Jalosjos v COMELEC

FACTS
In People v. Jalosjos, Romeo G. Jalosjos was convicted by final judgement of 2
counts of statutory rape and 6 counts of acts of lavisciousness. He was
sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal for each
count, which carried the accessory of perpetual absolute disqualification,
which deprived him of the right to vote or be voted for in any election. Arroyo
issued an order to commute his prison term to 16 years, 3 months, and 3
days. He was then issued a Certificate of Discharge From Prison.
In 2012, Jalosjos applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City but this
was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the Election Registration
Board (ERB) because of his previous conviction. In response, he filed a
Petition for Inclusion the Permanent List of Voters before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Zamboanga City (MTCC). Pending that, he filed a Certificate
of Candidacy seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City in the May 13,
2013 elections. MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion, on the ground of his
perpetual absolute disqualification, which was affirmed by the RTC of
Zamboanga City.
COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution to Cancel and Deny Due
Course the CoC filed by Jalosjos as Mayor due to his perpetual and absolute
disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration
requirement.

ISSUE
- WON COMELEC En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued
motu proprio Resolution, thus violating Jalosjos right to due process
- WON Jalosjos perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective
office had already been removed by Section 40 of LGC.

HELD
This case has already been mooted by the exclusion of petitioner
from the May 13, 2013 elections. The Court decided on this to guide the
bar and the bench.

1. WON COMELEC acted beyond its jurisdiction NO

PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: En Banc usurped the Divisions jurisdiction by
cancelling petitioners CoC through Resolution No. 9615. Constitution
provides that COMELEC En Banc can only decide Motions for Reconsideration.
COURTS ARGUMENT: Constitutional provision only applies in cases where
COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial powers. It cannot be applied when
COMELEC is exercising administrative functions.
Administrative concerned with the work of applying policies and
enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.
Quasi-judicial action, discretion of public administrative officers or
bodies who are required to investigate facts or ascertain existence of
 facts, hold hearings, draw conclusions from them, as a basis for official
action.
In the case at bar, there was no violation of procedural due process since
COMELEC En Banc would be acting in a purely administrative power.
COMELEC En Banc merely performed its duty to enforce and administer
election laws in cancelling Jalosjos CoC on the basis of his perpetual
absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by
his final conviction, in addition to the MTCCs denial of his Petition for
Inclusion, which was rendered final and executory by the RTC.

2. WON Jalosjos perpetual absolute disqualification to run for

elective office had already been removed by the LGC NO.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: The RPC states that perpetual absolute
disqualification includes deprivation of the right to vote in any election for
any popular office or to be elected in such office. On the other hand
according to Section 40(a) of the LGC, those sentenced by final conviction
are disqualified to run for local elective position within two years after
serving sentence. In this regard, Jalosjos argues that the LGC partially
amended the RPC, thus removing his perpetual absolute disqualification.
COURTS ARGUMENT: Section 40(a) should not be deemed to include cases
wherein the law imposes a penalty, either principal or accessory, which has
the effect of disqualifying the convict to run for elective office. This is in
keeping with the rule that one who is rendered infamous by conviction of a
felony, or other base offese indicative of moral turpitude is unfit to hold
public office. In addition, according to the principles of statutory
construction, the LGC is a law of general application and thus must yield to
the more definitive RPC provisions. The only way to remove the accessory
penalty is if it shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. GMAs Order
of Commutation did not expressly remit this penalty.