Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No.
122156, February 3, 1997
DECISION
(En Banc)
BELLOSILLO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Pursuant to the privatization
program of the Philippine Government,
the GSIS sold in public auction its stake
in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only
2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of
the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58
per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition before the
Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to
allow it to match the bid of Renong
Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First
Policy enshrined in 10, paragraph 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos.
II. THE ISSUES
1. Whether 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision and does not need
implementing legislation to carry it into
effect;
2. Assuming 10, paragraph 2, Article XII
is self-executing, whether the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
form part of our patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term
State, hence, mandated to implement
10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the
Constitution; and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State,
whether it should give preference to the
petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over
Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in
the sale of the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation.
III. THE RULING
[The Court, voting 11-
4, DISMISSED the petition.]
1. YES, 10, paragraph 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
self-executing provision and does not
need implementing legislation to carry
it into effect.
Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is
couched in such a way as not to make it
appear that it is non-self-executing but
simply for purposes of style. But,
certainly, the legislature is not precluded
from enacting further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as the
contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to
the legislature without impairing the self-
executing nature of constitutional
provisions.
xxx
xxx xxx
Respondents . . . argue that the
non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10,
second par., of Art. XII is implied from the
tenor of the first and third paragraphs of
the same section which undoubtedly are
not self-executing. The argument is
flawed. If the first and third paragraphs
are not self-executing because Congress
is still to enact measures to encourage
the formation and operation of
enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in
the first paragraph, and the State still
needs legislation to regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within
its national jurisdiction, as in the third
paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same
logic, the second paragraph can only be
self-executing as it does not by its
language require any legislation in order
to give preference to qualified Filipinos in
the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony. A constitutional
provision may be self-executing in one
part and non-self-executing in another.
xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII
of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in
itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. From its very words
the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per
se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant
of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos, it means just that -
qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And
when our Constitution declares that a
right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject; consequently, if
there is no statute especially enacted to
enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which
all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is
a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. YES, the controlling shares
of the Manila Hotel Corporation form
part of our patrimony as a nation.
In its plain and ordinary
meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. When the Constitution speaks
of national patrimony, it refers not only to
the natural resources of the Philippines,
as the Constitution could have very well
used the term natural resources, but also
to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
xxx
xxx xxx
For more than eight (8) decades
Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to
the triumphs and failures, loves and
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence
is impressed with public interest; its own
historicity associated with our struggle for
sovereignty, independence and
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has
become part of our national economy and
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of
the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that
anyone who acquires or owns the 51%
will have actual control and management
of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the
MHC cannot be disassociated from the
hotel and the land on which the hotel
edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot
sustain respondents claim that
the Filipino First Policy provision is not
applicable since what is being sold is only
51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the Hotel building nor the
land upon which the building stands.
3. YES, GSIS is included in the
term State, hence, it is mandated to
implement 10, paragraph 2, Article XII
of the Constitution.
It is undisputed that the sale of
51% of the MHC could only be carried out
with the prior approval of the State acting
through respondent Committee on
Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the
sale of the assets of respondents GSIS
and MHC a state action. In
constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of
persons distinct from the government are
considered state action covered by the
Constitution (1) when the activity it
engages in is a public function; (2) when
the government is so significantly
involved with the private actor as to make
the government responsible for his
action; and, (3) when the government has
approved or authorized the action. It is
evident that the act of respondent GSIS
in selling 51% of its share in respondent
MHC comes under the second and third
categories of state action. Without
doubt therefore the transaction, although
entered into by respondent GSIS, is in
fact a transaction of the State and
therefore subject to the constitutional
command.
When the Constitution addresses
the State it refers not only to the people
but also to the government as elements
of the State. After all, government is
composed of three (3) divisions of power
- legislative, executive and
judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional
mandate directed to the State is
correspondingly directed to the three (3)
branches of government. It is undeniable
that in this case the subject constitutional
injunction is addressed among others to
the Executive Department and
respondent GSIS, a government
instrumentality deriving its authority from
the State.
4. YES, GSIS should give
preference to the petitioner in the sale
of the controlling shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation.
 It should be stressed that while the omnipresent to be simply
Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is disregarded. To ignore it would be to
not yet the winning bidder. The bidding sanction a perilous skirting of the basic
rules expressly provide that the highest law.
bidder shall only be declared the winning
bidder after it has negotiated and
executed the necessary contracts, and HON. EXECUTIVE SEC. ET, AL. VS.
secured the requisite approvals. Since SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES,
the Filipino First Policy provision of the INC.,
Constitution bestows preference G.R. No. 164171:
on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of
the highest bid is not an assurance that
the highest bidder will be declared the On January 16, 2004,
winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents respondents South wing Heavy
are not bound to make the award yet, nor
are they under obligation to enter into one Industries, Inc., (SOUTHWING) United
with the highest bidder. For in choosing Auctioneers, Inc. (UNITED
the awardee respondents are mandated AUCTIONEERS), and Microvan, Inc.
to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Constitution the provisions of which are (MICROVAN), instituted a declaratory
presumed to be known to all the bidders relief case docketed as Civil Case No.
and other interested parties.
20-0-04,[1] against the Executive
xxx Secretary, Secretary of Transportation
xxx xxx and Communication, Commissioner of

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding Customs, Assistant Secretary and Head

rules provides that [i]f for any reason the of the Land Transportation
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Office, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to
other Qualified Bidders that have validly (SBMA), Collector of Customs for the
submitted bids provided that these Port at Subic Bay Freeport Zone, and the
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the Chief of the Land Transportation Office
highest bid in terms of price per
share. Certainly, the constitutional at Subic Bay Freeport Zone.
mandate itself is reason enough not to SOUTHWING, UNITED
award the block of shares immediately to
AUCTIONEERS and MICROVAN prayed
the foreign bidder notwithstanding its
submission of a higher, or even the that judgment be rendered (1) declaring
highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156
of a stronger reason than the
unconstitutional and illegal; (2) directing
constitutional injunction itself.
the Secretary of Finance, Commissioner
In the instant case, where a of Customs, Collector of Customs and the
foreign firm submits the highest bid in a
public bidding concerning the grant of Chairman of the SBMA to allow the
rights, privileges and concessions importation of used motor vehicles; (2)
covering the national economy and ordering the Land Transportation Office
patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Filipino, there is no question that the and its subordinates inside
Filipino will have to be allowed to match the Subic Special Economic Zone to
the bid of the foreign entity. And if the
process the registration of the imported
Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm
the award should go to the Filipino. It used motor vehicles; and (3) in general,
must be so if we are to give life and to allow the unimpeded entry and
meaning to the Filipino First
importation of used motor vehicles
Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither subject only to the payment of the
be expressly stated nor contemplated in required customs duties.
the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is
 Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, is void
Upon filing of petitioners for being repugnant to the constitution.
answer/comment, The aforequoted decision of the
respondents SOUTHWING and MICROV Court of Appeals was elevated to this
AN filed a motion for summary judgment Court and docketed as G.R. No.
which was granted by the trial 168741. In a Resolution dated October 4,
court. On May 24, 2004, a summary 2005,[10] said case was consolidated with
judgment was rendered declaring that G.R. No. 164171 and G.R. No. 164172.
Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 Petitioners are now before this
constitutes an unlawful usurpation of Court contending that Article 2, Section
legislative power vested by the 3.1 of EO 156 is valid and applicable to
Constitution with Congress. The trial the entire country, including
court further held that the proviso is the Freeport. In support of their
contrary to the mandate of Republic Act arguments, they raise procedural and
No. 7227 (RA 7227) or the Bases substantive issues bearing on the
Conversion and Development Act of 1992 constitutionality of the assailed proviso.
which allows the free flow of goods and
capital within the Freeport. The ISSUES:
dispositive portion of the said decision 1.The procedural issues are: the
reads: lack of respondents locus standi to
question the validity of EO 156, the
From the foregoing decision, petitioners propriety of challenging EO 156 in a
sought relief before this Court via a declaratory relief proceeding and the
petition for review on certiorari, docketed applicability of a judgment on the
as G.R. No. 164171. he issuance of EO pleadings in this case.
156 spawned three separate actions for 2.substantive issues, which are:
declaratory relief before Branch 72 of (1) whether there is statutory basis for the
the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, issuance of EO 156; and (2) if the answer
all seeking the declaration of the is in the affirmative, whether the
unconstitutionality of Article 2, Section 3.1 application of Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO
of said executive order. The cases were 156, reasonable and within the scope
filed by herein respondent entities, who or provided by law.
whose members, are classified
as Subic Bay Freeport Enterprises and 1. In Commission on Audit of the
engaged in the business of, among Province of Cebu v. Province of Cebu,
[13]
others, importing and/or trading used the Court entertained a suit for
motor vehicles. declaratory relief to finally settle the doubt
as to the proper interpretation of the
Aggrieved, the petitioners in Civil
conflicting laws involved, notwithstanding
Case No. 30-0-2003, filed a petition for
a violation of the right of the party
certiorari[8] with the Court of Appeals (CA-
affected. We find no reason to deviate
G.R. SP. No. 83284) which denied the
from said ruling mindful of the
petition on February 14, 2005 and
significance of the present case to the
sustained the finding of the trial court that
national economy.
 So also, summary judgments the importation of used motor vehicles is
were properly rendered by the trial court an exercise of police power vested on the
because the issues involved in the instant legislature and absent any enabling law,
case were pure questions of law. A the exercise thereof by the President
motion for summary judgment is through an executive issuance, is void.
premised on the assumption that the Police power is inherent in a
issues presented need not be tried either government to enact laws, within
because these are patently devoid of constitutional limits, to promote the order,
substance or that there is no genuine safety, health, morals, and general
issue as to any pertinent fact. It is a welfare of society. It is lodged primarily
method sanctioned by the Rules of Court with the legislature. By virtue of a valid
for the prompt disposition of a civil action delegation of legislative power, it may
in which the pleadings raise only a legal also be exercised by the President and
issue, not a genuine issue as to any administrative boards, as well as the
[14]
material fact. lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels,
At any rate, even assuming the including the barangay.[16] Such
procedural flaws raised by petitioners delegation confers upon the
truly exist, the Court is not precluded from President quasi-legislative power which
brushing aside these technicalities and may be defined as the authority
taking cognizance of the action filed by delegated by the law-making body to the
respondents considering its importance to administrative body to adopt rules and
the public and in keeping with the duty to regulations intended to carry out the
determine whether the other branches of provisions of the law and implement
the government have kept themselves legislative policy.[17] To be valid, an
[15]
within the limits of the Constitution. administrative issuance, such as an
executive order, must comply with the
2.The main thrust of the petition is following requisites:
that EO 156 is constitutional because it
was issued pursuant to EO 226, the (1) Its promulgation must be
authorized by the legislature;
Omnibus Investment Code of the (2) It must be promulgated in
Philippines and that its application should accordance with the prescribed
procedure;
be extended to the Freeport because the
(3) It must be within the scope of
guarantee of RA 7227 on the free flow of the authority given by the
goods into the said zone is merely an legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.[18]
exemption from customs duties and taxes
on items brought into the Freeport and
A legislative rule, on the other
not an open floodgate for all kinds of
hand, is in the nature of subordinate
goods and materials without restriction.
legislation, crafted to implement a primary
legislation.
In G.R. No. 168741, the Court of
Appeals invalidated Article 2, Section 3.1
In Commissioner of Internal
of EO 156, on the ground of lack of any
Revenue v. Court of Appeals,
statutory basis for the President to issue
[26]
and Commissioner of Internal
the same. It held that the prohibition on
Revenue v. Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop,
Inc.,[27] the Court enunciated the
doctrine that when an administrative
rule goes beyond merely providing for the
means that can facilitate or render less
cumbersome the implementation of the
law and substantially increases the
burden of those governed, it behooves
the agency to accord at least to those
directly affected a chance to be heard
and, thereafter, to be duly informed,
before the issuance is given the force and
effect of law.
In Tiu v. Court of Appeals[46] as
reiterated in Coconut Oil Refiners
Association, Inc. v. Torres,[47] this
provision limiting the special privileges on
tax and duty-free importation in the
presently fenced-in former Subic Naval
Base has been declared valid and
constitutional and in accordance with RA
7227.
LUCILA TAN vs. Judge MAXWEL S.
ROSETE
Lucila Tan filed the instant complaint
against Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, former
Acting Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro
Manila,[1] for violation of Rule 140 of the
Revised Rules of Court and the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act
No. 3019).
The complaint alleged that Lucila Tan was
the private complainant in Criminal Case
No. 59440 and Criminal Case No. 66120,
both entitled People of the Philippines vs.
Alfonso Pe Sy and pending before
Branch 58, Metropolitan Trial Court of
San Juan, Metro Manila, then presided by
respondent judge. Before the cases were
decided, respondent judge allegedly sent
a member of his staff to talk to
complainant. They met at Sangkalan
Restaurant along Scout Albano, near
Timog Avenue in Quezon City. The staff
member told her that respondent was
asking for P150,000.00 in exchange for
the non-dismissal of the cases. She was
shown copies of respondent judges
Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440
and 66120, both still unsigned, dismissing
the complaints against the accused. She
was told that respondent judge would
reverse the disposition of the cases as
soon as she remits the amount
demanded. The staff member allowed
complainant to keep the copy of the draft
decision in Criminal Case No.
59440. Complainant, however, did not
accede to respondents demand because
she believed that she had a very strong
case, well supported by evidence. The
criminal cases were eventually dismissed
by respondent judge.[2]
Respondent judge, in his Comment,
denied the allegations of complainant. He
instead stated that it was complainant
who attempted to bribe him in exchange
for a favorable decision. She even tried to
delay and to derail the promulgation of
the decisions in Criminal Cases Nos.
59440 and 66120. Complainant also
sought the intervention of then San Juan
Mayor, Jinggoy Estrada, to obtain
judgment in her favor. Mayor Estrada
allegedly talked to him several times to
ask him to help complainant. The former
even called him over the phone when he
was in New Zealand, persuading him to
hold in abeyance the promulgation of the
Decisions in said cases. But he politely
declined, telling him that there was no
sufficient evidence to convict the
accused, and moreover, he had already
turned over the Decisions to Judge
Quilatan for promulgation. Respondent
further stated that complainant kept
bragging about her close relations with
Mayor Estrada who was her neighbor in
Greenhills, San Juan, and even
insinuated that she could help him get
appointed to a higher position provided
he decides the suits in her
favor. Respondent judge also claimed
that complainant offered to give cash for
the down payment of a car he was
planning to buy. But he refused the
offer. Finally, respondent judge denied
that a member of his staff gave
complainant a copy of his draft decision
in Criminal Case No. 59440. He said that
he had entrusted to Judge Quilatan his
Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440
and 66120 before he left for New Zealand
on study leave. Thus, he asserted that it
was impossible for him to thereafter
change the resolution of the cases and it
was likewise impossible for any member
of his staff to give complainant copies of
said Decisions.[3]
In a resolution dated December 2, 2002,
the Court referred the complaint to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City for investigation,
report and recommendation.[4]
First Vice Executive Judge Edwin A.
Villasor conducted several hearings on
the administrative case. Only complainant
Lucila Tan testified for her side. She
presented as documentary evidence the
copy of the unsigned Decision in Criminal
Case No. 59440 dated February 23, 2001
which was allegedly handed to her by a
member of respondent judges staff.
[5]
Respondent judge, on the other hand,
presented four (4) witnesses: Josefina
Ramos, Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), Fernando
B. Espuerta, and Joyce Trinidad
Hernandez. His documentary evidence
consists of the affidavits of his witnesses,
[6]
copy of the Motion for Reconsideration
in Criminal Case No. 59440,[7] and
various documents composed of the
machine copy of the Order of Arrest in
Criminal Case No. 117219, machine copy
of the letter dated December 29, 1997,
machine copy of Certification dated Nov
13, 2000, front and dorsal sides of Check
No. QRH-0211804, Bank Statement
dated March 31, 1998, Stop Payment
Order dated April 6, 1998, Current
Account Inquiry, and Transaction Record,
which documents were allegedly given by
complainant to respondents witness,
Fernando B.
ISSUE:
The issue in this administrative
case thus boils down to a determination
of the credibility of the parties evidence.
After a thorough evaluation of the
testimonies of all the witnesses, as well
as the documentary evidence presented
by both parties, we find the complainants
version more trustworthy.
We have repeatedly admonished our
judges to adhere to the highest tenets of
judicial conduct. They must be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence. Like Caesars wife, a
judge must not only be pure but above
suspicion. This is not without reason. The
exacting standards of conduct demanded
from judges are designed to promote
public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary because the
peoples confidence in the judicial system
is founded not only on the magnitude of
legal knowledge and the diligence of the
members of the bench, but also on the
highest standard of integrity and moral
uprightness they are expected to
possess. When the judge himself
becomes the transgressor of any law
which he is sworn to apply, he places his
office in disrepute, encourages disrespect
for the law and impairs public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount
that a judges personal behavior both in
the performance of his duties and his
daily life, be free from any appearance of
impropriety as to be beyond reproach.[12]
Respondents act of sending a member of
his staff to talk with complainant and
show copies of his draft decisions, and
his act of meeting with litigants outside
the office premises beyond office hours
violate the standard of judicial conduct
required to be observed by members of
the Bench. They constitute gross
misconduct which is punishable under
Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Respondent Judge
Maxwel S. Rosete is SUSPENDED from
office without salary and other benefits
for FOUR (4) MONTHS.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 03-11-30-SC. June 9, 2005]
COMPLAINT OF MR. AURELIO
INDENCIA
ARRIENDA vs. JUSTICES REYNATO
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This administrative case was
spawned by the November 10, 2003
affidavit of complaint filed by complainant
Aurelio Indencia Arrienda with the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA). In his
complaint, the complainant accused
Associate Justices Reynato S. Puno,
Santiago M. Kapunan,[1] Bernardo P.
Pardo[2] and Consuelo Ynares-Santiago
of this Court, Court Administrator
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., and Associate
Justices B.A. Adefuin-de la Cruz[3] and
Perlita Tria Tirona of the Court of Appeals
(CA), of graft and corruption.[4]
In particular, the complainant charged
the respondent justices for willfully,
maliciously and arbitrarily rendering
allegedly unjust decisions in (RTC) Civil
Case No. Q-53060, CA-G.R. CV No.
48737 and G.R. No. 137904 which were
filed by complainant and his family
against the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) and Crispina
de la Cruz. He also charged them with
willfully, maliciously and arbitrarily
suppressing evidence and resorting to
a modus operandi or the so-called 1-2-3
to swindle or defraud him and his family
by simply issuing minute resolutions
based on technicalities without having
passed upon the unresolved issues and
those other issues that were resolved
contrary to laws, rules on evidence, etc.[5]
The complainant outlined the alleged
1-2-3 modus operandi or swindling
scheme as follows:
1. Then Judge now CA Associate
Justice Tirona, as presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 102, in her December
2, 1984 decision in Civil Case
No. Q-53060 dismissed the
complaint for annulment of
contract, reconveyance and
damages filed by the
complainant and his co-
plaintiffs against the GSIS and
de la Cruz.
2. The Eleventh Division of the
CA, with then CA Associate
Justice now Court
Administrator Velasco
as ponente, in the October 30,
1988 decision in CA-G.R. CV
No. 48737, affirmed the
decision of the RTC in toto.
Then CA Associate Justice
Ynares-Santiago, now a
member of this Court, and CA
Associate Justice Adefuin-de
la Cruz, now retired, concurred
in the decision.
3. The First Division of this Court,
through Justice Puno, denied
the petition for review of the
complainant and his co-
petitioners and affirmed the
decision of the CA in the
October 19, 2001 decision in
G.R. No. 137904 entitled vda.
de Urbano v. Government
Service Insurance System.
[6]
The decision was concurred
in by the other members of the
First Division, namely, Chief
Justice Davide as chairman,
and Justices Kapunan and
Pardo.[7]
The complainant accused the
respondent justices of acting on the basis
of personal considerations when they
decided the case against him and his
family. He alleged that they acted like the
lawyers of GSIS and de la Cruz. He
described the adverse decisions as acts
of betrayal of public trust.[8]
The complainant branded the
respondent justices as Crooks in Robes
and Swindlers in Robes who gypped him
and his family of their right to due
process. He also labeled them as corrupt
justices. who were only sowing judicial
terrorism. [9]
He claimed that the Chief Justice
relinquished his competence, integrity,
probity and independence as the highest
magistrate of the land by refusing to take
a last look at the merits of complainants
case.[14] Further, he labeled the Chief
Justice as the Chief-Swindler-in-Robe
and the one who has contributed to the
build-up of graft and corruption in the
judiciary, in the government service and
in our society.[15]
 Because of his offensive and
disrespectful statements, the complainant
was ordered to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt for
attempting to foist falsehood on the Court
and committing grave abuse of court
processes.
There is only one Supreme Court
from whose decisions all other courts are
required to take their bearings. [31] While
most of the Courts work is performed by
its three divisions, the Court remains one
court single, unitary, complete and
supreme. Flowing from this is the fact
that, while individual justices may dissent
or only partially concur, when the Court
states what the law is, it speaks with only
one voice.[32] Any doctrine or principle of
law laid down by the Court may be
modified or reversed only by the Court en
banc.[33]
The right to criticize, guaranteed by
the freedom of speech and of expression
under the Constitution, must be exercised
responsibly for every right carries with it a
corresponding obligation.[39] True freedom
is not freedom divorced from
responsibility but freedom coupled with
responsibility.[40]
Freedom of speech and expression,
like other constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute. It is subject to the limitations of
equally important public interests such as
the maintenance of the integrity and
orderly functioning of the administration
of justice.[41]
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the
use of foul language which ridicules the
high esteem for the courts, creates or
promotes distrust in judicial
administration, or tends to undermine the
confidence of the people in the integrity of
the members of this Court and to degrade
the administration of justice by this Court;
or offensive, abusive and abrasive
language; or disrespectful, offensive,
manifestly baseless and malicious
statements in pleadings or in a letter
addressed to the judge; or disparaging,
intemperate, and uncalled for remarks.[42]
The loathsome epithets hurled by the
complainant against the respondent
justices, e.g., Crooks in Robe, Swindlers
in Robe, corrupt justices who were only
sowing judicial terrorism, as well as his
vilification of the Chief Justice whom he
called Chief-Swindler-in-Robe, go beyond
the bounds of acceptable behavior.
WHEREFORE, the complaint of
Aurelio Indencia Arrienda against
Supreme Court Justices Reynato S.
Puno, Santiago M. Kapunan (Ret.),
Bernardo P. Pardo (Ret.) and Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago, Court Administrator
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., CA Justices
Bennie Adefuin-De la Cruz (Ret.) and
Perlita Tria-Tirona, is hereby DISMISSED
with finality. Furthermore, he is found
guilty of contempt of court and a FINE of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) is
hereby imposed on him, payable within
ten days from receipt of this resolution
under pain of imprisonment. He is hereby
warned that any repetition hereof shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
GERMAN MACHINERIES G.R. NO.
156810
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
EDDIE D.
ENDAYA, Promulgated:Respondent.
November 25, 2004
Before us is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the November 14, 2002
Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 71460[2] which dismissed
the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner; and the January 16, 2003
Resolution[3] denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration.
The antecedents of the case as
summarized by the labor arbiter are as
follows:
Complainant [Eddie Endaya] alleged that
he was employed by respondent
company on January 18, 1993, [as a] car
painter with a salary of P8,000.00 a
month for work performed from 7:30 A.M.
to 5:15 P.M., Monday to Friday; that
before March 1, 1999, he requested
management that his SSS premiums
already deducted from his salary be
remitted to the SSS but management did
not pay attention to his request; that on
March 29, 1999, he filed a complaint with
the Social Security System against
respondent company for failure to remit
his SSS premiums; that when
management learned about his
complaint, he was reprimanded and
became the object of harassment; that he
was shouted at and belittled; that on
August 27, 1999, he at first refused to
paint the trusses of the newly-constructed
building, an extension of office of
respondent company because his
position is that of a car painter, not that of
a construction worker and besides he
finds difficulty working in high places as
he was not trained for the purpose; but,
later, he consented to do the painting job;
that at about 11:00 A.M., he felt thirsty, so
he went down to drink; but when he was
about to go back to work, Mr. Andy
Junginger who asked him where he came
from got irked when told that he
(complainant) went down to drink and,
immediately, told complainant to get his
separation pay from the Cashier and go
home as he was already terminated.
Complainant also alleged that on
September 6, 1999, he reported for work
but he was surprised that Mr. Joseph
Baclig handed him letters of suspension,
dated August 27, 1999 and September 6,
1999 and he was told to go home; that he
reported for work several times thereafter
but he was told to stop reporting for work
since his services were already
terminated as of August 27, 1999.
Complainant, thus, contends that he was
illegally dismissed.
Controverting complainants allegations,
respondents averred that complainant
was employed, as painter, on January 18,
1993, with a salary of P8,000.00; that he
was performing well in the first years in
his employment but in the later years,
particularly in July and August 1999, he
became lazy, inefficient and hardheaded;
that on August 27, 1999, after an
investigation, complainant was
suspended for acts of insubordination on
August 23, 1999, when he did not follow
instruction of the company president who
asked him to help and assist a co-worker
and instead turned his back on the
president as if he heard nothing; that
complainant was also warned of several
offenses, such as (a) negligence in the
performance of his work in quality and
efficiency, for doing a below par painting
job, (b) evading work by leaving the
working area without permission of his
superior, (c) showing no interest in his
work, (d) not cooperating or supporting
co-employees during work, and (e)
cutting short working time; that when
complainant returned to work on
September 6, 1999, after his suspension,
he was observed to be working
halfheartedly, did not cooperate with his
co-employees and did not follow
instructions of his superiors for which
respondent called his attention in a
Memorandum dated September 6, 1999;
that after he received the Memorandum,
complainant never reported for work; and
that respondent sent a Memorandum
requiring complainant to explain his
absences from work, which Memorandum
was received by complainants wife on
September, 28, 1999; and that thereafter,
nothing was heard of the complainant.
Further, respondents alleged that
deductions from complainants salary
were amounts authorized by law or with
the authority of complainant; that he was
paid his holiday pay, five (5) days service
incentive leave pay, 13th month pay for
1999 and vacation and sick leaves; that
complainant has unpaid cash advances
in the total amount of P8,600.00 secured
from May, 1998 to May, 1999 for
enrollment of his children, hospitalization
of his parents, medicine and other
personal family needs; that his sick leave,
vacation leave and incentive leave had
been fully paid by way of cash advances
given to him on July 5, 1999, for the
death of his father.
Respondents contended that complainant
was never dismissed but he was the one
who voluntarily left the company after his
attention was called by management to
his inefficiency and bad attitude toward
his co-employees and superiors, which is
chaotic and disorderly and troublesome;
and that respondents offered to accept
complainant back during the preliminary
conference but he declined the offer and
demanded payment of backwages and to
be allowed to finish his painting job
contract.
Respondents, thus, contend that
complainant was never dismissed.[4]
On January 8, 2001, the Labor Arbiter
rendered judgment in favor of herein
respondent, ratiocinating as follows:
On the first issue whether or not
complainant was illegally dismissed it has
invariably been ruled by the Supreme
Court that, in termination cases, the
burden of proof rests on the respondent
to show that the dismissal is for a just
cause and when there is no showing of a
clear, valid and legal cause for the
termination of employment, the law
considers that matter a case of illegal
dismissal. (See Cosep, et. al. vs. NLRC,
et. al., G. R. No. 124960, June 6, 1998).
In this case, the respondents contend
that complainant abandoned his work and
submitted in evidence a Memorandum
dated September 15, 1999 (Annex E,
Position Paper for respondent), stating:
Date: September 15, 1999
To : EDDIE D. ENDAYA
From: EBERHARD JUNGINGER
Memo: Absence from work
Since the time you had received the
memo dated September 6, 1999
you choose not to report for work since
then, and you did not also reply this
memo as required.
Please explain why you do not like to
work, and if you fail to do so you can be
considered having abandoned your work.
Also you have failed to explain our
charge of insubordination as stated in our
memo.
Very truly yours,
German Machineries Corporation
(Sgd.) Eberhard Junginger
Said Memorandum appears to have been
received by one Margie Endaya on
September 28, 1999. (Annex E-1, ibid.)
We note, however, that complainant has
filed a complaint with the Department of
Labor and Employment, National Capital
Region, on August 30, 1999, charging the
respondents of illegal dismissal (Annex F,
ibid.). Summons was issued by the Chief,
Industrial Relations Division of DOLE-
NCR on September 13, 1999, ordering
the parties to appear at the DOLE-NCR
on September 24, 1999, at 10:00 A.M.
There is, thus, good reason to believe
that the said Memorandum, dated
September 15, 1999, was issued by
respondent Junginger for the purpose of
justifying the prior illegal dismissal of
complainant.
Besides, abandonment is inconsistent
with the filing of a complaint for illegal
dismissal seeking reinstatement, as in
this case.
As regards respondents charges of
absenteeism, painting job contract, bad
attitude towards co-employees and
superior and alleged bad working habits,
suffice it to state that complainant was not
asked to explain his said offenses and,
therefore, the same cannot constitute as
valid causes for dismissal of the
complainant.
From all the foregoing, it is clear that
complainant did not abandon his work
and respondent has no just or authorized
cause to terminate the services of the
complainant.[5]
The dispositive portion of the Labor
Arbiters decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. declaring the dismissal of
complainant to be without a just or
authorized cause and, therefore,
illegal;
2. ordering respondent German
Machineries Corporation to reinstate the
complainant to his former position without
loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to pay complainant his full
backwages inclusive of allowances and
other benefits, computed from August 27,
1999 up to his actual reinstatement. As of
the date of this Decision, complainants
full backwages totaled P143,884.06.
Should reinstatement of complainant be
no longer feasible due to some valid
reasons, respondent German
Machineries Corporation is ordered to
pay to complainant in addition to his full
backwages, separation pay equivalent to
one (1) month salary for every year of
service, a fraction of at least six (6)
months to be computed as one (1) whole
year.
3. Ordering respondent German
Machineries Corporation to pay to
complainant the amount equivalent to ten
(10%) percent of the total award in this
decision as attorneys fees.
The other claims of complainant are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Aggrieved by the Labor Arbiters decision,
herein petitioner filed an appeal with the
National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).
In a decision promulgated on
February 28, 2002, the NLRC affirmed,
with modification, the Labor Arbiters
decision. Accordingly, it disposed of the
case as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision
of January 8, 2001 is hereby MODIFIED
in that the award of 10% attorneys fees
shall be based on awards representing
13thmonth pay and service incentive leave
pay.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied
by the NLRC in a resolution promulgated
on April 19, 2002.[8]
On July 3, 2002, herein petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction with the Court of
Appeals assailing the aforementioned
decision and resolution of the NLRC.[9]
On November 14, 2002, the Court of
Appeals issued the herein assailed
resolution dismissing the petition
for certiorari,[10] to wit:
It is axiomatic that for a writ of preliminary
injunction to prosper, it must be shown
that the invasion of the right sought to be
protected is material and substantial, that
the right of complainant is clear and
unmistakable, and that there is an urgent
and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage.
In the present petition, the foregoing
circumstances are not present. The
findings of fact by the Labor Arbiter were
affirmed by public respondent to the
effect that private respondent Eddie
Endaya was illegally dismissed by
petitioner. It therefore pains us to
conclude that private respondent stands
to suffer more due to the said illegal
dismissal. Such that, it is the private
respondent who may suffer irreparable
injury should the writ for preliminary
injunction be issued. Such being the
case, the prayer for the issuance of a
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction is hereby DENIED for LACK
OF MERIT.
Insofar as the prayer of private
respondent for the immediate dismissal of
the instant petition is concerned, we find
merit in the same. The factual issues
raised in the instant petition had already
been passed upon by public respondent.
As such, we give our imprimatur to the
same since it is in agreement with that of
the Labor Arbiter, and hence deems (sic)
binding and conclusive on us.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED for LACK OF MERIT
and that the questions raised are too
UNSUBSTANTIAL to require
consideration.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the appellate court
denied the same in a resolution issued on
January 16, 2003.[12]
On March 7, 2003, petitioner filed the
present petition for review
on certiorari with prayer for the issuance
of temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction.
On September 24, 2003, this Court
issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the enforcement of the disputed
resolutions of the Court of Appeals, as
well as the writ of execution dated
October 21, 2002, issued by Labor Arbiter
Aliman D. Mangandog in connection with
the decision dated February 28, 2002 and
resolution dated April 18, 2002, issued by
the NLRC.
In the present petition, petitioner
contends that:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS HAS VIOLATED THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION THAT
NO DECISION SHALL BE RENDERED
BY ANY COURT WITHOUT
EXPRESSING CLEARLY AND
DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW
ON WHICH IT IS BASED.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS HAS CLEARLY NOT ONLY
FAILED TO CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD BUT ALSO
MISAPPRECIATED THEM TO THE
DAMAGE AND PREJUDICE OF
PETITIONER:
A. THE HONORABLE APPELLATE
COURT IN SUMMARILY DISMISSING
THE PETITION ALLOWED THE
ASSAILED DECISION OF THE LABOR
ARBITER, AS AFFIRMED BY THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, TO STAY, IN VIOLATION
OF THE TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLES,
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
B. THE HONORABLE APPELLATE
COURT DEVIATED FROM
ESTABLISHED RULES AND
PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE PROPER
RESOLUTION OF THE CASE
PRESENTED BEFORE IT.[13]
In its first assigned error, petitioner
asserts that the Court of Appeals issued
the above-quoted resolution without any
analysis of the evidence of the parties or
reference to any legal basis. As such, it
violated Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which provides that:
No decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court
shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the legal basis therefor.
We are not persuaded.
The assailed resolution is not the
decision contemplated under Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution. The
mandate embodied in this constitutional
provision is applicable only in cases
submitted for decision i.e., given due
course and after the filing of briefs or
memoranda and/or other pleadings, but
not where a resolution is issued denying
due course to a petition and stating the
legal basis thereof.[14] Thus, when the
court, after deliberating on a petition and
subsequent pleadings, decides to deny
due course to the petition and states that
the questions raised are factual or there
is no reversible error in the respondent
courts decision, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional
requirement.[15] In the present case, the
Court of Appeals denied due course and
outrightly dismissed the petition
for certiorari filed by herein petitioner on
the grounds that the factual issues had
already been passed upon by the NLRC,
and since its factual findings are in
agreement with the findings of the labor
arbiter, the same are binding and
conclusive upon the Court of Appeals;
and that the questions raised are too
unsubstantial to require consideration.
We find these legal bases in conformity
with the requirements of the Constitution.
The writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65
of the Rules of Court is a prerogative writ,
never demandable as a matter of right,
never issued except in the exercise of
judicial discretion.[16] Moreover, the
second paragraph of Section 8, Rule
65[17] of the Rules of Court provides that
the court may dismiss a petition
for certiorariif it finds the same to be
patently without merit, prosecuted
manifestly for delay, or that the questions
raised therein are too unsubstantial to
require consideration.
Furthermore, a reading of the
petition filed with the Court of Appeals
shows that the main issue raised is
factual as it questions the finding of the
NLRC that respondent Endaya was
illegally dismissed from his employment.
Petitioner brought up issues the
resolution of which necessarily involves a
review of the evidence presented by both
parties. It is settled that resort to a
judicial review of the decisions of the
NLRC in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court is confined only to issues
of want or excess of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the
rendering tribunal, board or office. [18] It
does not include an inquiry as to the
correctness of the evaluation of evidence
which was the basis of the labor official or
officer in determining his conclusion.[19] It
is not for the appellate court to reexamine
conflicting evidence, reevaluate the
credibility of witnesses nor substitute the
findings of fact of an administrative
tribunal which has gained expertise in its
specialized field. Considering that the
findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC are supported by evidence on
record, the same must be accorded due
respect and finality.[20]
In its second assigned error,
petitioner would have us review the
factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC. Settled is the rule that the
findings of the Labor Arbiter, when
affirmed by the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals, are binding on the Supreme
Court, unless patently erroneous. It is not
the function of the Supreme Court to
analyze or weigh all over again the
evidence already considered in the
proceedings below.[21] The jurisdiction of
this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari is limited to reviewing only
errors of law, not of fact, unless the
factual findings being assailed are not
supported by evidence on record or the
impugned judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts.[22] We find none
of these exceptions in the present case.
Petitioners main asseveration is
that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
erred in finding that respondent Endaya
was illegally dismissed from his
employment. A perusal of the records at
hand convinces us otherwise. We agree
with the Labor Arbiters conclusion that
the Memorandum dated September 15,
1999 was simply an afterthought on the
part of the petitioner. In the same
manner, we find that the suspension letter
dated August 27, 1999 and the
memorandum of September 6, 1999
addressed to Endaya were merely issued
to justify his prior illegal dismissal. Aside
from the letter dated August 27, 1999,
which Endaya claimed to have been
given to him only on September 6, 1999,
petitioner failed to present proof that
Endaya was indeed suspended prior to
the filing of his complaint for illegal
dismissal on August 30, 1999. If Endaya
was in fact suspended, there should have
been a record of proceedings taken by
petitioner to investigate the latters alleged
infractions before suspending him; or at
the least, petitioner should have handed
out a memorandum, like the ones it
subsequently issued, calling Endayas
attention for his shortcomings or directing
him to explain his side. Despite
petitioners claim that there was an
investigation, we find no evidence to this
effect. Hence, we are led to no
conclusion other than the fact that the
letter of suspension dated August 27,
1999 and the memorandums of
September 6, 1999 and September 15,
1999 were all issued as a means of
validating the prior illegal dismissal of
Endaya.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition
is DENIED and the temporary restraining
order issued on September 24, 2003 is
forthwith LIFTED. The Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dated November 14,
2002 and January 16, 2003
are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 88954 October 29, 1992
DATU SAMAD MANGELEN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, PEDRO HABALAYUS and
HABALAYUS ENTERPRISES,
INC.,respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review is the
Resolution dated 12 July 1989 of the
public respondent Court of Appeals, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 04585, 1 reversing its
previous Decision therein of 30 January
1989 2 which affirmed in toto the 15
August 1984 Decision of Branch 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in
Civil Case No. 84-22306 entitled DATU
SAMAD MANGELEN vesus
HABALUYUS ENTERPRISES,
INC., and PEDRO J. HABALUYAS. 3 The
dispositive portion of the RTC Decision
reads:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered
as follows:
1. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and
severally, the plaintiff the sum of
P600,000.00 plus interest thereon at the
rate of 12% per annum from the date of
formal demand on May 25,1983, until the
same is fully paid; and
2 Ordering the same defendants to pay
plaintiff, jointly and severally, the additional
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages;
another P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and the amount of P100,000.00
as attorney's fees.
Defendants are further ordered to pay the
costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED. 4
Civil Case No. 84-22306 involved an
action for the recovery of the amount of
P600,000.00 which defendant, now
private respondent Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc., represented by its
President, private respondent Pedro
Habaluyas, bound itself to pay plaintiff,
now petitioner, by virtue of a Compromise
Agreement.
Instead of filing an Answer within the
reglementary period private respondents
submitted a motion to dismiss the case
on the ground of improper venue, which
the trial court denied in its Order of 24
February 1984. The private respondents
then filed a supplemental motion to
dismiss, dated 9 March 1984, alleging as
ground therefore the pendency of another
case in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. This was followed, on 28
March 1984, by a second supplemental
motion to dismiss amplifying on the
ground of lis pendens and reply to the
opposition to the first supplemental
motion to dismiss. Both supplemental
motions were denied by the trial court in
its Order of 4 April 1984. On 11 April
1984, private respondents filed an urgent
motion to reconsider said order which
was likewise denied by the court on 30
May 1984. Although they received a copy
of the denial order on 5 June 1984,
private respondents still did not file any
answer to the complaint. Consequently,
on 22 June 1984, petitioner filed a motion
to declare defendants in default and to be
allowed to present evidence ex-
parte, which the trial court granted in its
25 June 1984 Order. Pursuant thereto,
petitioner presented his evidence ex-
parte on 16 July 1984.5
On 24 July 1984, defendant filed a motion
to set aside the order of default and to
hold in abeyance further proceedings on
the ground that they had filed with the
then Intermediate Appellate Court on 12
July 1984 a petition for certiorari raising
the issues of improper venue, lack of
jurisdiction and litis pendencia. That case
was docketed as A.C.-G.R. No. 03742. 6
On 27 July 1984, after considering in
open court the said motion, and
petitioner's opposition thereto and in view
of the absence of a restraining order from
the Intermediate Appellate Court
enjoining the trial court from proceeding
with the case, the latter issued an order
denying the defendants' motion to set
aside the order of default. The
order 7 reads:
For lack of merit, as the Court considers
defendants were grossly and excusably
negligent, for it appears that defendants
had until June 19, 1984 within which to
submit their responsive pleading but they
failed to do so; that the Petition
for Certiorari (for (sic) which this Court
has no copy up to the present) which they
allegedly filed with the Honorable
Intermediate Appellate Court was made
supposedly on July 12, 1984 only; that
defendants knew as early as July 2, 1984
of the Order of Default and of the ex-
parte presentation of plaintiff's evidence
scheduled on July 16th, yet defendants'
Motion to Set Aside Order of Default and
To Hold in abeyance Further Proceedings
is hereby denied.
Thereafter, on 15 August 1984, the trial
court rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioner based on the evidence
submitted ex-parte; the dispositive portion
of said decision was quoted earlier. It
made the following findings of fact:
Plaintiff (Datu Samad Mangelen) has a
logging concession consisting of 3,000
hectares, under O.T.L. No. 463-123165
located somewhere in Datalblao,
Columbia, Sultan Kudarat. This logging
concession of the plaintiff, the extent and
boundaries of which are as indicated in
the red lines named "Datu Samad
Mangelen", marked Exhibit L-1, appears
to be included in the logging concession
located on same general vicinity under
T.L.A. 229 with an aggregate area of
50,000 hectares, more or less,
supposedly granted defendants
Habalayus Enterprises, Inc. (Exh. L).
On November 2, 1981, the plaintiff, by
means of a letter addressed to the
President of the Philippines, requested
that this logging concession be
segregated from that awarded the
defendant Habalayus Enterprises, Inc.
(Exh. A). The matter was referred by the
President to then Minister of Natural
Resources (Exh. B). Thereafter, acting in
behalf of Minister Pea, Special Assistant
Felipe Corleto of said Ministry endorsed
the matter to Director Edmundo Cortes of
the Bureau of Forest Development,
Central Office (Exh. C). Upon receipt by
the latter government functionary of the
papers, he immediately directed the
Regional Director of the same Bureau at
Cotabato City to advise Habaluyas
Enterprises to stop its present logging
operation inside the area awarded to the
plaintiff until such time as the requested
petition shall had (sic) been acted upon.
Meanwhile, the parties were directed to
appear in a conference on January 5,
1983, to be presided over by an official of
the bureau (Exh. D). The meeting was
thereafter reset to February 2, 1983, as
there had been no complete proposal as
yet for settlement. On the latter date,
defendant Atty. Habaluyas appeared with
a proposed Compromise Agreement.
After studying the matter, plaintiff
suggested, and his suggestion was
heeded, that the consideration for the
Compromise Agreement would be the
waiver on the part of the plaintiff of
whatever rights he may have over his
logging concession in favor of the
defendants (Exh. E-2). The Compromise
Agreement was thus finalized between
the parties, more specially (sic) the
plaintiff as the Second Party and the
defendant Pedro (sic) Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc. represented by its
President, defendant Pedro Habaluyas,
as the First Party. The pertinent text of
their agreement, embodied in Exhibit E, is
as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, in pursuance
hereof and as gesture (sic) of gratitude
and good faith, the FIRST PARTY has
agree (sic), as he hereby agrees, to give
to the SECOND PARTY the total amount
of SIX THOUSAND (sic) (6,000.00)
PESOS, one fourth of the amount of
P150,000.00 (sic) shall be paid and/or
delivered on February 28, 1983 and the
remaining balance of P300,000.00 shall
be paid in three (3) equal installment
(sic) with a 30-day interval, beginning
April 30, 1983.
For this (sic) part, and as a manifestation
of reciprocity, the SECOND PARTY
agreed, as he hereby agrees, to continue
helping in the concession area of the
FIRST PARTY and that he and his heirs
and successors-in-interests (sic) are
hereby relinquishing or waiving whatever
right they have over a portion of the area
granted to the FIRST PARTY by the
government under TLA No. 229;
That finally, this compromise agreement
shall be subject to the approval of the
Bureau of Forest Development.
Parenthetically, as already stated, the
Compromise Agreement was executed by
the parties in the presence of witnesses
and duly sworn to, and approved by, Asst.
Director Doroteo U. Antonio of the Bureau
of Forest Development.
Despite the compromise, defendant
refused to issue checks in compliance
therewith, thus prompting plaintiff to
complain to the Bureau of Forest
Development. Said office, thru its
Assistant Director Antonio, responded by
directing compliance by defendants of
(sic) the Compromise Agreement as
shown in the Order marked Exhibit F. The
said Order also directed therein
respondent, herein defendant Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc., to refrain from
continuing with the logging operation
inside the area complained of by the
herein plaintiff.
A consequence of the issuance of the
Order marked as Exhibit F was the act of
the defendant in later issuing two (2)
post-dated checks in favor of the plaintiff.
The first was dated April 11, 1983, for the
amount of P150,000.00 payable to Mayor
Samad Mangelen which is an Allied
Banking Corporation check and under the
signature of defendant Atty. Pedro
Habaluyas (Exh. G), while the second
was dated April 24, 1983, for the same
amount, payee, maker (sic) and with the
same bank (Exh. H).
On or about April 28, 1983, defendant
Atty. Habaluyas advised plaintiff, thru the
Barangay Captain of the place where
plaintiff's logging concession is situated,
to inform the plaintiff that the two (2)
checks that were issued last April 15,
1983, were to be encashed or negotiated
(Ipasok) on May 2, 1983 (Exh. I). When
the two checks were negotiated to (sic)
the bank concerned, both of the checks
were dishonored on the ground of
insufficiency of funds of the marker
thereof. Demands were thereafter made
on the defendants to make good the two
checks, but despite these verbal
demands, there was no favorable
response on the part of the defendants.
Plaintiff was thus constrained to write a
formal demand letter dated May 25,
1983, giving the defendants fifteen (15)
days from receipt thereof within which to
make good the two checks that had
bounced (Exh. J). The original of said
letter was received on May 25, 1983 by
the defendants (Exh. G-1). Not still (sic)
heeding the demands of the plaintiff, the
latter was compelled to initiate two
criminal complaints for Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known
as the bouncing Check Law , against
defendant Pedro Habaluyas. The
necessary Informations were filed with
the Makati Branch of the regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
where they are now pending (Exhs. K
and K-1).
The present action was filed by the
plaintiff to recover the entire amount of
plaintiff to recover the entire amount of
P600,000.00 that defendant promised to
pay him per the Compromise Agreement,
plus interest from date of demand until
fully satisfied; moral damages due to the
embarassment, sleepless nights and
other sufferings of the plaintiff resulting
from defendants' obstinate refusal to
comply with their undertaking under the
Compromise Agreement (TSN, pages 17
to 17, July 16, 1984 Hearing); attorney's
fees of P100,000.00 which plaintiff had
promised to pay his counsel, of which
50% had already been paid; and the
premium payments on the Indemnity
Bond and the Sheriff's Fees and other
litigation expenses incurred by the plaintiff
in the prosecution of this case. 8
Not satisfied with the aforesaid judgment,
private respondents interposed an appeal
before the Intermediate Appellate Court.
During the pendency of the appeal,
specifically on 7 January 1985, the Fourth
Division of said Court dismissed the
petition of private respondents in AC-G.R.
No. 03742. Their subsequent petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court to set aside the dismissal was
denied by this Court in the resolution of 3
July 1985; the motion to reconsider the
same was likewise denied by this Court
on 9 October 1985. 9
In the Appellants' Brief filed with the
public respondent, private respondents
impute upon the trial court the
commission of the following errors:
I. . . . IN FINDING THE DEFENDANTS
GROSSLY AND INEXCUSABLE
NEGLIGENT AND DECLARING THEM
IN DEFAULT AND RECEIVING
EVIDENCE EX-PARTE.
II . . . IN FINDING THE DEFENDANTS
LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF IN THE
AMOUNT OF PLAINTIFF IN THE
AMOUNT OF P600,000.00 AS THE
REAL AND TRUE CONSIDERATION
FOR THE LATTER'S RELINQUISHMENT
OF WHATEVER RIGHTS HE HAS
UNDER O.T.L. 453-123165.
III . . . IN FINDING THE DEFENDANTS
LIABLE FOR MORAL DAMAGES IN THE
AMOUNT OF P50,000.00.
IV . . . IN FINDING THE DEFENDANTS
TO BE IN BAD FAITH HENCE LIABLE
FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN THE
AMOUNT OF P10,000.00.
V . . . IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S
FEES IN THE SUM OF P100,000.00. 10
After reviewing the records of the case,
public respondent promulgated on 30
January 1989 a ten-page decision the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, being in accordance with
the law and the evidence, the judgment
appealed from is affirmed in toto. With
costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED. 11
In said decision, public respondent
practically adopted the factual findings of
the trial court, and explicitly declared that
the latter simply acted "in accordance
with the provisions of the rules of
court" 12 and committed no reversible
error "in declaring the defendents (sic) in
default, in allowing plaintiff to adduce
evidence ex parte, and in finding the
defendants-appellants grossly and
inexcusably negligent (sic)" 13 in view of
the latter's failure to make a timely motion
for reconsideration of the order of default;
appear in court on 16 July 1984 when
petitioner was scheduled to present his
evidence ex parte; and furnish the trial
court with a copy of their petition
for certiorari filed with the appellate court
within a reasonable time. Its was only on
6 August 1984 long after the case had
been submitted for decision that the
same was filed.
Anent the substantive issues raised on
appeal, public respondent ruled out any
merit in the defendants-appellants'
(private respondents) contention that the
consideration for the payment of the
P600,000.00 pursuant to the
Compromise Agreement was not the
waiver of petitioner's rights over the
logging concession, but the maintenance
of peace and order in the area covered
thereunder. Finding the terms of the
Compromise Agreements between the
parties "too clear as to obviate any room
for a contrary interpretation," 14 public
respondent found the appellants to have
been properly adjudged liable for the
P600,000.00, together with the interest
thereon, and for moral and exemplary
damages for deliberately evading the
clear and indubitable provisions of the
agreement.
Still unable to accept the verdict,
defendants-appellants filed a motion to
reconsider the decision, reiterating
therein the procedural and substantive
issues raised in their Brief, particularly on
the interpretation of the consideration
contemplated in the Compromise
Agreement. Petitioner filed an opposition
thereto.
On 12 July 1989, public respondent
promulgated a resolution reversing its
earlier decision of 30 January 1989.
Because of its brevity, the resolution is
quoted in full:
It appearing (sic) from the motion for
reconsideration that defendants-
appellants have good and valid defenses
as a amplified in their motion for
reconsideration and their reply to
Opposition which in fairness to the lower
court, We will not point out, since this is
default case so that any decision of the
lower court will not in any way be
preempted in the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, the motion for
reconsideration of the decision of this
Court promulgated on January 30, 1989
is hereby granted and the said decision is
hereby reversed. Let this case be
remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED. 15
Hence, this resource under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
It is alleged in the petition that the
petitioner (plaintiff-appellee therein) died
during the pendency of the appeal. The
appropriate motion for substitution of
parties was filed but public respondent
failed to take any action thereon until
rendering its 30 January decision wherein
it allowed the substitution of plaintiff-
appellee by his widow, Bai Salilang T.
Mangelen 16 Respondents have not
raised any issue on this point. In the
interest of justice, therefore, the widow
shall be deemed to have been substituted
for the petitioner and, for all legal intents
and purposes, shall be considered as the
petitioner in this case.
Petitioner contends that:
(a) The Court of Appeals seriously erred
in remanding the case to the Lower Court
for further proceedings;
(b) The Court of Appeals seriously erred
in finding that herein respondents have a
valid and good defense. 17
On 8 January 1990, after the private
respondents filed their Comment and the
petitioner submitted his Reply thereto,
this Court resolved to give due course to
the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective
memoranda, 18 which they subsequently
complied with.
There is merit in the petition.
The challenged decision leaves much to
be desired. What was filed before the
public respondent was an ordinary appeal
from a judgment by default. This
necessitated a full-blown decision taking
into account the five (5) assigned errors
which touch on both substantive and
procedural matters. Accordingly, public
respondent promulgated its 30 January
1989 decision following a meticulous
review of the proceedings had before the
trial court and careful re-appraisal of the
evidence adduced before it. Thus, that
decision faithfully complied with Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution which
provides that no decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts of
the law on which it is based. Now, if such
decision had to be completely overturned
or set aside, upon the filing of a motion
for reconsideration, in a subsequent
action via a resolution or modified
decision, such resolution or decision
should likewise state the factual and legal
foundation relied upon. The reason is
obvious: aside from being required by the
Constitution, the court should be able to
justify such a sudden change of course; it
must be able to convincingly explain the
taking back of its solemn conclusions and
pronouncements in the earlier decision.
In the instant case, the public respondent
miserably failed to do so; this is reflected
in the quoted resolution of 12 July 1989
which leaves in limbo the trial court's
challenged decision because it is not the
latter which is reserved but rather the
public respondent's own decision of 30
January 1989. Public respondent simply
restore the parties to the status
quo obtaining prior to 30 January 1989.
Clearly, therefore, an amended decision
on the appeal proper or on the merits of
the decision of the trial court would be in
order.
There is more to the confusion. Public
respondent ordered the remand of the
case to the trial court for further
proceedings, thereby placing the latter in
a quandary as to what it was supposed to
do. The trial court would not know what
"further proceedings" means as the public
respondent neither nullified the order of
default nor set aside the evidence
received ex parte. Thus, the former would
be hard pet at finding a satisfactory
solution to the problem presented for its
resolution.
And now to the errors assigned in this
instant petition. The principal issues
raised resolve around (a) the correctness
or incorrectness of the trial's declaring
private respondents in default for failure
to answer the complaint within the
reglementary period in view of the
pendency of the motion to dismiss and
the motion for reconsideration, and
authorizing the petitioner to present his
evidence ex-parte; and (b) the presence
or absence of a good and valid defense
to warrant the lifting of the default order.
Private respondents admit that they did
not file their Answer within the
reglementary period, but allege that their
failure to do so was not due to gross,
inordinate and inexcusable neglect as the
omission was the result of the elevation
of the issues of litis pendencia and
jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals via a
petition for certiorari. It is averred that at
most, they should be faulted for a mere
procedural lapse. While this sounds
appealing, We cannot subscribe to it. The
pleadings disclose facts which, as earlier
summarized, clearly reveal respondents'
attempt, through different procedural
maneuvers, to delay a simple case. First,
they filed a motion to dismiss on the sole
ground of improper venue. Upon denial of
the motion, and without asking for its
reconsideration, they filed a so-called
supplemental motion to dismiss, this time
on the basis of lis pendens, a ground
already available to them before the filing
of the motion to dismiss because the
case pleaded as a bar to the prosecution
of petitioner's cause is a complaint which
respondents themselves filed. They knew
only too well that under Section 2, Rule 9
of the Rules of Court, they had waived
the right avail of this ground by their
failure to raise the same in the motion to
dismiss. They, however, shrewdly tried to
put one over the trial court by
denominating their second motion as
asupplemental motion; this, of course, is
utterly baseless because the original
motion had already been denied. To
further camouflage the weakness of their
weakness of their position and give a
semblance of strength to the
supplemental motion, they filed a second
supplemental motion to dismiss which,
however, merely amplified on the
preceding motion. After the denial of the
said motions on 4 April 1984, private
respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the trial court
likewise denied on 30 May 1984. Private
respondents received a copy of this last
order on 5 June 1984. They still refused
to file an answer, thus prompting the
petitioner to file a motion to declare them
in default which was granted on 25 June
1984. If the reason for failure to file the
answer was because they had wanted to
file a petition for certiorari with the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, they should
have acted immediately. Yet, as borne out
by the records, they opted to take their
sweet time, filing that petition only on 12
July 1984. It is obvious that they were
unmoved by any sense of urgency to
protect their interests. it appears,
therefore, that the filing of the petition
much later was but part of a well-planned
strategy to gain more time to delay the
case. If the trial court aborted such
strategy, private respondents have only
themselves to blame. The trial court acted
correctly and in accordance with Section
1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court in
declaring private respondents in default
and in authorizing petitioner to present
his evidence ex-parte.
In order to set aside an order of default,
Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court
must be complied with. It reads:
Sec. 3 Relief from order of default. A
party declared in default may at any time
after discovery thereof and before
judgment file a motion under oath to set
aside the order of default upon proper
showing that his failure to answer was
due to fraud, accident, meritorious
defense. In such case the order of default
may be set aside on such terms and
conditions as the judge may impose in
the interest of justice.
In the light of the above narrated
circumstances, private respondents
cannot take refuse under the allegations
of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect to justify their failure to file the
answer. To Our mind, such inaction was
due to their obstinate refusal to comply
with the mandated procedural
requirements.
Thus, whether private respondents had a
valid or good defense is entirely irrelevant
considering the circumstances obtaining.
The public respondent, therefore, gravely
erred in "reversing" its decision of 30
January 1989 on the basis of
respondents "good and valid defenses".
Under the aforesaid Section 3, Rule 18 of
the Rules of Court, a meritorious
defense, which public respondent
considers as synonymous to a "good and
valid defense," is not only basis for the
lifting of an order of default; it is merely
one of two requisites which a party must
comply with. The first is the existence of
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect. Needless to say, these two
requisites must concur. While it is not
required of Us to inquire into the nature,
character and quality of the defense
interposed by private respondents, it
should nevertheless be stated here that
such a defense relates to the
interpretation of the provision in the
Compromise Agreement regarding the
purpose of the P600,000.00
consideration. Petitioner claims that it is
for the waiver of his rights over a portion
of a logging concession mentioned in the
Compromise Agreement; on the other
hand, private respondent claim that it is
for the maintenance of peace and order
by the petitioner. Both the trial court and
the public respondent in its 30 January
1989 decision upheld the theory of the
petitioner. In the latter, public respondent
even made the following apt observation:
What may be said of appellants is that
they are deliberately evading or
sidestepping the clear and indubitable
provisions of the Compromise
Agreement. From a reading of the above
quoted portions of the agreement, it is
light as day and subject to no argument
that the true and actual consideration for
the payment by appellants of that amount
of P600,000.00 to appellee is the latter's
waiver and relinquishment of whatever
rights he may have over a portion of the
area supposedly granted as a logging
concession to the former. To subscribe to
appellants' trend of thinking would be to
countenance blackmail and to violate
public policy, moral and good
customs. . . 19
We are thus unable to see how further
proceedings by the trial court could
produce a result consistent with the
theory of private respondents. Besides,
the interpretation of the Compromise
Agreement involves a question of law; the
remand of the case would thus serve no
useful purpose. The granting then of the
petition and the reinstatement of the
public respondent's 30 January 1989
decision are in order, except that the said
decision should be modified insofar as it
affirms the awards for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees,
and holds moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees, and holds private
respondent Pedro Habaluyas jointly and
severally liable with the other private
respondent for the amounts adjudged.
The award for moral and exemplary
damages is based on the trial court's
conclusion that:
Plaintiff is entitled to moral damages due
to defendants' persistent and
unreasonable refusal to comply with their
undertaking under the Compromise
Agreement, thus resulting to (sic)
embarassment (sic), sleepless nights and
other sufferings of the plaintiff, things that
may have aggravated his present
physical condition. Likewise award (sic) of
exemplary damages to serve as an
example for public good is hereby given,
in addition to moral damages, because of
the obvious bad faith of defendant (sic) in
not complying with their undertakings.
The legal support for the award of
attorney's fees to the full extent of
plaintiff's claim are the provisions, or
anyone of them, of paragraphs 1, 2, 5
and 11 of Article 2208 of the Civil Code,
even as the extensive efforts being
exerted by plaintiff's counsel in protecting
the rights of his client not only in this case
but in other related criminal and civil
cases are being noted. 20
We have carefully examined the 15
August 1984 decision of the trial court
and the 30 January 1989 decision of the
public respondent. Their respective
statements of the case reveal nothing
about an allegation and prayer in the
complaint for the specific amount of moral
and exemplary damages sought. Neither
do they disclose that the petitioner
testified on, and therefore proved, a
specific amount. Such non-disclosure
constitutes ample proof that indeed, the
complaint did not specify, much less pray,
for a specified sum to be awarded as
moral damages.
Moreover, the idea of exemplary
damages was broached for the first time
only in the dispositive position of the trial
court's decision. Section 5, Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court provides that judgment
entered against a party in default, as in
the case of the private respondents, shall
not exceed the amount or be different in
kind from that prayed for. Consequently,
an award of exemplary damages should
not have been made since it was not
even prayed for. Besides, the complaint is
for beach of contract. Exemplary
damages may only be awarded therein if
private respondents acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner. 21 There is no finding
whatsoever on the matter. Also, since no
specific amount of moral damages was
prayed for, the maximum limit provided
for in said Section 5 can in no case be
fixed. Thus, the P50,000.00 award is
purely arbitrary and speculative.
It may be pointed out that there is a
difference between a judgment against a
defendant based on evidence
presented ex-parte pursuant to a default
order and one based on evidence
presented ex-parte and against a
defendant who had filed an answer but
who failed to appear at the hearing. In the
former, section 5 of Rule 18 provides that
the judgment against the defendant
should not exceed the amount or to be
different in kind from that prayed for. In
the latter, however, the award may
exceed the amount or be different in kind
from the prayed for. 22
As regards the attorney's fees, We find
the award of P100,000.00 to be
unreasonable. The second paragraph of
Article 2208 is not applicable since the
acts of private respondents did not
compel the petitioner to litigate with third
persons; moreover, there is no proof
presented to show that the petitioner
incurred expenses to protect his interest.
Besides, the court took into account the
services rendered by counsel in other
related civil and criminal cases, and not
exclusively in Civil Case No. 84-22306.
Attorney's fees for such other related
cases do not appear to have been
alleged and the proof offered is, as
summarized by the trial court, limited to
the subject civil case. We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that an award of
P25,000.00 for attorney's fees would be
proper and just.
Finally, We find the basis for holding
private respondent Pedro Habaluyas
jointly and severally liable with private
respondent Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc.
for the amounts adjudged. The
Compromise Agreement was a corporate
act of the latter with the former signing
merely as its representative. No provision
therein makes him solidarily liable with
the corporation. Additionally, the liability
arising from the obligation is not solidarily.
There is solidarily liability only when the
obligation expressly so states, or when
the law or the nature of the obligation
requires solidarity. 23 The trial court simply
cannot write into the Compromise
Agreement a stipulation or condition
which the parties did not contemplate. It
would have been entirely different if
petitioner alleged and proved grounds
allowing the piercing of the veil of
corporate fiction.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.
The resolution of public respondent of 12
July 1989 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 04585 is
SET ASIDE and its Decision of 30
January 1989 is hereby REINSTATED,
subject to the modifications above
discussed. As modified, the Decision of
the trial court of 15 August 1984 in Civil
Case No. 84-22306 is affirmed in all
respects except that the portion holding
private respondent Pedro Habaluyas
jointly and severally liable with private
respondent Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc.
and awarding, moral and exemplary
damages, is hereby DELETED and SET
ASIDE. Furthermore, the award of
attorney's fees is hereby reduced to
P25.000.00.
No costs.
Francisco Jr. vs. The house of
Representative
On July 22, 2002, the House of
Representatives adopted a Resolution,
[2]
sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed
the Committee on Justice to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).[3]
On June 2, 2003, former President
Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint[4] (first impeachment complaint)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.
and seven Associate Justices[5] of this
Court for culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust
and other high crimes.[6] The complaint
was endorsed by Representatives Rolex
T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and
Didagen Piang Dilangalen,[7] and was
referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003 [8] in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI
of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for
impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives
or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together
with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled
on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was sufficient in III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be
form,[9] but voted to dismiss the same on declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in issue a writ of mandamus directing
substance.[10] To date, the Committee respondents House of
Report to this effect has not yet been sent Representatives et. al. to comply with
to the House in plenary in accordance Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the
with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of Constitution, to return the second
the Constitution. impeachment complaint and/or strike it off
the records of the House of
Four months and three weeks since
Representatives, and to promulgate rules
the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
which are consistent with the
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day
Constitution; and (3) this Court
after the House Committee on Justice
permanently enjoin respondent House of
voted to dismiss it, the second
Representatives from proceeding with the
impeachment complaint[11] was filed with
second impeachment complaint.
the Secretary General of the House [12] by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners
(First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens
Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of
Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. the case are of transcendental
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged importance, pray, in their petition for
results of the legislative inquiry initiated Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a
by above-mentioned House Resolution. writ perpetually prohibiting respondent
This second impeachment complaint was House of Representatives from filing any
accompanied by a Resolution of Articles of Impeachment against the Chief
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at Justice with the Senate; and for the
least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of issuance of a writ perpetually prohibiting
the House of Representatives.[13] respondents Senate and Senate
President Franklin Drilon from accepting
Thus arose the instant petitions
any Articles of Impeachment against the
against the House of Representatives, et.
Chief Justice or, in the event that the
al., most of which petitions contend that
Senate has accepted the same, from
the filing of the second impeachment
proceeding with the impeachment trial.
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates
the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners
the Constitution that [n]o impeachment Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad
proceedings shall be initiated against the Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers,
same official more than once within a lawyers and members of the Integrated
period of one year. Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their
petition for Prohibition involves public
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty.
interest as it involves the use of public
Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he
funds necessary to conduct the
has a duty as a member of the Integrated
impeachment trial on the second
Bar of the Philippines to use all available
impeachment complaint, pray for the
legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional
issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining
impeachment, that the issues raised in
Congress from conducting further
his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
proceedings on said second
Mandamus are of transcendental
impeachment complaint.
importance, and that he himself was a
victim of the capricious and arbitrary In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner
changes in the Rules of Procedure in Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this
Impeachment Proceedings introduced by Court has recognized that he has locus
the 12th Congress,[14] posits that his right standi to bring petitions of this nature in
to bring an impeachment complaint the cases of Chavez v.
[15]
against then Ombudsman Aniano PCGG and Chavez v. PEA-Amari
Desierto had been violated due to the Coastal Bay Development Corporation,
[16]
capricious and arbitrary changes in the prays in his petition for Injunction that
House Impeachment Rules adopted and the second impeachment complaint be
approved on November 28, 2001 by the declared unconstitutional.
House of Representatives and prays that
(1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule
 In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty.
Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and
members of the legal profession, pray in
their petition for Prohibition for an order
prohibiting respondent House of
Representatives from drafting, adopting,
approving and transmitting to the Senate
the second impeachment complaint, and
respondents De Venecia and Nazareno
from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners
Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and
Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez,
alleging that, as members of the House of
Representatives, they have a legal
interest in ensuring that only
constitutional impeachment proceedings
are initiated, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that the second
impeachment complaint and any act
proceeding therefrom be declared null
and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners
Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that
they have a right to be protected against
all forms of senseless spending of
taxpayers money and that they have an
obligation to protect the Supreme Court,
the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the
Judiciary, allege in their petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that it is
instituted as a class suit and pray that (1)
the House Resolution endorsing the
second impeachment complaint as well
as all issuances emanating therefrom be
declared null and void; and (2) this Court
enjoin the Senate and the Senate
President from taking cognizance of,
hearing, trying and deciding the second
impeachment complaint, and issue a writ
of prohibition commanding the Senate, its
prosecutors and agents to desist from
conducting any proceedings or to act on
the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public
Interest Center, Inc., whose members are
citizens and taxpayers, and its co-
petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen,
taxpayer and a member of the Philippine
Bar, both allege in their petition, which
does not state what its nature is, that the
filing of the second impeachment
complaint involves paramount public
interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17
of the House Impeachment Rules and the
second impeachment complaint/Articles
of Impeachment be declared null and
void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty.
Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a
member of the Philippine Bar Association
and of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo
N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their
petition for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Permanent
Injunction to enjoin the House of
Representatives from proceeding with the
second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging
that it is mandated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility to uphold the
Constitution, prays in its petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16
and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8,
9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment
Rules be declared unconstitutional and
that the House of Representatives be
permanently enjoined from proceeding
with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-
taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that
the House Impeachment Rules be
declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P.
Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al.,
in their petition for Prohibition and
Injunction which they claim is a class suit
filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa
v. Factoran[17] which was filed in behalf of
succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray
for the issuance of a writ prohibiting
respondents House of Representatives
and the Senate from conducting further
proceedings on the second impeachment
complaint and that this Court declare as
unconstitutional the second impeachment
complaint and the acts of respondent
House of Representatives in interfering
with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-
taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan
Aquino, alleging that the issues in his
petition for Prohibition are of national and
transcendental significance and that as
an official of the Philippine Judicial
Academy, he has a direct and substantial
interest in the unhampered operation of
the Supreme Court and its officials in
discharging their duties in accordance
with the Constitution, prays for the
issuance of a writ prohibiting the House
of Representatives from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate
and the Senate from receiving the same
or giving the impeachment complaint due
course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A.
Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his
petition for Prohibition that respondents
Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they
filed the second impeachment complaint,
were absolutely without any legal power
to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction
as far as the Articles of Impeachment
assail the alleged abuse of powers of the
Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF).
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners
Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L.
Hofilea, alleging that as professors of law
they have an abiding interest in the
subject matter of their petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains
to a constitutional issue which they are
trying to inculcate in the minds of their
students, pray that the House of
Representatives be enjoined from
endorsing and the Senate from trying the
Articles of Impeachment and that the
second impeachment complaint be
declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty.
Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging
his locus standi, but alleging that the
second impeachment complaint is
founded on the issue of whether or not
the Judicial Development Fund (JDF)
was spent in accordance with law and
that the House of Representatives does
not have exclusive jurisdiction in the
examination and audit thereof, prays in
his petition To Declare Complaint Null and
Void for Lack of Cause of Action and
Jurisdiction that the second impeachment
complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner
Philippine Bar Association, alleging that
the issues raised in the filing of the
second impeachment complaint involve
matters of transcendental importance,
prays in its petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second
impeachment complaint and all
proceedings arising therefrom be
declared null and void; (2) respondent
House of Representatives be prohibited
from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate; and (3)
respondent Senate be prohibited from
accepting the Articles of Impeachment
and from conducting any proceedings
thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners
Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens
and taxpayers, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second
impeachment complaint as well as the
resolution of endorsement and
impeachment by the respondent House
of Representatives be declared null and
void and (2) respondents Senate and
Senate President Franklin Drilon be
prohibited from accepting any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice
or, in the event that they have accepted
the same, that they be prohibited from
proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers
G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263,
the first three of the eighteen which were
filed before this Court,[18] prayed for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or preliminary injunction to
prevent the House of Representatives
from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment arising from the second
impeachment complaint to the
Senate. Petition bearing docket number
G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the
declaration of the November 28, 2001
House Impeachment Rules as null and
void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers
G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295,
which were filed on October 28, 2003,
sought similar relief. In addition, petition
bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292
alleged that House Resolution No. 260
(calling for a legislative inquiry into the
administration by the Chief Justice of the
JDF) infringes on the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers and is a
direct violation of the constitutional
principle of fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the
plenary session of the House of
Representatives, a motion was put forth
that the second impeachment complaint
be formally transmitted to the Senate, but
it was not carried because the House of
Representatives adjourned for lack of
quorum,[19] and as reflected above, to
date, the Articles of Impeachment have
yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
 Before acting on the petitions with
prayers for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction which
were filed on or before October 28, 2003,
Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse
themselves, but the Court rejected their
offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited
himself, but the Court directed him to
participate.
Without necessarily giving the
petitions due course, this Court in its
Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved
to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require
respondent House of Representatives
and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor
General, to comment on the petitions not
later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003;
(c) set the petitions for oral arguments on
November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d)
appointed distinguished legal experts
as amici curiae.[20] In addition, this Court
called on petitioners and respondents to
maintain the status quo, enjoining all the
parties and others acting for and in their
behalf to refrain from committing acts that
would render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when
respondent House of Representatives
through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr.
and/or its co-respondents, by way of
special appearance, submitted
Manifestation asserting that this Court
has no jurisdiction to hear, much less
prohibit or enjoin the House of
Representatives, which is an independent
and co-equal branch of government
under the Constitution, from the
performance of its constitutionally
mandated duty to initiate impeachment
cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a
Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante
Cautela)[21] and Comment, praying that
the consolidated petitions be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over
the issues affecting the impeachment
proceedings and that the sole power,
authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as
the impeachment court to try and decide
impeachment cases, including the one
where the Chief Justice is the
respondent, be recognized and upheld
pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of
the Constitution.[22]
Acting on the other petitions which
were subsequently filed, this Court
resolved to (a) consolidate them with the
earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require
respondents to file their comment not
later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003;
and (c) include them for oral arguments
on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of
the Philippines, through Senate President
Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation
stating that insofar as it is concerned, the
petitions are plainly premature and have
no basis in law or in fact, adding that as
of the time of the filing of the petitions, no
justiciable issue was presented before it
since (1) its constitutional duty to
constitute itself as an impeachment court
commences only upon its receipt of the
Articles of Impeachment, which it had not,
and (2) the principal issues raised by the
petitions pertain exclusively to the
proceedings in the House of
Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime
Soriano filed a Petition for Leave to
Intervene in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295,
questioning thestatus quo Resolution
issued by this Court on October 28, 2003
on the ground that it would unnecessarily
put Congress and this Court in a
constitutional deadlock and praying for
the dismissal of all the petitions as the
a matter in question is not yet ripe for
judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys
Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a Motion
for Leave of Court to Intervene and to
Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in
Intervention.
On November 4,
2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga
Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for
Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On
November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also
filed a Petition-in-Intervention with Leave
to Intervene in G.R. Nos. 160261,
160262, 160263, 160277, 160292,
160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were
granted and both Senator Pimentels
Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and
Quadras Petition in Intervention were
admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court
heard the views of the amici curiae and
the arguments of petitioners, intervenors
Senator Pimentel and Attorney
Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo
Benipayo on the principal issues outlined
in an Advisory issued by this Court on
November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court may be invoked; who can
invoke it; on what issues and at what
time; and whether it should be exercised
by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following
may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity;
mootness);
c) political
question/justiciability;
d) Houses exclusive power to
initiate all cases of
impeachment;
e) Senates sole power to try and decide
all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on
Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of
Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of
preliminary and substantive issues arising
from the instant petitions as well as the
myriad arguments and opinions
presented for and against the grant of the
reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted
and determined them to be as follows: (1)
the threshold and novel issue of whether
or not the power of judicial review
extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or
not the essential pre-requisites for the
exercise of the power of judicial review
have been fulfilled; and (3) the
substantive issues yet remaining. These
matters shall now be discussed
in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead
for this Court to exercise the power of
judicial review to determine the validity of
the second impeachment complaint.
This Courts power of judicial review is
conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of
our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by
law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was
early on exhaustively expounded upon by
Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive
1936 case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission[23] after the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution whose provisions,
unlike the present Constitution, did not
contain the present provision in Article
VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial
power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel
discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or
political excitement, the great landmarks
of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten
or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In
cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several
departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our
Constitution is of course lacking
perfection and perfectibility, but as much
as it was within the power of our people,
acting through their delegates to so
provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however
limited, has established a republican
government intended to operate and
function as a harmonious whole, under a
system of checks and balances, and
subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said
instrument. The Constitution sets forth
in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon
governmental powers and agencies. If
these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable
if the Constitution had not provided for
a mechanism by which to direct the
course of government along
constitutional channels, for then the
distribution of powers would be mere
verbiage, the bill of rights mere
expressions of sentiment, and the
principles of good government mere
political apothegms. Certainly, the
limitations and restrictions embodied in
our Constitution are real as they should
be in any living constitution. In the United
States where no express constitutional
grant is found in their constitution, the
possession of this moderating power
of the courts, not to speak of its
historical origin and development there,
has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than
one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not
expressly, by clear implication from
section 2 of article VIII of our
Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the
powers of government. Who is to
determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it
does not in reality nullify or invalidate an
act of the legislature, but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and
to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to
them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power
of judicial review under the
Constitution. Even then, this power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases
and controversies to be exercised after
full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics
and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner,
the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More than that,
courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments,
not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom
and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of
the government.[24] (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this
moderating power to determine the
proper allocation of powers of the
different branches of government and to
direct the course of government along
constitutional channels is inherent in all
courts[25] as a necessary consequence of
the judicial power itself, which is the
power of the court to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable. [26]
Thus, even in the United States
where the power of judicial review is not
explicitly conferred upon the courts by its
Constitution, such power has been set at
rest by popular acquiescence for a period
of more than one and a half centuries. To
be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case
of Marbury v. Madison[27] that the power of
judicial review was first articulated by
Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of
observation, that in declaring what shall
be the supreme law of the land,
the constitution itself is first mentioned;
and not the laws of the United States
generally, but those only which shall be
made in pursuance of the constitution,
have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the
constitution of the United States
confirms and strengthens the principle,
supposed to be essential to all written
constitutions, that a law repugnant to
the constitution is void; and
that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that
instrument.[28] (Italics in the original;
emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as
1902, decades before its express grant in
the 1935 Constitution, the power of
judicial review was exercised by our
courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm
acts.[29] And as pointed out by noted
political law professor and former
Supreme Court Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza,[30] the executive and legislative
branches of our government in fact
effectively acknowledged this power of
judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil
Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones, and their violation or
non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter
shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts,
orders and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the
laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis
supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral
Commission,[31] judicial review is indeed
an integral component of the delicate
system of checks and balances which,
together with the corollary principle of
separation of powers, forms the bedrock
of our republican form of government and
insures that its vast powers are utilized
only for the benefit of the people for
which it serves.
The separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in
our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere. But it
does not follow from the fact that the
three powers are to be kept separate and
distinct that the Constitution intended
them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments
of the government. x x x And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme
Court as the final arbiter, effectively
checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the
law, and hence to declare executive
and legislative acts void if violative of
the Constitution.[32] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former
Supreme Court Justice Florentino
Feliciano, x x x judicial review is essential
for the maintenance and enforcement of
the separation of powers and the
balancing of powers among the three
great departments of government through
the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control
between them.[33] To him, [j]udicial review
is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation or instrument of intervention
of the judiciary in that balancing
operation.[34]
To ensure the potency of the power of
judicial review to curb grave abuse of
discretion by any branch or
instrumentalities of government, the
afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution engraves, for the first time
into its history, into block letter law the so-
called expanded certiorari jurisdiction of
this Court, the nature of and rationale for
which are mirrored in the following
excerpt from the sponsorship speech of
its proponent, former Chief Justice
Constitutional Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence
copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our
constitutional law. I will read it first and
explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to
of justice to settle actual controversies settle matters of this nature, by
involving rights which are legally claiming that such matters constitute
demandable and enforceable and to a political question.[35] (Italics in the
determine whether or not there has been original; emphasis and underscoring
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to supplied)
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
or instrumentality of the government. To determine the merits of the issues
raised in the instant petitions, this Court
Fellow Members of this Commission, this must necessarily turn to the Constitution
is actually a product of our experience itself which employs the well-settled
during martial law. As a matter of fact, it principles of constitutional construction.
has some antecedents in the past,
First, verba legis, that is, wherever
but the role of the judiciary during the
possible, the words used in the
deposed regime was marred
Constitution must be given
considerably by the circumstance that
their ordinary meaning except where
in a number of cases against the
technical terms are employed. Thus,
government, which then had no legal
inJ.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
defense at all, the solicitor general set
Administration,[36] this Court, speaking
up the defense of political questions
through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando,
and got away with it. As a
declared:
consequence, certain principles
concerning particularly the writ of habeas
We look to the language of the
corpus, that is, the authority of courts to
document itself in our search for its
order the release of political detainees,
meaning. We do not of course stop
and other matters related to the operation
there, but that is where we begin. It is
and effect of martial law failed because
to be assumed that the words in which
the government set up the defense of
constitutional provisions are couched
political question. And the Supreme Court
express the objective sought to be
said: Well, since it is political, we have no
attained. They are to be given
authority to pass upon it. The Committee
their ordinary meaning except where
on the Judiciary feels that this was not
technical terms are employed in which
a proper solution of the questions
case the significance thus attached to
involved. It did not merely request an
them prevails. As the Constitution is not
encroachment upon the rights of the
primarily a lawyers document, it being
people, but it, in effect, encouraged
essential for the rule of law to obtain that
further violations thereof during the
it should ever be present in the peoples
martial law regime. x x x
consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the
xxx
sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the
Briefly stated, courts of justice
provision to be construed compels
determine the limits of power of the
acceptance and negates the power of
agencies and offices of the
the courts to alter it, based on the
government as well as those of its
postulate that the framers and the people
officers. In other words, the judiciary
mean what they say. Thus these are the
is the final arbiter on the question
cases where the need for construction is
whether or not a branch of
reduced to a minimum.[37] (Emphasis and
government or any of its officials has
underscoring supplied)
acted without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
Second, where there is
constitute an abuse of discretion
ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or
words of the Constitution should be
lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a
interpreted in accordance with the intent
judicial power but a duty to pass
of its framers. And so did this Court apply
judgment on matters of this nature.
this principle in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary[38] in this wise:
This is the background of paragraph 2 of
Section 1, which means that the courts
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional
construction is the intention underlying
the provision under consideration. Thus, it
has been held that the Court in
construing a Constitution should bear in
mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the
evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the
Constitution was framed. The object is
to ascertain the reason which induced
the framers of the Constitution to
enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished
thereby, in order to construe the whole
as to make the words consonant to
that reason and calculated to effect
that purpose.[39](Emphasis and
underscoring supplied supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner
on Internal Revenue[40] where, speaking
through Madame Justice Amuerfina A.
Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent
is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction
that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting
it should be given effect. The primary
task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers
and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely
assumed that the people in ratifying
the Constitution were guided mainly
by the explanation offered by the
framers.[41] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam
pereat. The Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole. Thus,
in Chiongbian v. De Leon,[42] this Court,
through Chief Justice Manuel Moran
declared:
x x x [T]he members of the
Constitutional Convention could not
have dedicated a provision of our
Constitution merely for the benefit of
one person without considering that it
could also affect others. When they
adopted subsection 2, they permitted,
if not willed, that said provision should
function to the full extent of its
substance and its terms, not by itself
alone,but in conjunction with all other
provisions of that great document.
[43]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union
v. Executive Secretary,[44] this Court
affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in
constitutional construction that no one
provision of the Constitution is to be
separated from all the others, to be
considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular
subject are to be brought into view
and to be so interpreted as to
effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a
particular subject should be
considered and interpreted together
as to effectuate the whole purpose of
the Constitution and one section is not
to be allowed to defeat another, if by
any reasonable construction, the two
can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize
them, if practicable, and must lean in
favor of a construction which will render
every word operative, rather than one
which may make the words idle and
nugatory.[45] (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the
word is not found to be clear, resort to
other aids is available. In still the same
case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction
to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason
and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had
only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the
terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention "are of value as
showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reasons
for their votes, but they give us no light as
to the views of the large majority who did
not talk, much less of the mass of our
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls
gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more
on how it was understood by the
people adopting it than in the
framers's understanding thereof.
[46]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing
backdrop of constitutional refinement and
jurisprudential application of the power of
judicial review that respondents Speaker
De Venecia,et. al. and intervenor Senator
Pimentel raise the novel argument that
the Constitution has excluded
impeachment proceedings from the
coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of
respondents Speaker De Venecia et.
al. that impeachment is a political action
which cannot assume a judicial
character. Hence, any question, issue or
incident arising at any stage of the
impeachment proceeding is beyond the
reach of judicial review.[47]
For his part, intervenor Senator
Pimentel contends that the Senates sole
power to try impeachment cases[48] (1)
entirely excludes the application of
judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily
includes the Senates power to determine
constitutional questions relative to
impeachment proceedings.[49]
In furthering their arguments on the
proposition that impeachment
proceedings are outside the scope of
judicial review, respondents Speaker De
Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator
Pimentel rely heavily on American
authorities, principally the majority
opinion in the case of Nixon v. United
States.[50] Thus, they contend that the
exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings is
inappropriate since it runs counter to the
framers decision to allocate to different
fora the powers to try impeachments and
to try crimes; it disturbs the system of
checks and balances, under which
impeachment is the only legislative check
on the judiciary; and it would create a
lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning
relief.[51] Respondents likewise point to
deliberations on the US Constitution to
show the intent to isolate judicial power of
review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents and intervenors
reliance upon American jurisprudence,
the American Constitution and American
authorities cannot be credited to support
the proposition that the Senates sole
power to try and decide impeachment
cases, as provided for under Art. XI, Sec.
3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment
of all issues pertaining to impeachment to
the legislature, to the total exclusion of
the power of judicial review to check and
restrain any grave abuse of the
impeachment process. Nor can it
reasonably support the interpretation that
it necessarily confers upon the Senate
the inherently judicial power to determine
constitutional questions incident to
impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and
authorities, much less the American
Constitution, are of dubious application
for these are no longer controlling within
our jurisdiction and have only limited
persuasive merit insofar as Philippine
constitutional law is concerned. As held in
the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,[52] [i]n
resolving constitutional disputes, [this
Court] should not be beguiled by foreign
jurisprudence some of which are hardly
applicable because they have been
dictated by different constitutional settings
and needs.[53] Indeed, although the
Philippine Constitution can trace its
origins to that of the United States, their
paths of development have long since
diverged. In the colorful words of Father
Bernas, [w]e have cut the umbilical cord.
The major difference between the
judicial power of the Philippine Supreme
Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court
is that while the power of judicial review is
onlyimpliedly granted to the U.S.
Supreme Court and is discretionary in
nature, that granted to the Philippine
Supreme Court and lower courts,
as expressly provided for in the
Constitution, is not just a power but also
a duty, and it was given an expanded
definition to include the power to correct
any grave abuse of discretion on the part
of any government branch or
instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions
between the U.S. Constitution and the
Philippine Constitution with respect to the
power of the House of Representatives
over impeachment proceedings. While
the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power
of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation,[54] our
Constitution, though vesting in the House
of Representatives the exclusive power to
initiate impeachment cases,[55] provides
for several limitations to the exercise of
such power as embodied in Section 3(2),
(3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These
limitations include the manner of filing,
required vote to impeach, and the one
year bar on the impeachment of one and
the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that
judicial review of impeachments
undermines their finality and may also
lead to conflicts between Congress and
the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this
Court to exercise judicial statesmanship
on the principle that whenever possible,
the Court should defer to the judgment of
the people expressed legislatively,
recognizing full well the perils of judicial
willfulness and pride.[56]
But did not the people also express
their will when they instituted the above-
mentioned safeguards in the
Constitution? This shows that the
Constitution did not intend to leave the
matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it
provided for certain well-defined limits, or
in the language of Baker v. Carr,
[57]
judicially discoverable standards for
determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion, through the power of
judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v.
[58]
Yniguez and Alejandrino v. Quezon,
[59]
cited by respondents in support of the
argument that the impeachment power is
beyond the scope of judicial review, are
not in point. These cases concern the
denial of petitions for writs
of mandamus to compel the legislature to
perform non-ministerial acts, and do not
concern the exercise of the power of
judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in
which this Court exercised the power of
judicial review over congressional
action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,
[60]
this Court ruled that it is well within the
power and jurisdiction of the Court to
inquire whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution
or grave abuse of discretion in the
exercise of their functions and
[61]
prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara, in
seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravened
the Constitution, it held that the petition
raises a justiciable controversy and that
when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,
[62]
this Court declared null and void a
resolution of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the
nomination, and rescinding the election,
of a congressman as a member of the
House Electoral Tribunal for being
violative of Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,[63] it
held that the resolution of whether the
House representation in the Commission
on Appointments was based on
proportional representation of the political
parties as provided in Section 18, Article
VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial
review. In Daza v. Singson,[64] it held that
the act of the House of Representatives
in removing the petitioner from the
Commission on Appointments is subject
to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,
[65]
it held that although under the
Constitution, the legislative power is
vested exclusively in Congress, this does
not detract from the power of the courts
to pass upon the constitutionality of acts
of Congress. InAngara v. Electoral
Commission,[66] it ruled that confirmation
by the National Assembly of the election
of any member, irrespective of whether
his election is contested, is not essential
before such member-elect may discharge
the duties and enjoy the privileges of a
member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional
basis for the contention that the exercise
of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of
checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole and one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another.[67] Both are
integral components of the calibrated
system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no
branch of government act beyond the
powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial
Review
 As clearly stated in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, the courts power
of judicial review, like almost all powers
conferred by the Constitution, is subject
to several limitations, namely: (1) an
actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have standing to
challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement; (3)
the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and (4) the issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties,
and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics
and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner,
the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More than that,
courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments,
not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom
and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of
the government.[68] (Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has
been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the
court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.[69]
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the
dismissal of the petitions, contends that
petitioners do not have standing since
only the Chief Justice has sustained and
will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus
curiae former Justice Minister and
Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza
similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor
General asserts that petitioners have
standing since this Court had, in the past,
accorded standing to taxpayers, voters,
concerned citizens, legislators in cases
involving paramount public interest[70] and
transcendental importance,[71] and that
procedural matters are subordinate to the
need to determine whether or not the
other branches of the government have
kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they
have not abused the discretion given to
them.[72] Amicus curiae Dean Raul
Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law
is of the same opinion, citing
transcendental importance and the well-
entrenched rule exception that, when the
real party in interest is unable to vindicate
his rights by seeking the same remedies,
as in the case of the Chief Justice who,
for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke
the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts
will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference
between the rule on real-party-in-interest
and the rule on standing, for the former is
a concept of civil procedure[73] while the
latter has constitutional underpinnings.
[74]
In view of the arguments set forth
regarding standing, it behooves the Court
to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc.
v. Morato[75] to clarify what is meant
by locus standi and to distinguish it from
real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on
standing and real party in interest has
been noted by authorities thus: It is
important to note . . . that standing
because of its constitutional and public
policy underpinnings, is very different
from questions relating to whether a
particular plaintiff is the real party in
interest or has capacity to sue. Although
all three requirements are directed
towards ensuring that only certain parties
can maintain an action, standing
restrictions require a partial consideration
of the merits, as well as broader policy
concerns relating to the proper role of the
judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in
constitutional law because in some cases
suits are brought not by parties who have
been personally injured by the operation
of a law or by official action taken, but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters
who actually sue in the public interest.
Hence the question in standing is
whether such parties have alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.
On the other hand, the question as to
"real party in interest" is whether he is the
party who would be benefited or injured
by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to
the avails of the suit.[76](Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief
Justice may have been injured by the
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House
of Representatives, none of the
petitioners before us asserts a violation of
the personal rights of the Chief Justice.
On the contrary, they invariably invoke
the vindication of their own rights as
taxpayers; members of
Congress;citizens, individually or in a
class suit; and members of the bar and of
the legal profession which were
supposedly violated by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however,
concerned citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when specific requirements
have been met have been given standing
by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest
of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be
direct and personal. He must be able to
show, not only that the law or any
government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result
of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It
must appear that the person complaining
has been or is about to be denied some
right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties
by reason of the statute or act
complained of.[77] In fine, when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right,[78] the mere fact that he is a
citizen satisfies the requirement of
personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is
allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed, or
that public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose, or that there is a
wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or
[79]
unconstitutional law. Before he can
invoke the power of judicial review,
however, he must specifically prove that
he has sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a
direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or
contract. It is not sufficient that he has
merely a general interest common to all
members of the public.[80]
At all events, courts are vested with
discretion as to whether or not a
taxpayer's suit should be entertained.
[81]
This Court opts to grant standing to
most of the petitioners, given their
allegation that any impending transmittal
to the Senate of the Articles of
Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the
Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to
sue to question the validity of any official
action which he claims infringes his
prerogatives as a legislator.[82] Indeed, a
member of the House of Representatives
has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in his office. [83]
While an association has legal
personality to represent its members,
[84]
especially when it is composed of
substantial taxpayers and the outcome
will affect their vital interests, [85] the mere
invocation by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or any member of the legal
profession of the duty to preserve the rule
of law and nothing more, although
undoubtedly true, does not suffice to
clothe it with standing. Its interest is too
general. It is shared by other groups and
the whole citizenry. However, a reading of
the petitions shows that it has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.[86] It, therefore, behooves this
Court to relax the rules on standing and
to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing
with class suits filed in behalf of all
citizens, persons intervening must be
sufficiently numerous to fully protect the
interests of all concerned[87] to enable the
court to deal properly with all interests
involved in the suit,[88] for a judgment in a
class suit, whether favorable or
unfavorable to the class, is, under the res
judicata principle, binding on all members
of the class whether or not they were
before the court.[89] Where it clearly
appears that not all interests can be
sufficiently represented as shown by the
divergent issues raised in the numerous
petitions before this Court, G.R. No.
160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since
petitioners additionallyallege standing as
citizens and taxpayers, however, their
petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in
G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole
ground of transcendental importance,
while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R.
No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of
transcendental importance, the following
instructive determinants formulated by
former Supreme Court Justice Florentino
P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the
character of the funds or other assets
involved in the case; (2) the presence of
a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by
the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3)
the lack of any other party with a more
direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.[90] Applying these
determinants, this Court is satisfied that
the issues raised herein are indeed of
transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in
fact adopted a liberal attitude on
the locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people,
as when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public.
[91]
Such liberality does not, however,
mean that the requirement that a party
should have an interest in the matter is
totally eliminated. A party must, at the
very least, still plead the existence of
such interest, it not being one of which
courts can take judicial notice. In
petitioner Vallejos case, he failed to
allege any interest in the case. He does
not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for
intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court requires an intervenor to
possess a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is
so situated as to be adversely affected by
a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of
an officer thereof. While intervention is
not a matter of right, it may be permitted
by the courts when the applicant shows
facts which satisfy the requirements of
the law authorizing intervention.[92]
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo
Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadras
case, they seek to join petitioners
Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262.
Since, save for one additional issue, they
raise the same issues and the same
standing, and no objection on the part of
petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been
interposed, this Court as earlier stated,
granted the Motion for Leave of Court to
Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga
Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join
petitioner Francisco in G.R. No.
160261. Invoking their right as citizens to
intervene, alleging that they will suffer if
this insidious scheme of the minority
members of the House of
Representatives is successful, this Court
found the requisites for intervention had
been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the
petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and
160310 were of transcendental
importance, World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed
a Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to
Intervene to raise the additional issue of
whether or not the second impeachment
complaint against the Chief Justice is
valid and based on any of the grounds
prescribed by the Constitution.
 Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga
Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II
Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines,
Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter
in litigation the respective motions to
intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the
other hand, sought to intervene for the
limited purpose of making of record and
arguing a point of view that differs with
Senate President Drilons. He alleges that
submitting to this Courts jurisdiction as
the Senate President does will undermine
the independence of the Senate which
will sit as an impeachment court once the
Articles of Impeachment are transmitted
to it from the House of Representatives.
Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, he
being a member of Congress against
which the herein petitions are directed.
For this reason, and to fully ventilate all
substantial issues relating to the matter at
hand, his Motion to Intervene was
granted and he was, as earlier stated,
allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Sorianos
motion to intervene, the same must be
denied for, while he asserts an interest as
a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing
requirement for bringing taxpayers suits
as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,[93] to
wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to
be held involve the expenditure of public
moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said
petitioners allege that their tax money is
being extracted and spent in violation of
specific constitutional protection against
abuses of legislative power, or that there
is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC, or that public
money is being deflected to any improper
purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to
restrain respondent from wasting public
funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law.
[94]
(Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the
petitions, Soriano failed even to allege
that the act of petitioners will result in
illegal disbursement of public funds or in
public money being deflected to any
improper purpose. Additionally, his mere
interest as a member of the Bar does not
suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,[95] this Court,
through Chief Justice Fernando, held that
for a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the
picture.[96] Only then may the courts pass
on the validity of what was done, if and
when the latter is challenged in an
appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main
the issue of the validity of the filing of the
second impeachment complaint against
the Chief Justice in accordance with the
House Impeachment Rules adopted by
the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of
which is questioned. The questioned acts
having been carried out, i.e., the second
impeachment complaint had been filed
with the House of Representatives and
the 2001 Rules have already been
already promulgated and enforced, the
prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be
accomplished and performed before suit,
as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been
complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the
question of whether the instant petitions
are premature. Amicus curiae former
Senate President Jovito R. Salonga
opines that there may be no urgent need
for this Court to render a decision at this
time, it being the final arbiter on questions
of constitutionality anyway. He thus
recommends that all remedies in the
House and Senate should first be
exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul
Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law
who suggests to this Court to take judicial
notice of on-going attempts to encourage
signatories to the second impeachment
complaint to withdraw their signatures
and opines that the House Impeachment
Rules provide for an opportunity for
members to raise constitutional questions
themselves when the Articles of Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without
Impeachment are presented on a motion consistency and seemingly without any
to transmit to the same to the rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on
Senate. The dean maintains that even its stance of taking cognizance of cases
assuming that the Articles are transmitted which involved political questions. In
to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise some cases, this Court hid behind the
the issue of their constitutional infirmity by cover of the political question doctrine
way of a motion to dismiss. and refused to exercise its power of
judicial review.[100] In other cases,
The deans position does not
however, despite the seeming political
persuade. First, the withdrawal by the
nature of the therein issues involved, this
Representatives of their signatures would
Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it
not, by itself, cure the House
found constitutionally imposed limits on
Impeachment Rules of their constitutional
powers or functions conferred upon
infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal,
political bodies.[101] Even in the landmark
by itself, obliterate the questioned second
1988 case of Javellana v. Executive
impeachment complaint since it would
Secretary[102] which raised the issue of
only place it under the ambit of Sections
whether the 1973 Constitution was
3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the
ratified, hence, in force, this Court
Constitution[97] and, therefore, petitioners
shunted the political question doctrine
would continue to suffer their injuries.
and took cognizance thereof. Ratification
Second and most importantly, the by the people of a Constitution is a
futility of seeking remedies from either or political question, it being a question
both Houses of Congress before coming decided by the people in their sovereign
to this Court is shown by the fact that, as capacity.
previously discussed, neither the House
The frequency with which this Court
of Representatives nor the Senate is
invoked the political question doctrine to
clothed with the power to rule with
refuse to take jurisdiction over certain
definitiveness on the issue of
cases during the Marcos regime
constitutionality, whether concerning
motivated Chief Justice Concepcion,
impeachment proceedings or otherwise,
when he became a Constitutional
as said power is exclusively vested in the
Commissioner, to clarify this Courts
judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I,
power of judicial review and its
Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy
application on issues involving political
cannot be sought from a body which is
questions, viz:
bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr.
Presiding Officer.
In the leading case of Tanada v.
Cuenco,[98] Chief Justice Roberto
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically,
Concepcion defined the term political
everybody has made, I suppose, the
question, viz:
usual comment that the judiciary is the
weakest among the three major branches
[T]he term political question connotes, in
of the service. Since the legislature holds
legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
the purse and the executive the sword,
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In
the judiciary has nothing with which to
other words, in the language of Corpus
enforce its decisions or commands
Juris Secundum, it refers to those
except the power of reason and appeal to
questions which, under the Constitution,
conscience which, after all, reflects the
are to be decided by the people in their
will of God, and is the most powerful of all
sovereign capacity, or in regard to
other powers without exception. x x x And
which full discretionary authority has
so, with the bodys indulgence, I will
been delegated to the Legislature or
proceed to read the provisions drafted by
executive branch of the Government. It is
the Committee on the Judiciary.
concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
The first section starts with a sentence
measure.[99] (Italics in the original)
copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our
constitutional law. I will read it first and
explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts
of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this
is actually a product of our experience
during martial law. As a matter of fact, it
has some antecedents in the past, but
the role of the judiciary during the
deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that
in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal
defense at all, the solicitor general set
up the defense of political questions
and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles
concerning particularly the writ
of habeas corpus, that is, the authority
of courts to order the release of
political detainees, and other matters
related to the operation and effect of
martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of
political question. And the Supreme
Court said: Well, since it is political, we
have no authority to pass upon it. The
Committee on the Judiciary feels that
this was not a proper solution of the
questions involved. It did not merely
request an encroachment upon the
rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof
during the martial law regime. I am
sure the members of the Bar are familiar
with this situation. But for the benefit of
the Members of the Commission who are
not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will
start with a decision of the Supreme
Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana
vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not
mistaken. Martial law was announced on
September 22, although the proclamation
was dated September 21. The obvious
reason for the delay in its publication was
that the administration had apprehended
and detained prominent newsmen on
September 21. So that when martial law
was announced on September 22, the
media hardly published anything about
it. In fact, the media could not publish any
story not only because our main writers
were already incarcerated, but also
because those who succeeded them in
their jobs were under mortal threat of
being the object of wrath of the ruling
party. The 1971 Constitutional
Convention had begun on June 1, 1971
and by September 21 or 22 had not
finished the Constitution; it had barely
agreed in the fundamentals of the
Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the
proclamation of martial law, some
delegates to that 1971 Constitutional
Convention, dozens of them, were picked
up. One of them was our very own
colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So,
the unfinished draft of the Constitution
was taken over by representatives of
Malacaang.In 17 days, they finished what
the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention had been unable to
accomplish for about 14 months. The
draft of the 1973 Constitution was
presented to the President around
December 1, 1972, whereupon the
President issued a decree calling a
plebiscite which suspended the operation
of some provisions in the martial law
decree which prohibited discussions,
much less public discussions of certain
matters of public concern. The purpose
was presumably to allow a free
discussion on the draft of the Constitution
on which a plebiscite was to be held
sometime in January 1973. If I may use a
word famous by our colleague,
Commissioner Ople, during the
interregnum, however, the draft of the
Constitution was analyzed and criticized
with such a telling effect that Malacaang
felt the danger of its approval. So, the
President suspended indefinitely the
holding of the plebiscite and announced
that he would consult the people in a
referendum to be held from January 10 to
January 15. But the questions to be
submitted in the referendum were not
announced until the eve of its scheduled
beginning, under the supposed
supervision not of the Commission on
Elections, but of what was then
designated as citizens assemblies or
barangays. Thus the barangays came
into existence. The questions to be
propounded were released with proposed
answers thereto, suggesting that it was
unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because
the answers given in the referendum
should be regarded as the votes cast in
the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was
filed with the Supreme Court praying that
the holding of the referendum be
suspended. When the motion was being
heard before the Supreme Court, the
Minister of Justice delivered to the Court
a proclamation of the President declaring
that the new Constitution was already in
force because the overwhelming majority
of the votes cast in the referendum
favored the Constitution. Immediately
after the departure of the Minister of
Justice, I proceeded to the session room
where the case was being heard. I then
informed the Court and the parties the
presidential proclamation declaring that
the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by
the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to
declare the presidential proclamation
null and void. The main defense put up
by the government was that the issue
was a political question and that the
court had no jurisdiction to entertain
the case.
The government said that in a
referendum held from January 10 to
January 15, the vast majority ratified the
draft of the Constitution. Note that all
members of the Supreme Court were
residents of Manila, but none of them had
been notified of any referendum in their
respective places of residence, much less
did they participate in the alleged
referendum. None of them saw any
referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips
spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the
members of the Court felt that there had
been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute
for a plebiscite. There is a big difference
between a referendum and a
plebiscite. But another group of
justices upheld the defense that the
issue was a political
question. Whereupon, they dismissed
the case. This is not the only major
case in which the plea of political
question was set up. There have been
a number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political
question was rejected because the
issue was clearly justiciable.
x x x When your Committee on the
Judiciary began to perform its functions, it
faced the following questions: What is
judicial power? What is a political
question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts,
has one main function: to settle actual
controversies involving conflicts of rights
which are demandable and
enforceable. There are rights which are
guaranteed by law but cannot be
enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided
case, a husband complained that his wife
was unwilling to perform her duties as a
wife. The Court said: We can tell your
wife what her duties as such are and that
she is bound to comply with them, but we
cannot force her physically to discharge
her main marital duty to her
husband. There are some rights
guaranteed by law, but they are so
personal that to enforce them by actual
compulsion would be highly derogatory to
human dignity.
This is why the first part of the second
paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts
to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable or
enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain,
much less decide, hypothetical
questions. In a presidential system of
government, the Supreme Court has,
also another important function. The
powers of government are generally
considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary. Each one
is supreme within its own sphere and
independent of the others. Because of
that supremacy power to determine
whether a given law is valid or not is
vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice
determine the limits of power of the
agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its As pointed out by amicus curiae
officers. In other words, the judiciary former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP
is the final arbiter on the question College of Law, this Court has in fact in a
whether or not a branch of number of cases taken jurisdiction over
government or any of its officials has questions which are not truly political
acted without jurisdiction or in excess following the effectivity of the present
of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to Constitution.
constitute an abuse of discretion
In Marcos v. Manglapus,[105] this
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or
Court, speaking through Madame Justice
lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a
Irene Cortes, held:
judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
The present Constitution limits resort to
the political question doctrine and
This is the background of paragraph 2
broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into
of Section 1, which means that the
areas which the Court, under previous
courts cannot hereafter evade the duty
constitutions, would have normally left to
to settle matters of this nature, by
the political departments to decide.[106] x x
claiming that such matters constitute
x
a political question.
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon
I have made these extended remarks to
Committee,[107] through Justice Teodoro
the end that the Commissioners may
Padilla, this Court declared:
have an initial food for thought on the
subject of the judiciary.[103] (Italics in the
The "allocation of constitutional
original; emphasis supplied)
boundaries" is a task that this Court must
perform under the Constitution. Moreover,
During the deliberations of the
as held in a recent case, (t)he political
Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice
question doctrine neither interposes
Concepcion further clarified the concept
an obstacle to judicial determination of
of judicial power, thus:
the rival claims. The jurisdiction
to delimit constitutional boundaries
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will
has been given to this Court. It cannot
always have to be decided by the
abdicate that obligationmandated by
Supreme Court according to the new
the 1987 Constitution, although said
numerical need for votes.
provision by no means does away with
the applicability of the principle in
From the foregoing record of the
appropriate cases.[108] (Emphasis and
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
underscoring supplied)
Commission, it is clear that judicial power
is not only a power; it is also a duty, a
And in Daza v. Singson,[109] speaking
duty which cannot be abdicated by the
through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court
mere specter of this creature called the
ruled:
political question doctrine. Chief Justice
Concepcion hastened to clarify, however,
In the case now before us, the
that Section 1, Article VIII was not
jurisdictional objection becomes even
intended to do away with truly political
less tenable and decisive. The reason is
questions. From this clarification it is
that, even if we were to assume that the
gathered that there are two species of
issue presented before us was political in
political questions: (1) truly political
nature, we would still not be precluded
questions and (2) those which are not
from resolving it under
truly political questions.
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon
Truly political questions are thus us that now covers, in proper cases, even
beyond judicial review, the reason for the political question.[110] x x x (Emphasis
respect of the doctrine of separation of and underscoring supplied.)
powers to be maintained. On the other
hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court
the Constitution, courts can review does not define what are justiciable
questions which are not truly political in political questions and non-justiciable
nature. political questions, however. Identification
of these two species of political questions
may be problematic. There has been no
clear standard. The American case
of Baker v. Carr[111] attempts to provide
some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any
case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or alack
of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a courts undertaking
independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or
an unusual need for questioning
adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments
on one question.[112] (Underscoring
supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable
have been the first three: (1) a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political
department; (2) the lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion. These standards are
not separate and distinct concepts but
are interrelated to each in that the
presence of one strengthens the
conclusion that the others are also
present.
The problem in applying the
foregoing standards is that the American
concept of judicial review is radically
different from our current concept, for
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
provides our courts with far less
discretion in determining whether they
should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination
of a truly political question from a non-
justiciable political question lies in the
answer to the question of whether there
are constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our
courts are duty-bound to examine
whether the branch or instrumentality of
the government properly acted within
such limits. This Court shall thus now
apply this standard to the present
controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial
issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in
the Second impeachment
complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under
the Constitution.
II. Whether the second
impeachment complaint was
filed in accordance with
Section 3(4), Article XI of the
Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry
by the House Committee on
Justice into the Judicial
Development Fund is an
unconstitutional infringement
of the constitutionally
mandated fiscal autonomy of
the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16
of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the
12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating
the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second
impeachment complaint is
barred under Section 3(5) of
Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of
the second impeachment complaint over
which this Court has no jurisdiction. More
importantly, any discussion of this issue
would require this Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to
the sound discretion of the legislation.
Such an intent is clear from the
deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.[113]
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the
Constitution enumerates six grounds for
impeachment, two of these, namely, other
high crimes and betrayal of public trust,
elude a precise definition. In fact, an
examination of the records of the 1986
Constitutional Commission shows that
the framers could find no better way to
approximate the boundaries of betrayal of
public trust and other high crimes than by
alluding to both positive and negative
examples of both, without arriving at their
clear cut definition or even a standard
therefor.[114] Clearly, the issue calls upon
this court to decide a non-justiciable
political question which is beyond the
scope of its judicial power under Section
1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of
adjudication that an issue assailing the
constitutionality of a governmental act
should be avoided whenever
possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v.
Commission on Elections,[115] this Court
held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a
court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law
to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless
such question is raised by the parties and
that when it is raised, if the record also
presents some other ground upon
which the court may rest its judgment,
that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for
consideration until a case arises in
which a decision upon such question
will be unavoidable.[116] [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied
in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,[117] where this Court invalidated
Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No.
6657 for being confiscatory and violative
of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court
will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is
shown that the essential requisites of
a judicial inquiry into such a question
are first satisfied. Thus, there must be
an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of
judicial determination, the constitutional
question must have been opportunely
raised by the proper party, and the
resolution of the question is
unavoidably necessary to the decision
of the case itself.[118] [Emphasis
supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch
the issue of constitutionality unless it is
truly unavoidable and is the very lis
mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant
consolidated petitions, while all seeking
the invalidity of the second impeachment
complaint, collectively raise several
constitutional issues upon which the
outcome of this controversy could
possibly be made to rest. In determining
whether one, some or all of the remaining
substantial issues should be passed
upon, this Court is guided by the related
cannon of adjudication that the court
should not form a rule of constitutional
law broader than is required by the
precise facts to which it is applied.[119]
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners
Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that,
among other reasons, the second
impeachment complaint is invalid since it
directly resulted from a
[120]
Resolution calling for a legislative
inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution
and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to
likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a)
a violation of the rules and jurisprudence
on investigations in aid of legislation; (b)
an open breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers; (c) a violation of
the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an
assault on the independence of the
judiciary.[121]
Without going into the merits of
petitioners Alfonso, et. al.s claims, it is the
studied opinion of this Court that the
issue of the constitutionality of the said
Resolution and resulting legislative
inquiry is too far removed from the issue
of the validity of the second impeachment
complaint. Moreover, the resolution of
said issue would, in the Courts opinion,
require it to form a rule of constitutional
law touching on the separate and distinct
matter of legislative inquiries in general,
which would thus be broader than is
required by the facts of these
consolidated cases. This opinion is
further strengthened by the fact that said
petitioners have raised other grounds in
support of their petition which would not
be adversely affected by the Courts
ruling.
 En passant, this Court notes that a
standard for the conduct of legislative
inquiries has already been enunciated by
this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue
Ribbon Commttee,[122] viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly
recognizes the power of both houses of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI
thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its
exercise is circumscribed by the afore-
quoted provision of the
Constitution. Thus, as provided therein,
the investigation must be in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure and that the
rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected. It
follows then that the right rights of
persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due
process and the right not be compelled to
testify against ones self.[123]
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors
Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadra, while joining the original petition
of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce
the new argument that since the second
impeachment complaint was verified and
filed only by Representatives Gilberto
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella, the same does not fall under
the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI
of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment is
filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment,
and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.
They assert that while at least 81
members of the House of
Representatives signed a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment, the same
did not satisfy the requisites for the
application of the afore-mentioned
section in that the verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment was
not filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House.With the
exception of Representatives Teodoro
and Fuentebella, the signatories to said
Resolution are alleged to have verified
the same merely as a Resolution of
Endorsement. Intervenors point to the
Verification of the Resolution of
Endorsement which states that:
We are the proponents/sponsors of the
Resolution of Endorsement of the
abovementioned Complaint of
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and
Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x[124]
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra
further claim that what the Constitution
requires in order for said second
impeachment complaint to automatically
become the Articles of Impeachment and
for trial in the Senate to begin forthwith, is
that the verified complaint be filed, not
merely endorsed, by at least one-third of
the Members of the House of
Representatives. Not having complied
with this requirement, they concede that
the second impeachment complaint
should have been calendared and
referred to the House Committee on
Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of
the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for
impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives
or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together
with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors foregoing position is
echoed by Justice Maambong who
opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of
the Constitution to apply, there should be
76 or more representatives who signed
and verified the second impeachment
complaint as complainants, signed and
verified the signatories to a resolution of
impeachment. Justice Maambong
likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at
least one-third of the members of the
House of Representatives as
endorsers isnot the resolution of
impeachment contemplated by the
Constitution, such resolution of
endorsement being necessary only from
at least one Member whenever a citizen
files a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued
by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra,
does indeed limit the scope of the
constitutional issues to the provisions on
impeachment, more compelling
considerations militate against its
adoption as the lis mota or crux of the
present controversy. Chief among this is
the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal
and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No.
160262, have raised this issue as a
ground for invalidating the second
impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt
this additional ground as the basis for
deciding the instant consolidated petitions
would not only render for naught the
efforts of the original petitioners in G.R.
No. 160262, but the efforts presented by
the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the
resolution of this issue as unnecessary
for the determination of the instant cases
is made easier by the fact that said
intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have
joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al.,
adopting the latters arguments and
issues as their own. Consequently, they
are not unduly prejudiced by this Courts
decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two
remaining issues, inextricably linked as
they are, constitute the very lis mota of
the instant controversy: (1) whether
Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the
House Impeachment Rules adopted by
the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for
violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution; and (2)
whether, as a result thereof, the second
impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to
exercise judicial restraint on the ground
that the Senate, sitting as an
impeachment court, has the sole power
to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates
that the power of judicial review includes
the power of review over justiciable
issues in impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents
Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that
[t]here is a moral compulsion for the
Court to not assume jurisdiction over the
impeachment because all the Members
thereof are subject to impeachment.
[125]
But this argument is very much like
saying the Legislature has a moral
compulsion not to pass laws with penalty
clauses because Members of the House
of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over
justiciable issues is not an option before
this Court. Adjudication may not be
declined, because this Court is not legally
disqualified.Nor can jurisdiction be
renounced as there is no other tribunal to
which the controversy may be referred.
[126]
Otherwise, this Court would be
shirking from its duty vested under Art.
VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More
than being clothed with authority thus,
this Court is duty-bound to take
cognizance of the instant petitions. [127] In
the august words ofamicus curiae Father
Bernas, jurisdiction is not just a power; it
is a solemn duty which may not be
renounced. To renounce it, even if it is
vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty.
Even in cases where it is an
interested party, the Court under our
system of government cannot inhibit itself
and must rule upon the challenge
because no other office has the authority
to do so.[128] On the occasion that this
Court had been an interested party to the
controversy before it, it has acted upon
the matter not with officiousness but in
the discharge of an unavoidable duty
and, as always, with detachment and
fairness.[129] After all, by [his] appointment
to the office, the public has laid on [a
member of the judiciary] their confidence
that [he] is mentally and morally fit to
pass upon the merits of their varied
contentions. For this reason, they expect Yet the Constitution provides no scheme
[him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to or mode for settling such unusual
render justice, to be unafraid to displease situations or for the substitution of
any person, interest or power and to be Senators designated to the Tribunal
equipped with a moral fiber strong whose disqualification may be sought.
enough to resist the temptations lurking in Litigants in such situations must simply
[his] office.[130] place their trust and hopes of vindication
in the fairness and sense of justice of the
The duty to exercise the power of
Members of the Tribunal. Justices and
adjudication regardless of interest had
Senators, singly and collectively.
already been settled in the case of Abbas
v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.[131] In that
Let us not be misunderstood as saying
case, the petitioners filed with the
that no Senator-Member of the Senate
respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a
Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify
Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of
himself from sitting in judgment on any
the Senators-Members thereof from the
case before said Tribunal.
hearing and resolution of SET Case No.
EveryMember of the Tribunal may, as his
002-87 on the ground that all of them
conscience dictates, refrain from
were interested parties to said case as
participating in the resolution of a case
respondents therein. This would have
where he sincerely feels that his personal
reduced the Tribunals membership to
interests or biases would stand in the way
only its three Justices-Members whose
of an objective and impartial judgment.
disqualification was not sought, leaving
What we are merely saying is that in the
them to decide the matter. This Court
light of the Constitution, the Senate
held:
Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function
as such, absent its entire membership of
Where, as here, a situation is created
Senators and that no amendment of its
which precludes the substitution of any
Rules can confer on the three Justices-
Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of
Members alone the power of valid
his other colleagues in the Senate without
adjudication of a senatorial election
inviting the same objections to the
contest.
substitute's competence, the proposed
mass disqualification, if sanctioned and
More recently in the case of Estrada
ordered, would leave the Tribunal no
v. Desierto,[132] it was held that:
alternative but to abandon a duty that no
other court or body can perform, but
Moreover, to disqualify any of the
which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn
members of the Court, particularly a
of the participation of its entire
majority of them, is nothing short of pro
membership of Senators.
tanto depriving the Court itself of its
jurisdiction as established by the
To our mind, this is the overriding
fundamental law. Disqualification of a
consideration that the Tribunal be not
judge is a deprivation of his judicial
prevented from discharging a duty which
power. And if that judge is the one
it alone has the power to perform, the
designated by the Constitution to
performance of which is in the highest
exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is
public interest as evidenced by its being
the case with the Justices of this Court,
expressly imposed by no less than the
the deprivation of his or their judicial
fundamental law.
power is equivalent to the deprivation of
the judicial power of the court itself. It
It is aptly noted in the first of the
affects the very heart of judicial
questioned Resolutions that the framers
independence. The proposed mass
of the Constitution could not have been
disqualification, if sanctioned and
unaware of the possibility of an election
ordered, would leave the Court no
contest that would involve all
alternative but to abandon a duty which it
Senatorselect, six of whom would
cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon.
participation of its entire membership of
Indeed, such possibility might surface
Justices.[133] (Italics in the original)
again in the wake of the 1992 elections
when once more, but for the last time, all
24 seats in the Senate will be at stake.
 Besides, there are specific lacks a personal or property right. Thus,
safeguards already laid down by the the challenge by a public official
Court when it exercises its power of interested only in the performance of his
judicial review. official duty will not be entertained . . .
In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed
In Demetria v. Alba,[134] this Court,
the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen
through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the
who sought to have the Nineteenth
seven pillars of limitations of the power of
Amendment declared unconstitutional.
judicial review, enunciated by US
InMassachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge
Supreme Court Justice Brandeis
of the federal Maternity Act was not
in Ashwander v. TVA[135] as follows:
entertained although made by the
Commonwealth on behalf of all its
1. The Court will not pass upon the
citizens.
constitutionality of legislation in a friendly,
non-adversary proceeding, declining
6. The Court will not pass upon the
because to decide such questions is
constitutionality of a statute at the
legitimate only in the last resort, and as a
instance of one who has availed himself
necessity in the determination of real,
of its benefits.
earnest and vital controversy between
individuals. It never was the thought that,
7. When the validity of an act of the
by means of a friendly suit, a party
Congress is drawn in question, and even
beaten in the legislature could transfer to
if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
the courts an inquiry as to the
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this
constitutionality of the legislative act.
Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly
2. The Court will not anticipate a question
possible by which the question may be
of constitutional law in advance of the
avoided (citations omitted).
necessity of deciding it. . . . It is not the
habit of the Court to decide questions of a
The foregoing pillars of limitation of
constitutional nature unless absolutely
judicial review, summarized
necessary to a decision of the case.
in Ashwander v. TVA from different
decisions of the United States Supreme
3. The Court will not formulate a rule of
Court, can be encapsulated into the
constitutional law broader than is required
following categories:
by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied. 1. that there be absolute
necessity of deciding a case
4. The Court will not pass upon a
2. that rules of constitutional law
constitutional question although properly
shall be formulated only as
presented by the record, if there is also
required by the facts of the
present some other ground upon which
case
the case may be disposed of. This rule
has found most varied application. Thus, 3. that judgment may not be
if a case can be decided on either of two sustained on some other
grounds, one involving a constitutional ground
question, the other a question of statutory
4. that there be actual injury
construction or general law, the Court will
sustained by the party by
decide only the latter. Appeals from the
reason of the operation of the
highest court of a state challenging its
statute
decision of a question under the Federal
Constitution are frequently dismissed 5. that the parties are not
because the judgment can be sustained in estoppel
on an independent state ground.
6. that the Court upholds the
5. The Court will not pass upon the presumption of
validity of a statute upon complaint of one constitutionality.
who fails to show that he is injured by its As stated previously, parallel
operation. Among the many applications guidelines have been adopted by this
of this rule, none is more striking than the Court in the exercise of judicial review:
denial of the right of challenge to one who
 1. actual case or controversy judgment has not only juridical effects but
calling for the exercise of also political consequences. Those
judicial power political consequences may follow even
where the Court fails to grant the
2. the person challenging the act
petitioners prayer to nullify an act for lack
must have standing to
of the necessary number of
challenge; he must have a
votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly,
personal and substantial
one way or the other, itself constitutes a
interest in the case such that
decision for the respondent and
he has sustained, or will
validation, or at least quasi-validation,
sustain, direct injury as a result
follows. [138]
of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality Thus, in Javellana v. Executive
must be raised at the earliest Secretary[139] where this Court was split
possible opportunity and in the end there were not enough
votes either to grant the petitions, or to
4. the issue of constitutionality
sustain respondents claims,[140] the pre-
must be the very lis mota of
existing constitutional order was
the case.[136]
disrupted which paved the way for the
Respondents Speaker de establishment of the martial law regime.
Venecia, et. al. raise another argument
Such an argument by respondents
for judicial restraint the possibility that
and intervenor also presumes that the
judicial review of impeachments might
coordinate branches of the government
also lead to embarrassing conflicts
would behave in a lawless manner and
between the Congress and the
not do their duty under the law to uphold
[J]udiciary. They stress the need to avoid
the Constitution and obey the laws of the
the appearance of impropriety or conflicts
land. Yet there is no reason to believe
of interest in judicial hearings, and the
that any of the branches of government
scenario that it would be confusing and
will behave in a precipitate manner and
humiliating and risk serious political
risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and
instability at home and abroad if the
anarchy by encouraging disrespect for
judiciary countermanded the vote of
the fundamental law of the land.
Congress to remove an impeachable
official.[137] Intervenor Soriano echoes this Substituting the word public officers
argument by alleging that failure of this for judges, this Court is well guided by the
Court to enforce its Resolution against doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:
[141]
Congress would result in the diminution
of its judicial authority and erode public
confidence and faith in the judiciary. Obedience to the rule of law forms the
bedrock of our system of justice. If [public
Such an argument, however, is
officers], under the guise of religious or
specious, to say the least. As correctly
political beliefs were allowed to roam
stated by the Solicitor General, the
unrestricted beyond boundaries within
possibility of the occurrence of a
which they are required by law to
constitutional crisis is not a reason for this
exercise the duties of their office, then
Court to refrain from upholding the
law becomes meaningless. A government
Constitution in all impeachment
of laws, not of men excludes the exercise
cases. Justices cannot abandon their
of broad discretionary powers by those
constitutional duties just because their
acting under its authority. Under this
action may start, if not precipitate, a
system, [public officers] are guided by the
crisis.
Rule of Law, and ought to protect and
Justice Feliciano warned against the enforce it without fear or favor, resist
dangers when this Court refuses to act. encroachments by governments, political
parties, or even the interference of their
x x x Frequently, the fight over a own personal beliefs.[142]
controversial legislative or executive act
is not regarded as settled until the Constitutionality of the Rules of
Supreme Court has passed upon the Procedure for Impeachment
constitutionality of the act involved, the
Proceedings adopted by the 12th
Congress
Respondent House of
Representatives, through Speaker De
Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17
of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of
Article XI of our present Constitution,
contending that the term initiate does not
mean to file; that Section 3 (1) is clear in
that it is the House of Representatives, as
a collective body, which has the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of
impeachment; that initiate could not
possibly mean to file because filing can,
as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the
Constitution provides, only be
accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a
verified complaint for impeachment by
any member of the House of
Representatives; or (2) by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any
member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the
members of the House. Respondent
House of Representatives concludes that
the one year bar prohibiting the initiation
of impeachment proceedings against the
same officials could not have been
violated as the impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide and seven
Associate Justices had not been initiated
as the House of Representatives, acting
as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus
hinges on the interpretation of the term
initiate. Resort to statutory construction
is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of
Section 3(5) of the Constitution,
Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who
eventually became an Associate Justice
of this Court, agreed on the meaning of
initiate as to file, as proffered and
explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Maambong during the
Constitutional Commission proceedings,
which he (Commissioner Regalado)
as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral
arguments on the instant petitions held
on November 5, 2003 at which he added
that the act of initiating included the act of
taking initial action on the complaint,
dissipates any doubt that indeed the word
initiate as it twice appears in Article XI (3)
and (5) of the Constitution means to file
the complaint and take initial action on it.
Initiate of course is understood by
ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do,
to begin, to commence, or set going. As
Websters Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language
concisely puts it, it means to perform
or facilitate the first action, which jibes
with Justice Regalados position, and that
of Father Bernas, who elucidated during
the oral arguments of the instant petitions
on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding
is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts
consisting of a beginning, a middle and
an end. The end is the transmittal of the
articles of impeachment to the
Senate. The middle consists of those
deliberative moments leading to the
formulation of the articles of
impeachment. The beginning or the
initiation is the filing of the complaint and
its referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House
Rule relied upon by Representatives
Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that
impeachment is deemed initiated when
the Justice Committee votes in favor of
impeachment or when the House
reverses a contrary vote of the
Committee. Note that the Rule does not
say impeachment proceedings are
initiated but rather are deemed
initiated. The language is recognition
that initiation happened earlier, but by
legal fiction there is an attempt to
postpone it to a time after actual
initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of
interpreting the Constitution is looking
into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the
intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to
Section 3, regarding the procedure and
the substantive provisions on
impeachment, I understand there have
been many proposals and, I think, these
would need some time for Committee
action.
However, I would just like to indicate that
I submitted to the Committee a resolution
on impeachment proceedings, copies of
which have been furnished the Members
of this body. This is borne out of my
experience as a member of the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and
Good Government which took charge of
the last impeachment resolution filed
before the First Batasang Pambansa. For
the information of the Committee, the
resolution covers several steps in the
impeachment proceedings starting
with initiation, action of the Speaker
committee action, calendaring of
report, voting on the report, transmittal
referral to the Senate, trial and
judgment by the Senate.
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I
am not moving for a reconsideration of
the approval of the amendment submitted
by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just
make of record my thinking that we do
not really initiate the filing of the Articles
of Impeachment on the floor. The
procedure, as I have pointed out
earlier, was that the initiation starts
with the filing of the complaint. And
what is actually done on the floor is
that the committee resolution
containing the Articles of
Impeachment is the one approved by
the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may
be corrected by the Committee on Style,
it appears that the initiation starts on the
floor. If we only have time, I could cite
examples in the case of the impeachment
proceedings of President Richard Nixon
wherein the Committee on the Judiciary
submitted the recommendation, the
resolution, and the Articles of
Impeachment to the body, and it was the
body who approved the resolution. It is
not the body which initiates it. It only
approves or disapproves the
resolution. So, on that score, probably
the Committee on Style could help in
rearranging these words because we
have to be very technical about this. I
have been bringing with me The Rules of
the House of Representatives of the U.S.
Congress. The Senate Rules are with
me. The proceedings on the case of
Richard Nixon are with me. I have
submitted my proposal, but the
Committee has already
decided. Nevertheless, I just want to
indicate this on record
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to
move for a reconsideration of the
approval of Section 3 (3). My
reconsideration will not at all affect the
substance, but it is only in keeping with
the exact formulation of the Rules of the
House of Representatives of the United
States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President,
without doing damage to any of this
provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3),
from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words
which read: to initiate impeachment
proceedings and the comma (,) and
insert on line 19 after the word resolution
the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and
then capitalize the letter i in impeachment
and replace the word by with OF, so that
the whole section will now read: A vote of
at least one-third of all the Members of
the House shall be necessary either to
affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES
of Impeachment OF the Committee or to
override its contrary resolution. The vote
of each Member shall be recorded.
I already mentioned earlier yesterday
that the initiation, as far as the House of
Representatives of the United States is
concerned, really starts from the filing
of the verified complaint and every
resolution to impeach always carries with
it the Articles of Impeachment. As a
matter of fact, the words Articles of
Impeachment are mentioned on line 25 in
the case of the direct filing of a verified
compliant of one-third of all the Members
of the House. I will mention again,
Madam President, that my amendment
will not vary the substance in any way. It
is only in keeping with the uniform
procedure of the House of
Representatives of the United States
Congress. Thank you, Madam President.
[143]
(Italics in the original; emphasis and
udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by
Commissioner Maambong was clarified
and accepted by the Committee on the
Accountability of Public Officers.[144]
It is thus clear that the framers
intended initiation to start with the filing of
the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief,
Commissioner Maambong explained that
the obvious reason in deleting the
phrase to initiate impeachment
proceedings as contained in the text of
the provision of Section 3 (3) was
to settle and make it understood once
and for all that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings starts with
the filing of the complaint, and the vote
of one-third of the House in a resolution
of impeachment does not initiate the
impeachment proceedings which was
already initiated by the filing of a
verified complaint under Section 3,
paragraph (2), Article XI of the
Constitution.[145]
Amicus curiae Constitutional
Commissioner Regalado is of the same
view as is Father Bernas, who was also a
member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, that the word initiate as
used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to
file, both adding, however, that the filing
must be accompanied by an action to set
the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this
Court, Father Bernas clarified that the
word initiate, appearing in the
constitutional provision on
impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall
be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one
year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, impeachment case
and impeachment proceeding.
Father Bernas explains that in these
two provisions, the common verb is to
initiate. The object in the first sentence is
impeachment case. The object in the
second sentence is impeachment
proceeding. Following the principle
of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term
cases must be distinguished from the
term proceedings. An impeachment case
is the legal controversy that must be
decided by the Senate. Above-quoted
first provision provides that the House, by
a vote of one-third of all its members, can
bring a case to the Senate. It is in that
sense that the House has exclusive
power to initiate all cases of
impeachment. No other body can do
it. However, before a decision is made to
initiate a case in the Senate, a
proceeding must be followed to arrive at
a conclusion. A proceeding must be
initiated. To initiate, which comes from the
Latin word initium, means to begin. On
the other hand, proceeding is a
progressive noun. It has a beginning, a
middle, and an end. It takes place not in
the Senate but in the House and consists
of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a
verified complaint either by a Member of
the House of Representatives or by a
private citizen endorsed by a Member of
the House of the
Representatives; (2) there is the
processing of this complaint by the proper
Committee which may either reject the
complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the
resolution of the Committee rejects or
upholds the complaint, the resolution
must be forwarded to the House for
further processing; and (4) there is the
processing of the same complaint by the
House of Representatives which either
affirms a favorable resolution of the
Committee or overrides a contrary
resolution by a vote of one-third of all the
members. If at least one third of all the
Members upholds the complaint, Articles
of Impeachment are prepared and
transmitted to the Senate. It is at this
point that the House initiates an
impeachmentcase. It is at this point that
an impeachable public official is
successfully impeached. That is, he or
she is successfully charged with an
impeachment case before the Senate as
impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The
impeachment proceeding is not initiated
when the complaint is transmitted to the
Senate for trial because that is the end of
the House proceeding and the beginning
of another proceeding, namely the
trial. Neither is the impeachment
proceeding initiated when the House
deliberates on the resolution passed on
to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been
done. The action of the House is already
a further step in the proceeding, not its
initiation or beginning.Rather, the
proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to
the Committee on Justice for action. This
is the initiating step which triggers the
series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also
understood initiation in its ordinary
meaning. Thus when a proposal reached
the floor proposing that A vote of at least
one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary to initiate
impeachment proceedings, this was met
by a proposal to delete the line on the
ground that the vote of the House does
not initiate impeachment proceeding but
rather the filing of a complaint does.
[146]
Thus the line was deleted and is not
found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when
Section 3 (5) says, No impeachment
proceeding shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a
period of one year, it means that no
second verified complaint may be
accepted and referred to the Committee
on Justice for action. By his explanation,
this interpretation is founded on the
common understanding of the meaning of
to initiate which means to begin. He
reminds that the Constitution is ratified by
the people, both ordinary and
sophisticated, as they understand it; and
that ordinary people read ordinary
meaning into ordinary words and not
abstruse meaning, they ratify words as
they understand it and not as
sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House
of Representatives as a body can initiate
impeachment proceedings because
Section 3 (1) says The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of
impeachment, This is a misreading of
said provision and is contrary to the
principle of reddendo singula singulis by
equating impeachment cases with
impeachment proceeding.
From the records of the Constitutional
Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs
of two former Constitutional
Commissioners, it is without a doubt that
the term to initiate refers to the filing of
the impeachment complaint coupled with
Congress taking initial action of said
complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation
takes place by the act of filing and referral
or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on
Justice or, by the filing by at least one-
third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary
General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear.Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V
of the House Impeachment Rules,
impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated (1) if there is a
finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2)
once the House itself affirms or overturns
the finding of the Committee on Justice
that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is not sufficient in substance or
(3) by the filing or endorsement before
the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or
a resolution of impeachment by at least
1/3 of the members of the House. These
rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of
Article XI since the rules give the term
initiate a meaning different meaning from
filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice
Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court
could not use contemporaneous
construction as an aid in the
interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI,
citing Vera v. Avelino[147] wherein this
Court stated that their personal opinions
(referring to Justices who were delegates
to the Constitution Convention) on the
matter at issue expressed during this
Courts our deliberations stand on a
different footing from the properly
recorded utterances of debates and
proceedings. Further citing said case, he
states that this Court likened the former
members of the Constitutional
Convention to actors who are so
absorbed in their emotional roles that
intelligent spectators may know more
about the real meaning because of the
latters balanced perspectives and
disinterestedness. [148]
Justice Gutierrezs statements have
no application in the present
petitions. There are at present only two
members of this Court who participated in
the 1986 Constitutional Commission
Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf
Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not
taken part in these proceedings for
obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court
has not simply relied on the personal
opinions now given by members of the
Constitutional Commission, but has least one-third of all the Members of the
examined the records of the deliberations House, the same shall constitute the
and proceedings thereof. Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the
Senate shall forthwith proceed.
Respondent House of
Representatives counters that under
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be
Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and
initiated against the same official more
unequivocal that it and only it has the
than once within a period of one year.
power to make and interpret its rules
governing impeachment. Its argument is
It is basic that all rules must not
premised on the assumption that
contravene the Constitution which is the
Congress has absolute power to
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress
promulgate its rules. This assumption,
had absolute rule making power, then it
however, is misplaced.
would by necessary implication have the
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides power to alter or amend the meaning of
that The Congress shall promulgate its the Constitution without need of
rules on impeachment to effectively carry referendum.
out the purpose of this section. Clearly, its
In Osmea v. Pendatun,[149] this Court
power to promulgate its rules on
held that it is within the province of either
impeachment is limited by the phrase to
House of Congress to interpret its rules
effectively carry out the purpose of this
and that it was the best judge of what
section. Hence, these rules cannot
constituted disorderly behavior of its
contravene the very purpose of the
members. However, in Paceta v.
Constitution which said rules were
Secretary of the Commission on
intended to effectively carry
Appointments,[150] Justice (later Chief
out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI
Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for
clearly provides for other specific
this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis
limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
in United States v. Smith,[151] declared that
where the construction to be given to a
Section 3. (1) x x x
rule affects persons other than members
of the Legislature, the question becomes
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment
judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,
may be filed by any Member of the House [152]
quoting United States v. Ballin,
of Representatives or by any citizen upon
Joseph & Co.,[153] Justice Vicente
a resolution of endorsement by any
Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held
Member thereof, which shall be included
that while the Constitution empowers
in the Order of Business within ten
each house to determine its rules of
session days, and referred to the proper
proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore
Committee within three session days
constitutional restraints or violate
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing,
fundamental rights, and further that there
and by a majority vote of all its Members,
should be a reasonable relation between
shall submit its report to the House within
the mode or method of proceeding
sixty session days from such referral,
established by the rule and the result
together with the corresponding
which is sought to be attained. It is only
resolution. The resolution shall be
within these limitations that all matters of
calendared for consideration by the
method are open to the determination of
House within ten session days from
the Legislature. In the same case
receipt thereof.
of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato
S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the
Opinion, was even more emphatic as he
Members of the House shall be
stressed that in the Philippine setting
necessary to either affirm a favorable
there is even more reason for courts to
resolution with the Articles of
inquire into the validity of the Rules of
Impeachment of the Committee, or
Congress, viz:
override its contrary resolution. The vote
of each Member shall be recorded.
With due respect, I do not agree that
the issues posed by the petitioner are
(4) In case the verified complaint or
non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we
resolution of impeachment is filed by at
will trivialize the principle of
separation of power if we assume
jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even
in the United States, the principle of
separation of power is no longer an
impregnable impediment against the
interposition of judicial power on cases
involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case
of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to
view the issues before the Court. It is
in Ballin where the US Supreme Court
first defined the boundaries of the power
of the judiciary to review congressional
rules. It held:
The Constitution, in the same section,
provides, that each house may determine
the rules of its proceedings. It appears
that in pursuance of this authority the
House had, prior to that day, passed this
as one of its rules:
3. On the demand of any member, or at
the suggestion of the Speaker, the names
of members sufficient to make a quorum
in the hall of the House who do not vote
shall be noted by the clerk and recorded
in the journal, and reported to the
Speaker with the names of the members
voting, and be counted and announced in
determining the presence of a quorum to
do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb.
14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct
compliance with this rule. The question,
therefore, is as to the validity of this
rule, and not what methods the Speaker
may of his own motion resort to for
determining the presence of a quorum,
nor what matters the Speaker or clerk
may of their own volition place upon the
journal. Neither do the advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of
such a rule present any matters for
judicial consideration. With the courts the
question is only one of power. The
Constitution empowers each house to
determine its rules of proceedings. It
may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should
be a reasonable relation between the
mode or method of proceedings
established by the rule and the result
which is sought to be attained. But
within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of
the House, and it is no impeachment of
the rule to say that some other way would
be better, more accurate, or even more
just. It is no objection to the validity of a
rule that a different one has been
prescribed and in force for a length of
time. The power to make rules is not one
which once exercised is exhausted. It is a
continuous power, always subject to be
exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body
or tribunal.
Ballin, clearly confirmed the
jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the
validity of congressional rules, i.e,
whether they are constitutional. Rule
XV was examined by the Court and it was
found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not
ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it
did not violate any fundamental right; and
(3) its method had a reasonable
relationship with the result sought to be
attained. By examining Rule XV, the
Court did not allow its jurisdiction to
be defeated by the mere invocation of
the principle of separation of powers.
[154]
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is
a more compelling reason for courts
to categorically reject the political
question defense when its
interposition will cover up abuse of
power. For section 1, Article VIII of our
Constitution was intentionally cobbled
to empower courts x x x to determine
whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the
government. This power is new and was
not granted to our courts in the 1935 and
1972 Constitutions. It was not also
xeroxed from the US Constitution or
any foreign state constitution. The
CONCOM granted this enormous
power to our courts in view of our
experience under martial law where
abusive exercises of state power were
shielded from judicial scrutiny by the
misuse of the political question
doctrine. Led by the eminent former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the
CONCOM expanded and sharpened the
checking powers of the judiciary vis--vis
the Executive and the Legislative
departments of government.[155]
The Constitution cannot be any
clearer. What it granted to this Court is
not a mere power which it can decline
to exercise. Precisely to deter this
disinclination, the Constitution
imposed it as a duty of this Court to
strike down any act of a branch or
instrumentality of government or any
of its officials done with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.Rightly or
wrongly, the Constitution has elongated
the checking powers of this Court against
the other branches of government
despite their more democratic character,
the President and the legislators being
elected by the people.[156]
The provision defining judicial power as
including the duty of the courts of
justice. . . to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government
constitutes the capstone of the efforts of
the Constitutional Commission to
upgrade the powers of this court vis--vis
the other branches of government. This
provision was dictated by our experience
under martial law which taught us that a
stronger and more independent judiciary
is needed to abort abuses in government.
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this
Court the duty to annul acts of
government committed with grave abuse
of discretion, the new Constitution
transformed this Court from passivity to
activism. This transformation, dictated by
our distinct experience as nation, is not
merely evolutionary but
revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the
1973 Constitutions, this Court
approached constitutional violations by
initially determining what it cannot
do; under the 1987 Constitution, there
is a shift in stress this Court is
mandated to approach constitutional
violations not by finding out what it
should not do but what it must do. The
Court must discharge this solemn duty by
not resuscitating a past that petrifies the
present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give
due and serious consideration to this new
constitutional provision as the case at bar
once more calls us to define the
parameters of our power to review
violations of the rules of the House. We
will not be true to our trust as the last
bulwark against government abuses if
we refuse to exercise this new power
or if we wield it with timidity.To be
sure, it is this exceeding timidity to
unsheathe the judicial sword that has
increasingly emboldened other
branches of government to denigrate,
if not defy, orders of our
courts.In Tolentino, I endorsed the view
of former Senator Salonga that this novel
provision stretching the latitude of judicial
power is distinctly Filipino and its
interpretation should not be depreciated
by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at
bar, the lessons of our own history should
provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.[157] (Italics in the
original emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v.
Pendatun is not applicable to the instant
petitions. Here, the third parties alleging
the violation of private rights and the
Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of
Representatives rely on Nixon v.
[158]
US as basis for arguing that this Court
may not decide on the constitutionality of
Sections 16 and 17 of the House
Impeachment Rules. As already
observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution
simply provides that the House of
Representatives shall have the sole
power of impeachment. It adds nothing
more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to
how this sole power is to be
exercised. No limitation whatsoever is
given. Thus, the US Supreme Court
concluded that there was a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment
of a constitutional power to the House of
Representatives. This reasoning does not
hold with regard to impeachment power
of the Philippine House of
Representatives since our Constitution,
as earlier enumerated, furnishes several
provisions articulating how that exclusive
power is to be exercised.
 The provisions of Sections 16 and 17
of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules which state that impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if
there is a finding by the House
Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in
substance, or (2) once the House itself
affirms or overturns the finding of the
Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is not
sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing
or endorsement before the Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives
of a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment by at least 1/3 of the
members of the House thus clearly
contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as
they give the term initiate a meaning
different from filing.
Validity of the Second Impeachment
Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation
takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to
the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning
of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period
following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first
impeachment complaint, was filed by
former President Estrada against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with
seven associate justices of this Court, on
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003,
the second impeachment complaint filed
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro,
Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against
the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003
violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year
period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about
this country, it is that there is always a
phenomenon that takes the center stage
of our individual and collective
consciousness as a people with our
characteristic flair for human drama,
conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to
demean the seriousness of the
controversy over the Davide
impeachment. For many of us, the past
two weeks have proven to be an
exasperating, mentally and emotionally
exhausting experience. Both sides have
fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to
articulate what they respectively believe
to be the correct position or view on the
issues involved. Passions had ran high
as demonstrators, whether for or against
the impeachment of the Chief Justice,
took to the streets armed with their
familiar slogans and chants to air their
voice on the matter. Various sectors of
society - from the business, retired
military, to the academe and
denominations of faith offered
suggestions for a return to a state of
normalcy in the official relations of the
governmental branches affected to
obviate any perceived resulting instability
upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the
time when the Articles of Impeachment
had been constituted, this Court was
specifically asked, told, urged and argued
to take no action of any kind and form
with respect to the prosecution by the
House of Representatives of the
impeachment complaint against the
subject respondent public official. When
the present petitions were knocking so to
speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the
same clamor for non-interference was
made through what are now the
arguments of lack of jurisdiction, non-
justiciability, and judicial self-restraint
aimed at halting the Court from any move
that may have a bearing on the
impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to
adopt a hands-off stance as far as the
question of the constitutionality of
initiating the impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide is
concerned. To reiterate what has been
already explained, the Court found the
existence in full of all the requisite
conditions for its exercise of its
constitutionally vested power and duty of
judicial review over an issue whose
resolution precisely called for the
construction or interpretation of a
provision of the fundamental law of the
land. What lies in here is an issue of a
genuine constitutional material which only
this Court can properly and competently
address and adjudicate in accordance
with the clear-cut allocation of powers
under our system of government. Face-
to-face thus with a matter or problem that
squarely falls under the Courts
jurisdiction, no other course of action can
be had but for it to pass upon that
problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court
by judicially entangling itself with the
process of impeachment has effectively
set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is
patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions
subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved
on the merits only the main issue of
whether the impeachment proceedings
initiated against the Chief Justice
transgressed the constitutionally imposed
one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did
not go about assuming jurisdiction where
it had none, nor indiscriminately turn
justiciable issues out of decidedly political
questions. Because it is not at all the
business of this Court to assert judicial
dominance over the other two great
branches of the government. Rather,
the raison detre of the judiciary is to
complement the discharge by the
executive and legislative of their own
powers to bring about ultimately the
beneficent effects of having founded and
ordered our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking
cognizance of the issue of
constitutionality of the impeachment
proceedings against the Chief Justice,
the members of this Court have actually
closed ranks to protect a brethren. That
the members interests in ruling on said
issue is as much at stake as is that of the
Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther
from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme
Court together with all other courts has
long held and been entrusted with the
judicial power to resolve conflicting legal
rights regardless of the personalities
involved in the suits or actions. This Court
has dispensed justice over the course of
time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to
benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by
whatever imputations or speculations
could be made to it, so long as it
rendered judgment according to the law
and the facts. Why can it not now be
trusted to wield judicial power in these
petitions just because it is the highest
ranking magistrate who is involved when
it is an incontrovertible fact that the
fundamental issue is not him but the
validity of a government branchs official
act as tested by the limits set by the
Constitution? Of course, there are rules
on the inhibition of any member of the
judiciary from taking part in a case in
specified instances. But to disqualify this
entire institution now from the suit at bar
is to regard the Supreme Court as likely
incapable of impartiality when one of its
members is a party to a case, which is
simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the
Constitution. This is a basic precept in
any legal system which recognizes
equality of all men before the law as
essential to the laws moral authority and
that of its agents to secure respect for
and obedience to its
commands. Perhaps, there is no other
government branch or instrumentality that
is most zealous in protecting that
principle of legal equality other than the
Supreme Court which has discerned its
real meaning and ramifications through
its application to numerous cases
especially of the high-profile kind in the
annals of jurisprudence. The Chief
Justice is not above the law and neither is
any other member of this Court. But just
because he is the Chief Justice does not
imply that he gets to have less in law than
anybody else. The law is solicitous of
every individuals rights irrespective of his
station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic
institutions have no doubt been put to test
once again by this impeachment case
against Chief Justice Hilario
Davide. Accordingly, this Court has
resorted to no other than the Constitution
in search for a solution to what many
feared would ripen to a crisis in
government. But though it is indeed
immensely a blessing for this Court to
have found answers in our bedrock of
legal principles, it is equally important that
it went through this crucible of a
democratic process, if only to discover
that it can resolve differences without the
use of force and aggression upon each
other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of
Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001
are unconstitutional. Consequently, the
second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which
was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the
Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is
barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.
CALLEJO, SR., J.: People vs
Lacson
Before the Court is the petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration[1] of the
Resolution[2] dated May 28, 2002,
remanding this case to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81,
for the determination of several factual
issues relative to the application of
Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure on the
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 filed against the
respondent and his co-accused with the
said court. In the aforesaid criminal
cases, the respondent and his co-
accused were charged with multiple
murder for the shooting and killing of
eleven male persons identified as Manuel
Montero, a former Corporal of the
Philippine Army, Rolando Siplon, Sherwin
Abalora, who was 16 years old, Ray
Abalora, who was 19 years old, Joel
Amora, Jevy Redillas, Meleubren
Sorronda, who was 14 years old,
[3]
Pacifico Montero, Jr., of the 44th
Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army,
Welbor Elcamel, SPO1 Carlito Alap-ap of
the Zamboanga PNP, and Alex Neri,
former Corporal of the 44th Infantry
Batallion of the Philippine Army, bandied
as members of the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang. The respondent opposed
petitioners motion for reconsideration.[4]
The Court ruled in the Resolution
sought to be reconsidered that the
provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were
with the express consent of the
respondent as he himself moved for said
provisional dismissal when he filed his
motion for judicial determination of
probable cause and for examination of
witnesses. The Court also held therein
that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
could be given retroactive effect, there is
still a need to determine whether the
requirements for its application are
attendant. The trial court was thus
directed to resolve the following:
... (1) whether the provisional dismissal of
the cases had the express consent of the
accused; (2) whether it was ordered by
the court after notice to the offended
party; (3) whether the 2-year period to
revive it has already lapsed; (4) whether
there is any justification for the filing of
the cases beyond the 2-year period; (5)
whether notices to the offended parties
were given before the cases of
respondent Lacson were dismissed by
then Judge Agnir; (6) whether there were
affidavits of desistance executed by the
relatives of the three (3) other victims; (7)
whether the multiple murder cases
against respondent Lacson are being
revived within or beyond the 2-year bar.
The Court further held that the
reckoning date of the two-year bar had to
be first determined whether it shall be
from the date of the order of then Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases, or from
the dates of receipt thereof by the various
offended parties, or from the date of
effectivity of the new rule. According to
the Court, if the cases were revived only
after the two-year bar, the State must be
given the opportunity to justify its failure
to comply with the said time-bar. It
emphasized that the new rule fixes a
time-bar to penalize the State for its
inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases
already filed in court. However, the State
is not precluded from presenting
compelling reasons to justify the revival of
cases beyond the two-year bar.
In support of their Motion for
Reconsideration, the petitioners contend
that (a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is
not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the
time-bar in said rule should not be
applied retroactively.
The Court shall resolve the
issues seriatim.
I. SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE
REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO
CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-99-81679 TO
Q-99-81689.
The petitioners aver that Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure is not applicable to Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689
because the essential requirements for its
application were not present when Judge
Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of March
29, 1999. Disagreeing with the ruling of
the Court, the petitioners maintain that
the respondent did not give his express
consent to the dismissal by Judge Agnir,
Jr., of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679
to Q-99-81689. The respondent allegedly
admitted in his pleadings filed with the
Court of Appeals and during the hearing
thereat that he did not file any motion to
dismiss said cases, or even agree to a
provisional dismissal thereof. Moreover,
the heirs of the victims were allegedly not
given prior notices of the dismissal of the
said cases by Judge Agnir, Jr. According
to the petitioners, the respondents
express consent to the provisional
dismissal of the cases and the notice to
all the heirs of the victims of the
respondents motion and the hearing
thereon are conditions sine qua non to
the application of the time-bar in the
second paragraph of the new rule.
The petitioners further submit that it is
not necessary that the case be remanded
to the RTC to determine whether private
complainants were notified of the March
22, 1999 hearing on the respondents
motion for judicial determination of the
existence of probable cause. The records
allegedly indicate clearly that only the
handling city prosecutor was furnished a
copy of the notice of hearing on said
motion. There is allegedly no evidence
that private prosecutor Atty. Godwin
Valdez was properly retained and
authorized by all the private complainants
to represent them at said hearing. It is
their contention that Atty. Valdez merely
identified the purported affidavits of
desistance and that he did not confirm
the truth of the allegations therein.
The respondent, on the other hand,
insists that, as found by the Court in its
Resolution and Judge Agnir, Jr. in his
resolution, the respondent himself moved
for the provisional dismissal of the
criminal cases. He cites the resolution of
Judge Agnir, Jr. stating that the
respondent and the other accused filed
separate but identical motions for the
dismissal of the criminal cases should the
trial court find no probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest against
them.
The respondent further asserts that
the heirs of the victims, through the public
and private prosecutors, were duly
notified of said motion and the hearing
thereof. He contends that it was sufficient
that the public prosecutor was present
during the March 22, 1999 hearing on the
motion for judicial determination of the
existence of probable cause because
criminal actions are always prosecuted in
the name of the People, and the private
complainants merely prosecute the civil
aspect thereof.
The Court has reviewed the records
and has found the contention of the
petitioners meritorious.
 Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall
not be provisionally dismissed except
with the express consent of the accused
and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses
punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any
amount, or both, shall become permanent
one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been
revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than
six (6) years, their provisional dismissal
shall become permanent two (2) years
after issuance of the order without the
case having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the
petitioners-panel of prosecutors and
before the Court of Appeals, the
respondent is burdened to establish the
essential requisites of the first paragraph
thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express
conformity of the accused or the accused
moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio)
dismissal of the case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for a
provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the
motion for a provisional dismissal of the
case;
3. the court issues an order granting the
motion and dismissing the case
provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a
copy of the order of provisional dismissal
of the case.
The foregoing requirements are
conditions sine qua non to the application
of the time-bar in the second paragraph
of the new rule. The raison d etre for the
requirement of the express consent of the
accused to a provisional dismissal of a
criminal case is to bar him from
subsequently asserting that the revival of
the criminal case will place him in double
jeopardy for the same offense or for an
offense necessarily included therein.[5]
Although the second paragraph of the
new rule states that the order of dismissal
shall become permanent one year after
the issuance thereof without the case
having been revived, the provision should
be construed to mean that the order of
dismissal shall become permanent one
year after service of the order of
dismissal on the public prosecutor who
has control of the prosecution [6] without
the criminal case having been
revived. The public prosecutor cannot be
expected to comply with the timeline
unless he is served with a copy of the
order of dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional
dismissal is given either viva voce or in
writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal
consent requiring no inference or
implication to supply its meaning.[7] Where
the accused writes on the motion of a
prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of
the case No objection or With my
conformity, the writing amounts to
express consent of the accused to a
provisional dismissal of the case. [8] The
mere inaction or silence of the accused to
a motion for a provisional dismissal of the
case[9] or his failure to object to a
provisional dismissal[10] does not amount
to express consent.
A motion of the accused for a
provisional dismissal of a case is an
express consent to such provisional
dismissal.[11] If a criminal case is
provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused, the case may be
revived only within the periods provided
in the new rule. On the other hand, if a
criminal case is provisionally dismissed
without the express consent of the
accused or over his objection, the new
rule would not apply. The case may be
revived or refiled even beyond the
prescribed periods subject to the right of
the accused to oppose the same on the
ground of double jeopardy[12] or that such
revival or refiling is barred by the statute
of limitations.[13]
The case may be revived by the
State within the time-bar either by the
refiling of the Information or by the filing
of a new Information for the same offense
or an offense necessarily included
therein. There would be no need of a new
preliminary investigation.[14] However, in a
case wherein after the provisional
dismissal of a criminal case, the original
witnesses of the prosecution or some of
them may have recanted their
testimonies or may have died or may no
longer be available and new witnesses
for the State have emerged, a new
preliminary investigation[15] must be
conducted before an Information is refiled
or a new Information is filed. A new
preliminary investigation is also required
if aside from the original accused, other
persons are charged under a new
criminal complaint for the same offense or
necessarily included therein; or if under a
new criminal complaint, the original
charge has been upgraded; or if under a
new criminal complaint, the criminal
liability of the accused is upgraded from
that as an accessory to that as a
principal. The accused must be accorded
the right to submit counter-affidavits and
evidence. After all, the fiscal is not called
by the Rules of Court to wait in ambush;
the role of a fiscal is not mainly to
prosecute but essentially to do justice to
every man and to assist the court in
dispensing that justice.[16]
In this case, the respondent has
failed to prove that the first and second
requisites of the first paragraph of the
new rule were present when Judge Agnir,
Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the
prosecution did not file any motion for the
provisional dismissal of the said criminal
cases. For his part, the respondent
merely filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and for
examination of prosecution witnesses
alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of
the Constitution and the decision of this
Court in Allado v. Diokno,[17] among other
cases, there was a need for the trial court
to conduct a personal determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against respondent and
to have the prosecutions witnesses
summoned before the court for its
examination. The respondent contended
therein that until after the trial court shall
have personally determined the presence
of probable cause, no warrant of arrest
should be issued against the respondent
and if one had already been issued, the
warrant should be recalled by the trial
court. He then prayed therein that:
1) a judicial determination of probable
cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of
the Constitution be conducted by this
Honorable Court, and for this purpose, an
order be issued directing the prosecution
to present the private complainants and
their witnesses at a hearing scheduled
therefor; and
2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-
movants be withheld, or, if issued,
recalled in the meantime until the
resolution of this incident.
Other equitable reliefs are also prayed
for.[18]
The respondent did not pray for the
dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-
99-81689. Neither did he ever agree,
impliedly or expressly, to a mere
provisional dismissal of the cases. In fact,
in his reply filed with the Court of
Appeals, respondent emphasized that:
... An examination of the Motion for
Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
and for Examination of Prosecution
Witnesses filed by the petitioner and his
other co-accused in the said criminal
cases would show that the petitioner did
not pray for the dismissal of the case. On
the contrary, the reliefs prayed for therein
by the petitioner are: (1) a judicial
determination of probable cause pursuant
to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution;
and (2) that warrants for the arrest of the
accused be withheld, or if issued,
recalled in the meantime until the
resolution of the motion. It cannot be
said, therefore, that the dismissal of the
case was made with the consent of the
petitioner. A copy of the aforesaid motion
is hereto attached and made integral part
hereof as Annex A.[19]
During the hearing in the Court of
Appeals on July 31, 2001, the
respondent, through counsel,
categorically, unequivocally, and definitely
declared that he did not file any motion to
dismiss the criminal cases nor did he
agree to a provisional dismissal thereof,
thus:
Continue.[20]
In his memorandum in lieu of the oral
argument filed with the Court of Appeals,
the respondent declared in no uncertain
terms that:
Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999
rendered a decision declaring the
Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over
the cases. The records were remanded to
the QC RTC: Upon raffle, the case was
assigned to Branch 81. Petitioner and the
others promptly filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause (Annex
B). He asked that warrants for his arrest
not be issued. He did not move for the
dismissal of the Informations, contrary
to respondent OSGs claim.[21]
The respondents admissions made in
the course of the proceedings in the
Court of Appeals are binding and
conclusive on him. The respondent is
barred from repudiating his admissions
absent evidence of palpable mistake in
making such admissions.[22]
To apply the new rule in Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689
would be to add to or make exceptions
from the new rule which are not expressly
or impliedly included therein. This the
Court cannot and should not do.[23]
The Court also agrees with the
petitioners contention that no notice of
any motion for the provisional dismissal
of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-
99-81689 or of the hearing thereon was
served on the heirs of the victims at least
three days before said hearing as
mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind
that in crimes involving private interests,
the new rule requires that the offended
party or parties or the heirs of the victims
must be given adequate a priori notice of
any motion for the provisional dismissal
of the criminal case. Such notice may be
served on the offended party or the heirs
of the victim through the private
prosecutor, if there is one, or through the
public prosecutor who in turn must relay
the notice to the offended party or the
heirs of the victim to enable them to
confer with him before the hearing or
appear in court during the hearing. The
proof of such service must be shown
during the hearing on the motion,
otherwise, the requirement of the new
rule will become illusory. Such notice will
enable the offended party or the heirs of
the victim the opportunity to seasonably
and effectively comment on or object to
the motion on valid grounds, including:
(a) the collusion between the prosecution
and the accused for the provisional
dismissal of a criminal case thereby
depriving the State of its right to due
process; (b) attempts to make witnesses
unavailable; or (c) the provisional
dismissal of the case with the consequent
release of the accused from detention
would enable him to threaten and kill the
offended party or the other prosecution
witnesses or flee from Philippine
jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the
destruction or loss of the prosecutions
physical and other evidence and
prejudice the rights of the offended party
to recover on the civil liability of the
accused by his concealment or furtive
disposition of his property or the
consequent lifting of the writ of
preliminary attachment against his
property.
In the case at bar, even if the
respondents motion for a determination of
probable cause and examination of
witnesses may be considered for the
nonce as his motion for a provisional
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689, however, the heirs
of the victims were not notified thereof
prior to the hearing on said motion on
March 22, 1999. It must be stressed that
the respondent filed his motion only on
March 17, 1999 and set it for hearing on
March 22, 1999 or barely five days from
the filing thereof. Although the public
prosecutor was served with a copy of the
motion, the records do not show that
notices thereof were separately given to
the heirs of the victims or that subpoenae
were issued to and received by them,
including those who executed their
affidavits of desistance who were
residents of Dipolog City or Pian,
Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon,
Leyte.[24] There is as well no proof in the
records that the public prosecutor notified
the heirs of the victims of said motion or
of the hearing thereof on March 22,
1999. Although Atty. Valdez entered his
appearance as private prosecutor,[25] he
did so only for some but not all the close
kins of the victims, namely, Nenita Alap-
ap, Imelda Montero, Margarita Redillas,
Rufino Siplon, Carmelita Elcamel, Myrna
Abalora, and Leonora Amora who (except
for Rufino Siplon)[26] executed their
respective affidavits of desistance.
[27]
There was no appearance for the heirs
of Alex Neri, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and
Meleubren Sorronda. There is no proof
on record that all the heirs of the victims
were served with copies of the resolution
of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said
cases. In fine, there never was any
attempt on the part of the trial court, the
public prosecutor and/or the private
prosecutor to notify all the heirs of the
victims of the respondents motion and the
hearing thereon and of the resolution of
Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing said
cases. The said heirs were thus deprived
of their right to be heard on the
respondents motion and to protect their
interests either in the trial court or in the
appellate court.
Since the conditions sine qua non for
the application of the new rule were not
present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his
resolution, the State is not barred by the
time limit set forth in the second
paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The State can thus revive or
refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689 or file new Informations for
multiple murder against the respondent.
II. THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION
8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED
RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE
APPLIED RETROACTIVELY.
The petitioners contend that even on
the assumption that the respondent
expressly consented to a provisional
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 and all the heirs of
the victims were notified of the
respondents motion before the hearing
thereon and were served with copies of
the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year
bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
should be applied prospectively and not
retroactively against the State.To apply
the time limit retroactively to the criminal
cases against the respondent and his co-
accused would violate the right of the
People to due process, and unduly
impair, reduce, and diminish the States
substantive right to prosecute the
accused for multiple murder. They posit
that under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code, the State had twenty years within
which to file the criminal complaints
against the accused. However, under the
new rule, the State only had two years
from notice of the public prosecutor of the
order of dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 within which
to revive the said cases. When the new
rule took effect on December 1, 2000, the
State only had one year and three
months within which to revive the cases
or refile the Informations. The period for
the State to charge respondent for
multiple murder under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code was considerably
and arbitrarily reduced. They submit that
in case of conflict between the Revised
Penal Code and the new rule, the former
should prevail. They also insist that the
State had consistently relied on the
prescriptive periods under Article 90 of
the Revised Penal Code. It was not
accorded a fair warning that it would
forever be barred beyond the two-year
period by a retroactive application of the
new rule.[28] Petitioners thus pray to the
Court to set aside its Resolution of May
28, 2002.
For his part, the respondent asserts
that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure may be applied retroactively
since there is no substantive right of the
State that may be impaired by its
application to the criminal cases in
question since [t]he States witnesses
were ready, willing and able to provide
their testimony but the prosecution failed
to act on these cases until it became
politically expedient in April 2001 for them
to do so.[29] According to the respondent,
penal laws, either procedural or
substantive, may be retroactively applied
so long as they favor the accused. [30] He
asserts that the two-year period
commenced to run on March 29, 1999
and lapsed two years thereafter was
more than reasonable opportunity for the
State to fairly indict him.[31] In any event,
the State is given the right under the
Courts assailed Resolution to justify the
filing of the Information in Criminal Cases
Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the
time-bar under the new rule.
The respondent insists that Section 8
of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure does not broaden the
substantive right of double jeopardy to
the prejudice of the State because the
prohibition against the revival of the
cases within the one-year or two-year
periods provided therein is a legal
concept distinct from the prohibition
against the revival of a provisionally
dismissed case within the periods stated
in Section 8 of Rule 117. Moreover, he
claims that the effects of a provisional
dismissal under said rule do not modify or
negate the operation of the prescriptive
period under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code. Prescription under the
Revised Penal Code simply becomes
irrelevant upon the application of Section
8, Rule 117 because a complaint or
information has already been filed against
the accused, which filing tolls the running
of the prescriptive period under Article 90.
[32]
The Court agrees with the
respondent that the new rule is not a
statute of limitations. Statutes of
limitations are construed as acts of grace,
and a surrender by the sovereign of its
right to prosecute or of its right to
prosecute at its discretion. Such statutes
are considered as equivalent to acts of
amnesty founded on the liberal theory
that prosecutions should not be allowed
to ferment endlessly in the files of the
government to explode only after
witnesses and proofs necessary for the
protection of the accused have by sheer
lapse of time passed beyond availability.
[33]
The periods fixed under such statutes
are jurisdictional and are essential
elements of the offenses covered.[34]
On the other hand, the time-bar
under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a
special procedural limitation qualifying the
right of the State to prosecute making the
time-bar an essence of the given right or
as an inherent part thereof, so that the
lapse of the time-bar operates to
extinguish the right of the State to
prosecute the accused.[35]
The time-bar under the new rule does
not reduce the periods under Article 90 of
the Revised Penal Code, a substantive
law.[36] It is but a limitation of the right of
the State to revive a criminal case against
the accused after the Information had
been filed but subsequently provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of the
accused. Upon the lapse of the timeline
under the new rule, the State is
presumed, albeit disputably, to have
abandoned or waived its right to revive
the case and prosecute the accused. The
dismissal becomes ipso
facto permanent. He can no longer be
charged anew for the same crime or
another crime necessarily included
therein.[37] He is spared from the anguish
and anxiety as well as the expenses in
any new indictments.[38] The State may
revive a criminal case beyond the one-
year or two-year periods provided that
there is a justifiable necessity for the
delay.[39] By the same token, if a criminal
case is dismissed on motion of the
accused because the trial is not
concluded within the period therefor, the
prescriptive periods under the Revised
Penal Code are not thereby diminished.
[40]
But whether or not the prosecution of
the accused is barred by the statute of
limitations or by the lapse of the time-line
under the new rule, the effect is basically
the same. As the State Supreme Court of
Illinois held:
This, in effect, enacts that when the
specified period shall have arrived, the
right of the state to prosecute shall be
gone, and the liability of the offender to
be punishedto be deprived of his
libertyshall cease. Its terms not only strike
down the right of action which the state
had acquired by the offense, but also
remove the flaw which the crime had
created in the offenders title to liberty. In
this respect, its language goes deeper
than statutes barring civil remedies
usually do. They expressly take away
only the remedy by suit, and that
inferentially is held to abate the right
which such remedy would enforce, and
perfect the title which such remedy would
invade; but this statute is aimed directly
at the very right which the state has
against the offenderthe right to punish, as
the only liability which the offender has
incurred, and declares that this right and
this liability are at an end. [41]
The Court agrees with the
respondent that procedural laws may be
applied retroactively. As applied to
criminal law, procedural law provides or
regulates the steps by which one who
has committed a crime is to be
punished. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
[42]
this Court held that:
Statutes regulating the procedure of the
courts will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage. Procedural laws
are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent. The fact that procedural statutes
may somehow affect the litigants rights
may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The
retroactive application of procedural laws
is not violative of any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely
affected. Nor is the retroactive application
of procedural statutes constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is that as a
general rule no vested right may attach
to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has
been held that a person has no vested
right in any particular remedy, and a
litigant cannot insist on the application to
the trial of his case, whether civil or
criminal, of any other than the existing
rules of procedure.
It further ruled therein that a
procedural law may not be applied
retroactively if to do so would work
injustice or would involve intricate
problems of due process or impair the
independence of the Court. In a per
curiam decision in Cipriano v. City of
Houma,[43] the United States Supreme
Court ruled that where a decision of the
court would produce substantial
inequitable results if applied retroactively,
there is ample basis for avoiding the
injustice of hardship by a holding of
nonretroactivity.[44] A construction of which
a statute is fairly susceptible is favored,
which will avoid all objectionable,
mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, and
injurious consequences.[45] This Court
should not adopt an interpretation of a
statute which produces absurd,
unreasonable, unjust, or oppressive
results if such interpretation could be
avoided.[46] Time and again, this Court
has decreed that statutes are to be
construed in light of the purposes to be
achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. In construing a statute, the
reason for the enactment should be kept
in mind and the statute should be
construed with reference to the intended
scope and purpose.[47]
Remedial legislation, or procedural
rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to
enhance and implement the constitutional
rights of parties in criminal proceedings
may be applied retroactively or
prospectively depending upon several
factors, such as the history of the new
rule, its purpose and effect, and whether
the retrospective application will further
its operation, the particular conduct
sought to be remedied and the effect
thereon in the administration of justice
and of criminal laws in particular.[48] In
a per curiamdecision in Stefano v.
Woods,[49] the United States Supreme
Court catalogued the factors in
determining whether a new rule or
doctrine enunciated by the High Court
should be given retrospective or
prospective effect:
(a) the purpose to be served by the new
standards, (b) the extent of the reliance
by law enforcement authorities on the old
standards, and (c) the effect on the
administration of justice of a retroactive
application of the new standards.
In this case, the Court agrees with
the petitioners that the time-bar of two
years under the new rule should not be
applied retroactively against the State.
In the new rule in question, as now
construed by the Court, it has fixed a
time-bar of one year or two years for the
revival of criminal cases provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of the
accused and with a priori notice to the
offended party. The time-bar may appear,
on first impression, unreasonable
compared to the periods under Article 90
of the Revised Penal Code. However, in
fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced
the societal interests and those of the
accused for the orderly and speedy
disposition of criminal cases with
minimum prejudice to the State and the
accused. It took into account the
substantial rights of both the State and of
the accused to due process. The Court
believed that the time limit is a
reasonable period for the State to revive
provisionally dismissed cases with the
consent of the accused and notice to the
offended parties. The time-bar fixed by
the Court must be respected unless it is
shown that the period is manifestly short
or insufficient that the rule becomes a
denial of justice.[50] The petitioners failed
to show a manifest shortness or
insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by
the Committee on the Revision of the
Rules and approved by the Court en
banc primarily to enhance the
administration of the criminal justice
system and the rights to due process of
the State and the accused by eliminating
the deleterious practice of trial courts of
provisionally dismissing criminal cases on
motion of either the prosecution or the
accused or jointly, either with no time-bar
for the revival thereof or with a specific or
definite period for such revival by the
public prosecutor. There were times when
such criminal cases were no longer
revived or refiled due to causes beyond
the control of the public prosecutor or
because of the indolence, apathy or the
lackadaisical attitude of public
prosecutors to the prejudice of the State
and the accused despite the mandate to
public prosecutors and trial judges to
expedite criminal proceedings.[51]
It is almost a universal experience
that the accused welcomes delay as it
usually operates in his favor,[52] especially
if he greatly fears the consequences of
his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to
disturb the hushed inaction by which
dominant cases have been known to
expire.[53]
The inordinate delay in the revival or
refiling of criminal cases may impair or
reduce the capacity of the State to prove
its case with the disappearance or
nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical
evidence may have been lost. Memories
of witnesses may have grown dim or
have faded. Passage of time makes proof
of any fact more difficult.[54] The accused
may become a fugitive from justice or
commit another crime. The longer the
lapse of time from the dismissal of the
case to the revival thereof, the more
difficult it is to prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a
mere provisional dismissal of a criminal
case does not terminate a criminal
case. The possibility that the case may
be revived at any time may disrupt or
reduce, if not derail, the chances of the
accused for employment, curtail his
association, subject him to public obloquy
and create anxiety in him and his
family.He is unable to lead a normal life
because of community suspicion and his
own anxiety. He continues to suffer those
penalties and disabilities incompatible
with the presumption of innocence.[55] He
may also lose his witnesses or their
memories may fade with the passage of
time. In the long run, it may diminish his
capacity to defend himself and thus
eschew the fairness of the entire criminal
justice system.[56]
The time-bar under the new rule was
fixed by the Court to excise the malaise
that plagued the administration of the
criminal justice system for the benefit of
the State and the accused; not for the
accused only.
The Court agrees with the petitioners
that to apply the time-bar retroactively so
that the two-year period commenced to
run on March 31, 1999 when the public
prosecutor received his copy of the
resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing
the criminal cases is inconsistent with the
intendment of the new rule. Instead of
giving the State two years to revive
provisionally dismissed cases, the State
had considerably less than two years to
do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-
99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new
rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If
the Court applied the new time-bar
retroactively, the State would have only
one year and three months or until March
31, 2001 within which to revive these
criminal cases. The period is short of the
two-year period fixed under the new
rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is
applied prospectively, the State would
have two years from December 1, 2000
or until December 1, 2002 within which to
revive the cases. This is in consonance
with the intendment of the new rule in
fixing the time-bar and thus prevent
injustice to the State and avoid absurd,
unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and
wrongful results in the administration of
justice.
The period from April 1, 1999 to
November 30, 1999 should be excluded
in the computation of the two-year period
because the rule prescribing it was not
yet in effect at the time and the State

could not be expected to comply with the
time-bar. It cannot even be argued that
the State waived its right to revive the
criminal cases against respondent or that
it was negligent for not reviving them
within the two-year period under the new
rule. As the United States Supreme Court
said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter,
in Griffin v. People:[57]
We should not indulge in the fiction that
the law now announced has always been
the law and, therefore, that those who did
not avail themselves of it waived their
rights .
The two-year period fixed in the new
rule is for the benefit of both the State
and the accused. It should not be
emasculated and reduced by an
inordinate retroactive application of the
time-bar therein provided merely to
benefit the accused. For to do so would
cause an injustice of hardship to the
State and adversely affect the
administration of justice in general and of
criminal laws in particular.
To require the State to give a valid
justification as a condition sine qua non to
the revival of a case provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of the
accused before the effective date of the
new rule is to assume that the State is
obliged to comply with the time-bar under
the new rule before it took effect. This
would be a rank denial of justice.The
State must be given a period of one year
or two years as the case may be from
December 1, 2000 to revive the criminal
case without requiring the State to make
a valid justification for not reviving the
case before the effective date of the new
rule. Although in criminal cases, the
accused is entitled to justice and fairness,
so is the State. As the United States
Supreme Court said, per Mr. Justice
Benjamin Cardozo, in Snyder v. State of
Massachussetts,[58] the concept of
fairness must not be strained till it is
narrowed to a filament. We are to keep
the balance true. In Dimatulac v. Villon,
[59]
this Court emphasized that the judges
action must not impair the substantial
rights of the accused nor the right of the
State and offended party to due process
of law. This Court further said:
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales
must balance; justice is not to be
dispensed for the accused alone. The
interests of society and the offended
parties which have been wronged must
be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of
conviction is not necessarily a denial of
justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily
a triumph of justice, for, to the society
offended and the party wronged, it could
also mean injustice. Justice then must be
rendered even-handedly to both the
accused, on one hand, and the State and
offended party, on the other.
In this case, the eleven Informations
in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-
101112 were filed with the Regional Trial
Court on June 6, 2001 well within the
two-year period.
In sum, this Court finds the motion for
reconsideration of petitioners meritorious.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED. The
Resolution of this Court, dated May 28,
2002, is SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated August 24, 2001,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034 is
REVERSED. The Petition of the
Respondent with the Regional Trial Court
in Civil Case No. 01-100933 is
DISMISSED for being moot and
academic. The Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 81, is DIRECTED to
forthwith proceed with Criminal Cases
Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with
deliberate dispatch.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.