Professional Documents
Culture Documents
OBINTRODUCTION
01 - Religious Affairs v. Bayot (1955) (advertisement)
Doctrines:
Law is a profession and not a trade.
Section 25 of Rule 127 provides that the practice of soliciting cases at law for purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents of brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Facts:
Attorney Estanislao Bayot is charged with malpractice for publishing an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune on
June 13, 2943. It states that he provides the service of securing marriage licenses and performing marriage ceremonies:
Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay publicity avoided
if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the
poor. Everything confidential.
Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
Initially, he appeared in his own behalf and denied having the advertisement published. Subsequently, he
admitted, through his attorney, that he caused its publication. He asked for the indulgence and mercy of the Court,
promising not to repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the
law profession. He added that it was only published once and that he never had any case by reason of the advertisement.
Issues:
1. W/N the advertisement is a violation of legal ethics.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES.
Section 25 of Rule 127 provides that the practice of soliciting cases at law for purpose of gain, either personally
or thru paid agents of brokers, constitutes malpractice. It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his
talents as a merchant advertises his wares. By advertising his services, the lawyer degrades himself and his
profession. The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer... is the establishment
of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct. (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
In the Tagorda case, the attorney involved repeatedly made solicitations. As a result, he was suspended from the
practice of law. This case is less serious in nature. Considering Bayots plea for leniency and his promise to not
repeat his actions, the Court merely reprimanded Bayot.
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Although the latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of
donation, which provides that the administrator may be removed on the ground of ineptitude in the discharge of
his office or lack of evident sound moral character. As far as moral character is concerned, the standard
required of one seeking reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in
paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the
defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous
disbarment were wiped out.
As for the claim of intervenor, Romulo Cui, he is also a lawyer, grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of
the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession,
than Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. The intervenor contends
that the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by line and successively to the descendants of
the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named. Since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui,
who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom
the intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.
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ADMISSION TO PRACTICE
06 - Philippine Lawyers Association v. Celedonio Agrava (1959)
Doctrine:
The practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
principle, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training or experience.
In the exercise of police power, the legislature may regulate the practice of law by requiring further examination
in order to practice before any quasi-judicial or administrative agency.
Facts:
In 1957, Director Agrava of the Philippine Patent Office issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled an
examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippine
Patent Office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient
scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. The Philippine Lawyers Association
(PLA) opposed the circular and claims that one who has passed the bar examinations, licensed by the Supreme Court to
practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippine Patent
Office. Furthermore, PLA contends the issuance of such circular is in excess of Agravas jurisdiction. On the other hand,
Agrava maintains that the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes
the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the
prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers. Director Agrava further contends that just as the Patent
Law of the United States of America authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to
who practice before the United States Patent Office, he is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, as it is
patterned from the Patent Law of the United States of America.
Issue:
1. W/N the Circular is issued in excess of Director Agravas jurisdiction.
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. In general, all advice to clients, and
all action taken for them in matters connected with the law or where the work done involves the determination
by the trained legal mind although the transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings,
and those that may become involved in litigation require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill which only a
member of the bar can provide. The Supreme Court believes that the practice of law includes such appearance
before the Patent Office. The transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of
technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with
the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in
accordance with law. Moreover, the proceedings undertaken in the Patent Office, if circumstances so
require, will be elevated to the Supreme Court on appeal, a process which cannot be undertaken by anyone
but a lawyer. It is then reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training,
should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification.
On the contention of Director Agrava that he was authorized by law to conduct such examinations, the Court
ruled that his claim finds no basis in the law. There is no provision in the Patent Law which explicitly confers
upon the Director the authority to conduct such examinations in order to screen who may be admitted to
the patent office. What the law merely authorizes is the submission of application as well as other documents
which prove that the applicant does possess the skill needed to properly carry out the duties and tasks in the Patent
Office.
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Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such is incidental and consists of isolated
activities which do not fall under the denominations of practice of law
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It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the
same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. The Bar Confidant
has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make
the passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. The Bar Confidant has no
business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal
made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the
examiner.
2. Yes. Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the
Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries and, later, perjury when he declared under oath that he had
no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in
court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972
was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been
charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well
settled. Furthermore, respondents persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his having
been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very name of
the victim in that case and his continued failure to clear his name in that criminal case, indicate his lack of the
requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of
the noble profession of law.
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suspending or disbarring someone as an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has
proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney and, thus, to
protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish an attorney.
However, in this case, the Court held that respondents act was not grossly immoral as to warrant his
disbarment. From the recommendation and observation of the IBP investigator, the respondent had no intention
to flaunt the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession as shown by the following: (a) after his first
failed marriage and prior to his second marriage (for 7 years), he has not been romantically involved with any
woman; (b) his second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife; (c) he never
absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child; (d) he never disclaimed paternity over the child and
husbandry with relation to his wife; (e) since up to now, he remained celibate.
The Court found the imposition of disbarment upon him to be unduly harsh.
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she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two
previous marriages.
3. NO
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure do not apply in the determination of a lawyers
qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar because admission to the practice of law is a component of
the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest.
4. NO
In light of the public service character of the practice of law, Maelotisea is considered more of a witness than a
complainant in these proceedings. She filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented her
evidence; her evidence are now available for the Courts examination and consideration, and their merits are not
affected by her desistance.
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Espinosa later submitted a Karagdagang Salaysay stating that Omaa arrived at his residence together with a
girl whom he later recognized as the person who notarized the contract. He further stated that Omaa was not in her office
when the contract was notarized.
The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline: Espinosas desistance did not put an end to the
proceedings. The IBP-CBD found that Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD
stated that Omaa had failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of her function as a notary public and to comply
with the requirements of the law. The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense of Omaa who first claimed
that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract but then later claimed that it was her former maid who notarized
it.
Respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still disclaimed its authorship, thereby revealing much
more her propensity to lie and make deceit, which she is deserving [of] disciplinary sanction or disbarment.
The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaa be suspended for one year from the practice of law and for two years as
a notary public. Omana filed for a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
Issues:
1. W/N Omaa violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal and Espinosas
Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES
This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is
void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and
the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal
partnership, which is exactly what Omaa did in this case.
We cannot accept Omaas allegation that it was her part-time office staff who notarized the contract. We agree
with the IBP-CBD that Omaa herself notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff
who notarized the contract, it only showed Omaas negligence in doing her notarial duties. We reiterate that a
notary public is personally responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of
this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries or any member of her staff.
We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void document, Omaa violated Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Omaa knew fully well that the Kasunduan Ng
Paghihiwalay has no legal effect and is against public policy. Therefore, Omaa may be suspended from office
as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Court suspended Atty. Omana from the practice of law for 1 year and revoked her notarial commission, if still
existing, and suspended her as a notary public for 2 years.
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18 - De Ysasi III v. NLRC (Father and son feud, illegal dismissal, Counsels should try to avoid litigation)
Doctrines:
Rule 1.04: A lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end, or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement.
Facts:
In 1980, De Ysasi III (employee-son) was employed by his father, who is the private respondent in this case.
De Ysasi III was working as farm administrator for his father in Hacienda Manucao in Negros Occidental. Starting in
1982, De Ysasi III, the employee son, started suffering from various illnesses which required hospitalization. First,
he underwent fistulectomy which is the removial of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. He had to recuperate for 4 months.
Second, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis. Third, he was also confined for infectious hepatitis for 2 months.
During the entire period of the illnesses, De Ysasi II, the father-employer, took care of the medical expenses of his
son and continued to give him his salary. However, in April 1984, without due notice, the father stopped paying his
sons salary. The son made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden stop of his income flow. The
demands were not heeded. So, De Ysasi III, the employee-son, filed an action with the NLRC against his father for
illegal dismissal.
Issues:
1. W/N the father illegally dismissed his son
Held/Ratio:
1. YES, there was illegal dismissal.
The Supreme Court stated its disappointment with the respective counsels of the petitioner and respondent
for not trying hard enough to avoid litigation between a father and a son. They did not initiate steps which
would lead to the reconciliation of the family. The Court reminded the counsels that it is their duty to avoid
litigation as much as possible, as long as justice would still be served. Thats the gist of it but here is what the
Court said:
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties sorely disappoints the CourtIt is their
responsibility to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out
of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties
between their clients. The useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but
to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit.
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that (a) lawyer shall
encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement.
On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of them. The
records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a
rapprochement between their clients.
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Facts:
The Legal Clinic, Inc. had published the advertisements in annexes A and B shown below.
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THEN Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg.,
UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retirees Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-
7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
Ulep, as a member of the bar, seeks to prevent The Legal Clinic, Inc. from publishing any more of these
advertisements. Ulep asserts that such advertisements are unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of
the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. On the other hand, The Legal Clinic claims
that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of legal support services through paralegals with the use
of modern computers and electronic machines and should not therefore be banned from advertising its services.
Issues:
1. W/N The Legal Clinic, Inc. is engaged in the practice of law
2. W/N its activities can properly be the subject of advertisements
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Held/Ratio:
1. YES, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that
involves legal knowledge or skill. The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities. While some of
the services being offered by The Legal Clinic merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the
installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, it is clear that it nonetheless gives out legal information to laymen
and lawyers. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption with its
attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken.
2. NO, the advertisements are not allowed
As for the advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his
legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. He is not
supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. The standards of the legal profession
condemn the lawyers advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The
prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the practice of law is a profession.
Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc., was
reprimanded by the Court, with a warning that running more advertisements similar to the ones above will be
dealt with more severely. FooThe Legal Clinic is prohibited from further advertising its services.
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The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner
continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring
of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
As for decisions in the United States, there is a custom allowing such. Many firms in the city use the names of
deceased members with the approval of other attorneys, bar associations and the courts.
A local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact. There is no proof of the existence of a local custom, and
of the elements requisite to constitute the same in the Philippines.
Petitioners desire to preserve the identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to legal and ethical
impediment.
Justice Aquino dissent: petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of the two firms
(as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they
served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased founders is to retain the
clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill
attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
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3. Lawyers Oath (To do no falsehood) because he led Ramos to believe that he really filed an action against
the Jovellanoses. He made it appear the cases were being tried and asked Ramos for appearance fees for
hearings which never took place.
Contrary to the findings of the IBP Board, Atty. Imbing did not violate:
1. Rule 16.01 (Duty to account for all money / property received for / from his client). There was insufficient
basis for finding him guilty because he did not hold the P5,000 of Ramos in trust. He accepted them as his
attorneys fees. But he should still return it because he is not allowed to accept them, being a government lawyer.
He was disbarred from the practice of law.
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government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts
which do not fall within the scope of the term matter and cannot disqualify. It goes without saying that
Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged
intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 (liquidation of Genbank) is an intervention on a
matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096 (the case involving the ill gotten wealth).
The petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading; hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza
as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent
Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with
the prejudice to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a
disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer
in whom the client has confidence The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit
of the work done by the latter
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official
independence of lawyers in the government service. The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the
office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General
should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General
to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend
officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue diminution of the independence of the Solicitor General
will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that
the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the
fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 was not yet adopted by the IBP and
approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose
length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable.
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Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Atty. Buffes petition for declaratory relief does not serve to justify her actions in violation of the law.
Under Section 7 of RA 6713, the general rule is that all public officers are not allowed to practice their profession
privately during their incumbency. The exception is when the Constitution or the law permits it or when such
practice will not conflict with their official functions. This prohibition extends to a period of 1 year after
relinquishment of their public duties, except that during this period, they may engage in the private practice
allowed by the law under (b)(2). The exception to this exception is when the allowable private practice involves a
matter before the public office one previously was affiliated with.
In this case, Atty. Buffe, within a year from her resignation, appeared before the same RTC branch, where she
served as clerk of court in violation of RA 6713. Atty. Buffe did not deny these appearances. The doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur applies.
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29 - Rey Vargas et al v. Atty. Michael Ignes (2010) (Disbarment case, counsel without authority)
Doctrines:
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so .
A lawyer appearing after his authority as counsel has expired is also appearance without authority.
Facts:
Koronadal Water District (KWD) is a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC). Atty. Michael
Ignes was hired as private legal counsel for 1 year effective April 17, 2006 with the consent of the Office of
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and Commission on Audit (COA). Controversy erupted when 2 different
groups, the Dela Pea Board and Yaphockun Board, simultaneously claimed to be the legitimate Board of Directors of
KWD.
The Dela Pea Board adopted Resolution 9 appointing respondents Atty. Rodolfo Viajar Jr. and Atty.
Leonard Mann as private collaborating counsels for all cases of KWD and its Board under the supervision of Atty.
Ignes.
On February 16, 2007 the OGCC approved the retainership contract of Atty. Benjamin Cunanan as new
legal counsel of KWD. This was pursuant to the Local Water Utilities Administrations confirmation that the Yaphockun
Board was the new board and that the latter requested for new counsel. In addition, it stated that the contract of Atty.
Ignes expired on January 14, 2007. Still, the following cases were filed by Attys. Ignes, Viajar and Mann:
Feb. 9 2007 Indirect Contempt of Court: KWD represented by its Gen. Manager Eleanor Gomba v. Efren
Cabucay
Feb. 19, 2007 Civil Case for Injunction and Damages: KWD represented by its Gen. Manager Eleanor Gomba
v. Rey Vargas
Mar. 9, 2007 Supplemental Complaint for the previous case
As a result, the complainants filed a disbarment case before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). The
IBP Board of Governors dismissed the disbarment case. The Investigating Commissioner recommended that the case
against Atty. Ignes be dismissed for lack of merit holding that he was unaware of the pre-termination of his contract when
he filed pleadings in the abovementioned cases. As to Attys. Viajar, Mann and Nadua, they were fined P 5,000 each for
failing to secure the conformity of the OGCC and COA to their employment as collaborating counsels. Hence, this
petition for review.
Issues:
1. W/N the respondents willfully appeared as counsel for KWD without legal authority and if yes, are
administratively liable for doing so.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Section 3 of Memorandum Circular No. 9 enjoins GOCCs from employing private lawyers/firms from
handling their cases and legal matters but under exceptional circumstances may do so provided,
a. The written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel,
as the case may be AND
b. The written concurrence of the COA shall first be secured before the hiring of a private lawyer/firm.
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Despite admitting to be aware of the existence of MC 9 requiring indispensible conditions before a GOCC
can hire private counsel and that non-compliance with them would render said private counsel no
authority to file a case in behalf of a GOCC, they signed pleadings and voluntarily represented themselves
as counsels of KWD. Also, the respondents authority as counsel had already been raised in the previous civil
cases by virtue of an urgent motion to disqualify KWD counsels dated Feb 21, 2007 and even during the hearing 2
days later.
Even if they claim that their professional fees were not paid from the public coffers of KWD, it is clear that they
appeared as counsels of KWD without authority and not merely as counsel of the Dela Pea Board and KWD
personnel in their private suits as claimed as one of their defenses.
For Atty. John Nadua: Only the 4th Whereas Clause of Res. No. 9 partly stated that he and Atty. Ignes presently
stand as KWD legal counsels. No proof that COA and OGCC approved his engagement.
For Attys. Viajar and Mann: Although Resolution 9 granted them authority to act as collaborating counsels of
KWD, it had no approval from the OGCC and COA.
For Atty. Ignes: Although the OGCC and COA approved his retainership contract for 1 year effective April 17,
2006, he appeared as counsel of KWD without authority when it expired. Even assuming that he was not notified
of the pre-termination of his contract, records prove that he continued representing KWD even after April 17,
2007. A lawyer appearing after his authority as counsel has expired is also appearance without authority.
Disbarment should not be decreed where any less severe such as reprimand, suspension or fine would accomplish
the end desired. Attys. Ignes, Mann, Viajar and Nadua are found guilty of appearing as attorneys without
authority to do so and fined P5,000 each and are sternly warned that a similar offense in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
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Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No. 784, respondent acted rudely
towards an officer of the court.
Respondent ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the
public estimation and erode public respect for it. These acts violate Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, to wit:
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to
practice law, now shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their brethren. This esteem cannot be
purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contexts and thrives
despite conflicting interest. It emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skills in the honorable
performance of professional duty.
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Doctrines:
A lawyer should not steal another lawyers client, nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better
service, good result or reduced fees for his services.
Facts:
Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office filed a disbarment complaint against Atty.
Tolentino. He alleged that Tolentino is guilty of solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.
Linsangan claimed that Tolentino and his paralegal, Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation.
Linsangan said that Tolentino promised them financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. Tolentino
apparently called and texted Linsangans clients.
To support his allegations, Linsangan presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried
to convince him to sever his association with Linsangan and employ Tolentinos services and even be able to get a loan of
P50,000. Linsangan also presented Labianos calling card which specifically states, w/ financial assistance.
Tolentino denied knowing Labiano and the printing and circulation of the said calling cared in his answer.
However, he later admitted that he knew her during the mandatory hearing.
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP found that Tolentino encroached on the professional
practice of Linsangan, violating Rule 8.02. He also contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain. The CBD
recommended that Tolentino be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
Issues:
1. W/N the Tolentino should be disbarred?
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. HOWEVER, the SC held that he should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and is
sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Rule 8.02 requires that A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of
another lawyer. Tolentino violated such canon. The means employed by Tolentino in furtherance of such
misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules. A lawyer should not steal another lawyers
client, nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his
services. Tolentino never denied having Linsangans clients in his own client list. He also did not deny Labianos
connection to his office. Hence, Tolentino committed an unethical, predatory overstep in anothers legal practice.
The SC also noted that Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, 16.04 and Canon 3 of the CPR, and Section 27, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. The SC also reminded lawyers what professional cards should contain: (1) lawyers
name, (2) name of firm with which he is connected, (3) address, (4) telephone number, and (5) special branch of
law practiced.
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42 - Atty. Bonifacio Barandon v. Atty Edwin Ferrer (2010) (drunk lawyer, uttered invectives)
Doctrine:
A lawyers language should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The
use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.
Facts:
Atty. Barandon filed a complaint-affidavit with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate
disciplinary actions against Atty. Ferrer.
Atty Barandon was alleging Atty Ferrers conduct and the words he uttered at the courtroom of
Municipal Trial Court Daet before the start of a hearing (Civil Case 7040). Atty. Ferrer was drunk when he
uttered the words: Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling
na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogadona rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur,
hindi kayo taga-rito.
The Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted a Report, recommending the
suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove
Atty. Ferrers violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Ferrer attributed to
Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the falsification of the plaintiffs affidavit despite the absence of evidence
that the document had in fact been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it. The Investigating Commissioner
also found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the presence of other counsels, court
personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing.
The IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioners
recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating Commissioner erred in finding respondent
Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges against him
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite the
adversarial nature of our legal system.
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy,
fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Specifically, in Rule 8.01, A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper. Atty. Ferrers actions do not measure up to Rule 8.01. Evidence shows
that he imputed to Atty. Barandon pure malice when he had no evidence of the falsification of the affidavit
and that Atty. Barandon authored the same.
Atty. Ferrer also violated Canon 7, particularly rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflect on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession. Ferrer uttered the invectives against Barandon with intent to annoy,
humiliate, incriminate, and discredit the former. A lawyers language should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind
ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. He should be aware that such kind of public behavior
can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it.
The SC affirmed the one-year suspension of Atty. Ferrer as ordered by the IBP-CBD.
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authenticated by the NSO. The erroneous entries in the birth certificates of her children as to the place and date of her
marriage were merely an oversight.
Cambaliza filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint after realizing that this disbarment case arose out of a
misunderstanding and misappreciation of facts. She is NO LONGER INTERESTED in pursuing this case. IBP did
not act on this Motion.
Report of the IBP: IBP found Atty. Cristal-Tenorio guilty of the charge of cooperating in the illegal practice of
law by Felicismo Tenorio, in violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility based on
the following evidence:
1. The letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., as a senior partner
2. The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card of Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., signed by
Atty. Cristal-Tenorio as Chairperson
3. Order by the MTC in a criminal case wherein Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., entered his appearance as counsel
and even moved for the provisional dismissal of the case
IBP recommended that Atty. Cristal-Tenorio be reprimanded. IBP Board of Governors modified the
penalty from reprimand to suspension from the practice of law for 6 months.
Issues:
1. W/N IBP should have acted on the disbarment case notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint by
Cambaliza
2. W/N Atty. Cristal-Tenorio should be suspended
Held/Ratio:
1. YES
The IBP was correct in not acting on the Motion to Withdraw Complaint filed by Cambaliza. SC quoted from
another case:
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where
the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts
of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them The complainant or
the person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense
a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be
suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.
2. YES
A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law is
guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:
Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any
task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer
for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding ones self out as a
lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court
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in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law.
Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law.
In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds himself out as one. His wife, the
respondent herein, abetted and aided him in the unauthorized practice of the legal profession.
Atty. Cristal-Tenorio admitted that the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office listed Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.,
Gerardo A. Panghulan, and Maricris D. Battung as senior partners. She admitted that the first two are not
lawyers but paralegals. They are listed in the letterhead of her law office as senior partners because they
have investments in her law office. That is a blatant misrepresentation.
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on
public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals
found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual
and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It
devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin
him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized
practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject
to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
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Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however,
he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his
vicious tirade against this Court.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacens petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself.
The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds
of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract
public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring the Court and its members into disrepute and destroy
public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice.
Because of this, Atty. Almacen is suspended indefinitely, until further orders.
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A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of
justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice. Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties
of the people. Thus has it been said of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty
to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to
the proper administration of justice.
Since lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their
clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients success is wholly subordinate;
and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.
The Supreme Court found the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration
of justice. He is held guilty of contempt of court.
Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto
Sotto accuses petitioners of having made false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice
the courts against MacArthur. He brands such efforts as scattershot desperation. He describes a proposition of
petitioners as corrupt on its face, laying bare the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners.
A lawyers language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. It is Sottos duty as a
member of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor
or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. He
is thus guilty of contempt.
Atty. Graciano C. Regala, Atty. Erlito R. Uy
They are not really involved in the preparation of the pleadings. Not guilty.
SECOND INSTANCE OF CONTEMPT
First, it was not filed with leave of court.
Second, The Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and
specifically states that it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote. While Morton Meads
is admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being foisted upon this
Court. There was a qualification to the rule quoted and that qualification was intentionally omitted.
Third, the motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United States
government in order to reverse the decision of the Court.
Atty. Calig Contends that he was dragged in the case only in the last minute. However, he still should have made
sure that his name would not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character.
Atty. Santiago contends that he had nothing to do with the fourth motion. Nonetheless, A lawyer should use his
best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought
not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and
suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation.
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with
complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a
judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the
assaults of disrespect.
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wit: The Counter-complainant Batan failed to submit any position paper to substantiate its claims despite
sufficient opportunity to do so.
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Also, the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to decide cases within 2 years from the date of
submission. As for the Oppus case, it is no longer pending as it was already been disposed of and was decided by
another ponente. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, there are no more than ten thousand cases pending in the
Supreme Court at any one time.
Claiming that De La Serna had been informed that a member of the Court was involved in bribery, yet he chose to
remain silent in the meantime and to divulge the information long after he had come to know that he lost the case.
He failed to inform the Court of this matter waited until Nov. 4, 2007 before he divulged the alleged bribery in his
Request for Inhibition which he did not even alleged in his prior Motion for Reconsideration.
While admitting that he did not even verify from other sources if Mr. Chans statement had any factual basis, De
La Serna offers another feeble explanation for his delayed reaction in that he could not just go to the Supreme
Court and request for investigation, as he could not even pass through the guards. A lawyer of De La Sernas
caliber and experience would know that there is a proper way of lodging a formal complaint for investigation,
including sending it by registered mail.
De La Serna is found guilty of indirect contempt of court.
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CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
Atty. Barcelona has demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting to clients that he has the proper connections to
secure the relief they seek, and thereafter, ask for money, which will allegedly be given to such connections. In
this case, he misrepresented to Berbano that he could get the release of Mr. Porfirio Daen through his connection
with a Supreme Court Justice. Not only that, he even had the audacity to tell Berbano that the Justices of the
Supreme Court do not accept checks.
Its also not his first time to be charged with and found guilty of conduct unbecoming a lawyer. In a case filed by
Gil Aquino, Atty. Barcelona misrepresented that he could secure the restructuring of a loan though his connection
with a legal assistant named Gonzalo in PNB. He got 60k from Aquino but there was no such employee by the
name of Gonzalo.
The Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of corruption and malpractice. For a member of the
legal profession to further stoke the embers of mistrust on the judicial system with such irresponsible
representations is reprehensible and cannot be tolerated. Atty. Barcelona made a mockery of the Judiciary and
further eroded public confidence in courts and lawyers
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Subsequently, Atty. Paderanga filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim before Sheriff Suarin, the sheriff executing
the judgment in the said civil case. He claimed that he was the owner of another parcel of land and a FUSO (Canter series)
vehicle, which he bought from the spouses, both of which could be erroneously levied by a writ of execution issued in the
civil case. He filed for Annulment of Judgment with prayer for the issuance of an injunction and temporary restraining
order (TRO) with damages against Hegna, Judge Rosales and Suarin.
Hegna sent a letter-complaint to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) against Paderanga for deliberately
falsifying documents, which caused delay in the execution of the decision, arguing that the third-party claim was full of
irregularities, one of which was that the transfer of the properties were not registered with the Register of Deeds.
Paderange replied that he did not bother to register such properties for estate-planning purposes and that he had planned
to re-sell the properties.
The Court referred the administrative complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP found that
there was a multitude of irregularities surrounding the execution of the Affidavit and, coupled with the letter sent by the
Panaguinip spouses left unrebutted by Paderanga, there is substantial evidence that the Affidavit of Third Party Claim was
purposely filed to thwart the enforcement of the decision in the forcible entry case. This was also adopted by the IBP
Board of Governors who suspended Paderange for 1 year.
Issue:
1. W/N Paderanga violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Although Paderange denied having acted as counsel for the Panaguinips in the forcible entry case filed by
complainant, his involvement in the said case was still highly suspect. After the writ of execution had been issued,
he went with them to amicably settle with Hegna on two separate occasions, ostensibly to protect his own
interests. He actually led Hegna to believe that he was, in fact, the counsel for defendants-spouses. It was only
after the meetings had transpired that he received the affidavit of a third-party claim executed by Paderange,
stating that the he was the owner of the property and motor vehicle.
The Court is more inclined to believe that when Hegna and the Panaguinips failed to reach an agreement,
Paderange came forward as a third-party claimant to prevent the levy and execution of said properties. He,
therefore, violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. This conduct has been construed not to pertain
exclusively to the performance of a lawyers professional duties.
In addition, while the act of registration of a document is not necessary in order to give it legal effect as between
the parties, requirements for the recording of the instruments are designed to prevent frauds and to permit and
require the public to act with the presumption that a recorded instrument exists and is genuine. While Paderanges
acts may not be considered as falsification, he had shown intent to defraud the government, which had the right to
collect revenue from him.
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with Motion for Reinvestigation. He claimed that forum shopping was not the sole issue raised for resolution but also
respondents alleged violation of the Oath of Attorney. He argued that the IBP should have also discussed and resolved
respondents act of allegedly resurrecting Jovita de Macasieb from the dead and for allowing an impostor to impersonate
the dead.
Issue:
1. W/N the case should be dismissed?
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Even assuming to be true complainants allegation that he only learned on October 3, 2006, that the
mortgagor, Jovita de Macasieb, has been dead since 1968, still he failed to raise this issue at the Mandatory
Conference before the IBP where the issues were defined. The transcript of stenographic notes taken during the
mandatory conference on September 13, 2007, long after complainant allegedly knew of the death of Jovita de
Macasieb, shows that respondents act of allegedly resurrecting Jovita de Macasieb from the dead and for
allowing an impostor to impersonate the dead was never raised as an issue
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61 - Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Augusto Sanchez and the Union of Filipro Employees (1987)
Kimberly Independent Union for Solidarity, Activism, and Nationalism Olalia v. NLRC (1987)
(Picketing outside the SC)
Doctrine:
It is the duty of lawyers, as officers of the Court, to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and
proper attitude toward courts of justice.
An abuse of the exercise of the right to petition the Court would amount to an attempt to influence the Court.
Facts:
[This is a consolidated case.]
Petitions of the Union of Filipro Employees and Kimberly Independent Union were pending before the Supreme
Court. From June-July 1987, the two unions picketed outside the Supreme Court premises, obstructing access to the
premises. The unions and their respective counsels, Atty. Espinas (for Filipro) and Atty. Flores (for Kimberly), were
summoned by the Court to appear before them and explain why they should not be held in contempt, and were informed
that their petitions would not be entertained if they continue picketing. Atty. Espinas and the unions appeared before
the Court. Espinas apologized to the Court in behalf of the picketers and assured that the acts would not be repeated. He
also asked for the Courts leniency and explained that the picketing was actually spearheaded by an unregistered union
and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly Independent Union. He also assured the Court that he
explained to the unions that the reason for the delay in the resolution of their cases was due to factors beyond the
powers of the Court and that the Court has been steadfast in its duty to protect the Constitution.
Issue:
1. W/N the Unions and their Counsels should be cited for contempt.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO but only because they desisted from conducting pickets and the Court accepted their apology. The right
of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. However, an abuse of
this right would amount to an attempt to influence the Court in resolving matters in their favor. It is well
settled that in the determination of cases, the Courts should be immune from every extraneous influence; that
facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies. An attempt to influence the Court is a violation of the right of
the adverse party and the citizenry to an impartial trial.
In the case at bar, the SC acknowledged that the picketers are not knowledgeable in the intricacies of the law. It is
the duty of their lawyer to tell them the consequences of their actions, which Atty. Espinas did after his
attention was called by the Court.
The Court ordered that the incident be a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is their duty as
officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward
courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their members.
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Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. - He engaged in deceitful conduct by taking advantage of the
complaint against CDO to advance his interest to obtain funds for his Batas Foundation and seek sponsorships
and advertisements for the tabloids and his television program.
Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates a lawyer to refrain from making public
statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. - He
continued with his attacks against Foodsphere despite the pendency of the civil case and the issuance of a status
quo order against him.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. - He defied the said status quo order.
Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to conduct himself
with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel, and that a lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper, by using intemperate language.
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity
and the dignity of the legal profession. - He failed to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting
standards of the legal profession.
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He also violated the Lawyers Oath, as he swore to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. As a senior state prosecutor
and officer of the court, he should have set the example of observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts
and to judicial officers.
The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly provide for the
proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the institution must always be maintained.
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That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were furnished to Francisco and that there was no secret
communication transmitted would not vary the situation. The mere relation of attorney and client precludes
the attorney from accepting the opposite partys retainer in the same litigation regardless of what
information was received by him from his first client.
The court held: So without impugning respondents good faith, we nevertheless can not sanction his taking up
the cause of the adversary of the party who had sought and obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not
necessarily to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but to keep above reproach the honor and integrity of
the courts and of the bar. Without condemning the respondents conduct as dishonest, corrupt, or fraudulent, we
do believe that upon the admitted facts it is highly in expedient. It had the tendency to bring the profession, of
which he is a distinguished member, into public disrepute and suspicion and undermine the integrity of justice.
Also, that it was his partner who wrote the letter and that he merely signed it without reading it would not save
Atty. Francisco in this case because an information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm
is information imparted to the firm.
The motion for disqualification should be allowed.
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66 - Gonzales v. Chavez (1992) (OSG withdraws because he was made laughing stock)
Doctrine:
The Office of the Solicitor General is mandated by law to represent the Government and its agencies in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer.
Solicitor General is obligated to perform his functions and to perform them well. He may not abdicate his
function through an arbitrary exercise of his discretion. Withdrawal of appearance on flimsy and petty
grounds is tantamount to withdrawing on no grounds at all.
Facts:
This case involves a complaint against then Solicitor General, Francisco Chavez. SolGen Chavez (Counsel of the
Republic and PCGG) was then handling various cases (39 for PCGG, 144 total.) Then suddenly in 1990 he withdrew as
counsel for the PCGG and filed petition for Withdrawal of Appearance with Reservation. This resulted in PCGG hiring
40 private lawyers to continue the case where they would each receive monthly compensation of 10k. (the PCGG cases
were about the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos and cronies)
Petitioner Gonzales (as citizen taxpayer) then filed a complaint against the Solicitor General and PCGG on the
ground that it affects matters on public duty and unlawful expenditures of public fund. There are 2 main points in his
allegations. (1) Solicitor Generals unilateral withdrawal from the PCGG cases is null and void because it has no valid
reason and theres no consent of the Republic or the PCGG. In citing a case, Gonzales states that because its the duty of
the SolGen to appear for the Republic, he must proceed to discharge his duty regardless of personal convictions or
opinions. (2) PCGG acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in hiring private lawyers as substitutes for the SolGen. He
claims that by employing private lawyers, PCGG created a public office and named new public officers (actions not
within their authority.)
In his defense, OSG claims that Sol Gen Chavez inhibited himself from appearing in the cases because for them
the subject is already a closed matter. (e.g. OSG argued that asset was under sequestration only to be informed by adverse
party that such order was already lifted) basically SolGen says that all throughout the proceedings they could not
perform his functions because of the lack of consultation and communication with PCGG. SolGen does not want to
continuously be the laughing stock so he withdraws from appearing in the said cases.
In their defense, PCGG asserts that hiring private lawyers is not ultra vires act for it was a means by which it can
effectively exercise its powers. PCGG claims that pon the withdrawal of SolGen it badly needed some legal assistance
because of the complexities of the said case. The 2 prosecutors sent by the DOJ was not enough. Hiring private lawyers
was geared to protect the interest of the State.
Issues:
1. W/N Solicitor General neglected his public duty by withdrawing as counsel for RP and PCGG (in cases he filed in
court)
2. W/N PCGG acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in hiring private lawyers as result of such withdrawal of
appearance.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The Court held that the withdrawal of the SolGen mainly for the main reason that he had already become
the laughing stock in the hearings is arbitrary. The Court looked through the revised Admin Code, Sec 35
wherein it states that OSG was tasked to represent the Govt of the Philippines, its agencies in any litigation,
proceeding and investigation or matters requiring the services of a lawyer. In this case the Court delved on the
history of Solicitor General and the power and nature bestowed upon him by the law. According to the SC, Sol
Gen (as a public officer) is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving
disputes. The SolGen in this case, therefore, is compelled to appear before court to ensure that case of RP against
those who illegally amassed wealth at the expense of people be made accountable.
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In the end, SC finds that SolGens withdrawal of his appearance on behalf of the PCGG (ultimately the Filipino
people- his client) was beyond the scope of his authority. As a public official, it is his sworn duty to provide
legal services to Govt particularly to represent it in litigation. Withdrawal from case because of flimsy, petty
and arbitrary grounds (such as to stop being the laughing stock) renders such action null and void.
2. NO. The Court held that PCGGs action of hiring private lawyers was justified because upon the withdrawal of
the OSG, the former was left without the proper and sufficient legal assistance to continue in the campaign to
legally recover wealth amassed by the Marcoses. They are left with no choice but to hire private lawyers to
continue the work left by the SolGen.
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Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The test of the conflict of interest in disciplinary cases against a lawyer is whether or not the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client
or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof. Applying it to the present
cases, the Court found no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Solicitor General upholding the complaints
against the Ocampo. His aforementioned acts of representing Blaylock, and at the same time advising Tiania, the
opposing party, as in the first administrative case, and once again representing Blaylock and her interest while
handling the legal documents of another opposing party as in the second case, whether the said actions were
related or totally unrelated, constitute serious misconduct. They are improper to the Ocampos office as attorney.
Taking into consideration the advanced age of the Ocampo who is 73 years old, the Court found him guilty of
malpractice and gross misconduct and suspend him from the practice of law for 1 year.
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consent. A lawyer engaged as counsel for corporation cannot represent members of the same corporations board
of directors in a derivative suit brought against them. To do so would be tantamount to representing conflicting
interest.
In the case at bar, records show that in the SEC case filed by the PPSTA against its own Board of Director,
Sulunat as managing partner of the law firm retained by PPSTA, appeared as counsel of record for the Board of
Director. In this case, Salunat was guilty of conflict of interest when represented the parties against whom his
other clients, the PPSTA, filed suit. In the Ombudsman case, Salunat filed an Manifestation of Extreme Urgency
when he prayed for dismissal of the complaints against his clients, the individual board members. By filing the
pleading, he entered his appearance. This also constitute conflict of interest considering that the complaint in the
name of the individual member of the PPSTA was brought in behalf of and to protect the interest of the
corporation.
Salunat was found guilty and considering this was only his first offence he is only ADMONISHED.
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73 - Clarita J. Samala v. Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (2007) (Memory Aid - maximum of 5 words only)
Facts:
This is a case filed by Clarita J. Samala against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia for Disbarment on the following
grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by
submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d)
having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children. After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its
Resolution, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
Issues:
1. W/N Atty. Valencia is guilty of serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties (RULE 15
and RULE 21 issue)
2. W/N Atty. Valencia knowingly mislead the court by submitting false documentary evidence (RULE 10)
3. W/N Atty. Valencia is guilty of being immoral by siring illegitimate children (RULE 1)
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. In case No. 95-105-MK, Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez for nonpayment of rentals, Valencia, while
being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and
Bayuga by filing an Explanation and Compliance.
In another case No.98-6804, Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante and her husband for
ejectment, Valencia represented Valdez against Bustamante - one of the tenants in the property subject of the
controversy. In the decision, Presiding Judge dela Cruz warned Valencia to refrain from repeating the act of being
counsel of record of both parties.
But in Case No. 2000-657-MK, entitled Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds of
Marikina City, Valencia, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages and
Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title against Alba, respondents former client in Civil Case No. 98-6804
and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.
Records reveal that at the hearing, Valencia admitted that in Case No. 95-105-MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay
but not for Bustamante and Bayuga. He also admitted that he represented Valdez against Bustamante and her
husband but denied being the counsel for Alba although the case is entitled Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and
her husband because Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the property and it was only
Valdez who signed the complaint for ejectment. But, while claiming that he did not represent Alba, he, however,
avers that he already severed his representation for Alba when he charged Alba with estafa Civil Case No. 2000-
657-MK for not turning over the proceed collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804.
Termination of the relation of attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest
adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the
severance of the relation with his client, do anything, which will injuriously affect his former client in any
matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the clients confidences
acquired in the previous relation. Termination of the attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney from
representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former client. Alba may not be his original client but the
fact that he filed a case entitled Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband, is a clear indication that
respondent is protecting the interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case.
Valencia is bound to comply with Rule 15.03, Canon 15 which states that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. and Canon 21 which
states that a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation
is terminated. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his clients case. He learns from his
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client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and
guarded with care.
2. YES. In a case for ejectment, respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdezs ownership despite
the fact that a new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the name of Alba. Records reveal that respondent filed
Civil Case No. 00-7137 on November 27, 2000 and presented TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdezs
ownership of the subject property. During the hearing before Commissioner Raval, Valencia avers that when the
Answer was filed in the said case, that was the time that he came to know that the title was already in the name of
Alba; so that when the court dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything anymore. He further avers that
Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him only when the case for rescission was filed in
2002. Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK for rescission of contract
and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on November 27, 2000, thus belying the averment of
respondent that he came to know of Albas title only in 2002.
Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10, which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. It matters not
that the trial court was not misled by respondents submission. What is decisive in this case is respondents intent
in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title was already cancelled
and a new one, was already issued in the name of Alba.
3. Yes. During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay while his first wife
was still alive. He also admitted that he has eight children by his first wife and after his wife died in 1997, he
married Lagmay in 1998. He further admitted that Lagmay was staying in one of the apartments being claimed by
complainant. However, he does not consider his affair with Lagmay as a relationship and does not consider the
latter as his second family. It is of no moment that respondent eventually married Lagmay after the death of his
first wife. The fact still remains that respondent did not live up to the exacting standard of morality and decorum
required of the legal profession.
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the latter. Atty. Pascual-Lopez wrote explaining that all the properties and cash turned over to her by complainant
had been returned to her clients who had money claims against Multitel. In exchange for this, she said that she was
able to secure quitclaim documents clearing complainant from any liability. Still unsatisfied, Pacana decided to file
an affidavit-complaint against Pascual-Lopez before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of Pascual-Lopez. In sum, Pacana avers that a lawyer-client relationship was
established between him and Atty. Pascual Lopez although no formal document was executed by them at that time.
Issue:
1. W/N Atty. Pascual-Lopez represented conflicting interests
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Pascual-Lopezs act of constantly and actively communicating with Pacana and assisting him by giving
legal advice eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility provides:
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.
Pascual-Lopez cannot shield herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying that
the assistance she rendered to complainant was only in the form of friendly accommodations, precisely
because at the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the
opposing parties who had been referred to her by the SEC.
The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship between
the parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the
contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an
attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession
Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing, which Pascual-Lopez should have done was either to advise
complainant to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already representing the opposing parties, or
to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be
permitted to do both because that would amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of
interest
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77 - Daniel Lemoine v. Amadeo Balon, Jr. (2003) (Insurance Claim + Attorneys lien)
Doctrine:
A lawyer must hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that he may come to possess. This
commandment entails certain specific acts to be done by a lawyer such as rendering an accounting of all money
or property received for or from the client, as well as delivery of the funds or property to the client when due
or upon demand.
A lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his dealings with his client not only violates his duty of fidelity,
loyalty and devotion to the clients cause but also degrades himself and besmirches the fair name of an honorable
profession.
Facts:
Daniel Lemoine, a French national, filed a complaint before the IBP against Atty. Balon for estafa and
misconduct. Balon Jr. acted as Lemoines attorney in an insurance claim against Metropolitan Insurance regarding his lost
vehicle. A certain Jess Garcia arranged for the meeting of Balon and Lemoine. Balon insisted that for his fees, he shall be
paid 25% of whatever amount is to be collected from the insurance company. Lemoine objected to this arrangement,
but still hired the services of Balon.
A few days before Dec. 23, 1998, Lemoine signed an undated, prepared Special Power of Attorney authorizing
Garcia or Balon to institute actions, negotiate and encash checks received from Metropolitan. On Dec. 23, the SPA was
dated and Metropolitan issued a check payable to Lemoine for P525,000. Balon received the check. Fast forward,
Lemoine inquired with Garcia about the status of the claim, Garcia echoed to him that Balon wrote him a letter on March
1999 stating that the claim was still pending, that it is still subject to negotiations and that Metropolitan offered 350K. He
suggested to Garcia that they accept the 350K to avoid litigation.
On Dec 1999, Lemoine went to Metropolitan Insurance to personally inquire about the claim and he learned that it
had long been settled in Dec 1998. He immediately went to Balons law office. The next day Balon sent Lemoine a letter
stating that he is in fact in possession of the money but he will not turn it over to Lemoine and will continue to retain it
until Lemoine pays him an amount of 50% of the claim. In his letter he also stated that he will not hesitate to institute
cases in the Bureau of Immigration, NLRC, NBI against Lemoine, warning that he has good network relations with
them.
Lemoine thus instituted this action. Lemoine contends that Balon is entitled only to 50K and not 50% of the claim
as attorneys fees and that respondent acted fraudulently with regard to the claim. Balon in his counter-affidavit stated
that he is entitled to 50% because that was the practice in the insurance industry and that the absence of a contract
between him and Lemoine justifies the claim. He also contends that Garcia, as Lemoines attorney in fact already
approved of the 50% arrangement and that the balance of the claim minus the costs and attorneys fees were already
delivered to Garcia. No written memorandum to prove this claim was submitted. Balon also stated that the March letter
offering the 350K was made only at the request of Garcia for show to another business partner. The IBP ruled that he is
guilty of misconduct and recommended that he be suspended.
Issue:
1. W/N Balon should be disbarred.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Balon acted in violation of Canon 16 of the CPR. A lawyer must hold in trust all moneys and properties
of his client that he may come to possess. This commandment entails certain specific acts to be done by a lawyer
such as rendering an accounting of all money or property received for or from the client, as well as delivery of the
funds or property to the client when due or upon demand. Respondent breached this Canon when after he
received the proceeds of complainants insurance claim, he did not report it to complainant, who had a
given address in Makati, or to his co-attorney-in-fact Garcia who was his contact with respect to complainant.
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Balon could not justify his misconduct based on his right to attorneys lien. The fact that he kept the money from
Lemoine and only informed him that he has it when Lemoine himself discovered it cannot be tolerated. The fact
that he also altered the check to add his name as payee is grossly unacceptable. He abused his right to attorneys
lien.
It is evident from the facts that Balon misappropriated the money. The SC found it somewhat fishy that at first
he wanted only 25% of the claim but after he received the money, he wanted 50 % of it. Moreover, the fact that he
said he paid Garcia the balance of the claim minus the fees during several occasions from May-October 1999,
contrary to his earlier affidavit admitting that he had the whole 525,000 in his possession evinces that he has
already misappropriated the money. Balon was disbarred.
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CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.
The SC emphasized that respondent admits having received from complainant at least US$544,828. He claims,
however, that the amount was used for the purchase of the Las Pias property and the discharge of the mortgage
thereon, the setting up of the corporations earlier mentioned, and the downpayment on the Makati property and
related representation expenses therefor. The SC found that the claim does not lie and was not a proper accounting
of the amount received. All respondent presented to account for the money is a handwritten acknowledgment of a
supposed partial payment of P500K for the Makati property, purportedly executed by one Mangco. By any
standard, this document is a mere piece of paper, Mangco not having been presented, if he exists at all, to confirm
that he indeed issued the receipt. Since respondent failed to credibly account, upon demand, for the money held
by him in trust an element of misappropriation complainants claim that respondent employed deceit on her is
established. If those documents actually exist, and considering that his license to practice law is on the line,
respondent could have readily attached even photocopies thereof to his Comment in order to lend a semblance of
credibility to his claim.
Atty. Sebrio was adjudged guilty and was disbarred by the Court. In addition, he was ordered to return from the
Reddi the amount of $544k.
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80 - De Chavez-Blanco v. Atty. Lumasag (2009) (lawyer cousin deceives American cousins wife)
Doctrines:
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to
continue to be an officer of the court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers
to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, Rule 1.01 thereof provides: A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Facts:
Nelia De Chavez-Blanco is married to Mario Blanco, an American citizen. Both are residents of the U.S.. Nelia is
the owner of two (2) adjacent parcels of land in Quezon city, each with an area of 400 square meters. Atty. Jaime
Lumasag, Jr., the respondent, is the first cousin of the husband, Mario Blanco.
In a document, Nelia authorized Atty. Lumasag to sell the two lots. In a letter dated March 20, 1990, Atty.
Lumasag informed Nelia that he had sold only one lot for the price of P320,000 and therefrom he deducted P38,130 for
taxes and commissions. Allegedly, per Nelias instructions, Atty. Lumasag remitted the remaining balance of P281,900 to
a certain Belen Johnnes. In 1995, Nelia was informed by Atty. Lumasag that the other lot remained unsold due to the
presence of squatters on the property. In December of 1998, Mario discovered that the two lots had already been sold in
March of 1990 for P 1,120,000 and that new titles had been issued to the transferees. Mario wrote a letter to Atty.
Lumasag about these facts but Atty. Lumasag disregarded it. In 1999, Nelia, through his attorney-in-fact, sent a demand
letter for the entire proceeds of the sale. Atty. Lumasag admits to the sale of the lots, and receipt of the proceeds but
never tendered or offered to tender the same despite repeated and continued demands. Thus, Nelia filed with the
IBP this administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Lumasag for deceit, dishonesty, and gross misconduct.
Nelia claims the lots were sold for P 1,120,000. She further claims that the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) was
a falsified document, and hers and her husbands signatures therein were forged. However, no documentary evidence was
presented on the claimed P 1,120,000. Neither was it proven that the SPA was a falsified document, or the signatures a
forgery.
However, evidence showed that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 11, 1990 that both two lots were
sold for P 560,000. In Atty. Lumasags letter dated March 20, 1990, he acknowledged therein that he received P
320,000 for the total value of one lot. The Report of the IBP Commissioner held therefore that there was clear
deception on the part of Atty. Lumasag for informing the Blanco spouses that he had sold only one lot when the
truth was that there was a sale of both lots. During the hearing, Atty. Lumasag admitted that the sale covered two lots.
He was therefore not forthcoming towards the Blanco spouses.
The IBP Commissioner recommended that, in view of the fact that Atty. Lumasag was already 72 years old, he
be meted out the penalty of suspension of one-year suspension, not disbarment as had been prayed for and not the five-
year suspension as had been earlier resolved by the IBP Board of Governors. Moreover, the IBP Commissioner
recommended that respondent be ordered to deliver to Complainant the amount of P240,000.00 plus the legal interest rate
of 6% per annum computed from March 1990.
Issues:
1. W/N Atty. Lumasag should be disbarred.
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The Court ordered the suspension of Atty. Lumasag, Jr. for a period of six months, and to deliver the balance
of P240,000 plus legal interest to the Spouses Blanco. Atty. Lumasags actions erode the public perception of the
legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
ALS2014B 99 of 173
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reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority to so do.
Nelia asks that respondent be disbarred. The Court finds, however, that suspension from the practice of law is
sufficient to discipline respondent. The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of
the bar. While the Court will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers,
where the evidence calls for it, the Court will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to
accomplish the desired end. In this case, the Court finds the recommended penalty of suspension of two (2)
years for respondent to be too severe, considering his advanced age. The Court believes that a suspension of six
(6) months is sufficient. Suspension, by the way, is not primarily intended as punishment, but as a means to
protect the public and the legal profession.
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82 - Heirs and/or Estate of Atty. Rolando Siapian v. Intestate Estate of the Late Eufrocina Mackay (2010)
Doctrine:
A lawyer shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful
fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent
on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Facts:
Eufrocina G. Mackay died and left four children: Antonio, Arturo, Domingo and Elpidio. Another child,
Honorato, predeceased Eufrocina. Antonio filed before the RTC of Caloocan a petition for the settlement of
Eufrocinas intestate estate and for his appointment as administrator. The other heirs opposed Antonios
appointment and pushed instead for the appointment of Arturo to represent them in the case. Arturo and the other
siblings (Arturo et al) engaged the services of Atty. Rolando P. Siapian and agreed to pay him P3M legal fees. The
intestate court issued an order appointing Antonio and Arturo et al as co-special administrators of the estate. About a year
after, Arturo, et al. told the RTC that they had terminated the services of Atty. Siapian. Atty. Siapian filed a motion for
enforcement and annotation of his attorneys lien. He also asked the court to 1) not recognize any new counsel
representing Arturo et al because his services were illegally terminated, 2) direct Arturo et al to pay his attorneys fees
and 3) to order the Register of Deeds to inscribe his claim as a lien on the titles of the Estate to its properties. The
motion was initially denied for lack of jurisdiction of the intestate court but it was subsequently granted. Atty. Siapian
eventually died and was replaced by his heirs.
On appeal, the CA ruled that the intestate courts decision was null and void because an estate cannot be
held liable for attorneys fees arising out of the dispute between the estates beneficiaries and their lawyer. Only Arturo
et al and his siblings, in their personal capacity, should be held liable. The heirs of Atty. Siapian moved for
reconsideration.
Issues:
1. W/N the CA properly set aside the lower courts order for Arturo et al to pay Atty. Siapians P3M claim
for attorneys fees and that the claim be annotated on the titles of the properties of the estate.
Held:
1. NO.
It is settled that a claim for attorneys fees may be asserted either in the very action in which a lawyer
rendered his services or in a separate action but enforcing it in the main case is preferred because it reduces
multiplicity of suits. The intestate court in this case, therefore, correctly allowed Atty. Siapian to interject his
claim for attorneys fees in the estate proceedings against some of the heirs
Since the award of P3 million in attorneys fees in favor of Atty. Siapian had already become final and
executory, the intestate court was within its powers to order the Register of Deeds to annotate his lien on
the Estates titles to its properties. The Estate has no cause for complaint since the lien was neither a claim nor a
burden against the Estate itself. It was not enforceable against the Estate but only against Arturo et al et al, et
al, who constituted the majority of the heirs. It is a lien contingent on the intestate courts final determination
of Arturo, et al.s shares of what would remain of the estates properties after payment of taxes and debts
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prohibition. To rule otherwise would be to lend a stamp of judicial approval on an arrangement, which, in effect,
circumvents that which is directly prohibited by law. In piercing through the legal fiction of separate juridical
personality, Atty. Villegas stands to benefit from the contractual relationship created between his client Felix
Leong and his family partnership over properties involved in the ongoing estate proceedings.
Atty. Villegas contention of good faith cannot be sustained, as the prohibition is intended to curtail any undue
influence of the lawyer upon his client on account of his fiduciary and confidential association. The claim of
good faith is no defense to a lawyer who has failed to adhere faithfully to the legal disqualifications imposed
upon him, designed to protect the interests of his client.
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are impliedly sanctioned by Canon 13 (old canons) of the Canons of Professional Ethics. In fact, in the United
States, the great weight of authority recognizes the validity of contracts for contingent fees, provided such
contracts are not in contravention of public policy, and it is only when the attorney has taken an unfair or
unreasonable advantage of his client that such a claim is condemned.
Third, they contend that the contract was executed for the purpose of securing a decree of divorce, which is in
violation of Philippine laws. Again, this is wrong because the language of the contract as well as the intent of the
parties does not bear this out. The purpose was not to secure a divorce, but merely to protect the interest of Mrs.
Harden in the conjugal partnership during the pendency of a divorce suit she intended to file in the United States.
Moreover, as Mr. and Mrs. Harden are U.S. citizens, they are governed by the laws of the U.S., which permit
divorce.
Finally, the contention that the terms of the contract are harsh, inequitable, and oppressive cannot be sustained as
well. This last objection is based upon principles of equity, but pursuant thereto, one who seeks equity must come
with clean hands. This is not the case, as the circumstances surrounding the case show that the agreements
supposedly for the settlement of the differences between Mr. and Mrs. Harden were made for the purpose of
circumventing or defeating the rights of Recto. Mrs. Harden would not waive all of the rights and assets awarded
to her for the paltry sum agreed upon.
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Vinson B. Pineda v. Atty. Clodualdo de Jesus (2006) (Nagpaderma na, nagsamantala pa.)
Doctrine:
A lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by:
1. (Preferred) Filing the necessary petition as an incident of the main action in which his services were
rendered; or
2. In an independent suit against his client.
Principle of Quantum Meruit as much as the lawyer deserves permitted when no express agreement as to
fees. Mechanism to prevent unscrupulous clients from running away without paying their attorneys a share of the
fruits of their labor.
1. The SC has the power to delete the award of attorneys fees because when lawyers take their oath as
attorneys they submitted themselves to the authority of the SC and their professional fees to judicial
control.
Facts:
Vinson Pineda was represented by Attys. De Jesus, Ambrosio, and Mariano in a case for nullification of
marriage. The Pineda spouses reached a settlement regarding property relations and visitation rights. The court approved
the settlement and declared their marriage null and void.
Throughout the proceedings, respondent counsels were well compensated. They, including their relatives and
friends, even availed of free products and treatments from petitioners dermatology clinic. However, respondent
counsels billed additional legal fees amounting to 16.5M. Pineda refused to pay and instead paid them checks totaling
1.2M as full payment for settlement.
Atty. De Jesus etc. filed a motion in the same trial court where the nullity proceedings commenced, a motion for
lawyers fees amounting to 50M (equivalent to 10% of the property entitled to Pineda under the settlement). The trial
court and the CA ordered the ff. attorneys fees:
De Jesus Mariano Ambrosio
RTC 5M 2M 2M
CA 1M 500K 500K
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lawyers conduct is nagsasamantala. The practice of law is a decent profession and not a money-making trade.
Compensation should be but a mere incident.
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Facts:
A complaint was filed before the Sandiganbayan by the PCGG against Eduardo Cojuangco for recovery of ill-
gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks. Among the defendants in this complaint are Regala, Angara, Cruz,
Concepcion, Vinluan, Lazatin, Escueta, and Hayudini who are all partners of ACCRA Law Firm. ACCRA law
performed legal services for clients. More specifically, the members of the law firm delivered to its client stock
certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or
assignment covering said shares. In the course of this, ACCRA law came to know the assets of their clients as well as
personal and business circumstances. They also assisted in the organization and acquisition of companies and they also
acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings. (coco levy scandal)
The PCGG said that they would drop the ACCRA law partners from the complaint if they comply with the
following conditions:
1. Disclosure of identity of its clients
2. Submission of documents substantiating lawyer-client relationship
3. Submission of the deeds of assignments the ACCRA law partners executed in favor of its clients covering
their respective shareholdings.
Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution that basically said that until ACCRA lawyers prove the existence and
identity of their clients, they cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts. So they are still impleaded in
the complaint. (So names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint)
Issues:
1. W/N the ACCRA lawyers should be subjected to the strict application of the law of agency
2. (ETHICS RELATED) W/N the attorney-client privilege prohibits ACCRA lawyers from revealing identity of
their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. The ACCRA lawyers are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the
course of their duties as lawyers. They are being impleaded in the complaint so it can be used as leverage to
compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. PCGG has NO valid
cause of action against the ACCRA lawyers and should exclude them.
A lawyer-client relationship is MORE than a principal-agent relationship because he possesses special powers of
trust and confidence reposed on him by his client. A lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the court, thus
his powers are entirely different from and superior to those of an ordinary agent.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into
it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character,
requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith.
2. YES. While the general rule is that a lawyer should name his client (Just in case Sir asks: Reasons on naming
client 1. Court has right to know, 2. Attorney-client relationship does not exist if there is no client, 3. Privilege
pertains to the subject matter of the relationship, 4. Due process right to know), the general rule DOES not
apply in this case.
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The general rule is qualified by some exceptions. Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists
that revealing the clients name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the
lawyers advice. So basically, when disclosure would open the client to liability, his identity is privileged.
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the
instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name
would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged
information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without
which there would be no attorney-client relationship).
The preparation of the deed of assignment was part of their service to their clients. More important, it
constituted an integral part of their duties as lawyers. If ACCRA lawyers will identify their clients, they would
implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of
ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.
Revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case,
where none otherwise exists. The prosecution should get their own sources and NOT from compelled testimony.
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respondent made the representation after the termination of his retainer agreement with Comtech. A lawyers
immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with
the client.
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JUDICIAL ETHICS
CANON 1 INDEPENDENCE
01 - Libarios v. Juge Dabalos (1991) (bail without hearing)
Doctrines:
In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge done in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts may be erroneous. While judges should not be
disciplines for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet it is highly
imperative that they should be conversant with basic legal principles.
Facts:
Originally, there was a frustrated murder case with Mayor Corvera as complainant, against Pablo Macapas.
Mayor Calo was counsel for Macapas. After hearing, Macapas supposedly shot Corvera inside a courtroom. A formal
charge of murder was filed against Macapas (1st accused), Mayor Calo (lawyer), and Allocod (bodyguard).
Judge Dabalos issued an Order issuing warrants of arrest, but granting bail to, Calo and Allocod, because
evidence of guilt against them was merely circumstantial. (No bail was granted to Macapas). There was no prior hearing
to determine whether evidence of guilt was strong. The CA set aside this Order for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion. An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Dabalos where it was claimed that his granting bail to the
accused Calo and Alllocod without a hearing was tantamount to gross ignorance and willful disregard of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Sec. 5, Rule 114 requires a hearing before an accused charged with a capital offense can be granted
bail). They also raise impartiality on the ground of said Judges close association with Calo.
The Judge claimed that hearing was not necessary because the accused in this case were no longer in custody, that
he was a mere employee of Calo, and that he was justified in finding that the evidence of guilt is circumstantial
against Calo and Allocod. He stated that the acts being attributed to Calo as the mastermind behind the killing do not
appear to be a natural conduct of man; that he has known Calo to be of above-average intelligence for 20 years; and other
instances indicating serious doubts as to the probability of Calo providing the weapon and pushing the gunman
(Macapas) to kill Corvera inside the Courtroom.
Issues:
1. W/N the Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
Held/Ratio:
1. YES, the Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting bail without hearing.
In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge done in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts may be erroneous. But, while judges should not be
disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet, it is highly
imperative that they should be conversant with basic legal principles.
Irrespective of respondent judge's opinion that the evidence of guilt against herein accused is not strong,
the law and settled jurisprudence demanded that a hearing be conducted before bail was fixed for the temporary
release of accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod, if bail was at all justified. Moreover, when the Judge, in the same order,
directed the issuance of warrants of arrest, it was a superfluous and useless ceremony because with the grant of
bail the accused could secure their freedom at once.
Furthermore, considering that respondent judge had a close association with respondent Calo, Jr. as a former
employee of the said accused, he should have refrained from acting in the manner that he did in order to avoid any
doubt as to his judicial impartiality.
Judge Dabalos was imposed a fine of P20,000 and warned to exercise more care and diligence in his duties as a
judge, and that a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
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03 - Go v. CA (1992)
Doctrine:
A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
Where the trial court abuses its discretion by indefinitely suspending summary proceeding involving ejectment
cases, a petition for certiorari may be entertained by the proper court to correct the blunder.
Facts:
Star Group Resources and Development (Star Group) filed with the MTCC of Iloilo City an ejectment case
against Go and Siong. Upon motion of Go, the court, in an Order, held in abeyance the preliminary conference in the
ejectment case until after the case for specific performance involving the same parties shall have been finally
decided by Branch 37 RTC of Iloilo City.
An appeal was taken by Star Group from the aforesaid Order which was assigned to herein public
respondent RTC of Iloilo City (Branch 34). Go filed with Branch 34 a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that the appealed order is interlocutory and therefore not appealable. The motion was denied by Branch 34. Go
subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, which was likewise denied. Hence, Go filed the present petition
for certiorari, raising the issue of whether or not the respondent RTC (Branch 34) acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss appeal.
Issue:
1. W/N an appeal is proper as a remedy to challenge the suspension of proceedings, which is an interlocutory order,
in an ejectment suit.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The undisputed facts illustrate that there is a procedural void. The existing procedural rules do not provide
an adequate remedy to Star Group. It may be recalled that the MTCC, acting on Go's motion, held in abeyance the
preliminary conference in the ejectment suit, until the termination of a pending case for specific performance
involving the same parties. In challenging the order of the MTCC, Star group appealed to the RTC. Go filed
a motion to dismiss, arguing that the assailed order was interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to appeal.
Indisputably, the appealed order is interlocutory, for "it does not dispose of the case but leaves something else to
be done by the trial court on the merits of the case." It is axiomatic that an interlocutory order cannot be
challenged by an appeal. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the
remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a
mode of redress.
Clearly, Star Group cannot appeal the order, being interlocutory. But neither can it file a petition for
certiorari, because ejectment suits fall under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Section 19 (g) of
which considers petitions for certiorari prohibited pleadings. Based on the foregoing, Star Group was literally
caught "between Scylla and Charybdis1" in the procedural void observed by the Court of Appeals and the RTC.
Under these extraordinary circumstances, the Court is constrained to provide it with a remedy consistent
with the objective of speedy resolution of cases.
The purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is "to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of
cases without regard to technical rules. In situations wherein a summary proceeding is suspended
indefinitely, a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion may be allowed. Because of the
extraordinary circumstances in this case, a petition for certiorari, in fact, gives spirit and life to the Rules on
1. Scylla and Charybdis were mythical sea monsters noted by Homer; later Greek tradition sited them on opposite sides of the Strait of Messina
between Sicily and the Italian mainland. Scylla was rationalized as a rock shoal (described as a six-headed sea monster) on the Italian side of the
strait and Charybdis was a whirlpool off the coast of Sicily. They were regarded as a sea hazard located close enough to each other that they
posed an inescapable threat to passing sailors; avoiding Charybdis meant passing too close to Scylla and vice versa.
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Summary Procedure. A contrary ruling would unduly delay the disposition of the case and negate the
rationale of the said Rules.
Star Group herein filed an appeal to question the interlocutory order. This recourse was upheld by the
RTC and the CA in order to fill a "procedural void." The SC held, however, that the appeal should instead
be treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 because an appeal ordinarily entails a longer process
which negates an expeditious resolution.
Go contends that if such "procedural void" exists, no remedy is sanctioned by law, and the courts thus have no
power to provide one. Go avers that the defect lies in the law and can only be remedied by the legislature. This
argument is unacceptable. First, at issue in this case is not a law passed by the legislature, but procedural rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, categorically allows the Court to
lay down rules concerning, among others, procedure in all courts. Second, courts are "empowered, even
obligated, to suspend the operation of the rules," when a rule "deserts its proper office as an aid to justice
and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy such that rigid application thereof frustrates rather than
promotes substantial justice." Thus, it has been held that "the power of this Court to suspend its own rules
or to except a particular case from their operations whenever the purposes of justice require it, cannot be
questioned."
In short, because Star Group was left without remedy, the court, in the interest of justice, was correct in
suspending the operation of rules and allowing the appeal, even if it was against the rules. But, since this case falls
within the rules on Summary procedure, the SC says the appeal should be treated as a petition for certiorari
because it would be more consistent with the objective of Summary Proceedings, which is the expeditious
resolution of cases.
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07 - In Re: Suspension of Clerk of Court Rogelion R. Joboco, RTC branch 16 Naval, Biliran (1998)
Doctrines:
Acts of judge, which pertain to his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary powers unless they are
committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption and bad faith. Even if the acts are erroneous the judge is not admin
accountable unless any of the 4 causes are present.
(Closest to CANON 1 Independence) Congenial relationship between a judge and another govt official (legis or
executive branch) does not by itself tarnish the independence of the judiciary. Without any showing or actual
proof that such close relationship formed basis a judge cant be convicted of conduct Unbecoming of a judge with
regard to aspect of independence.
Facts:
This case involves a series of complaints and counter-complaints between Executive RTC Judge Maceda and
Clerk of Court Atty. Joboco. The controversy began when Judge Maceda issued the first (among many) suspension order
against Atty. Joboco for Infidelity in custody of case records. The following complaints were filed by the two parties
against each other:
Filed by Judge Maceda against Atty. Joboco
CHARGE REASON STATUS
Infidelity in the custody of case Judge maceda holds joboco GUILTY, as clerk of court it was
records personally liable for the missing his positive duties to exercise
case records of a certain case responsibility and be vigilant in
guarding the records of the case
Sabotaging judicial reforms Judge alleges Joboco guilty of NOT GUILTY, Court did not
erroneously serving notice to find a blatant, malicious,
counsel and bondsmen and not to deliberate effort in jocobo in
accused thisaspect
Grave misconduct, usurpation of Joboco failed to comply with GUILTY, overstepped
judicial authority judges order to turn over boundaries of his functions, and
documents, exhibits in a case usurping the acts which should
Tampering of subpoena
have been under the discretion of
the judge (maceda)
Insubordination DISMISSED
Falsification of accomplishment
of certificate of service
Agitating workers to go on mass
leaves
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Held/Ratio:
1. Atty. Joboco was found guilty of some selected and not all charges filed against him by Judge Maceda. The
Court imposed a fine against him because they could not impose a suspension on him since he was recently
appointed to another position: 3rd assistant city prosecutor. Charges against the Judge Maceda were all dismissed
but he was advised by the Court to exert care and consideration in his dealings with his office staff to avert future
repetition of such administrative misdemeanors.
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08 - In Re: Derogatory News Items Charging CA Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria with Interference on Behalf
of a Suspected Drug Queen
Doctrine:
A judge should refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before
another court or administrative agency.
Facts:
Senior Prosecutor Formaran III charged Yu Yuk Lai, together with her supposed nephew, Kenneth
Monceda before the RTC of Manila with violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, RA 6425, as amended, for "conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent and without authority of law to willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to a poseur-buyer three (3) kilograms, more or less, of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), which is a regulated drug." Yu Yuk Lai and Kenneth Monceda were held
at the detention cell of the PNP Narcotics Group in Camp Crame, Q.C. They filed for bail, but was denied by Judge
Laguio because he found the evidence against them strong and sufficient to warrant a conviction. Yu Yuk Lai and
Monceda then filed a Joint Motion for Inhibition arguing that the trial court's actuations "do not inspire the belief that its
decision would be just and impartial." Judge Laguio, Jr. inhibited himself. The case was re-raffled to Judge Angel V.
Colet. Accused Yu Yuk Lai then filed a Motion to Order the Confinement of the Accused in a Hospital. Before Judge
Colet could resolve the motion, the case was handled by the Branch's Pairing Judge Manuel T. Muro. Judge Muro granted
accused Yu Yuk Lai's motion and allowed her to be confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital for a period not exceeding
seven (7) days, which was extended to a month.
Soon, rumors circulated in the Manila City Hall that Judge Muro was partial towards accused Yu Yuk Lai.
Concerned court employees" wrote the Secretary of Justice and alleged that Judge Muro ordered the hospitalization
of Yu Yuk Lai "even if she was not sick and there was already a rumor circulating around the City Hall, that the
notorious Judge had given the go signal to the counsel of the accused to file the Motion to Quash, which would be
granted for a consideration of millions of pesos."
SP Formaran III filed a Motion for Inhibition praying that Judge Muro inhibit himself from further handling
the case. Meanwhile, at around 7:30 o'clock in the morning, while Yu Yuk Lai was supposed to be confined at the Manila
Doctors Hospital, accused Yu Yuk Lai was arrested inside the VIP room of the Casino Filipino at the Holiday Inn
Pavilion, Manila, while playing baccarat, unescorted.
Later in the afternoon, Justice Demetria, PATAFA President Go Teng Kok (Yu Yuk Lais friend) and Atty.
Reinerio Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok and a close friend of Justice Demetria, went to the office of SP Formaran III in the
DOJ. Justice Demetria asked about the status of the case. SP Formaran III informed the parties about the motion
for inhibition that he filed against Judge Muro. Justice Demetria asked SP Formaran III if he could do something
to help Go Teng Kok who was desperate in helping Yu Yuk Lai out of her situation. SP Formaran told them he
would bring up the matter to CSP Zuno, just to end the conversation. The parties left. In the afternoon, through a
phone call, Justice Demetria was quoted saying to CSP Zuno: "Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na
iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa na ng Order si Judge Muro." Politely, CSP
Zuo said that he would see what he could do. Tingnan ko po kung ano ang magagawa ko."
A few days after, The Philippine Daily Inquirer reported that a "Supreme Court Justice and an outspoken sports
person and leader" had been exerting "undue pressure" on the DOJ to go slow in prosecuting re-arrested drug queen Yu
Yuk Lai. That same afternoon, the names of Justice Demetria and Mr. Go Teng Kok were disclosed to the media to clear
the name of the Supreme Court justices who might have been affected by the erroneous news report. The following day,
several newspapers named Justice Demetria and Go Teng Kok as "drug lawyers."
Issue:
1. W/N Justice Demetria really did intercede in behalf of suspected drug queen Yu Yuk Lai.
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Held/Ratio:
1. YES. While Justice Demetria vehemently denied knowing Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk Lai and the other parties, and
interfering with the criminal case, his denial cannot stand against the positive assertions of CSP Zuo and SP
Formaran III, which are consistent with natural human experience. The testimony of CSP Zuo is plainly
unambiguous and indubitably consistent with the other facts and circumstances surrounding the case.
CSP Zuo testified that as far as he could recall Justice Demetria said, "Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor
Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si Judge
Muro." In his discussion with Go Teng Kok and Justice Demetria, SP Formaran III said that he would consult his
superiors regarding the proposal to withdraw the motion. The timely telephone call to CSP Zuo was thus a
logical follow-up.
Even the requested "help" for Go Teng Kok, whom respondent Justice claims he did not know and met
only that time, could not have meant any other assistance but the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge
Muro. True, Justice Demetria never categorically asked SP Formaran III to withdraw his Motion. But when
respondent Justice Demetria asked the state prosecutor at that particular time "to do something to help
Mr. Go Teng Kok," the latter was pleading for the withdrawal of the motion, and nothing else. That was
the only form of "help" that Go Teng Kok wanted.
In sum, the SC found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses convincing and trustworthy, as compared
to those of the defense which do not only defy natural human experience but are also riddled with major
inconsistencies which create well-founded and overriding doubts.
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His at all times must be characterized with propriety
and must be above suspicion. His must be free of even a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the
performance of his judicial duties, but also his behavior outside the courtroom and as a private individual.
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the Judiciary. High ethical principles and a sense of propriety
should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in the Judiciary cannot be preserved. There is
simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and
integrity. Justice Demetria is found guilty of violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and is ordered
dismissed from the service.
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CANON 2 - INTEGRITY
09 - Kilat v. Macias (2005) (inhibit self; raffled to the same court)
Doctrine:
In order to avoid suspicions of wrongdoing, a judge must respect and observe the prevailing rules.
He should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the judicial system.
A judge cannot exercise his discretion whether to inhibit himself from a case or not.
Facts:
Kilat filed an administrative complaint against Judge Mariano Macias, Executive Judge of the RTC of Liloy,
Zamboanga de Norte. Her charges included immorality, conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer, rape, and violation of
the Anti-Child Abuse Law.
Kilat claimed that she met Macias when she was 16 years old. He fetched her from school, had dinner with her,
and brought her to a hotel. She tried to leave the hotel room but Macias threatened her with a gun and subsequently had
sexual intercourse with her. Macias gave her 1,500php and warned her not to tell anyone. Eventually, she became his
kept woman. However, Kilat claimed that she left Macias upon discovering that he was having another affair.
Judge Macias contended that Kilat was merely being used by his ex-wife, Mayor and Vice Mayor, who wanted
him dismissed from his work. Kilat confessed that the Mayor and Vice Mayor approached her to help her file a case for
rape against Macias. She refused. The Vice Mayor told Kilats mother that her father would be give a job in the
municipal hall if they agree to file the rape case. Kilats mother refused and she was threatened with a lawsuit.
Eventually, Kilat was forced to sign the affidavit-complant against Macias. Kilat was brought to Manila and was locked
up in a house for almost three weeks. She was able to escape.
Macias filed a Manifestation informing the Court of the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman, which
dismissed the criminal complaint for rape filed against him
Kilat filed charges against those who kidnapped her. The case was raffled to the RTC branch presided by Macias.
Macias ordered for the arrest of the persons. The accused moved for the inhibition of Macias on the ground that he is
directly involved in the case. Macias issued an order inhibiting himself.
Issues:
1. W/N Macias should have inhibited himself from the case.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Rule 137 of the Rules of Court mandatorily disqualifies a judge or judicial officer to sit in any case in
which: (a) he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise; (b) he is related
to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of civil law; (c) he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel;
or (d) he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
In order to avoid suspicions of wrongdoing, a judge must respect and observe the prevailing rules. Here, one of
the accused in the criminal case is his ex-wife. Further, the persons involved were the same people who wanted
him dismissed from his work. His swift issuance of the arrest warrant suspiciously smells of vengeance and
vindication. He should not use his position in the judiciary for his personal concerns.
He should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the judicial system. To avoid any doubt or
suspicion of bias, he should have inhibited himself from the very beginning. He cannot exercise his discretion
whether to inhibit himself or not. It is immaterial that he inhibited himself after the accused moved for his
inhibition.
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Penalty for violating the rule on mandatory inhibition and bias and abuse of authority: fine of 20,000 php to
be deducted from his disability benefits.
10 - Sps. Jesus and Nenita Jacinto vs. Hon. Placido Vallarta (2005) (Isuzu cargo truck)
Doctrine:
Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a "judge should so behave at all times as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
The judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a magistrate and imposes a number of restrictions. This
is a price that judges have to pay for accepting and occupying their exalted positions in the administration of
justice.
Maintaining the dignity of courts and enforcing the duty of the citizens to respect them are necessary adjuncts to
the administration of justice.
Facts
Petitioner spouses have initiated this complaint against Judge Vallarta on account of a civil case between them
and Spouses Magundayao over an Isuzu cargo truck that was sold to the Jacintos. The Magundayaos were alleged to be
rich and affluent in Gapan, Nueva Ecija. They originally sold the truck to the Jacintos, but subsequently they applied for
a Writ of Replevin for it in Judge Vallartas sala. The Jacintos were many times being coerced by the judge to enter into
an amicable settlement with the Magundayaos, but while a compromise agreement was executed, the Magundayaos
always failed to hold their end of the bargain. The Jacintos also discovered that the company that endorsed the
Magundayaos replevin bond (Utility Assurance Corporation) was not authorized to do such business in the MTC of
Gapan. Also pending the action, Judge Vallarta often displayed actions and made utterances2 that made clear to the
spouses that he does not intend to prioritize their complaint and that they would need money if they want their action to
proceed faster. Thus the Jacintos complained against Judge Vallarta.
Issues
1. W/N Judge Vallarta is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. While the Spouses Jacinto failed to prove that Vallarta is guilty of gross ignorance of the law, the SC
decided that he nonetheless violated Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Respondent judge displayed
conduct that fell short of the standards expected of a magistrate of the law. His unguarded utterances, impatience,
and undisguised lack of concern bordering on contempt for the plight of complainants, who had humbly looked
up to him and sought his help, constituted vulgar and unbecoming conduct that eroded public confidence in the
judiciary. From the standpoint of conduct and demeanor expected of members of the bench, a resort to
intemperate language only detracts from the respect due them and becomes self-destructive.
2. Quoting from the original. Some of the utterances made by Vallarta are as follows: Kung ayaw ninyong sabihin magtalikuran tayo. Hindi ko
alam kung kailan ko maaksiyunan yang problema ninyo. Tingnan ko sa Martes (March 12, 2002) kung naroon ako (MTC-Gapan) kung hindi
ako makarating pasensiya kayo at hintayin ninyo kung kailan ko aaksiyunan yang problema ninyo.
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Marcos to the cooperative officers would have been sufficient, to our mind, to allow the Tacaldos' entry to the
cooperative business of transporting passengers.
Respondent's posture that Mrs. Marcos is also guilty of immorality does not excuse nor even mitigate his actions.
It is respondent's private action that is being investigated not his wife's.
The personal behavior of a judge should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior,
not only in the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond
reproach.
If good moral character is required of a lawyer, with more reason is the requirement exacted of a member of the
judiciary who at all times is expected to observe irreproachable behavior and is bound not to outrage public
decency.
Keeping a mistress is certainly not an act one would expect of a judge who is expected to possess the highest
standard of morality and decency. If a judge fails to have high ethical standards, the confidence and high respect
for the judiciary diminishes as he represents the judiciary.
Jurisprudence is rich in cases where the Court has inflicted on judges the punishment of dismissal for immorality
especially when it is committed openly and flagrantly, causing scandal in the place where his court is situated.
2. Herein respondent cannot find comfort in the "affidavit of desistance" signed by his wife and children. Generally,
the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought.
The fact that complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the administrative case against herein respondent judge
will not necessarily warrant a dismissal thereof. Once charges have been filed, the Supreme Court may not be
divested of its jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth of the matter alleged in the complaint.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos has demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity. He has violated the code of
Judicial Conduct, which requires every judge to be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence
and to avoid the appearance of impropriety in all activities as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, respondent must be meted out the
severest form of disciplinary sanction dismissal from the service.
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31, 1988 and an increase from P53,000.00/month to P81,000.00/month from January 1, 1989 until the place is
vacated.
The increase in the total amounts awarded in the June 15, 1992 decision is due to the fact that in the June 15, 1992
decision respondent judge assessed different rates of rentals for the period January 1, 1988 to December 31, 1988,
and from January 1989 until the place is vacated, while in the June 10, 1992 draft she assessed just one rate from
January 1, 1988 until the place is vacated.
Neither in her decision nor in her testimony did respondent judge give any reason for the use of different rates. It
is entirely possible that, she made the change simply in response to the suggestions made in the June 10, 1992
draft by Atty. Chua.
Second. It may be wondered why despite the fact that substantial increases in monetary awards had been obtained
by it Centrum still filed this administrative case and thereby expose its representatives to the risk of prosecution
for bribery or violation of law, such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019). On the other
hand, the reason why the case was filed by Centrum against the Judge, appears to be that although the decision in
its favor had been prepared as early as June 15, 1992, its release was not in sight even after nearly a month,
leading to the fear that Judge Katalbas will not increase the awards in favor of Centrum. Although Judge Katalbas
eventually ordered the release of the June 15, 1992 decision on July 13, 1992, which is the date of the complaint
in this case, Centrum did not receive its official copy of the decision until July 18, 1992, while its counsel, Atty.
Chua, did not receive his copy until July 21, 1992.
Third. There was delay in the release of the decision of the judge. According to her, she finished correcting the
intermediate draft, which became the final decision, on June 15, 1992. Considering that according to her she could
have decided the case on the records alone, and that Centrum had been pressing for the early resolution of the
appeal through the filing of two motions to this effect, there was no reason why respondent judge had to allow the
tenants an extension to file a supplemental memorandum. That the tenants did not after all file a supplemental
memorandum only shows that it was not really indispensable. As this Court had occasion to state, it is not enough
that judges write their decisions; it is also important to promulgate and make it known to all concerned.
Otherwise, what good would a favorable decision be if the interested party is kept in the dark about it? It would
only be a tool for maneuvers on the part of the losing party or a valuable commodity for sale by unscrupulous
persons.
The evidence in this case may not be sufficient to secure conviction in a criminal case. But the standards of
integrity required of members of the Bench are not satisfied by conduct, which merely enables one to escape the
penalties of the criminal law.
On the Charge of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Order. The judge's errors in
this case are so gross as to be inexcusable. It is clear from the decision that the MTCC adopted the increased
monthly rentals, which Centrum demanded after the expiration of their lease. Judge Katalbas had no power to
increase or reduce the amount fixed by the lower court as reasonable rent for the premises since this is a question,
which would have to be decided in disposing of the appeal on the merits.
Judge Katalbas was dismissed.
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CANON 3 IMPARTIALITY
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the court and the parties, should refrain from showing any semblance of bias or more or less partial attitude in
order not to create any false impression in the minds of the litigants.
In resolving the formal offer of exhibits of Banco Filipino, Judge Tac-an exercised undue haste. Without awaiting
the reply of parties, Judge Tac-an already issued an order admitting all the exhibits offered.
Judge Tac-an had in fact already prejudged the case. He issued an interlocutory order on the principal issue that
effectively disposes of the merits of the case.
It is of utmost importance that a judge must preserve the trust and confidence reposed in him by the parties as an
impartial, unbiased and dispassionate dispenser of justice. When he conducts himself in a manner that gives rise,
fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are eroded. His decisions, whether right or
wrong, will always be under suspicion of irregularity.
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liability when he further required them to pay their rent at the MTC although he was then staying at the same
building. By these calculated steps, respondent Judge in the words of Rule 2.03, clearly intended to use the
prestige of his judicial office to advance the interest of his maternal co-heirs.
Although he is the complainant in the three criminal complaints, Velasco did not disqualify himself from the
cases. He even issued a warrant of arrest resulting in the arrest and detention of complainant. His subsequent
inhibition from the three cases does not detract from his culpability for he should not have taken cognizance of the
cases in the first place.
With respect to the issuance by inferior courts of warrants of arrest, it is necessary that the judge be satisfied that
probable cause exists. The only instance where the judge may dispense with such procedure is when the
application for the warrant of arrest is filed before a Regional Trial Court judge. In such a case, the RTC judge
can rely on the report of the prosecutor on the finding of probable cause. The case against Oktubre does not fall
under such exception.
He is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in
any branch of the government. However, he shall receive any accrued leaves due him as of this date.
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23 - Sandoval v. CA (1996)
Facts:
A parcel of land in Quezon City on which a five-door apartment building stands is the subject of this case. Such
land was covered by a TCT in the name of Lorenzo Tan.
October 1984, Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr. (real Tan Jr.) was notified of the need to present his owners copy of the TCT
to the Registry of Deeds, Quezon City in connection with an adverse claim. He explained that he was still looking for his
copy of the TCT. November 1984, he discovered that one Godofredo Valmeo had an adverse claim annotated on his title
in the RoD. Another Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr. (fake Tan Jr) had mortgaged the property to Valmeo to secure an obligation.
December 1984, real Tan, Jr. filed a complaint for cancellation of the annotation of mortgage and damages.
In April 1985, real Tan Jr. met Juan C. Sandoval who claimed to be the new owner. He informed Sandoval of the
case he previously filed. Upon further investigation, Sandoval discovered that as early as September 13, 1984, fake Tan,
Jr. sold such property on Pacto de Retro. He also executed a waiver in favor of Bienvenido Almeda. Consequently, fake
Tan Jr's TCT was cancelled and a new TCT was issued in the name of Bienvenido Almeda. Almeda then sold the
property to Sandoval and a new CT was issued in favor of Sandoval.
Real Tan Jr.'s original annulment complaint was amended and he impleaded Sandoval with additional causes of
action: nullification of the deed of sale with pacto de retro, the waiver and the cancellation of TCT Nos. 326781 and
329487 in the QC Registry of Deeds. He alleged that Sandoval had prior knowledge of legal flaws which tainted
Bienvenido Almedas title. Petitioner claims that he was a purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration. He
bought the property through real estate brokers whom he contacted after seeing the property advertised Manila Bulletin in
the March 3, 1985 issue. After guarantees were given by the brokers and his lawyers go-signal to purchase the property,
petitioner negotiated with Bienvenido Almeda who executed a Deed of Sale and a new TCT in favor of Sandoval. RTC
ruled in favor of real Tan Jr.
Only Sandoval appealed to the CA wherein Justice Luis Victor, the one who penned the decision, affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition for review with the SC where Sandoval prays for the reversal of the CA
decision. Two issues are presented for resolution. First, he contends that he was denied due process when the ponente of
the decision in the Court of Appeals, Justice Luis Victor, did not inhibit himself from the case inasmuch as he was, for a
time, the presiding judge in the court a quo trying the case. Second, petitioner maintains that he is an innocent purchaser
for value who should not be held accountable for the fraud committed against real Tan, Jr.
Issues:
1. W/N Juan Sandoval is a purchaser in good faith
2. W/N the Justice who penned the decision in the CA should have inhibited himself from taking part in the case
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. Petitioner should have been aware of his vendors fraudulent or forged title.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right
to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before
he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the property with the belief
that the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could convey title to the property.
It was testified to by the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City that there were two copies of TCT No.
196518(real Tan Jr's TCT) in the Register of Deeds, only one of which could be genuine. This apparently came
about when real Tan Jr's TCT was lost and a forged copy was made. One copy was used to entice Valmeo and the
other was used by Almeda. The two copies of the TCT soon found their way to the Registry of Deeds. By the
time that the sale to Sandoval was being negotiated, the two copies of real Tan Jr's TCT were already in the files
of the Register of Deeds. Since Sandovals lawyer apparently made a verification at the Register of Deeds, it was
inevitable for him to come across the two copies. Sandoval was thus aware in fact of the irregularity attending
such TCT and its derivative certificates.
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2. NO. The principle that approximates the situation obtaining herein is the disqualification of a judge from deciding
a case where his ruling in a lower court is the subject of review or in which he has presided in any inferior
court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review.
To be sure, as trial court judge, he presided partly over the case below, heard part of plaintiffs evidence and ruled
on motions. The decision itself, however, was penned by another judge, the Honorable Lucas Bersamin, who took
over as presiding judge when then Judge Luis Victor was promoted. Upon elevation to the Court of Appeals, it
was only the time that Justice Victor became the ponente. Hence, he cannot be said to have been placed in a
position where he had to review his own decision as judge in the trial court. Accordingly, he was not legally
bound to inhibit himself from the case.
Nevertheless, Justice Victor should have been more prudent and circumspect and declined to take on the case,
owing to his earlier involvement in the case. The Court has held that a judge should not handle a case in which he
might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality, which is intended to preserve and
promote public confidence in the integrity and respect for the judiciary. While it is not legally required, it is the
court's view that his active participation in the case below constitutes a just or valid reason, under Section 1 of
Rule 137 for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from the case.
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CANON 4 PROPRIETY
29 - Cabreana v. Avelino (1981) (bokbok, defective furniture is art)
Doctrines:
A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety and his personal conduct and
behavior should be beyond reproach. He should be temperate, patient, and impartial, having always in mind that
every litigant is entitled to "nothing short of the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free disinterested and
impartial tribunal
Facts:
The spouses Cabreana filed a case of rescission w/ damages against Teody Tumakay, whose furniture company
the Cabreanas commissioned to make pieces of furniture for their home. However, the Cabreanas found out that the
furniture was made w/ sub-par materials and shoddy worksmanship. Respondent Judge Avelino was the presiding judge
over the case. When the Cabreanas moved to have an ocular inspection of the defective furniture, Avelino rode in
Tumakays car to the Cabreanas home. While Anna Rose was describing the cracks and defects, Avelino kept on
contradicting her and ordering the stenographer to state on the record that the defects were mere scratches or was
designated as art. He even insinuated that the bokbok (wood borers) dust evidencing that the furniture were not made of
narra wood (as was the agreement) were only planted by the Cabreanas and their counsel. Thereafter, the Cabreanas filed
an administrative case against him. Avelinos defense is that he was just making sure that the record correctly reflected his
observations and the real state of the furniture.
Issues:
1. W/N Avelino should be held administratively liable for his actions
Held/Ratio:
1. YES, Avelinos acts showed his lack of restraint, impatience, and intolerance, which shows that he falls
short of the required judicial norm of conduct. Judges are given transportation allowance precisely so they
wont have to hitch rides with the parties. By hitching a ride w/ Tumakay, he openly exposed himself and his
office to suspicion, which impaired the trust and faith of the people in the administration of justice. The
Investigating Judge of the CA correctly observed that instead of merely observing the ocular inspection, Avelino
actively participated to the point of cross-examining Anna Rose herself. This, he should not have done. Plus, his
so-called observations were contradicted by the photographic evidence on record.
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32 - Re: Anonymous Complaint Against Judge Edmundo T. Acua (2005) (Judges favorite expressions)
Doctrines:
Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and in language. Indeed, a
judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
Facts:
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received a letter from concerned citiznes of the lower court,
reporting the alleged practices of Judge Edmundo Acua, RTC, Caloocan City. The letter stated the following:
1. That Judge Acua conducted trials, signed orders and even sentenced accused while on official leave. The
letter went on to question whether Judge Acua had authority to impose such sentences, issue orders and
conduct hearings.
2. List of Judge Acuas dialogues and favorite expressions (putris, anak ng pating, putang ina, pogi/beauty,
tulungan niyo naman ako, hirap na hira na ako, mali ka nanaman)
3. That Judge Acua spends much of his energy talking and loves to berate and embarrass people, not caring
whether he speaks in open court, as long as he has an audience
4. That Judge Acuas decisions usually take about 7 to 10 drafts, as he changes his mind so many times
5. That Judge Acua loves to glorify himself and that his behavior was weird
Judge Acua, in his comment, said that the writers of the letter was actuated by improper motive and sent with no
other purpose but to harass him. He said that at the time he conducted trial, signed orders and issued sentences, he was not
yet on leave. He also said that he had decided to defer his leave for another week as his siblings who would be going with
him to Canada had not yet secured their visas. Regarding his weird behavior, he said that he was still mourning the loss of
his eldest son who died of an aneurism. Judge Acua admitted having made some of the alleged humiliating statements
while he was discussing performance ratings of his staff. He also admitted that putris, putang ina, beauty/pogi were
among of his favorite expressions, but that he did not use them often, certainly not in open court, and that he had been
misquoted.
Issues:
1. W/N Judge Acua should be reprimanded?
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. He is guilty of impropriety and is reprimanded. He is sternly warned that the repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Regarding Judge Acuas approved leave, there was nothing repulsive in deferring the date of his leave. Judge
Acuas decision to report for work appears to have been motivated by his honest belief that he could defer his
leave and make the necessary adjustments after.
As to the use of his humiliating and insensitive expressions, it is improper for the extolled office of a magistrate of
the law. By virtue of the very office he holds, the public expects more of the Judge as he undeniably occupies an
exalted yet delicate niche in the administration of justice. Those who don the judicial robe and wiled the judicial
gavel ought to impress in their consciousness that appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. Judges are
demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and in language. Indeed, a judge should
so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Propriety
and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. Thus, Judge
Acuas claim that his favorite expressions were not directed to anyone in particular is unacceptable.
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[Judge Zantua was admonished with a warning that a repetition of similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely.]
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be set for hearing at 8:30 in the morning of July 5, 2002. The proximity of the date of mailing of the copy of the
motion to the other party and the hearing date indicated in the notice of hearing clearly shows that it is impossible
for the other party to receive said motion at least three days before the date of hearing. Evidently, the party filing
the motion to lift attachment had already violated the three-day notice rule. Moreover, Judge Hontinosas acted
with indecent haste in immediately holding a hearing on the motion to lift attachment filed only a few minutes
before said hearing, in considering the same submitted for resolution, and in issuing the order lifting the writ of
preliminary attachment and approving the counter-bond, all on the same day of July 5, 2002, without giving the
King brothers the opportunity to be heard on the matter.
Judge Hontinosas was found guilty of gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and is dismissed from the
service.
It was stated by the King brothers that Judge Hontanasas frequented their karaoke bar and used the facilities free
of charge. The Court said that such conduct is improper and a disgrace to the profession and that the judge
miserably failed to live up to the standards of judicial conduct.
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CANON 5 - EQUALITY
39 - Espayos v. Lee (1979)
Doctrines:
Canon 5 Section 2: Judges shall not in the performance of his judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias
or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.
Facts:
Through a verified letter-complaint, Espayos charged Judge Lee, Municipal Judge of Magallanes, Sorsogon, for
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge and Partiality in the Administration of Justice.
A complaint for less serious physical injuries was filed by the station commander of Magallanes police
department before Judge Lee when one Pareja threw a piece of stone at Espayos hitting him on the nose. Espayo alleges
the following:
a. Without Espayo knowing, Pareja was arraigned appearing in court without a lawyer pleading guilty for slight
physical injuries and Judge Lee immediately sentenced him to 15 days of imprisonment despite previous
notice of Espayos lawyer that the complaint was to be amended to serious physical injuries (because his left
nostril closed, as seen from his inability to blow out smoke)
b. Before denying Espayos petition to prove damages, Judge Lee offered him P80.00 then later P100.00 saying
that Espayos could not get anything from Pareja because he was insolvent
c. Judge Lee made his house his office and goes to the municipal building only when he tries cases and performs
marriage ceremonies.
Espayos filed a motion withdrawing his complaint stating he had lost interest due to the circulization of the
municipal courts (Judge Lee was transferred to Bacon, Sorsogon). The investigator recommended the dismissal of the
case for failure to prosecute.
Issues:
1. W/N Judge Lee is guilty
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Complainants desistance is not an obstacle to taking disciplinary action against respondent because
the latters answers to the charges reveals the he had not performed his duties properly.
In a letter-answer ordered by the Supreme Court, Judge Lee explained:
a. Before arraignment, Pareja told him that he could not afford the expenses of litigation and would be
willing to plead guilty although he was innocent of the crime charged provided that the penalty would not
exceed 15 days imprisonment. In response, he advised Pareja that if he was really intending to plead
guilty, he should state that he is willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense when the complaint is read to
him.
b. He denied that he offered P80/100 and rationalized that Espayos could still file a separate civil action for
damages despite denial of petition to prove damages sustained in the same case.
c. Admitted that he stays in the library of his house when he studies cases and prepares for decisions
because i. his library is more complete and nearer to the library of his brother, ii. Clerk of court could stay
in the office and could call him if needed, iii. He needed secrecy and concentration in making decisions
(which was difficult in the office because of the constant entrance and exit of people and clerks noise
using the typewriter)
It was improper and unethical to suggest to Pareja what he should do at the arraignment. That
impropriety generated suspicion that Judge was in collusion with Pareja. It is this sort of misbehavior,
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which would be resented by the offended party and making him conclude that the sentence meted out was
fixed or known as lutong macao A judges official conduct should be free from impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety. (Canon 4)
As well-stated by Justice Muoz Palma, "reasons of public policy, the preservation of the good image of the
judiciary, and avoidance of an appearances of impropriety, require that a judge should hold office at the
regular place of business of the court and not at his residence. A judge holding office in his house makes
himself open to suspicion and possible criticism that his official actuations cannot bear public scrutiny,
more particularly of his co-officials in the local government"
Lastly, when a criminal action is instituted a civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense is
impliedly instituted unless the offended party expressly waives or reserves his right to institute it separately,
which Espayos did not do.
For having committed the above-mentioned irregularities showing that he had not performed his duties properly
he is severely censured and warned that a more drastic penalty will be imposed in case of similar irregularities in
the future.
***Case under Canon 5 but only mentioned Canon 4 in discussion, so just in case, focus on the issue A.
Under Canon 5, ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of the
judicial office. Canon 5 Section 2: Judges shall not in the performance of his judicial duties, by words or conduct,
manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.
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41 - Cua Shuk Yin v. Judge Perello (2005) (Greedy and usurer Chinese woman!)
Doctrine:
In the absence of malice, fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject
to disciplinary action, even if such acts are erroneous.
Judges must bear in mind that their behavior must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary, and
that justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done
Facts:
Cua Shuk Yin filed a complaint for undue delay against Judge Norma Perello. Cua Shuk Yin had a case under
Judge Perello against Sps. Arciaga. According to her, Perello had a history of being negligent and tolerating delays of
the other party. It was only after the SC ordered Perello to resolve with dispatch cases pending in her sala and warned
her that such other delays would be dealt with severely, that Perello decided to resolve her case. The case was decided
against Cua but was reversed by the CA. Perello issued an order for the execution of the CA decision giving the
Spouses 90 days to pay their loan otherwise their properties would be foreclosed. 90 days have lapsed but Perello failed
to issue a writ of execution despite persistent follow-ups. Cua filed another administrative case against Perello. The
Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the case be dismissed because it involved Perellos
understanding of a judicial question - the start of the 90-day period - which should be resolved in a judicial action and
not in an administrative action. However, the OCA recommended that Perello be admonished for calling Cua Shuk Yin
names such as greedy and usurer Chinese woman, tagging her lawyer as lazy and negligent while branding her own
clerk of court as equally lazy and incompetent.
Issues:
1. W/N the finding of the OCA should be upheld.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Perellos act of not issuing the writ was not motivated by bad faith because it was justified by her
understanding of the law. For her, the 90-day period should start on the issuance of her order executing the CA
judgment and not the entry of judgment of the CA. If Cua wanted to question this, she shouldve done so in a
judicial action.
As for the improper language, the Court stated that:
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge. As such, the esteemed position of a magistrate of the law demands temperance, patience
and courtesy both in conduct and in language. As subjects of constant public scrutiny, personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen should be freely and
willingly accepted by a judge. In particular, he or she must exhibit conduct consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office. Thus, judges must bear in mind that their behavior must reaffirm the
peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary, and that justice must not merely be done but must
also be seen to be done.
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another court Caguioa knew about these suits. The CA also ordered the writ of execution to be void because it was
not in consonance with the decision, which dismissed the case due to prescription and not due to adjudication based on
the merits.
Burns Jr., son of the petitioner in Burns v. Beltran, charged Caguioa and Sherriff Perez with Grave Misconduct.
Caguioas Defense
Caguioa argues that the mistakes he committed in issuing the questioned orders should be considered as mere
errors of judgment that do not warrant administrative disciplinary action, because his acts were never proven to be, and
were in fact never, motivated by bad faith, ill will, fraud and corrupt motives. According to him, the judiciary will be
paralyzed if judges will be penalized for errors they make in the absence of fraud or bad faith. As regards the writ of
execution in the third case, he said that it would be better if he issued the writ than let everyone wait for the outcome of
the reversion suits.
Issues:
1. W/N Caguioa is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and manifest partiality.
2. W/N Caguioa is guilty of gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of service.
3. W/N Caguioa is guilty of grave misconduct.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES for Gross Ignorance. It is elementary that taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and there are no
vested rights for tax exemptions. The issuance of the injunction was without basis. Moreover, the arbitrary
ordering of a P1M bond which was not proportionate to the number of businesses of Indigo which will benefit
from the injunction defeats the purpose of issuing injunctive bonds which is to protect the person affected by
the injunction against loss or damages when the court finds out that the person asking for injunction is not really
entitled to it. (No evidence of manifest partiality)
2. YES for Gross Ignorance. The injunctions were issued outside of Caguioas jurisdiction. The Gayacao
doctrine (stating that even if the officers are outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, if those affected are
under its jurisdiction, the action is valid) is not applicable because it applies only to cases where there is a
question of whether an order of a public official is valid or not, and not when the action involves enjoining such
official from enforcing such orders.
Moreover, it is elementary that the issuance of a preliminary injunction requires a vested right that would be
affected and it is fairly obvious and well known that a public office is NOT a vested right. (No evidence of
manifest partiality)
3. NO. Guilty only of simple misconduct because for grave misconduct to exist the judicial act complained of
should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a persistent disregard of well- known rules.
This is not clearly evident in this case. (As for the sherriff, he is not at fault because he is obligated to implement
the writ.)
SC RULED:
For Case 3: Suspension for 3 Months
For Cases 1 and 2: DISMISSAL with forfeiture of benefits except leave credits.
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due weight against respondent Judge for being hearsay evidence. By the same token, the rumors relative to the
alleged acceptance of money in exchange for a favorable decision remain as such and cannot be admitted as
evidence, let alone given due evidentiary weight. Corollary, private complainant Suarez fell short of the required
degree of proof needed in an administrative charge of graft and corruption.
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