Professional Documents
Culture Documents
INTERPLEADER (62)
Bereft of merit too is petitioners argument that the Caloocan City MeTC cannot disregard the
injunction order of the Quezon City RTC hearing the Annulment/Reversion case. The established
rule is that a pending civil action for ownership such as annulment of title shall not ipso
facto suspend an ejectment proceeding. The Court explained that the rationale for this is that in an
ejectment case, the issue is possession, while in an annulment case the issue is ownership. In fact,
an ejectment case can be tried apart from an annulment case.
Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court observes that while the first,9 second,10
and third11 requirements appear to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements,
however, remain wanting.
As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the
ripening seeds of one exists in this case.
A perusal of private respondents petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed
to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury
as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far removed from the
factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only assert general interests
as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government could prospectively commit if the
enforcement of the said law would remain untrammelled. As their petition would disclose, private
respondents fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials
which were addressed to the general public.14 They, however, failed to show how these remarks
tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared towards the implementation of
RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of
them.
a. Rule 64 does not cover rulings of the COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative powers
Though the provision appears unambiguous and unequivocal, the Court has consistently held that
the phrase "decision, order, or ruling" of constitutional commissions, the COMELEC included,
that may be brought directly to the Supreme Court on certiorari is not all-encompassing, and that
it only relates to those rendered in the commissions' exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers.51 In the case of the COMELEC, this would limit the provision's coverage to the decisions,
orders, or rulings issued pursuant to its authority to be the sole judge of generally all controversies
and contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of elective offices.
JURISDICTION: Thus, under Sec. 58, the proper remedy to question the ruling of the head of the
procuring entity is through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The term "procuring entity" is defined under the RA 9184 as "any branch, department, office,
agency, or instrumentality of the government, including state universities and colleges,
government-owned and/or -controlled corporations, government financial institutions, and local
government units procuring Goods, Consulting Services and Infrastructure Projects."64 This
statutory definition makes no distinction as to whether or not the procuring entity is a constitutional
commission under Article IX of the Constitution. It is broad enough to include the COMELEC
within the contemplation of the term. Hence, under the law, grievances relating to the COMELEC
rulings in protests over the conduct of its project procurement should then be addressed to the
RTC.
CERTIORARI (65)
Tan vs. Antazo
The pivotal issue in this case is the correctness of a special civil action for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals as a remedy against the Decision and Resolution of the Regional Trial Court.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a pleading limited to correction of
errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its
principal office is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent
it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It
may issue only when the following requirements are alleged in and established by the petition: (1)
that the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) that such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) that there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.4
Only the first requisite is here present. Petitioner correctly impleaded the trial court judge in her
certiorari petition.
Regarding to the second requisite, it is well-settled that a petition for certiorari against a court
which has jurisdiction over a case will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is manifested. The
burden is on the part of the petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing
the impugned order. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. The term grave
abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or
hostility.5
Anent the third requisite, a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available
to the aggrieved party. The party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is proscribed
from assailing the decision or final order of said court via Rule 65 of the Rules of Court because
such recourse is proper only if the party has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course
of law.8 Furthermore, certiorari cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an
ordinary appeal.
PROHIBITION (65)
MANDAMUS (65)
EXPROPRIATION (67)
Barangay Sindalan vs CA
Petitioner imputes errors to the CA for (1) allegedly violating its power of eminent domain, (2)
finding that the expropriation of the property is not for public use but for a privately owned
subdivision, (3) finding that there was no payment of just compensation, and (4) failing to accord
respect to the findings of the trial court. Stated briefly, the main issue in this case is whether the
proposed exercise of the power of eminent domain would be for a public purpose.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained by two constitutional provisions: (1)
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation under Article III
(Bill of Rights), Section 9 and (2) that no person shall be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or
property without due process of law under Art. III, Sec. 1.
However, there is no precise meaning of "public use" and the term is susceptible of myriad
meanings depending on diverse situations. The limited meaning attached to "public use" is "use
by the public" or "public employment," that "a duty must devolve on the person or corporation
holding property appropriated by right of eminent domain to furnish the public with the use
intended, and that there must be a right on the part of the public, or some portion of it, or some
public or quasi-public agency on behalf of the public, to use the property after it is
condemned."12 The more generally accepted view sees "public use" as "public advantage,
convenience, or benefit, and that anything which tends to enlarge the resources, increase the
industrial energies, and promote the productive power of any considerable number of the
inhabitants of a section of the state, or which leads to the growth of towns and the creation of new
resources for the employment of capital and labor, [which] contributes to the general welfare and
the prosperity of the whole community."13 In this jurisdiction, "public use" is defined as "whatever
is beneficially employed for the community."14
It is settled that the public nature of the prospective exercise of expropriation cannot depend on
the "numerical count of those to be served or the smallness or largeness of the community to be
benefited."15 The number of people is not determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use,
provided the use is exercisable in common and is not limited to particular individuals.16 Thus, the
first essential requirement for a valid exercise of eminent domain is for the expropriator to prove
that the expropriation is for a public use. In Municipality of Bian v. Garcia, this Court explicated
that expropriation ends with an order of condemnation declaring "that the plaintiff has a lawful
right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation."17
Oribello vs. CA
Before going further, it is relevant to relive the nature of the remedy of judicial partition. The
proceeding under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court is a judicial controversy between persons who,
being co-owners or coparceners of common property, seek to secure a division or partition thereof
among themselves, giving to each one of them the part corresponding to him.18 The object of
partition is to enable those who own property as joint tenants, or coparceners, or tenants in common
to put an end to the joint tenancy so as to vest in each a sole estate in specific property or an
allotment in the lands or tenements.19 According to American jurisprudence:20
The right of compulsory partition, in the case of coparceners was the gift of the common law, but
in the case of joint tenants and tenants in common it was first given by statutes. The common law,
having established this right in favor of coparceners, because their relationship being created by
it, and not by an act or choice of their own, as in the case of joint tenants and tenants in common,
thought it reasonable that it should endure no longer than the parties should be pleased with it; but
at the same time deemed it expedient as well as just, that they should not be placed in worse
condition by the partition, than if they had continued to enjoy their respective interests in the lands
or property without a division. x x x [T]herefore, after the partition a warranty was annexed by the
common law to each part, so that, if any one should be impleaded, she might vouch her sisters, or
those who had been her coparceners at the time of the partition, or their heirs, and by this means
also have their aid to deraign the warranty paramount, if any existed, annexed to the purchase of
their ancestor. (citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
To accord with the nature of the remedy of judicial partition, there are two stages defined under
Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. The first relates to the determination of the rights of the parties to
the property held in common. The second concerns the physical segregation of each party's just
share in the property held in common. The second stage need not be gone into should the parties
agree on the physical partition.
FORCIBLE ENTRY/UNLAWFUL DETAINER (70)
Panganiban vs. Pilipinas Shell Petrolium
An action for unlawful detainer is filed by a person from whom possession of any land or building
is unlawfully withheld by another after the expiration or termination of the latter's right to hold
possession under a contract, express or implied. 25 Clearly, the interpretation of a provision in the
SLDA as to when the SLDA would expire is the key issue that would determine petitioner's right
to possess the gasoline service station. When the primary issue to be resolved is physical
possession, the issue should be threshed out in the ejectment suit, and not in any other case such
as an action for declaratory relief to avoid multiplicity of suits.
Petitioner erroneously believes that the unlawful detainer case should have been dismissed because
private respondent was already guilty of laches when it filed the ejectment suit 269 days from July
31, 1995, the date private respondent claims the SLDA expired. A complaint for unlawful detainer
should be filed within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession
occurs. 28 When the action is to terminate the lease because of the expiration of its term, it is upon
the expiration of the term of the lease that the lessee is already considered to be unlawfully
withholding the property. 29 The expiration of the term of the lease immediately gives rise to a
cause of action for unlawful detainer. 30 In such a case, a demand to vacate is no longer
necessary. 31Private respondent therefore shall one year or 365 days from July 31, 1995 to file the
case for unlawful detainer. Laches definitely had not yet set in when private respondent filed the
unlawful detainer case 269 days after the expiration of the SLDA. Private respondent did not sleep
on its right when it filed the unlawful detainer case well within the prescriptive period for filing
the action.