1.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS PIO MARCOS

FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed by Secretary of Justice Jose Vicente Abad Santos
against Judge Pio Marcos of the CFI of Baguio and Benguet for issuing a search warrant against
Rogelio Roxas for the violation of Illegal Possession of Firearms Law and Central Bank
Regulations. This warrant arose when the Chief of Police of Baguio, Col. Victorino Calano
received a report from Romeo Amansec that the missing golden buddha was in the possession of
Rogelio Roxas in his home at Ledesma St., Baguio City. Based on his affidavit, Amansec said
that he saw the golden buddha in the home of Roxas, who was putting it up for sale to the price
of P100,000. The Applicant for the warrant, Col. Calano arrived in the house of the Judge at 10
PM and the warrant was issued at 11:45 PM.
The following violations were noted by the Secretary of Justice: 1.) That the judge did not
carefully examine under oath the applicant and his witness; 2.) That the search warrant was
issued for more than one offense; 3.) That the items to be taken were not properly described; 4.)
That there was delay in the return of the property taken to the court.
ISSUE: Was the search warrant properly issued?
DECISION: There were infirmities and defects in the issuance but the search warrant is
effective. On the first issue, the Clerk of Court (Witness for the Complainant) testified that Judge
Marcos propounded questions on the applicant and his witnesses evidencing that he examined
them under oath although he had not accepted the written disposition of the other witness, Sgt.
De Vera. This is because of the lack of time and the urgency of the matter. On the second issue,
there was a probable cause to issue the warrant although there were defects in that two offenses
were being charged (contrary to the rule that no warrant shall be issue for more than one specific
offense) and that the Central Bank Regulation was not specified. On the third issue, the items to
be taken have been substantially described because by the nature of the items to be taken, no
more further description can be made. The description should be enough to enable the searching
officer to identify the items to be taken and that no other property would have been taken.
Although not specifically described, the taking of the brass bars, sabres and scabbards were
justified in that they appeared to be gold to the searching officers. On the fourth issue, the delay
could not be imputed to the fault of the judge because it was Col. Calano who held the golden
buddha which was ordered to be delivered in 48 hours to the court.
The administrative complaint is dismissed because although there were infirmities, it was not
shown that the judge had bias, wrongful motive or prejudice for the applicant of the search
warrant.

2. CASTRO v PABALAN, 70 SCRA 477

FACTS: Ernesto I. Lumang admitted that "he has been informed" and was of the belief that
Maria Castro and Co Ling, being at Barrio Padasil, Bangar, La Union, "have in possession
narcotics and other contraband." There is a claim that he had verified the report and that he had
"reasons to believe that a Search Warrant should be issued to enable the undersigned to take
possession" of such narcotics and other contraband.
Lumang informed Sergeant Francisco. The application for Search Warrant was
accompanied by the joint affidavit of a Sergeant Francisco C. Molina and a Corporal Lorenzo G.
Apilado of the Philippine Constabulary. Again, mention was merely made of their information
about narcotics and other contraband being kept by Castro and Co Ling. They allege that they
conducted rigid surveillance, but all they could come out with is that petitioner Co Ling is an
overstaying alien for almost ten years conducting such traffic and that after verification, he was
not registered in the Immigration Office.
Then, on the very same day, the search warrant was issued for illegal traffic of narcotics
and contraband. Again, there was reference to the possession by Castro and Co Ling of such
forbidden goods. As to the complete and detailed description of the properties to be seized, the
search warrant merely mentioned illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband inside the
warehouse and premises of petitioners.
According to the Judge, he examined and asked Sgt. Lumang although not in writing and
not recorded. He reasoned that the inquiry was brief because Sgt. had with a long service behind.
The barrio to be searched was handwritten in ink, Maria Cristina cancelling the typewritten name
Padasil. But this correction was not done in the duplicates. Anyhow Padasil and Maria Cristina
are adjoining barrios. After the routine taking of their oath and examination questions and
answers, the Presiding Judge of this Branch signed the application for search warrant, the joint
affidavits, and forthwith issued the search warrant."
ISSUE: W/N a search warrant issued without complying with the requisites of the Constitution
and the Rules of Court should have been nullified
HELD: Respondent Judge conducted the required "examination under oath" be justified merely
because respondent Lumang was "a Sergeant of the PC, with a long service behind [him]." He
did not even bother to take the depositions of the witnesses in writing, attaching them to the
record. There was thus a manifest and palpable violation of the constitutional standard as to the
quantum of proof to show the existence of probable cause.
The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular
description of "the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." As admitted by
the judge in the challenged resolution, there was a mistake concerning the residence of
petitioners, which was set forth in the search warrant as being in Barrio Padasil when in fact it is
in Barrio Maria Cristina.
Another infirmity was the failure to comply with the basic procedural requisite that a
search warrant "shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense."
Reference was made to "an illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband." The latter is a generic
term covering all goods exported from or imported into the country contrary to applicable
statutes. More than one offense could arise from the activity designated as illegal traffic of
narcotics and contraband. As a matter of fact, in the challenged order, reference was made to at
least three charges having been filed, the violation of Section 203 of the Internal Revenue Code,
its Section 1039 on tax evasion, as well as illegal possession of opium.
It is the established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the illegality of the search warrant
does not call for the return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited by law. The
issuance of the search warrant in question the judge did not comply with the requirements of
section 98 of General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return of the opium
and its paraphernalia which were found and seized under said warrant, and much less are they
entitled to be exonerated because of such omission of the judge.
 The SC held that the search warrant in question is tainted by illegality for being violative
both of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. Likewise notwithstanding the illegality of such
search warrant, the challenged order of respondent Judge can be sustained only insofar as it
would limit the return of the articles seized to the liquor, the pack of playing cards, the bottle of
distilled water and five bottles of Streptomycin taken under such search warrant.
3. ASIAN SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., vs. HON. JOSE HERRERA

FACTS: Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge Jose Herrera
of the City Cyourt of Manila, and to command respondents to return immediately the documents,
papers, receipts and records alleged to have been illegally seized thereunder by agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) led by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.
On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI
agent Celso Zoleta, Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a
search warrant in connection with an undocketed criminal case for estafa, falsification, insurance
fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian Surety and Insurance Co., a corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office at Room 200 Republic
Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila.
Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division of the
NBI entered the premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and served the search warrant
upon Atty. Alidio of the insurance company, in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president and
chairman of the board of directors of the insurance firm. After the search they seized and carried
away two (2) carloads of documents, papers and receipts.

ISSUE:Whether or not the search warrant is void.

HELD:In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses
of : (1) estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the
explicit command of Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no search warrant shall
issue for more than one specific offense."
Petition is granted; the search warrant of October 27, 1965, is nullified and set aside, and
the respondents are hereby ordered to return immediately all documents, papers and other objects
seized or taken thereunder..

4. COLLECTOR vs. HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court,
7th Judicial District stationed at Pasig, Rizal, et.al.

The case involves separate cases with one common issue: whether a Circuit Criminal Court
possesses the power to conduct preliminary investigations which is significant to determine
whether items may be returned or not.

Case 1:
The Collector of Customs, Salvador T. Mascardo filed against Cesar T. Makapugay, a case for
violation of (a) The Central Bank Act, claiming that Cesar T. Makapugay "with malicious
intention to defraud the government, brought into the country FORTY (40) cartons of "untaxed
blue seal" Salem cigarettes and FIVE (5) bottles of Johnny Walker Scotch Whiskey, also
"untaxed", without the necessary permit from the proper authorities. The respondent submitted a
Baggage Declaration Entry which did not declare the said articles. Respondent brought into the
country various Philippine Money in the amount of P2,280.00 cleverly hidden in one of the
pieces of baggage examined by the assigned customs examiner, without any prior permit from
the Central Bank authorities.

Respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction to conduct and did conduct the preliminary investigation,
and issued the challenged order, dismissing "the case with prejudice and ordering the return to
private respondent the amount of P2,280.00, as well as those forfeited from him.

Armed with said order, private respondent Makapugay demanded that petitioner release the
articles so stated. Petitioner Collector of Customs refused to obey the order due to the "prior
institution of seizure proceedings. The refusal prompted respondent Makapugay to file a
complaint for "Open Disobedience" before the City Fiscal of Pasay City on the ground that
respondent Judge has no power to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal complaints
directly filed with him, cannot legally order the dismissal "with prejudice" of a criminal case
after conducting a preliminary investigation thereon, and is without authority to order the return
of articles subject of seizure proceedings before Customs authorities.

The respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction over the objection of petitioners counsel, conducted
the preliminary examination and investigation, simultaneously in the manner provided for by
Section 13, Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court, and issued a Warrant of Arrest.

Case 2:
Collector of Customs filed a letter- complaint against Nicanor Marcelo for an alleged violation of
the Tariff and Customs Code, for arriving from Hongkong on board a Philippine Air Lines and
with intention to defraud the government did not declare the contents of his pieces of baggage in
the Baggage declaration Entry nor with the assigned Customs Examiner. Instead of personal
effects as declared in the Baggage Declaration Entry, what were found were various assorted
Watches, Bags, Montagut shirts and Dress materials which are highly taxable.

Case 3:
Gregorio Conde and Anastacia Torillo, filed a complaint with the Circuit Criminal Court,
indicting petitioners with violations of the Anti-Graft Law.

Judge forthwith issued an order setting a preliminary investigation of the case.

Immediately before the hearing petitioners, filed an "Urgent Motion to Suspend Preliminary
Investigation" contesting the power of the respondent Judge to conduct the preliminary
examination and investigation which was denied by respondent Judge in his order. Counsel for
petitioners then asked for time to raise the issue before this Court, which respondent Judge
granted by giving petitioners a period of just one (1) day to seek relief from this Tribunal.

Case 3
Felix Halimao filed a criminal complaint directly with the Circuit Criminal Court presided over
by respondent Judge charging herein petitioner with alleged violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.

Petitioner filed an "Urgent Motion to Suspend Preliminary Investigation" (based on the ground
that respondent Judge has no authority to conduct the same.

After arguments by counsels for both parties, the respondent Judge denied petitioner's motion.
An oral motion for reconsideration was likewise denied (pp. 14-15, rec.).
Hence, this petition.

The higher court issued a restraining order, "enjoining respondent Judge, his agents,
representatives, and/or any person or persons acting upon his orders or in his place or stead from
proceeding further with the preliminary investigation ... "

Case 4
Petitioner filed this instant petition seeking to annul "any preliminary investigation conducted by
respondent Judge in Preliminary Inv. No. 72-Rizal, Circuit Criminal Court, 7th Judicial District,
as well as the warrant, if any, that may be issued for the arrest and imprisonment of petitioner"
and to enjoin permanently respondent Judge from conducting preliminary investigations and
from ordering petitioner's arrest.

Case 5
Jose Arellano filed with the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal, a complaint charging herein
petitioner with estafa, Respondent Judge proceeded to conduct the preliminary investigation in
question.

HELD:

SC: while we sustain the power of the Circuit Criminal to conduct preliminary examination
pursuant to OUR constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts as a matter of
policy, WE enjoin the respondent Judge and other Circuit Criminal Court Judges to concentrate
on hearing and deciding criminal cases filed before their courts The primary purpose of the
creation of the Circuit Criminal Courts in addition to the existing Courts of First Instance, as
above intimated, is to mitigate the case load of the Courts of First Instance as well as to expedite
the disposition of criminal cases involving serious offenses. Circuit Criminal Judges therefore,
should not encumber themselves with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal
complaints, which they should refer to the municipal judge or provincial or city fiscal, who in
turn can utilize the assistance of the state prosecutor to conduct such preliminary examination
and investigation. Or the Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court can directly request the Secretary
of Justice to assign a state prosecutor for the same purpose.

The dismissal of a case, even with prejudice, during the stage of preliminary investigation does
not bar subsequent prosecution.
Respondent Judge ignored the established principle that from the moment imported goods are
actually in the possession or control of the Customs authorities, even if no warrant of seizure had
previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture
proceedings, the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over such imported goods for
the purpose of enforcing the Customs laws, subject to an appeal only to the Court of Tax Appeals
and to final review by the Supreme Court. Such exclusive jurisdiction precludes the Court of
First Instance as well as the Circuit Criminal Court from assuming cognizance of the subject
matter and divests such courts of the prerogative to replevin properties subject to seizure and
forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code because proceedings for the
forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the
conviction of wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty

5. VIDUYA v BERDIAGO

Facts:
Respondent Eduardo Berdiago is the owner of a Rolls Royce car, Model 1966, which arrived in
the Port of Manila on January 8, 1968. However, the petitioner, Jose T. Viduya, then Collector of
Customs of Manila, obtained reliable intelligence that fraudulent documents were used by
Berdiago in securing the release of the car from the Bureau of Customs, making it appear therein
that the car was a 1961 model instead of a 1966 one, thus enabling respondent to pay a much
lower customs duty.
There was a demand for the correct amount due and the respondent expressed his willingness to
pay. However, he was not able to live up to his promise so a search warrant was issued. As the
car was kept in a dwelling house at the Yabut Compound, two officials of the Customs Police
Service as duly authorized agents of petitioner, applied to respondent Judge for a warrant to
search said dwelling house and to seize the Rolls Royce car found therein.
Berdiago filed a motion to quash the search warrant issued by the court on the ground that it
lacks of probable cause to issue the warrant. This was heard by respondent Judge Andres Reyes.
Collector Viduya opposed, alleging that Berdiago could not rely on his constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure because it was not shown that he owned the dwelling
house which was searched. Nonetheless, respondent judge, in the challenged order, quashed such
search warrant.
Hence, the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge in quashing the
search warrant?

Held:
A case of a grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge when he quashed
the search warrant had been shown. What lessens the gravity of such lapse from controlling
doctrines was the commendable attitude displayed in stressing the worth of a constitutional right.
Where attempts at evasion of payment of customs duties are concerned, however, this Court has
not been disposed to be as receptive to claims of its violation, especially where they rest on no
substantial basis.
The Court opined that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising
police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in
the enforcement of customs laws. There is justification then for the insistence on the part of
private respondent that probable cause be shown. So respondent Judge found in issuing the
search warrant.
Apparently, he was persuaded to quash it when he noted that the warrant for seizure and
detention came later than its issuance. In thus acting, respondent Judge apparently overlooked
that long before the search warrant was applied for, to be specific on April 15, 1968, the
misdeclaration and underpayment was already noted and that thereafter on April 24, 1968,
private respondent himself agreed to make good the further amount due but not in the sum
demanded.
As the car was kept in a dwelling house, petitioner through two of his officers in the Customs
Police Service applied for and was able to obtain the search warrant. Had there been no such
move on the part of petitioner, the duties expressly enjoined on him by law to assess and collect
all lawful revenues, to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds and to enforce tariff and
customs law would not have been performed.
While therefore, it is to be admitted that his warrant of seizure and detention came later than the
search warrant, there were indubitable facts in existence at that time to call for its issuance.
Certainly there was probable cause. There was evidently need for the issuance of a search
warrant. It ought not to have been thereafter quashed.

7. People Vs. Veloso

FACTS:
In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used
by an organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member
of the House of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the
club.
The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was
nothing more than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the
gambling squad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923,
Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained
a search warrant from Judge Garduo of the municipal court. Thus provided, the police
attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of the date above-
mentioned. They found the doors to the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of
police including policeman Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the
house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door.
Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police.
One of them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter
showed him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative
Veloso and not John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house. Townsend
answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it
contained gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game.
About five minutes was consumed in conversation between the policemen and the accused the
policemen insisting on searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the
search.
At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of
Veloso only to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a
blow in another part of the body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Through the
combined efforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long
sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.
All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons.
Veloso again refused to obey and shouted offensive epithets against the police department. It was
necessary for the policemen to conduct him downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted so
tenaciously that three policemen were needed to place him in the patrol wagon.
The defense, as previously indicated, is planted squarely on the contention that since the
name of Veloso did not appear in the search warrant, but instead the pseudonym John Doe was
used, Veloso had a legal right to resist the police by force.

ISSUE: Whether the warrant is properly issue?

HELD:YES.
JOHN DOE WARRANTS Valid IF the best description possible is given in the arrest
warrant it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is to be served by stating his
occupation, personal appearance or peculiarities, place of residence or other circumstances
which he may be identified
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and
statutory provisions under which it is issued. Otherwise it has rightly been held, must be
absolutely legal, "for there is not a description of process known to the law, the execution of
which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling
in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect." The warrant will always be construed
strictly without, however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions
of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it.
The search warrant has been likened to a warrant of arrest. Although apprehending that
there are material differences between the two, in view of the paucity of authority pertaining to
John Doe search warrants we propose to take into consideration the authorities relied upon by the
appellant, thus following the precedent of Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal ([1920], 42 Phil., 886), where
the regularity of the issuance of the search warrant was also questioned.
Proceeding along a different line of approach, it is undeniable that the application for the
search warrant, the affidavit, and the search warrant failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso as the person
to be seized. But the affidavit and the search warrant did state that "John Doe has illegally in his
possession in the building occupied by him, and which is under his control, namely, in the
building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, certain devices and
effects used in violation of the Gambling Law." Now, in this connection, it must not be forgotten
that the Organic Act requires a particular description of the place to be searched, and the person
or things to be seized, and that the warrant in this case sufficiently described the place and the
gambling apparatus, and, in addition, contained a description of the person to be seized. Under
the authorities cited by the appellant, it is invariably recognized that the warrant for the
apprehension of an unnamed party is void, "except in those cases where it contains a description
personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused." The description must be
sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served. As the
search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the building
occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma.
Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without
difficulty.
 John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the rule. The police should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever
and whenever it is feasible. The police should not be hindered in the performance of their
duties, which are difficult enough of perfo

8. ELI LUI, ET AL. VS. MATILLANO, May 27, 2004

Right against unreasonable searches and seizures; Mission Order does not authorize an illegal
search. Waiver of the right against an unreasonable search and seizure.

FACTS:

Sometime in September 1987, then seventeen-year-old Elenito Lariosa visited his aunt Paulina
Lariosa Matillano at Davao del Sur.

Lariosa was employed as a laborer at the Davao United Products Enterprise store, with a monthly
salary of P800.00. The store was owned by Leong Shiu Ben and King Kiao. Lariosa was tasked
to close the store during lunch time and after store hours in the afternoon.

Adjacent to the said store was another store owned by Kiaos son, Eli Lui, who also happened to
be Bens nephew.

One day, Lariosa was taken ill and was permitted to take the day off. He went to the house of
his aunt, Paulina Matillano, and her husband Eulogio Matillano where he rested until the next
day. Lariosa reported for work the day after, but Kiao told him that his employment was
terminated. Lariosa was not paid his salary. Kiao warned Lariosa not to report the matter to the
Departmet of Labor.

Ben informed his nephew, Eli Lui, that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash at the store. Ben reported
the matter to NBI Senior Agent Ruperto Galvez, and forthwith executed an affidavit wherein he
alleged that after Lariosas employment was terminated on October 19, 1988, he then also
discovered that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash in the store. He suspected that Lariosa was the
culprit because the latter, as a former employee, had a duplicate key to the side door of the
United Products Enterprise Store.

The incident occurred wherein Lui mauled Lariosa and tried to force the latter to admit that he
had stolen Bens money. Lariosa refused to do so. Lui then brought Lariosa to the comfort room
of the store and pushed his face into the toilet bowl, in an attempt to force him into confessing to
the crime. Lariosa still refused to admit. Lui then made a telephone call to the PNP; based in
Davao City.

Sgt. Alberto Genise of the Metrodiscom (PNP) issued Mission Order, directing Pat. Leo Roxas,
to follow up a theft case committed in Davao city from 12:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.. Roxas was
directed to coordinate with the nearest PNP headquarters or stations. H was authorized to carry
his firearm for the mission. He then left the police station on board a police car.

In search of the allegedly missing amount of P45,000.00 owned by the employer, the residence
of a relative of the suspect was forcibly open by the authorities by kicking the kitchen door to
gain entry into the house. Thereafter, they confiscated different personal properties therein which
were allegedly part of those stolen from the employer. They were in possession of a mission
order but later on claimed that the owner of the house gave his consent to the warrantless search.

ISSUE/s:
Are the things admissible in evidence? Can they be sued for damages as a result of the said
warrantless search and seizure?

Held:

In this case, the petitioners failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that respondent
Paulina Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search and seizure by consenting
thereto, either expressly or impliedly. Admittedly, respondent Paulina Matillano did not object to
the opening of her wooden closet and the taking of their personal properties.

However, such failure to object or resist did not amount to an implied waiver of her right against
unreasonable search and seizure. The petitioners were armed with handguns; petitioner Lui
threatened and intimidated her.

Respondent Eulogio Matillano, her husband, was out of the house when the petitioner and his
cohorts conducted the search and seizure. He could, thus, not have waived his constitutional
right.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived
expressly or impliedly. BUT A WAIVER BY IMPLICATION CANNOT BE PRESUMED. There
must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. There must
be proof of the following:

a. that the right exists;

b. that the person involved had knowledge, either constructive or actual, of the existence of said
right;

c. that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

Finally, the waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently in order that the said is
to be valid.

The search was therefore held illegal and the members of the searching party held liable for
damages in accordance with the doctrine laid down in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon and MHP
Garments vs. CA.

9. MICROSOFT V. FARAJALLAH

FACTS:
Petitioners:
-Microsoft Corporation and Adobe Systems Incorporated ( corporations under US laws) are
copyright owners respectively of Microsoft software, and all corresponding users manuals and
Microsoft DOS trademarks in the Philipines;
-Adobe Systems copyright relating to all versions and editions of Adobe software.
Respondents: Samir Farajallah, Virgilio D.C. Herce, Rachel P. Follosco, Jesusito G. Morallos and
Ma. Geraldine S. Garcia are the directors and officers of New Fields (Asia Pacific), Inc., a
domestic corporation with principal office at Ortigas Center, Pasig City.

Petitioners claim: September 2009, they were informed that New Fields was unlawfully
reproducing and using unlicensed versions of their software.

Orion Support, Inc.(OSI): Was engaged by petitioners to assist in the verification of this
information. Norma Serrano and Michael Moradoz : trained researchers from OSI were assigned
to confirm and detect unauthorised copies of adobe and Microsoft software.

Filing of complaint and product identification

-On 17 March 2010, counsel for petitioners filed a letter-complaint with the Chief of the
Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group. The case was assigned to
Police Senior Inspector Ernesto V. Padilla.

Padilla and the two witnesses were able to ascertain that the company was indeed using
counterfeit software, by using two computers of New Fields and getting information about the
installed software on the computer, which revealed that they were using common product
identification or serial numbers, an indication that the software is counterfeit; also they noted that
the company used only one installer of the software which were installed on several computers,
numbering about 90 computers.

After being informed of the results of the investigation and warrants

-Petitioners then issued certifications that they have not authorized New Fields to "copy, print,
reproduce and/or publish unauthorized copies of Microsoft and Adobe software products.

-An application for search warrants was filed by Padilla on 20 May 2010, before Judge Amor
Reyes in her capacity as Executive Judge of the RTC.

-The warrants were served on respondents on 24 May 2010. New Fields employees witnessed
the search conducted by the authorities.
-Several items were seized, including 17 CD installers and 83 computers containing
unauthorized copies of Microsoft and/or Adobe software. (resulted in the seizure of more than
5.4 million pesos worth of pirated and unlicensed software)

New Fields then filed on June 6, 2010 a Motion To Quash Search Warrant Search No. 10-15912.
Petitioners received a copy of the motion, which was set for hearing on June 11, 2010, on June
10, 2010. The trial court also required them file their comment not later than June 21, 2010.
Petitioners objected to the motion, averring that it did not comply with the 3-day notice rule on
motions, as they received a copy of the motion only on June 10, 2010, despite the fact that the
motion was set for hearing on June 11, 2010.
RTC: The RTC also dismissed the petitioners objection to the motion for failure to comply with
the 3-day notice rule, citing they were notified personally of the motion. Petitioners moved to
reconsider; this time, respondents objected to the motion for reconsideration for failure to
comply with the 3-day notice rule in motions. Still, the RTC denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

The RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its Order dated 27 August 2010.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on 8 November 2010 before the Court of
Appeals.

Petitioners alleged that: the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion to
Quash despite: (1) respondents failure to comply with the three-day notice requirement; and (2)
the existence of probable cause, and personal knowledge of the warrant applicant.

The Ruling of the CA

-The CA denied the petition for certiorari. The appellate court held that: In the instant case, when
the court a quo ordered petitioners to submit their comment on the motion to quash, it was, in
effect, giving petitioners their day in court. Thus, while the [three]-day notice rule was not
strictly observed, its purpose was still satisfied when respondent judge did not immediately rule
on the motion giving petitioners the opportunity to study and oppose the arguments stated in the
motion.

Issue: Whether Judge Amor Reyes committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion
to quash search warrants.

Held: We rule that strict compliance with the three-day notice rule may be relaxed in this case.
However, we sustain petitioners contention that there was probable cause for issuance of a
warrant, and the RTC and CA should have upheld the validity of both warrants.

Compliance with the three-day notice rule: In Anama v. Court of Appeals, 29 we ruled that the
three-day notice rule is not absolute. The purpose of the ruleis to safeguard the adverse partys
right to due process. Thus, if the adverse party was given a reasonable opportunity to study the
motion and oppose it, then strict compliance with the three-day notice rule may be dispensed
with.
As correctly pointed out by the CA: In the instant case, when the court a quo ordered petitioners
to submit their comment on the motion to quash, it was, in effect, giving petitioners their day in
court. Thus, while the [three]-day notice rule was not strictly observed, its purpose was still
satisfied when respondent judge did not immediately rule on the motion giving petitioners x x x
the opportunity to study and oppose the arguments stated in the motion

Existence of probable cause: Under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitions for
review by certiorari "shall raise only questions of law." A question of fact exists when there is a
doubt as to the truth of certain facts, and it can only be resolved through a reexamination of the
body of evidence. In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., we ruled that the existence of
probable cause is a question of fact.

Probable cause is dependent on the opinion and findings of the judge who conducted the
examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses. For
this reason, the findings of the judge deserve great weight. The reviewing court should overturn
such findings only upon proof that the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear
dictates of reason. This Court is not a trier of facts. As a general rule, we defer to the lower
courts appreciation and evaluation of evidence but is not absolute.

Reason to overturn the rulings of the RTC and CA

since there was grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts. The CA sustained the
quashal of the warrant because the witnesses had "no personal knowledge of the facts upon
which the issuance of the warrants may be justified," and the applicants and the witnesses merely
relied on the screen shots acquired from the confidential informant. We disagree with the
conclusions of the CA. The assailed CA Decision itself stated:

Initial hearsay information or tips from confidential informants could very well serve as
basis for the issuance of a search warrant, if followed up personally by the recipient and
validated. It is clear that Padilla and his companions were able to personally verify the tip of
their informant. In his Affidavit submitted to Judge Amor Reyes prior to the issuance of the
warrant, Padilla stated that: At the time that I was inside the office premises of the NEW FIELDS,
I saw the Product Keys or Product Identification Numbers of the ADOBE and MICROSOFT
computer software programs installed in some of the computer units. Ms. Serrano and Mr.
Moradoz were able to pull up these data since they were allowed to use some of the computers of
the target companies in line with the pretext that we used to gain entry into NEW FIELDS. I
actively read and attentively observed the information reflected from the monitor display unit of
the computers that Ms. Serrano and Mr. Moradoz were able to use.

As mentioned earlier, Padilla has been trained to distinguish illegally reproduced Adobe and
Microsoft software. The evidence likewise shows that there was probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant. Thus, the requirement of personal knowledge of the applicant
and witnesses was clearly satisfied in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Search Warrants are declared valid.
10. JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE vs. HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO and HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL
DE LAS ALAS

FACTS: Leviste was charged with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12,
2007. After paying a P40,000 cash bond approved by the trial court, he was released from
detention, and his arraignment was set on January 24, 2007.

The heirs of De Las Alas then filed a motion praying for the postponement of the Levistes
Arraignment to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct
an investigation to determine the proper offense for Leviste.

The RTC favored the motion of De Las Alas heirs and issued an order on January 27, 2004
postponing the arraignment of Leviste and allowing the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation
to determine Levistes proper offense. Leviste asked the court to reconsider but the request was
denied through a Court Order dated January 31, 2007. Leviste then assailed these orders via
certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.

While the petition for certiorari was pending on the Court of Appeals, he then filed a motion
before the Trial Court asking the court to not act on the prosecutors recommendation to
reinvestigate until the Court of Appeals renders its decision.

Nonetheless, the trial court still executed the orders suspending Lesvistes arraignment and
allowing the prosecution to reinvestigate. The trial court then issued an order on February 7,
2007 admitting the results of the reinvestigation and directing the issuance for warrant of arrest
for Leviste for the crime of murder. Please note here that prior to the reinvestigation, Leviste was
charged of homicide. Leviste again questioned these orders via supplemental petition before the
appellate court. So at this point, Leviste supplemented the previous petition he file to include the
questioning of the February 7, 2007 order.

Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals denied Levistes petition so the case was brought to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the amendment of the information (as a result of the investigation) from
homicide to murder is considered a substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right
but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary investigation.

HELD: Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.
The following have been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate
only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an
amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the
original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so
as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an
amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an
amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to
introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is
already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for
the crime charged.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense
under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and
whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in
the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature
of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive
the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form
and not of substance.
What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge
of murder after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion.
Petitioner did not, however, make much of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on
the proposed amended charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe the
proceedings and declined to actively participate, even with extreme caution, in the
reinvestigation.
11. BORLONGAN VS. JUDGE LIMSIACO

TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., et. al. vs. MAGDALENO M. PEA and HON.
MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge Designate of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Bago City

FACTS: Magdaleno Pea instituted a civil case for recovery of agents compensation and
expenses, damages, and attorneys fees against Urban Bank and the petitioners, before the RTC
of Negros Occidental, Bago City.

He anchored his claim for compensation on the contract of agency, allegedly entered into
with the petitioners wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any
intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Banks property located along Roxas
Boulevard, Pasay City.

Petitioners filed a Memorandum (MD) arguing that they never appointed the respondent
as agent or counsel.

The following documents were attached to the MD:

a. A letter dated December 19, 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on
behalf of Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the subject property;
b. An unsigned letter dated December 7, 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa from
Marilyn G. Ong;
c. A letter dated December 9, 1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan and signed by
Marilyn G. Ong; and
d. A Memorandum dated November 20, 1994 from Enrique Montilla III.

The abovementioned documents were presented in an attempt to show that the respondent
was appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.
Pea filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City. He claimed
that said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their
signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI.
Worse, petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they
were falsified.

***City Prosecutors Report (Sept 23, 1998): In the report, the Prosecutor concluded that the
petitioners were probably guilty of four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified
Documents penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified because the alleged signatories
untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal of the respondent; that petitioners knew that the
documents were falsified considering that the signatories were mere dummies; and that the
documents formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they were used by petitioners
as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, adopted in their answer and later, in their Pre-
Trial Brief. Subsequently, the corresponding Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 6683,
6684, 6685, and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants for the arrest of
the petitioners.

***Petitioners (Oct. 1, 1998) filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash (MQ): They insist that they
were denied due process because of the non-observance of a proper procedure on preliminary
investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court; since no such counter-affidavit and supporting
documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-
affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention
of the Rules. Moreover they claim that the respondents affidavit was not based on the latters
personal knowledge and therefore should not have been used by the court in determining
probable cause.
On the same day that the Omnibus MQ was filed, the petitioners posted bail. Their bail bonds
expressly provided that they do not intend to waive their right to question the validity of their
arrest. On the date of arraignment, the petitioners refused to enter their plea, for the obvious
reason that the legality of their information and their arrest was yet to be settled by the court.

***MTCCs answer (in response to Omnibus MQ filed by petitioners): They upheld the
validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules. Besides,
(according to the MTCC) petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant since
they already posted bail.

ISSUES:

1. W/N petitioners were deprived of their right to due process of law because of the
denial of their right to preliminary investigation and to submit their counter-affidavit; and
2. W/N this Court can, itself, determine probable cause.

HELD: ***For issues 1 and 2:

The following sections of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure are relevant
to the aforementioned issues:

SECTION 1. Definition. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose

of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
SEC. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for
an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such
number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies of the official file. The said
affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized
to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that he
personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits.

SEC. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts not covered
by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

a. Where filed with the fiscal. If the complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or
state prosecutor, the procedure outlined in Section 3 (a) of this Rule shall be observed.
The Fiscal shall take appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting
documents submitted by the complainant.

Records show that the prosecutor relied merely on the affidavits submitted by the
complainant and did not require the petitioners to submit their answer. He should not be faulted
for doing such as this is sanctioned by the rules. Moreover, he is not mandated to require the
submission of counter-affidavits. Probable cause may then be determined on the basis alone of
the affidavits and supporting documents of the complainant, without infringing on the
constitutional rights of the petitioners.

Regarding the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners contend that the warrants were
illegally issued as they were solely based on the affidavits of the complainant. Section 2 of
Article III of the Constitution underscores the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not required
to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by
the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may
already make a personal determination of the existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is not
satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutors report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause. There is no provision or procedural rule which makes the
submission of counter-affidavits mandatory before the judge could determine probable cause.

12. Bureau of Customs vs. Agnes Devanadera, Acting Secretary, Department of Justice

FACTS:

This case deals with the controversy of Unioil Petroleum Philippines, Inc. and its officers
smuggling oil products from Oilink International Inc.s depot in 2008.

Private respondent UNIOIL Petroleum Philippines, Inc. is engaged in marketing,

distribution, and sale of petroleum, oil and other products, while its co-respondent OILINK
International, Inc. is engaged in manufacturing, importing, exporting, buying, selling, or
otherwise dealing in at wholesale and retails of petroleum, oil, gas and of any and all refinements
and byproducts thereof.

Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales of petitioner Bureau of Customs (BOC) issued Audit

Notification Letter (ANL) informing the President of OILINK that the Post Entry Audit Group
(PEAG) of the BOC will be conducting a compliance audit, including the examination,
inspection, verification and/or investigation of all pertinent records of OILINK's import
transactions for the past three (3)-year period.

The events happened in 2007 as follows (you can omit reading this part, however, I
included it just in case Atty. Gacayan would ask about it) :):

1. March 2: A pre-audit conference was held between the BOC Audit Team and the
representatives of OILINK. During the conference, the Audit Team explained to OILINK
representatives the purpose of the post-entry audit and the manner by which it would be
conducted, and advised it as to the import documents required for such audit.

2. March 14: OILINK submitted to the Audit Team the following documents: Post-
Entry Audit Group General Customs Questionnaire, General Information Sheet for the
year 2006, SEC Registration, Articles of Incorporation, Company By-laws, and Audited
Financial Report for the year 2005.

3. April 20: The Audit Team requested OILINK to submit the other documents
stated in the List of Initial Requirements for Submission, namely: 2004 Audited Financial
 Report, 2004-2006 Quarterly VAT Returns with the accompanying schedule of
importations, Organizational chart/structure, and List of foreign suppliers with details on
the products imported and the total amount, on a yearly basis.

4. May 7: OILINK expressed its willingness to comply with the request for the
production of the said documents, but claimed that it was hampered by the resignation of
its employees from the Accounting and Supply Department. OILINK also averred that it
would refer the matter to the Commissioner of Customs in view of the independent
investigation being conducted by the latter.

5. June 4: OILINK sent a letter stating that the documents which the Audit Team
previously requested were available with the Special Committee of the BOC, and that it
could not open in the meantime its Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) - registered books
of accounts for validation and review purposes.

6. July 11: The Audit Team informed OILINK of the adverse effects of its request
for the postponement of the exit conference and its continuous refusal to furnish it the
required documents. It advised OILINK that such acts constitute as waiver on its part to
be informed of the audit findings and an administrative case would be filed against it,
without prejudice to the filing of a criminal action.

7. July 24: Commissioner Morales approved the filing of an administrative case

against OILINK for failure to comply with the requirements of Customs Administrative
Order.

8. September 20: An Order was issued by the Legal Service of the BOC, submitting
the case for resolution in view of OILINK's failure to file its Answer within the
prescribed period.

9. December 14: The Legal Service of the BOC rendered a Decision finding that
OILINK violated Section IV.A.2(c) and (e) of CAO 4-20047 when it refused to furnish
the Audit Team copies of the required documents, despite repeated demands.

In review of the foregoing events, it was held that OILINK International Inc. is liable for
violating the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. They were ordered to pay the
administrative fine amounting to Php 2,764,859,304.80. Commissioner Morales sent OILINK
demand letters regarding the payment of such fine twice, in 2007 and in 2008. The final demand
letter in 2008 stated that the BOC will be compelled to file the necessary legal action and put in
force a hold order against OILINKs succeeding shipments to protect the governments interest.

A month after, OILINK failed to settle its outstanding account with the BOC so the hold
order was enforced. OILINKs terminal was closed, however, UNIOILs Corporate
Administrative Supervisor, Rochelle Vicencio, requested the BOC (through District Collector
Horacio Suansing, Jr.) to withdraw the process oils and industrial lubricating oils (collectively
base oils) from OILINKs terminal. This was the subject of a prior Terminalling Agreement
between UNIOIL and OILINK. Her request was granted by Commisioner Morales subject to the
following conditions.
 1. Only Unioil products shall be withdrawn subject to proper inventory by the BIR
and BOC.

2. Appropriate duties and taxes due on the products to be withdrawn are fully paid or
settled.

3. The company should allow the operation/withdrawal to be closely monitored and

continuously underguarded by assigned Customs personnel.

On May 9, 2008, a Warrant of Seizure and Detention (WSD) was issued by District
Collector Suansing Jr., directing the BOC officials to seal and padlock the oil tanks/depots of
OILINK located in Bataan.

Kenneth Pundanera, Operations Manager of UNIOIL, sent a letter to Zaldy Almoradie,

District Collector of Mariveles, Bataan for permission to relase UNIOIL products from
OILINKs storage terminal. In his letter, he stated that UNIOIL should not be affected with the
unresolved issue between OILINK and the BOC. Even though UNIOIL has already paid all the
duties, fees, and taxes as required, UNIOIL was still unable to withdraw their products from
OILINKs tanks. As a result, UNIOIL could not supply their customers who are using the
products to supply major government infrastructure projects in the country.

Almoradie approved the release, and UNIOIL withdrew their products from OILINKs
tanks. The agreement is that UNIOIL will only withdraw the products which are mentioned in
the request; however, UNIOIL also withdrew products not mentioned in the request. UNIOIL
said that they withdrew the products believing in good faith that they could do so. A complaint-
affidavit was filed against UNIOIL and OILINK by the BOC, accusing them of unlawful
importation and fraudulent practice against customs revenue. Atty. Balmyrson M. Valdez, a
member of the BOC's Anti-Oil Smuggling Coordinating Committee investigated the illegal
withdrawal by UNIOIL of oil products consigned to OILINK. This was valued at P181,988,627.

The State Prosecutor of the DOJ recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit
for lack of probable cause. It was approved by his co-State Prosecutors and subsequently
approved by then Secretary of the DOJ, Raul Gonzales. The BOC filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the DOJ Acting Secretary Agnes Devanadera. The BOC
appealed to the CA but they lost because they did not duly submit to the CA another set of
petition with a certification against forum shopping (in essence, the BOC did not follow the
procedural rules).

So, the BOC filed a petition to the Supreme Court raising the issue that the decision of
the CA was erroneous because they overlooked the merits of the case: it was clearly established
that there is probable cause to indict UNIOIL and OILINK for trial for violation of the TCCP.

ISSUE: Whether there was probable cause to indict UNIOIL and OILINK for trial for violation
of the TCCP.

HELD:
 SC opined that since the allegations in the BOCs complaint-affidavit fell short of acts or
omissions constituting violations of the Customs code, then DOJ chief Devanadera correctly
ruled that there was no probable cause to believe that Unioil committed such crimes.
A careful reading of the BOCs complaint-affidavit would show that there is no allegation
to the effect that private respondents committed undervaluation, misdeclaration in weight,
measurement or quantity of more than thirty percent [30 percent] between the value, weight,
measurement or quantity declared in the entry, and the actual value, weight, quantity or
measurement which constitute prima facie evidence of fraud. Nor is there an allegation that
[Unioil] intentionally committed undervaluation, misdescription, misclassification or
misdeclaration in the import entry.
13. ROBERT VS CA

FACTS:
Petitioners, who are corporate officers and members of the Board of Pepsi Cola Products Phils.,
Inc. were prosecuted in connection with the Pepsi Number Fever promotion by handlers of the
supposedly winning 349 Pepsi crowns. Of the four cases filed against the petitioners, probable
cause was found by the investigating prosecutor only for the crime of estafa, but not for the other
alleged offenses.

On 12 April 1993, the information was filed with the trial court without anything accompanying
it. A copy of the investigating prosecutors Joint Resolution was forwarded to and received by
the trial court only on 22 April 1993. However, no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of
stenographic notes of the proceedings during the preliminary investigation, or other documents
submitted in the course thereof were found in the records of the case as of 19 May 1993.

On 15 April 1993, petitioners Roberts, et al. filed a petition for review to the Department of
Justice seeking the reversal of the finding of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor. They
also moved for the suspension of the proceedings and the holding in abeyance of the issuance of
warrants of arrest against them. Meanwhile, the public prosecutor also moved to defer the
arraignment of the accused-appellants pending the final disposition of the appeal to the
Department of Justice.

On 17 May 1993, respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order (1) denying, on the
basis of Crespo Vs. Mogul, the foregoing motions respectively filed by the petitioners and the
public prosecutor, and directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest after June 1993 and
setting the arraignment on 28 June 1993. In part, respondent judge stated in his order that since
the case is already pending in this Court for trial, following whatever opinion the Secretary of
Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity his court. To
justify his order, he quoted the ruling of the Supreme Court in Crespo, which stated:

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice
should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The
matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the respondent judge had not the
slightest basis at all for determining probable cause when he ordered the issuance of warrants of
arrest. After finding that a copy of the public prosecutors Joint Resolution had in fact been
forwarded to, and received by, the trial court on 22 April 1993, the CA denied petitioner's
application for writ of preliminary injunction. The CA ruled that the Joint Resolution was
sufficient in itself to have been relied upon by respondent Judge in convincing himself that
probable cause indeed exists for the purpose of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest and
that the mere silence of the records or the absence of any express declaration in the questioned
order as to the basis of such finding does not give rise to an adverse inference, for the respondent
Judge enjoys in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty.
Roberts, et al. sought reconsideration, but meanwhile, the DOJ affirmed the finding of probable
cause by the investigating prosecutor. The CA therefore dismissed the petition for mootness.

ISSUE:

Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of
arrest without examining the records of the preliminary investigation?

HELD:

**The Court, in a 7-5-2 vote, GRANTED the petition. It SET ASIDE the decision and resolution
of the CA, the resolutions of the DOJ 349 Committee, and the order of respondent judge.

YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants
of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary investigation.

The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and Webb reject the proposition that the
investigating prosecutors certification in an information or his resolution which is made the
basis for the filing of the information, or both, would suffice in the judicial determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In Webb, this Court assumed that since the
respondent Judges had before them not only the 26-page resolution of the investigating panel but
also the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and even the counter-affidavits of the
respondents, they (judges) made personal evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of
the case.

In this case, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing on 12 April 1993 with the trial
court. A copy of the Joint Resolution was forwarded to, and received by, the trial court only on
22 April 1993. And as revealed by the certification of respondent judges clerk of court, no
affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the
preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof were found in the
records of this case as of 19 May 1993. Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion issued the
assailed order of 17 May 1993 directing, among other things, the issuance of warrants of arrest,
he had only the information, amended information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did
not have the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause. And
strangely enough, he made no specific finding of probable cause; he merely directed the issuance
of warrants of arrest after June 21, 1993. It may, however, be argued that the directive
presupposes a finding of probable cause. But then compliance with a constitutional requirement
for the protection of individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even
convincing logic.

13. ROBERT VS CA

FACTS:
Petitioners, who are corporate officers and members of the Board of Pepsi Cola Products Phils.,
Inc. were prosecuted in connection with the Pepsi Number Fever promotion by handlers of the
supposedly winning 349 Pepsi crowns. Of the four cases filed against the petitioners, probable
cause was found by the investigating prosecutor only for the crime of estafa, but not for the other
alleged offenses.

On 12 April 1993, the information was filed with the trial court without anything accompanying
it. A copy of the investigating prosecutors Joint Resolution was forwarded to and received by
the trial court only on 22 April 1993. However, no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of
stenographic notes of the proceedings during the preliminary investigation, or other documents
submitted in the course thereof were found in the records of the case as of 19 May 1993.

On 15 April 1993, petitioners Roberts, et al. filed a petition for review to the Department of
Justice seeking the reversal of the finding of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor. They
also moved for the suspension of the proceedings and the holding in abeyance of the issuance of
warrants of arrest against them. Meanwhile, the public prosecutor also moved to defer the
arraignment of the accused-appellants pending the final disposition of the appeal to the
Department of Justice.

On 17 May 1993, respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order (1) denying, on the
basis of Crespo Vs. Mogul, the foregoing motions respectively filed by the petitioners and the
public prosecutor, and directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest after June 1993 and
setting the arraignment on 28 June 1993. In part, respondent judge stated in his order that since
the case is already pending in this Court for trial, following whatever opinion the Secretary of
Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity his court. To
justify his order, he quoted the ruling of the Supreme Court in Crespo, which stated:

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice
should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The
matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the respondent judge had not the
slightest basis at all for determining probable cause when he ordered the issuance of warrants of
arrest. After finding that a copy of the public prosecutors Joint Resolution had in fact been
forwarded to, and received by, the trial court on 22 April 1993, the CA denied petitioner's
application for writ of preliminary injunction. The CA ruled that the Joint Resolution was
sufficient in itself to have been relied upon by respondent Judge in convincing himself that
probable cause indeed exists for the purpose of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest and
that the mere silence of the records or the absence of any express declaration in the questioned
order as to the basis of such finding does not give rise to an adverse inference, for the respondent
Judge enjoys in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty.
Roberts, et al. sought reconsideration, but meanwhile, the DOJ affirmed the finding of probable
cause by the investigating prosecutor. The CA therefore dismissed the petition for mootness.

ISSUE:

Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of
arrest without examining the records of the preliminary investigation?

HELD:

**The Court, in a 7-5-2 vote, GRANTED the petition. It SET ASIDE the decision and resolution
of the CA, the resolutions of the DOJ 349 Committee, and the order of respondent judge.

YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants
of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary investigation.

The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and Webb reject the proposition that the
investigating prosecutors certification in an information or his resolution which is made the
basis for the filing of the information, or both, would suffice in the judicial determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In Webb, this Court assumed that since the
respondent Judges had before them not only the 26-page resolution of the investigating panel but
also the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and even the counter-affidavits of the
respondents, they (judges) made personal evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of
the case.

In this case, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing on 12 April 1993 with the trial
court. A copy of the Joint Resolution was forwarded to, and received by, the trial court only on
22 April 1993. And as revealed by the certification of respondent judges clerk of court, no
affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the
preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof were found in the
records of this case as of 19 May 1993. Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion issued the
assailed order of 17 May 1993 directing, among other things, the issuance of warrants of arrest,
he had only the information, amended information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did
not have the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause. And
strangely enough, he made no specific finding of probable cause; he merely directed the issuance
of warrants of arrest after June 21, 1993. It may, however, be argued that the directive
presupposes a finding of probable cause. But then compliance with a constitutional requirement
for the protection of individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even
convincing logic.

14. SKECHERS, U.S.A., INC. vs. INTER PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL TRADING CORP.

Facts:
Skechers U.S.A. Inc. filed an application for the issuance of search warrants against an
outlet and warehouse operated by Inter Pacific Industrial Trading Corp. for infringement of
trademark under Section 155, in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293, Intellectual
Property Code of the Philippines.

Skechers U.S.A. Inc. has registered the trademark "SKECHERS" and the trademark "S"
(within an oval design) with the Intellectual Property Office (IPO). Two search warrants were
issued against Inter Pacific and more than 6,000 pairs of shoes bearing the S logo were seized.
Inter Pacific moved to quash the warrants arguing that there was no confusing similarity between
petitioners "Skechers" rubber shoes and its "Strong" rubber shoes. RTC granted the motion and
quashed the search warrants. Skeckers filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which affirmed
the decision of the RTC. Thus, Skeckers filed the present petition with the SC assailing that the
CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it considered matters of defense in a criminal trial
for trademark infringement in passing upon the validity of the search warrant when it should
have limited itself to a determination of whether the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in quashing the warrants. And that it committed grave abuse of discretion in finding
that Inter Pacific are not guilty of trademark infringement in the case where the sole triable
issue is the existence of probable cause to issue a search warrant. Subsequently, Trendworks
International Corporation (petitioner-intervenor) filed a Petition-in-Intervention with the Court
claiming to be the sole licensed distributor of Skechers products here in the Philippines, but the
same was dismissed. Both Skechers and Trendworks filed separate motions for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether Inter Pacific is guilty of trademark infringement.

Ruling: Yes. The essential element of infringement under R.A. No. 8293 (Intellectual Property
Code) is that the infringing mark is likely to cause confusion. In determining similarity and
likelihood of confusion, two tests have been developed: (1) the Dominancy Test which focuses
on the similarity of the prevalent or dominant features of the competing trademarks that might
cause confusion, mistake, and deception in the mind of the purchasing public. Duplication or
imitation is not necessary; neither is it required that the mark sought to be registered suggests an
effort to imitate. (2) The Holistic or Totality Test which necessitates a consideration of the
entirety of the marks as applied to the products, including the labels and packaging, in
determining confusing similarity.

In the case at bar, the Court applied the Dominancy Test and found that the use of the
stylized "S" by respondent in its Strong rubber shoes infringes on the mark already registered by
Skechers with the IPO. While it is undisputed that petitioners stylized "S" is within an oval
design, to this Courts mind, the dominant feature of the trademark is the stylized "S," as it is
precisely the stylized "S" which catches the eye of the purchaser. Thus, even if respondent did
not use an oval design, the mere fact that it used the same stylized "S", the same being the
dominant feature of petitioners trademark, already constitutes infringement under the
Dominancy Test.

The protection of trademarks as intellectual property is intended not only to preserve the
goodwill and reputation of the business established on the goods bearing the mark through actual
use over a period of time, but also to safeguard the public as consumers against confusion on
these goods. While respondents shoes contain some dissimilarities with petitioners shoes, this
Court cannot close its eye to the fact that for all intents and purpose, Inter Pacific had
deliberately attempted to copy Skechers mark and overall design and features of the shoes.

15. MILLER v SEC OF JUSTICE (2011)

FACTS:
The petitioner is George Miller, a British national and an inmate at the Maximum Security
Compound of the New Bilibid Prison (NBP). While he was Acting General of the Inmates
Crusade Against Drugs (ICAD) in Nov-Dec 1998, he wrote to NBP Superintendent Col. Agalo-
os, alleging the drug trading activities of Giovan Bernardino (ICAD Treasurer), Rodolfo
Bernardo (ICAD Chairman) and Ace Aprid, who were inmates at the Medium Security
Compound. Miller recommended that the two be transferred at the Max Security Compound.
Miller was threatened by Bernardo and Bernardino for authoring the letters, and few days later in
Jan 1999, while he was heading towards the volleyball court at around 2:30PM, he was struck
with a piece of wood at the back of his head. He ran to the infirmary for first aid treatment and
was later brought to the NBP Hospital, where the medical specialist reported that the healing
period for his head wound (8-9cm long, 1cm deep) was 7 to 10 days.

The assailants turned out to be Constantino Quirante and Roberto Ceballos, who were ordered
through their "Bosyo" (Commander of their group, the BC45 gang) Rodrigo Toledo to hit Miller,
and in return Bernardino and Bernardo would pay them P1,500.

The day after the assault, they were paid P100 as initial payment. Three days later, they were
called in for investigation, and because the 1,400 balance never came through, they readily
admitted hitting Miller via sworn statements, written in Tagalog. Toledo likewise corroborated
the story with his own sworn statement.

The investigator recommended that Quirante and Ceballos be charged with Frustrated Murder
and the case be placed under further investigation pending the establishment of sufficient
evidence to indict Bernardo, Bernardino, and Aprid.

In March 1999, Prosecutor Antonio Padilla issued a resolution, stating that only Quirante could
be charged for attempted murder in the RTC of Muntinlupa, and that there is insufficient
evidence against the others. However, it was also stated there that in the event that evidence
against the others "may be unearthed by concerned authorities", refiling of the information may
be made.

In Dec 1999, Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo executed new affidavits in English, providing a
more detailed narration, and categorically implicating Bernardo, Bernardino and Aprid as the
masterminds.

In March 2000, Prosecutor Leopoldo Macinas found "probable cause" against all inmates,
amending the information to include Ceballos, Toledo, Bernardino, Bernardo and Aprid as co-
conspirators.

Bernardino filed a petition for review with the DOJ, arguing that there was no sufficient evidence
to support a claim of conspiracy, since it was based merely on "conflicting testimonies or
affidavits in a language foreign to the affiants".

In March 2002, DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez granted the petition and ordered that Bernardino
be excluded from the information, finding that the English affidavits were not part of the
preliminary investigation, and that they "can only be considered as afterthought or made upon
the prodding or influence of other persons".
Miller filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, prompting him to elevate the case to
the CA, who also sustained the Sec. Perez's ruling. Hence, this petition for certiorari to the SC.

ISSUES:
1. WON the Sec of Justice erred in disregarding the English affidavits and ruling to exclude
Bernardino in the information.
2. Who determines probable cause?

HELD:
1. Yes. The SC ruled in favor of Miller. Bernardino should be included in the charge. The English
affidavits were mere reiterations and a more detailed account of the incident. They were
consistent with the original Tagalog statements.
There was probable cause to charge all inmates. In a preliminary investigation for the purpose of
filing an information, only prima facie evidence is required, not a full and exhaustive
presentation of evidence (that is reserved for the actual trial). Here, prima facie evidence has
been established against Bernardino through the affidavits.

2. General rule: The Court does not interfere with the preliminary investigation. The
determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information in court is an executive
function which pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and then to the Secretary of
Justice. The SOJ may reverse or modify the resolution of the prosecutor.

However: The Supreme Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable
cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when necessary for the orderly
administration of justice. The SC may substitute the SOJ's decision, such as in this case.

Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. To determine the existence
of probable cause, there is need to conduct preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation
constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. Its purpose is to determine
whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty thereof. It is a means of discovering which person or persons may be
reasonably charged with a crime.

People vs Del Rosario

July 20, 1994
Facts: Normando del Rosario was charged before RTC of Cavite with illegal possession of
Firearms and ammunition, and Illegal sale of Regulated drugs.
On Sept. 4, upon the application of SPO3 Raymundo Unteveros in the RTC of Cavite, a search
warrant was issued authorizing the seizure of an "undeterminate quality of Methamphetamine
hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalias" in the premises of appelants
house in San Roque, Cavite. On the evening of the same day, PO1 Vernando Luna posed as a
posuer buyer and gave the marked 100 peso bill to the accused. After that PO1 went back to the
police station and the raiding team proceeded in the house of the accused. They found a black
canister on the top of tv set of the accused containing shabu, an aluminum foil and a paltik (.22
caliber) with 3 ammunition.
Contention of accused: the police found the accused on his living room and immediately
searched his house without any witnesses. The police then planted the evidence.

Issue: WON the search warrant was validly implemented.

No. The search warrant was not validly implemented. At the case at bar, the accused-appellant
cannot be convicted of possession of the shabu contained in a canister and allegedly seized at his
house, for the charge against him was for selling shabu with the information alleging that the
"accused, without legal authority did . . . sell to a poseur buyer an aluminum foil containing
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride . . ." Sale is totally different from possession. Article 1458 of
the Civil Code defines sale as a contract whereby "one of the contracting parties obligates
himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determine thing, and the other to pay
therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent", while "possession is the holding of a thing or
the enjoyment of a right" as defined by Article 523 of the Civil Code. Accused-appellant cannot
be convicted of a crime which is not charged in the information for to do so would deny him the
due process of law (People vs. Despavellador, 1 SCRA 205 [1961]; People vs. Mori, 55 SCRA
382 [1974]).

Neither can accused-appellant be convicted of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The
search warrant implemented by the raiding party authorized only the search and seizure of ". . .
the described quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its
paraphernalia" (Exh. O, p. 50, original record). Thus, the raiding party was authorized to seize
only shabu and paraphernalia for the use thereof and no other. A search warrant is not a sweeping
authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a finishing expedition to seize and confiscate
any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The Constitution itself (Section 2,
Article III) and the Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 126) specifically mandate that the search
warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no
authority for the police officers to seize the firearm which was not mentioned, much less
described with particularity, in the search warrant. Neither may it be maintained that the gun was
seized in the course of an arrest, for as earlier observed, accused-appellant's arrest was far from
regular and legal. Said firearm, having been illegally seized, the same is not admissible in
evidence (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 [1967]). The Constitution expressly ordains the
exclusion in evidence of illegally seized articles.

Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

(Section 3[2], Article III, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines).

17. DE LOS SANTOS-REYES v JUDGE MONTESA

Facts: In her complaint filed on 23 March 1993, Guillerma de los Santos-Reyes charges the
respondent judge with gross ignorance of law and evident dishonesty in the performance of his
work in that he granted bail to the accused in 3 Criminal Cases without the required petition for
bail and without conducting any hearing to accord the prosecution an opportunity to establish
that the evidence of guilt of the accused was strong.

The antecedent facts which gave rise to the instant complaint are as follows:
On November 4, 1990, Patrolman Celso Reyes, Bgy. Captain Pedro Panganiban and Armando
Vitug were ambushed along Ipo-road, Kay-Pian, San Juan del Monte, Bulacan, resulting in the
untimely death of Reyes and Panganiban. The NBI conducted an inquisition of the incident and
after which charged petitioners Estelita Hipolito and Alfredo Bolsico, together with Romeo
Adviento, Romeo Permejo, Rolando Gozum and four (4) John Does with the crimes of murder
and frustrated murder before the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose del Monte, then presided over
by Judge Virginia Pagarogon.
Judge Pagarogon conducted a preliminary investigation of the witnesses and on November 14,
1990 issued an order admitting the complaint and ordering the detention of all the accused after
finding that the crimes charged have been committed and there is reasonable ground to believe
that the accused are probably guilty thereof. No bail was recommend.
On April 4, 1991, the trial court, apparently with a change of heart, issued an order consolidating
the petitions for bail, set them for hearing on April 6, 1991, and directed the DOJ and/or the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to forward to it the records of the preliminary investigation of
the cases within ten (10) days from notice. library
On April 22, 1991, the accused withdrew their motion for reinstatement of their petition for bail
bond and opted to pursue their motion to quash the warrants of arrest alleging want of probable
cause.
On May 17, 1991, after examining the records of the cases as forwarded to him by the
prosecution, the trial court found the existence of probable cause but instead of issuing the
corresponding warrants of arrest, for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over the persons of the
accused upon their apprehension or voluntary surrender, it ex mero motu granted bail to them
despite the absence of (because it was previously withdrawn) a petition for bail and, worse, the
lack of a hearing wherein the prosecution could have been accorded the right to present evidence
showing that the evidence of guilt is strong.

Respondent judge asserts that he is not administratively liable for what he did because he was
merely guided by the doctrine in Lim vs. Felix, to the effect that the determination of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest should be personally determined by the judge. Since
in these cases the issuance of the warrants of arrest was based solely on the certification of the
state prosecutor, he granted the motion to quash the warrants of arrest and, considering that on
the date of the hearing to determine probable cause the witnesses for the prosecution did not
appear and the private prosecutor submitted the issue on the basis of the proceedings had at the
preliminary investigation and the affidavits of witnesses, he formally resolved it on such basis.
He further alleges that since he found the evidence purely circumstantial, except as against
Romeo Permejo who was positively identified as the gunman, he believed that the evidence of
guilt as against the others was not strong and, accordingly, admitted them to bail in the amount of
P80,000 each.

Issue: 1.) WON a hearing is necessary for the determination of a probable cause
2.) may a judge grant application for bail without conducting any hearing to accord the
prosecution an opportunity to establish that the evidence of guilt of the accused was strong.

Ruling : A hearing is not necessary. The determination of probable cause in the issuance of a
warrant of arrest is mandated by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. In satisfying himself
of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge, following the
established doctrine and procedure, shall either:
(a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest, or
(b) if on the face of the information he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
prosecutor's certification and require the submission of the supporting affidavits of witnesses to
aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
This procedure is dictated by sound public policy; otherwise judges would be unduly laden with
the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. At this stage of a criminal proceeding, the
judge is not tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary
investigation; : it is sufficient that he (judge) personally evaluates the report and supporting
documents submitted by the prosecution in determining probable cause.
2.) To grant an application for bail and fix the amount thereof without such hearing duly called
for the purpose of determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong constitutes ignorance or
incompetence whose grossness cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or excusable
negligence or constitutes inexcusable conduct which reflects either gross ignorance of the law or
cavalier disregard of its requirements.

18. LIM VS. FELIX

Facts:
An assassination took place in Masbate Domestic Airport. In this incident, Congressman Moises
Espinosa and his security escorts were attacked and killed by a lone assassin (bad ass).
Upon preliminary investigation, it was found that probable cause had been established for the
issuances of arrest of accused Vicente Lim Sr. and 11 other dudes for the crime of Multiple
Murder
With Frustrated Murder. This investigation was based on affidavits and answers given by
witnesses .This case was then brought to the RTC of Masbate by respondent Fiscal Alfane.
Petitioners Vicente Lim Sr. and Susana Lim filed a petition to change the venue from the RTC of
Masbate to the RTC of Makati, which was subsequently granted. Their case was raffled to herein
respondent Judge Felix.

In the Makati RTC, Vicente and Susana filed a motion for all the initial records of the
preliminary
investigation which was conducted in Masbate to be transmitted to Makati. This was done so that
the Makati RTC would be best enlightened when they try to determine probable cause/prima
facie evidence against them.

In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court should conduct a hearing to
determine if there really was prima facie evidence against them based on the documents from
the preliminary investigation. This was denied for lack of merit by respondent Judge Felix. In
this
denial, he stated that the investigation in Masbate had already established prima facie evidence
against them, and that this was confirmed by the Provincial Prosecutor in Masbate. Given that
they were both competent officers, he found no reason to re examine the documents. Petitioners
then filed this case questioning respondent judges order.

Issue :
1) WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the
prosecutions certification and recommendation that probable cause exists.

Held:
NO. Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion by relying solely on
prosecutors certification.

The 1987 Constitution expressly requires probable cause to be personally determined by the
judge (Art 3., Sec. 2). If a judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor like in this
case, he or she has not personally*determined probable cause. This means that a constitutional
requirement has not been met and therefore the judge has committed grave abuse of discretion.
In this case, the records of the preliminary investigation conducted in Masbate were still in
Masbate when the warrants of arrest were issued against the petitioners. There was no basis for
the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence of a
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution.

He could
not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification.
Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the
records on the ground that the mere certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal
that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
The doctrine in Soliven v. Makasiar still stands. The judge does not have to personally examine
the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a
commissioner for the taking of evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary
documents supporting the Fiscals bare certification, which were not present in this case.
What constitutes personal examination depends on the circumstances of each case. The judge
has discretion to be as brief or as detailed in his or her examination.

However, to be sure, the

judge must at least go beyond the Prosecutors bare certification.
In this case, the evidence the petitioners presented to the judge were documents of recantation
(retraction) of witnesses whose testimonies were used to establish prima facie evidence against
them. Although, the general rule is that recantations are not given much weight in the
determination of a case and in the granting of a new trial, the respondent Judge before issuing his
own warrants of arrest should, at the very least, have gone over the records of the preliminary
examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now presented by the concerned
witnesses in view of the political undertones prevailing in the cases.

19. [G.R. No. L-8666. March 28, 1956.]

NATALIO P. AMARGA, vs. HONORABLE MACAPANTON ABBAS
Facts:
Natalio Amarga, the Provincial Fiscal of Sulu, filed in the Court of First Instance of Sulu an
information for murder (criminal case No. 1131, People of the Philippines vs. Madpirol, Awadi,
Rajah, Sali, Insa and Maharajah Bapayani). At the foot of the information the Petitioner certified
under oath that he has conducted the necessary preliminary investigation. As the only
supporting affidavit was that of Iman Hadji Rohmund Jubair, to the effect that the latter was told
that the deceased was shot and killed by three persons named: Hajirul Appang, Rajah Appang
and Awadi Bagal. Petitioner had failed or refused to present other evidence sufficient to make out
a prima facie case, leading to the decision of the Respondent dismissing the case without
prejudice to reinstatement.
Issue:
1. Whether or not a judge can hold the issuance of a corresponding warrant of arrest in a
preliminary investigation.
2. Whether or not a judge can dismiss a case without prejudice to reinstatement given the
following circumstances.
Held:
1. Yes. Respondent judge argues that the issuance of a warrant of arrest involves a judicial
power which necessarily imposes upon him the legal duty of first satisfying himself that there is
probable cause, independently of and notwithstanding the preliminary investigation made by the
provincial fiscal.
2. No. While the Respondent Judge was within his right in requiring the Petitioner to submit
further evidence so as to show probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, he exceeded
his jurisdiction in dismissing the case which was filed with the Court of First Instance of Sulu
not merely for purposes of preliminary investigation. In other words, the failure or refusal of the
Petitioner to present further evidence, although good as a ground for the Respondent Judge not to
issue a warrant of arrest, is not a legal cause for dismissal.

PETITION GRANTED.

10. 20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

EDUARDO M. BARRETO, RAUL SAGULLO and FORTUNE LEDESMA

Facts:

In a letter-complaint, 20th Century Fox Film Corporation through counsel sought the NBIs
assistance in the conduct of searches and seizures in certain videotape outlets all over Metro
Manila engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in videotape form
which constitute a flagrant violation of PD No. 49 (otherwise known as the Decree on the
Protection of Intellectual Property).

The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and
subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by
the private respondents. The applications were consolidated, heard, and issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132.

Armed with the search warrants, they raided the video outlets and seized the items described
therein. An inventory of the items seized was made and left with the private respondents. The
latter filed a motion to lift search warrants and release seized properties. The Court lifted the
search warrants.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the lower court but it was denied. Then the
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to annul the decisions made
by the lower court but again it was dismissed.

The petitioner then appealed before the SC maintaining that the lower court issued the
questioned search warrants after finding the existence of a probable cause justifying their
issuance.

Issue:

Whether there is probable cause to issue said search warrants

Held:

No. The respondent Court had an erroneous finding as to the existence of probable cause and
therefore declared the search and seizure to be unreasonable.

Probable cause for a valid search is defined "as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." Further,
"no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which
the issuance of a search warrant may be justified" in order to convince the judge, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of a
probable cause.

In the instant case, the lower court lifted the three questioned search warrants in the absence of
probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. As found out by the court, the NBI
agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their
testimony which was the alleged commission of the offense by the private respondents. Only the
petitioner's counsel who was also a witness during the application for the issuance of the search
warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private
respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. However, the
lower court did not give much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the master tapes
of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the application.

Certainly, the action of the lower court correcting such action is within the power and authority
of the respondent Court to perform, provided that it is not exercised in an oppressive or arbitrary
manner. Indeed, the order of the respondent Court declaring the existence of probable cause is
not final and does not constitute res judicata.

21. EDUARDO QUINTERO, petitioner,

vs.
THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HON. ELIAS ASUNCION, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, and HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, City Fiscal of
Pasay City, respondents.
(Sorry its so haba -.- ang daming ganap sa case eh (you can delete the part on the detail about
the amounts received if you like).. p.s. Petitioner is deceased (moot and academic), but the court
still decided on the case)

Facts:
On 19 May 1972, Eduardo Quintero, delegate of the first district of Leyte to the 1971
Constitutional Convention (Con-Con), delivered a privilege speech. He disclosed that certain
persons had distributed money to some delegates of the Con-Con, apparently in an effort to
influence the delegates in the discharge of their functions (He himself had received P11,150.00).
However, he did not reveal the names of the persons who gave him the money; and he begged at
that time not to be made to name names.

However, pressure mounted on Quintero to reveal the Identities of the people behind the
"payola" scheme. Hence, on 30 May 1972 (the day after he returned from Tacloban City, where
he had attended the funeral of his brother), Quintero released from his hospital bed in San Juan
de Dios Hospital, where he was hospitalized due to an indisposed condition, a sworn statement
addressed to the Committee on Privileges of the Con-Con, mentioning the names of the persons
who gave him the "payola." The sworn statement revealed the following:

1. Amount No. 1. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me at the Manila
Hotel on March 19, 1971, by Delegate Gabriel Yniquez. He later made me understand it from the
First Lady.
2. Amount No. 2. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was received from the office of
Representative Nicanor Yniquez of Southern Leyte on April 22, 1971.
3. Amount No. 3. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was received from Mrs. Paz Mate
(wife of Congressman Mate of Leyte) in May 1971. She told me that other delegates from Leyte
were being given the same amount of money by the First Lady.
4. Amount No. 4. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was received in the house of
Congressman Marcelino Veloso on June 2, 1971 from Delegate Domingo Veloso at Bayview Hotel,
Manila. Other envelopes were also given to other Samar-Leyte delegates.
5. Amount No. 5. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me by Delegate
Jaime Opinion on June 10, 1971 in the suite of Delegate Domingo Veloso at the Bayview Hotel,
Manila. Other envelopes were also given to other Samar-Leyte delegates.
6. Amount No 6 P500.00 The envelope containing this amount was handed to me by Delegate
Domingo Veloso in the Convention Hall on June 23, 1971. He made me understand it came "from
the same source."
7. Amount No. 7. P2,000.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me by Delegate
Ramon Salazar on June 27, 1971, in the residence of Delegate Augusta Syjuco. Delegate Salazar told
me that the First Lady met Samar-Leyte delegates that noon and since I was not in that meeting, the
money was being sent to me.
8. Amount No. 8. P200.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me by Delegate
Domingo Veloso on June 28, 1971 during a party given by President and Mrs. Diosdado Macapagal
for the delegates and their ladies. Delegate Veloso told me the money came from Delegate Augusta
Syjuco.
 9. Amount No. 9. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me by Delegate
Federico dela Plana at the Convention Hall on July 13, 1971.
10. Amount No. 10. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was left inside my drawer in
the Convention Hall on August 5, 1971 by Delegate Constantino Navarro, Jr. He said it came from
Delegate Venancio Yaneza.
11. Amount No. 11. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was placed on my desk under a
piece of paper in the session hall on August 11, 1971 by Delegate Constantino Navarro, Jr. He said it
came from Delegate Venancio Yaneza.
12. Amount No. 12. P450.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me by Delegate
Domingo Veloso on September 6,1971. He said it came "from Imelda." According to Delegate
Veloso, Yniquez took from the envelope P50.00 for an unnamed delegate.
13. Amount No. 13. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me on
September 23, 1971 by Delegate Domingo Veloso near the men's room. He said it came "from the
First Lady."
14. Amount No. 14. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me on October
6, 1971 by Delegate Domingo Veloso near the office of the Sergeant-at-Arms. Two other delegates,
Delegate Damian Aldaba and Delegate Antero Bongbong, received an envelope each that same
afternoon.
15. Amount No. 15. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me by Delegate
Gabriel Yniquez on December 2, 1971 at the entrance of the Oakroom.
16. Amount No. 16. P1,000.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me by
Delegate Gabriel Yniquez on January 13,1972. He said. "This is for the months of December and
January.
17. Amount No. 17. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me on March 7,
1972 by Delegate Flor Sagadal, in the session hall. The envelope was covered by a piece of paper
which Delegate Sagadal placed on my desk.
18. Amount No. 18. P1,000.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me by
Delegate Damian Aldaba on May 8, 1972. He said it came from Delegate Gabriel Yniquez.

Thus, the then First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, among others, was implicated in the Quintero
in expose. Hours after Quintero's statement was made public, President Ferdinand E. Marcos
went on the air and on TV to denounce Mr. Quintero, and averred that he "shall not rest until I
have unmasked this pretender, his master-minds and accomplices."

In the evening of the same day, the agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) raided
the house of Quintero, at 2281 Mayon St., Sta., Aria, Manila, on the basis of Search Warrant No.
7 issued by Judge Elias Asuncion. After the raid, said NBI agents claimed to have found in the
Quintero residence, and therefore seized, bundles of money amounting to P379,000.00. The NBI
filed with the City Fiscal of Pasay a criminal complaint for direct bribery against Quintero.

Hence, Quintero seeks to annul and declare as void and without legal effect Search Warrant No.
7, issued Judge Elias Asuncion (CFI Manila) as well as all acts and proceedings taken
thereunder.

Issue: WON the search warrant was properly issued and WON the search conducted violates his
rights
Held: 1. No. The search warrant is null and void (no force and effect) since it violates the
constitution and the Rules of Court.

The 1935 Constitution (in force at the time of the issuance of the questioned search warrant)
provides:
Article IIIBill of Rights
Section 1 (3) The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provided:
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

A search warrant may issue only upon the finding of the judge of "probable cause," defined as
"such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.

In the case at bar, the questioned search warrant was issued by Judge Asuncion, upon application
of NBI agent Samuel Castro it was also accompanied by an affidavit of the complainant,
Congressman Artemio Mate. The interrogations conducted by the respondent judge, upon the
applicant NBI agent Samuel Castro, showed that the latter knew nothing, of his own personal
knowledge, to show that Mr. Quintero had committed any offense. On the other hand, it is clear
from a careful examination of Congressman Mate's statement that, from it, no judicious,
reasonable and prudent man could conclude that probable cause existed that Mr. Quintero had
committed the crime of direct bribery. His statement is replete with conclusions and inferences
drawn from what he allegedly witnessed (seeing 2 unidentified men handing Quintero a folder
which he claims contained the money for the expose) when he visited Mr. Quintero in the
hospital. It lacked the directness and definiteness. As held in one case, persons swearing to, or
supporting the application for, search warrants, must set forth the facts that they know personally.
Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or
belief.
However, Judge Asuncion still issued the warrant. The judge should have been cautious in
issuing the search warrant and should have been alert to some ulterior motives on the part of
Congressman Mate since his wife was one of those implicated in the "expose." "The questions
propounded are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading
questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant and conducting of examination in
a general manner would not satisfy the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant."
(Probable cause was not established by the Judges investigation/interrogation)

Another circumstance which points to the nullity of the questioned search warrant, for having
been issued without probable cause, is the fact that the search warrant delivered to the occupant
of the searched premises, Generoso Quintero (nephew of Quintero), was issued in connection
with the offense of "grave threats" and not "direct bribery," which was the criminal complaint
filed against Quintero.

The offense charged or labelled in the questioned search warrant had no relation at all to the
evidence, i.e., "half a million pesos, Philippine currency," ordered to be seized in said search
warrant. There was thus no ground whatsoever for the respondent judge to claim that facts and
circumstances had been established, sufficient for him to believe that the crime of "grave threats"
had been committed, because, on the basis of the evidence alone, and what was ordered to be
seized in the search warrant he issued, no relation at all can be established between the crime
supposedly committed (grave threats) and the evidence ordered to be seized.
According to the judge, when the search warrant was presented to him by applicant NBI agent
Samuel Castro, he saw that the crime charged was for "grave threats." But after he allegedly
conducted his interrogations, he found that the proper charge should be "Direct Bribery." Hence
he caused the proper changes in the search warrant, but inadvertently, he failed to make the
proper changes in the sole copy that was presented by the NBI agents to Generoso Quintero,
although the copy retained by the NBI agents had been corrected.

To this, petitioner claimed that the changes in the questioned search warrant were made after the
search was made. According to petitioner, his counsel, Atty. Ordonez who was present during the
latter part of the raid-questioned in fact the materiality of the property being seized to the offense
stated on the warrant, i.e., "grave threats." Consequently, if the copy in the possession of the
raiding party had indeed been corrected before the search, the raiding party, would have been
able to clear up the matter at once, when petitioner's counsel raised the question with them.
However, the raiding party kept silent on the matter at that time, thereby negating their later
pretenses.

The Court notes the admission of the respondents that it was an NBI form which was used for the
search warrant, and that it was pre-filled by the applicant, before it was presented to the
respondent judge, but that, he (the judge) allegedly made the changes after he had conducted his
examination. The Court considers the act of the respondent judge in entertaining a pre-filled
search warrant as irregular; it casts doubt upon his impartiality.

2. Yes. Disregarding for a moment the absence of "probable cause," the search itself that was
conducted by the NBI agents who raided the house of petitioner, pursuant to the questioned
search warrant, was highly irregular. The two (2) occupants of the house who witnessed the
search conducted, Generoso Quintero and Pfc. Alvaro Valentin, were closeted in a room where a
search was being made by a member of the raiding party, while the other NBI agents were left to
themselves in the other parts of the house, where no members of the household were in a position
to watch them, and thus they conducted a search on their own.

Such a procedure, wherein members of a raiding party can roam around the raided premises
unaccompanied by any witness is held to be violative of both the spirit and the letter of the law,
which provides that "no search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in
the presence of at least one competent witness, resident of the neighborhood."

Another irregularity committed by the agents was their failure to comply with the requirement of
Sec. 10, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides that "The officer seizing property under
the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the person on whom or in whose
possession it was found, or in the absence of any person, must, in the presence of at least one-
witness, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property." The receipt issued by
the seizing party in the case at bar, 19 showed that it was signed by a witness, Sgt. Ignacio
Veracruz. This person was a policeman from the Manila Metropolitan Police (MMP), who
accompanied the agents of respondent NBI during the conduct of the search. This requirement of
the Rules was rendered nugatory, when the one who attested to the receipt from the raiding party
was himself a member of the raiding party.

The circumstances prevailing before the issuance of the questioned search warrant, and the actual
manner in which the search was conducted in the house of the petitioner, all but imperfectly, and
yet, strongly suggest that the entire procedure, from beginning to end, was an orchestrated
movement designed for just one purpose to destroy petitioner Quintero's public image with
"incriminating evidence," and, as a corollary to this, that the evidence allegedly seized from his
residence was "planted" by the very raiding party that was commanded to "seize" such
incriminating evidence.

22. THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE TEOFILO L, GUADIZ,
JR.,Presiding Judge, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 147: NCR (MAKATI), and
KARAMFIL IMPORT-EXPORT CO., INC., respondents.
FACTS: On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned with the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160
and 161 against the petitioners Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc., P & B Enterprises Co., Inc.,
Philippine Veterans Corporation, Philippine Veterans Development Corporation, Philippine
Construction Development Corporation, Philippine Lauan Industries Corporation, Inter-trade
Development (Alvin Aquino), Amelili U. Malaquiok Enterprises and Jaime P. Lucman
Enterprises.
The application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan
of the Bureau of Customs who is a deputized member of the PADS Task Force. Attached to the
said application is the affidavit of Josefin M. Castro who is an operative and investigator of the
PADS Task Force. Castro is likewise the sole deponent in the purported deposition to support the
application for the issuance of the six (6) search warrants involved in this case. The application
filed by Atty. Gatmaytan, the affidavit and deposition of Josefin M. Castro are all dated March
12, 1985.
The private respondent (the petitioner) went to the RTC on a petition to enjoin the
implementation of the search warrants in question. On April 16, 1985, the lower court issued the
first of its challenged Orders, and held:
...the Court hereby declares Search Warrant Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, and 161 to be null
and void. Accordingly, the respondents are hereby ordered to return and surrender immediately
all the personal properties and documents seized by them from the petitioners by virtue of the
aforementioned search warrants.
On April 4, 1986, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force went to the respondent Court of
Appeals to contest, on certiorari, the twin Orders of the lower court. In ruling initially for the
Task Force, the Appellate Court held:
Herein petitioner is a special quasi-judicial body with express powers enumerated under PD
1936 to prosecute foreign exchange violations defined and punished under P.D. No. 1883. The
petitioner, in exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with the Regional Trial Courts, and the
latter in the case at bar had no jurisdiction to declare the search warrants in question null and
void. Besides as correctly pointed out by the Assistant Solicitor General the decision of the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is appealable to the Office of the President.
On November 12, 1986, Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc. sought a reconsideration, on the
question primarily of whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is "such
other responsible officer' countenanced by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants of search and
seizure. The Court of Appeals, on Karamfil's motion, reversed itself and issued its Resolution,
dated September 1987, and subsequently, its Resolution, dated May 20, 1988, denying the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is a quasi-judicial body, and
one co-equal in rank and standing with the Regional Trial Court, and accordingly, beyond the
latter's jurisdiction
RULING: No. This Court finds the Appellate Court to be in error, since what the petitioner puts
to question is the Regional Trial Court's act of assuming jurisdiction over the private respondent's
petition below and its subsequent countermand of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task
Force's orders of search and seizure, for the reason that the presidential body, as an entity
(allegedly) coordinate and co-equal with the Regional Trial Court, is not vested with such a
jurisdiction. An examination of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's petition shows
indeed its recognition of judicial review (of the acts of Government) as a basic privilege of the
courts. Its objection, precisely, is whether it is the Regional Trial Court, or the superior courts,
that may undertake such a review.
A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court of law and
other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or
rule making."
A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential Decree
No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force
was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute
its judgments. As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the
black marketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree to handle the
prosecution of such activities, but nothing more.
The Court sees nothing in the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1936 (except with respect to
the Task Force's powers to issue search warrants) that will reveal a legislative intendment to
confer it with quasi-judicial responsibilities relative to offenses punished by Presidential Decree
No. 1883. Its undertaking is simply to determine whether or not probable cause exists to warrant
the filing of charges with the proper court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a
judicial recourse, and to recommend action "of appropriate authorities". It is not unlike a fiscal's
office that conducts a preliminary investigation to determine whether or not prima facie evidence
exists to justify haling the respondent to court, and yet, while it makes that determination, it
cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court. For it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on
the accused, not the fiscal.
If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not, hence, a quasi-judicial body, it cannot be
said to be co-equal or coordinate with the Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its enabling
statutes that would demonstrate its standing at par with the said court.
In that respect, we do not find error in the respondent Court of Appeal's resolution sustaining the
assumption of jurisdiction by the court a quo.

23. SOLIVEN VS MAKASIAR

FACTS:
Soliven broadcasted the statement that President Aquino hid under her bed during a coup
d' etat. Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran.
Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a
correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the
President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the
prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat
her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing
herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

ISSUES: In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised:

(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed
against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by
the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President;
(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge
issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses,
if any, to determine probable cause; and
(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
HELD:
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic.
MARCH 30, 1988: Secretary of Justice denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
APRIL 7, 1988: A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was
denied by the Secretary of Justice
MAY 2, 1988: On appeal, the President, through Executive Secretary, affirmed the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice
MAY 16, 1988: Motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary
With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the
administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due
process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting
his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his
right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that
the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the
constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
 produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses which Beltran contends. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to
aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting
down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is
reiterated and clarified in this resolution. It has not been shown that respondent judge has
deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of
arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot
be sustained.
On the third issue, the rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of
immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the office holders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office
and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents
behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and
submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is
solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any
other person.
Petition is dismissed

26. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL,
ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL,
FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondent

Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital,
Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their
office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a
gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male
"sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988
at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City. The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon,"
twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Bian, Laguna however it was
disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this
verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM,
for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as
the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.

On February 6, 1988 a petition for habeas corpus was filed with the court on behalf of
Umil, Dural, and Villanueva.

Issue: Whether or not the detention of the petitioners is lawful

(That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made without
warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule
113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the constitutional rights of the
persons arrested)

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and

Held: The court find no merit on the motions of the accused.

The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567)
without warrant is justified it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he
(Dural) was committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a
member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized, 7
and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8 a
continuing offense, thus:

The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such

crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion thereof,
or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all
in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from
their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. . . .
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for
the overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a
subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest,
confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day
before his arrest, without warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM
policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part
of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another
opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or
representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or
insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common"
offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission,
subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the
same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing organized
government is attained.

It may also be said, under the facts of the Umil case, that the arrest of Dural falls under Section
5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which requires

Two (2) conditions for a valid arrest without warrant

1) that the person to be arrested has just committed an offense
2) the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense

It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion

It is clear in the facts of the case that these requirements had been complied with.

The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first the day before, or on 31 January 1988,
two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5)
"sparrows" including Dural; second a wounded person listed in the hospital records as
"Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound;
third as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in
the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural.

As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by
the officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are
deemed to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to
regularly perform their official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not appear
to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural.

24.Pendon vs. CA

Facts: First lieutenant Filipe Rojas, OIC of the Philippine Constabulary - Criminal Investigation
Services filed an application for search warrant since he was informed that Kenneth Siao of
Kener trading has in his possession the NAPOCOR supplies like bolts, aluminum wires and
other tower parts and line accessory which were illegally acquired. The application of search
warrant was witnessed by an employee of NAPOCOR and an employee of CIS. Judge
Magallanes of Bacolod City then issued the search warrant. The PC officers conducted the raid
and seized bolts and angular bars.The receipt was made by PC Sergeant Digno Mamaril and
marked with "from Kenneth Siao".A complaint was filed against Siao. It was then that he also
made a counter affidavit alleging that he relinquished all his rights and ownership of the keneth
trading to Erle Pendon Jr. (petitioner ). The fiscal recommended the dismissal of case against
Siao and the filing of case against Pendon. The case was assigned to Judge Jocson of Negros
Occidental. Pendon file an application for the return of the seized items on the ground that the
search warrant was illegally issued. Judge Jocson opposed the application since one of the items
were marked with the identity of NPC. The CA also denied the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE : whether the search warrant was legal.

HELD: No. A search warrant will only be justified upon finding a probable cause. The
application failed to provide facts and circumstances which would lead to believe that an offense
was committed. The judge failed to examine the witnesses carefully in a form of searching
questions and answers to determine whether there was a probable cause. Further the possession
of those seized items were not prohibited by law. Thus the return must be made to Pendon.

25. PEOPLE VS HON. ENRIQUE INTING, G.R. No. 88919

FACTS: In 1988, Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador
Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her, a
permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote
barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by
law. The COMELEC then directed Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, then the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Dumaguete City to conduct a preliminary investigation on the case, to prepare and
file the necessary information in court, and to handle the prosecution if it was found that there
was a prima facie case.
After preliminary investigation, Lituanas found a prima facie case, hence filed a case for
violation of sec. 261 par. (h), of the Omnibus Election Code. The court then, through Judge
Inting, on Sept 30, found probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest as recommended by
Lituanas.
But Oct 3, the court set aside the Sept 30 decision because it said that a Provincial Election
Supervisor is not allowed to determine probable cause according to Art 3 Sec. 2 of the
Constitution. The court says it will give the information filed due course only if signed by the
Provincial Fiscal but the same was not given by Lituanas.

ISSUE: Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor

involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Fiscal now Provincial
Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and
determine whether or not probable cause exists?

HELD: NO, it does not need the approval of the Provincial Fiscal. While the judge alone
determines probable cause (Art. 3 Sec. 2), the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to
conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping
the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is
exclusive with COMELEC (Art. IX-C Sec. 2 par 6). The evident constitutional intendment in
bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of
elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make
a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the
COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials
in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear
constitutional mandate. Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent that the respondent trial
court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the
Provincial Election Supervisor.

26.B Umil vs. Ramos

Facts:
Rolando Dural was identified as one of the five (5) male sparrows of the New Peoples
Army who shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen. The shooting took place at Bagong, Bario,
Caloocan City during the noon of January 31, 1988. After the incident, the military agents
received information about a wounded man, listed by the hospital management at Ronnie
Javellon, was admitted to St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. The said man
was then arrested after being identified as Dural. The petition at bar is to ascertain whether the
detention prisoner was illegal or not by looking as to the questioned arrest without warrant was
made in accordance with law.

Issue:
Whether or not the arrest made without warrant is lawful

Held:
Yes. The general rule that no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest
anyone without a warrant of arrest has exceptions. The law expressly allowing arrests without
warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Courts which states that an arrest without
a warrant is lawful (1) when the person arrested is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; and (2) when the person conducting the arrest has personal knowledge of the
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. In the case at bar, the arrest
warrant was justified because in the contemplation of the said rule, Dural was committing an
offense as he was identified as a member of the NPA, an outlawed organization, where
membership is penalized. Further, his mission as a sparrow did not end at the time of the
commission of murder since subversion like rebellion or insurrection is perceived here as a
continuing offense. Also, the police officers who conducted the arrest has personal knowledge
of facts which are based on probable cause (actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion).
They also conducted the arrest in good faith, considering that they are presumed to be
performing their official duties. Thus, the arrest was lawful since it complies with those listed in
Rule 113 or the Rules of Court.

*Note: The mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member of a subversive is absolutely not
a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The court predicated the validity of the
arrests in compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long
existing law, and which, for stress, are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace
officers, and further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and circumstance
supporting the arrests

27. ATTY. MIGUEL P. PADERANGA petitioner, vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON

FACTS:
An information for multiple murder was filed in the Regional Trial Court, Gingoog City, against
Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and
Richard Doe, for the deaths on May 1, 1984 of Renato Bucag, his wife Melchora Bucag, and
their son Renato Bucag II. Venue was, however, transferred to Cagayan de Oro City. Only Felipe
Garion was tried and found guilty. The others remained at large.
Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely Roxas," "Fely Roxas" and "Lolong Roxas," was later on included as
a co-accused. Roxas retained petitioner Paderanga as his counsel. Paderanga, as counsel, filed an
Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash the Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment. The
motion was denied and instead, the City Prosecutor was directed "to conduct another preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation in order to grant the accused all the opportunity to adduce
whatever evidence he has in support of his defense.
In the course of the preliminary investigation, Felizardo Roxas was implicated herein petitioner
in the commission of the crime charged. that the preliminary investigation was not yet completed
when said resolution was promulgated, and that he was deprived of his right to present a
corresponding counter-affidavit and additional evidence crucial to the determination of his
alleged "linkage" to the crime charged.

ISSUES:
a. The preliminary investigation is not yet complete and as such, cannot be used as basis for
implicating him for the crime charged.
b. There exists no prima facie evidence or probable cause to justify his inclusion in the second
amended information.

HELD:

a. Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of

discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to
prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose
except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom
it is taken in jeopardy. As such, he can be implicated in the crime charged even if the preliminary
investigation is not yet complete.

b. A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of

determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary
investigation is such evidence sufficient to "engender a well-founded belief as to the fact of the
commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is
not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the
presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. We are in accord with the state
prosecutor's findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of petitioner's
involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence
presented and the facts obtaining therein.

29. PEOPLE VS VILLANUEVA

FACTS: On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio
Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said
municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel
de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San
Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of
the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would
appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he
would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private
prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs.
Blanco, et al.,

L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the
position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law,
he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in
entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling.
On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City
Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule
from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec.
35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel
claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by
upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged
in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon.
Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of
which read:

The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party
of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal
counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice.

HELD: In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may
appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this
criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.

WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna,
allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.
side from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and
which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused
interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides
that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor
General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to
clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was
engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did
not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is
more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1,
87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and
demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The
appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the
private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who
is a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it
is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant.

30. FISCAL PLACER, et Al. v. JUDGE VILLANUEVA

FACTS

Petitioners are fiscals of Butuan City while the respondent is the judge of Branch I City Court of
Butuan. The case stems from several criminal information which were certified by the
petitioners. According to them, they have conducted preliminary investigations to establish
probable cause, or in the words of Assistant Fiscals Felixberto Guiritan and Ernesto Brocoy
prima facie case, to allow the issuance of the warrants-of-arrest against Renato and Edgardo
Dayan (for Estafa) and Benito Ybaez (for violation of BP 22).

After receipt of the information, Judge Villanueva set a hearing for the purpose of determining
whether he would issue the corresponding warrants of arrest. After the hearing, the judge
required the petitioners to submit affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other documentary
evidences in support of the information to aid him to find probable cause.
Petitioners filed two motions for reconsideration, contending that under P.D. Nos. 77 and 911,
the petitioners are authorized to determine the existence of a probable cause in a preliminary
examination/investigation, and that their findings as to the existence thereof constitute sufficient
basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest by the court. Nevertheless, respondent judge denied
said motions and reiterated his order to petitioners to submit the supporting affidavits and other
documents within five days from notice. The reason being that it has been the practice ever since
and that he wants to satisfy a finding of probable cause.

ISSUE/S
Whether or not the respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest,
compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation.|

In the same vein, we can ask whether or not the judge, in issuing warrants of arrest, is bound by
the prima facie case/probable cause found by fiscals/prosecutors.

HELD

Yes, he may compel the fiscals to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other
documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation. Because he can, it would
also mean that he is not bound solely by the prima facie case/ probable cause found by
fiscals/prosecutors.

The reason for this can be traced in the letters of Section 6, Rule 112 of the ROC which states:
If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the
investigating officer that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant
or order for his arrest
What is controlling is not the fact that there was probable cause found in the preliminary
examination of the fiscals but if the judge is satisfied to issue the warrant of arrest. If he is not,
then he may compel the investigating officer, or in this case the fiscal, to present more evidences
or simply to dismiss the case for lack of probable cause. To wit, the issuance of a warrant is not a
mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing
magistrate.

This is even true given that the cases were summary proceedings and under Section 9, Paragraph
2 of the Rules on Summary Proceedings, it says , the complaint or information must be
accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies
as there are defendants plus two (2) copies for the court's files.

The obvious purpose of requiring the submission of affidavits of the complainant and of his
witnesses is to enable the court to determine whether to dismiss the case outright or to require
further proceedings. Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence
which, as a matter of long-standing practice had been attached to the informations filed in his
sala, respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the determination of probable
cause. In previous and ensuing instances, after petitioners had submitted the required affidavits,
respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the cases where he was satisfied
that probable cause existed.

31. TOLENTINO VS VILLALUZ, JULY 27, 1987

FACTS:
The case stems from eleven petitions filed by Tagaytay City officers. The first two petitions were
filed by the City Mayor and Vice Mayor, while the 3rd up to the 11th were filed by councilors of
Tagaytay City including Bayot, former treasurer of the city and Parra andCastillo who were the
Ating City Auditor and Incumbent Officer in Charge of the City Treasurer Office.

Prior the filing of the 11 petitions, Fiscal Mojica filed a complaint against BAyot, Parra,and
Castillo before the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal which was presided by Judge Villaluz.
The complaint involved violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for their refusal to
pay Mojicas salary (4,200/annum) since June, 1969 despite the opinion of the Sec of Justice
concurred in by the Auditor General that the salary of a City Fiscal can be paid out of the
appropriations for City Attorney.

The judge conducted preliminary examination and investigation after which he issued a
resolution ruling that under existing laws, the City fiscal was entitled to a salary from the city;
holding that there exists a prima facie case against Bayot, Parra and Castillo; ordering the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against them; directing the City Fiscal to file the necessary
information against them and to conduct a preliminary examination and investigation in the case
to determine the criminal liability of the members of the said city council and thereafter file the
corresponding information in the court of competent jurisdiction, if the evidence warrants.

After the filing of the necessary information, Espridion MAnalastas filed another complaint
against the three, but this time, the complaint included incumbent City Mayor Atty Isaac
Tolentino, and City Councilors Alfred Ner and Afren Mendiola. Manalastas asserts that they
refused to pay his salary as the Asst City Fiscal from 1971 up to the present despite the opinion
of the Sec of Justice concurred in by the Auditor General that the salary of an Asst. City Fiscal
can be paid out of the appropriations for City Attorney.

Judge Villaluz set the case for prelim investigation, after which the parties of Tolentino filed an
Urgent Motion to Quash/ Dismiss though it was denied by Judge Villaluz. A month later, a
motion for reconsideration was filed for the denial of their previous Urgent Motion to Quash was
filed but same was denied.

Hence this petition which was filed by the parties of Tolentino asserting that Judge Villaluz
giving due course to the complaints filed by Mojica and Manalastas and proceeding with the
preliminary investigation was a violation of law and the constitutional rights of the accused to
due process. They asserted that Criminal Circuit Courts were created with limited jurisdiction,
concurrent with regular courts of first instance, to try and decide only certain specific cases
pursuant to sec 1 of RA 5179.

HELD:
The contention of the petitioners is untenable. As indicated in the previous case of Collector of
Customs vs Villaluz, et. Al., supra, what is limited by RA 5179 is the scope of cases that maybe
tried by the Circuit Criminal Courts. The power of preliminary examination and investigation
exercised by judges of CFI is also possessed by the judges of Circuit Criminal Courts. The main
purpose in creating Criminal Circuit Courts is to alleviate the burden of the regular CFIs and to
accelerate the disposition of cases therein as well as to stem the tide of criminality; hence it is
logical that such authority vested in the judges of CFI is likewise conferred on Circuit Criminal
Courts. Otherwise, the CFI would still be carrying the burden of conducting preliminary
investigations in those cases where the Circuit Criminal Courts have jurisdiction and
consequently delaying the trial and disposition of criminal cases pending before such CFIs.
Another contention of the petitioners is that of improper venue alleging that Circuit Criminal
Courts have no power, authority and jurisdiction to try and decide, much less conduct the
questioned preliminary investigations of cases over crimes which are allegedly committed in the
Province of Cavite, because of improper venue. The rule is that the Circuit Criminal Courts
may hold sessions anywhere within their respective districts but this rule is subject to the
condition that cases shall be heard within the province where the crime subject of the offense
was committed. However, the law also directs that when the interests of justice so demands
with the prior approval of the SC, cases may be heard in neighboring province within the
district, which conditions do not exist in the instant petition such as to justify the hearing in
Pasig of an offense committed in the Province of Cavite.
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.