Preliminary A

Omnipotence is a Special Case of Knowledge. Nescience and Omniscience are

Opposites. Nescience and Knowledge are Contradictory. IF some Essence is not
Nescience then it is a Knower. If it is not a Knower then it is Nescience. It is Per Se
Absurd for an Individual Essence to be Nescience and Knowerin general and Nescience
and Omniscience in Particular.
Preliminary B
Omniscience meaneth Absolute Knowledge [AL ILM AL MUT:L-Q], This Knowledge
Comprehendeth each and every Logical Thing or Logical Occurrence i.e each and ecvery
Per Se Contingent, Per Se Absurd, Per Se Necessary and Necessary For Necessary
[Neither Per Se Necessary Nor Per Se Contingent but Per Se Possible] with out any
Exception. It comprehendeth each and every Per Se Contingent Time and any Event in
time.
Preliminary C
To Know a Thing is one thing and to Express it in sentences is an other thing. One and
same thing that is known to two Rational Essence cannot be expressed by them by one
and same Assertive/Affirmative and Negative sentence. This problem can be ascribed
to the Attribute of Speech and Not to the Attribute of Knowledge.
Preliminary D
Omniscience doeth not mean that all kind of knowledge that is found in Per Se
Contingent Created Rational Essences are ascribed to Divine Essence. Per Se Contingent
Created Finite Timeal Knowledge are denied for Divine Essence. There are many
Intrinsic Properties and Essential Attributes of Finite Knowledges which are not found in
Necessary for Necessary, Essential, Eternal and Infinite Knowledge, This cannot be used
to argue against the Omniscience of Divine Knowledge.IF A Knowledge is Divine
Knowledge then it Knoweth/Comprehendeth each and every Logical Thing/Occurrence
and Event. It is not that it Comprehendeth/Knoweth a thing or an event as Known by a
Finite Created Knowledge. Maulana: Ashraf Ali Tha:nvi a Great Scholar scholar pointed
at this fact while discussing an issue whether Ilm Al Ghaib is a Communicable Attribute
or an Incommunicable Attribute In his work H:ifz: Al I:ma:n he presented a claim that a
person can say that the Divine Knowledge is not limited Knowledge then a person can
say that Divine Essence is not the Knower of Al Ghaib in the meaning that Divine
Knowledge is not Limited. He rejected this saying axiomatically. This means that
meaning of Divine Knowledge is not that Divine Essence must have all kinds of
Knowledge. But it meaneth that it must comprehendeth all types of events and
ocuurrances.
Preliminary E
The word Now is used in several meanings. One of them is that the Sentencer/Speaker
,the Sentence and the Event expressed in the Sentence all belong to one and same
time. In this meaning the Divine Essence never saith the Word Now in any sentence.
How ever there are several other meanings in which the word Now [A:n,/AlA:n] may be
used by be Divine Essence.
As to say that there are several theories about the Present,Past and Future of time.
Baesd on them there are six cases.
1] According to most used theory Only Present Exists ;and Past and Future do not Exist.
2] According to some Present and Past Exist but Future Does not.
3] According to some Present and Future Exist but Past Does Not.
4] According to some Neither Present, Nor Future, Nor Past Exist.
5] According to some Future and Past Exist but Present does Not.
6] According to some all the three times/tenses Present,Pastand Future Exist.
These are the THEORIES and none of them is proved with certainty,yet each one of
them is Per Se Contingent.
Divine Essence is beyond all types of time. If there are some types such that they are
neither Present, Nor Future Nor Past and they are different from each other even then
Divine Essence is Beyond times. Our discussion is based on the six stated above
theories. If needed discussion on other Per Se Contingent Parts of times shall be
discussed.
If 1 is the case then the word Now can be used for the Existing time.
If 2 is the case then the word now can be used in the meaning of the last Created and
Existing Time which Exist. If an other time is created after it then the word Now can be
used for it. If 3 is the case then the word Now can be used for the most prior existing
time. If 3 is the case then the word now can be used for the time which exists and is
created ,yet it is prior to all existing times.If 4 is the case then the time doeth not exist
at least one which consist of three parts Pasr,Present and Future. So the word Now can
be used for the Last Created Events. If 5 is the case then the word Now can be used for
the Non Existing Time. If 6 is the case then choice of Past, Present and Future depends
upon the Divine Will and Part Present and Future becomes a matter of choice. So what
so ever times is chosen by Divine Essence as Present the word Now can be used for it.
It must be noted that Past and Future both are finite so Neither Infinite Past Exists nor
Infinite Future Exist in case atleast one of them Exists. So it means that Divine Essence
Createth the future one after an other even if they are far away from Present.
All this assumes that Posteriori and Priority of times are more fundamental concepts
than time. For Example Almost all theists believe that Divine Essence is Eternal and
Time is not then this Implieth Priority Of Divine Essence and Posteriority of Time. This
Implieth that these are more Fundamental Concepts. Maulana Qa:sim in His Work
Tahdh:I Anna:s have also implicitly advocated this View. This may be derived from his
concept of three types of Finality and Firstness.
Preliminary F

The Essence of a Suppositum is believed to be Absolutely Identical to the Suppositum ,

The Essence of a Substance is Supposed to be Absolutely Identical to the Substance,
Similarly the Essence of an Essence is Absolutely Identical To the Very Essence it self. An
Essence Is Subsistent. Divine Essence is Per Se Subsistent. If it is clearified that Per Sr
Contingent Essence is Pe Se Subsistent then An Essence is a Per Se Subsistent . If not
then An Essence is Subsistent whether Per Se or Not Per Se.
Preliminary G
The lines of argument of Nicholas goes as follow: It is per Se Absurd for Divine
Essence to Know Indexicals. Every Non Indexical is an Indexical. So Divine Essence
is ascribed by Nescience [Jahl] and Divine Essence is Nescient [ Ja:hil].

It may be noted that these lines are based on some Axioms of Nicholas System of
arguments.

1]To Know time it is Per Se Necessary to be in Time.2] To Know a Thing /an Event in
time it is Necessary to be in Time.

3]To Know time it is Per Se Necessary to be in Time.4] To Know a Thing /an Event in
time it is Necessary to be in Time.
It is Per Se Absurd for Divine Essence to be in Time and In Space. So It is Per Se
Absurd for Divine Essnce to Know Time. Space and things/events in at least one of
them,

In response one must note the following.

Divine Essence Knoweth what would Its Knowledge would have been If Logical
Absurds were Logical Contingents and Logical Contingents were Logical Absurds,

Logical Necessaries were Logical Absurds and Logical Absurds were Logical
Necessaries , Logical Contingencies were Logical Necessaries and Logical
Necessaries were Logical Contingencies. It is Clear that In such cases Divine
Essence. So it is Not Per Se Absurd for Divine Essence to Know Indexicals, Since at
best it may be said that it is Per Se Absurd to know Indexicals but Divine Essence
Knoweth even Per Se Absurds, So It Knoweth What if It/He Knoweth them in the
case they are Per Se Absurd to be Known. It is not Necessary to be in Time in order
to Know Time. It is not Mecessary to be in Time in order to Know the things in time
[Timeal Things]. It is not Necessary to be in Space in order to Know Space. It is not
Necessary to be in Space in order to Know the things in Space [Spatial Things].

This thing may be kept in mind and may be repeated latter at its proper places,
where repeating/repeatation may seem to be necessary.

Preliminary H

Nicholas has a very Wrong approach of Indexicals. The Wrongness of His Approach
is very obvious and when this wrongness is mixed with the wrongness of conception
of Omniscience a very new form of fallacious arguments are generated. Nicholas
has given more examples and did not discuss to the Axioms of his approach. Since
he probably conceived the idea that this may expose the weaknesses of his System
of arguments.

The Basic Ideas upon which the claim is based that Divine Essence cannot Know
indexicals are numerically there.

1]Timeal Indexicals.According to the Critic of Divine Omniscience Divine Essence

Cannot Know the Timeal Indexicals.

The Timeal Indexical Imply that the event and, The Speaker both are in Time .
The Special Case is that both are in one and same time. This is generally shewn by
the word Now which is either a Preposition or an adverb or both. For example if
an Intellegent Essence Saith :=It is lightening Now . It means that the Essence
that is the Speaker and the Event both are in one and the same Time. So if Speaker
is in time t1 and the Event is in time t2 then t1=t2.
As the Divine Essence is Beyond All Possible Times then if Divine Essence Saith that
It is Lightening Now then either it meaneth that The Event of Lightening is Beyond
Time or Divine Essence is in Time. In this case it implieth that the event and the
Divine Essence both are in One and the Same Time. Both of the meanings are
equally false. Learned denouncer of Divine Essence and Divine Omniscience used
this fallacy to refute Divine Essence which he considered as Irrefutable Refutation
Of Divine Essence and Divine POmniscience.S

2] Spatial Indexicals:=

Spatial Indexicals Imply that the Speaker and the Event both are in Space. Special
Case is the use of the word Here.

For an Example if a Rational Essence saith :=A is Here.;It meaneth that the
Speaker S and the Thing A both are in Space , and the distance between them is
small, that is A is near to the Speaker some where in Space .

If Divine Essence Saith : A is near then it meaneth that Either Divine Essence is in
some space or in all space, or the thing A is Beyond all Spaces. Both are false
meanings.

3] Pronounal Indexicals.

This means that the Speaker and the Subject of the Pronoun both are in Time or
both are in Space or both are in both.

Special Case the Pronoun I.

If some saith I feel pain this means that the Speaker S and the Event E all are in
Time and Space and the Subject of the Pronoun and the Speaker both are one and
the same Rational Essence. In this case If Divine Essence Saith, I feel pain then
this is false on several Gounds. 1] Divne Essence is not in time. 2] Divine Essence is
not in Space. 3] Divine Essence is not the Subject of the Pronoun I. At best the
Divine Essence may say He/She/It feeleth pain. But the Knowledge of the user of
the Pronoun He/She/It cannot be same as the Knowledge of the Speaker of the
Pronoun I. So there is some thing that the user of the Pronoun I Knoweth more then
the user of the Pronoun He/She/It for the speaker of the Pronoun 1. Further it
implieth that the User and Speaker of the Pronouns is in time.

Based on the fallacious Ideas the Critic of the Divine Omniscience denieth the
Divine Omniscience. This is just an Illusion that the Non Divine Essences know
some which the Divine Essence Knoweth Not. On excogitating minutely and
nuclearly it is found that There is nothing that is Known to Non Divine Essence that
is not Known to Divine Essence. So these are the basic fallacies which serve as
bases of all fallacious arguments,
An other Fallacy which is often used is that:- If Essence in Time and Space cannot
Know Existent That Transcendenteth Time and Space then One That
Transcendenteth Time and Space cannot Know things that are in time and space.

There is really nothing that isnot KLnown to Divine Essence but Known to Essences
in Time and Space, The arguments from Indexicals are the only arguments used by
the Demouncers of Divine Omniscience.

Preliminary I

Some Ahlul Vuju:d Existantialists] believe that Divine Essence is the Mansaha:
[Originator] and Manda: [Source] of each and every Per Se Contingent Thing and
Event. Divine Essence Knoweth the very Mansha: Itself and two Know the Mansha:
is Sufficient and equal to Know each and every other thing of whom the Divine
Essence is the Mansha:. In this case as Indexical Events and Things are also have a
Coomon Mansha: and that is Divine Essence ,hence to Know the very Mansha:
Itself is sufficient to Know each and every Indexical thing and indexical event what
so ever, and if not sufficient then a perfect alternative. In this case the Omniscience
in regard to indexicals may be defined and expressed as the Knowledge of
Mansha:.

PRELIMINARY J

If it is accepted that Knowledge of every Rational Essence about one and same
event/thing is not one and the same and it differs fromEssence to Essence, Divine
Essence Knoweth each and every Indexical in Its Own Way and not in the Wayse of
Non Divine Essences.

Divine Knowledge is Omniscience in the meaning each and every thing whether it
be Logically Necessary,or it be Logically Contingent or it be Logically Absurd is
known to Divine Essence exactly ,correctly, really and accurately. Ways may be
different. Omniscience doet not mean that Divine Essence knoweth an event as a
Non Divine Essence Knoweth it as a Non Divine Essence. So thing can be different.
Similarly Omniscience doeth not mean that Knowledge of each and every Non
Divine Essence is ascribed to the Divine Essence as it is ascribed to the very Non
Divine Essence, But it mean that what so ever that is Logically Necessary or
Logically Absurd or Logically Contingent or Logically Neither Necieesary nor
Contingent is Known to Divine Essence. So types of Knowledges are dissimilar but
what so ever is known to any Non Divine Essence is Known to Divine Essence, So
difference in type of Knowledge is not any thing which implieth Ignorance.

Preliminary K

If it is suppesed that a Non Divine Essence E1 Knows an event E1 and knoweth

some thing about it that Divine Essence Knoweth Not even then:
1]Divine Essence Knoweth the event Infintely more correctly and rightly that the
Non Divine Knowledge if Non Divine Essence E1.

2]Divine Essence Knoweth the Knowledge of the the Non Divine Essence E1.

3] Divine Essence Knoweth What It Would have Known if It would be that Non Divine
Essence .

4]Divine Essence Knoweth what would It Hath Known if It would Have Known what
the Non Divine Essence Knoweth.

It must be notede that Non Divine Essence Doeth Know each and every Logical
Contingent, Logical Necessary, Logical Absurd, and it also Knoweth what if Logical
Contingents were Logical Necessaries , What if Logical Contingents were Logical
Absurds, What if Logical Absurds were Logical Contingents, What if Logical Absurds
were Logical Necessaries, What if Logical Necessaries were Logical Absurds and
What if Logical Necessaries were Logical Contingents.

Preliminary L

It is not the case that a thing/ an Event that is Indexical is Known to Non Divine
Essences but Not Known to Divine Essence. Rather it is Known to Both types of
Essences whether Divine or Not Divine ,yet the differences in the KNOWELDGES of
Knowing Essences do exist the Differences which exist in the Knowledges from one
essence to an other essence and so on is due to the relations of these essences to
the thing/event stated above. It is not the case that there exist /subsist infinite or
indefinite number of sub-things sub-events in each indexical event or thing such
that each Knowing Essence knoweth only one of them and no two knowing essences
have one and the same knowledge or the knowledge of one and the same sub-
event or sub- thing existing/subsiting in the indexical event/thing. Rather the case is
different. The only thing that can be said about these indexicals is that Knowledge
of some Knowing Essences are better then the other essences and Knowledge of
some Essences are worse then the other Essences. Omniscience of Divine Essence
doeth not mean that all the Knowledges of all Logically Contingent Knowing
Essences are ascribed to Divine Essence, Rather it meaneth that Divine Knowledge
is the Absolutely Perfect Knowledge ,infinitely more perfect then any Non Divine
Essence.

For example if a Non Divine Essence saith that A is near me the sayer may not
know the exact distance of the very self of itself and the very thing, and on the
contrary Divine Essence Knoweth the Exact Distance of them and also Knoweth the
word near used for this distance.

Knowledge of an event is another event. For example a None Divine Essence E1

Knoweth a thing A and an other Non Divine Essence E2 Knoweth the Thing A, the
thing A is common in both of the two Knowledges of two Knowing Essences ,yet it
may be the case one of the two Essences Knoweth better then the other or one of
the Essence Knoweth it worse then the other. It may be said in case of indexicals
knowledge of no two Essences are equal, and taking any two Knowing essences
such that each one of the two knoweth the said event /thing , one knoweth it better
than the other or one knoweth it worse than the other. So different is not in the
thing but in the different Knowledges of different Knowing Essences about one and
the same thing/event. Each and every Knowledge of a Knowing Essence in regard to
the stated above thing/event is a different event/thing. Now Divine Essence Not
Only Knoweth the said Event/Thing infinitely more perfectly then any Non Divine
Essence but also Knoweth each and every Knowledge in regard to the said
Thing/Event. So Divine Essence Knoweth With the Pure Knowledge .

Preliminary M

Let it be known that if it is accepted that an Indexical Event/Thing may have

different Knowledges in regard to different Essences suth that each knowledge is
ascribed to one and only Essence, then this means that the different Knowledges
are events /things other then the said event/thing and are events /things other then
that thing/event. There differences i.e the differences of these knowledges are only
due to know the event/thing better or less better, worse or less worse. Now it is not
the case that one essence has the knowledge of some thing which the other
essence does not have. But it is the case that one Knoweth some Essence better or
worse than the other Essence. If No Two Essence are equal in Knowledge then it
doeth not imply that Divine Essence doeth not know it or that Divine Knowledge is
not Omniscience. At best it implies that in case of indexicals , no two Knowing
Essences in Time and Space have equal Knowledges, BUT this Doeth Not Imply
that Divine Essence That is Beyond Time and Space Knoweth the INDEXICAL
Event/Thing NOT.

Preliminary N

If it is excepted that no two Non Divine Essence have equal Knowledge of an

Indexical then it is implied that Real Knowledge of an Indexical is Logically
Impossible, and What so ever is called Knowledge is actually Ignorence. Pure or Real
Knowledge of an Indexical becometh Logically Absurd. This is the only result of this
approach of indexical. If every thing is supposed to be AN Indexical then there is no
Knowledge of any thing at all. This is denial of the very knowledge itself.

Introduction
Some writers claim that:=
Omniscience generates puzzles at least as perplexing
as those raised by omnipotence (see, for example, Stewart 1993: 32). This
may be true, but as we will argue, the puzzles which have most troubled the-
istic writers really depend on their views in other areas of philosophy, and
the issues that are really puzzling about divine omniscience have had very
little attention.
Let the alleged puzzles be presented by Nicholas and let them be critically
and strictly be analyzed.
It is customary to divide human knowledge into three categories: ability
knowledge (knowing how to do things); knowledge by acquaintance (know-
ing objects, persons, places, etc.); and propositional knowledge (knowing
truths) (see, for example, Everitt and Fisher 1995: 12). Some writers have
insisted that a truly omniscient being ought to be all-knowing in all three
categories (see Martin 1990: Chapter 12).
Divine Omniscience is a special rather exceptional case so it is different from
different types of Created Knowledges.
Although there is some reason to
take knowledge in this inclusive way (e.g. that if one does not, ordinary
humans could know things which an omniscient being would not know), in
what follows we shall focus exclusively on propositional knowledge.
Divine knowledge
Just as for omnipotence we raised a prior question about the
nature
of
Gods power, quite apart from its extent, and found that human experience
gave some understanding of how it might be conceived, so we will find that
a similar strategy works if we ask about the nature of Gods knowledge,
quite apart from its extent.
Divine Omnipotence is discussed and it may be seen there.
There has been a good deal of discussion in recent years about how human
propositional knowledge should be analysed, and one distinction which
many authors have deployed is that between mediate or indirect knowledge,
and immediate or direct knowledge. Some things we know on the basis
of other things that we know. From a consideration of the relevant evidence,
scientists infer that the theory of evolution is true. The jury infers from
286

15
Omniscience
the evidence presented in court that the accused is guilty. Here, the know-
ledge which they arrive at is mediate or indirect because it is inferred from
other facts presented as true. By contrast, other things that we know, we
know without any process of inference at all we just know straight off or
immediately. Suppose that I am now thinking of the number nine. How do I
know that the proposition I am now thinking of the number nine is true? A
plausible negative answer would say that I know this immediately; I do not
have to infer or deduce from something that that is what I am doing; there
isnt a method by the use of which I come to know this. I just know straight
off.
Ideally, the theist would like to be able to say that all Gods knowledge is
immediate
, just as some human knowledge is immediate.
Divine Knowledge is Per Se Immediate and Eternal.
God does not have
to work out, or infer or deduce or calculate anything which he knows. He
does not
come to know
what he knows, if coming to know suggests any
kind of temporal process, at the start of which he does not know some
particular truth and at the end of which he does. Rather, he just knows
everything which he knows, straight off, without needing to use a method of
knowledge acquisition.
It must be known at this point that Divine Knowledge is self immediate
yet Divine Essence Knoweth all the intermediates and mediums of Created
Knowledge and their results as Knowns . Divine Omniscience is the
Essential Attribute and it is Per Se Essential.
The analogy must not be pressed too far. My capacity to know anything
will depend on my possession of a brain, and the theist clearly will not want
to make a correlative claim about Gods knowledge.
Mind and Brains are not Divine Attributes.
When I know some-
thing immediately, there is doubtless some sort of physiological mechanism
at work, even if I have no idea what it is; and the theist does not want to say
that divine knowledge is similarly underpinned by any cognitive mecha-
nisms. But the parallel does give us at least a partial understanding of what
it is for God to know something. It does not of course give us an under-
standing of
how
God knows what he knows, but rather of what kind of
relationship he stands in to what he knows.
With that as a preliminary let us turn directly to the question of divine
omniscience.
Omniscience

llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
ll
Omniscience
How, then, should omniscience be defined? Just as in our discussion of
omnipotence, we can start with a simplistic conception :
Definition 1
X is omniscient = For every true proposition, X knows
that it is true.
This may be some what problematic. Divine Essence Knoweth every True
Proposition and Every False Proposition and Knoweth that Which is True and
Which is False. A proposition is a Sentence and it is a speech. The correct
statement is above as stated in the Preliminaries.
Although this might seem immediately acceptable to the non-partisan
observer, it faces some problems. We need to notice first one very elegant
argument which has been advanced by Grim (Plantinga and Grim: 1993)
designed to show that there cannot be a set of all true propositions, and hence
that there cannot be an omniscient being who knows all the propositions in
this set.
This alleged elegant argument is refuted by Professor Gary Mar in his work
Why Cantor Theorem Against God Does Not Work in Pure Logical way.
Lovers of RFC may see this beautiful logical work. But it must be sent that
Morse Kelly Set theory is far more strong then RFC. Knowledge of Divine
Essence doeth not constitueth a Set. It is beyond all RFC Sets. Alias Theorem
does shew that there is a missing condition in Cantors theorem which when
imposed maketh the Theorem valid on all sets that are Not Set of All Set.
Suppose that there were such a set of all truths, call it T. Consider
now all the subsets of T. The set of all these subsets is what set theoreticians
call the power set of T. To each set in the power set, there will correspond a
truth. The truth might, for example, simply specify that there is a subset con-
taining those particular members. So there will be as many truths as there are
members of the power set. But it has been proved by Cantor that the power
set of any set has more members than the set itself. So, the power set of T will
have more members than T itself. So since each member of the power set of T
has a truth correlated with it, there will be more truths than are contained in
T itself, contrary to our initial assumption that T was the set of all truths. It
follows that the very concept of the set of all truths is logically impossible:
there cannot be any such set. Consequently there cannot be a being who
knows the set of all truths.
This beautiful argument, which illustrates very neatly how debates about
theism can be enriched by philosophical ideas coming from wholly un-
expected directions, will persuade some at once that there cannot be an
omniscient being, by Definition 1 of the term.
Cantor Theorem is not Applied to Divine Essence. First this theorem is
applicable to RFC Sets and Not On MKS Classes. Secondly It is not
Applicable to Grothendiek Universes. Third Professor Gary Mar has proved
that Cantor Theorem is useless against the Divine Knowledge. Alias
Theorem modifies Cantor theorem with applying a missing Condition. Last
and not the least Divine Knowledge Doeth not imply Set Of All Sets.
Since Cantors Theorem only proves that there is no Set of All Sets. Granted.
Divine Knowledge Knoweth each and Every Set even if there is no Set of All
Sets. That is Divine Knowledge is Beyond all Cantorian Sets. So it is
Mathematically Absurd to suppose a Set of All Divine Knowns. Divine Essence
Knoweth each and every set whether all the sets belong to a Set of All Sets [if
Cantors Theorem is Incorrect] or they do not belong to such a Set [if Cantors
Theorem is Correct] But in any case Divine Essence Knoweth each and Very
Set with out any Exception.
So If Divine Omniscience is over each and every thing then these things do
not constitute a set of all RFC Sets.
An other way is to say that Divine Essence Knoweth each and every set even if
there is no such set such that each and every set beloneth to.
An other thing which Respected Nicholas did not mentioned is the Proposition
given below:
N= No One Knoweth that N is True.
It is said that if this statement is false then its negation is true . But if its
negation is true then this negation implieth the truth of the original
statement. This implies that it is true under all values. If a statement is true
under all values then it is Logically True. If Logically True then True. If true
then no one Knoweth its trueth including Divine Essence.
The proper answer to this argument is that this Statement does not deny the
knowledge of any one who knows that it is logically true. So it is also Known
to Divine Essence. An other response is that it is a complex statement and it
contains itself infinite times. Such a statement cannot have the laws of simple
statements. Consider the statement.
N= No One Know that Law Of Contradiction is False.
Its Negation is ~N= Some do know that Law of Contradiction is False.
But both sides of this statement is false. Take an other example :
P= No One Knoweth that N is Logicallay False, where N= No one Knoweth that
N is True.
Now ~P=Some Do Know that N is False.
These type of statements in which there is a statement with in a statement
may be False and its Negation is also equally false and its truth is Pseudo
Truth. To our all theists brethren irrespective of their respective religions it is
requested once for all that in Theological Logic they should add one more law
of thought, Any thing which contradicteth Divine Omniscience is false so the
Necessary Condition for the truth in general and Logical Truth in particular of
any statement is that it doeth not imply that it is not known to Divine
Essence. If a statement and its negation both imply this thing then they both
are equally false. This shall amuse our theists brethren and may annoy
Nicholas. Since its farmotre better to add some Laws equal to Laws of thought
instead of making modifications in the definition of Divine Omniscience. But
this is the last act, there are may before it and this may be used if no answer
is left. I believe I shall be cursed for this proposal but to be cursed for Divine
Essence by atheists is a blessing for theists..
But so far there is no need to use this principle. But it must be in the set of
Axioms of Theological Logic even if it is not used.
This by itself would give theists a motive for wanting an alternative defin-
ition of omniscience (though see the response by Plantinga, op. cit.).
It is most humbly stated that why not to add an other axom itstead of
changing the definition??? But even without such bold steps such objections
are answered and replied.
But in
practice they have been moved to this conclusion by other problems (as they
see it) with Definition 1. In particular, many theists have thought that there
are some grounds for thinking that there are true propositions which God
cannot
know.
There is no such statement. The alleged true statement if not known to Divine
Essence is still known to Atheists? How? Are they not contradicting THE
ALLEGED Truth of them.
So, given a prior commitment to the claim that God exists,
and is omniscient, the theist would have to reject Definition 1.
This is an incorrect supposition.
Of course, an
alternative atheist conclusion which could be drawn immediately is that if
there are truths which God could not know, then there could not be an
omniscient God, and hence since omniscience is one of his defining proper-
ties, it will follow at once that God does not exist.
All Truth are Known to Divine Essence , the only thing is that all Knowns of
Divine Essence do not belong to s Single Set IF RFC is supposed to be correct.
There is Event that is not Known to Divine Essence. But one thing is correct.
As Divine Knowledge is an Essential Divine Attribute, if it doeth not exist
,Divine Essence also doeth not Exist
Since Negation of an Essential Attribute Per Se Essentially Implieth the
Negation of Essence. But the same is not true for Relative and Moral
Attributes. Their negation doeth not imply the negation of the Divine Essence.
But let us assume, at least
provisionally that there is some modification of Definition 1 which is both
intuitively acceptable (i.e. captures what we might prephilosophically think
of as omniscience) and also has the consequence that there could be an
omniscient being.
Modifications are Not Necessary. Since Divine Knowledge is defined as above
see the Preliminaries.
The propositions which are thought to be beyond the reach of even divine
omniscience are of two kinds: the first concerns the future free actions of
humans, and the second concerns so-called indexicals. Which of these prob-
lems the theist regards as serious will depend in part on the view which she
takes of Gods relations to time and space.
There is no problem at all in regard to time and space. If they are they are not
serious ones. They shall be discussed on there proper place of discussions.

Theists agree that eternity and

omnipresence are two of Gods defining attributes; but as we saw in the pre-
vious chapter, each of these attributes can be taken in at least two different
ways. Gods eternal existence might be either temporal or timeless, his
omnipresence might be either spatial or non-spatial.
Omnipresence is a problematic Attribute. Divine Essence Existeth in Itself. So
It is problematic to Say that I t hath Omnipresence and Immanence as Its
Attributes. But If Omnipresence is taken as a Divine Attribute then it Must be
Beyond time and Must Transcendent Time and Space.
Very broadly, there is thought to be one problem in combining divine
omniscience with the temporal conception of eternity; and a different prob-
lem with combining divine omniscience with the timeless conception of
eternity (although, as we shall see, this second problem can be extended to
cover either conception of eternity).
They shall be seen at their proper place of reply Insha: Allah. There is no
such problems at all. The Essential Attributes are related/Connected to Times
and Spaces but not any Time and Not in any Space. They are NEITHER
Unconnected NOR Unrelated.
We will deal with the first of these
problems in the next section, and the second in the following sections. We
will then consider other problems that are raised by the idea of divine
omniscience.
Can God foreknow future free actions?
Divine Essence Doeth Know free Acts of Free Will/Intention.
The first problem arises when we combine Definition 1 with the temporal
conception of eternity. The problem is this: if God knows on Monday that
on Tuesday I will go to London, can my going to London really be free?
This depends on the claim that One that Implies a Logical Absurd is also
Logical Absurd or Mustalzim Muh:a:l Muh:a:l but this is not correct and
this law of absurdity is not accepted by a number of Logicians and
Philosophers of Theology.
For
if he knows in advance what I am going to do, and he cannot be wrong,
then when Tuesday comes, I will
have
to go to London. If I do not go, then
God would have been wrong, and that is impossible (omniscient beings do
not make mistakes). But if I have to go, then it cannot be true that I go
freely. So, in general, if God knows in advance what our actions will be,
then none of our actions can be free. Conversely, if some of our actions
really are free, then God cannot know in advance what they will be, and
hence cannot be omniscient.
This is a good example. But one line of the of answer is that if human freedom
contradicteth Divine Essence then Free Will of the Human Being must be
denied. May do so. So if one have to chose between Divine Existence and Free
Human Will one must select the first and reject the second. But Let the
question be reviewed . Let it be think again.
First let is be assumed that Nicholas as a free will to go to London on
Tuesday. As Nicholas has the Free Will to Go to London and Not to go to
London on Tuesday. So Will Of Nicholas is Free . His Will can chose to Go to
London or to Chose Not to go to London on Tuesday. So far so good even to
the standard of Nicholas. Now Consider that Nicholas choseth to go to London
on Tuesday . This implies that the Will of Nicholas can chose whether to go to
London or not to go to London on Tuestay.
Now If the Knowledge of Divine Essence which is since Eternity not just from
Monday is studied there are different levels.
1] Divine Essence Knoweth that Nicholas Will Can Chose to Go To London and
Can Chose Not to go to London one Tuesday.
So it is well and good and Divine Essence knoweth that Nicholas Will Can
chose to go to London or not to go to London. That is Divine Essence Eternally
Knoweth that Nicholas Will is free to chose to go to London or not to go to
London on Tueday.
2] Divine Essence also Knoweth that Nocholas shall chose to go to London,
that is Nicholas Will Shall chose to go to London due to its freedom.
Now the freedom of the Will of Nicholas to Chose to Go to London or Not to Go
To London doeth not contradict Divine Omniscience. The thing which
contradicteth is to chose not to go to London on Tuesday. So free will of
Nicholas is not contradicteth both one of the Contingent out comes of the
free will is Contrdicteth. It must be noted that there is a very wrong concept
that one that implieth a Logical Absurdity /Logical Contradiction is it self
Logical Absurd. This is incorrect. It may be still Logical Contingent if the
implication is Extrinsic and External. It may be noted that rather must be
noted that Free Will to Chose Not to go to London on Tuesday doeth not imply
to Chose Not to go to London. Other wise Nicholas cannot chose to go to
Logon due to this implication, which if is must be intrinsic implication, So if
there is no implication of the freedom to chose not to go to London on
Tuesday and to chose to Not to go to London on Tuesday there is also no
implication of this freedom and the Contradiction of Divine Knowledge. So
the question is that in this case:1] The freedom of Nicholas Will not to chose
to go to London or to Chose Not to go to London On Tuesday doeth not
contradict Divine Knowledge . 2] To choose No to go to London or Not to chose
to go to London contradicteth the Divine Knowledge. In such conditions the
freedom of any Created Rational Suppositum is conserved inregard to Divine
Knowledge. Now the question is that what if Nicholas Will chose not to go to
London, or doeth not chose to go to London,? In this case it meaneth not that
Divine Knowledge becometh wrong and incorrect but it was eternally wrong
and incorrect. But if it Was Eternally Correct then Nicholas Will can chose not
to go to London but shall not chose not to go to London without loss of its
freedom.
So it is hoped that the entire problem is based upon some supposed problem
in the freedom but there is none.
This line of thought has proved very seductive to many theists. Some have
drawn the conclusion that since God is omniscient by Definition 1, he does
know our future actions, and hence that we are not really free after all.
Others have said that since we are free, our actions are not knowable in
advance, and given that God is omniscient, it follows that Definition 1 of
omniscience is faulty: you can be omniscient even if there are things which
you do not know.
The author of Reconstruction of Thought In Islam has used this approach . But
this is incorrect and is a wrong Idea.
Others again have tried to show that although we are
free, God can know in advance what we will do, and hence it is possible to
retain Definition 1 after all at least as far as
this
problem is concerned. We
will argue that theists have been unnecessarily concerned about divine fore-
knowledge of free action: the two concepts are not in any conflict.
We need first to be clearer about what the issue is supposed to be. The
problem is not that the initial argument shows that omniscience is a self-
contradictory concept.
It is accepted that Omniscience is neither Self Contradictory nor a Paradox.
Nor is the problem quite that omniscience is
incompatible with the temporal conception of eternity.
An other thing is also accepted that is is not incompatible. This implieth that
it is Compatible and Confirmable to Temporal Acts and Events.
More nearly, the
problem is supposed to be that omniscience
and
the temporal conception of
eternity
and
human free will (on a certain understanding of that idea) are
incompatible. But even this formulation is not quite right. A better way of
putting it is that, as traditionally conceived, the problem is generated by
divine
foreknowledge
of free action (whether or not that is accompanied by
omniscience) with an existence in time (whether or not that is existence at all
times). Putting it this way enables us to see that the problem does not arise
for
divine
foreknowledge in particular: if it arises at all, it arises for any fore-
knowledge of free action. If Gods knowledge on Monday of what I will do
OMNISCIENCE
289
on Tuesday is a threat to the freedom of my Tuesday action, then Freds sim-
ilar knowledge on Monday presents an exactly parallel threat to my
freedom.
This is correct that if any correct knowledge contradicteth Freedom then this
is not necessary Divine, it may be Non Divine as well.
If there is a threat at all, it arises from foreknowledge per se, no
matter who has it.
But is there a threat at all? We can present the argument that worries the
theist as follows:
Argument A
(1) God knows on Monday that I will go to London on Tuesday (premise).
(2) Necessarily, if God knows on Monday that I will go to London on Tues-
day, then I will go to London on Tuesday (premise). So:
(3) Necessarily, I will go to London on Tuesday (from (1) and (2)). So:
(4) If I go to London on Tuesday, I do not go freely (from (3)).
But argument A is a simple logical fallacy. In general, one cannot infer
Necessarily q from the two premises Necessarily if p, then q and p. The
necessity of the conditional does not imply the necessity of the consequent,
even when the antecedent is true. All that follows from 1 and 2 is
(5) I will go to London on Tuesday.
This is correct. How ever a number of scholars did commit this mistake.
The crucial difference between (3) and (5) is the disappearance from (5) of
any necessity about my going to London, and hence the disappearance
of any threat to my freedom from action from the fact of Gods fore-
knowledge. It is not as if Gods foreknowledge exerts some irresistible causal
power that gets a grip of me on Tuesday and forces me to go to London. His
foreknowledge exerts
no
freedom-removing pressure at all. I do not go to
London in virtue of Gods foreknowledge; rather, God foreknows in virtue
of what I do. If God foreknows that I will do X, then it follows that I
do
not
do not-X. What does not follow is that I
cannot
do not-X. What knowledge
of a proposition requires is the truth of the proposition known; it does not
require the
necessary
truth of the proposition.
We noted above that the problem does not arise specifically from
divine
foreknowledge. We can now add that it does not even arise from
know-
ledge
It must be noted that If Divine Essence Doeth Know that X shall do an act with
its free Will then if X doeth it with out free Will implieth a flaw in Divine
Knowledge.
. For consider the following (bad) argument:
Argument B
(6) God remembers on Wednesday that I went to London on Tuesday
(premise).
Divine Essence Knoweth . To rename the Knoweth by Remembereth is some
what problematic. But if it is some thing which meaneth Knoweth then with
suitable notes it may be accepted.
(7) Necessarily, if God remembers on Wednesday that I went to London on
Tuesday, then I went to London on Tuesday (premise). So:
OMNISCIENCE
290
(8) Necessarily, I went to London on Tuesday (from (6) and (7)). So:
(9) If I went to London on Tuesday, I did not go freely (from (8)).
All that follows from (6) and (7) is that I went to London on Tuesday, not
that it was necessary that I went to London on Tuesday. So the argument is
invalid. But if Argument A were valid, then Argument B would be too.
That the problem does not spring from epistemic concepts (knowledge,
remembrance, etc.). can be seen when we look at the following argument:
Argument C
(10) It is true on Monday that I will go to London on Tuesday (premise).
(11) Necessarily, if it is true on Monday that I will go to London on Tues-
day, then I will go to London on Tuesday (premise). So:
(12) Necessarily, I will go to London on Tuesday (from (10) and (11)). So:
(4) If I go to London on Tuesday, I do not go freely (from (3)).
If Argument C were sound, it would show that it is mere truth, not specifi-
cally foreknowledge, nor divine foreknowledge, nor remembrance, which is
incompatible with free action. But of course the argument is hopeless. (3)
does not follow from (10) and (11), any more than it follows from (1) and
(2). All that follows from (10) and (11) is that I will go to London on Tues-
day; and that conclusion is compatible with my going freely.
The real source of the pseudo-puzzle about foreknowledge of free action
lies in the fact that we can describe events and states of affairs which happen
at one time, using descriptions which are true of those events only in virtue
of what happens at other times, either earlier or later. Consider the sentence
(S) David Humes father, Joseph, was born in 1681.
This gives a true description of an event which happened in 1681. However,
one of the truth conditions of what it says (namely, that Joseph would later
beget David) concerns 1711, the year of David Humes birth. But this does
not mean that when 1711 arrived, Joseph was somehow
compelled
to beget
David because of the truth (as we can now express it) that Davids father
was born in 1681. It is in virtue of Josephs begetting David in 1711 that (S)
is true; it is not in virtue of the truth of (S) that Joseph did the begetting that
he did. Events are truth-makers for propositions; propositions are not neces-
sitators of events.
This is correct so no need of making further discussion on this particular
issue. How ever the essence of basis of this objection on the freedom of Will
of Created Rational Supposita say Human Being or Jin Being or Angelic Beings
(to some extent) is based upon the following controversial principle:
Any thing which implieth a Logically Absurd is Logically Absurd or in other
sentences One that Implieth a Logically Absurd is Logically Absurd or If A
Implieth B and B is Logically Absurd then A is also Logically Absurd.
But these are incorrect Principles and cannot be accepted. If Divine Essence
Knoweth that Events and S are Per Se Contingent, If Divine Essence
Knoweth that Event doeth Occureth and even S doeth not Occur. Now if
Event atleast one of the two events And S is Not Per Se Contingent then
this Per Se Implieth that Divine Knowledge is Nescience or Ignorance. But if
the Event
 Ocurreth Not or Event S Occureth then these Extrinsically Imply a Flaw
Upon/In Divine Knowledge or Imperfection Upon/In Divine Knowledge.
Accrding to the Rules of Implications , If A Implieth B Intrinsically /Per Se
Necessarily/Absolutely/Logically , and B is Per Se Absurd/Logically Absurd
then A is also Logically Absurd. But if A Implieth B Extrinsically/Per Se
Contigently/ Relatively/ Practically ,B is Per Se Absurd, and there is no
additionally Implication which maketh it Per Se Absurd , then it is Per Se
Contingent. So it is in Power of Divine and Non Divine Essences. Since the
Extrinsic Implications doeth not and can not make of Self Contingent a Self
Absurd. Such a mistake was commited by the author of Reconstruction of
Thought In Islam when the Author Denied the Divine Knowledge to
Cpmprehend each and every thing.

Many theists have tried to show that there is a deeper worry about divine
foreknowledge and freedom than this account allows.
1
But it is hard to see
that there is a real problem here.
OMNISCIENCE
291
Can God know the truth of indexicals?
Divine Essence Doeth Know the events which are expressed by indexical
sentences, and sentences are Speech an other Attribute , that is other
than Knowledge.
The second category of propositions which arguably present a challenge to
the possibility of an omniscient being are those which contain indexical
expressions. The problem is this: we are familiar with the thought that for
some sentences, whether they say something true is independent of who says
them, or when and where they are said. For example, if I say Water boils at
100
o
C, you can express the very same fact by using the very same sentence.
So too can anyone else, and they can use that sentence at any time, and in any
place to express the same fact. Or if you say It is better to have loved and lost
than never to have loved at all, I can express the very same thought by using
the very same sentence and again, where and when I or anyone else uses
that sentence makes no difference to the fact which we thereby state. By con-
trast, there are other sentences which are such that whether the sentence says
something true depends essentially on when or where or by whom it is said.

1. An Indexical may be defined as :- a : varying in reference with

the individual speaker <the indexical words I,he,she,it, there here,
now,then etc.> It is also used in the meaning associated

2. with or identifying an individual speaker <indexical features of speech> For

Example if a Per Se Contingent Created Rational Essence C1 saith I Am I Am ,the

Word I is used for C1. If and other Per Se Contingent Created Rational Essence C2

Saith I Am I Am , the word I in this case is used for C2 and not for C1. But the same

Occurrence[Va:qi] in the meaning C1 Is C1 Is canbe Expressed by C2 either is

 C1 Is C1 or It is It is. So the problem with these Pronouns is that they are

Variables and their subject may change from Speaker of the sentence to the

Speaker of the Sentence.

3. The Occurrence or the Truth or Reality is Constant and same yet the
sentences expressing and sentencing them may vary from Speaker to Speaker.

4. The same words may mean differently in different

sentences spoken or written or expressed or sentenced by
different speaker, that is their subjects may be subject of
change and variation.

For example, if you say I am hot, I cannot state the same fact by using the
same sentence. I have to say not I am hot but You are hot.
If one Essence C1 saith that It is hot or warm or cold or wet etc the VERY same
event cannot be expressed by the very same pronoun I by an other Essence
say C2. The Essence C2 hath to use sentences like C1 is Hot or It is Hot
or He /She is Hot etc.
But one thing must be clarified once for all . They all do represent one and the
same Occurrence. So it must be noted and remarked that a Single Object of
Knowledge is known to different Knowers yet they express them by different
sentences. So the Sentences of Speech differ from one another. But not the
known. So the problem is with the Attribute of Speech and not with the
Attribute of Knowledge. This meaneth that once and the sam event cannot be
expressed and cannot be sentenced by two Knowers if it in one ane Same
Sentence. If the shall attempt to express it by once and same or similar
sentences and if one of the sentence spoken by any one of the two is true and
other is false. That is one known event cannot be expressed by two different
Knowers of the Event. The problem is in the Attribute of Speech and not in the
Attribute of Knowledge.
Again, if you
say today Today it is raining, and I want to express the same thought
tomorrow, I cannot use the same sentence you used (another sentence token
of the same type):
The problem of these types of sentences is that an event cannot be stated or
sentenced by same words and sentences and speech(es).But this does not
mean that Divine Essence doeth not know these events. Suppose that X is
standing at time t0. Let it be supposed that He Said that I am Standing at
time t0. Let is be supposed tha Y said for X He is Standing at time T0 or X
is Standing at time t0. So Y cannot use the sentence used by X, for X. What
does this means . It only means that different sentences are relative to their
speakers but the correspond to one and same truth. Divine Essence Knoweth
that X is standing at t0. It also Knoweth that X said the sentence I am
Standing at time t0. So there is no problem of the knowledge, as for as the
truth of the sentence is known. It is the confusion of speech and knowledge,
two different attributes.

I have to use a different sentence and say Yesterday, it was

raining just as the weather forecaster expressing yesterday the same
thought, has to use yet another sentence and say Tomorrow it will rain.
Words that have this feature (what they refer to, and hence the truth of
sentences containing them, depends essentially on the user, or the time and
place of utterance) are called indexicals, and sentences in which they occur
are indexical sentences.
This is a proof that while the event is constant , the sentences describing and
sentencing them are different depending upon different setencers and
speakers. In other sentence one and the same event is signified by different
sentences depending upon different speakers. The Event is Absolutely
Identical yet the sentences are different. In this case a different may be
pointed out when the event hath occurred and when it is occurring. So this
difference can be known to Divine Essence, Since if an event is occurring and
when it is not occurring are two different types of events. If Presentists view
is taken, the event is gone out of Existence and Hath been annihilated .
Annihilation of an event is another event. So if event is not existing at some
time t0 then Divine Per Se Subsistent Existent Knoweth that the Event hath
occurred and is not Existing. The connection of Divine Knowledge with the
Created Time and the Created event in time doeth exist. It is not the case that
as Divine Kowledge is beyond Time it hath no connection/relation with things
in time and the very time that is not in an other time.
It seems that corresponding to indexical sentences
(to some at least, and perhaps to all) there is a non-indexical sentence (or
perhaps several such sentences) which says
very roughly
the same thing as
the indexical. To see what these non-indexicals are like, let us first introduce
the idea of a tenseless verb form.
The introduction of tenseless verb [some time Mad:ari is used to shew it] is a
good thing yet it does not prove what is intended and attempted to be
proved.
Let us use the present tense form to mean
not just is now . . . but is, was, or will be. For example, instead of saying
I am hot, I could say Everitt is (timelessly) hot on 17 March 2003 at 5.23
p.m. or The lecturer speaking in room 3.02 on the 76th day of 2003 is hot
or The only person standing in room 3.02 of the Arts Block, UEA at 5.30
p.m. on St Patricks Day 2003 is (timelessly) hot.
Everitt is not Timelessly Hot rather Erevitt is Hot in Time , Yet is Knowledge
is A Beyond Time Attribe Of Divine Essence. So it must be noted that
Knowledge of an Event in Time May be Beyond Time , and this cannot be
sentenced as Everitt is timelessly Hot. Rather It is Known that Everitt is (Hot
in any ) Time and the Knowledge this Knowledge is Per Se Beyond Time.
These would be non-
indexical sentences which say
very roughly
what the original indexical
sentence said; and they are sentences which you or anyone else could use
now or at any other time to state
very roughly
the same fact that I was stat-
ing when I used the indexical. Let us call such sentences the correlates of
the corresponding indexical sentence.
In Theological Discussions Present Tense is often used in Beyond Time Truths
and Realities. Like Divine Essence is One. In the Eternity Divine Essence is
alone . Some time Past Tense is also used for Beyond Tense meaning. Like In
the Eternity there was no one with Divine Essence. Some time even future
tense is also used in the very same meaning, EG. If Divine Essence annihilates
Every Contingent Essence the Divine Essence Shall Be Alone. Know it must be
noted that if is an Event in time T and C is a Created Essence at time T. As
the Knowledge K of the Created Essence is also in time T , The C can say in a
continuous sentence that Event is Occurring Now. As the knowledge of C
is also Per Se Contingent then the Knowledge of the Contingent Essence Per
Se Contingent not to Exist. If it doeth not Exist then there is no influence or
effect on the Event . This shews that Occurance of the event is independent
of the K of C. So Divine Knowledge Knoweth the event that is independent of
the Knowledge K of the Essence C. The only difference is that the Knowledge
K is in time if it existeth and Divine Knowledge is beyond time. So there is no
thing /Event that is in Non Divine Knowledge but not in Divine Knowledge. If
the event would have been in Non Divine Knowledge not in Divine Knowledge
then this would have been a valid argument. But it is not so. Additionally the
Non Divine Knowledge is also in Divine Knowledge, not as a Divine Attribute
but as a Known of the Divine Knowledge. So Divine Essence knoweth not only
the event but also the Knowledge of the Non Divine Essence about the event
. Sothere is no occurrence/event not known to Divine Knowledge. Hence the
objection is incorrect. It has been stated above that if the Eternal Knowledge
knoweth not an event as a Non Eternal Knowledge then it knoweth the event
as an Eternal Knowledge. So the negation is of the state/act of Knowing as a
non Eternal Knowledge. This does shew that Not Knowing as a Imperfect
Knowledge is no event. But even then it is Known, Since to know as a Non
Eternal and Imperfect Knowledge is Per Se Absurd Upon Divine Essence and
upon Divine Knowledge,yet Divine Essence Knoweth each and every Absurd
including it. So it is also known as the Eternal Knowledge Knoweth any Absurd
Per SE.
So there is no Event Left. The word Now only means that the Contingent
Knowledge , the Contingent Knower, the Contingent Event and Contingent
Relations of the event to the Contingent Knowledge of the Contingent Knower
all are in one and same Contingent Time. It must be noted that the
connections and relations of the Contingent Event to the Contingent
Knowledge are different from the relations and connections of Eternal
Knowledge , but as the relations and connections of the contingent
knowledge are imperfect they imply imperfection of the Contingent
Knowledge and are implied from it [Bi-implication/Tala:zum].
But if so then the objection becometh that if Divine Knowledge is not
Imperfect then it is not Omniscience. This meaning of Omniscience is never
used by theists in general. So the result is that the Divine Knowledge
Knoweth the Event at it is and is beyond time. So this does not mean that
Divine Knowledge doeth not know the event. It only meaneth that Only it
Knoweth The Event Perfectly. This is a fallacy and an allusion of mind that
None Divine Essence knows thing not known to Divine Essence. When
discussed and analyzed there is no thing that is Known by Non Divine Essence
but Not Known By Divine Essence. It is shewn above and may be shewn below
that there is nothing no event that is not in Divine Essence but in Non Divine
ESSENCE. Now the timeless verb invented can express the idea that the
Knower is not in any time and Transcendenteth all Logically Contingent Times
and Logically Contingent Dimensions of time. So if so then the speaker can
sentence these types of sentences. Since the time and the event in time do
exist . Time does exist in no time. Now knowing that Divine Essence Knoweth
the every same event being Beyond time, this means that one and the same
event is known to two different Knowers, one in time who/which when use
the word Now use in the meaning that it/he/she is also in time, the other one
Who/Which if uses the Word Know Maketh a Necessary Exception for
Itself/Himself from being in Time. How ever as time it self is not in any other
time otherwise there is implied in infinite series such that each and every
time is in an other time, Divine Essence can use the word Now in a meaning
which implieth that the Speaker and the Knower is Beyond time. But even this
doeth not imply that Divine Essence doeth not know some thing. So the
question is what thing/which thing is not known to Divine Essence, if the
Divine Essence is not in any time. The answer is there is nothing. If other
views about time are taken the time-less or beyond time existent may use
the word Now by the difference of past present and future. How ever if time is
itself Non Existent and just a supposition things become wrse for the Anti
Divine Objection Makers. Perhaps what ws initially intended by the learned
objection makers was that if Divine Essence saith Now it meaneth the event
is in no time, but it is in time. When the same word is spoken or written in a
speech by a Non Divine Essence that is in time it meaneth that the event is in
time. But it is not implied. As it is explained above to express an event in a
sentence is one thing and to know an event is an other thing. It must be
noted that expressing an event say E1 in a sentence is an other event say E2.
The Knowledge of these events is some thing that is neither.

It is an obvious truth that we express much of the knowledge that we

have using indexical sentences.

There is a difference between Knowledge and Expressions of Knowledge.

These are two different things.To confuse two Attributes Nounly Knowledge
and Speech [Sentence] is incorrect and wrong.
There is a difference between an event in time and its relation to a Finite
Created Non Eternal Non Absolute Knowledge in tine and relations of the very
same event in time to an Infinite Uncreated Eternal and Absolute Knowledge
that is Beyond [Ma: Vara:] all Times [Azzama:nAl Vaqt]. The former stated
knowledge is Imperfect and latter stated Knowledge is Perfect.
And we can divide these indexicals into three
main groups: personal indexicals, spatial indexicals, and temporal indexi-
cals, thus:

(1) personal: I, me, mine, you, yours, he/she, his/hers, etc.

If a Rational Essence that is in time is feeling some pain the Rational
Essence can say that I am Feeling pain But if another Rational
Essence that is also in time saith the same event it may say It/He/She
is feeling pain.Sentences are different but the signify one and the
same event. So in this case the event is known but the sentences
expressing this one and same event may differ relative to different
expressor. But such differences does not imply that one event is known
by one Knower is not known by an other knower. How ever in practical
 one who feels the pain knows it more perfectly [relative perfection]
then the one who is not feeling it. Yet knowing the pain of the other
with out being a subject of any pain ;AND knowing it equally as the
feeler of the pain knows is Logically Contingent and not Logically
Absurd. Unfortunately this is an issue that is beyond the scope of this
discussion. So to save one self from entering an other debate it is
assumed to be true. Sine feeling is just a source of knowledge. Same
knowledge can be obtained and attained by different sources not
necessarily practical but just Not Logically Absurd. There is Logical
Absurdity it it.
(2) spatial: here, there, to the left, to the right, nearer, further, this, that, etc.
Now it is an other problem that must be discussed in required detail
with the minimum requirement considered.
If a thingT is on the right side of a Rational body Essence B1 in time the
Rational Essence may say It is on my Right Side. But the very same
sentence cannot be said by an other Rational Essence B2 of same type to
which it is on the left side. So this means that the relative approach of
different sentencers and staters may be imperfect approaches to an
event. In the case of Divine Essence the Divine Per Se Subsistent Existent
the location of the body in Space yet the Divine Essence does not
expresseth it by saying that It is on my right side or it is on my left
side . Since Divine Essence is beyond all Spaces. So the thing is neither
to the left side of the Divine Essence nor on the right side of the Divine
Essence. If Divine Essence saith so then it shall be a false
statement/sentence. But it does Not mean that None Divine Essences
Know some thing which Divine Essence Doeth Not Know. Additionally
Divine Essence Knoweth that it is on the right side of B1 and left side of
B2. Divine Essence additionally Knoweth what so ever is known by B1 and
B2 and repective Knowledges of each one of B1 and B2 in ABOUT the Body
T[Assuming that the thing T is also a Body]. So there is nothing which
canbe pointed out as known to atleast one Non Divine Essence yet Not
Known to the Divine Essence. Even if B1 andB2 if both of them do cease to
have the Attribute of Knowledge and do become Nescient simultaneously
and immediately , even then there is no event and no occurrace not known
to Divine Essence what so ever. It is just an illusion of mind that there is
something not known to Divine Essence yet when studied clearly there is
no such event as supposed to be out of the Divine Attribute of Knowledge.
So there is nothing not known to Divine Essence whether there are some
Non Divine Essences [at least one] to Know there Spetial Things Spatially
specially or there is none.

(3) temporal: now, in the past, in the future, today, yesterday, tomorrow,
soon, and all tensed verbs.
This is the basic problem and it is discussed on primarily basis in this
discussion.
With these preliminaries, we can now raise the question about divine omni-
science: on the timeless conception of divine eternity, can God know the
truths which we know when we express our knowledge using temporal
indexical sentences?
In Principle Divine Essence Knoweth them Necessarily and Essentially. The
problem is not in Knowing them but in expressing them.
Althouth it appears to be a confusion in the mind of the learned objecton
maker it is hidden delirately.
The difficulty is this: Suppose I say It is now raining. I can know that
that says something true, in part because I am a being in time who can pro-
duce the sentence at one time (when it is raining) and not at an earlier or
later time (when it is not raining). But if God is timeless, he cannot do any-
thing at a time .
Divine Essence and Divine Essential Attributes are beyond all Possible
Dimensions of time but Divine Acts are not Necessary Beyond time. According
to some time itself is a Divine Act. So to claim that Divine Essence if timeless
rather beyond time so Divine Essence cannot do any thing in time is a claim
with out any Proof. How ever to say some thing IS A DIFFERENT CASE AND IT
MUST BE DISCUSSED.
Suppose that an event E0 is occurring at time T0. Suppose that there is a
Created Essence B0. Let the B0 Knoweth at the time T0 that the event E0
is occurring at time T0. Now B0 cans say Event E0 is Occurring Now. But
the Knowledge of B0 is Per Se Contingent. So it is Per Se Contingent that
B0 Knoweth that event E0 is occurring, and it is Per Se Contingent that the
B0 doeth not Know that the Event E0 is not Occurring. This implietht that
the occurrence of E0 is independent of the Knowledge of the Created
Essence. It may know or it may not know. This sheweth that the
occurrence of the event E0 is independent of the knowledge of K0 of B0.So
if the same event E0 is known by Divine Essence by the Eternal Beyond
time Knowledge , the thing E0 in the Non Divine Knowledge is also in
Divine Knowledge. The word now in any sentence is not the part of the
event E0. So as far as the event E0 is concern there is not a single thing
that is known to the Non Divine Essence and Not Known to Divine Essence.
Now let it be seen that the knowledge of B0 say K0 about the event is also
known by Divine Essence. Divine Knowledge not only comprehendeth the
theven occurring but also the knowledge of the Non Divine Essence that
E0 is occurring now. But know is not the part of the event. It is the part of
the knowledge about the event. So it is not known as a part of the event.
So there is nothing that is known to Non Divine Essence but not nown to
Divine Essence. So this alleged argument against Divine Omniscience
faileth and is invalid. So if it is raining in time t0 and Divine Essence is
Beyond time ,Divine Essence can say the very same sentence in the
meaning that the event of raining is in time which may be considered as
present in some respect. Once again it is the problem of once view about
time ,whether he considereth Past as future as non existents or considers
them as existents. Of course Divine Essence doeth not mean that the
event of raing is not in any time what so ever.

In particular, he cannot even have the thought It is raining

Now
As it is stated above :
There is a difference between an event in time and its relation to a Finite
Created Non Eternal Non Absolute Knowledge in tine and relations of the very
same event in time to an Infinite Uncreated Eternal and Absolute Knowledge
that is Beyond [Ma: Vara:] all Times [Azzama:nAl Vaqt]. The former stated
knowledge is Imperfect and latter stated Knowledge is Perfect. If it is raining
then Divine Essence Knoweth the event the Non Divine Essence also knows
this event only the relations and connections are different . So this is just am
illusion of mind that there is some thing/event Not Known By Divine Essence.
Yet there is none. The objection is really based on the weak basis of an other
claim that if Divine Knowledge doeth not have the same type of connections
which the Non Divine Knowledges have then this implieth that Divine Essence
Doeth not Know the event. But this is incorrect. This only means that if
Perfect Knowledge is not imperfect it is not a Omniscience. This is a fallacy.
One must see that:
The formally stated Knowledge [i.e of Non Diivne Essence] is imperfect and
Latter Stated Knowledge [i.e of Divine Essence] is Perfect. So the Created
Essence Knows the event imperfectly and Uncreated Essence Knoweth the
Event Perfectly. The word Now, and other indexicals used by the Non Divine
Essence implies imperfection. Negation of intrinsic Attributes of Imperfections
in case of Non Divine Knowledges is necessary from Perfect Knowledge.
Omniscience doeth not mean that imperfections of Non Divine Knowledge are
associated with Perfect Knowledge. However Perfect Knowledgfe knoweth
imperfections. To to Imperfections is one thing and to be imperfect is another
thing. So this revert to its basic principle [As:l/Us:u:l] that If Perfect
Knowledge is not imperfect then it is not Perfect. This claim is incorrect in
itself. This is If B A is not Not B then then it is Not B. This is a fallacy.

, and hence he cannot think that thought to be true, or know it to be

true.
The problem is multifold. Is thought /Idea a Divine Attribute? It is a
controversial issue. But still there are some question. One of them is that if it
is , even then it must be different from Divine Knowledge. So with out this
thought Divine Knowledge can comprehend the event.
This is a point which needs to be discussed in some detail.
Suppose that there is a Per Se Contingent Created Rational Essence say E1
in/at TIME t0 . Suppose that it is raining at time t0. Suppose that E1 saith It
is raining or more explicitly It is raining Now. A Declarative Assertive /
Declarative Affirmative Sentence. So it meaneth that At time t0 it is raining
and the Speaker/Sentencer of the Sentence of Speech, Its/his/her Knowledge
all are in the time t0.
Now an any Speaker or Sentencer whether it be C1 or another one say C2
which/who is in time t1 such that t0<t1 saith the same event , the Essence
saith It was raining or more explicitly It was raining then or even more
explicitly It was raining at time t0. The event or Occurrence is one and the
same, so it is known by a number of Mutually Distinct Essences yet one and
the same event is expressed by different Sentences.
The word Now is used to express that the Speaker , the Sentence ,
Knowledge of the Speaker and the Event all are in one and the same time say
t0.
Now The very same event of raining is Known to Divine Essence. How ever the
Divine Essence does not Signifieth it by the sentence which includeth the
word Now in the very same meaning. So as for as Divine Knowledge is concern
It knoweth to the very same occurrence yet the sentence is different. So the
sentence if used by the Divine Essence with the word Now must have a Per
Se Necessary Exception for the Divine Essence and the Divine Essential
Attribute Of Knowledge. So any thing which is known by the Essence C1 is
also Known by Divine Essence. The difference is in the type of Knowledge. The
Knowledge of Created Essence is Finite, Created, Relative, Timeal ,and Not
Eternal, and the Knowledge of Divine Essence is Infinite, Uncreated, Absolute,
Beyond Time and Eternal. So the type of Knowledge is different but Knowns
are the same. So the any thing in Non Eternal Knowledge is also in Eternal
Knowledge . Objection would have been valid if some thing in Non Divine
Knowledge be not in Divine Knowledge. But this is not the case.

We may concede for the moment (although I will later challenge this
concession) that he can think, and know to be true, one or more correlates
of that indexical sentence. He can think to himself and know to be true the
non-indexical sentence It is (timelessly) raining on 17 March at 5.15 p.m..
But he cannot know the very thing that I know when I know It is
now
rain-
ing;
This is an old claim in new form. The claim is that Divine Essence cannot know
the events in time. The word thought is some thing other then knowledge.
The question is whether Thought is a Divine Attribute or it is not is an other
issue, but How can it be said that it is Per Se Absurd that the Divine Essence
knoweth the very same thing that Nicholas knoweth when it is raining. The
thing which is the Nicholas Knowledge is not the Knowledge of Divine
Essence but the Known of Divine Essence and Divine Knowledge. Things must
be seen in this perspective. When Nicholas says It is raining at any given
time say t0 and the sentence is true , then Divine Essence also Knoweth that
it is raining at time t0 and that Nicholass is saying that it is raining at time
t0. So which thing skipeth from Divine Knowledge, which is presented as
Divine Essence cannot know.
It may be repeated that Divine Essence doeth know the very same event
exactly at it is , and the Non Divine Essence also Knoweth it. The only
difference is in the type of Knowledge.
As Divine Essence Knoweth the same event which the Non Divine Essence in
Time Knows, so as for the event is concern it is known by both alike. Now the
problem is to express by sentences. Where as a Non Divine Timeal Essence
can express it by saying It is raining Now at 5.15 on March April Divine
Essence can express the very same event by other types of sentences.
Keeping the Event of Raining as Constant and fixed there is no question that
Divine Essence Knoweth Not what that the Non Divine Essence Knows. But
the problem is that the Divine Essence cannot Express with the same
sentence. So a sentence is not an Attribute of Knowledge but of Speech. At
best it is a problem of Omniscpeech and not of Omniscience. It can be
restated as follow: The Divine Essence and the Non Divine Essence both know
one and the same event say the event of raining but the Divine Essence
cannot Express the event by a sentence in which the word Now existeth as
a part of the Sentence if the meaning of the Sentence is true. As the Per Se
Contingency of Speaking a False Statement is accepted by Majority of
Ahlussunnah since they believe that Al Kala:m Al Lafz:i: is Temporal , so this
is no problem. Divine Essence is not an Omnispeaker in regard to Divine
Verbal Speech [Al Cala:m Al Lafz:i:]. So this is a different thing.
for he cannot know the truth which I could express by saying It is
now
5.15 p.m. on 17 March.
The truth is conserved but the same truth is expressed as It is raining at
5.15pm on March 19 of year Z CE.
So the very same truth is expressed as stated above. How ever the word now
implieth the fact of at this or that time. Divine Essence doeth know that
Nicholas uses the stated sentence to express the event. It must be known
that truth and realities are truth and realities even if no sentence is used for
them .So if it is raining at the given time or stated above time and no one
says it in any sentence what so ever , it is still true and real. So change of
sentences does not implieth chabge of truth and realities. These sentences all
signify one and same reality and truth what so ever it may be. If a truth or a
reality cannot be expressed by the sentence which is used by a Sentencer A
or Speaker A by any other Sentencer or Speaker say B, it does mean that it is
the problem of Speech(es) and Sentences but not of Knowledge. So the truth
is known yet the very same Speech if Spoken cannot be used by any other
Sentencer or Speaker.
So there are truths which a timeless being could
not know.
This is just an incorrect claim. One must disagree from respected Nicholas .
The Truth is Known to Divine Essence but it cannot be expressed by these
types of sentences unless and otherwise they become false. The reason is
that the words like Now in these sentences imply that the Knower, the
Knowledge of the Knower, the Event, and the relation of event with the
knowledge all are in time and in one and same time. As Divine Essence is
Eternal and not Sempiternal this type of sentence if spoken by Divine
Existence is false. Although Divine Essence can speak a false statement in
regard to Al Cala:m Al Lafz:i: yet in these meanings the statement is false.
But once again one and the same event is known by the Knower That is
Beyond time With the Knowledge that is Beyond Time, and the Knower that is
in time with the knowledge that is in time.
3] If events have no identity of their own then this means that they violate
law of identity. This may be the reason some did try to deny Law of
Identity or atleast tried to find some Exceptions where the law is not valid.
But Indexicals do obey them. So if there is no unique identity of an
Indexical Event/Thing X then it means that they are purely relative and it
changes its identity relative to different Essences or Knowledges of
different Essences or both. So if an Indexical Event/Thing E is Ea relative
to an Essence A , and Eb relative to the Essence B , then it is not Eb in
relation to A and not Ea in relation to Essence B. So what is the result? Ea
and Eb are just relatively Identical. Now this is the only thing that an
Indexical Thing/Event can be. There is nothing C that is Absolutely
Identical to E. So in this case the following approaches are necessary. The
real Identity of the Event /Thing E is in relation to Divine Essence I or
Divine Knowledge K of Divine Essence. Now every thing is clear that Divine
Essence or Divine Knowledge that is the Divine Essential Attribute of
Divine Knowledge is the Real Identity. However in this case one may say
that Divine Essence Knoweth Indexical X as E and all the Non Divine
Essences knew it as Ei relative to their Selves say Yi , the knowledges of
Eyi say Kis are all imperfect Knowledges. How ever Divine Essence doeth
Know the Knowledge Ki of each and every Non Divine Essence as well.
With is approach indexicals are not a problem at all for the Divine
Absolute Knowledge , whether the Relations are in relation to these
essences, times, spaces or else.

So, no being can be both timeless and omniscient; so, God does
not exist (on the timeless interpretation of his eternity).
This is an incorrect result against Omniscience. To be Beyond Time doeth not
Contradict to be Omniscience. A Beyond Time Existing Divine Essence is
Omniscient Essence With Intrinsic Necessity.To be beyond time is one thing
and to not to know any thing in Time is another thing and there is no
implication like If One is Beyond Time then that Once cannot know things
/events in time. [Cannot meaneth Per Se Absurd I this particular Sentence] .
A parallel argument applies to sentences with spatial indexicals.
An Proofs have been provided above as a definite and certain that this is
incorrect conception .See immediate Above.
The idea that any Essence that is Beyond Time cannot know any Thing
/Event in Time as an Essence that is in Time Knoweth the Thing/Event is
based on False and Fallacious Ideas taken as Preliminaries. Analyzation of
these type of arguments does shew that such arguments are based on the
suppositions taken as bases that Timeal Relations of the Essence and the
Event/Thing in Time are Necessary Conditions in order to Know the
Thing/Event in Time. If these Conditions are not satisfied then then the
Knowledge of the said event /thing is Per Se Absurd. But these Relations
are not the Necessary Conditions of Knowing any thing in Time. So the
Principle upon which such arguments are based taking it as the basis is
basically Wrong and Incorrect. So all those arguments based on this basis
are incorrect and wrong since any thing based on an incorrect basis is
wrong. Similarly it cane be argued in case of space that Spatial Relations
are not Necessary Conditions as assumed in correctly. Those who are
interested to see in written form are humbly requested to write
themselves as an exercise.

We have
(at any one time) one and only one spatial position: we are not everywhere,
and we are not nowhere. It is in relation to the position of the speaker/thinker
(the producer of the token sentence) that terms like here, there, to the
left/right, over there, in front of me, behind me, etc. are to be under-
stood.
The words like here ,there, where, everywhere ,right, left etc. are relatives n
space and are used to state special spatial relations. These are parts of
imperfect knowledges of imperfect Non Divine Essences. Let it be seen what
are the Nicholas Objections in regard to Spatial Terms.
So if I say
This
building is on fire or
Here
is where the fire is, I
can say something true, because I can have a spatial relationship to the fire.
But the meaning of the word here implies that the Speaker and the event
both are in Space or Space-Time Manifold or simply the Word Here implies
that the Speaker, the event and the grammatical Object of the Transitive act
all are in Time and Space, the every same meaning is known by Divine
Essence exactly as it is, yet the choice of sentence whether it be an
Declarative Assertive Sentence or Declarative Negative Sentence cannot be
the same. Since if Divine Essences Uses the same Sentence to Express the
very same Meaning this must imply that Divine Essence is also In Time or In
Space or Both or in Time-Space Manifold. But Divine Essence is Per Se Beyond
and Per Se Transcendent to Time , Space and Time Space Manifold. So Divine
Essence may use a different Sentence. Yet there is nothing which the Created
Rational Essence in Created Time and Created Space Knows which Uncreated
Per Se Beyond Time and Per Se Transcendent Space Divine Essence Knoweth
Not. So it is clear that the word implies some thing say a condition that is not
found in Divine Essence say not satisfied by Divine Essence. So these
implication are some thing extra from the piece of Knowledge of the event
speaking strictly with out addition of any thing else. So these implications are
addition to the meaning . So these Sentences cannot be used to refute the
Divine Omniscience.
If I am to know to be true that here is where the fire is, then I must be located
in the vicinity of the fire.
Once again one may dispute from this claim. This there is no implication
between Knowing a Spatial or Timial thing and to be the Spatial or Timeal
Thing.The claim of Such an Implication is incorrect. If no implication then all
the alleged claims and argumentations/proofs become false and wrong
respectively,which are presented by Nicholas Everitt in this regard.
One must analy
But a being who was non-spatial could not be
located in the vicinity of anything, and hence could not know what I know
when I know that the fire is here.
Once again the Attributes of Speech/Sentence is confused by Attribute of
Knowledge. Such confusions do not contradict Divine Omniscience. The next
thing is that the defective,Imperfect and flawed Created Knowledges are
different from Perfect and Uncreated Knowledge. What are said for some
types of Knowledges are Finite , Flawed, Imperfect, Timed and Ctreated.
Omniscience doeth not mean that it is a Summation of all types of
Knowledges. Rather is may be defined as follwow:
IT IS A KNOWLEDGE.
So this is a very incorrect conception. If there is some thing that is Known by
a Contingent Created Essence in Contingent Created Time , it is Known to
Uncreated Divine Essence Beyond it time. Only thing is that the Knowledgge
of Contingent Essence is Imperfect and the Knowledge of Necessary Essence
is Perfect. So if one supposes a classes of knowns of both Essences it is if
any thing belongeth to the class of knowns of the contingent essence is
belongeth to the class of knowns of Necessary Essence. The only difference is
that there are more known elements . It must be noted that this is
considered as knowing some thing in addition by the learned objection
makers and this is incorrect.
It is assumed by the learned critic of Divine Essence that in order to Known
an Event in Time or Space or Both it is Necessary to be in Time and space or
to be located in some time and in some space. This is a claim which requireth
a Proof. But to infer from the use of the the words like Here ,There, Where,
Left, Right, Front ,Behind, Up, Down etc. is incorrect. As it is discussed above
and may be discussed below since these are just the representations of
Knowledge not the Real Knowledge It Self. Knowledge of Per Se Contingent
Essences are imperfect analogues of Divine Knowledge. For example Divine
Essence Knoweth that there is a Rational Essence E1 in Time T1 and an Event
Occureth in Time T2 such that T1= T2 the very Knowledge is expressed by
the Non Divine Essence E1 as follow:- The Event E1 is Occuring Now .
Similarly if there is a Non Divine Essence in Space S1 and a Body B1 is in
Space B2 such that |S1-S2| >0 , is small [ i.e the distance between S1 and S2
is very small] then E1 can represent Knowledge as follow:=It is Near Me.
But there is really nothing as assumed by the learned critic of Divine
Knowledge that is Not Known to Divine Essence but Known the Non Divine
Essence E1.

Further, a being whose spatial relationship

to the fire was exactly the same as his spatial relationship to everything else
in the universe (because he was equally present everywhere) could not know
any such thing.
This is based upon the very idea that each an every thing/event which is
Indexical has infinite different Attributes/Properties/Qualities and a Essence in
Time or Space Can Know Only and Only One of them.
Once again it is presupposed that If Some One Knows and Event or Thing In
Time or Space or both or in Space Time Manifold and is it Self in some of them
or all of them, then any thing Else if Knoweth it Exactly Alike the former
thing , it must have the very same relations. But this is Just an Axiom of
Nicholasian System of arguments, It is rejected. If rejected then all the
arguments based on it do fail Necessarily.
This is incorrect. Additionally Divine Knowledge is not Unconnected and
Unrelated, rather it is Connected and Related With the Time, Events/Things In
Time, Space and Things In Space.

Again, we can for the moment concede in this context that

God can think, and know to be true, one or more correlates of that indexical
sentence.
The word Can in this case If Implieth Per Se Contingency , then it means that
Divine Attribute of Thinking /Idea is Not Eternal. And this is a Problem, It
cannot not be accepted. If Thinking/Thought/Idea is an Attribute of Divine
Essence then it must be Eternal, so this concept is rejected by theists eeven
prior to atheists in general.
He can think to himself and know to be true the non-indexical sen-
tence It is raining in Norwich. But he cannot know the very thing that
I know when I in Norwich know It is raining here; for he cannot know
the truth which I could express by saying Norwich is here. The problem
thus arises from the fact that Gods relationship to space (being either
everywhere or nowhere) is of the wrong sort to allow him to know to be true
sentences which contain spatial indexicals.
One may refer to Preliminary G . These are discussed there in Essene and in
Substance. It may be noted that the Learned Critic of Divine Knowledge does
assume that in order to know an Indexical that is in Time and Space as Known
by a Non Divine Essence in Time and Space the the Necessary Condition
rather Per Se Necessary Condition is to have the very same timeal and spatial
relations. Other wise the KLnowledge is either diffent or there is no
knowledge of the Event at all. This is an incorrect supposition. Perhaps
provable in the Axiom System of Nicholas Everitts system but either not
provable or disprovable in Theological systems. Respected Critic of Divine
Knowledge Nicholas Everitt considers the Imperfect Relations as Some
Unique type of Knowledge Known to a Unique Non Divine Essence. But this
cannot be accepted. Such a Consideration is proof less and unproved.
So there are truths which a non-
spatial being could not know. So, no being can be both non-spatial and
omniscient; so, God does not exist (on the non-spatial interpretation of his
omnipresence).
Let us turn finally to personal indexicals. I can know certain things about
myself and express them using personal indexicals for example, I now
have a slight ache in my leg, I am thinking of divine omniscience, I am look-
ing forward to dinner, and so on. As before, we can provisionally allow that
God can know the non-indexical correlates of these things I know. He can
know, for example, Everitt has a slight ache or The lecturer in lecture the-
atre 3.02 has a slight ache etc. But since he cannot know that I am Everitt
nor that I am the lecturer in room 3.02, it again turns out that there is a
range of facts which I can know but God cannot.
This is one of the greatest fallacies ever commited even if there is no Divine
Essence at all. Let there be a Non Divine Rational Essence S i.e Suppostum.
Let it hath the Property/ Attribute P [say Pain] which is the Event as well in
this case. Let this Essence Knoweth the the Attribute P. Now this Non Divine
Rational Essence can say I have the Attribute P. Now the same event is
Known to Divine Essence. But Divine Essence Knoweth it as follow: The None
Divine Rational Essence S Hath the Attribute P. But as the Divine Essence is
NOT the Non Divine Essence P, Divine Essence Knoweth that He/It [Divne
Essence] is not the Non Divine Essence S, He/It [Divine Essence]Doeth not
Posses the Attribute P. In case of Everitt Divine Essence Knoweth that He/It is
not Ervitt ,He/It is Not the Lecturer in the Room at time x,at any time t. Divne
Essence doeth not know that He is Everitt Since to know it is not Knowledge
but a Compound Ignorence. Since it is incorrect that Divine Essence is
Nicholas Ervitt. So the thing that is incorrect if known then it is ignorance.
Raither Divine Essence Knoweth He is not the lecturer. How ever Divine
Essence Knoweth that He/It is not the Lecturer in the room, He / Is Not Ervit.
Talking more clearly there are two Only Logical Possibilities. Either Divine
Essence is Ervitt or Divine Essence is not Ervitt. If Divine Essence is Ervitt
then Divine Essence Must Know that He/It is Ervitt. If Divine Essence is not
Ervitt then Divine Essence Must Know that He is Not Ervitt. Now if Divine
Essence is not Ervitt then Divine Essence Knoweth that He Is Not Ervitt. If A is
Not B then Not to Know A is B is not some thing which implieth Negation of
Divine Omniscience. Raither in this case to Know A is B is an Absolute
Complex Ignirence, and Not Knowledge at all.
But let it be suppose that Divine Essence Knoweth it then what is implied? It
is implied that Divine Essence is Everitt . This is Per Se Absurd. It must be
noted that if Divine Essence is Not Everitt [Noun of a Created Rational
Essence] then to Know that Divine Essence is Everitt is not Knowledge, and if
let it be supposed that Divine Essence is Eiveritt then to know that Divine
Essence is Not Everitt is an Ignorence. But it is Logically Absurd for Divine
Essence to be Everitt. And Divine Essence Knoweth that It is Logically Absurd
that He/It is Everitt. It may be seen in the case, let there be no Curcular
Squire, and No Triangular Circle. So If Divine Essence Doeth Not Know that
there is a Circular square and there is no Triangular Circle it is not against
Omniscience but it is the Omniscience rather direct implication of
Omniscience. Since Divine Essence Knoweth that there is No Circular Squire,
and there is no Triangular Circle. What is the point. It is the same question
as follow: If Divine Essence doeth not Know that Not A is A and A is Not A then
He/It is ignorant. Or if Divine Essence doeth not know the greatest real
number then He/It is Ignorent.
If Divine Essence Doeth not Know that I am Everitt, then this means Divine
Essence Doeth Know that Iam Not Everitt. How ever Divine Essence Doeth
Know that it is INCORRECT that He/ It is Everitt. So this is the incorrect
concept never taken by a Theist .
As with the problem about spatial indexicals, this problem about per-
sonal indexicals arises whatever conception of divine eternity one accepts.
So whereas the theist could solve the problem about temporal indexicals by
moving to the duration conception of Gods eternity; or solve the problem
about spatial indexicals by saying that God occupies some regions of space
but not others, she is bound to be left with the problem about personal
indexicals.
It may be noted that the original vlief is that Divine Essence is Per Se Beyond
and Per Se Transcendent to Time and Space.
An objection to the argument from indexicals
The argument as I have presented it so far has presupposed that someone
who knows the truth of an indexical knows something different from what is
known by someone who knows the truth of one or more of its non-indexical
correlates.
If it is assumed that An Indexical Thing/Event is one whose knowledge varies from
one Essence of Knower to an other Essence of Knower only then it can be said that
what one Essence Knoweth about it no Essence that is distinct from it knoweth. This
implieth that Knowledge of each and every knowing Essence differ from one an
other. So in order to have one and the same knowledge about it the Essences must
also be one and the same. But this means that there are infinite Attributes or
Qualities such that only one of them is Per Se Contingent to be Known by One
Essence . This is the only concept of Indexical which is the Basic Principle of the
Concept that Divine Essence cannot be Omniscient. But this is not correct. So any
thing that is based on it taking it as a Basis is incorrect and biased. The problem is
that each one of the Knowing Essence have a different relation with one and the
same thing. So there Knowledges do not differ in the meaning that one Knoweth
some thing the other Knoweth it not. They only differ in the meaning that they are
two different Knowledges cooresponding to two different Knowing Essences. Yet the
known one is one and the same. Now the problem is that the denouncers of Divine
Omniscience have incorrectly assumed that to know a thing means to know with a
certain relation.So as the Divine Essence doeth not have Relations like the Imperfect
Knowers ,It cannot Know it. Coming back to the position the Knowledge on a Non
Divine Essence is not ascribable to Divine Essence yet the Known is Uniques , one
and the same. Only Divine Relations of Divine Knowledge differ. So one and the
same thing is known by two different Types of Knowledges. This is What the Belief of
Omniscience is. In symbolic style If A is Known to B by Knowledge K then A is
Known to/by AE [Infinitely more perfectly] by the Knowledge AK [Absolute
Knowledge]. It is not that the very same Attribute of Knowledge is Ascribed to AE
[AbsoluteEssence].The Relations of Imperfect Knowledge to the Event/Thing and the
Relations of Perfect Knowledge are different and in this they strictly differ. But it
must be known that denouncers of Omniscience have committed a great error when
they say that What is Known by A can be known by AA unless and other wise AA is
A, AND a IS AA. This is just to say that Divine Knowledge cannot be Perfect
Omniscience unless it is Imperfect or Summation or Integral of all Imperfect
Knowledges. Once again there is a problem of misconception. Any how if this is the
definition of Omniscience then it is not correct, and Theologians have defined
Omniscience. Once again if the Knowledge of a thing changes from Essence to
Essence , Knowledge of one Essence to Knowledge of an other Essence that is
Distinct from it, this means that change in knowledge is due to change in relations ,
not that there is no unique Knowledge of this thing or event .So this means
Knowledge of the thing according to some is the Thing Known With the Relation of
Knowledge. Only then it can be said that Knowledge changes or alters from Essence
to Essence. But this is not the meaning of Knowledge in which Divine Essence is
ascribed by the words Knowledge, Absolute Knowledge, Omniscience, Al Ilm Al
Kulli etc. Actually these relations are Events, Occurrences and Acts other than the
Event stated above. But it must be noted that Divine Essence also Knoweth all these
Knowledges of these Essences as well. So there is really nothing that is not Known.

To put it more tersely, we have presupposed that an indexical and

its correlates do not say the same thing.
If an Indexical Event has two or more Correlates then this imply that there
exist Different Correlations one for each correlate. This Correlation is a
Relation as in the response and reply.
That is why above I cautiously said
that the correlates say
very roughly
the same as the indexicals, the implication
being that they do not in fact say the same thing. Suppose the theist chal-
lenges this assumption.
First of all let it be not challenged and let it be accepted for Sake of an
Argument.But even in this case the Divine Knowledge cannot be negated.
Let it be suppose that certan events are relative. They have no identity of
there own. For example the event say is A1 with relative to Essence B1,
A2 relative to A2 ,A3 relative to B3, A4 relative to B4 and so one. Let they
be all Non Divine Essence. Let it be A relative to Divine Essence B.Now it
must be seen that Divine Essence Doeth Know:1] is A1 relative to B1, A2
relative to B2 and so on. Also it is A relative to B. As it is not A2 relative to
B1, etc. Divine Essence Knoweth that it is not B2,B3,B4, etc relative to B1
etc. Never the less Divine Essence Knoweth that WHETHER it is Logically
Contingent to be B2 or B3 etc. in relation of B1 or it is Logically Absurd to
be B2 or B3 etc. relative to B1 or it is Logically Necessary.2] It may be the
case that the Event may not be A1 relative to A1, A2relative to Essence
B2, but it is A1 in relation to the Knowledge K1 of B1, SIMILARLY it is Ai in
relation to the Knowledge Ki of the Essence Bi, where Ki is the Knowledge
of ith Essence Bi , and K is the Knowledge of Divine Essence. In this case
the same can be said for and its relation to K the Knowledge of Divine
Essence. In this case the event is certainly Not Unique. It can only be
explained in relation to the Knowledge of an Essence or relative to the
Essence. But the case is this that Divine Essence Knoweth that it Ai in
Relation to Bi , and It is A in relation to B [ the Divine Essence]. Now if
these relations are supposed to be ceased. In this case there are only two
Logically Contingent Alternatives. 1] It Ceaseth to be and becomes Non
Existent.2] It becometh some thing C. In the first case Divine Essence
Knowth even Non Existences and Non Existents [Adma:t and
Madu:ma:t].If it becometh C, then either it was Not C when it Hath the
relations with different Essences or it was C when it hath relations stated
above. If it did was C then It was never a Relative Event . Raither it was
some thing C all the times. If it was not C and did not have any unique
identity then it is clear that during Non Existence of each and every
Relation it mutated from Relative to Non Relative thing. Any how in this
case as it did not have have unique Identity but only relative identities,
Divine Essence Knoweth each one of its relative identity in relation of
respective Essences or Knowledges of respective Essences or both. So if
Indexicals are of this type even then they are Known. In an other sentence
if is not Aj in relation to whether is Bi or B, j=/=I, then Divine Essence
Knoweth that it is not Aj relative to . But if Divine Essence Knoweth Ai is
relatively not Aj it cannot be expressed Divine Essence knowth not that Ai
is Aj relative to Bi or Ki of Bi. Perhaps this is the extreme case and
idexicals cannot be more relative then this mentioned supposed example.
But even this doeth not Disprove Divine Absolute Knowledge.

The challenge can go like this: we need to distinguish between what is

known on the one hand, and the vehicle of knowledge or how the know-
ledge is expressed on the other. This is a distinction which is familiar to us
from translation between languages. If I say Today is Monday and you say
Aujourdhui est lundi, then although we have used different sentences or
different vehicles of knowledge, what we have said using those different sen-
tences is the same. It would be a mistake to say that
mere
difference of
sentence necessarily implied difference of what is said/known.
The objection Nicholas can made to challenge this challenge is that Indexicals
are of not this nature. Nicholas can at best say that if an event is Non
Indexical then this argument can be accepted. Yet if an event is indexical
then this answer ceaseth to be correct. This is the only answer which may be
given . But in this case it may be responced that there is nothing indexical in
reration to Divine Knowledge. If to suppose a thing indexical implieth that
Divine Knowledge is Not Omniscience then An Indexical is not indexical to
Divine Knowledge. Since in becomethas follw: Either Indexical or Omniscience.
If omniscience then no Indexical atleast in relation to Divine Knowledge. So
indexicals whal become relative. In regard to Non Perfect Knowledge they are
Indexicals but in regard to Divine Knowledge they are not. How many times
Nicholas has suggested change in definitions of Omnipotence or Omniscience
but he did not suggest any change in the definition of Indexicals. Any how an
Indexical is not Absolute but relative. So actual identity of indexical is in
regard to Absolute Knowledge.
As stated above in Britanic Bold[ black colour Not B] page 21 , this is a
misconception. Since if an Indexical is assumed then its Knowledge is
assumed to be changed from Essence to Essence. It is not assumed that the
meaning /knowledge is constant and conserved yet words in the sentences
may be changed from one language to an other language , or change of words
in sentences of one and same language. So the response may be seen as
stated above.
Similarly if
I know in 2003 that John F. Kennedy was killed 40 years ago, and what God
knows is that Kennedy is (timelessly) killed in 1963, then (according to this
line of reply) we know the same thing even though we express our knowledge in different sentences.
Now instead of discussing in general and abstract way the Learned Critic of
Divine Omniscience attempts to provide some Examples.

After all, it might be said, what makes my belief

true is the very same historical events, or very same set of historical facts as
makes Gods belief true.
That is a problematic dogma. Since Divine Essence Knoweth Itself by Itself BY
Divine Absolute Knowledge, and It Doeth not Depend upon Historical Events.
A similar story (the theist might continue) goes for
spatial and personal indexicals. If I know that the man facing me has a gun,
and God knows something like The man facing Everitt has (timelessly) a
gun, then there is just one set of people and one set of facts about them that
make my belief and Gods belief true.
The Man has a Gun in Time not Timelessly a Gun , however the knowledge
that the reated Essence has a Gun facing a target say Everitt is Beyond Time.
These are two different thing fused and confused with one each other which is
a fallacy.
So there are no good grounds for
saying that my knowledge and Gods differ in content, and no reason to say
that I know something which God cannot.
This is a correct response to , since the indexical sentences differ from non
indexical sentences not in the meaning that the event changes from Knower
to Knower as claimed by Learned Nicholas Everitt , but it the sentences
change from knower to knower that is sentence to sentence [One who maket
a sentence].
Unfortunately for the theist, however, this second line of reply fails. Index-
ical sentences do not have the same content as non-indexicals, and knowing
that an indexical sentence is true is not the same as knowing that its non-
indexical pair is true.
It may be seen that this concept of Indexical Sentences is incorrect. Indexial
sentence if defined as such must not be correct.
Suppose that A Rational Essence S1 is Pointinga t an other Rational Essence
S2 by some ting say G, then this is the event. Suppose that this event is kept
constant and fixted. Now S1 may express the event as follow:=
The Rational Essence is Pointing at me by G. Divine Essence can say the very
same Event that Rational Essence S1 is Pointing at Rational Essencew S2 by
the thing G. This is just the difference and variation of sentences, not in the
knowledge, Knowledge is one and same fixed and constant. So one must not
accept this very claim that indexical sentences implieth change in meanings
and knowledge,rather it implieth change in sentences in expressing one and
the same event. Additionally Divine Essnce doeth Know

each and every sentence of difference Rational Essence. The scholar has
suggested a number of time change in the definitions of Omniscience. But he
is unwilling to change the meaning of indexicals? Why ? One may challenge it
as well. Indexical and Non Indexical may differ in some respects but the
events are the same in each case. The difference is that sentence expressing
one and same event in case of Indexicals may change from Speaker to
Speaker, Sentencer to Sentencer, but not in the case of Non Indexicals. But
every thing stops here perpetually once for all times. Last not the least if the
alleged definition of indexical contradicteth the Divine Absolute Knowledge
then instead of changing the definition of Divine Knowledge one may redefine
Indexicals and Non Indexicals. This is an equal right.
Once again it must be reminded that if A is Not B then Omniscience Implieth
that Divine Knowledge must Necessary be A is Not B and Not That A IS B, AND
If A is Not B then Not to Know A is B is not some thing that is against Divine
Omniscient Knowledge.
So Stating an Indexical Sentence only meaneth that an event is stated with
some conditions and Knowing an event meaneth to know the very Event, and
Knowing an Indexical Sentence spoken by an Essence in Time is another
thing. These things are not one and the same. So any argument based on
considering them as one and the same is incorrect.

To establish these claims, we can note in the first place

that an indexical and any of its correlates fail to display the most basic
requirement which must be met if two sentences are to say the same thing:
there is no mutual entailment between them.
An entailment is not necessary in the meaning taken by the learned Anti
Divine Objection Maker. This requirement is of Non Indexical Sentences. But if
these requirements or Necessary and Sufficient Condition is not fulfilled then
it does mean that One and Same event cannot be sentenced by different
speakers and sentencers. It doeth not mean that the event itself is relative
and it is different with respect to different knowers . Consider an example from
Mathematics. Let P be a Distinct point in XY-Plain Let X1Y1, X2Y2,X3Y3,X4Y4,,XnYn be
n Cooarditale systems. Let its coordinates are (x1,y1),(x2,y2),(x3,y3),(x4,y,4),..(xn,yn)
corresponding to each Coordinate system. Now the point P is One and the same yet the
coordinates do change from Coordinate System to Coordinate System. Now if there is no
Absolute Coordinate System then it is incorrect to assume that Not to Know an Absolute
Coordinate system is some thing which negates the Absolute Knowledge. On the Contrary
if there is an Absolute Coordinate System then An Absolute Coordinate System is in the
Divine Omnipotence. In this case each and every Point is known by the Absolute Coordinate
System . How ever each and every point is also known by Non Absolute Coordinates
Systems as well.
The sane is the case with the indexical events. Each one of them is Unique and Definite, yet
its sentences changes from Knower to Knower. It is not the Knowledge that changes from
Knower to Knower but the sentence about the event change from Speaker to Speaker.
However this is a rough analogue but the truth is the same. The knowledge of the Point
doeth not change but the coordinates changes.

Take the two sentences:

This is an example and let it be discussed in detail.
(A) Kennedy was killed 40 years ago.
This is a imperfect form of saying since this means that JFK was Assassinated
40 years before from the time X say 1963 in Gregorian System . So this is an
incomplete sentence , if incomplete then imperfect,
(B) Kennedy is (timelessly) killed in 1963.
JFK was not killed timelessly in 1963 CE but in Time, yet the Knowledge
of Divine Essence about this event is Beyond Time . The distinction
between the two is Obvious.
(B) is true every time it is said. But (A) was not true at any time in the past
until 2003, and it will not be true at any time in the future after the end of
2003. Someone who knows that (B) is true cannot thereby deduce that (A) is
true;
Deduction is not necessary from B to know A.
It is not necessary that if two events are known one of them is deduced from the
other. It is not necessary that if there are two approaches to a single event then
one of the two is deduce-able / deductable from the other. Also if a single event
has two approaches one Non Indexical , and the other one Indexical , then it is
not necessary that one is deduced from the other. As these things are not
necessary , their respective knowledges are also not deduced-able /deductable.
Let it be seen in some what abstract way.
Suppose that an Event occurred in the time (1,1,1).
Suppose that in the time (2,2,2). The event occurred
(,, )
time before it. Now this time is only true for (2,2,2). It is not true for any time
(3,3,3). The actual event is Known by Divine Essence. The difference
between the two times(1,1,1) and (2,2,2). is known by Divine Essence.
Divine Essence doeth Know that the Event occurred (,, ) unit of time
before (2,2,2).
Now (,, )
If Knowledge of Event occurring in (1,1,1) is not deductable from the knowledge
that this event occurred (,, ) before (2,2, 2) then this does not mean that
it is not known. If a thing is known it is not necessarily
deduceable/deductable. They may be independent from deductions.
Similarly the Knowledge the Event occurred (,,) before (2,2,2) is not
deductable from the knowledge that the event occurred in the year (1,1,1)
then this does not mean that it is not known. If a thing is known it is not
necessarily deduceable/deductable. They may be independent from
deductions. It must be known that as there is a mathematical equation the
knowledge is deductable and deduceable.
Note it is assumed that time has Three Dimensions and Space has also three
Dimensions in this answer, since the arguments can be safely used for Three
Dimensional Space , if Three Dimensional Time is assumed by stating that the
similarly the same can be saind for three Dimensional Space. If one
Dimensional Time is needed one my put the the last two values of 3-tupple as
zero as it is a especial case of three dimensional time in this meaning.

and someone who knows that (A) is true cannot thereby deduce that (B)
is true.
There is an objection since the Mathematical Equation it self a proof of
deduction. Since from any arbitrary time (i,i, i) the difference is (i,i,
i). But id it is accepted thenThis only shews that A and B are not mutually
deducible. But they are known.
What makes (A) true is not quite the same as what makes (B) true.
But this does not imply that they are not known.
For (A) refers to its own time of utterance as well as to what happened in
2003, whereas (B) does not. So there are times when (B) says something true
and (A) does not. So someone who knows only (B) is ignorant of something
which is known by someone who knows (A); and someone who knows only
(A) is ignorant of something which is known by someone who knows (B).
Of course (B) can be deduced from (A), and (A) from (B) if the knower
can know
(C) The current year is 2003.
Divine Knowledge is not a Deductive Knowledge. Although Divine Essences
doeth Know deductions , and Aprroximations as Knowns yet It is neither
Deductive not Approximate. To Know some thing is one thing and to be some
thing is another thing, to know some thing is one thing and to be ascribed
wjth some thing is an other thing. Things are not deducted in divine
knowledge to know. So Nocholas is analogueing Imperfect knowledges and
Perfect Knowledge which is invalid if there is no Divine Knowledge.
But this is of no comfort to the theist. For (C) is itself an indexical sentence;
and how a timeless God could know (C) raises the same problems as how he
could know (A).
It must be noted that the questionof How is incorrect, Since Divine ESSENCE
doeth not require a How. It is discussed that Indexicals can not be used to
deny Divine Knowledge. If it is correct that it is Per Se Absurd to Know an
Indexical then ANY THING THAT IMPLIETH Non Existence of Absolute
Omniscience is it self Per Se Absurd. This implieth that they are really not
Indexicals but Pesudo Indexicals .
But one may not need to go so far.
It is not just in their entailments that (A) and (B) differ. They also differ in
their inductive relations.
Differences are one thing and Knowledge of differences are another thing.
This is the point which is voluntarily or unvoluntarity missed several times.
From (A) I could plausibly infer inductively
(D) No one who is now under 38 will remember the Kennedy assassination.
But I cannot infer (D) from (B). And if someone is trying to work out how
long ago Kennedy was assassinated, she might reason to herself that (A) is
probably true, on the ground that

(E) I am now 46, and Kennedy was killed between my 5th and 8th birth-
days.
But (E) by itself would not be good inductive evidence for (B).
Nor is it just in their deductive and inductive relations that indexicals and
their correlates differ. They differ also in their explanatory power.
Deduction is one thing and Knowledge is an other thing. For Exampe there are
a set of Axioms such that any two of them are mutually independent and none
can be derives /proved from the others. That is each one of them is absolutely
independent. Then they can prove a number of theorems. Now it is possible
that A Rational Essence Knows each one of the Axiom and each one of the
theorem independent of deduction/proof of the theorems. So to know a
theorem directly is one thing and to know by deduction/proof ia another thing
and to know the proof is a thing other then these two things. So if an Essence
knoweth a Theorem Directly and the Knowledge is not deductive and proofic
even then THE Essence may know the Deductions and proofs directly.
Suppose
we ask why Lee Harvey Oswald pulled the trigger as and when he did. We
get the beginnings of an explanation if we attribute to him a cluster of
beliefs, including the following:
(F)
That
man is the President.
(G) If and only if I pull the trigger
now
, will I hit
that
man.
It would not be enough to attribute to Oswald such beliefs as:
(H) The man seated on the left in the back of the third car is (timelessly) the
President.
(I) If and only if I fire at 11.32, do I hit (timelessly) the President.
For suppose that Oswald does not also believe that now is 11.32. Then the
fact that he believes (I) will not help to explain why he fires at 11.32. Indeed
it will make it puzzling that he fires at 11.32, since he must have thought
that he was firing at a time when he had no idea whether he would hit the
President. Or suppose that he believes (H), but does not believe that
that
man (at whom he is pointing) is seated on the left in the back of the third
car. Then (H) would not help to explain why Oswald shot
that
man, for he
cannot think that
that
man (at whom he is aiming) is the President.
This is the imperfection of Finite Knowledge. Actual and Factual rather Real
Event may be known by two types of Knowledge 1] Imperfect 2] Perfect/ The
Properties of Imperfect Knowledge are not found in Perfect Knowledge. But the
Learned Scholar is trying to deny Perfect Omniscience on the basis that it is
beyond the imperfection and attributes of imperfections. A very strange thing but
equally incorrect. So this may be seen in detail and discussed more accurately.
The moral is that if we are to explain peoples actions in part by reference
to their beliefs, these beliefs will have to contain some indexicals, otherwise
we will not be able to explain why they perform those actions at that time
rather than earlier or later, or in that place rather than somewhere else.
First of all there is a difference between Knowledge and Belief.
Belief is not an Attribute Of Divine Essence unless and
otherwise it is defined and its definition is strictly analyzed. But
for the time being let it be true as according to some definition
for an Essence in Time and Space. A belief may be true and may
be false. So it is not knowledge which can not be false, since a
false knowledge is not Knowledge but Ignorance and
Nescience.So it is Per Se Contingent that an Essence may have
some imperfect knowledge and based on this inperfect
knowledge he may have some immediate believed. But these
believes are not Knowledges . These are believes. To confuse
both of them is a fallacy. Now these believes may involve some
indexicals. This is not a problem. Indexicals are not such things
which Divine Essence cannot Know or it is Per Se Absurd for
the Divine Essence to Know It. SEE ABOVE.
Now the question is about the explanation of their acts at a given
time. It is a separate issue based on the indexical approach of a
Rational Essence. Not only Human Essences can do amy things
but Animal Essences can do many Voluntary Act. Only there
Will is less perfect the will of Human Essences. To deny that
Animals do not Have Will is as incorrect as to deny that they do
not have sight or hearing. So the same problem is for them. But
what sort of belief can be scribed to them? Coming back to the
original position there is a large quantity of Discussion about
human Will as well. It it free or it is not is an ancient Problem .
as a solution of the problem if Divine Omniscience implieth that
No Created Essence has a free will then there is nothing to
accept it. So all the problems of Assassination of Present JFK
can be responded on the basis to Not Free Will if Free Will
implies Non Omniscience of Divine Essence. So the question is
whether a free will contradicts Divine Omniscience or it does
not or it impieth Limitations to Divine Knowledge of Divine
Essence. If indexicals in the Contingent belief of the
Contingent Essence implies Limitations in the Knowledge of
Divine Essence then Contingent Essence cannot have a free will.
But as the Indexicals are not such thing thaty are Not Known to
Divine Essence as discussed above and may be discussed
below , the arguments become invalid in principle. How ever a
particular refutation may be liked to be seen by the readers and
this may be done latter.
short, then, we can say that indexical sentences and their non-indexical cor-
relates differ in three crucial respects:
Divine Essence Doeth Know the differences clearly , immediately and directly,
a point to be noted since Divine Essence is Omniscient, whether Divine
Essence really exist or not that is not the question at this place, the question
is if there is a Divine Essence then whether It knowth these difference or not ,
and the answer is in affirmation and assertion .

in their deductive relations, in their

inductive relations, and in their explanatory power. Because of these differ-
ences, an indexical sentence and its non-indexical correlate will play very
different roles in a persons overall view of the world,
It must be noted that to know a thing whether it is a small thing or a great
thing or it is over all or not is one thing and a view is an other thing. A view
may be incorrect and approximately correct. Divne Essence knoweth the
event accurately and the views of the Created Essences as well. But these
views are not not accurate knolwledges but approximate knowledges . These
are also events and Divine Essene doeth Know them as well. As for the
problem of deduction one may further see the problem more minutely.
and hence the objec-
tion which tries to claim that the sentences are different expressions of a
single truth, rather than the expression of different truths, must be rejected.

This objection may be Studied in Detail Since

there are some problems in these lines of
attempted arguments which must be pointed out
and the basic fallacy behind all this may be
refuted or denied.
Indexicals of a Contingent Event that is in Contingent Time and in
Contingent Space if known by a Contingent Essence may have relations with
the Knowing Contingent Essence, and the said Essence may have the
Knowledge of these relations that are themselves in Tine and Space. But the
Divine Essence Doeth Not and Cannot Have these sorts of relations with the
Event. These imperfect relations imply imperfect Knowledge. So the view of
Created Rational Essences may Differ/ Vary from Rational Essence to Rational
Essence. But these imperfect views are directly and indispensably implied by
the Imperfect Relations STATED ABOVE. So the Knowledges of Contingent
Essences are Imperfect in themselves. Now the Perfect Knowledge of an Event
cannot be an imperfect Knowledge. Now either the View of the Imperfect
Essence is just the Imperfect Knowledge or it is some thing generated by
Imperfect Knowledge and Contingent Created Belief. In the first canse the
negation of imperfectness directly imply the negation of such views. If views
are some thing which are generated by Imperfect Knowledge and Imperfect
Belief then Divine Knowledge doeth not fulfil this condition. Since it is
Absolutely Perfect. Also belief is not an Attribute of Divine Essence, and if it
is then the imperfect Views are not generated in this case.
So the learned scholar committed a fallacy that he confused negation of
imperfect Knowledge as the negation of either the Perfect Knowledge or
negation od Very Knowledge it self.

The upshot of this line of objection to divine omniscience, then, is this:

indexicals necessarily have a different content from even their closest corre-
lates. So someone who knows the truth of an indexical sentence knows
something different from what is known by someone who knows only the
correlates. So someone who knows only the correlates is ignorant of what is
known by someone who knows the indexicals.
This means as stated repeatedly that Either the Event E is Purely Relative to
the Contingent Knowledges or its Knowledge is Purely relative to the
Contingent Essences Knowing it, In the first case if it is supposed that No
Knowing Essence Existeth then it is implied that the Event ceaseth and never
Occurred. In the second case it is implied that if other Essences do not exist
this Event also Not Exist. In this case One may say Essence E1 KNOWETH it as
K1 and Essence E2 Knoweth it as K2 and so on but the question is if Divine
Essence E Knoweth it Divine Knowledge AK is neither K1 nor K1. So What Do
E1,E2 Know , Divine Essence E Doeth Not Know. But Omniscience is not to
ascribe the Attributes of Per Se Contingent Created Knowledges of Non
Divine Essences to Divine Essence. But Divine Essence Knoweth K1 the
Knowledge of E1 , K2 the Knowledge of E2 and so on. This is Omniscience, and
it is not as assumed by the Learned Critics of Divine Omniscience.

If events have no identity of their own then this means that they violate
law of identity. This may be the reason some did try to deny Law of
Identity or atleast tried to find some Exceptions where the law is not valid.
But Indexicals do obey them. So if there is no unique identity of an
Indexical Event/Thing X then it means that they are purely relative and it
changes its identity relative to different Essences or Knowledges of
different Essences or both. So if an Indexical Event/Thing E is Ea relative
to an Essence A , and Eb relative to the Essence B , then it is not Eb in
relation to A and not Ea in relation to Essence B. So what is the result? Ea
and Eb are just relatively Identical. Now this is the only thing that an
Indexical Thing/Event can be. There is nothing C that is Absolutely
Identical to E. So in this case the following approaches are necessary. The
real Identity of the Event /Thing E is in relation to Divine Essence I or
Divine Knowledge K of Divine Essence. Now every thing is clear that Divine
Essence or Divine Knowledge that is the Divine Essential Attribute of
Divine Knowledge is the Real Identity. However in this case one may say
that Divine Essence Knoweth Indexical X as E and all the Non Divine
Essences knew it as Ei relative to their Selves say Yi , the knowledges of
Eyi say Kis are all imperfect Knowledges. How ever Divine Essence doeth
Know the Knowledge Ki of each and every Non Divine Essence as well.
With is approach indexicals are not a problem at all for the Divine
Absolute Knowledge. Indexicals are incorrectly explained by the
Denouncers of Divine Omniscience. It is a better way to explain that an
Event is Indexical if sentences regarding to it vary from sentencer to
sentencer , speaker to speaker. But Divine Essence doeth Know the
knowledges of Imperfect Knowers. So there is no thing which can be said
not to be known. Once again it is o fuse and confuse the Indexical
Knowledge of an Event and the Event as one and equating imperfect
knowledges and the Perfect Knowledge. It is just to identify Imperfect as
Perfect or consider Negation of Imperfection as Negation of Perfection.

Let it be Supposed that There is an Event such that its Knowledge varies
Necessarily from Knowing Essence to Knowing Essence. Let its Knowledge
be K1 with respect to Essence E1, K2 with respect to Essence E2 and so
on. Let it be Logically Absurd for E1 to have the Knowledge K2, for E2 to
have the Knowledge K1 etc. Let Divine Essence E Its Knowledge K. As
according to the Assumption IF Divine Essence is E1 then Divine Essence
Necessary Hath the Knowledge K1. Let it be supposed that it is Logically
Absurd for E to be E1. So the result is that it is Logically Absurd for Divine
Essence to Have the Kniowledge K1. This Logically Imply that it is Logically
Absurd for Divine Essence to Know K1 SINCE IT IS Logically Absurd for
Divine Essence to be Ascribed by the Attribute of Knowledge K1. But it
must be noted Divine Essence Knoweth each and every Per Se Absurd,
each and every Per Se Contingent. So Divine Essence Per Se Necessarily
Knoweth that What would have His Knowledge if The UnCreated Beyond
Time Divine Essence Was a Created Non Divine Essence E1 in Time.
Similarly the Knowledge about the Essence E2 and the alleged Indexible
Event etc. So If Divine Essence E Knoweth Not What E1 Knows, Divine
Essence Knoweth what would have been his Knowledge if It was E1 . So
this is an exact substitute of Divine Knowledge and Divine Essence is
Omniscience in this very meaning. So Divine Essence Knoweth What If
Correctly and Rightly.So there is nothing that is not known to Divine
Essence. Since If it is accepted that If Divine Essence Doeth Not Know
what a Created Essence Knoweth an allegedly Indexical Event , Divine
Essence Knoweth correctly and rightly what It Would Have Known if It
Were thatVery Essence i.e Identical to that Non Divine Essence , in regard
to the said Event. This is Necessary and Sufficient for Omniscience rather
Logically Necessary and Logically Sufficient for some meaning of
Omniscience and supposing that there is an Essence that is an Existent in
this meaning of Omniscience , what is the argument that such an Essence
Existeth Not.

Divine Essence Knoweth what would Its Knowledge would have been If
Logical Absirds were Logical Contingents and Logical Contingents were
Logical Absurds,Logical Necessaries were Logical Absurds and Logical
Absurds were Logical Necessaries , Logical Contingencies were Logical
Necessaries and Logical Necessaries were Logical Contingencies. It is
Clear that In such cases Divine Essence. So it is Not Per Se Absurd for
Divine Essence to Know Indexicals, Since at best it may be said that it is
Per Se Absurd to know Indexicals but Divine Essence Knoweth even Per Se
Absurds, So It Knoweth What if It/He Knoweth them in the case they are
Per Se Absurd to be Known.

. What this shows is that the

concept of omniscience (by Definition 1) is self-contradictory: there could
not be an omniscient being.
It has been discussed that the basic flaw is in the interpretation of Indexicals.
One may not agree with the Learned Scholar that an Event/Thing is such that
it is not unique and its Knowledge varies or differs from Knower to Knower.
Also it is not necessary to be in Time (Space) to Know an event in Time
(Space).

He would have to exist at all places, in order to

know all truths of the form.

Here
is . . ., and yet also
not
exist in all places,
since then no place would be here for him. In relation to time, he would
have to exist at every time.
It is stated that Divine Omniscience DOES NOT REQUIRE to fulfill these
conditions as alleged . But according to Some Divine Knowledge is in every
Space and Divine Essence is Beyond All Spaces. What does this means. It may
mean that Divine Knowledge is Per Se Associted With Divine Essence yet it is
Connected to each and every Per Se Contingent Space and each and every
Spatial Thing that Exist in each and every Space. With this connections Divine
Essence Not Only Knoweth each and every Alleged Indexical and Hath the
Perfect Knowledge if each one of them. So Knowledge of each one of them is
correct. The only Problem is that the Knowledge of Indexical varies from
Essence to Essence if the Allegation i.e Alleged Claim is assumed to be
correct. But in this case Divine Essence Doeth Know each and every
Contingent Knowledge of each and every Contingent Essence. So this is
Omniscience.
So This objection on Absolute Knowledge is not correct as discussed above
and may be discussed bellow as well.
An other approach is as follow: There are two types of Divine Knowledges, 1]
That is in every Space . B] That is Associted With Divine Essence. Both of
them are mutually connected . So the objection may become weak. Please
consider them.
The same can be said in regard to Time as Well.
An extension of the argument from indexicals
As a final postscript to this line of criticism of classical theism, I want to
raise one much more destructive criticism. The criticism which I have raised
so far of divine omniscience has presupposed a distinction between indexical
and non-indexical sentences, and allowed that God could know the truth of
the non-indexical correlates of indexical sentences. It has denied only that
he could know the indexical sentences themselves. The final criticism to con-
sider is whether he could know the truth even of what we have been calling
the non-indexical correlates. The reason for thinking that he could not is
that
what we have been calling the non-indexical correlates themselves arecovertly indexical.
This is the belief that Pure Non Indexicals are Per Se Absurd. And this is
where the Learned Author wants to take his readers.
He thinks that every thing is indexical and there is not a single thing that is
not indexical. If so then according to the Learned Author it is Logically
Absurd for any thing to be Non Indexical. This is unacceptable concept. If the
learned Critic has this right then an equal and opposite right is to deney
Indexicals and to claim that that
what the learned author has been calling the indexical correlates themselves are
covertly Non- indexical.
This is an equal and opposite response and is correct if analysed. The actual
arguments of the claim that Divine Essence cannot Know Indexicals are
extracted in Preliminary I.AND these are what stated by the Critics of
Divine Omniscience Implicitly and Allusionary.

Let us see how this is so with temporal sentences first of all. Consider again
(H) Everitt lectures (timelessly) on Monday.
Flaw: Ereritt does not lecture timelessly on Monday but in time on Monday.
What understanding can a timeless being have of the word Monday?
What is the basic idea of the meaning of Monday. If there is any then it is
known to Divine Essene. To claim that the Idea of Monday can only be known
to Non Divine Essences that are In Time is as incorrect as it seems to be .
Suppose that there is no Idea behind the concept of Monday then what is the
idea of very Monday. Nothing. So the argument fais. But if there is then it is
Known to Divine Essnce. The fallacy the learned auther is coming is that the
learned Author of the objection is presenting an interrogative phrase and
wants a reply from from Theists . The question is whether there an idea or
understanding of the words LIKE Sunday or Monday orTuesday or Wednesday
or Thursday or Friday or Saturday,. If there are understandings about these
words then they are Known to Non Divine Essences they are Known to Divine
Essence, there is No Per Se Necessary Condition to be in Time in order to
Know these Understanding. Now it may be descended from the original
position to accept the view that there is no Unique understanding of a Noun
of a Day say Monday and the Understanding differ from Rational Essence to
Rational Essence or Rational Suppositum to Rational Suppositum then what
is the result. Divine Essnce Must have a different Understanding of it. But the
Contingent Understandings of each one of Contingent Essence stated above
are Attributes of Contingent Essences and not the parts of the Event alleged
to be Indexical in the sense accepted by the Learned Critic. So they are
separate evens that is each understanding is a different event and Divine
Essence Knoweth them.
Sup-
pose he knows a number of truths about it , for example, that it comes
between Sunday and Tuesday, that it is for many people the first day of work
after a short break, etc. Will that enable him to know which day is being
referred to as Monday? It is true that if he knows which day is Sunday or
Tuesday, and has a grasp of temporal indexicals such as tomorrow and yes-
terday, he can pin down the reference of Monday on any occasion of its
use. But then the same problem could be raised in connection with his grasp
of Sunday and Tuesday. It seems that our grasp of each member of this set
of weekday terms presupposes a grasp of some indexicals. The same is true of
other temporal terms, such as the names of the months and the years.
This is in Principle an old Argument suited in new style that An Existent that
is Beyond Time cannot Know Time Since Monday or Tuesday are nothing but
some units of Time. The question is it is Per Se Absurd for an Existent that is
Beyond Time to Know Time or it is Not. If it is Not then What is the Proof. The
answer is there is none. At best it can be chosen as an Independent Axiom in
Some Anti Omniscience Axiom System, but if so it can be rejected and
discarded from Pro-Omniscience Axiom System, If Divine Essence Knoweth
Time Divine Essence Knoweth Units of Time like days and their Proper Nouns
etc. So it is required to clarify whether it is an Axiom or a Theorem. If Axiom
them why to insist that it may be accepted and added in the other Axiom
Systems. If a theorem then it may be provable in Some Axiom System. So the
Proof is required so that it is studied how it is proved and what are the parts
of the Proof. Does it include and disputed Axiom in the in the Axiom System in
which it is proved. Before presenting complete knowledge of every thing it is
incorrect and such a claim is just a claim. An other thing is what is the correct
Knowledge/Understanding of Monday that Divine Essence Doeth not /Cannot
Know. Suppose that there is no unique understanding of the term and the
meaning of the term changes from Rational Essence to Rational Essence in
Time. So what does this means?? This only means that there are Indefinite
/Infinte many meanings under a single term Monday. Different Users of the
word Monday use it in a different Meaning. If it is so then it may be said that
if a Rational Essence Uses it in one meaning an other Rational Essence cannot
use in in the very same meaning, the latter stated Essence is compelled to
use it in another meaning. But this only means that there are many meanings
included under a single term say Monday. But there is no Problem that Divine
Essence Knoweth each and every one of these meaning, yet if the Divine
Essence useth in a number of meanings the sentences in which it is used must
become False. So this is not a Problem of Omniscience but the problem of
Attributes of Speech(es) and Sentences. The problem is that the Learned
Objection Makers on the Divine Omniscience have not stated what they really
want to say. It is evident that they want to say that eitherin Indexical Event is
not Abolutely Unique and is Purely relative and varies from Knowing Essence
to Knowing Essence or it is Unique but its Knowledge is not Unique and it
Varies from Knowing Essence to Knowing Essence ot Both. It is responded
that analyzation of this argument yields that they have Confused relations
with with events suggesting such conditions which if not satisfied ,implies not
knowing of it in some regard. But this is an incorrect formation and it has
been discussed above that such Ideas are incorrect and wrong. One may
consider the concept of time in some detail. Suppose that each Unit Time is in
perfect likeness to the Other Unit of Time. Yet it is Logically Contingent to
assign a different Noun to each one of the Unit Times. Similarly it is Logically
Contingent to Assign a Finite Number of Nouns in a periodic or cyclic manner.
For example 1 to n are the nouns which are assigned to each unit time from
the very beginning of time.Suppose that Timelessness is Timelessly Prior to
the First of All (Created)Times. Let assign Noun 2 to the second (Created) Unit
Time; and so on , to n th time the noun n is assigned.But for (n+1)th time the
noun 1 is once again assigned and so on. This is what that is done in the
Nouns of days of a week, froms Sunday to Sturday.
[]
It must be noted that the human beings have no special sense to distinguish
Friday from Saturday and Thursday, and Sunday from Saturday and Monday.
But this is all based upon calculations. Although Divine Essence Knoweth all
calculations but Divine Knowledge is Per Se Direct and is Not Derived from
Calculations. Similarly Divine Knowledge is Certain and Not Probable ,Yet
Divine Knowledge Knoweth all Probabilities. So assigning of Nouns to Equal or
Unequal or both types of periods of time is Logically Contingent Yet Divine
Essence /Diovine Knowledge Knoweth all all Per Se Contingent Nouns,whether
assigned or not, and also those that are assigned by Divine Essence Itself. As
there is nothing which prevents A Beyond Time Essence/Knowledge to Know
the Time , Parts of Time and Units of Time Per Se Directly.
[ Note that sentences like Divine Essence Knoweth and Divine Knowledge
Knoweth etc. are used in one and the same meaning.]
`
Do similar considerations apply to our grasp of proper names? That may
seem to depend on whether we think of proper names as purely referential
or as abbreviated descriptions. If they are purely referential, then there will
be a hidden indexical element in them. There will be some baptismal occa-
sion when the speakers of the language agree to call
this
or
that
object the
Grand Canyon or the Eiffel Tower or the River Thames. For personal
names, the idea of a baptism may be a good deal more literal. I name
this
ship
Fairy Mist
says the celebrity; I baptise
this
child John Doe says the
minister. If the referential theory of names is correct, it is in virtue of these
indexically imbued occasions that the words have the reference that they
subsequently do.
Whether Referential Theory of Nouns is correct or incorrect one may but this discussion aside since it is
beyond the scope of the discussion yet the thing is that Indexicals are Not Unknowable to Divine Essence , and
claim of Everitt is unacceptable. The alleged proofs provided by Nicholas are highly questionable,
objectionable and debateable.
Consequently, a being who is unable to know any indexi-
cally expressed truths will not be able to know which object is the Grand
Canyon, or the Eiffel Tower, the
Fairy Mist
, or John Doe.

However, when we touched on the issue of names in Chapter 1, we opted

for the abbreviated description view. So could a timeless God understand
the descriptions for which a proper name is an abbreviation? One immedi-
ate problem for many proper names is that other proper names appear in
the description which the original proper name abbreviates. The Grand
Canyon is a canyon in the
USA
through which the
Colorado River
runs; the
Eiffel Tower is a metallic structure in
Paris
; John Doe is the son of
James
and
Mary Doe
; and so on. Let us assume, however, that for every proper
name, N, we can supply a set of descriptions in purely general terms which
do not themselves use any other proper names, and which serve to pin down
the meaning of N.
The question now to raise is whether a timeless God
could ever understand the meaning of any of these general terms.
Neither these general terms implieth that Onw That Knoweth them is Not
Beyond Time, Nor the Beyondness from Time of an Essence Implieth that the
Essence is not the Knower if these stated above terms.Any thing which is
argued by the learned critic of Divine Knowledge from the controversial use of
indexicals is discussed above and may be found below. See them their.

Could he
understand the meaning of terms like river, canyon, metal and son?
The Answer is that Divine Essence doeth Necessarily Know. The problem is
with the wrong and incorrect approach to the Concept and Definition of
Indexicals,
We can agree for the sake of argument that the timeless being might know
for each general term how it relates semantically to every other general
term. Thus he might know that river is semantically connected to flowing
and water, that flowing is connected to movement, and water to
colourless and liquid, and so on. He might know, as we could put it
loosely, the content of a dictionary. But if he knew
nothing
of the form
That
is a river or
That
is some water or
That
is a so-and-so, surely he would
not know the meaning of the general terms?
For comparison, consider the situation of a standard speaker of English
who is a non-speaker of Japanese and who is given a Japanese dictionary
which allows her to match each Japanese word (which presents itself to her
only as a set of distinctive squiggles) with another set of Japanese words
(which she knows only as a further set of distinctive squiggles). Even if she
can match every Japanese word with another Japanese word or phrase or
sets of phrases which define the original word, it seems clear that this person
has not so far learnt Japanese. To count as having learned Japanese, she
must have some grasp of how at least some of the squiggles
relate to the
world
; and that requires her to have some means of identifying this or that
piece of reality. It requires her to know the truth of sentences of the form
When the world is like
this
,
this
squiggle applies.
This is a wrong analogy of Divine Knowledge . Divine Knowledge is not like
Non Divine Knowledges so that dictionaries and Lexicons may be used as
examples. This is certainly and incorrect example.
If this line of thought is correct,
These lines of argument are not correct.
it shows that a timeless existence would
rule out knowledge not just of indexically expressed truths, but of truths in
general, because a grasp of indexicals is essential to a grasp of the general
terms by means of which non-indexical thoughts are expressed. Far from
being omniscient, a timeless being would be hugely ignorant.
Every thing is discussed above that Divine Knowledge knoweth every thing
directly and essentially. The interpretations of Indexicals such that they are
not Known to Divine Essence is incorrect and wrong. It is not so that
indexicals do not exist but this approach of indexicals that negateth Divine
Knowledge is not correct and is incorrect.
2
Even if God
exists in time, and so will escape the original objection above to his know-
ledge of temporal indexical sentences, a parallel argument to the one above
will show that he cannot know the truth of spatial or personal indexical sen-
tences.
It must be noted at this point that such claims are based on the supposition
That Divine Existence cannot Know time or Things in Time or both. As this is
an incorrect assumption based on incorrect approaches to indexicals all
things based on this basis are incorrect. [Bana:Al Ba:t:il Alal Ba:t:il].
Point to be noted that Nicholas said every thing but did not refer to any definition of time or space or both so
that one may see which definition of time or space implieth that to know an event in it the Essence of the
Knower must also be in it other wise it is Per Se Absurd to Know any thing in it.

Given the argument that our grasp of a wide range of general terms
requires a grasp of indexicals, it will follow that even a God in time will be
unable to know a wide range of truths.
It is not followed since the claim that it is followed is based on very wrong
concept of indexicals.

No matter what other features a

OMNISCIENCE
298
being has, he cannot be omniscient. So if omniscience is a defining feature of
God, it will follow that God does not exist.

Divine Essence does not Exist in Time. Since Time is just a Creation Of Divine
Essence and The Essence of the Creator Doeth Not Exist in any Created Thing
whether ithe Created This is an Attribute or an Essence . So a proper response
is due upon those who believe Divine Essence in Time. Le them answer it in
their own way.
Even if the theist rejects this extension of the argument from indexicals to
cover all general terms as well, she will still be left with serious problems
over divine omniscience.
Let it be seen what is the problem presented by the Learned Author.
For even if she can establish that God could know
that someone answering your description exists, he could not know that
you
exist.
If Divine Essence Knoweth every thing Divine Essence Knoweth each and
every Existing and Non Existing Essence. So the words like You, Thou [Anta]
does not make any problem as assumed by the Learned Objection Maker .
Also if it is excepted that Indexicals are not known to Divine Essence in their
own type , they are known through the types of Non Indexicals. Other wise it
is implied that there are infinite indexicals prior to each and every indexical
and this makes they entire knowledge as a Logically absurd Attribute.
He could not know that you are the person who answers that descrip-
tion. In that sense, he could not have any knowledge of or thoughts about
any individuals, as distinct from types of individuals. And if he cannot have
any thoughts about individuals, it will follow that he cannot care about any
individuals. If he does not even know that you exist, it is not logically possi-
ble for him to care about what happens to you.
It is merely a repetition so one is requested to see above if he/she may need
to review the above discussions, so instead of repeating the answers it is
most humbly advised to see above once again.
A revised definition of omniscience
At this point, the theist might wonder whether the problems with her posi-
tion stem from an over-hasty acceptance of a flawed account of omniscience.
Is there some alternative to Definition 1? One possibility that at once sug-
gests itself is:
Definition 2
X is omniscient = For every true proposition p, if it is logi-
cally possible for X to know that p (i.e. Xs knowing p is consistent with
Xs defining properties), then X knows that p.
Once again Nicholas is trying to motivate Theists to change the Diefinition.
But to change the Definition of Absolute Knowledge is not so easy. How ever
one must say that Ervitt has once again missed some points in regard to
Divine Omniscience. Let they be seen one by one. 1) Divine Omniscience
meaneth that All Per Se Absurds, Per Se Contingents, and Logical Necessaries
are known of Divine Essence and Divine Knowledge regardless of their
Existences or Non Existences.2) All Existences are Known to Divine Essence
and Divine Knowledge regardless of their Per Se Necessity or Per Se
Absurdity or Per Se Contingency.3) All Events which are Logically Contingent
to occur and Shall occur are Known bu Divine Essence and Divine
Omniscience. 4) Divine Essence Knoweth All the Per Se CONTINGENT
DIMENSIONS of time. 5) Divine Essence Knoweth Time and Events in no time
( since time is it self an event and is in no time otherwise there are infinite
numbe of times are implied and it is implied that each time is IN an other
time).
6) Divine Omnisciene does not mean that Divine Essence is Attributed to all
kinds of Knowledges whether they be Eternal or Not Eternal, Timeal or not
Timeal, Spatial or Not Spatial. Temporal or Not Temporal , Created or Not
Created ETC. Omniscience does not mean this thing.6) To know an event in
time is one thing and to know an even as it is known by Imperfect Knowledge
is an other thing. The indexical as stated by Nicholas are the imperfection of
Created Knowledges, and Divine Knowledge is Uncreated and Perfect. So
every thing reduces to the Claim that If Divine Knowledge is not Imperfect
and Created then infinite number of things are not known to Divine Essence
by Divine Essential Attribute of Knowledge. This is a very dangerous Fallacy
based upon a fallacious misconception. Technically it is the fallacy of WRONG
BASED UPON THE BASIS OF WRONG OR IN OTHER SENTENCE A IS THE
BASIS OF B AND B IS BASED UPON A AND BOTH WRONG. BANA: AL BAT:IL
ALAL BA:T:IL.
So it is better to define Nescient first and then to define Knower and then
Omniscient, Tha is a logical way.
A Nescient is an Essence to Which every thing is Logically Absurd to Know,
A Knower is an Essence to Which a Number [in the meaning one or more then
one] of things are Not Logically Absurd to Know and the Essence Doeth Know
all those that are not Logically Absurd to Know. An Omniscient is an Essence
to Which Infinite Number of thing are Not Logically Asurd to Know and The
Essence Knoweth all that are Not Logically Absurd.
In some other formations , If X is a thing and E is an Essence and E is not a
Nescient then E is Omniscient. I ma be noted that there are several issues
with this definition yet it is clear that the objection is answered as presented
by the learned scholar. How ever it constitute a separate case that some new
objections are proposed. But as one is dealing to a definition problem, if the
Logic cannot define a concept this means there is a flaw in the definition
system not in the concept. One may ask the Learned Scholar that suppose
there is an Omniscient Existent then how can It be defined? If not then under
this supposition Omniscient is beyond the Definition System of the Logic.
Suppose that there is not Omniscient Existent then how can a deniar say
there is No Omniscient Existent. In either case there is a problem in the
definition system it is it unable to present a definition of a concept. But really
it is the flaw in the definition and not in the system. Since one may define as
follow:
If X is Logically Not Absurd for an Essence E to be Known By It and there are
infinite many Logical Things that are Not Logically Absurd for the Essence to
be known by the Essence , and the Essence knoweth each and every logicl
thing that is not logically absurd for it to know then it is OMNISCIENT.
It is hopes that the problem is not as problematic as it seemed to be initially.
Acceptin the Definition may argue that in this case thre are two types of
Omniscient Essences. 1] Nescent Omniscient.2] Non Nescent Omniscient.
In this case Divine Essence is not Nescient Omniscient but Non- Nescient
Omniscient. , irrespective if its Existence or Non Existence. In this case
there is Only One Omniscient and that is Non Nescient Omniscient.
Monotheistic Religions discard the Concept of Created Divine Essence the
can also discard the concept of Nescient Omniscient Essence as Well. But
it may sound to may as a contradicting term. Additionally some other
Definitions are given which may be considered for sake of argument if not
for sake of belief.

Let E be an Essence such that it knoweth each and every thing that is Not
Per Se Absurd to be Known by E then E is Omniscient. It may need a
Modification. Let E be an Essence such that it knoweth each and every
thing that is Not Per Se Absurd to be Known By E and there are infinite
may such things that are not Per Se Absurd to be Known by E then E is
Omniscient.

If E be an Essence such that it knoweth each and every thing that is Not
Per Se Absurd to be Known By E and there are infinite may such things
that are not Per Se Absurd to be Known by E then E is Omniscient. The
problem of If is that it some time includes Null Sets and this is the point
picked by the Objection Makers who so every they may be, so in this case
one have to exclude null sets.

If there are some things which it is logically impossible for God to know, in
virtue of the fact that by definition he is,
There is none as discussed above.
for example, non-temporal, or
lacks a spatial position, then by Definition 2, the fact that he does not know
them would not show that he was not omniscient.
It appears that Learned Scholar is trying to propose new and new definitions
of Omniscience and is then trying to shew that Divine Essence doeth not Exist
since there can be no Existent which can satisfy these definitions. This is
incorrect. He would have consulted several Theological Logicians before
making these definitions.
Equally, if it is logically
impossible for anyone to know in advance what the free choices of a human
agent will be, then the fact that God does not know what such choices are
would not show that he is not omnipotent.
Once again the problem is that is there any thing that is Logically Absurd for
Divine Essence to Know by Divine Omniscience? The examples are irrelevant
and their alleged relevancy is based upon the basis of fallacy and
misconception.
At first sight, this might seem to be an attractive compromise position
for the theist. But it is clear that this definition will be subject to the same
undermining line of argument that we applied to a similar definition of
omnipotence. Suppose a nescient being is one who by definition knows
nothing. It will then be logically impossible for a nescient being to know
anything. Yet a nescient being will count as omniscient by Definition 2:
Once again the objection is incorrect, Nescent contradicteth Knowledgeful
general, and Omniscient in Particular. Also if it is acceped even then it is not
Logically Absurd of any Per Se Contingent to Know . Even it is Not Logically
Absurd Upon Non Living Per Se Contingent Essences to Know , So this is an
Objection which is Absolutely Wrong and Infinitely Incorrect.
A response to this objection is two fold at least. First it is better to modify
this definition as follow:
If A KNOWETH Necessarily all that, that is not Per Se Absurd for A to Know then A is
Omniscient and Knowledge of A is Omniscience.

This definition does not include that an Nescient Individual. Any definition which
cannot differentiate between Nescient and Omniscient is Incorrect and Wrong.
One need to know that Omniscient is a special case of Scient and contradicts
Nescient [Absolute Ignorent]. So any definition of Science [Knowledge] and Scient
[Knower] which must be the general to include Omniscience and Omniscient. So
any definition which does not differentiate between Omniscient and Nescient
must be incorrect. It needs some modification to correct it. The same is true for
Omnipotence. The Nescient Problem is discussed prior to this part of the
argument see page 27 of this article , and it is advised to be seen once again if
required.

if it
is logically possible for the nescient being to know that p, then he knows
that p but for every proposition p, it can never be logically possible for the
being to know that p.
This may be Per Se Absurd for Finite Knowledge. But this cannot be said for
Infinite Knowledge. For Example P is known , and That P is Known and That
That P is known etc, thisPer Se Implieth that the Knowledge of the Knower is
Infinite and Absolute. In other sentence the Knowledge of the Knower is
Omniscience.The objection would have been correct if the Knowledge of That
P Implieth that There is no Knowledge of P. This is not the case. For further
detai see page 27.
 Definition 2 therefore has absurd consequences, and is
to be rejected.
It is required to shew what is the actual problem. The true definition of
Knowledge and Knower is first required and Omniscience and Omniscient
[Absolute Knowledge and Absolute Knower] must be different and exclude
Nescient and Nescience. It is discussed above see it there.
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Conclusion
It thus becomes clear that the theist faces a number of serious problems in
defending the existence of an omniscient God.
Let it be seen what are those alleged serious problems.
If Gods eternity is construed
atemporally, he will be ignorant of a wide range of truths.
This is a claim that if Divine Knowledge is Beyond Time, Eternal and then
Divine Essence cannot know all the things , Truths and Realities. So one must
be what are the alleged proofs of thses claims. It may be said that Atemporal
means two things. A] Unconnected to time and things in time. B] To be beyond
Time yet conneted with time and things in time. Divine Knowledge if it is
atemporal it is in the second meaning.
He will certainly
not know any temporally indexical truths.
This is once again based upon the basis of Misconception which is discussed
above in some detail. See above.
If his omnipresence is either his
being non-spatial, or his existing everywhere in space, again he will be
unable to know spatially indexical truths.
It is not necessary to be a Spatial Existent to know the Spatial Truths just as it
is not necessary to know Timeal Truths to be in time as discussed above.How
ever Omnipresence [H:d:u:r Va N-z:u:r] is interpreted in different ways and we
take it Non Spatial Omnipresence which is Knowledge and Observation. The
objection makers are begging the argument/question in this case. It is not
necessary to be in time or space to know an event in time or space or both,
and the indexical sentence which expresses he very event is an other event. A
proposition about an event is an other event. Both are not the same. A is B is
the Event. Ten the Sentence of Proposition A is B is some thing different and
it is an other event.
It is also at least arguable that if his eternity and omnipresence are interpreted in these ways, he will not be

able to know a very wide range of general truths either.

Yes it is also at least arguable that if his eternity and omnipresence are
interpreted in these ways, he will be able to know a very each and every
general truth .

Since he will not

be able to have knowledge of us as individuals, neither will he be able to
have any concern or care for any of us as individuals.
This is discussed above, please see it there . This is mere repitation of the
claims which are discussed above.

As in the case of the

other divine attributes which we have looked at, the theist can respond by
seeking to limit the scope of omniscient in effect to say that someone can
be omniscient, even if there are truths of which they are ignorant.
The author of Reconstruction Of Thought Have used this Approach in the third
lecture of this book, yet the objection to this approach by Nicholas is correct.
But the
sceptic is likely to feel that this is a case of moving the goalposts, and that a
more honest response would be to say God cannot be omniscient after all,
and he cannot know nearly as much as we initially thought that he could.
The objection although correct is based on the principle that Meaning of
terms cannot be changed. But this is the point whether one need to dispute .
How ever one must Explicitly state that he is using this term in this
meaning/definition and not in that meanining/definition. If he is not informing
it this is objectionable.
Further reading
There is a large literature focusing on the relation between divine omni-
science and future human free action. Mavrodes in Quinn and Taliaferro
(1997) provides a brief but good overview of the problem about future free
actions, and the problem about indexicals. In relation to the first, a good
starting point is Pike (1965), which argues that given some assumptions,
divine foreknowledge of future free actions is impossible. Other important
contributions to that debate are Plantinga (1986b), Swinburne (1986) and
Hasker (1989). The argument pursued in the text about indexicals was first
defended in Perry (1979), but has since been criticised by, among others,
Millikan (1990), Abbruzzese (1997) and Jacquette (1999). Abbruzzese also
replies to the Grim argument from set theory described in the text, full
details of which are at Plantinga and Grim (1993).
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