Vitarich Corporation

vs.
Chona Locsin

FACTS:
Respondent Chona Losin (Losin) was in the fastfood and catering services business
named Glamours Chicken House, with address at Parang Road, Cotabato City. Since 1993,
Vitarich, particularly its Davao Branch, had been her supplier of poultry meat. In 1995,
however, her account was transferred to the newly opened Vitarich branch in General Santos
City.
In the months of July to November 1996, Losins orders of dressed chicken and other
meat products allegedly amounted to P921,083.10. During this said period, Losins poultry
meat needs for her business were serviced by Rodrigo Directo (Directo) and Allan Rosa
(Rosa), both salesmen and authorized collectors of Vitarich, and Arnold Baybay (Baybay), a
supervisor of said corporation. Unfortunately, it was also during the same period that her
account started to experience problems because of the fact that Directo delivered stocks to
her even without prior booking which is the customary process of doing business with her.
On August 24, 1996, Directos services were terminated by Vitarich without Losins
knowledge. He left without turning over some supporting invoices covering the orders of
Losin. Rosa and Baybay, on the other hand, resigned on November 30, 1996 and December
30, 1996, respectively. Just like Directo, they did not also turn over pertinent invoices
covering Losins account.
On February 12, 1997, demand letters were sent to Losin covering her alleged unpaid
account amounting to P921,083.10. Because of said demands, she checked her records and
discovered that she had an overpayment to Vitarich in the amount of P500,000.00. She
relayed this fact to Vitarich and further informed the latter that checks were issued and the
same were collected by Directo.
It appears that Losin had issued three (3) checks amounting to P288,463.30 which
were dishonored either for reasons - Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF) or Stop
Payment.
On March 2, 1998, Vitarich filed a complaint for Sum of Money against Losin, Directo,
Rosa, and Baybay before the RTC.
On August 9, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Vitarich rendered in
favor of plaintiff, ordering defendant Chona Losin to pay plaintiff the following:
1. P297,462.50 representing the three checks which had been stopped payment with
interest at 12% per annum from the date of this Decision until the whole amount is fully
paid;
2. P101,450.20 representing the unpaid sales (Exhibits L and M) with interest at 12%
from date of this Decision until the whole amount is fully paid;
3. P20,000.00 in concept of attorneys fees; and
4. The cost of suit.
As to the complaint against defendant Allan Rosa and Arnold Baybay, the same is
dismissed. The complaint against Rodrigo Directo still remains and is hereby ordered
archived until he could be served with summons.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent was being violated her right by overpayment to the
Vitarich?

RULING:
No. Records bear out that the Court already resolved to deny with finality the Motion
for Reconsideration of Losin challenging the Court's Decision dated November 15, 2010. The
instant Urgent Manifestation with a Dire Request to Take a Very Close Look on the Fact That
RCBC Check No. CX046324 Dated August 27, 1996 in the Amount of P93,888.80 Was Already
Paid Way Back on August 29, 1996 appears to be a second motion for reconsideration
although not denominated as such by Losin. Thus, it is essentially a prohibited pleading. It
has been settled that only for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after an express
leave has been first obtained may a second motion for reconsideration be entertained. The
Court finds no reason to depart from the general rule.
The Court already ruled that Losin was liable to pay petitioner Vitarich Corporation
the amount of P93,888.80, as indicated in RCBC Check No. CX046324 dated August 27,
1996, as part of her total liability which had been stopped payment by Losin.
The attached bank statement marked as Exh. "BB" and referred to by Losin bearing
the amount of P93,888.80 does not clearly prove payment of the said amount. In fact, the
entry in the said bank statement with this amount has not been specifically sub-marked at
all. If indeed the questioned amount was already paid by Losin, it could be threshed out in
the court of origin in connection with the execution of the final judgment.

ROCKVILLE EXCEL INTERNATIONAL EXIM CORPORATION,

PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES OLIGARIO CULLA AND BERNARDITA
MIRANDA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

FACTS:

The spouses Culla are the registered owners of a parcel of land.They mortgaged this
property to PS Bank to secure a loan of P1,400,000.00. To prevent the foreclosure,
HUSBAND approached ROCKVILLE for financial assistance. Rockville extended him
total loan amount of P2,000,000.00. When HUSBAND failed to pay the loan after
repeated demands and promises to pay, he agreed to pay their indebtedness by selling
to ROCKVILLE another property the spouses owned. The parties agreed to fix the
purchase price at P3,500,000.00 since a survey revealed that the property is worth
more than the P2,000,000.00 loan.
ROCKVILLE and HUSBAND executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property with
an agreement that the former would pay the additional P1,500,000.00 after WIFE affixes
her signature to the Deed of Absolute Sale since the land is a conjugal property.
ROCKVILLE filed a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages when WIFE
continued to refuse to sign, insisting that the transaction was an absolute sale by way
of dacion en pago.

ISSUE:

Whether the transaction entered by the parties is therefore an absolute sale or an

equitable mortgage.

RULING:

The transaction between the parties was in reality an equitable mortgage, not an
absolute sale. First, the SPOUSES retained possession of the property. Second,
ROCKVILLE kept a part of the purchase price. Third, ROCKVILLE continued to give the
SPOUSES extensions on the period to repay their loan even after the parties allegedly
agreed to a dacion en pago. Fourth, unequivocal testimonies of H & W that the purpose
of the Deed of Absolute Sale was merely to guarantee their loan.

In determining the nature of a contract, courts are not bound by the title or name given
by the parties. The decisive factor in evaluating an agreement is the intention of the
parties, as shown, not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but, by their
conduct, words, actions and deeds prior to, during and immediately afterexecuting the
agreement. After all an equitable mortgage has been defined as one which although
lacking in some formality, or form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute,
nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a
debt, there being no impossibility nor anything contrary to law in this intent.