BSP Group vs Sally Go (2010)
testificandum against the respective managers or records custodians of Security
The basic antecedents are no longer disputed.
Petitioner, the BSB Group, Inc., is a duly organized domestic corporation presided by its
herein representative, Ricardo Bangayan (Bangayan).
o Respondent Sally Go, alternatively referred to as Sally Sia Go and Sally Go-
Bangayan, is Bangayans wife, who was employed in the company as a cashier,
and was engaged, among others, to receive and account for the payments made
by the various customers of the company.
In 2002, Bangayan filed with the Manila Prosecutors Office a complaint for estafa and/or
qualified theft[5] against respondent, alleging that several checks [6] representing the
aggregate amount of P1,534,135.50 issued by the companys customers in payment of
their obligation were, instead of being turned over to the companys coffers, indorsed by
respondent who deposited the same to her personal banking account maintained at
Security Bank and Trust Company (Security Bank) in Divisoria, Manila Branch. [7]
o Upon a finding that the evidence adduced was uncontroverted, the assistant city
prosecutor recommended the filing of the Information for qualified theft against
respondent.[8]
Accordingly, respondent was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
36, in an Information, the inculpatory portion of which reads:
That in or about or sometime during the period comprised (sic)
between January 1988 [and] October 1989, inclusive, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent [to] gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away
cash money in the total amount of P1,534,135.50 belonging to BSB
GROUP OF COMPANIES represented by RICARDO BANGAYAN, to
the damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount
of P1,534,135.50, Philippine currency.
That in the commission of the said offense, said accused acted
with grave abuse of confidence, being then employed as cashier by said
complainant at the time of the commission of the said offense and as such
she was entrusted with the said amount of money.
Contrary to law.[9]
Respondent entered a negative plea when arraigned. [10] The trial ensued.
o On the premise that respondent had allegedly encashed the subject checks and
deposited the corresponding amounts thereof to her personal banking account,
the prosecution moved for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum /ad
Banks Divisoria Branch, as well as of the Asian Savings Bank (now
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. [Metrobank]), in Jose Abad Santos, Tondo,
Manila Branch.[11]
o The trial court granted the motion and issued the corresponding subpoena. [12]
Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena dated November 4, 2003, addressed to
Metrobank, noting to the court that in the complaint-affidavit filed with the prosecutor,
o there was no mention made of the said bank account, to which respondent, in
addition to the Security Bank account identified as Account No. 01-14-006,
allegedly deposited the proceeds of the supposed checks.
o Interestingly, while respondent characterized the Metrobank account as
irrelevant to the case, she, in the same motion,
nevertheless waived her objection to the irrelevancy of the SecurityBank accou
nt mentioned in the same complaint-affidavit, inasmuch as she was admittedly
willing to address the allegations with respect thereto. [13]
Petitioner, opposing respondents move, argued for the relevancy of the Metrobank
account on the ground that the complaint-affidavit showed that there were two checks
which respondent allegedly deposited in an account with the said bank. [14]
o To this, respondent filed a supplemental motion to quash, invoking the
absolutely confidential nature of the Metrobank account under the provisions of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1405.[15]
o The trial court did not sustain respondent; hence, it denied the motion to quash
for lack of merit.[16]
Meanwhile, the prosecution was able to present in court the testimony of Elenita
Marasigan (Marasigan), the representative of Security Bank.
o In a nutshell, Marasigans testimony sought to prove that between 1988 and
1989, respondent, while engaged as cashier at the BSB Group, Inc., was able to
run away with the checks issued to the company by its customers, endorse the
same, and credit the corresponding amounts to her personal deposit account
with Security Bank.
o In the course of the testimony, the subject checks were presented to Marasigan
for identification and marking as the same checks received by respondent,
endorsed, and then deposited in her personal account with Security Bank. [17]
o But before the testimony could be completed, respondent filed a Motion to
Suppress,[18] seeking the exclusion of Marasigans testimony and accompanying
documents thus far received, bearing on the subject Security Bank account.
o This time respondent invokes, in addition to irrelevancy, the privilege of
confidentiality under R.A. No. 1405.
The trial court, nevertheless, denied the motion in its September 13, 2004 Order.[19]
 o A motion for reconsideration was subsequently filed, but it was also denied in
the Order dated November 5, 2004.[20]
o These two orders are the subject of the instant case.
Aggrieved, and believing that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in acting the
way it did, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
o Finding merit in the petition, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
assailed orders of the trial court in its April 20, 2005 Decision. [21] The decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
orders dated September 13, 2004 and November 5, 2004 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The testimony of the SBTC representative is ordered
stricken from the records.
SO ORDERED.[22]
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, [23] petitioner is now before the Court
pleading the same issues as those raised before the lower courts.
In this Petition[24] under Rule 45,
o petitioner averred in the main that the Court of Appeals had seriously erred in
reversing the assailed orders of the trial court, and in effect striking out
Marasigans testimony dealing with respondents deposit account with Security
Bank.[25]
o It asserted that apart from the fact that the said evidence had a direct relation to
the subject matter of the case for qualified theft and, hence, brings the case
under one of the exceptions to the coverage of confidentiality under R.A. 1405.
[26]
o Petitioner believed that what constituted the subject matter in litigation was to
be determined by the allegations in the information and, in this respect, it
alluded to the assailed November 5, 2004 Order of the trial court, which
declared to be erroneous the limitation of the present inquiry merely to what
was contained in the information.[27]
For her part, respondent claimed that the money represented by the Security Bank
account was neither relevant nor material to the case, because nothing in the criminal
information suggested that the money therein deposited was the subject matter of the
case.
o She invited particular attention to that portion of the criminal Information
which averred that she has stolen and carried away cash money in the total
amount of P1,534,135.50. She advanced the notion that the term cash money
stated in the Information was not synonymous with the checks she was
purported to have stolen from petitioner and deposited in her personal banking
account.
o Thus, the checks which the prosecution had Marasigan identify, as well as the
testimony itself of Marasigan, should be suppressed by the trial court at least
for violating respondents right to due process.[28]
o More in point, respondent opined that admitting the testimony of Marasigan, as
well as the evidence pertaining to the Security Bank account, would violate the
secrecy rule under R.A. No. 1405.[29]
In its reply, petitioner asserted the sufficiency of the allegations in the criminal
Information for qualified theft, as the same has sufficiently alleged the elements of the
offense charged.
o It posits that through Marasigans testimony, the Court would be able to
establish that the checks involved, copies of which were attached to the
complaint-affidavit filed with the prosecutor, had indeed been received by
respondent as cashier, but were, thereafter, deposited by the latter to her
personal account with Security Bank.
o Petitioner held that the checks represented the cash money stolen by respondent
and, hence, the subject matter in this case is not only the cash amount
represented by the checks supposedly stolen by respondent, but also the checks
themselves.[30]
We derive from the conflicting advocacies of the parties that the issue for resolution is
whether the testimony of Marasigan and the accompanying documents are irrelevant to
the case, and whether they are also violative of the absolutely confidential nature of bank
deposits and, hence, excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405.
o The question of admissibility of the evidence thus comes to the fore. And the
Court, after deliberative estimation, finds the subject evidence to be indeed
inadmissible.
Prefatorily, fundamental is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the constitutive
acts of the offense must be established with unwavering exactitude and moral certainty
because this is the critical and only requisite to a finding of guilt. [31]
o Theft is present when a person, with intent to gain but without violence against
or intimidation of persons or force upon things, takes the personal property of
another without the latters consent. It is qualified when, among others, and as
alleged in the instant case, it is committed with abuse of confidence. [32]
o The prosecution of this offense necessarily focuses on the existence of the
following elements:
(a) there was taking of personal property belonging to another;
(b) the taking was done with intent to gain;
(c) the taking was done without the consent of the owner;
(d) the taking was done without violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things; and
(e) it was done with abuse of confidence.[33]
 o In turn, whether these elements concur in a way that overcomes the
presumption of guiltlessness, is a question that must pass the test of relevancy
and competency in accordance with Section 3 [34] Rule 128 of the Rules of
Court.
Thus, whether these pieces of evidence sought to be suppressed in this case the
testimony of Marasigan, as well as the checks purported to have been stolen and
deposited in respondents Security Bank account are relevant, is to be addressed by
considering whether they have such direct relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence; or whether they relate collaterally to a fact
from which, by process of logic, an inference may be made as to the existence or
non-existence of the fact in issue.[35]
The fact in issue appears to be that respondent has taken away cash in the amount
of P1,534,135.50 from the coffers of petitioner.
o In support of this allegation, petitioner seeks to establish the existence of
the elemental act of taking by adducing evidence that respondent, at
several times between 1988 and 1989, deposited some of its checks to her
personal account with Security Bank.
o Petitioner addresses the incongruence between the allegation of theft of
cash in the Information, on the one hand, and the evidence that respondent
had first stolen the checks and deposited the same in her banking account,
on the other hand, by impressing upon the Court that there obtains no
difference between cash and check for purposes of prosecuting respondent
for theft of cash. Petitioner is mistaken.
o It is conceded that while the fundamental law has not bothered with the triviality of
In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes deprivation of personal property of one
by another with intent to gain, and it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable
to freely dispose of the property stolen because the deprivation relative to the
offended party has already ensued from such act of execution. [36]
The allegation of theft of money, hence, necessitates that evidence presented must
have a tendency to prove that the offender has unlawfully taken money belonging to
o R.A. No. 1405 has two allied purposes.
another.
o Interestingly, petitioner has taken pains in attempting to draw a connection
between the evidence subject of the instant review, and the allegation of
theft in the Information by claiming that respondent had fraudulently
deposited the checks in her own name.
o But this line of argument works more prejudice than favor, because it in
effect, seeks to establish the commission, not of theft, but rather of some
other crime probably estafa.
Moreover, that there is no difference between cash and check is true in other
instances.
o In estafa by conversion, for instance, whether the thing converted is cash
or check, is immaterial in relation to the formal allegation in an
information for that offense; a check, after all, while not regarded as legal
tender, is normally accepted under commercial usage as a substitute for
cash, and the credit it represents in stated monetary value is properly
capable of appropriation.
o And it is in this respect that what the offender does with the check
subsequent to the act of unlawfully taking it becomes material inasmuch as
this offense is a continuing one.[37]
o In other words, in pursuing a case for this offense, the prosecution may
establish its cause by the presentation of the checks involved.
o These checks would then constitute the best evidence to establish their
contents and to prove the elemental act of conversion in support of the
proposition that the offender has indeed indorsed the same in his own
name.[38]
Theft, however, is not of such character.
o Thus, for our purposes, as the Information in this case accuses respondent
of having stolen cash, proof tending to establish that respondent has
actualized her criminal intent by indorsing the checks and depositing the
proceeds thereof in her personal account, becomes not only irrelevant but
also immaterial and, on that score, inadmissible in evidence.
We now address the issue of whether the admission of Marasigans testimony on the
particulars of respondents account with Security Bank, as well as of the
corresponding evidence of the checks allegedly deposited in said account,
constitutes an unallowable inquiry under R.A. 1405.
specifically addressing privacy rights relative to banking accounts, there,
nevertheless, exists in our jurisdiction a legitimate expectation of privacy governing
such accounts. The source of this right of expectation is statutory, and it is found in
R.A. No. 1405,[39] otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy Act of 1955. [40]
o It hopes to discourage private hoarding and at the same time encourage the
people to deposit their money in banking institutions, so that it may be
utilized by way of authorized loans and thereby assist in economic
development.[41]
o Owing to this piece of legislation, the confidentiality of bank deposits
remains to be a basic state policy in the Philippines. [42] Section 2 of the law
institutionalized this policy by characterizing as absolutely confidential in
general all deposits of whatever nature with banks and other financial
institutions in the country. It declares:
Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking
institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the
Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
 instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential
nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of
the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent
court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in
cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation.
o Subsequent statutory enactments[43] have expanded the list of exceptions to this policy yet
the secrecy of bank deposits still lies as the general rule, falling as it does within the
legally recognized zones of privacy.[44]
o There is, in fact, much disfavor to construing these primary and supplemental
exceptions in a manner that would authorize unbridled discretion, whether
governmental or otherwise, in utilizing these exceptions as authority for
unwarranted inquiry into bank accounts.
o It is then perceivable that the present legal order is obliged to conserve the
absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits. [45]
o The measure of protection afforded by the law has been explained in China Banking
Corporation v. Ortega.[46]
o That case principally addressed the issue of whether the prohibition against an
examination of bank deposits precludes garnishment in satisfaction of a judgment. Ruling
on that issue in the negative, the Court found guidance in the relevant portions of the
legislative deliberations on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later
became the Bank Secrecy Act, and it held that the absolute confidentiality rule in R.A.
No. 1405 actually aims at protection from unwarranted inquiry or investigation if the
purpose of such inquiry or investigation is merely to determine the existence and nature,
as well as the amount of the deposit in any given bank account. Thus,
x x x The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the
deposit of B&B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the
law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not
the defendant B&B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the
China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued
by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any
withdrawal until further order. It will be noted from the discussion of the
conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No.
3977which later became Republic Act No. 1405, that it was not the
intention of the lawmakers to place banks deposits beyond the reach of
execution to satisfy a final judgment. Thus:
x x x Mr. Marcos: Now, for purposes of the record, I
should like the Chairman of the Committee on Ways
and Means to clarify this further. Suppose an
individual has a tax case. He is being held liable by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue [(BIR)] or, say, P1,000.00
worth of tax liability, and because of this the deposit of
this individual [has been] attached by the [BIR].
Mr. Ramos: The attachment will only apply
after the court has pronounced sentence declaring the
liability of such person. But where the primary aim
is to determine whether he has a bank deposit in
order to bring about a proper assessment by the
[BIR], such inquiry is not allowed by this proposed
law.
Mr. Marcos: But under our rules of
procedure and under the Civil Code, the attachment or
garnishment of money deposited is allowed. Let us
assume for instance that there is a preliminary
attachment which is for garnishment or for holding
liable all moneys deposited belonging to a certain
individual, but such attachment or garnishment will
bring out into the open the value of such deposit. Is
that prohibited by... the law?
Mr. Ramos: It is only prohibited to the
extent that the inquiry... is made only for the purpose
of satisfying a tax liability already declared for the
protection of the right in favor of the government; but
when the object is merely to inquire whether he has
a deposit or not for purposes of taxation, then this
is fully covered by the law. x x x
Mr. Marcos: The law prohibits a mere
investigation into the existence and the amount of
the deposit.
Mr. Ramos: Into the very nature of such
deposit. x x x[47]
o In taking exclusion from the coverage of the confidentiality rule, petitioner in the instant
case posits that the account maintained by respondent with Security Bank contains the
proceeds of the checks that she has fraudulently appropriated to herself and, thus, falls
under one of the exceptions in Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 that the money kept in said
account is the subject matter in litigation.
 o To highlight this thesis, petitioner avers, citing Mathay v. Consolidated Bank
and Trust Co.,[48] that the subject matter of the action refers to the physical
facts; the things real or personal; the money, lands, chattels and the like, in
relation to which the suit is prosecuted, which in the instant case should refer to
the money deposited in the Security Bank account.[49]
o On the surface, however, it seems that petitioners theory is valid to a point, yet
a deeper treatment tends to show that it has argued quite off-tangentially.
o This, because, while Mathay did explain what the subject matter of an action is,
it nevertheless did so only to determine whether the class suit in that case was
properly brought to the court.
o What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation in relation to Section 2 of R.A.
No. 1405 has been pointedly and amply addressed in Union Bank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals,[50] in which the Court noted that the inquiry into bank deposits
allowable under R.A. No. 1405 must be premised on the fact that the money deposited in
the account is itself the subject of the action.[51]
o Given this perspective, we deduce that the subject matter of the action in the
case at bar is to be determined from the indictment that charges respondent with
the offense, and not from the evidence sought by the prosecution to be admitted
into the records.
o In the criminal Information filed with the trial court, respondent, unqualifiedly
and in plain language, is charged with qualified theft by abusing petitioners
trust and confidence and stealing cash in the amount of P1,534,135.50.
o The said Information makes no factual allegation that in some material way
involves the checks subject of the testimonial and documentary evidence
sought to be suppressed.
o Neither do the allegations in said Information make mention of the supposed
bank account in which the funds represented by the checks have allegedly been
kept.
In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the indictment itself that the Security Bank
account is the ostensible subject of the prosecutions inquiry.
Without needlessly expanding the scope of what is plainly alleged in the
Information, the subject matter of the action in this case is the money amounting
to P1,534,135.50 alleged to have been stolen by respondent, and not the money
equivalent of the checks which are sought to be admitted in evidence.
Thus, it is that, which the prosecution is bound to prove with its evidence, and no
other.
It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and documentary evidence relative to
respondents Security Bank account serves no other purpose than to establish the existence
of such account, its nature and the amount kept in it.
It constitutes an attempt by the prosecution at an impermissible inquiry into a bank
deposit account the privacy and confidentiality of which is protected by law.
On this score alone, the objection posed by respondent in her motion to suppress
should have indeed put an end to the controversy at the very first instance it was
raised before the trial court.
In sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan on the particulars of respondents
supposed bank account with Security Bank and the documentary evidence represented by
the checks adduced in support thereof, are not only incompetent for being excluded by
operation of R.A. No. 1405.
They are likewise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as they do not appear to have any
logical and reasonable connection to the prosecution of respondent for qualified
theft.
We find full merit in and affirm respondents objection to the evidence of the
prosecution. The Court of Appeals was, therefore, correct in reversing the assailed
orders of the trial court.
A final note. In any given jurisdiction where the right of privacy extends its scope to
include an individuals financial privacy rights and personal financial matters, there is an
intermediate or heightened scrutiny given by courts and legislators to laws infringing
such rights.[52]
Should there be doubts in upholding the absolutely confidential nature of bank
deposits against affirming the authority to inquire into such accounts, then such
doubts must be resolved in favor of the former.
This attitude persists unless congress lifts its finger to reverse the general state
policy respecting the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits. [53]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 87600 dated April 20, 2005, reversing the September 13, 2004 and November
5, 2004 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 in Criminal Case No. 02-
202158, is AFFIRMED.
Ejercito vs SB (2006) III. Urban Bank Managers Check and their corresponding Urban Bank Managers Check
CARPIO MORALES, J.: Application Forms, as follows:

The present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated 1. MC # 039975 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of P70,000,000.00;
February 7 and 12, 2003 denying petitioner Joseph Victor G. Ejercitos Motions to Quash 2. MC # 039976 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of P2,000,000.00;
Subpoenas Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum, and Resolution dated March 11, 2003 denying his 3. MC # 039977 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of P2,000,000.00;
Motion for Reconsideration of the first two resolutions. 4. MC # 039978 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of P1,000,000.00;

The three resolutions were issued in Criminal Case No. 26558, People of
the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al., for plunder, defined and penalized in R.A.
7080, AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.
In above-stated case of People v. Estrada, et al., the Special Prosecution
Panel[1] filed on January 20, 2003 before the Sandiganbayan a Request for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum for the issuance of a subpoena directing the President of Export and
Industry Bank (EIB, formerly Urban Bank) or his/her authorized representative to produce the
following documents during the hearings scheduled on January 22 and 27, 2003:
I. For Trust Account No. 858;
1. Account Opening Documents;
2. Trading Order No. 020385 dated January 29, 1999;
3. Confirmation Advice TA 858;
4. Original/Microfilm copies, including the dorsal side, of the following:
The Special Prosecution Panel also filed on January 20, 2003, a Request for Issuance
of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum directed to the authorized representative of
Equitable-PCI Bank to produce statements of account pertaining to certain accounts in the
name of Jose Velarde and to testify thereon.
The Sandiganbayan granted both requests by Resolution of January 21, 2003 and
subpoenas were accordingly issued.
The Special Prosecution Panel filed still another Request for Issuance of Subpoena
Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum dated January 23, 2003 for the President of EIB or his/her
authorized representative to produce the same documents subject of the Subpoena Duces
Tecum dated January 21, 2003 and to testify thereon on the hearings scheduled on January 27
and 29, 2003 and subsequent dates until completion of the testimony. The request was likewise
granted by the Sandiganbayan. A Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum was accordingly
issued on January 24, 2003.

a. Bank of Commerce MC # 0256254 in the amount Petitioner, claiming to have learned from the media that the Special Prosecution
of P2,000,000.00; Panel had requested for the issuance of subpoenas for the examination of bank accounts
b. Urban bank Corp. MC # 34181 dated November 8, 1999 in belonging to him, attended the hearing of the case on January 27, 2003 and filed before the
the amount of P10,875,749.43; Sandiganbayan a letter of even date expressing his concerns as follows, quoted verbatim:
c. Urban Bank MC # 34182 dated November 8, 1999 in the
amount of P42,716,554.22; Your Honors:
d. Urban Bank Corp. MC # 37661 dated November 23, 1999 in
the amount of P54,161,496.52; It is with much respect that I write this court relative to the concern of
subpoenaing the undersigneds bank account which I have learned
5. Trust Agreement dated January 1999: through the media.
Trustee: Joseph Victor C. Ejercito
Nominee: URBAN BANK-TRUST DEPARTMENT I am sure the prosecution is aware of our banking secrecy laws everyone
Special Private Account No. (SPAN) 858; and supposed to observe. But, instead of prosecuting those who may have
6. Ledger of the SPAN # 858. breached such laws, it seems it is even going to use supposed evidence
which I have reason to believe could only have been illegally obtained.
II. For Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9
SPAN No. 858 The prosecution was not content with a general request. It even lists and
identifies specific documents meaning someone else in the bank illegally
1. Signature Cards; and released confidential information.
2. Statement of Account/Ledger
 If this can be done to me, it can happen to anyone. Not that anything can
still shock our family. Nor that I have anything to hide. Your Honors.
But, I am not a lawyer and need time to consult one on a situation that
affects every bank depositor in the country and should interest the bank
itself, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and maybe the Ombudsman
himself, who may want to investigate, not exploit, the serious breach that
can only harm the economy, a consequence that may have been
overlooked. There appears to have been deplorable connivance.
xxxx
I hope and pray, Your Honors, that I will be given time to retain the
services of a lawyer to help me protect my rights and those of every
banking depositor. But the one I have in mind is out of the country right
now.
May I, therefore, ask your Honors, that in the meantime, the issuance of
the subpoena be held in abeyance for at least ten (10) days to enable me to
take appropriate legal steps in connection with the prosecutions request for
the issuance of subpoena concerning my accounts. (Emphasis supplied)
From the present petition, it is gathered that the accounts referred to by petitioner in
his above-quoted letter are Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9.[2]
In open court, the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan, through Associate Justice
Edilberto Sandoval, advised petitioner that his remedy was to file a motion to quash, for which
he was given up to 12:00 noon the following day, January 28, 2003.
Petitioner, unassisted by counsel, thus filed on January 28, 2003 a Motion to Quash
Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum praying that the subpoenas previously issued to the
President of the EIB dated January 21 and January 24, 2003 be quashed.[3]
In his Motion to Quash, petitioner claimed that his bank accounts are covered by
R.A. No. 1405 (The Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) and do not fall under any of the
exceptions stated therein. He further claimed that the specific identification of documents in
the questioned subpoenas, including details on dates and amounts, could only have been made
possible by an earlier illegal disclosure thereof by the EIB and the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC) in its capacity as receiver of the then Urban Bank.
The disclosure being illegal, petitioner concluded, the prosecution in the case may
not be allowed to make use of the information.
Before the Motion to Quash was resolved by the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution
filed another Request for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum dated
January 31, 2003, again to direct the President of the EIB to produce, on the hearings
scheduled on February 3 and 5, 2003, the same documents subject of the January 21 and 24,
2003 subpoenas with the exception of the Bank of Commerce MC #0256254 in the amount
of P2,000,000 as Bank of Commerce MC #0256256 in the amount of P200,000,000 was
instead requested. Moreover, the request covered the following additional documents:
IV. For Savings Account No. 1701-00646-1:
1. Account Opening Forms;
2. Specimen Signature Card/s; and
3. Statements of Account.
The prosecution also filed a Request for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad
Testificandum bearing the same date, January 31, 2003, directed to Aurora C. Baldoz, Vice
President-CR-II of the PDIC for her to produce the following documents on the scheduled
hearings on February 3 and 5, 2003:
1. Letter of authority dated November 23, 1999 re: SPAN [Special Private
Account Number] 858;
2. Letter of authority dated January 29, 2000 re: SPAN 858;
3. Letter of authority dated April 24, 2000 re: SPAN 858;
4. Urban Bank check no. 052092 dated April 24, 2000 for the amount of
P36, 572, 315.43;
5. Urban Bank check no. 052093 dated April 24, 2000 for the amount of
P107,191,780.85; and
6. Signature Card Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9. (Underscoring
supplied)
The subpoenas prayed for in both requests were issued by the Sandiganbayan
on January 31, 2003.
On February 7, 2003, petitioner, this time assisted by counsel, filed an Urgent
Motion to Quash Subpoenae Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum praying that the subpoena
dated January 31, 2003 directed to Aurora Baldoz be quashed for the same reasons which he
cited in the Motion to Quash[4] he had earlier filed.
 On the same day, February 7, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying deposit their money in banking institutions and to
petitioners Motion to Quash Subpoenae Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum dated January 28, discourage private hoarding so that the same may be
2003. properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist in
the economic development of the country. (Underscoring
Subsequently or on February 12, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution supplied)
denying petitioners Urgent Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum
dated February 7, 2003.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated February 24, 2003seeking a

reconsideration of the Resolutions of February 7 and 12, 2003 having been denied by
If the money deposited under an account may be used by banks for authorized loans to
Resolution of March 11, 2003, petitioner filed the present petition.
third persons, then such account, regardless of whether it creates a creditor-debtor
relationship between the depositor and the bank, falls under the category of accounts
Raised as issues are:
which the law precisely seeks to protect for the purpose of boosting the economic
development of the country.
1. Whether petitioners Trust Account No. 858 is covered by the term deposit
as used in R.A. 1405;
Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account.
The Trust Agreement between petitioner and Urban Bank provides that the
2. Whether petitioners Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-
trust account covers deposit, placement or investment of funds by Urban
17345-9 are excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405;and
Bank for and in behalf of petitioner.[6]
The money deposited under Trust Account No. 858, was, therefore,
3. Whether the extremely-detailed information contained in the Special
intended not merely to remain with the bank but to be invested by it
Prosecution Panels requests for subpoena was obtained through a prior
elsewhere.
illegal disclosure of petitioners bank accounts, in violation of the fruit of the
To hold that this type of account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would
poisonous tree doctrine.
encourage private hoarding of funds that could otherwise be invested by
banks in other ventures, contrary to the policy behind the law.

Respondent People posits that Trust Account No. 858 [5] may be inquired into, not
Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the term deposits was
merely because it falls under the exceptions to the coverage of R.A. 1405, but
intended to be understood broadly:
because it is not even contemplated therein.
For, to respondent People, the law applies only to deposits which strictly
SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking
means the money delivered to the bank by which a creditor-debtor
institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the
relationship is created between the depositor and the bank.
Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential
The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term deposits, as used in
nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
R.A. 1405, by the mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor relationship government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of
between the trustor and the bank, does not lie. the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent
An examination of the law shows that the term deposits used therein is to
court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in
be understood broadly and not limited only to accounts which give rise to
cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank.
litigation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1:

The phrase of whatever nature proscribes any restrictive interpretation of
deposits. Moreover, it is clear from the immediately quoted provision that, generally, the
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the law applies not only to money which is deposited but also to those which are invested.
Government to give encouragement to the people to
 This further shows that the law was not intended to apply only to deposits in the
strict sense of the word. Otherwise, there would have been no need to add the phrase
or invested.
Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858.
The protection afforded by the law is, however, not absolute, there
being recognized exceptions thereto, as above-quoted Section 2
provides. In the present case, two exceptions apply, to wit: (1) the
examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases
of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, and (2) the money
deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Petitioner contends that since plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of duty, his
accounts are not excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405. Philippine National Bank v.
Gancayco[7] holds otherwise:
Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction
of duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be
excepted from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to
one cannot be different from the policy as to the other. This policy
expresses the notion that a public office is a public trust and any person
who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life,
so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.
Undoubtedly, cases for plunder involve unexplained wealth. Section 2 of R.A. No.
7080 states so.
SECTION 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. Any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or
other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealththrough a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as
described in Section 1(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of
at least Seventy-five million pesos (P75,000,000.00), shall be guilty of the
crime of plunder and shall be punished by life imprisonment with
perpetual absolute disqualification from holding any public office. Any
person who participated with said public officer in the commission of
plunder shall likewise be punished. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any
and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
including the properties and shares of stock derived from the deposit or
investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
An examination of the overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) of R.A.
No. 7080 would make the similarity between plunder and bribery even more pronounced since
bribery is essentially included among these criminal acts. Thus Section 1(d) states:
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business
enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of
Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through
dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and or business associates by
any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes.
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury;
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit
from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer concerned;
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or -controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including promise of future employment in any business enterprise
or undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or
other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at
the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, all the above-enumerated overt acts are similar to bribery such that, in each
case, it may be said that no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted
from the rule making bank deposits confidential.[8]
The crime of bribery and the overt acts constitutive of plunder are crimes committed
by public officers, and in either case the noble idea that a public office is a public trust and any
person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as
relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny applies with equal force.
Plunder being thus analogous to bribery, the exception to R.A. 1405 applicable in
cases of bribery must also apply to cases of plunder.
Respecting petitioners claim that the money in his bank accounts is not the subject
matter of the litigation, the meaning of the phrase subject matter of the litigation as used in
R.A. 1405 is explained in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[9] thus:
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals confuses the cause
of action with the subject of the action. In Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian,
petitioner points out, this Court distinguished the two concepts.
x x x The cause of action is the legal wrong
threatened or committed, while the object of the action
is to prevent or redress the wrong by obtaining some
legal relief; but the subject of the action is neither of
these since it is not the wrong or the relief
demanded, the subject of the action is the matter or
thing with respect to which the controversy has arisen,
concerning which the wrong has been done, and this
ordinarily is the property or the contract and its subject
matter, or the thing in dispute.
The argument is well-taken. We note with approval the
difference between the subject of the action from the cause of action. We
also find petitioners definition of the phrase subject matter of the action is
consistent with the term subject matter of the litigation, as the latter is used
in the Bank Deposits Secrecy Act.
In Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Magsino, where the petitioner bank
inadvertently caused the transfer of the amount of US$1,000,000.00
instead of only US$1,000.00, the Court sanctioned the examination of
the bank accounts where part of the money was subsequently caused
to be deposited:
x x x Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 1405]
allows the disclosure of bank deposits in cases where
the money deposited is the subject matter of the
litigation. Inasmuch as Civil Case No. 26899 is
aimed at recovering the amount converted by the
Javiers for their own benefit, necessarily, an
inquiry into the whereabouts of the illegally
acquired amount extends to whatever is concealed
by being held or recorded in the name of persons
other than the one responsible for the illegal
acquisition.
Clearly, Mellon Bank involved a case where the money
deposited was the subject matter of the litigation since the money
deposited was the very thing in dispute. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The plunder case now pending with the Sandiganbayan necessarily involves an
inquiry into the whereabouts of the amount purportedly acquired illegally by former President
Joseph Estrada.
In light then of this Courts pronouncement in Union Bank, the subject matter of the
litigation cannot be limited to bank accounts under the name of President Estrada alone, but
must include those accounts to which the money purportedly acquired illegally or a portion
thereof was alleged to have been transferred. Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No.
0116-17345-9 in the name of petitioner fall under this description and must thus be part of the
subject matter of the litigation.
In a further attempt to show that the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan are
invalid and may not be enforced, petitioner contends, as earlier stated, that the information
found therein, given their extremely detailed character, could only have been obtained by the
Special Prosecution Panel through an illegal disclosure by the bank officials
concerned. Petitioner thus claims that, following the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the
subpoenas must be quashed.
Petitioner further contends that even if, as claimed by respondent People, the
extremely-detailed information was obtained by the Ombudsman from the bank officials
concerned during a previous investigation of the charges against President Estrada, such
inquiry into his bank accounts would itself be illegal.
Petitioner relies on Marquez v. Desierto[10] where the Court held:
 We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be
a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the
account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject
matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The
bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present
during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account
identified in the pending case. (Underscoring supplied)
As no plunder case against then President Estrada had yet been filed before a court
of competent jurisdiction at the time the Ombudsman conducted an investigation, petitioner
concludes that the information about his bank accounts were acquired illegally, hence, it may
not be lawfully used to facilitate a subsequent inquiry into the same bank accounts.
Petitioners attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable to the instant case
fails. R.A. 1405, it bears noting, nowhere provides that an unlawful examination of bank
accounts shall render the evidence obtained therefrom inadmissible in evidence. Section 5 of
R.A. 1405 only states that [a]ny violation of this law will subject the offender upon conviction,
to an imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand
pesos or both, in the discretion of the court.
The case of U.S. v. Frazin,[11] involving the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978
(RFPA) of the United States, is instructive.
Because the statute, when properly construed, excludes a
suppression remedy, it would not be appropriate for us to provide one in
the exercise of our supervisory powers over the administration of justice.
Where Congress has both established a right and provided exclusive
remedies for its violation, we would encroach upon the prerogatives of
Congress were we to authorize a remedy not provided for by
statute. United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir.) , cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 825, 98 S.Ct. 72, 54 L.Ed.2d 83 (1977).
The same principle was reiterated in U.S. v. Thompson:[12]
x x x When Congress specifically designates a remedy for one of
its acts, courts generally presume that it engaged in the necessary
balancing of interests in determining what the appropriate penalty should
be. SeeMichaelian, 803 F.2d at 1049 (citing cases); Frazin, 780 F.2d
at 1466. Absent a specific reference to an exclusionary rule, it is not
appropriate for the courts to read such a provision into the act.
Even assuming arguendo, however, that the exclusionary rule applies in principle to
cases involving R.A. 1405, the Court finds no reason to apply the same in this particular case.
Clearly, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine [13] presupposes a violation of law. If
there was no violation of R.A. 1405 in the instant case, then there would be no poisonous tree
to begin with, and, thus, no reason to apply the doctrine.
How the Ombudsman conducted his inquiry into the bank accounts of petitioner is
recounted by respondent People of the Philippines, viz:
x x x [A]s early as February 8, 2001, long before the issuance of
the Marquezruling, the Office of the Ombudsman, acting under the
powers granted to it by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, and acting on
information obtained from various sources, including impeachment (of
then Pres. Joseph Estrada) related reports, articles and investigative
journals, issued a Subpoena Duces Tecum addressed to Urban
Bank. (Attachment 1-b) It should be noted that the description of the
documents sought to be produced at that time included that of numbered
accounts 727, 737, 747, 757, 777 and 858 and included such names as Jose
Velarde, Joseph E. Estrada, Laarni Enriquez, Guia Gomez, Joy Melendrez,
Peachy Osorio, Rowena Lopez, Kevin or Kelvin Garcia. The subpoena did
not single out account 858.
xxxx
Thus, on February 13, 2001, PDIC, as receiver of Urban Bank, issued a
certification as to the availability of bank documents relating to A/C 858
and T/A 858 and the non-availability of bank records as to the other
accounts named in the subpoena. (Attachments 2, 2-1 and 2-b)
Based on the certification issued by PDIC, the Office of the Ombudsman
on February 16, 2001 again issued a Subpoena Duces Tecum directed to
Ms. Corazon dela Paz, as Interim Receiver, directing the production of
documents pertinent to account A/C 858 and T/C 858. (Attachment 3)
In compliance with the said subpoena dated February 16, 2001, Ms. Dela Paz, as
interim receiver, furnished the Office of the Ombudsman certified copies
of documents under cover latter dated February 21, 2001:
1. Transaction registers dated 7-02-99, 8-16-99, 9-17-99, 10-
18-99, 11-22-99, 1-07-00, 04-03-00 and 04-24-00;
2. Report of Unregularized TAFs & TDs for UR COIN A & B
Placements of Various Branches as of February 29, 2000
and as of December 16, 1999; and
3. Trading Orders Nos. A No. 78102 and A No. 078125.
 Trading Order A No. 07125 is filed in two copies a white copy
which showed set up information; and a yellow copy which
showed reversal information. Both copies have been reproduced
and are enclosed with this letter.
We are continuing our search for other records and documents
pertinent to your request and we will forward to you on Friday,
23 February 2001, such additional records and documents as we
might find until then. (Attachment 4)
The Office of the Ombudsman then requested for the mangers checks,
detailed in the Subpoena Duces Tecum dated March 7, 2001. (Attachment
5)
PDIC again complied with the said Subpoena Duces Tecum dated March
7, 2001 and provided copies of the managers checks thus requested under
cover letter dated March 16, 2001. (Attachment 6)[14] (Emphasis in the
original)
The Sandiganbayan credited the foregoing account of respondent People. [15] The
Court finds no reason to disturb this finding of fact by the Sandiganbayan.
The Marquez ruling notwithstanding, the above-described examination by
the Ombudsman of petitioners bank accounts, conducted before a case
was filed with a court of competent jurisdiction, was lawful.
For the Ombudsman issued the subpoenas bearing on the bank accounts of petitioner
about four months before Marquez was promulgated on June 27, 2001.
While judicial interpretations of statutes, such as that made in Marquezwith respect
to R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, are deemed part of the statute as of the date
it was originally passed, the rule is not absolute.
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[16] teaches:
It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the
law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject only to the
qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, and more so when there is
a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the
old doctrine and acted in good faith. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
When this Court construed the Ombudsman Act of 1989, in light of the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Law in Marquez, that before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be a
pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction, it was, in fact, reversing an earlier
doctrine found in Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Purisima[17].
Banco Filipino involved subpoenas duces tecum issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman, then known as the Tanodbayan, [18] in the course of its preliminary
investigation of a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
While the main issue in Banco Filipino was whether R.A. 1405 precluded the
Tanodbayans issuance of subpoena duces tecum of bank records in the name of persons other
than the one who was charged, this Court, citing P.D. 1630,[19] Section 10, the relevant part of
which states:
(d) He may issue a subpoena to compel any person to appear,
give sworn testimony, or produce documentary or other evidence the
Tanodbayan deems relevant to a matter under his inquiry,
held that The power of the Tanodbayan to issue subpoenae ad testificandum and
subpoenae duces tecum at the time in question is not disputed, and at any rate does not
admit of doubt.[20]
As the subpoenas subject of Banco Filipino were issued during a preliminary
investigation, in effect this Court upheld the power of the Tandobayan under P.D. 1630 to issue
subpoenas duces tecum for bank documents prior to the filing of a case before a court of
competent jurisdiction.
Marquez, on the other hand, practically reversed this ruling in Banco
Filipino despite the fact that the subpoena power of the Ombudsman under R.A. 6770 was
essentially the same as that under P.D. 1630. Thus Section 15 of R.A. 6770 empowers the
Office of the Ombudsman to
 (8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take
testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine
and have access to bank accounts and records;
A comparison of this provision with its counterpart in Sec. 10(d) of P.D.
1630 clearly shows that it is only more explicit in stating that the power of
the Ombudsman includes the power to examine and have access to bank
accounts and records which power was recognized with respect to the
Tanodbayan through Banco Filipino.
The Marquez ruling that there must be a pending case in order for the
Ombudsman to validly inspect bank records in camera thus reversed a
prevailing doctrine.[21] Hence, it may not be retroactively applied.
The Ombudsmans inquiry into the subject bank accounts prior to the filing
of any case before a court of competent jurisdiction was therefore valid at
the time it was conducted.
Likewise, the Marquez ruling that the account holder must be notified to be present during the
inspection may not be applied retroactively to the inquiry of the Ombudsman subject of this
case. This ruling is not a judicial interpretation either of R.A. 6770 or R.A. 1405, but a judge-
made law which, as People v. Luvendino[22] instructs, can only be given prospective
application:
x x x The doctrine that an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel
is not to be given legal effect was initially a judge-made one and was
first announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales v. Enrile and reiterated
on 20 March 1985 in People v. Galit. x x x
While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12(1)
of the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to appellant
Luvendino for the requirements and restrictions outlined
in Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach
waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the date of promulgation
of Morales. (Emphasis supplied)
In fine, the subpoenas issued by the Ombudsman in this case were legal, hence,
invocation of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is misplaced.
AT ALL EVENTS, even if the challenged subpoenas are quashed, the Ombudsman
is not barred from requiring the production of the same documents based solely on information
obtained by it from sources independent of its previous inquiry.
In particular, the Ombudsman, even before its inquiry, had already possessed information
giving him grounds to believe that (1) there are bank accounts bearing the number 858, (2) that
such accounts are in the custody of Urban Bank, and (3) that the same are linked with the bank
accounts of former President Joseph Estrada who was then under investigation for plunder.
Only with such prior independent information could it have been possible for the Ombudsman
to issue the February 8, 2001 subpoena duces tecumaddressed to the President and/or Chief
Executive Officer of Urban Bank, which described the documents subject thereof as follows:
(a) bank records and all documents relative thereto pertaining to all
bank accounts (Savings, Current, Time Deposit, Trust, Foreign Currency
Deposits, etc) under the account names of Jose Velarde, Joseph E.
Estrada, Laarni Enriquez, Guia Gomez, Joy Melendrez, Peach Osorio,
Rowena Lopez, Kevin or Kelvin Garcia, 727, 737, 747, 757, 777 and 858.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The information on the existence of Bank Accounts bearing number 858 was, according to
respondent People of the Philippines, obtained from various sources including the proceedings
during the impeachment of President Estrada, related reports, articles and investigative
journals.[23] In the absence of proof to the contrary, this explanation proffered by respondent
must be upheld. To presume that the information was obtained in violation of R.A. 1405
would infringe the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions.
Thus, with the filing of the plunder case against former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, using the above independent information, may now proceed
to conduct the same investigation it earlier conducted, through which it can eventually obtain
the same information previously disclosed to it by the PDIC, for it is an inescapable fact
that the bank records of petitioner are no longer protected by R.A. 1405 for the reasons already
explained above.
Since conducting such an inquiry would, however, only result in the disclosure of
the same documents to the Ombudsman, this Court, in avoidance of what would be a time-
wasteful and circuitous way of administering justice,[24] upholds the challenged subpoenas.
Respecting petitioners claim that the Sandiganbayan violated his right to due process
as he was neither notified of the requests for the issuance of the subpoenas nor of the grant
thereof, suffice it to state that the defects were cured when petitioner ventilated his arguments
against the issuance thereof through his earlier quoted letter addressed to the Sandiganbayan
and when he filed his motions to quash before the Sandiganbayan.
IN SUM, the Court finds that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the challenged subpoenas for documents pertaining to petitioners Trust Account No.
858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 for the following reasons:
1. These accounts are no longer protected by the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Law, there being two exceptions to the said law applicable in this
case, namely: (1) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials,
and (2) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation.Exception (1) applies since the plunder case pending against
former President Estrada is analogous to bribery or dereliction of duty,
while exception (2) applies because the money deposited in petitioners
bank accounts is said to form part of the subject matter of the same
plunder case.
2. The fruit of the poisonous tree principle, which states that once
the primary source (the tree) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained,
any secondary or derivative evidence (the fruit) derived from it is also
inadmissible, does not apply in this case. In the first place, R.A. 1405 does
not provide for the application of this rule. Moreover, there is no basis for
applying the same in this case since the primary source for the detailed
information regarding petitioners bank accounts the investigation
previously conducted by the Ombudsman was lawful.
3. At all events, even if the subpoenas issued by the
Sandiganbayan were quashed, the Ombudsman may conduct on its own
the same inquiry into the subject bank accounts that it earlier conducted
last February-March 2001, there being a plunder case already pending
against former President Estrada.To quash the challenged subpoenas
would, therefore, be pointless since the Ombudsman may obtain the same
documents by another route. Upholding the subpoenas avoids an
unnecessary delay in the administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated
February 7 and 12, 2003 and March 11, 2003 are upheld. The Sandiganbayan is hereby
directed, consistent with this Courts ruling in Marquez v. Desierto, to notify petitioner as to the
date the subject bank documents shall be presented in court by the persons subpoenaed.
[G.R. No. 135882. June 27, 2001]
LOURDES T. MARQUEZ, in her capacity as Branch Manager, Union Bank of the
Philippines, petitioners, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, (in his capacity as
OMBUDSMAN, Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau, Office of the
Ombudsman, ANGEL C. MAYOR-ALGO, JR., MARY ANN CORPUZ-MANALAC and
JOSE T. DE JESUS, JR., in their capacities as Chairman and Members of the Panel,
respectively, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
In the petition at bar, petitioner seeks to--
a. Annul and set aside, for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, respondents order dated
September 7, 1998 in OMB-0-97-0411, In Re: Motion to Cite Lourdes T. Marquez for
indirect contempt, received by counsel of September 9, 1998, and their order dated
October 14, 1998, denying Marquezs motion for reconsideration dated September 10,
1998, received by counsel on October 20, 1998.
b. Prohibit respondents from implementing their order dated October 14, 1998, in
proceeding with the hearing of the motion to cite Marquez for indirect contempt,
through the issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction.[1]
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in May 1998, petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman
Aniano A. Desierto dated April 29, 1998, to produce several bank documents for purposes of
inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the
Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager.
The accounts to be inspected are Account Nos. 011-37270, 240-020718, 245-
30317-3 and 245-30318-1, involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman
 entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et.
al.
The order further states:
It is worth mentioning that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate
and to require the production and inspection of records and documents is
sanctioned by the 1987 Philippine Constitution, Republic Act No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and under existing
jurisprudence on the matter. It must be noted that R. A. 6770 especially
Section 15 thereof provides, among others, the following powers, functions
and duties of the Ombudsman, to wit:
xxx
(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and take
testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine
and have access to bank accounts and records;
(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under
the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein.
Clearly, the specific provision of R.A. 6770, a later legislation, modifies
the law on the Secrecy of Bank Deposits (R.A. 1405) and places the office
of the Ombudsman in the same footing as the courts of law in this regard.
[2]
The basis of the Ombudsman in ordering an in camera inspection of the accounts is a trail of
managers checks purchased by one George Trivinio, a respondent in OMB-0-97-0411, pending
with the office of the Ombudsman.
It would appear that Mr. George Trivinio, purchased fifty one (51) Managers Checks (MCs)
for a total amount of P272.1 Million at Traders Royal Bank, United Nations Avenue branch, on
May 2 and 3, 1995. Out of the 51 MCs, eleven (11) MCs
in the amount of P70.6 million, were deposited and credited to an account maintained at
the Union Bank, Julia Vargas Branch.[3]
On May 26, 1998, the FFIB panel met in conference with petitioner Lourdes T. Marquez
and Atty. Fe B. Macalino at the banks main office, Ayala Avenue, Makati City.
The meeting was for the purpose of allowing petitioner and Atty. Macalino to
view the checks furnished by Traders Royal Bank.
After convincing themselves of the veracity of the checks, Atty. Macalino
advised Ms. Marquez to comply with the order of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner agreed to an in camera inspection set on June 3, 1998.[4]
However, on June 4, 1998, petitioner wrote the Ombudsman explaining to him that the
accounts in question cannot readily be identified and asked for time to respond to the order.
The reason forwarded by petitioner was that despite diligent efforts and from
the account numbers presented, we can not identify these accounts since the
checks are issued in cash or bearer.
We surmised that these accounts have long been dormant, hence are not
covered by the new account number generated by the Union Bank system. We
therefore have to verify from the Interbank records archives for the
whereabouts of these accounts.[5]
The Ombudsman, responding to the request of the petitioner for time to comply with the
order, stated: firstly, it must be emphasized that Union Bank, Julia Vargas Branch was the
depositary bank of the subject Traders Royal Bank Managers Checks (MCs), as shown at its
dorsal portion and as cleared by the Philippine Clearing House, not the International Corporate
Bank.
Notwithstanding the fact that the checks were payable to cash or bearer, nonetheless, the
name of the depositor(s) could easily be identified since the account numbers x x x where said
checks were deposited are identified in the order.
Even assuming that the accounts xxx were already classified as dormant accounts, the
bank is still required to preserve the records pertaining to the accounts within a certain period
of time as required by existing banking rules and regulations.
And finally, the in camera inspection was already extended twice
from May 13, 1998to June 3, 1998, thereby giving the bank enough time within which to
sufficiently comply with the order.[6]
Thus, on June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued an order directing petitioner to produce
the bank documents relative to the accounts in issue. The order states:
Viewed from the foregoing, your persistent refusal to comply with Ombudsmans order is
unjustified, and is merely intended to delay the investigation of the case. Your act constitutes
disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order issued by this office and is punishable as
Indirect Contempt under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6770.
 The same may also constitute obstruction in the lawful exercise of the functions of
the Ombudsman which is punishable under Section 36 of R.A. 6770. [7]
On July 10, 1998, petitioner together with Union Bank of the Philippines, filed a petition
for declaratory relief, prohibition and injunction [8] with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City,
against the Ombudsman.
The petition was intended to clear the rights and duties of petitioner.
Thus, petitioner sought a declaration of her rights from the court due to the clear
conflict between R. A. No. 6770, Section 15 and R. A. No. 1405, Sections 2 and 3.
Petitioner prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) because the Ombudsman and
other persons acting under his authority were continuously harassing her to produce the bank
documents relative to the accounts in question.
Moreover, on June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued another order stating that
unless petitioner appeared before the FFIB with the documents requested, petitioner
manager would be charged with indirect contempt and obstruction of justice.
In the meantime,[9] on July 14, 1998, the lower court denied petitioners prayer for a
temporary restraining order and stated thus:
After hearing the arguments of the parties, the court finds the application for a Temporary
Restraining Order to be without merit.
Since the application prays for the restraint of the respondent, in the exercise of his contempt
powers under Section 15 (9) in relation to paragraph (8) of R.A. 6770, known as The
Ombudsman Act of 1989, there is no great or irreparable injury from which petitioners may
suffer, if respondent is not so restrained.
Respondent should he decide to exercise his contempt powers would still have to
apply with the court. x x x Anyone who, without lawful excuse x x x refuses to
produce documents for inspection, when thereunto lawfully required shall be subject
to discipline as in case of contempt of Court and upon application of the individual
or body exercising the power in question shall be dealt with by the Judge of the First
Instance (now RTC) having jurisdiction of the case in a manner provided by law
(section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code). Under the present Constitution
only judges may issue warrants, hence, respondent should apply with the Court for
the issuance of the warrant needed for the enforcement of his contempt orders.
It is in these proceedings where petitioners may question the propriety of
respondents exercise of his contempt powers.
Petitioners are not therefore left without any adequate remedy.
The questioned orders were issued with the investigation of the case of Fact-Finding and
Intelligence Bureau vs. Amado Lagdameo, et. el., OMB-0-97-0411, for violation of R.A.
3019.
Since petitioner failed to show prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the
investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, no writ of
injunction may be issued by this Court to delay this investigation pursuant to Section
14 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.[10]
On July 20, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration based on the following
grounds:
a. Petitioners application for Temporary Restraining Order is not only to restrain
the Ombudsman from exercising his contempt powers, but to stop him from
implementing his Orders dated April 29,1998 and June 16,1998; and
b. The subject matter of the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman at
petitioners premises is outside his jurisdiction.[11]
On July 23, 1998, the Ombudsman filed a motion to dismiss the petition for declaratory
relief[12] on the ground that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to hear a petition for
relief from the findings and orders of the Ombudsman, citing R. A. No. 6770, Sections 14 and
27. On August 7, 1998, the Ombudsman filed an opposition to petitioners motion for
reconsideration dated July 20, 1998.[13]
On August 19, 1998, the lower court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, [14]and
also the Ombudsmans motion to dismiss.[15]
On August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her for contempt,
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman by Agapito B. Rosales, Director, Fact Finding and
Intelligence Bureau (FFIB).[16]
On August 31, 1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an opposition to the motion to
cite her in contempt on the ground that the filing thereof was premature due to the petition
pending in the lower court.[17]
 Petitioner likewise reiterated that she had no intention to disobey the orders of the
Ombudsman.
However, she wanted to be clarified as to how she would comply with the orders
without her breaking any law, particularly R. A. No. 1405. [18]
Respondent Ombudsman panel set the incident for hearing on September 7, 1998.
[19]
After hearing, the panel issued an order dated September 7, 1998, ordering petitioner and
counsel to appear for a continuation of the hearing of the contempt charges against her. [20]
On September 10, 1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman a motion for
reconsideration of the above order.[21] Her motion was premised on the fact that there was a
pending case with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, [22] which would determine whether
obeying the orders of the Ombudsman to produce bank documents would not violate any law.
The FFIB opposed the motion,[23] and on October 14, 1998, the Ombudsman denied the
motion by order the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, respondent Lourdes T. Marquezs motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED,
for lack of merit. Let the hearing of the motion of the Fact Finding Intelligence Bureau (FFIB)
to cite her for indirect contempt be intransferrably set to 29 October 1998 at 2:00 oclock p.m.
at which date and time she should appear personally to submit her additional evidence. Failure
to do so shall be deemed a waiver thereof.[24]
Hence, the present petition.[25]
The issue is whether petitioner may be cited for indirect contempt for her failure to
produce the documents requested by the Ombudsman. And whether the order of the
Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an
exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R. A. No. 1405).
An examination of the secrecy of bank deposits law (R. A. No. 1405) would reveal the
following exceptions:
1. Where the depositor consents in writing;
2. Impeachment case;
3. By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials;
4. Deposit is subject of litigation;
5. Sec. 8, R. A. No. 3019, in cases of unexplained wealth as held in the case of
PNB vs. Gancayco[26]
The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera inspection the subject accounts
with the Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, is based on a pending
investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of
R. A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public
Estates Authority and AMARI.
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending
case before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the
subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction.
The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present
during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account
identified in the pending case.
In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we held that Section 2 of
the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, as amended, declares bank deposits
to be absolutely confidential except:
(1) In an examination made in the course of a special or general
examination of a bank that is specifically authorized by the
Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground
to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is
being committed and that it is necessary to look into the deposit to
establish such fraud or irregularity,
(2) In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank
to conduct its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit
purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of
the bank,
(3) Upon written permission of the depositor,
(4) In cases of impeachment,
(5) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of
duty of public officials, or
 (6) In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter
of the litigation[27]

In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent
authority. What is existing is an investigation by the office of the Ombudsman.

In short, what the Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for
additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the
Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would
warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws.

The Civil Code provides that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and
punishes as actionable torts several acts for meddling and prying into the
privacy of another.

It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for
damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and
recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications.

The Revised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an

officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling.
Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping
Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code.
[28]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we GRANT the petition. We order the Ombudsman to cease

and desist from requiring Union Bank Manager Lourdes T. Marquez, or anyone in her place to
comply with the order dated October 14, 1998, and similar orders. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
CHINABANK v CA (2006) 5) CITIBANK CHECK NO. 69003194405297 dated October 01 1997 in
the amount of US$766,011.97 payable to GOTIANUY: JOSE
AND/OR DEE: MARY MARGARET; and
DECISION
6) CITIBANK CHECK NO. 69003194405339 dated October 09 1997 in
the amount of US$83,053.10 payable to GOTIANUY: JOSE
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
AND/OR DEE: MARY MARGARET.[2]

A Complaint for recovery of sums of money and annulment of sales of real
properties and shares of stock docketed as CEB-21445 was filed by Jose
Joseph Gotianuy against his son-in-law, George Dee, and his daughter,
Mary Margaret Dee, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
Branch 58.
Jose Gotianuy accused his daughter Mary Margaret Dee of stealing, among his other
properties, US dollar deposits with Citibank N.A. amounting to not less
than P35,000,000.00 and US$864,000.00. Mary Margaret Dee received these amounts
from Citibank N.A. through checks which she allegedly deposited at China Banking
Corporation (China Bank).
He likewise accused his son-in-law, George Dee, husband of his daughter, Mary
Margaret, of transferring his real properties and shares of stock in George Dees
name without any consideration. Jose Gotianuy, died during the pendency of the
case before the trial court.[1]
He was substituted by his daughter, ElizabethGotianuy Lo.
The latter presented the US Dollar checks withdrawn by Mary Margaret Dee from
his US dollar placement with Citibank.
The details of the said checks are:
1) CITIBANK CHECK NO. 69003194405412 dated September 29
1997 in the amount of US$5,937.52 payable to
GOTIANUY: JOSE AND/OR DEE: MARY MARGARET;
Upon motion of Elizabeth Gotianuy Lo, the trial court[3] issued a subpoena to Cristota
Labios and Isabel Yap, employees of China Bank, to testify on the case.
The Order of the trial court dated 23 February 1999, states:
Issue a subpoena ad testificandum requiring MS. ISABEL YAP and
CRISTOTA LABIOS of China Banking Corporation, Cebu Main Branch,
corner Magallanes and D. Jakosalem Sts., Cebu City, to appear in person
and to testify in the hearing of the above entitled case on March 1,
1999 at 8:30 in the morning, with regards to Citibank Checks (Exhs. AAA
to AAA-5) and other matters material and relevant to the issues of this
case.[4]
China Bank moved for a reconsideration. Resolving the motion, the trial court issued an
Order dated 16 April 1999 and held:
The Court is of the view that as the foreign currency fund (Exhs.
AAA to AAA-5) is deposited with the movant China Banking
Corporation, Cebu Main Branch, Cebu City, the disclosure only
as to the name or in whose name the said fund is deposited is not
violative of the law.
o Justice will be better served if the name or names of
the depositor of said fund shall be disclosed because
such a disclosure is material and important to the
issues between the parties in the case at bar.

2) CITIBANK CHECK NO. 69003194405296 dated September
1997 in the amount of US$7,197.59 payable
GOTIANUY: JOSE AND/OR DEE: MARY MARGARET;
3) CITIBANK CHECK NO. 69003194405414 dated September
1997 in the amount of US$1,198.94 payable
GOTIANUY: JOSE AND/OR DEE: MARY MARGARET;
4) CITIBANK CHECK NO. 69003194405413 dated September
1997 in the amount of US$989.04 payable
GOTIANUY: JOSE AND/OR DEE: MARY MARGARET;
29 Premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is denied
to partly and granted partly, in the sense that Isabel Yap and/or
Cristuta Labios are directed to appear before this Court and to
testify at the trial of this case on April 20, 1999, May 6 & 7,
29 1999 at 10:00 oclock in the morning and only for the purpose of
to disclosing in whose name or names is the foreign currency fund
(Exhs. AAA to AAA-5) deposited with the movant Bank and not
to other matters material and relevant to the issues in the case at
29 bar.[5]
to
From this Order, China Bank filed a Petition for Certiorari[6] with the Court of
Appeals. In a Decision[7] dated 29 October 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the petition
of China Bank and affirmed the Order of the RTC.

In justifying its conclusion, the Court of Appeals ratiocinated:
From the foregoing, it is pristinely clear the law specifically
encompasses only the money or funds in foreign currency
deposited in a bank.
o Thus, the coverage of the law extends only to the
foreign currency deposit in the CBC account where
Mary Margaret Dee deposited the Citibank checks in
question and nothing more.
It has to be pointed out that the April 16, 1999 Order of the court
of origin modified its previous February 23, 1999 Order such
that the CBC representatives are directed solely to divulge in
whose name or names is the foreign currency fund (Exhs. AAA
to AAA-5) deposited with the movant bank.
o It precluded inquiry on other materials and relevant to
the issues in the case at bar. We find that the directive
of the court below does not contravene the plain
language of RA 6426 as amended by P.D. No. 1246.
The contention of petitioner that the [prescription] on absolute
confidentiality under the law in question covers even the name
As amended by Presidential Decree No. 1246, the law reads:
of the depositor and is beyond the compulsive process of the
courts is palpably untenable as the law protects only the deposits
itself but not the name of the depositor.
o To uphold the theory of petitioner CBC is reading into
the statute something that is not within the manifest
intention of the legislature as gathered from the statute
itself, for to depart from the meaning expressed by the
words, is to alter the statute, to legislate and not to
interpret, and judicial legislation should be avoided.
o Maledicta expositio quae corrumpit textum It is a
dangerous construction which is against the words.
o Expressing the same principle is the maxim: Ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos, which
simply means that where the law does not distinguish,
we should not make any distinction. (Gonzaga,
Statutes and their Construction, p. 75.)[8]
From the Decision of the Court of Appeals, China Bank elevated the case to this
Court based on the following issues:
I Presidential Decree No. 1034 are considered absolutely confidential in nature and may
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS INTERPRETED THE
PROVISION OF SECTION 8 OF R.A. 6426, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSIT
ACT, IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE,
THAT IS, TO PROVIDE ABSOLUTE CONFIDENTIALITY OF
WHATEVER INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE FOREIGN
CURRENCY DEPOSIT.
II
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS NOT THE OWNER OF THE
QUESTIONED FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSIT. THUS, HE
CANNOT INVOKE THE AID OF THE COURT IN COMPELLING THE
DISCLOSURE OF SOMEONE ELSES FOREIGN
CURRENCY DEPOSIT ON THE FLIMSY PRETEXT THAT THE
CHECKS (IN FOREIGN CURRENCY) HE HAD ISSUED MAY HAVE
ENDED UP THEREIN.
III
PETITIONER CAN RIGHTLY INVOKE THE PROVISION OF SEC. 8,
R.A. 6426, IN BEHALF OF THE FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITOR,
OWING TO ITS SOLEMN OBLIGATION TO ITS CLIENT TO
EXERCISE EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE IN THE HANDLING OF
THE ACCOUNT.[9]
SEC. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. All foreign currency
deposits authorized under this Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized under Presidential
Decree No. 1034, are hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely
confidential nature and, except upon the written permission of the
depositor, in no instance shall such foreign currency deposits be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official,
bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative or any
other entity whether public or private: Provided, however, that said foreign
currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any
other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency
or any administrative body whatsoever. (As amended by PD No. 1035, and
further amended by PD No. 1246, prom. Nov. 21, 1977) (Emphasis
supplied.)
Under the above provision, the law provides that all foreign currency deposits authorized
under Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by Sec. 8, Presidential Decree No. 1246,
Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized under
not be inquired into.
o There is only one exception to the secrecy of foreign currency deposits, that is,
disclosure is allowed upon the written permission of the depositor.
 This much was pronounced in the case of Intengan v. Court of Appeals,[10]where it was
held that the only exception to the secrecy of foreign currency deposits is in the case of a
written permission of the depositor.
It must be remembered that under the whereas clause of Presidential Decree No. 1246
which amended Sec. 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, the Foreign Currency Deposit System
including the Offshore Banking System under Presidential Decree 1034 were intended to
draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors, and we quote:
Whereas, in order to assure the development and speedy growth of the
Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the
Philippines, certain incentives were provided for under the two Systems
such as confidentiality of deposits subject to certain exceptions and tax
exemptions on the interest income of depositors who are nonresidents and
are not engaged in trade or business in the Philippines;
Whereas, making absolute the protective cloak of confidentiality over such
foreign currency deposits, exempting such deposits from tax, and
guaranteeing the vested rights of depositors would better encourage the
inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions authorized
to accept such deposits in the Philippines thereby placing such institutions
more in a position to properly channel the same to loans and investments
in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic development
of the country.
As to the deposit in foreign currencies entitled to be protected under the
confidentiality rule, Presidential Decree No. 1034, [11] defines deposits to mean funds
in foreign currencies which are accepted and held by an offshore banking unit in the
regular course of business, with the obligation to return an equivalent amount to the
owner thereof, with or without interest.[12]
It is in this light that the court in the case of Salvacion v. Central Bank of the
Philippines,[13] allowed the inquiry of the foreign currency deposit in question
mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case such that a strict interpretation
of the letter of the law would result to rank injustice.
o Therein, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, was charged with
criminal cases for serious illegal detention and rape committed against
then 12 year-old Karen Salvacion.
o A separate civil case for damages with preliminary attachment was filed
against Greg Bartelli.
o The trial court issued an Order granting the Salvacions application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
o A notice of garnishment was then served on China Bank
where Bartelli held a dollar account. China Bank refused, invoking the
secrecy of bank deposits. The Supreme Court ruled:
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its
justice x x x It would be unthinkable, that the questioned law
exempting foreign currency deposits from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever would be used as a device by an accused x x x for
wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense
of the innocent.[14]
With the foregoing, we are now tasked to determine the single material issue of
whether or not petitioner China Bank is correct in its submission that the Citibank
dollar checks with both Jose Gotianuy and/or Mary Margaret Dee as payees,
deposited with China Bank, may not be looked into under the law on secrecy of
foreign currency deposits.
o As a corollary issue, sought to be resolved is whether Jose Gotianuy may
be considered a depositor who is entitled to seek an inquiry over the said
deposits.
The Court of Appeals, in allowing the inquiry, considered Jose Gotianuy, a co-
depositor of Mary Margaret Dee.
o It reasoned that since Jose Gotianuy is the named co-payee of the latter in
the subject checks, which checks were deposited in China Bank, then, Jose
Gotianuy is likewise a depositor thereof. On that basis, no written consent
from Mary Margaret Dee is necessitated.
We agree in the conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals.
The following facts are established:
(1) Jose Gotianuy and Mary Margaret Dee are co-payees of various Citibank checks; [15]
(2) Mary Margaret Dee withdrew these checks from Citibank; [16]
(3) Mary Margaret Dee admitted in her Answer to the Request for Admissions by the
Adverse Party sent to her by Jose Gotianuy[17] that she withdrew the funds from
Citibank upon the instruction of her father Jose Gotianuy and that the funds
belonged exclusively to the latter;
(4) these checks were endorsed by Mary Margaret Dee at the dorsal portion; and
(5) Jose Gotianuy discovered that these checks were deposited with China Bank as
shown by the stamp of China Bank at the dorsal side of the checks.
o Thus, with this, there is no issue as to the source of the funds. Mary Margaret Dee
declared the source to be Jose Gotianuy. There is likewise no dispute that these funds in
the form of Citibank US dollar Checks are now deposited with China Bank.
As the owner of the funds unlawfully taken and which
are undisputably now deposited with China Bank, Jose Gotianuy has
the right to inquire into the said deposits.
 A depositor, in cases of bank deposits, is one who pays money into the
bank in the usual course of business, to be placed to his credit and
subject to his check or the beneficiary of the funds held by the bank as All things considered and in view of the distinctive circumstances
trustee.[18] attendant to the present case, we are constrained to render a
limited pro hac vice ruling.[21] Clearly it was not the intent of the
legislature when it enacted the law on secrecy on foreign currency
deposits to perpetuate injustice.
On this score, the observations of the Court of Appeals are worth
reiterating: o This Court is of the view that the allowance of the inquiry would
be in accord with the rudiments of fair play, [22] the upholding of
fairness in our judicial system and would be an avoidance of
delay and time-wasteful and circuitous way of administering
Furthermore, it is indubitable that the Citibank checks were drawn against justice.[23]
the foreign currency account with Citibank, NA. The monies subject of
said checks originally came from the late Jose Gotianuy, the owner of the
account. Thus, he also has legal rights and interests in the CBC account
where said monies were deposited. More importantly, the Citibank
checks (Exhibits AAA to AAA-5) readily demonstrate (sic) that the late WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision
JoseGotianuy is one of the payees of said checks. Being a co-payee of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 1999 affirming the Order of the
thereof, then he or his estate can be considered as a co-depositor of said RTC, Branch 58, Cebu City dated 16 April 1999 is AFFIRMED and this case
checks.Ergo, since the late Jose Gotianuy is a co-depositor of the CBC
is ordered REMANDED to the trial court for continuation of hearing with
account, then his request for the assailed subpoena is tantamount to an
express permission of a depositor for the disclosure of the name of the utmost dispatch consistent with the above disquisition. No costs.
account holder. The April 16, 1999 Order perforce must be sustained. [19]
(Emphasis supplied.)
SO ORDERED.

One more point. It must be remembered that in the complaint

of Jose Gotianuy, he alleged that his US dollar deposits with Citibank
were illegally taken from him.

o On the other hand, China Bank

employee Cristuta Labiostestified that Mary Margaret Dee
came to China Bank and deposited the money of
Jose Gotianuy in Citibank US dollar checks to the dollar account
of her sister Adrienne Chu.[20]

o This fortifies our conclusion that an inquiry into the said deposit
at China Bank is justified.

o At the very least, Jose Gotianuy as the owner of these funds is

entitled to a hearing on the whereabouts of these funds.
G.R. No. L-34964 January 31, 1973
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and TAN KIM LIONG, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. WENCESLAO ORTEGA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch VIII, and VICENTE G. ACABAN, respondents-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
The only issue in this petition for certiorari to review the orders dated March 4, 1972 and
March 27, 1972, respectively, of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No.
75138, is whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court
process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1405. *
On December 17, 1968 Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in the court a quo against
Bautista Logging Co., Inc., B & B Forest Development Corporation and Marino Bautista
for the collection of a sum of money.
Upon motion of the plaintiff the trial court declared the defendants in default for
failure to answer within the reglementary period, and authorized the Branch Clerk of
Court and/or Deputy Clerk to receive the plaintiff's evidence. On January 20, 1970
judgment by default was rendered against the defendants.
To satisfy the judgment, the plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the
defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Banking Corporation.
Accordingly, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial
court and served on said bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong.
In reply, the bank' cashier invited the attention of the Deputy Sheriff to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 which, it was alleged, prohibit the disclosure of
any information relative to bank deposits.
Thereupon the plaintiff filed a motion to cite Tan Kim Liong for contempt of court.
In an order dated March 4, 1972 the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion.
However, Tan Kim Liong was ordered "to inform the Court within five days from
receipt of this order whether or not there is a deposit in the China Banking
Corporation of defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation, and if there is
any deposit, to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order
from this Court.
" Tan Kim Liong moved to reconsider but was turned down by order of March 27,
1972. In the same order he was directed "to comply with the order of this Court
dated March 4, 1972 within ten (10) days from the receipt of copy of this order,
otherwise his arrest and confinement will be ordered by the Court." Resisting the
two orders, the China Banking Corporation and Tan Kim Liong instituted the instant
petition.
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 relied upon by the petitioners reads:
Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions
in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the
Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of absolutely confidential
nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of
the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent
court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in
cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation.
Sec 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking
institution to disclose to any person other than those mentioned in Section
two hereof any information concerning said deposits.
Sec. 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon conviction, to
an imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than
twenty thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the court.
The petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court does not
fall within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2, and that if the
questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under
Section 5 and the bank exposed to a possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development
Corporation.
Specifically referring to this case, the position of the petitioners is that the bank
deposit of judgment debtor B & B Forest Development Corporation cannot be
 subject to garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in view of the
aforequoted provisions of law.
We do not view the situation in that light.
The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B
Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law.
It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the defendant
B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking
Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank
would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order.
It will be noted from the discussion of the conference committee report on Senate
Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later became Republic Act 1405, that it
was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of
execution to satisfy a final judgment. Thus:
Mr. MARCOS. Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the
Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means to clarify this further.
Suppose an individual has a tax case. He is being held liable by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue for, say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and because
of this the deposit of this individual is attached by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.
Mr. RAMOS. The attachment will only apply after the court has
pronounced sentence declaring the liability of such person. But where the
primary aim is to determine whether he has a bank deposit in order to
bring about a proper assessment by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such
inquiry is not authorized by this proposed law.
Mr. MARCOS. But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code,
the attachment or garnishment of money deposited is allowed. Let us
assume, for instance, that there is a preliminary attachment which is for
garnishment or for holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a
certain individual, but such attachment or garnishment will bring out into
the open the value of such deposit. Is that prohibited by this amendment or
by this law?
Mr. RAMOS. It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry is limited,
or rather, the inquiry is made only for the purpose of satisfying a tax
liability already declared for the protection of the right in favor of the
government; but when the object is merely to inquire whether he has a
deposit or not for purposes of taxation, then this is fully covered by the
law.
Mr. MARCOS. And it protects the depositor, does it not?
Mr. RAMOS. Yes, it protects the depositor.
Mr. MARCOS. The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence
and the amount of the deposit.
Mr. RAMOS. Into the very nature of such deposit.
Mr. MARCOS. So I come to my original question. Therefore, preliminary
garnishment or attachment of the deposit is not allowed?
Mr. RAMOS. No, without judicial authorization.
Mr. MARCOS. I am glad that is clarified. So that the established rule of
procedure as well as the substantive law on the matter is amended?
Mr. RAMOS. Yes. That is the effect.
Mr. MARCOS. I see. Suppose there has been a decision, definitely
establishing the liability of an individual for taxation purposes and this
judgment is sought to be executed ... in the execution of that judgment,
does this bill, or this proposed law, if approved, allow the investigation or
scrutiny of the bank deposit in order to execute the judgment?
Mr. RAMOS. To satisfy a judgment which has become executory.
Mr. MARCOS. Yes, but, as I said before, suppose the tax liability is
P1,000,000 and the deposit is half a million, will this bill allow scrutiny
into the deposit in order that the judgment may be executed?
Mr. RAMOS. Merely to determine the amount of such money to satisfy
that obligation to the Government, but not to determine whether a deposit
has been made in evasion of taxes.
xxx xxx xxx
 Mr. MACAPAGAL. But let us suppose that in an ordinary civil action for
the recovery of a sum of money the plaintiff wishes to attach the properties
of the defendant to insure the satisfaction of the judgment. Once the
judgment is rendered, does the gentleman mean that the plaintiff cannot
attach the bank deposit of the defendant?

Mr. RAMOS. That was the question raised by the gentleman from
Pangasinan to which I replied that outside the very purpose of this law it
could be reached by attachment.

Mr. MACAPAGAL. Therefore, in such ordinary civil cases it can be

attached?

Mr. RAMOS. That is so.

(Vol. II, Congressional Record, House of Representatives, No. 12, pp.

3839-3840, July 27, 1955).

It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee report
of the two houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into
a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure
satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the
existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution
process.

It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable
debtors to evade payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through
the expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the lower court dated March 4 and 27, 1972, respectively, are
hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners-appellants.
[G.R. NO. 138967 : April 24, 2007]
LEIDEN E. FERNANDEZ, GLORIA B. ADRIANO, EMELDA A. NEGAPATAN, JESUS
P. TOMONGHA, ELEONOR A. QUIANOLA, ASTEMA C. CAMPO, FLORIDA
VILLACERAN, FLORIDA B. TALLEDO AND BRENDA
GADIANO, Petitioners, v.NICASIO C. ANION, the Labor Arbiter of the Regional
Arbitration Branch VII-Cebu City; MARGUERITE LHUILLIER; and ALVAREZ
CAETE LOPEZ PANGANDOYON AHAT & PAREDES LAW OFFICES, represented
by ATTY. WILFREDO S. PANGANDOYON, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
The instant petition is a proceeding for contempt in connection with the execution of a
final and executory Decision1 of this Court in G.R. No. 105892, entitled Leiden E.
Fernandez, et al., v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., a labor case involving
the illegal dismissal of herein petitioners by respondent Marguerite Lhuillier from their
employment at Agencia Cebuana-H. Lhuillier Pawnshop (Agencia Cebuana, hereafter),
of which the latter is the sole proprietor.
o Via the present recourse, petitioners pray the Court to hold the respondents
guilty of civil and criminal contempts for failure to comply with and implement
the Decision of the Court in G.R. No. 105892.
o They also seek the inhibition of respondent Labor Arbiter Nicasio C. Anion
from taking part in further execution proceedings relative to the same case, and
request that a final computation be made by the Court of the exact amount of
the monetary awards due them under the same Decision.
Stripped to the bare essentials, the material facts briefly stated as follows:
In 1990, petitioners filed their respective complaints against respondent Marguerite
Lhuillier and/or Agencia Cebuana with the Regional Arbitration Branch VII, Cebu City,
for illegal dismissal, service incentive pay, reinstatement with full back wages, and
damages. Their complaints were consolidated and assigned to then Labor Arbiter Gavino
Velasquez, Jr. who, in a decision2 dated August 30, 1991, found for the petitioners, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainants
[petitioners] and against the respondent. The respondent is hereby ordered:
1. To reinstate the complainants to their respective position at the Agencia Cebuana
with full back wages without qualifications; if reinstatement is not feasible, for one
reason or another, to pay to the complainants their respective separation pay, service
incentive leave pay with full back wages without qualification computed hereunder
as follows:
xxx
2. To pay to all the complainants the amount of P100,000.00 for moral damages and
the amount of another P100,000.00 for exemplary damages, plus the amount of
P98,018.25 as attorney's fees representing 10% of the total award and the amount of
P30,000.00 for litigation expenses.
o Claiming denial of due process, respondent Marguerite Lhuillier appealed to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), in connection with which she filed a cash bond
of P748,411.34. In a decision dated March 11, 1992, the NLRC vacated the decision of
Labor Arbiter Velasquez, Jr. and remanded the case to the Regional Arbitration Branch
VII, Cebu City, for further proceedings.
o Following the NLRC's denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners went to this
Court on a petition for certiorari in G.R. 105892.rbl rl l lbrr
o In a Decision3 promulgated on January 28, 1998, the Court granted the certiorari petition,
reversed and set aside the assailed decision and resolution of the NLRC and reinstated
with modifications the decision of Labor Arbiter Velasquez, Jr., thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The labor arbiter's decision is
REINSTATED with MODIFICATIONS, such that the award of separation pay is
deleted and the service incentive leave pay is computed from December 16, 1975 up
to the petitioners' actual reinstatement. Full back wages, including the accrued
thirteenth month pay, are also awarded to the nine petitioners - - Leiden Fernandez,
Brenda Gadiano, Gloria Adriano, Emelia Negapatan, Jesus Tomongha, Eleonor
Quianola, Asteria Campo, Florida Villaceran and Florida Talledo - - from the date
 ****of their illegal dismissal to the time of their actual reinstatement. Petitioners
Lim and Canonigo, whom we find to have voluntarily resigned, are not entitled to
any benefit.
SO ORDERED.
o On April 28, 1998, the Decision became final and executory and an Entry of Judgment
was made thereon in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
o represent Margruerite Lhuillier as they are not her counsels on record. Petitioners point
o What transpired next lies at the core of the instant petition for contempt.
o On April 8, 1999, herein public respondent Labor Arbiter Nicasio C. Anion, by way
enforcing this Court's Decision in G.R. No. 105892, issued a writ of
execution4commanding the Deputy Sheriff to:
x x x REINSTATE the complainants [petitioners] at the respondent Agencia Cebuana and
to proceed to the premises of the respondent located at Calderon St., Cebu City or
wherever the same could be found and collect from the respondent the sum of
P3,505,092.33 representing complainants award plus execution fee of P34,550.92 and the
deposit fee of P17,535.46 or a total sum of P3,556,178.71 and thereafter turn over the
said sum to this Office for appropriate disposition. Should you fail to collect said sum in
cash, you are hereby authorized to cause the satisfaction of the same on the movable or
immovable properties of the respondent not exempt from execution.
o On April 15 and 16, 1999, the Deputy Sheriff, garnished the Citibank and Metrobank
accounts of respondent Marguerite Lhuillier and levied on a parcel of land belonging to
her located in Mandaue City.
o On April 20, 1999, petitioners filed with the same Regional Arbitration Branch VII, Cebu
City, a motion for the release to them of respondent's cash bond earlier posted by her in
connection with her appeal to the NLRC from the adverse decision of Labor Arbiter
Velasquez, Jr.
o On the very same day, respondent Labor Arbiter Anion issued an Order
directing the release of the cash bond to the petitioners. Petitioners received the
amount of P748,411.34.
o Then, on May 14, 1999, respondents Alvarez Caete Lopez Pangandoyon Ahat & Paredes
Law Offices, through respondent Atty. Wilfredo S. Pangandoyon, Jr., filed with Labor
Arbiter Nicasio C. Anion, on behalf of Marguerite Lhuillier, a motion 5 to lift or set aside
the writ of garnishment alleging that the garnished accounts were not in the name of
Marguerite Lhuillier alone but were joint accounts with Christopher Darza and Claudine
Darza.
o The motion further claims that the writ of execution was directed only against
Agencia Cebuana, hence, not even Marguerite Lhuillier can be made personally
liable thereunder.
o Petitioners vigorously opposed the motion to lift, arguing that respondents Alvarez
Caete Lopez Pangandoyon Ahat & Paredes Law Offices have no legal personality to
out that the counsels on record for Marguerite Lhuillier are Atty. Amadeo D. Seno and
Atty. Luis V. Diores and that there had been no proper substitution of counsel made.
o Moreover, petitioners claim in the same opposition that the garnished bank
accounts are not joint accounts but are accounts only in the name of Marguerite
Lhuillier, who, contrary to the allegations in the motion, is just as liable under
the writ as Agencia Cebuana.
o In a resolution dated June 10, 1999, respondent Labor Arbiter Nicasio C. Anion granted
the motion to lift or set aside the writ of garnishment and directed the Deputy Sheriff to
enforce this Court's Decision in G.R. No. 105892 only on the properties of Agencia
Cebuana.
o On June 21, 1999, petitioners appealed the aforementioned resolution of Labor Arbiter
Ainon to the NLRC.
o Subsequently, they also filed with this Court the instant petition for "civil and
criminal contempt and other disciplinary sanctions; inhibition of the respondent
labor arbiter; final computation of the exact figure of petitioners' monetary
awards including separation pay; with request to consolidate petitioners' recent
appeal filed with the [NLRC] to this instant petition."
o In sum, petitioners' submit that the collective acts of the public and private
respondents constitute contempt of this Court in that they thwarted the
implementation of the final and executory Decision of the Court in G.R. No.
105892.
o First off, it greatly saddens the Court that petitioner employees, who were illegally
dismissed way back in 1990 - - seventeen (17) years before this date - - have yet to be
fully compensated for the injustice that had befallen them almost two decades ago despite
the final and executory judgment of this very Court in their favor.
 o It is in the interests of justice, therefore, that the Court must make conclusive
clarifications as to the execution of its final Decision against respondent
Marguerite Lhuillier.
o In an individual proprietorship, the owner has unlimited personal liability for all the debts
and obligations of the business.6
o As sole proprietor of Agencia Cebuana, from whose employment the petitioners
were unlawfully removed, Marguerite Lhuillier is the party against whom the
Court's final and executory Decision in G.R. No. 105892 is enforceable.
o Put differently, Marguerite Lhuillier is personally liable under the same
Decision. Garnishment and levy over her property are proper in the
dispensation of justice.
o Be that as it may, we do not find, however, any contumacious act to have been committed
by both the public and private respondents, either individually or collectively.
o As it were, there was never an attempt on their part to subvert or hold at bay the
final implementation of the executory Decision of the Court in the main case.
o Quite the contrary, recognizing the executory character of this Court's Decision
in question, respondent Labor Arbiter Nicasio Anion issued a writ of
execution for its implementation.
o For their part, the private respondents did not actually or maliciously resist the
writ thus issued.
o What they opposed was the garnishment of the bank accounts allegedly jointly
owned by respondent Marguerite Lhuillier and two others, not the writ of
execution itself.
o We hold, however, that such accounts, even if joint as claimed by the private
respondents, are subject to garnishment.
o It is in the nature of joint accounts that anyone of the depositors has access to
the entire funds therein.
o If, afterwards, there should be squabbling amongst the supposed joint
depositors as to the share of each, they can sort it out amongst themselves.
o We reiterate for the purpose of clarity that private respondent Marguerite Lhuillier is
personally liable under this Court's Decision in dispute.
o Her co-respondent Agencia Cebuana is a sole proprietorship without a juridical
personality of its own.
o But while the position taken by the public and private respondents that the
judgment in question is not enforceable against respondent Marguerite
Lhuillier, but solely against Agencia Cebuana is wrong, they are not liable for
contempt.
o For one, the filing of the respondent law firm of Alvarez Caete Lopez Pangandoyon
Ahat & Paredes Law Offices of its motion to lift the order of garnishment cannot be
adjudged contumacious simply because they do not appear as counsel of record of
respondent Marguerite Lhuillier/Agencia Cebuana.
o Their engagement to file that particular motion does not appear to be a
replacement or substitution of counsel where the withdrawal or consent of
former counsel is required.
o There was no intention on their part to replace or substitute the counsels on
record of Marguerite Lhuillier and/or Agencia Cebuana.
o For sure, the services of the counsels on record were never terminated. In this
light, we are inclined to believe that the engagement of the law firm of Alvarez
Caete Lopez Pangandoyon & Paredes Law Offices appears to have been on
collaborative effort basis.
o Besides, it is settled rule in our jurisdiction that a lawyer is presumed to be
properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears. 7
o It is hard to imagine that the respondent law firm who has no personal interest
in the case would fight for and defend a case with persistence and vigor if it had
not been authorized or employed by the party concerned. 8
o Besides, it must be stressed that the respondent law firm merely filed a motion
to lift the order of garnishment, an appearance which is basically limited in
character.
o On the part of the respondent Labor Arbiter, it appears clear to us that it was never his
intent to defy the final and executory Decision of this Court in the main case, much less
to delay its enforcement.
o He did, after all, issue a writ of execution on April 8, 1999. Not only that.
o When the petitioners filed their motion for the release to them of respondent's
cash bond in connection with her appeal to the NLRC from the earlier adverse
decision of Labor Arbiter Velasquez Jr., respondent Labor Arbiter Nicasio C.
Anion issued an order directing such release that very same day and
petitioners did receive the amount of P748,411.34.
o Hence, the Decision of this Court in question had, in fact, already been partially
executed.
o For this reason, we do not see the need for the inhibition of Labor Arbiter
Nicasio Anion in the enforcement process of the same Decision.
o He is, however, directed with all dispatch to satisfy the final and executory
Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 105892.
o The petitioners have waited long enough for the justly deserved fruits of their
labor.
o As regards the companion request of the petitioners for a final computation by
the Court of the exact amounts of monetary awards due them under the same
Decision, the Court is not inclined to venture thereon considering that said
computation had already been done by Labor Arbiter Velasquez, Jr., in his
decision of March 11, 1992, as affirmed with modifications by the Court in its
Decision in G.R. No. 105892.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, and finding no contumacious act on the part of the herein respondents,
the instant petition is DISMISSED but the respondent Labor Arbiter Nicasio C. Ainon is
DIRECTED to IMMEDIATELY IMPLEMENT this Court's Decision in G.R. No. 105892.