G.R. No. 30187. November 15, 1928
The contemporaneous
MARCOS YRA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MAXIMO ABANO, respondent.
Gregorio Perfecto and Angeles Arabiran for appellant.
enigno S. Aquino, Cirilo B. Santos and Domingo A. Guevara for appellee.
1.ELECTIONS; "QUO WARRANTO;" MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS;
QUALIFICATIONS OF ELECTIVE MUNICIPAL OFFICERS; ELECTION LAW,
SECTIONS 404, 431, AND 432, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, SECTION
2174, CONSTRUED.A candidate who was elected to the office of municipal
president and who at the time of the election was registered as a voter of Manila
and not of the municipality in which he was a candidate, is nevertheless eligible
to the office, and proceedings in the nature of quo warranto instituted by virtue of
the provisions of section 408 of the Election Law, as amended,. by the vice-
president elect of the municipality, who challenged the right of the municipal
president elect, to the position to which elected on the ground that the municipal
president was ineligible, cannot be successfully maintained.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.The Election Law makes use of the terms "qualified voter
in his municipality," and "qualified elector therein." To be a qualified voter, does
not necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter. It is sufficient for
the candidate to possess all of the qualifications prescribed in section, 431 and
none of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a candidate
failed to register as an elector in the municipality does not deprive him of the right
to become a candidate and to be voted for.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.One may be a qualified voter without exercising the right
to vote. Registering does not confer the right; it is but a condition precedent to
the exercise of the right. Registration regulates the exercise of the right of
suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.The question of residence for the purposes of the
Election Law is largely one of intention.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.In elections, the will of the electorate should be respected
if it be possible to effectuate it.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
construction of the law by the legislative and executive branches of the
Government, while not controlling on the Judiciary, is entitled to respectful
consideration.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J :
These are proceedings in the nature of quo warranto instituted by virtue of the
provisions of section 408 of the Election Law, as amended, in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan by the petitioner, Marcos Yra, the vice-president elect of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, who challenges the right of the respondent, Maximo
Abao, the municipal president elect of Meycauayan, to the position to which
elected on the ground that the respondent is ineligible. The decision in the lower
court, Judge Anastasio R. Teodoro presiding, was in favor of the respondent and
declared the complaint as without merit.
Maximo Abao is a native of the municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the
proper age, he transferred to Manila to complete his education. While temporarily
residing in Manila, Abao registered as a voter there. Shortly after qualifying as a
member of the bar and after the death of his father, Abao returned to
Meycauayan to live. From May 10, 1927, until the present, Abao has considered
himself a resident of Meycauayan. When the 1928 elections were approaching,
he made an application for cancellation of registration in Manila which was dated
April 3, 1928, but this application was rejected by the city officials for the reason
that it was not deposited in the mails on or before April 4, 1928. Nevertheless
Abao presented himself as a candidate for municipal president of Meycauayan
in the 1928 elections and was elected by popular vote to that office.
There can be no uncertainty as to the necessary facts. Undoubtedly, the
petitioner-appellant would be the first to admit them. As addressed, however, to
the decision of the trial court and the facts, the petitioner-appellant assigns and
argues four errors. The first error assigned relates to a technical matter which is
the act of the trial judge in permitting the respondent to retire his second answer.
This, of course, does not constitute either prejudicial or reversible error. Passing
the second error for the moment, the third error assigned is found to assail the
eligibility of the respondent because it is alleged that he had not been a resident
of Meycauayan for at least one year previous to the election. In this connection, it
is sufficient to point out that the question of residence is largely one of intention.
At least since May 10,1927, Abao has been a resident of Meycauayan or more
than the one-year period fixed by the law as a prerequisite to election. The fourth
error assigned is a formal one.
As we see it, the issue in the case is suggested by the second error, and centers
on the alleged non-eligibility of the respondent to hold a municipal office for the
reason that he was not a "qualified voter in his municipality" not a "qualified
elector therein." In this connection, it is well to recall that Abao was registered
as a voter in Manila and not in Meycauayan in June, 1928, when the election was
held. Is this sufficient to nullify his election?
The Election Law, as amended, in section 404 provides that "No person shall be
eligible . . . for any elective . . . municipal office unless, within the time fixed by
law, he shall file a duly sworn certificate of candidacy. Said certificate shall
declare . . . that he is a resident of the . . . municipality, . . . in which his candidacy
is offered; that he is a duly qualified elector therein, and that he is eligible to the
office." The Administrative Code in section 2174, in giving the qualifications of
elective municipal officers, also provides that "An elective municipal officer must,
at the time of the election, be a qualified voter in his municipality and must have
been resident therein for at least one year . . .." Section 431 of the Election Law
prescribes the qualifications for voters, section 432 the disqualifications.
The question before us has arisen in a slightly different form in the other
departments of the Government. In the early days of the Philippine Assembly, the
election of Honorable Fernando Ma. Guerrero as a member of the Assembly from
Manila was contested on the ground that he was not registered in his electoral
district. The Committee of the Philippine Assembly reached the conclusion that
the words "qualified elector" meant a person who had all of the qualifications
provided by law to be a voter and not a person registered in the electoral list
(Taken from Villamor's Tratado de Elecciones, 2d ed., p. 156). So also the
Executive Bureau has been of the opinion that the term "qualified" when applied
to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter
(Executive Bureau Unnumbered Provincial Circulars, May 19, 1925, May 2,
1925, May 7, 1925, cited in Laurel's The Law of Elections of the Philippine
Islands, 1st ed., pp. 32, 33).
Senator Jose P. Laurel in his Law of Elections of the Philippine Islands, pages 32,
33, summarizes the law on the subject in the following language:
"One of the qualifications required by law of a person who announces his
candidacy is that he must be a duly qualified elector. The Executive
Bureau has held that the term 'qualified' when applied to a voter does not
necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter. To become a
qualified candidate a person does not need to register as an elector. It is
sufficient that he possesses all the qualifications prescribed in section
431 and none of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact
that a candidate failed to register as an elector in the municipality does
not deprive him of the right to become a candidate and to be voted for."
It is not at all easy to disregard the forcible argument advanced by counsel for
the appellant to the effect that when the law makes use of the phrases "qualified
elector" and "qualified voter" the law means what it says. It is contended that it
would be an absurdity to hold one a qualified elector who was not eligible to vote
in his municipality. At the same time, the contemporaneous construction of the
law by two departments of the Government one the legislative branch
responsible for its enactment, and the other the executive branch responsible for
its enforcement while not controlling on the Judiciary, is entitled to our
respectful consideration. For the orderly and harmonious interpretation and
advancement of the law, the courts should, when possible, keep step with the
other departments.
But we are not without other authority. The law of Kentucky provided that "No
person shall be eligible to any office who is not at the time of his election a
qualified voter of the city and who has not resided therein three years preceding
his election." One Wood was elected a commissioner of the sinking fund. His
eligibility was protested upon the ground that he was not, at the time of his
election, a qualified voter of the city of Louisville since he had not registered as a
voter in that city. The Supreme Court of Kentucky, considering the law and the
facts in the case of Meffert vs. Brown ([1909], 132 Ky., 201), speaking through its
Chief Justice, held that under the Kentucky statutes requiring officers in certain
cities to be qualified voters, one's eligibility is not affected by his failure to
register. It was said that "The act of registering is only one step towards voting,
and it is not one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter. . . . One
may be a qualified voter without exercising the right to vote. Registering does not
confer the right; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of the right."
It is but fair to say that if the question were strictly one of first impression in this
jurisdiction, we would be more impressed with the potent points made by the
appellant. In view, however, of the authorities hereinbefore mentioned, we are
loath to depart from them, particularly as the language which goes to make up
these authorities, on close examination, is found to rest on reason. The
distinction is between a qualified elector and the respondent is such, and a
registered qualified elector and the respondent is such although not in his home
municipality. Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a
qualification for such right.
It should not be forgotten that the people of Meycauayan have spoken and their
choice to be their local chief executive is the respondent. The will of the
electorate should be respected.
For all the foregoing, we conclude that the decision rendered in the lower court
should be sustained. Accordingly, it will be affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant.
G.R. No. 147066 26 March 2001
AKBAYAN - Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II - Youth, ALYANSA,
KALIPI, PATRICIA Q. PICAR, MYLA GAIL Z. TAMONDONG, EMMANUEL E.
OMBAO, JOHNNY ACOSTA, ARCHIE JOHN TALAUE, RYAN DAPITAN,
CHRISTOPHER OARDE, JOSE MARI MODESTO, RICHARD M. VALENCIA,
EDBEN TABUCOL, petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTION, respondents.
G.R. No. 147179 26 March 2001
MICHELLE D. BETITO, petitioner,
vs.
CHAIRMAN ALFREDO BENIPAYO, COMMISSIONER MEHOL SADAIN,
RUFINO JAVIER, LUZVIMINDA TANCANGCO, RALPH LANTION,
FLORENTINO TUASON and RESURRECCION BORRA, all of the
Commission on Election (COMELEC), respondents.
Election Law; Suffrage; In a representative democracy, the right of suffrage,
although accorded a prime niche in the hierarchy of rights embodied in the
fundamental law, ought to be exercised within the proper bounds and framework
of the Constitution and must properly yield to pertinent laws skillfully enacted by
the Legislature.In a representative democracy such as ours, the right of
suffrage, although accorded a prime niche in the hierarchy of rights embodied in
the fundamental law, ought to be exercised within the proper bounds and
framework of the Constitution and must properly yield to pertinent laws skillfully
enacted by the Legislature, which statutes for all intents and purposes, are
crafted to effectively insulate such so cherished right from ravishment and
preserve the democratic institutions our people have, for so long, guarded
against the spoils of opportunism, debauchery and abuse. To be sure, the right of
suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all absolute. Needless to
say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is
subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our
Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law.
Same; Same; Voters Registration; The act of registration is an indispensable
precondition to the right of suffrage; The State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its
inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of
voters registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and
peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-
election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a
realistic and orderly manner, one which is not indifferent and so far removed from
the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.As
to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned
upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the
process of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise
his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by the fundamental
charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions of Republic
Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voters Registration Act of 1996. Stated
differently, the act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of
suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an
indispensable element in the election process. Thus, contrary to petitioners
argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of
a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as
a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise
of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the
act of voters registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly
and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even
pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a
realistic and orderly mannerone which is not indifferent and so far removed
from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Registration, Defined; Registration is
concededly, by its very nature, a pre-election act.The act of registration is
concededly, by its very nature, a pre-election act. Under Section 3(a) of R.A.
8189, registration, as a process, has its own specific definition, precise meaning
and coverage, thus: a) Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing
of a sworn application for registration by a qualified voter before the election
officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the
book of registered voters upon approval by the Election Registration Board.

Same; Same; Same: Statutory Construction; Rudimentary is the principle in legal
hermeneutics that changes made by the legislature in the form of amendments to
a statute should be given effect, together with other parts of the amended actIt
bears emphasis that the provisions of Section 29 of R.A. 8436 invoked by herein
petitioners and Section 8 of R.A. 8189 volunteered by respondent COMELEC, far
from contradicting each other, actually share some common ground. True
enough, both provisions, although at first glance may seem to be at war in
relation to the other, are in a more circumspect perusal, necessarily capable of
being harmonized and reconciled. Rudimentary is the principle in legal
hermeneutics that changes made by the legislature in the form of amendments to
a statute should be given effect, together with other parts of the amended act. It
is not to be presumed that the legislature, in making such changes, was indulging
in mere semantic exercise. There must be some purpose in making them, which
should be ascertained and given effect.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The best method of interpretation is that which
makes laws consistent with other laws.Every new statute should be construed
in connection with those already existing in relation to the same subject matter
and all should be made to harmonize and stand together, if they can be done by
any fair and reasonable interpretation. Interpretare et concordare legibus est
optimus interpretandi, which means that the best method of interpretation is that
which makes laws consistent with other laws. Accordingly, courts of justice, when
confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile
them instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one against the other. Courts
should harmonize them, if this is possible, because they are equally the
handiwork of the same legislature.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 8 of Republic Act (RA) 8189, providing that
no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty
(120) days before a regular election, applies in the present case, while the
provisions of Section 28 of R.A. 8436 would come into play in cases where the
pre-election acts are susceptible of performance within the available period prior
to election day; Section 28 of R.A. 8436 is anchored on the sound premise that
these certain pre-election acts are still capable of being reasonably performed
vis-a-vis the remaining period before the date of election and the conduct of other
related pre-election activities required under the law.In light of the foregoing
doctrine, we hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present case, for the
purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant
petitions, considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides that no registration
shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days
before a regular election. Corollarily, it is specious for herein petitioners to argue
that respondent COMELEC may validly and legally conduct a two-day special
registration, through the expedient of the letter of Section 28 of R.A. 8436. To this
end, the provisions of Section 28, R.A. 8436 would come into play in cases
where the pre-election acts are susceptible of performance within the available
period prior to election day. In more categorical language, Section 28 of R.A.
8436 is, to our mind, anchored on the sound premise that these certain pre-
election acts are still capable of being reasonably performed vis--vis the
remaining period before the date of election and the conduct of other related pre-
election activities required under the law.
Same; Same; Administrative Law; It is an accepted doctrine in administrative law
that the determination of administrative agency as to the operation,
implementation and application of a law would be accorded great weight.It is
an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the determination of
administrative agency as to the operation, implementation and application of a
law would be accorded great weight considering that these specialized
government bodies are, by their nature and functions, in the best position to
know what they can possibly do or not do, under prevailing circumstances.
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The law obliges no one to perform an
impossibility, expressed in the maxim nemo tenetur ad impossible; It must be
presumed that the legislature did not at all intend an interpretation or application
of a law which is far removed from the realm of the possible.Beyond this, it is
likewise well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible be done.
The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the maxim,
nemo tenetur ad impossible. In other words, there is no obligation to do an
impossible thing. Impossibilium nulla obligatio est. Hence, a statute may not be
so construed as to require compliance with what it prescribes cannot, at the time,
be legally accomplished. To put it differently, it must be presumed that the
legislature did not at all intend an interpretation or application of a law which is far
removed from the realm of the possible. Truly, in the interpretation of statutes, the
interpretation to be given must be such that it is in accordance with logic,
common sense, reasonableness and practicality. Thus, we are of the considered
view that the stand-by power of the respondent COMELEC under Section 28 of
R.A. 8436, presupposes the possibility of its being exercised or availed of, and
not otherwise.
Same; Same; Well-entrenched is the rule that the law aids the vigilant and not
those who slumber on their rights.Petitioners bare allegation that they were
disenfranchised when respondent COMELEC pegged the registration deadline
on December 27, 2000 instead of January 13, 2001the day before the
prohibitive 120-day period before the May 14, 2001 regular elections commences
is, to our mind, not sufficient. On this matter, there is no allegation in the two
consolidated petitions and the records are bereft of any showing that anyone of
herein petitioners has filed an application to be registered as a voter which was
denied by the COMELEC nor filed a complaint before the respondent COMELEC
alleging that he or she proceeded to the Office of the Election Officer to register
between the period starting from December 28, 2000 to January 13, 2001, and
that he or she was disallowed or barred by respondent COMELEC from filing his
application for registration. While it may be true that respondent COMELEC set
the registration deadline on December 27, 2000, this Court is of the firm view that
petitioners were not totally denied the opportunity to avail of the continuing
registration under R.A. 8189. Stated in a different manner, the petitioners in the
instant case are not without fault or blame. They admit in their petition that they
failed to register, for whatever reason, within the period of registration and came
to this Court and invoked its protective mantle not realizing, so to speak, the
speck in their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo accedat curiam. Let no one come to
court with unclean hands. In a similar vein, well-entrenched is the rule in our
jurisdiction that the law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their
rights. Vigilantis sed non dormientibus jura in re subveniunt.
Same; Same; Judicial Review; Certiorari; In the absence of clear showing of
grave abuse of power or discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), the Supreme Court may not validly conduct an incursion and
meddle with affairs exclusively within the province of the COMELEC-a body
accorded by no less than the fundamental law with independence.Under these
circumstances, we rule that the COMELEC in denying the request of petitioners
to hold a special registration, acted within the bounds and confines of the
applicable law on the matterSection 8 of RA 8189. In issuing the assailed
Resolution, respondent COMELEC simply performed its constitutional task to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, inter alia, questions relating to the registration of voters; evidently,
respondent COMELEC merely exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to it
and one which squarely falls within the proper sphere of its constitutionally-
mandated powers. Hence, whatever action respondent takes in the exercise of
its wide latitude of discretion, specifically on matters involving voters registration,
pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. Accordingly, in the
absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion on the part of
respondent COMELEC, this Court may not validly conduct an incursion and
meddle with affairs exclusively within the province of respondent COMELECa
body accorded by no less than the fundamental law with independence.
Same; Same; Mandamus; As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies
only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer
to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to
control the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon
him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is
required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of
the court.
Same; Same; Same; The determination of whether or not the conduct of a
special registration of voters is feasible, possible or practical within the remaining
period before the actual date of election, involves the exercise of discretion and
thus, cannot be controlled by mandamus.Considering the circumstances where
the writ of mandamus lies and the peculiarities of the present case, we are of the
firm belief that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction of this Court, that
they are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively
compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of voters. For the
determination of whether or not the conduct of a special registration of voters is
feasible, possible or practical within the remaining period before the actual date
of election, involves the exercise of discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by
mandamus.
KAPUNAN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Election Law; The standby power of the COMELEC to fix additional dates and
periods for registration under Section 29 of RA. 8646 and Section 28 of R.A.
8436 must be understood in the context of the inadequacy of the registration
period under the law then prevailing, i.e., the period provided in Section 126 of
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) 881, under which provision the registration of voters was
held only on the seventh and sixth Saturdays before a regular election;
Obviously, when Congress prescribed the new system of registration under R.A.
No. 8189, it intended to discard the system set forth in B.P. 881.The standby
power of the COMELEC to fix additional dates and periods for registration under
Section 29 of R.A. 6646 and Section 28 of R.A. 8436 must be understood in the
context of the inadequacy of the registration period under the law then prevailing,
Le., the period provided in Section 126 of B.P. 881. Under this provision,
registration of voters was held only on the seventh and sixth Saturdays before a
regular election. It was in recognition of the insufficiency of the two-day
registration period under Section 126 that Section 29 of R.A. 6646 granted the
COMELEC a standby power to fix additional dates and times for pre-election
activities, including registration. Section 126 of B.P. 881 has, however, been
impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 8189, which prescribes an entirely new system of
registration, and which in fact allows a prolonged period of registration for
potential voters. The implied repeal of Section 126 of B.P. 881 by Sections 7 and
8 of R.A. No. 8189 cannot be gainsaid inasmuch as these provisions speak of
two systems of registration of voters which are obviously inconsistent with each
other. B.P. 881 merely provided for a two-day registration period whereas R.A.
8189 now calls for a prolonged and continuous period of registration (daily during
regular office hours) except during the prohibited period. To uphold the view that
both systems of registration are presently co-existing would give rise to the
absurd situation where potential voters who failed to register daily during regular
office hours before the 120-day period would nonetheless be allowed to register
on the seventh and sixth Saturdays within the 120-day prohibited period.
Obviously, when Congress prescribed the new system of registration under R.A.
No. 8189, it intended to discard the system set forth in B.P. 881.
Same; Statutory Construction; The rule is that a law which treats a subject in
general terms and which does not contradict the provisions of a special statute is
not to be considered as intending to affect the provisions of the latter, unless it is
absolutely necessary to construe it in order to give its provisions any meaning at
all.Section 29 of R.A. 6646 and Section 28 of R.A. 8436 cannot prevail over
R.A. 8189 with respect to the pre-election activity of registration since the latter
deals specifically with registration of voters. The rule is that a law which treats a
subject in general terms and which does not contradict the provisions of a special
statute is not to be considered as intending to affect the provisions of the latter,
unless it is absolutely necessary to construe it in order to give its provisions any
meaning at all. Where a conflict between a general law and a special statute
exists, the latter should prevail because it evinces the legislative intent more
clearly than the general law. The special law is to be construed as an exception
to the general law in the absence of circumstances warranting a contrary
conclusion. Applying the foregoing rule to the cases at bar, since Section 29 of
R.A. 6646 and Section 28 R.A. 8436 do not deal with registration of voters alone,
as in fact the aforementioned provisions speak of pre-election activities in
general, and R.A. 8189 deals particularly with the pre-election activity of
registration, the provisions of the latter regarding registration are controlling.
Same; Suffrage; The right of suffrage is so important that every citizen knows or
ought to know that it is his right, duty and privilege to register and vote, if
qualified.It is an overstatement to say, as petitioners and the Solicitor General
do, that the reason for the disenfranchisement of four million new Filipino
votersa figure not duly establishedwas the alleged absence of a massive was createdfree, orderly and honest elections. Since it is the COMELECs
and active information campaign by the COMELEC for new voters to register.
R.A. No. 8189 providing for continuing registration has been in existence since
June 11, 1996 or for more than four (4) years. Everybody is presumed to know
the law. The right of suffrage is so important that every citizen knows or ought to
know that it is his right, duty and privilege to register and vote, if qualified. The
failure to register lies, perhaps, on neglect, apathy or nonchalance, rather than
the COMELECs alleged lack of information campaign.
Same; Administrative Law; It is elementary in administrative law that courts will
not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the
special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.The functions of
the COMELEC under the Constitution are essentially executive (enforcement)
and administrative (administration) in nature. It is elementary in administrative
law that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
The reason behind this salutary policy has been explained in this manner: The
rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious needs
of a modern or modernizing society and the establishment of diverse
administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates
to accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities by the
administrative agency charged with implementing a particular statute. In Asturias
Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs the Court stressed executive
officials are presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the considerations
pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law, and to have formed an
independent, conscientious and competent expert opinion thereon. The courts
give much weight to contemporaneous construction because of the respect due
the government agency or officials charged with the implementation of the law,
their competence, expertness, experience and informed judgment, and the fact
that they are frequently the drafters of the law they interpret. (Citations omitted)
Same: Same; The determination of the feasibility of conducting a special
registration less than fifty (50) days prior to the regular election must be dealt
with realistically and not from the standpoint of pure theory; Since it is the
COMELECs honest-to-goodness assessment that it cannot undertake the
conduct of special registration without compromising the integrity of the entire
election process, then the Court would do well to respect this administrative
finding of fact.The determination of the feasibility of conducting a special
registration less than fifty (50) days prior to the regular election must be dealt
with realistically and not from the standpoint of pure theory. The COMELEC, not
this Court, is concededly in a better position to resolve this matter considering its
actual experience as well as its knowledge of its own operational and logistical
capabilities. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and
methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the greater objective for which it
honest-to-goodness assessment that it cannot undertake the conduct of special
registration without compromising the integrity of the entire election process, then
the Court would do well to respect this administrative finding of fact.
Same; Same; The Supreme Courts function is merely to check and not to
supplant the COMELEC, or to ascertain merely whether it has gone beyond the
limits prescribed by law, not to exercise the power vested in it or to determine the
wisdom of its act.This pronouncement was reiterated in Loong vs. COMELEC.
Due regard for the independent character of the COMELEC, as ordained by the
Constitution, requires that the Court must not by any excessive zeal compel
that body to perform an act that would imperil the holding of a free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible election on May 14, 2001. This Courts function is
merely to check and not to supplant the COMELEC, or to ascertain merely
whether it has gone beyond the limits prescribed by law, not to exercise the
power vested in it or to determine the wisdom of its act. Clearly, certiorari would
not lie.
PARDO, J., Dissenting:
Election Law; Statutory Construction; It is a basic rule in statutory construction
that laws are to be harmonized rather than consider one repealed in favor of the
otherthere is nothing incongruous in R.A. No. 8189 with RA. No, 6646, Section
29, nor B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 52 [m], as to repeal the latter.It is a basic rule in
statutory construction that laws are to be harmonized rather than consider one
repealed in favor of the other. Besides, there is nothing incongruous in R.A. No.
8189 with R.A. No. 6646, Section 29, nor B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 52 [m], as to repeal
the latter. Neither is there an express repeal of the same. It is a well-settled rule
of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored.
The presumption is against inconsistency or repugnancy and, accordingly,
against implied repeal.
Same: Same; Under the circumstances prevailing, the prohibition to conduct
registration one hundred twenty (120) days before regular election as set forth in
R.A. No. 8189, Section 8, is not an absolute prohibitionit is directory, not
mandatory, and COMELEC is vested with residual power to conduct pre-election
activities, including the registration of voters beyond the deadline prescribed by
law,Under the circumstances prevailing, the prohibition to conduct registration
one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election as set forth in R.A. No.
8189, Section 8, is not an absolute prohibition. It is directory, not mandatory, and
Comelec is vested with residual power to conduct pre-election activities,
including registration of voters beyond the deadline prescribed by law. This is not
to defeat the right of suffrage of the people as guaranteed by the Constitution.
Millions of qualified voters in the country were not able to register before the 120-
day period provided by law because of the failure of Comelec to conduct a
nationwide public information campaign relative to the period provided by law.
The Comelec erroneously perceived that the number of voters, who registered
during the system of continuing registration is the barometer for the success or
effectiveness of their information campaign which was actually non-existent.
Comelec must bear the responsibility for this. Time and again, it has been said
that every Filipinos right to vote shall be respected and upheld. Preliminary as it
is in the exercise of their right to vote, the deprivation of their right to register is
tantamount to the denial of their right to vote.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The term election, in the context of the
Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters,
the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes.In
this jurisdiction, an election means the choice or selection of candidates to
public office by popular vote through the use of the ballot, and the elected
officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate. An election is
the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the
people. Specifically, the term election, in the context of the Constitution, may
refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the
electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes.
BUENA, J.:
At the helm of controversy in the instant consolidated petitions (G.R. No. 147066
and G.R. 147179.) before us is the exercise of a right so indubitably cherished
and accorded primacy, if not utmost reverence, no less than by the fundamental
law - the right of suffrage.
Invoking this right, herein petitioners - representing the youth sector - seek to
direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration
before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21.
According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before
the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under
Republic Act No. 8189 (Voter's Registration Act of 1996).
Acting on the clamor of the students and civic leaders, Senator Raul Roco,
Chairman if the Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and People's
Participation, through a Letter dated January 25, 2001, invited the COMELEC to
a public hearing for the purpose of discussing the extension of the registration of
voters to accommodate those who were not able to register before the
COMELEC deadline.1wphi1.nt
Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Ralph C. Lantion, together with
Consultant Resurreccion Z. Borra (now Commissioner) attended the public
hearing called by the Senate Committee headed by Senator Roco, held at the
Senate, New GSIS Headquarters Bldg., Pasay City.
On January 29, 2001, Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion submitted
Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the Report on the Request for a Two-day
Additional Registration of New Voters Only, excerpts of which are hereto quoted:
"Please be advised that the undersigned attended the public
hearing called by the Senate Committee on Electoral Reforms,
Suffrage and People's Participation presided by the Hon. Sen.
Raul Roco, its Committee Chairman to date at the Senate, new
GSIS Headquarters Building, Pasay City. The main agenda item
is the request by youth organizations to hold additional two days
of registration. Thus, participating students and civic leaders
along with Comelec Representatives were in agreement that is
legally feasible to have a two-day additional registration of voters
to be conducted preferably on February 17 and 18, 2001
nationwide. The deadline for the continuing voters registration
under R.A. 8189 is December 27, 2000.
"To address the concern that this may open the flood parts for
'hakot system,' certain restrictive parameters were discussed.
The following guidelines to serve as safeguard against fraudulent
applicants:
1. The applicants for the registration shall be 25 years of age or
less and will be registering for the first time on May 14, 2001;
2. The applicants shall register in their places of residences; and,
3. The applicants shall present valid identification documents, like
school records
"Preparatory to the registration days, the following activities are
likewise agreed:
1. Submission of the list of students and their addresses
immediately prior to the actual registration of the applicants;
2. The Comelec filed officers will be given the opportunity to verify
the voters enumerator's list or conduct ocular inspection;
3. Availability of funds for the purpose; and,
4. Meetings with student groups to ensure orderly and honest
political awareness and interest to participate in the political
 process generated by the recent political events in the country
among our youth. considering that they failed to register on
December 27, 2000 deadline, they approved for special
registration days.
"In viewing of the foregoing, the Commission en banc has to
discuss all aspects regarding this request with directives to the
Finance Services Department (FSD) to submit certified available
funds for the purpose, and for the Deputy Executive Director for
Operations (DEDO) for estimated costs of additional two days of
registration.
The presence of REDs on January 30 can be used partly for consultation on the
practical side and logistical requirements of such additional registration days. The
meeting will be set at 1:30 p.m. at the Office of ED.
Immediately, Commissioner Borra called a consultation meeting among regional
heads and representatives, and a number of senior staff headed by Executive
Director Mamasapunod Aguam. It was the consensus of the group, with the
exception of Director Jose Tolentino, Jr., of the ASD, to disapproved the request
for additional registration of voters on the ground that Section 8 of R.A. 8189
explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period
starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the
Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities.
On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued Resolution N. 3584, the decretal
portion:
"Deliberating on the foregoing memoranda, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to deny the request to
conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on
February 17, and 18 2001."
Commissioners Rufino S.B. Javier and Mehol K. Sadain voted to deny the
request while Commissioners Luzviminda Tancangco and Ralph Lantion voted to
accommodate the students' request. With this impasse, the Commission
construed its Resolution as having taken effect.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP,
KOMPIL II (YOUTH) et. al. filed before this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus, docketed as G.R. NO. 147066, which seeks to set aside and
nullify respondent COMELEC's Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of R.A.
8189 unconstitutional insofar as said provision effectively causes the
disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated. Likewise,
petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondent
COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters and to admit for
registration petitioners and other similarly situated young Filipinos to qualify them
to vote in the May 14, 2001 General Elections.
On March 09, 2001, herein petitioner Michelle Betito, a student of the University
of the Philippines, likewise filed a Petition for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No.
147179, praying that this Court direct the COMELEC to provide for another
special registration day under the continuing registration provision under the
Election code.
On March 13, 2001, this court resolved to consolidate the two petitions and
further required respondents to file their Comment thereon within a non-
extendible period expiring at 10:00 A.M. of March 16, 2001. Moreover, this Court
resolved to set the consolidated cases for oral arguments on March 16, 2001.
On March 16, 2001, the Solicitor General, in its Manifestation and Motion
in lieu of Comment, recommended that an additional continuing registration of
voters be conducted at the soonest possible time "in order to accommodate the
disfranchised voters for purposes of the May 14, 2001 elections."
In effect, the Court in passing upon the merits of the present petitions, is tasked
to resolve a two-pronged issue focusing on respondent COMELEC's issuance of
the assailed Resolution dated February 8, 2001, which Resolution, petitioners, by
and large, argue to have undermined their constitutional right to vote on the May
14, 2001 general elections and caused the disenfranchisement of around for four
million Filipinos of voting age who failed to register before the registration
deadline set by the COMELEC.
Thus, this Court shall determine:
a. Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing COMELEC Resolution dated February 8, 2001.
b. Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through
the extraordinary writ of mandamus, to conduct a special registration of
new voters during the period between the COMELEC's imposed
December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.
The petitions are bereft of merit.
In a representative democracy such as ours, the right of suffrage, although
accorded a prime niche in the hierarchy of rights embodied in the fundamental
law, ought to be exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the
Constitutions and must properly yield to pertinent laws skillfully enacted by the
Legislature, which statutes for all intents and purposes, are crafted to effectively
insulate such so cherished right from ravishment and preserve the democratic
institutions our people have, for so long, guarded against the spoils of
opportunism, debauchery and abuse.
To be sure, the right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all
absolute. Needles to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the
enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural
requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories
of law. Thus, as to the substantive aspect, Section 1, Article V of the
Constitutions provides:
"SECTION 1. SUFFRAGE MAY BE EXERCISED BY ALL
CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES NOT OTHERWISE
DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO ARE AT LEAST EIGHTEEN
YEARS OF AGE, AND WHO SHALL HAVE RESIDED IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR AND IN THE PLACE
WHEREIN THEY PROPOSE TO VOTE FOR AT LEAST SIX
MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION. NO
LITERACY, PROPERTY, OR OTHER SUBSTANTIVE
 REQUIREMENT SHALL BE IMPOSED ON THE EXERCISE OF
SUFFRAGE."
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily
conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among
others, the process of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to
exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by
fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions
of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the "Voter's Registration Act of
1996."
Stated differently, the act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the
right of suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an
indispensable element in the election process. Thus, contrary to petitioners'
argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of
a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as
a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise
of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the
act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly
and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even
pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a
realistic and orderly manner - one which is not indifferent and so far removed
from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.
Viewed broadly, existing legal proscription and pragmatic operational
considerations bear great weight in the adjudication of the issues raised in the
instant petitions.
On the legal score, Section 8 or R.A. 8189, which provides a system of
continuing registration, is explicit, to wit:
"SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. - The
Personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be
conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular
office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during
the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election,"
(Emphasis Ours)
Likewise, Section 35 of R. A. 8189, which among others, speaks of a prohibitive
period within which to file a sworn petition for the exclusion of voters from the
permanent voter's list, provides:
"SEC. 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List - Any
registered voter, representative of a political party x x x may file x
x x except one hundred (100) days prior to a regular election x x
x."
As aptly observed and succinctly worded by respondent COMELEC in its
Comment:
"x x x. The petition for exclusion is a necessary component to
registration since it is a safety mechanism that gives a measure
of protection against flying voters, non-qualified registrants, and
the like. The prohibitive period, on the other hand serves the
purpose of securing the voter's substantive right to be included in
the list of voters.
"In real-world terms, this means that if a special voter's
registration is conducted, then the prohibitive period for filing
petitions for exclusion must likewise be adjusted to a later date. If
we do not, then no one can challenge the Voter's list since we
would already be well into the 100-day prohibitive period. Aside
from being a flagrant breach of the principles of due process, this
would open the registration process to abuse and seriously
compromise the integrity of the voter's list, and consequently,
that of the entire election.
"x x x. The short cuts that will have to be adopted in order to fit
the entire process of registration within the last 60 days will give
rise to haphazard list of voters, some of whom might not even be
qualified to vote, x x x the very possibility that we shall be
conducting elections on the basis of an inaccurate list is enough
to cast a cloud of doubt over the results of the polls. If that
happens, the unforgiving public will disown the results of the
elections, regardless of who wins, and regardless of how many
courts validate our own results. x x x"
Perhaps undaunted by such scenario, petitioners invoke the so called "standby"
powers or "residual" powers of the COMELEC, as provided under the relevant
provisions of Section 29, Republic Act No. 6646 (An act introducing additional
reforms in the electoral system and for other purposes) and adopted verbatim in
Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8436 (An act authorizing the COMELEC to use an
automated election system in the May 11, 1998 national or local electoral
exercises, providing funds therefore and for other purposes), thus:
"SEC. 28. Designation of other Dates for Certain Pre-election
Acts - if it should no longer be possible to observe the periods
and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts, the
Commission shall fix other periods and dates in order to ensure
accomplishments of the activities so voters shall not be deprived
of their right to suffrage."
On this matter, the act of registration is concededly, by its very nature, a pre-
election act. Under Section 3(a) of R. A. 8189, registration, as a process, has its
own specific definition, precise meaning and coverage, thus:
"a) Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a
sworn application for registration by a qualified voter before the
election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and
including the same in the book of registered voters upon
approval by the Election Registration Board."
At this point, it bears emphasis that the provision of Section 29 R.A. 8436
invoked by herein petitioners and Section 8 of R.A. 8189 volunteered by
respondent COMELEC, far from contradicting each other, actually share some
common ground. True enough, both provisions, although at first glance may
seem to be at war in relation to the other, are in more circumspect, perusal,
necessarily capable of being harmonized and reconciled.
Rudimentary is the principle in legal hermeneutics that changes made by the
legislature in the form of amendments to a stature should be given effect,
together with other parts of the amendment act. It is not to be presumed that the
legislature, in making such changes, was indulging in mere semantic exercise.
There must be some purpose in making them, which should be ascertained and
given effect.
Similarly, every new statute should be construed in connection with those already
existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to
harmonize and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable
interpretation. Interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi,
which means that the best method of interpretation is that which makes laws
consistent with other laws. Accordingly, Courts of justice, when confronted with
apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile them instead of
declaring outright the invalidity of one against the other. Courts should harmonize
them, if this is possible, because they are equally the handiwork of the same
legislature.
In light of the foregoing doctrine, we hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in
the present case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC
Resolution and denying the instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid law
explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period
starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election.
Corollarily, it is specious for herein petitioners to argue that respondent
COMELEC may validly and legally conduct a two-day special registration,
through the expedient of the letter of Section 28 of RA 8436. To this end, the
provisions of Section 28, RA 8436 would come into play in cases where the pre-
election acts are susceptible of performance within the available period prior to
election day. In more categorical language, Section 28 of R.A 8436 is, to our
mind, anchored on the sound premise that these certain "pre-election acts" are
still capable of being reasonably performed vis-a-vis the remaining period before
the date of election and the conduct of other related pre-election activities
required under the law.
In its Comment, respondent COMELEC- which is the constitutional body tasked
by no less that the fundamental charter (Sec 2, par. 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution) to decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions
affecting elections, including registration of voters painstakingly and thoroughly
emphasized the "operational impossibility of conducting a special registration,
which in its own language, "can no longer be accomplished within the time left to
(us) the Commission."
Hence:
"xxx xxx xxx
19) In any case, even without the legal obstacles, the last 60
days will not be a walk in the park for the COMELEC. Allow us to
outline what the Commission has yet to do, and the time to do it
in:
20) First we have to complete the Project of Precincts by the
19th of March. The Projects of Precincts indicate the total
number of established precincts and the number of registered
voters per precincts in a city or municipality. Without the final
Project of Precincts, we cannot even determine the proper
allocation of official ballots, election returns and other election
forms and paraphernalia. More succinctly said, without the
Project of Precincts, we won't know how many forms to print and
so we're liable to come up short.
21) More importantly, without a completed Project of Precincts, it
will be impossible to complete the rest of the tasks that must be
accomplished prior to the elections.
22) Second, the Board of Elections Inspectors must be
constituted on or before the 4th of March. In addition, the list of
the members of the BEI - including the precinct where they are
assigned and the barangay where the precinct is located must
be furnished by the Election Officer to all the candidates and
political candidates not later that 26th of March.
23) Third, the Book of Voters, which contains the approved Voter
Registration Records of registered voters in particular precinct
must be inspected, verified, and sealed beginning March 30 until
April 15.
24) Fourth, the Computerized Voters' List must be finalized and
printed out of use on election day; and finally
25.) Fifth, the preparation, bidding, printing, and distribution of
the voters Information sheet must be completed on or before
April 15.
26.) With this rigorous schedule of pre-election activities, the
COMELEC will have roughly a month that will act as a buffer
against any number of unforeseen occurrences that might delay
the elections. This is the logic and the wisdom behind setting the
120-day prohibitive period. After all , preparing for an election is
no easy task.
27) To hold special registrations now would, aside from being
illegal, whittle that approximately 30-day margin away to nothing.
28) When we say registration of voters, we do not- contrary to
popular opinion- refer only to the act of going to the Election
Officer and writing our names down. Registration is. In fact a
long process that takes about three weeks to complete, not even
counting how long it would take to prepare for the registration in
the first place.
29) In order to concretize, the senior Staff of the COMELEC, the
other Commissioners, prepared a time-table in order to see
exactly how the superimposition of special registration would
affect the on-going preparation for the May 14 elections.
30) We assumed for the sake of argument that we were to hold
the special registration on April 16 and 17. These are not
arbitrary numbers, by the way it takes in account the fact that we
only have about 800,000 Voters Registration Forms available, as
against an estimated 4.5 million potential registrants, and it
would take about 14 days - if we were to declare special
registrations today - to print up the difference and to verify these
accountable forms. After printing and verification, the forms
would have to be packed and shipped - roughly taking up a
further two and a half weeks. Only then can we get on with
registration.
31) The first step in registration is, of course, filling the
application for registration with the Election Officer. The
application, according to Section 17 of R.A. 8189, is then set for
hearing, with notice of that hearing being posted in the city or
municipal bulletin board for at least one week prior. Thus, if we
held registrations on the 16th and the 17th, the posting
requirement would be completed by the 24th. Considering that
time must be allowed for the filling of oppositions, the earliest
that the Election Registration Board can be convened for hearing
would be the May 1st and 2nd.
32) Assuming - and this is a big assumption - that there are rift
challenges to the applicant's right to register, the Election
Registration Board can immediately rule on the applicant's
registration, and post notices of its action by the 2nd until the 7th
of May. By the 10th, copies of the notice of the action taken by
the board will have already been furnished to the applicants and
the heads of the registered political parties.
33) Only at this point can our Election Officers once against
focus on the business of getting ready for the elections. Once the
results of the special registration are finalized, they can be
encoded and a new Computerized Voters' List generated - at the
earliest, by May 11, after which the new CVL would be posted.
Incidentally, if we were to follow the letter of the law strictly, a
May 11 posting date for the new CVL would be improper since
the R.A. 8189 provides that the CVL be posted at least 90 days
before the election.
34) Assuming optimistically that we can then finish the
inspection, verification, and sealing of the Book of Voters by May
15, we will already have overshot the May 14 election date, and
still not have finished our election preparations.
35) After this point, we could have to prepare the allocation of
Official Ballots, Election Returns, and other Non-Accountable
Forms and Supplies to be used for the new registrants. Once the
allocation is ready, the contracts would be awarded, the various
forms printed, delivered, verified, and finally shipped out to the
different municipalities. All told, this process would take
approximately 26 days, from the 15th of May until June 10.
36) Only then can we truly say that we are ready to hold the
elections.
XXX XXX XXX
It is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the determination of
administrative agency as to the operation, implementation and application of a
law would be accorded great weight considering that these specialized
government bodies are, by their nature and functions, in the best position to
know what they can possible do or not do, under prevailing circumstances.
Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law does not require that the
impossible be done. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility,
expressed in the maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossible. In other words, there is
no obligation to do an impossible thing. Impossibilium nulla obligatio est.
Hence, a statute may not be so construed as to require compliance with what it
prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally ..., it must be presumed that the
legislature did not at all intend an interpretation or application of a law which is far
removed from the realm of the possible. Truly, the interpretation of statutes, the
interpretation to be given must be such that it is in accordance with logic,
common sense, reasonableness and practicality. Thus, we are of the considered
view that they "stand-by power" of the respondent COMELEC under Section 28
of R.A. 8436, presupposed the possibility of its being exercised or availed of, and
not otherwise.
Further, petitioners' bare allegation that they were disfranchised when
respondent COMELEC pegged the registration deadline on December 27, 2000
instead of the day before the prohibitive period before the May 14, 2001 regular
elections commences - is, to our mind, not sufficient. On this matter, there is no
allegation in the two consolidated petitions and the records are bereft of any
showing that anyone of herein petitioners has filed an application to be registered
as a voter which was denied by the COMELEC nor filed a complaint before the
respondent COMELEC alleging that he or she proceeded to the Office of the
Election Officer to register between the period starting from December 28, 2000
to January 13, 2001, and that he or she was disallowed or barred by respondent
COMELEC from filing his application for registration. While it may be true that
respondent COMELEC set the registration deadline on December 27, 2000, this
Court is of the firm view that petitioners were not totally denied the opportunity to
avail of the continuing registration under R.A. 8189. Stated in a different manner,
the petitioners in the instant case are not without fault or blame. They admit in
their petition that they failed to register, for whatever reason, within the period of
registration and came to this Court and invoked its protective mantle not
realizing, so to speak, the speck in their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo accedat
curiam. Let no one come to court with unclean hands.
In a similar vein, well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisdiction that the law aids
the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilanties sed non
dormientibus jura in re subveniunt.
Applying the foregoing, this Court is of the firm view that respondent COMELEC
did not commit an abuse of discretion, much less be adjudged to have committed
the same in some patent, whimsical and arbitrary manner, in issuing Resolution
No, 3584 which, in respondent's own terms, resolved "to deny the request to
conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18,
2001."
On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of laws.1wphi1.nt
Under these circumstances, we rule that the COMELEC in denying the request of
petitioners to hold a special registration, acted within the bounds and confines of
the applicable law on the matter - Section 8 of R.A. 8189. In issuing the assailed
Resolution, respondent COMELEC simply performed its constitutional task to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, inter alia, questions relating to the registration of voters; evidently,
respondent COMELEC merely exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to it
and one which squarely falls within the proper sphere of its constitutionally
mandated powers. Hence, whatever action respondent takes in the exercise of
its wide latitude of discretion, specifically on matters involving voters' registration,
pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. Accordingly, in the
absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion on the part of
respondent COMELEC, this Court may not validly conduct an incursion and
meddle with affairs exclusively within the province of respondent COMELEC - a
body accorded by no less than the fundamental law with independence.
As to the petitioners' prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, we hold
that this Court cannot, in view of the very nature of such extraordinary writ, issue
the same without transgressing the time-honored principles in this jurisdiction.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer
to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to
control the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon
him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is
required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of
the court.
Considering the circumstances where the writ of mandamus lies and the
peculiarities of the present case, we are of the firm belief that petitioners failed to
establish, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they are entitled to the issuance of
this extraordinary writ so as to effectively compel respondent COMELEC to
conduct a special registration of voters. For the determination of whether or not
the conduct of a special registration of voters is feasible, possible or practical
within the remaining period before the actual date of election, involves the
exercise of discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by mandamus.
In Bayan vs. Executive Secretary Zamora and related cases, we enunciated that
the Court's function, as sanctioned by Article VIII, Section 1, is "merely [to] check,
whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutionally limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In
the absence of a showing ...[of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power...It
has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
Finally, the Court likewise takes judicial notice of the fact that the President has
issued Proclamation No. 15 calling Congress to a Special Session on March 18,
2001, to allow the conduct of Special Registration of new voters. House Bill No.,
12930 has been filed before the Lower House, which bills seeks to amend R.A.
8189 as to the 120-day prohibitive period provided for under said law. Similarly,
Senate Bill No. 2276 was filed before the Senate, with the same intention to
amend the aforesaid law and, in effect, allow the conduct of special registration
before the May 14, 2001 General Elections.This Court views the foregoing
factual circumstances as a clear intimation on the part of both the executive and
legislative departments that a legal obstacle indeed stands in the way of the
conduct by the Commission on Elections of a special registration before May 14,
2001 General Elections.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitions for certiorari and
mandamus are hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
KABATAAN PARTY-LIST, REPRESENTED BY REPRESENTATIVE
JAMES MARK TERRY L. RIDON AND MARJOHARA S. TUCAY;
SARAH JANE I. ELAGO, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF
STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES; VENCER MARI E.
CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON OF THE ANAKBAYAN; MARC LINO
J. ABILA, NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE COLLEGE EDITORS
GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES; EINSTEIN Z. RECEDES, DEPUTY
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF ANAKBAYAN; CHARISSE BERNADINE
I. BAEZ, CHAIRPERSON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS; ARLENE CLARISSE Y. JULVE, MEMBER OF ALYANS A
NG MGA GRUPONG HALIGI NG AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA PARA
SA MAMAMAYAN (AGHAM); and SINING MARIA ROSA L.
MARFORI, Petitioners,
versus
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS , Respondent
x
-x
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
 Rights beget responsibilities; progress begets change.
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed
by herein petitioners Kabataan Party-List, represented by
Representative James Mark Terry L. Ridon and National President
Marjohara S. Tucay; Sarah Jane I. Elago, President of the National
Union of Students of the Philippines; Vencer Mari E. Crisostomo and
Einstein Z. Recedes, Chairperson and Deputy Secretary-General of
Anakbayan, respectively; Marc Lino J. Abila, National President of the
College Editors Guild of the Philippines; Charisse Bernadine I.
Baez, Chairperson of the League of Filipino Students; Arlene
Clarisse Y. Julve, member of Alyansa ng mga Grupong Haligi ng
Agham at Teknolohiya para sa Mamamayan (AGHAM); and Sining
Maria Rosa L. Marfori (petitioners) assailing the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. (RA) 10367, entitled An Act Providing for
Mandatory Biometrics Voter Registration, as well as respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863,
and 10013, all related thereto.
The Facts
On February 15, 2013, President Benigno S. Aquino III signed
into law RA 10367, which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 3469
and Senate Bill No. 1030, passed by the House of Representatives
and the Senate on December 11, 2012 and December 12, 2012,
respectively. Essentially, RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to
implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters
in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list
of voters through the adoption of biometric technology. RA 10367 was
duly published on February 22, 2013, and took effect fifteen (15) days
after.
RA 10367 likewise directs that [r]egistered voters whose
biometrics have not been captured shall submit themselves for
validation. Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before
the last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the
May 2016 [E]lections shall be deactivated x x x. Nonetheless,
voters may have their records reactivated after the May 2016
Elections, provided that they comply with the procedure found in
Section 28 of RA 8189, also known as The Voters Registration Act
of 1996.
On June 26, 2013, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
9721 which serves as the implementing rules and regulations of RA
10367, thus, prescribing the procedure for validation, deactivation,
and reactivation of voters registration records (VRRs). Among others,
the said Resolution provides that: (a) [t]he registration records of
voters without biometrics data who failed to submit for validation
on or before the last day of filing of applications for registration
for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections
shall be deactivated in the last [Election Registration Board (ERB)]
hearing to be conducted prior to said elections; (b) [t]he following
registered voters shall have their biometrics data validated: [(1)]
Those who do not have BIOMETRICS data appearing in the Voter[s]
Registration System (VRS); and [(2)] Those who have incomplete
BIOMETRICS data appearing in the VRS; (c) [d]eactivated voters
shall not be allowed to vote ; and (d) [d]eactivation x x x shall
comply with the requirements on posting, ERB hearing and
service of individual notices to the deactivated
voters. Resolution No. 9721 further states that, as of the last day of
registration and validation for the 2013 Elections on October 31,
2012, a total of 9,018,256 registered voters were without biometrics
data. Accordingly, all Election Officers (EOs) were directed
to conduct [an] information campaign on the conduct of
validation.
On July 1, 2013, the COMELEC, pursuant to the aforesaid
Resolution, commenced the mandatory biometric system of
registration. To make biometric registration convenient and accessible
to the voting public, aside from the COMELEC offices in every local
government unit, it likewise established satellite registration offices in
barangays and malls.
On April 1, 2014, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
9863 which amended certain portions of Resolution No. 9853 dated
February 19, 2014, by stating that ERBs shall deactivate the VRRs of
those who failed to submit for validation despite notice on or before
October 31, 2015, and that the [d]eactivation for cases falling under
this ground shall be made during the November 16, 2015 Board
hearing.
A month later, or in May 2014, the COMELEC launched
the NoBio- NoBoto public information campaign which ran
concurrently with the period of continuing registration.
On November 3, 2015, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
10013 which provides for the procedures in the deactivation of
[VRRs] who do not have biometrics data in the [VRS] after the
October 31, 2015 deadline of registration and validation. Among
others, the said Resolution directed the EOs to: (a) [p]ost the lists
of voters without biometrics data in the bulletin boards of the
City/Municipal hall, Office of the Election Officer and in the barangay
hall along with the notice of ERB hearing; and (b) [s]end individual
notices to the affected voters included in the generated list of
voters without biometrics data. It also provides that
[a]ny opposition/objection to the deactivation of records shall be
filed not later than November 9, 2015 in accordance with the period
prescribed in Section 4, [Chapter I,] Resolution No. 9853. During the
ERB hearing, which proceedings are summary in nature, the ERBs
shall, based on the list of voters without biometrics data, order the
deactivation of registration records on the ground of failure to
validate. Thereafter, EOs were required to [s]end individual notices
to the deactivated voters within five (5) days from the last day of ERB
hearing. Moreover, Resolution No. 10013 clarified that the
[r]egistration records of voters with incomplete biometrics data and
those corrupted data (biometrics) in the database shall not be
deactivated and be allowed to vote in the May 9, 2016
Synchronized National, Local and [Autonomous Region on Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM)] Regional Elections.
On November 25, 2015, herein petitioners filed the instant
petition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (W PI) assailing the
constitutionality of the biometrics validation requirement imposed
under RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863,
and 10013, all related thereto. They contend that: (a) biometrics
validation rises to the level of an additional, substantial qualification
where there is penalty of deactivation; (b) biometrics deactivation is
not the disqualification by law contemplated by the 1987 Constitution;
(c) biometrics validation gravely violates the Constitution, considering
that, applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised with a
compelling reason for state regulation and hence, an unreasonable
deprivation of the right to suffrage; (d) voters to be deactivated are
not afforded due process; and (e) poor experience with biometrics
should serve as warning against exacting adherence to the system.
Albeit already subject of a prior petition filed before this Court,
petitioners also raise herein the argument that deactivation by
November 16, 2015 would result in the premature termination of the
registration period contrary to Section 8 of RA 8189. Ultimately,
petitioners pray that this Court declare RA 10367, as well as
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, unconstitutional
and that the COMELEC be commanded to desist from deactivating
registered voters without biometric information, to reinstate voters
who are compliant with the requisites of RA 8189 but have already
been delisted, and to extend the system of continuing registration and
capture of biometric information of voters until January 8, 2016.
On December 1, 2015, the Court required the COMELEC to
file its comment to the petition. Meanwhile, it issued a TRO requiring
the COMELEC to desist from deactivating the registration records of
voters without biometric information, pending resolution of the case at
hand.
On December 7, 2015, COMELEC Chairman Juan Andres D.
Bautista, through a letter addressed to the Court En Banc, urgently
appealed for the immediate lifting of the above-mentioned TRO,
stating that the COMELEC is set to finalize the Project of Precincts
(POP) on December 15, 2015, and that the TRO issued in this case
has the effect of including the 2.4 Million deactivated voters in the list
of voters, which, in turn, would require revisions to the POP and
consequently, adversely affect the timelines of all other interrelated
preparatory activities to the prejudice of the successful
implementation of the Automated Election System (AES) for the 2016
Elections.
On December 11, 2015, the COMELEC, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, filed its comment to the instant petition. On
even date, petitioners filed a manifestation asking the Court to
continue the TRO against the deactivation of voters without biometric
information.
With no further pleadings required of the parties, the case was
submitted for resolution.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue in this case is whether or not RA 10367, as
well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related
thereto, are unconstitutional.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is bereft of merit.
I.
At the outset, the Court passes upon the procedural objections
raised in this case. In particular, the COMELEC claims that
petitioners: (a) failed to implead the Congress, the Office of the
President, and the ERB which it purports are indispensable parties to
the case; (b) did not have the legal standing to institute the instant
petition; and (c) erroneously availed of certiorari and prohibition as a
mode of questioning the constitutionality of RA 10367 and the
assailed COMELEC Resolutions.
The submissions do not hold.
Recognizing that the petition is hinged on an important
constitutional issue pertaining to the right of suffrage, the Court views
the matter as one of transcendental public importance and of
compelling significance. Consequently, it deems it proper to brush
aside the foregoing procedural barriers and instead, resolve the case
on its merits. As resonated in the case of Pabillo v. COMELEC, citing
Capalla v. COMELEC and Guingona, Jr. v. COMELEC :
DecisionG.R. No. 221318
There can be no doubt that the coming 10 May 2010 [in this case, the
May 2016] elections is a matter of great public concern. On election
day, the countrys registered voters will come out to exercise the
sacred right of suffrage. Not only is it an exercise that ensures the
preservation of our democracy, the coming elections also embodies
our peoples last ounce of hope for a better future. It is the final
opportunity, patiently awaited by our people, for the peaceful
transition of power to the next chosen leaders of our country. If there
is anything capable of directly affecting the lives of ordinary Filipinos
so as to come within the ambit of a public concern, it is the coming
elections, [x x x.]
Thus, in view of the compelling significance and transcending public
importance of the issues raised by petitioners, the technicalities
raised by respondents should not be allowed to stand in the way, if
the ends of justice would not be subserved by a rigid adherence to
the rules of procedure. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Furthermore, the issue on whether or not the policy on
biometrics validation, as provided under RA 10367 and fleshed out in
the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, should be upheld is one that
demands immediate adjudication in view of the critical preparatory
activities that are currently being undertaken by the COMELEC with
regard to the impending May 2016 Elections. Thus, it would best
subserve the ends of justice to settle this controversy not only in
order to enlighten the citizenry, but also so as not to stymy the
operations of a co-constitutional body. As pronounced in Roque, Jr. v.
COMELEC:
[T]he bottom line is that the Court may except a particular case from
the operations of its rules when the demands of justice so require.
Put a bit differently, rules of procedure are merely tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Accordingly, technicalities and
procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand in the way, if the
ends of justice would not be subserved by a rigid adherence to the
rules of procedure.
That being said, the Court now proceeds to resolve the
substantive issues in this case.
II.
Essentially, the present petition is a constitutional challenge
against the biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA
10367, including COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013.
As non-compliance with the same results in the penalty of
deactivation, petitioners posit that it has risen to the level of an
unconstitutional substantive requirement in the exercise of the right
of suffrage. They submit that the statutory requirement of biometric
validation is no different from the unconstitutional requirement of
literacy and property because mere non-validation already absolutely
curtails the exercise of the right of suffrage through deactivation.
Further, they advance the argument that deactivation is not the
disqualification by law contemplated as a valid limitation to the
exercise of suffrage under the 1987 Constitution.
The contestation is untenable.
As early as the 1936 case of The People of the Philippine
Islands v. Corral, it has been recognized that [t]he right to vote is not
a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege
granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most
likely to exercise it for the public good. In the early stages of the
evolution of the representative system of government, the
exercise of the right of suffrage was limited to a small portion of
the inhabitants. But with the spread of democratic ideas, the
enjoyment of the franchise in the modern states has come to
embrace the mass of the audit classes of persons are excluded
from the franchise.
Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution delineates the
current parameters for the exercise of suffrage:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least
eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines
for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for
at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage.
Dissecting the provision, one must meet the following
qualifications in order to exercise the right of suffrage: first, he must
be a Filipino citizen; second, he must not be disqualified by law; and
third, he must have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year
and in the place wherein he proposes to vote for at least six (6)
months immediately preceding the election.
The second item more prominently reflects the franchised
nature of the right of suffrage. The State may therefore regulate said
right by imposing statutory disqualifications, with the restriction,
however, that the same do not amount to, as per the second sentence
of the provision, a literacy, property or other substantive
requirement. Based on its genesis, it may be gleaned that the
limitation is geared towards the elimination of irrelevant standards
that are purely based on socio-economic considerations that have no
bearing on the right of a citizen to intelligently cast his vote and to
further the public good.
To contextualize, the first Philippine Election Law, Act No.
1582, which took effect on January 15, 1907, mandated that only men
who were at least twenty-three (23) years old and comprised within
one of the following three classes were allowed to vote: (a) those
who prior to the 13th of August, 1898, held the office of municipal
captain, governadorcillo, alcalde, lieutenant, cabeza de barangay, or
member of any ayuntamiento; (b) those who own real property to the
value of 500.00, or who annually pay 30.00 or more of the
established taxes; and (c) those, who speak, read, and write English
or Spanish.
When the 1935 Constitution was adopted, the minimum voting
age was lowered to twenty-one (21) and the foregoing class
qualification and property requirements were removed. However, the
literacy requirement was retained and only men who were able to
read and write were given the right to vote. It also made womens
right to vote dependent on a plebiscite held for such purpose.
 During the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the delegates
decided to remove the literacy and property requirements to broaden
the political base and discontinue the exclusion of millions of citizens
from the political systems:
Sponsorship Speech of Delegate Manglapus
DELEGATE MANGLAPUS: Mr. President, the draft proposal, the
subject matter of Report No. 11 contains amendments that are
designed to improve Article V on suffrage and to broaden the
electoral base of our country. The three main points that are taken up
in this draft which will be developed in the sponsorship speeches that
will follow might need explanatory remarks. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The present requirement, reading and writing, is eliminated
and instead a provision is introduced which says, No literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on
the exercise of suffrage;
xxxx
The draft before us is in keeping with the trend towards the
broadening of the electoral base already begun with the lowering
of the voting age to 18, and it is in keeping further with the
Committees desire to discontinue the alienation and exclusion of
millions of citizens from the political system and from
participation in the political life of the country. The requirement of
literacy for voting is eliminated for it is noted that there are very few
countries left in the world where literacy remains a condition for
voting. There is no Southeast Asian country that imposes this
requirement. The United States Supreme Court only a few months
ago declared unconstitutional any state law that would continue to
impose this requirement for voting.
xxxx
It is to be noted that all those who testified before the
Committee favoured the elimination of the literacy requirement. It
must be stressed that those witnesses represented all levels of
society x x x.
Sponsorship Speech of Delegate Ordoez
x x x in the process, as we evolve, many and more of our
people were left to the sidelines because they could no longer
participate in the process of government simply because their ability
to read and write had become inadequate. This, however, did not
mean that they were no longer responsive to the demands of the
times, that they were unsensible to what was happening among them.
And so in the process as years went on, conscious efforts were made
to liberate, to free these persons who were formerly entitled in the
course of election by means of whittling away the requirements for
the exercise of the right to vote. First of all, was the property
requirement. There were times in the English constitutional history
that it was common to say as an answer to a question, W ho are
entitled to vote? that the following cannot vote criminals,
paupers, members of the House of Lords. They were landed together
at the same figurative category.
Eventually, with the wisdom of the times, property requirement
was eliminated but the last remaining vestige which bound the
members of the community to ignorance, which was the persistence
of this requirement of literacy remained. And this is again preserved
in our Constitution, in our Election Code, which provides that those
who cannot prepare their ballots themselves shall not be qualified to
vote.
xxxx
Unless you remove this literacy test, the cultural
minorities, the underprivileged, the urban guerrillas will forever
be outcasts of our society, irresponsive of what is happening.
And if this condition were to continue, my friends, we cannot
fully claim that we have representative democracy. Let us reverse
the cycle. Let us eliminate the social imbalance by granting to these
persons who are very responsible the right to participate in the choice
of the persons who are to make their laws for them. (Emphases
supplied)
As clarified on interpellation, the phrase other substantive
requirement carries the same tack as the other standards alienating
particular classes based on socio-economic considerations irrelevant
to suffrage, such as the payment of taxes. Moreover, as particularly
noted and as will be later elaborated on, the phrase did not
contemplate any restriction on procedural requirements, such as that
of registration:
DELEGATE DE LOS REYES: On page 2, Line 3, the following
appears:
For other substantive requirement, no literacy[,] property, or
other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage.
just what is contemplated in the phrase, substantive
requirement?
DELEGATE OCCEA: I can answer that, but it belongs to the sphere
of someone else in the Committee. We use this term as distinguished
from procedural requirements. For instance, the law cannot come
in and say that those who should be allowed to vote should have
paid certain taxes. That would be a substantial requirement in
addition to what is provided for in the Constitution. But the law can
step in as far as certain procedural requirements are concerned
like requiring registration, and also step in as far as these
classifications are concerned. (Emphases supplied)
 As it finally turned out, the imposition of literacy, property, or
other substantive requirement was proscribed and the following
provision on suffrage was adopted74 in the 1973 Constitution:
Section 1. Suffrage shall be exercised by citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years
of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at
least six months preceding the election. No literacy, property, or
other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise
of suffrage. The Batasang Pambansa shall provide a system for the
purpose of securing the secrecy and sanctity of the vote. (Emphasis
supplied)
After deliberating on and eventually, striking down a proposal
to exclude literacy requirements from the limitation,75 the exact
provision prohibiting the imposition of literacy, property, or other
substantive requirement[s] in the 1973 Constitution was fully
adopted in the 1987 Constitution.
Along the contours of this limitation then, Congress, pursuant
to Section 118 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, or the Omnibus
Election Code, among others, imposed the following legal
disqualifications:
Section 118. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified
from voting:
(a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer
imprisonment for not less than one year, such disability not having
been removed by plenary pardon or granted amnesty: Provided,
however, That any person disqualified to vote under this paragraph
shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five
years after service of sentence.
(b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by
competent court or tribunal of having committed any crime involving
disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion,
sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any
crime against national security, unless restored to his full civil and
political rights in accordance with law: Provided, That he shall regain
his right to vote automatically upon expiration of five years after
service of sentence.
(c) Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent
authority.
A qualification is loosely defined as the possession of
qualities, properties (such as fitness or capacity) inherently or legally
necessary to make one eligible for a position or office, or to perform a
public duty or function.
Properly speaking, the concept of a qualification, at least
insofar as the discourse on suffrage is concerned, should be
distinguished from the concept of registration, which is
jurisprudentially regarded as only the means by which a persons
qualifications to vote is determined. In Yra v. Abao, citing Meffert v.
Brown, it was stated that [t]he act of registering is only one step
towards voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes the
citizen a qualified voter [and] one may be a qualified voter without
exercising the right to vote. In said case, this Court definitively
characterized registration as a form of regulation and not a
qualification for the rifht of suffrage:
Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a
qualification for such right.80 (Emphasis supplied)
As a form of regulation, compliance with the registration
procedure is dutifully enjoined. Section 115 of the Omnibus Election
Code provides:
Section 115. Necessity of Registration. In order that a
qualified elector may vote in any election, plebiscite or
referendum, he must be registered in the permanent list of voters
for the city or municipality in which he resides. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, although one is deemed to be a qualified elector, he
must nonetheless still comply with the registration procedure in order
to vote.
As the deliberations on the 1973 Constitution made clear,
registration is a mere procedural requirement which does not fall
under the limitation that [n]o literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage. This was
echoed in AKBAYAN-Youth v. COMELEC81 (AKBAYAN-Youth),
wherein the Court pronounced that the process of registration is a
procedural limitation on the right to vote. Albeit procedural, the right
of a citizen to vote nevertheless remains conditioned upon it:
Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the
enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and
procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books
and other repositories of law. Thus, as to the substantive aspect,
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution provides:
xxxx
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is
necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he
must undergo: among others, the process of registration. Specifically,
a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in
addition to the minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter,
is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voters Registration
Act of 1996.82 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
RA 8189 primarily governs the process of registration. It
defines registration as the act of accomplishing and filing of a
sworn application for registration by a qualified voter before the
election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and
including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval by
the [ERB].83 As stated in Section 2 thereof, RA 8189 was passed in
order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of
voters.
To complement RA 8189 in light of the advances in modern
technology, RA 10367, or the assailed Biometrics Law, was signed
into law in February 2013, It build on the policy considerations behind
RA 8189 as it institutionalized biometrics validation as part of the
registration process:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State
to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters
through the adoption of biometric technology.
Biometrics refers to a quantitative analysis that provides a
positive identification of an individual such as voice, photograph,
fingerprint, signature, iris, and/or such other identifiable features.
Sections 3 and 10 of RA 10367 respectively require registered
and new voters to submit themselves for biometrics validation:
Section 3. Who Shall Submit for Validation. Registered
voters whose biometrics have not been captured shall submit
themselves for validation.
Section 10. Mandatory Biometrics Registration. The
Commission shall implement a mandatory biometrics registration
system for new voters.
Under Section 2 (d) of RA 10367, validation is defined as
the process of taking the biometrics of registered voters whose
biometrics have not yet been captured.
The consequence of non-compliance is deactivation, which
refers to the removal of the registration record of the registered
voter from the corresponding precinct book of voters for failure to
comply with the validation process as required by [RA 10367].85
Section 7 states:
Section 7. Deactivation. Voters who fail to submit for
validation on or before the last day of filing of application for
registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections shall be
deactivated pursuant to this Act. (Emphases supplied)
Notably, the penalty of deactivation, as well as the
requirement of validation, neutrally applies to all voters . Thus,
petitioners argument that the law creates artificial class of voters86
is more imagined than real. There is no favor accorded to an
obedient group. If anything, non-compliance by the disobedient
only rightfully results into prescribed consequences. Surely, this is
beyond the intended mantle of the equal protection of the laws, which
only works against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality.
It should also be pointed out that deactivation is not novel to
RA 10367. RA 8189 already provides for certain grounds for
deactivation, of which not only the disqualifications under the
Constitution or the Omnibus Election are listed.
Section 27. Deactivation of Registration. The board shall
deactivate the registration and remove the registration records of the
following persons from the corresponding precinct book of voters and
place the same, properly marked and dated in indelible ink, in the
inactive file after entering the cause or causes of deactivation:
a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer
imprisonment for not less than one (1) year, such disability not having
been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however,
That any person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall
automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5)
years after service of sentence as certified by the clerks of courts of
the Municipal/Municipal Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional Trial Courts
and the Sandiganbayan;
b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a
competent court or tribunal of having caused/committed any crime
involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as
rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws,
or any crime against national security, unless restored to his full civil
and political rights in accordance with law; Provided, That he shall
regain his right to vote automatically upon expiration of five (5) years
after service of sentence;
c) Any person declared by competent authority to be insane or
incompetent unless such disqualification has been subsequently
removed by a declaration of a proper authority that such person is no
longer insane or incompetent;
d) Any person who did not vote in the two (2) successive preceding
regular elections as shown by their voting records. For this purpose,
regular elections do not include the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
elections;
e) Any person whose registration has been ordered excluded by the
Court; and
f) Any person who has lost his Filipino citizenship.
For this purpose, the clerks of court for the Municipal/Municipal
Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan
shall furnish the Election Officer of the city or municipality concerned
at the end of each month a certified list of persons who are
disqualified under paragraph (a) hereof, with their addresses. The
Commission may request a certified list of persons who have lost
their Filipino Citizenship or declared as insane or incompetent with
their addresses from other government agencies.
The Election Officer shall post in the bulletin board of his office a
certified list of those persons whose registration were deactivated
and the reasons therefor, and furnish copies thereof to the local
heads of political parties, the national central file, provincial file, and
the voter concerned.
With these considerations in mind, petitioners claim that
biometrics validation imposed under RA 10367, and implemented
under COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, must
perforce fail. To reiterate, this requirement is not a qualification to
the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the
registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably
regulate. It was institutionalized conformant to the limitations of the
1987 Constitution and is a mere complement to the existing Voters
Registration Act of 1996. Petitioners would do well to be reminded of
this Courts pronouncement in AKBAYAN-Youth, wherein it was held
that:
[T]he act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right
of suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and
an indispensable element in the election process. Thus, contrary to
petitioners argument, registration cannot and should not be
denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory
requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a
necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in
the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to
safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the
ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful
election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-
election activities could be performed by the duly constituted
authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which is not
indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and
the prevalent circumstances of the times.88 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises
to the level of a literacy, property or other substantive requirement as
contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution that is, one which
propagates a socio- economic standard which is bereft of any rational
basis to a persons ability to intelligently cast his vote and to further
the public good the same cannot be struck down as
unconstitutional, as in this case.
III.
For another, petitioners assert that biometrics validation
gravely violates the Constitution, considering that, applying the strict
scrutiny test, it is not poised with a compelling reason for state
regulation and hence, an unreasonable deprivation of the right to
suffrage. They cite the case of White Light Corp. v. City of Manila
(W hite Light), wherein the Court stated that the scope of the strict
scrutiny test covers the protection of the right of suffrage.
Contrary to petitioners assertion, the regulation passes the
strict scrutiny test.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict
scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and the
amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of
fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity
of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well
as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications
to equal protection. As pointed out by petitioners, the United States
Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect
fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access, and interstate
travel.
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of
compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on
the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest ,
and burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.
In this case, respondents have shown that the biometrics
validation requirement under RA 10367 advances a compelling state
interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of orderly,
honest, and credible elections by containing if not eliminating, the
perennial problem of having flying voters, as well as dead and
multiple registrants. According to the sponsorship speech of Senator
Aquilino L. Pimentel III, the objective of the law was to cleanse the
national voter registry so as to eliminate electoral fraud and ensure
that the results of the elections were truly reflective of the genuine
will of the people.96 The foregoing consideration is unquestionably a
compelling state interest.
Also, it was shown that the regulation is the least restrictive
means for achieving the above-said interest. Section 697 of
Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for biometrics validation,
whereby the registered voter is only required to: (a) personally
appear before the Office of the Election Officer; (b) present a
competent evidence of identity; and (c) have his photo, signature,
and fingerprints recorded. It is, in effect, a manner of updating ones
registration for those already registered under RA 8189, or a first-
time registration for new registrants. The re-registration process is
amply justified by the fact that the government is adopting a novel
technology like biometrics in order to address the bane of electoral
fraud that has enduringly plagued the electoral exercises in this
country. While registrants may be inconvenienced by waiting in long
lines or by not being accommodated on certain days due to heavy
volume of work, these are typical burdens of voting that are remedied
by bureaucratic improvements to be implemented by the COMELEC
as an administrative institution. By and large, the COMELEC has not
turned a blind eye to these realities. It has tried to account for the
exigencies by holding continuous registration as early as May 6, 2014
until October 31, 2015, or for over a period of 18 months. To make
the validation process as convenient as possible, the COMELEC even
went to the extent of setting up off-site and satellite biometrics
registration in shopping malls and conducted the same on Sundays.
Moreover, it deserves mentioning that RA 10367 and Resolution No.
9721 did not mandate registered voters to submit themselves to
validation every time there is an election. In fact, it only required the
voter to undergo the validation process one (1) time, which shall
remain effective in succeeding elections, provided that he remains an
active voter. To add, the failure to validate did not preclude
deactivated voters from exercising their right to vote in the
succeeding elections. To rectify such status, they could still apply for
reactivation following the procedure laid down in Section 28 of RA
8189.
That being said, the assailed regulation on the right to
suffrage was sufficiently justified as it was indeed narrowly tailored to
achieve the compelling state interest of establishing a clean,
complete, permanent and updated list of voters, and was
demonstrably the least restrictive means in promoting that interest.
IV.
Petitioners further aver that RA 10367 and the COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013 violate the tenets of
procedural due process because of the short periods of time between
hearings and notice, and the summary nature of the deactivation
proceedings.
Petitioners are mistaken.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the COMELEC,
through Resolution No. 10013, had directed EOs to: (a) [p]ost the
lists of voters without biometrics data in the bulletin boards of the
City/Municipal hall, Office of the Election Officer and in the barangay
hall along with the notice of ERB hearing; and (b) [s]end individual
notices to the affected voters included in the generated list of voters
without biometrics data.103 The same Resolution also accords
concerned individuals the opportunity to file their opposition/objection
to the deactivation of VRRs not later than November 9, 2015 in
accordance with the period prescribed in Section 4,104 Chapter I,
Resolution No. 9853. Meanwhile, Resolution Nos. 9721 and 9863
respectively state that [d]eactivation x x x shall comply with the
requirements on posting, ERB hearing and service of individual
notices to the deactivated voters,105 and that the [d]eactivation for
cases falling under this ground shall be made during the November
16, 2015 Board hearing. While the proceedings are summary in
nature, the urgency of finalizing the voters list for the upcoming May
2016 Elections calls for swift and immediate action on the
deactivation of VRRs of voters who fail to comply with the mandate of
RA 10367. After all, in the preparation for the May 2016 National and
Local Elections, time is of the essence. The summary nature of the
proceedings does not depart from the fact that petitioners were given
the opportunity to be heard.
Relatedly, it deserves emphasis that the public has been
sufficiently informed of the implementation of RA 10367 and its
deactivation feature. RA 10367 was duly published as early as
February 22, 2013, and took effect fifteen (15) days after.
Accordingly, dating to the day of its publications, all are bound to
know the terms of its provisions, including the consequences of non-
compliance. As implemented, the process of biometrics validation
commenced on July 1, 2013, or approximately two and a half (212)
years before the October 31, 2015 deadline. To add, the COMELEC
conducted a massive public information campaign, i.e., NoBio-
NoBoto, from May 2014 until October 31, 2015, or a period of
eighteen (18) months, whereby voters were reminded to update and
validate their registration records. On top of that, the COMELEC
exerted efforts to make the validation process more convenient for
the public as it enlisted the assistance of malls across Metro Manila
to serve as satellite registration centers and declared Sundays as
working days for COMELEC offices within the National Capital Region
and in highly urbanized cities.109 Considering these steps, the Court
finds that the public has been sufficiently apprised of the
implementation of RA 10367, and its penalty of deactivation in case
of failure to comply. Thus, there was no violation of procedural due
process.
V.
Petitioners aver that the poor experience of other countries
i.e., Guatemala, Britain, Cte dIvoire, Uganda, and Kenya in
implementing biometrics registration should serve as warning in
adhering to the system. They highlighted the inherent difficulties in
launching the same such as environmental and geographical
challenges, lack of training and skills, mechanical breakdown, and
the need for re-registration. They even admitted that while biometrics
may address electoral fraud caused by multiple registrants, it does
not, however, solve other election-related problems such as vote-
buying and source-code manipulation.
Aside from treading on mere speculation, the insinuations are
improper. Clearly, petitioners submissions principally assail the
wisdom of the legislature in adopting the biometrics registration
system in curbing electoral fraud. In this relation, it is significant to
point out that questions relating to the wisdom, morality, or
practicability of statutes are policy matters that should not be
addressed to the judiciary. As elucidated in the case of Farias v. The
Executive Secretary:
[P]olicy matters are not the concern of the Court . Government
policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the
government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or
propriety of legislative determination . Indeed, whether an
enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic
theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results,
whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits
should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the
judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does
not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the exercise of its legislative power, Congress has a wide
latitude of discretion to enact laws, such as RA 10367, to combat
electoral fraud which, in this case, was through the establishment of
an updated voter registry. In making such choices to achieve its
desired result, Congress has necessarily sifted through the policys
wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less
reverse.W hether RA 10367 was wise or unwise, or was the best
means in curtailing electoral fraud is a question that does not present
a justiciable issue cognizable by the courts. Indeed, the reason
behind the legislatures choice of adopting biometrics registration
notwithstanding the experience of foreign countries, the difficulties in
its implementation, or its concomitant failure to address equally
pressing election problems, is essentially a policy question and,
hence, beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny.
VI.
Finally, petitioners proffer that Resolution No. 9863 which
fixed the deadline for validation on October 31, 2015 violates Section
8 of RA 8189 which states:
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The
personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be
conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular
office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during
the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election .
(Emphasis added.)
The position is, once more, wrong.
Aside from committing forum shopping by raising this issue
despite already being subject of a prior petition filed before this
Court, i.e., G.R. No. 220918,114 petitioners fail to consider that the
120- and 90-day periods stated therein refer to the prohibitive period
beyond which voter registration may no longer be conducted. As
already resolved in this Courts Resolution dated December 8, 2015
in G.R. No. 220918, the subject provision does not mandate
COMELEC to conduct voter registration up to such time; rather, it
only provides a period which may not be reduced, but may be
extended depending on the administrative necessities and other
exigencies.115 Verily, as the constitutional body tasked to enforce
and implement election laws, the COMELEC has the power to
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to fulfill its mandate.
Perforce, this power includes the determination of the periods to
accomplish certain pre-election acts, such as voter registration.
At this conclusory juncture, this Court reiterates that voter
registration does not begin and end with the filing of applications
which, in reality, is just the initial phase that must be followed by the
approval of applications by the ERB. Thereafter, the process of filing
petitions for inclusion and exclusion follows. These steps are
necessary for the generation of the final list of voters which, in turn,
is a pre-requisite for the preparation and completion of the Project of
Precincts (POP) that is vital for the actual elections. The POP
contains the number of registered voters in each precinct and
clustered precinct, the names of the barangays, municipalities, cities,
provinces, legislative districts, and regions included in the precincts,
and the names and locations of polling centers where each precinct
and clustered precinct are assigned. The POP is necessary to
determine the total number of boards of election inspectors to be
constituted, the allocation of forms and supplies to be procured for
the election day, the number of vote counting machines and other
paraphernalia to be deployed, and the budget needed. More
importantly, the POP will be used as the basis for the finalization of
the Election Management System (EMS) which generates the
templates of the official ballots and determines the voting jurisdiction
of legislative districts, cities, municipalities, and provinces. The EMS
determines the configuration of the canvassing and consolidation
system for each voting jurisdiction. Accordingly, as the constitutional
body specifically charged with the enforcement and administration of
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, the COMELEC should be
given sufficient leeway in accounting for the exigencies of the
upcoming elections. In fine, its measures therefor should be
respected, unless it is clearly shown that the same are devoid of any
reasonable justification.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED due to lack of merit.
The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on December 1,
2015 is consequently DISSOLVED.