legal talent it could retain. It would frustrate the protection against unreasonable delay in the prosecution of cases and violate the constitutional mandate of speedy dispensation of justice which would in time erode the people's confidence in the judiciary. It also sorely tried the patience of the court and wasted its precious time and attention. Deferment of the proceedings may be allowed or tolerated especially where the deferment would cause no substantial prejudice to any party. These are acts of negligence. the filing of this petition. Lastly. the latter would consider petitioner’s right to present evidence deemed waived. and failed to diligently pursue the service of summonses. five years have been an unreasonably long time for a defendant to wait for the outcome of a trial which has yet to commence and on which his family. ISSUE:1) WON the appellate court err in affirming the trial court's ruling that the complaint ought to be dismissed was due to failure to prosecute? Should the dismissal be with or without prejudice? HELD: 1) No. on January 18. the final setting of presentation of petitioner’s evidence was scheduled on July 13. failed to seasonably appeal. Now. Postponements should not be allowed except on meritorious grounds. Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration. almost a month from the said dismissal.

without plaintiff having taken positive steps to prosecute the same. 1985. respondent bank. are DENIED for lack of merit.January 22. filed by defendant Arca. on March 6. filed a motion for alias summons. It appears that this case has been set several times for pre-trial (November 29. 1980. dated May 31. 1987 and February 27. the Motion for Bill of Particulars was granted. petitioner Calalang moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that respondent bank failed to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time. Respondent bank then moved for the issuance of Alias Summons on the said defendants. 1980. When it was informed later on by Judge Alikpala. Considering the judicial reorganization which took place during the pendency of this case and the numerous instances raised by both petitioner and respondent bank as contributing to the delay. HELD: Petitioner’s contention that the fact that respondent bank had not caused service of summons on the two other defendants. in his Order dated March 6.1986. Arca. The petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner. November 19. filed a Motion to Dismiss on June 2. 1983. respondent bank moved for the issuance of alias summons on defendant Acropolis Trading Corporation through its President/Director Calalang or through its director Arca. Arca being summoned filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars on June 5. RTC. in compliance therewith. for almost seven years after the complaint was filed on April 29. January 29. On May 8. Defendants' counterclaim is likewise dismissed. 1980. as permitted by the law. RTC issued an order wherein Calalang's motion to dismiss. the Acropolis Trading Corporation and Rio Arturo Salceda. The respondent bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of dismissal to which the CA granted and this case is ordered remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. On March 24. 1987. . Over a year after. 1987. The motion for alias summons was granted. 1987. On May 25. with the CFI. Jr. Salceda and the Acropolis Trading Corp. issued an Order wherein the Court shall not consider defendant Acropolis Trading Corporation as having been properly brought under the jurisdiction of this Court in view of the improper service of summons on said corporation. 1993 FACTS: On April 29. Summons is issued by the clerk of court upon the filing of the complaint. January 14. May 12. respondent Bank filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against petitioner Calalang and 3 other defendants namely. 1986. 1980 indicated "abuse of judicial leniency and tolerance" is bereft of merit. 1981. 1980 and the Counter Manifestation and motion to dismiss dated November 25. 1986. 1987). Acropolis Trading Corporation and Salceda were also summoned but only a clerk-employee of the Acropolis Trading Corporation received the summons while Salceda was no longer residing at his given address. he filed this instant petition with this Court ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Court erred in invoking the liberal application of the rules of procedure in favor of the respondent bank. after having been served with summons on May 19. 1987 that there was an improper service on defendants Acropolis Trading Corporation and Rio Arturo Salceda. 1980. The case had finally been dismissed for failure of plaintiff's (bank) counsel to appear in spite of notice and considering that this case has been pending for seven (7) years.

The acts of the respondent bank do not manifest lack of interest to prosecute. negligent. depriving petitioner of its right to recover the sums it had loaned to the private respondents. Admittedly there was delay in this case.. Subsequently. No. PCI Leasing assailed the above Resolution before the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The appellate court dismissed outright the petition holding that the petition for certiorari was filed out of time. MILAN G. PCI Leasing filed a Notice of Appeal in an attempt to challenge the Order of the RTC. but such delay is not the delay warranting dismissal. The Court held that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. V. when PCI Leasing presented the checks for payment. During the hearing of the motion. Milan. . 151215 April 5. in the absence of proof that it indeed abandoned or intended to abandon its case against petitioner and the other defendants. i. which the RTC scheduled for hearing. The RTC rendered a Resolution dismissing the Notice of Appeal. for being filed out of time RULING: Yes. Their strict and rigid application. PCI Leasing was then compelled to litigate to enforce payment of the total loan obligation. which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. 39 PCI LEASING AND FINANCE INC. PCI Leasing sought a reconsideration of the above Order but was denied. Case No. he was told by the neighbours that the respondents had already transferred to an unknown location. To be a sufficient ground for dismissal. delay must not only be lengthy but also unnecessary and dilatory resulting in the trifling of judicial processes. on the ground that the same was filed beyond the reglementary period. The RTC issued summons to respondents however the summons and the copy of the complaint were returned unserved for the reason that when the process server went to the respondents’ residence. PCI Leasing alleged that it extended loans to respondents for which Deeds of Assignment were duly executed by respondents. 2010 FACTS: The instant case was commenced upon the filing of a Complaint for Sum of Money by petitioner PCI Leasing against respondents Antonio C. assigned and transferred to PCI Leasing the former’s rights to various checks for and in consideration of the amounts obtained. the RTC issued an Order dismissing the case. respondents sold. PCI Leasing filed a Motion for Issuance of Alias Summons. there was no appearance from both counsels of PCI Leasing and respondents. tainted with bad faith or tantamount to abuse or misuse of court processes. must always be eschewed. the same were dishonoured. Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration.R. In the instant case.33.833. the crux of the controversy involves the property of PCI Leasing. It will not serve the ends of substantial justice if the RTC’s dismissal of the case with prejudice on pure technicalities would be automatically upheld by appellate courts likewise on solely procedural grounds.327. Despite repeated demands. which amounted to P2. respondents failed to settle their obligation. Under the terms of the Deeds.e. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition filed by petitioner. unless the procedural lapses committed were so gross. the sum of money supposedly owed to it by the respondents. Milan and Laura M. Accordingly.petitioner cannot now claim that respondent bank's "abuse of judicial leniency and tolerance is the single greatest component of this delay".

does not have the authority to act on any motion of the parties with respect to said case. The respondents on the other hand argues that the instant case is not covered by the rule regarding finality of decisions and orders under the Revised Rules of Court. Blanco. Emilia Gatchialian and Fidel Besarino were the accused in sixteen criminal cases for estafa filed by the private respondents. respondent Antonio stands to be unjustly enriched at the expense of PCI Leasing. 41 G. in view of the failure of the parties to undergo conciliation proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa. Corollarily. No.327.Contrary to the respondents contention. Baares II.33 it loaned to the respondents. 132624 March 13. 101883 December 11. In Jaca vs. CASE NO. Baares. The Regional Trial Court. CASE NO.R. Otherwise stated. 1992 SPOUSES LYDIA VS CA . This motion was granted by the MTC. the only way by which the action may be resuscitated or "revived" is by the institution of a subsequent action through the filing of another complaint and the payment of fees prescribed by law. the judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date set by law. the order of dismissal becomes final and the case may only be revived by the filing of a new complaint or information.R. After dismissal has become final after the lapse of the fifteen-day reglementary period. ISSUE: WON the attainment of finality of the dismissal order bars the herein respondents to file a Motion to Revive the case. thus. Hence. No. this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[38] the Court defined a provisional dismissal of a criminal case as a dismissal without prejudice to the reinstatement thereof before the order of dismissal becomes final or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the offense.After arraignment. Petitioners contend that an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality if not appealed within the reglementary period. Upon failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period of 15 days. the petitoners filed a Motion to Dismiss the aforementioned cases on the ground that the filing of the same was premature. Lilia C.Petitioners further argue that after the order of dismissal of a case attains finality. the court which issued the same loses jurisdiction thereon and. if no motion to revive the case is filed within the reglementary fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration of the courts order. the Court loses jurisdiction and control over it and can no longer make a disposition in respect thereof inconsistent with such dismissal. likewise. an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed. the foregoing rule applies not only to civil cases but to criminal cases as well. The MTC denied such motion but upon Motion for Reconsideration said order was reversed and ordered for the dismissal of the sixteen criminal cases against petitioners without prejudice. This is so because upon attainment of finality of the dismissal through the lapse of said reglementary period. denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Balising FACTS: Petitioners Fidel M. 2000 Baares II vs. Valeriano. The doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error. More than two months later. 40 G.In this instance. the respondents filed a Motion to Revive stating that the requirement of referral to the Lupon for conciliation had already been complied with. the order attained finality. Edgar M. HELD: Yes. Hence. if PCI Leasing would be forever barred from collecting the aforesaid amount.833. PCI Leasing would be left without any judicial recourse to collect the amount of P2.

the failure of the respondents to seek a reconsideration of the dismissal of their counterclaim or to take an appeal therefrom rendered the dismissal final. Both the claims therein of petitioners and private respondent arose from the same contract of lease.FACTS: Nelia Ziaga. Again. The CA reversed such decision holding that the counterclaim is a compulsory one. and here unauthorized sublease of the leased property to a third party. her construction of a concrete wall and roof on the site of a demolished house on the leased premises without the lessor's written consent. emanated from the same contractual relation. and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. the petitioners filed a complaint or recovery of the same amounts involved and alleged in their counterclaims. That contract of lease pleaded by private respondent constitutes the foundation and basis relied on by both parties for recovery of their respective claims. all these requisites are present. or is necessarily connected with. The relationship between petitioners' counterclaims and private respondent's complaint is substantially the same as that which exists between a complaint for recovery of land by the owner and the claim for improvements introduced therein by the possessor. petitioner's counterclaims were for damages for unlawful demolition of the improvements she introduced pursuant to her leasehold occupancy of the premises. to deposit the one month rental and to pay the monthly rentals due. Such dismissal barred the prosecution of their counterclaim by another action. The private respondents argue that the cause of action therein was barred by prior judgment. The rights and obligations of the parties. Private respondent's complaint was for rescission of the contract of lease due to petitioner Lydia Meliton's breach of her obligations under the said contract. as well as their potential liability for damages. are already barred from asserting the same in another action? HELD: 1. (b) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. WON the counterclaims of petitioners are compulsory in nature? 2. as well as for the filing of that civil suit which is contended to be clearly unfounded. The RTC denied private respondents’ motion on the ground that the dismissal of the petitioner's counterclaimsis not an adjudication on the merits as the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the counterclaims for failure of petitioner Lydia Meliton to pay the docket fees. The petitioner denied the allegations and set up three counterclaims for recovery of the value of her kitchenette constructed on the leased parcel of land and which was demolished by private respondent plus the value of the furniture and fixtures purchased for use in the kitchenette. Lydia Meliton. In the instant case. The two actions are but the consequences of the reciprocal obligations imposed by law upon and assumed by the parties under their aforesaid lease contract. the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. hence the said dismissal does not constitute a bar to the filing of the later complaint. Hence. It is a rule that a counterclaim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court . The counterclaims were also dismissed for non-payment of docket fees. having failed to seek reconsideration of or to take an appeal from the order of dismissal of their counterclaims. this petition. A counterclaim is compulsory if (a) it arises out of. On the other hand. as lessee. The trial court dismissed the complaint upon motion of private respondent contending that her cause of action had already become moot and academic by the expiration of the lease contract. Petitioners' right to claim damages for the unlawful demolition of the improvements they introduced on the land was based on their right of possession under the contract of lease which is precisely the very same contract sought to be rescinded by private respondent in her complaint. WON petitioners. Alleged as grounds therefor were said petitioner's failure. 2. ISSUES: 1. herein respondent. filed for the rescission of a contract of lease over a parcel of land with herein petitioner.

In order that a prior judgment will constitute a bar to a subsequent case. However. it may be abated upon a plea of auter action pendant or litis pendentia and/or dismissed on the ground of res judicata. much less the payment of the docket fee. was not adjudicated based on the merits. there is no need to pay docket fees for a compulsory counterclaim. identity of parties. At any rate. and hence. and (4) there must be between the first and second actions. Furthermore.cannot acquire jurisdiction. The dismissal on the first case is without prejudice. (2) the judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. . res judicata will not apply. the ambivalent positions adopted by the lower court can be considered cured by what we have construed as effectively a reservation in its order of dismissal for the filing of a complaint based on the causes of action in the dismissed counterclaims. On that ground. (3) the judgment must be on the merits. the only remedy left for the petitioners was to file a separate action for their claims and to pay the prescribed docket fees therein within the applicable and reglementary period.It must be remembered that the petitioners’ counterclaim were duly set-up but was only dismissed due to non-payment of docket fees. said rule is not applicable to the case at bar. under the Manchester doctrine. Hence. which is what they did in the case at bar in obedience and deference to the judicial mandate laid down in their case. the following requisites must concur: (1) the judgment must be final. Both defenses are unavailing to private respondent.Further. of subject matter. Under the Rules. the Court relaxed the rule on compulsory counterclaims stating that the failure of petitioners to seek reconsideration of or to take an appeal from the order of dismissal of the counterclaim should not prejudice their right to file their claims in a separate action because they were thereby made to understand and believe that their counterclaims were merely permissive and could be the subject of a separate and independent action. and of causes of action. Where a compulsory counterclaim is made the subject of a separate suit. depending on the stage or status of the other suit. the defect cannot be cured by an amendment of the complaint or similar pleadings.